RE: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Ben and Jon, That’s right — or as I would put it, “singular” as a predicate in the semiotic context refers to the reactivity (or existence or Secondness) of its object. The singular/individual distinction is not relevant here as it is in a mathematical context, where all the objects are

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon, While it’s true that a real continuum would contain no singularities, I don’t think you can say that a singular is “only an ideal” for Peirce. Indeed he says that “the totality of all real objects” is a singular. Harvard Lecture 6 (EP2:208-9): [[ That which is not general is singular;

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

Jon, list, On the question of which of the three Universes may not “have a Creator independent of it,” I’d like to offer an argument that it could be the Universe of Firstness rather than Thirdness. However I won’t have time this week to construct an argumentation as thoroughgoing as your

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Ben, I’m sure Peirce said this kind of thing, but not sure which specific passage you have in mind. Anyway, if you bought the Past Masters CD from Intelex, you should still be in their database; all you need to do is email them and they will give you access to the online edition through

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Relations of determination--three diagrams to highlight the strata of possibles, existents and necessitants in the 10-fold classification

Jeff, I'm sure I must be missing something here, so I'd better take it one question at a time ... When you say (iii) that "I determines (O-S)", does that mean that the Interpretant determines the Object-Sign relation? That would seem to mean that the Interpretant determines whether the sign is

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Edwina, I think we should thank you for being so honest about the principles which guide your “interpretation of Peirce.” You’ve explained why your practice of interpreting Peirce does not require that “close attention to his text in its context” which I stated to be my criterion. But it’s

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Jon, thanks for this, and for your later post, which clears things up considerably. Just a couple of responses: JS: In R 843, he states that the NA pertains to "the Being whose Attributes are, in the main, those usually ascribed to Him, Omniscience, Omnipotence, Infinite Benignity, a Being

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Jon, My responses to your four questions and the rest of your post are inserted into it below. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 8-Sep-16 21:40 List: Returning to the four questions in my post that started this thread … 1. To what

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Edwina (and list), I agree with your opinion that the focus of this list should be on the interpretation and analysis of Peirce and the use of his analytic framework for scientific or philosophical purposes. I think everyone in agreement with this should therefore refrain from presenting

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Ben, The difference between Firstness and Secondness is not really that complicated; I think if you look at the way Peirce defines them in the “Neglected Argument” essay itself (as the first and second Universes, EP2:435), you’ll see that Jon has it exactly right. Perhaps you’re confused by

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Helmut, yes, to quote from my Chapter 9, “These ideas can be traced back a long way, to work in the 1960s by Varela's colleague Maturana on ‘the circular organization of living systems,’ and before that to the ‘functional circle’ (Funktionskreis) of Jakob von Uexküll” (with a link to my

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

List, My blog post today is close enough to this subject that I should post this link to it: http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2016/09/thirdness-and-the-meaning-cycle/ I’m not copying it to the list because it’s so linked in to its context and the diagrams in Turning Signs that you can only read

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jon, Gary, Clark, Duty calls from another direction and I’ll have to withdraw from this thread for the next week or two; will try to catch up later. Gary f. } How do you know you are on the path? Reality checks you at every turn. [gnox] { <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/>

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jon, a few responses interleaved … Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 29-Aug-16 12:35 Gary F., List: GF: Jon, to answer your question to me that’s embedded near the end of your post, yes, you’ve gone a long way here toward a schema of the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Clark, list, I’m glad you posted that part of MS 599, I was thinking of doing that myself! I think that in a way, that 1902 passage is the ur-text of the distinction between immediate and dynamic object. The need for this distinction arises from the juxtaposition between the sentence you

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Clark, It seems to me that the “sign-vehicle,” if it means anything other than “sign, or representamen,” has to mean what Peirce called the “material qualities” of the sign (EP1:40). You quoted Joe Ransdell: [[ I have said that the object is essential in all semiosis. By this I mean the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Gary, I should have read your post before composing my reply to Clark (which i just posted), as it anticipates what I said about the immediate object being still an object. I think Scott is right about “subjective universality,” in that subjects of experience (using the term in the Kantian

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Clark, I don’t think this approach clarifies the matter, because it seems to overlook a couple of Peirce’s specifications. First, in reference to the sign “It is a stormy day,” he says that “Its Immediate Object is the notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jon, Jeff, list, Jon, to answer your question to me that’s embedded near the end of your post, yes, you’ve gone a long way here toward a schema of the interpretants that makes sense to me, and is entirely compatible with SS 111 (1909) (also included in your post), which to me is Peirce’s

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jon, I think the Peirce passage you quote here (CP 1.213), with its metaphor of the court and the sheriff, does a pretty good job of explaining “efficiency” by contrasting efficient and final causes, and by pointing out that neither of them can cause anything, or have any significance,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jon, you ask, JAS: How can the Immediate Object "lack the efficiency to determine signs" if it is precisely the Immediate Object that determines the Sign? I was afraid you’d ask me that … but fortunately, Jeff has already done most of the work toward a good answer, so I can keep mine

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jeff, a couple of responses inserted . Gary f. From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: 25-Aug-16 10:00 Gary F., List, You make an interesting point that I will need to think about more. The interpretative question is: where is the need for the division

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jon, regarding your question — [ My next question is how to translate this adverbial form into Peirce's dictionary definition of the adjective "virtual." If X virtually contains Y, is it then proper to say that Y is a virtual X--i.e., that Y is not an X, but has the efficiency of an X? For

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jeff, Jon, list, In the "Minute Logic" (CP 2.176) Peirce says that whatever a bee or ant does "is determined by virtual reasoning. He uses reason to adapt means to ends-that is, to his inclinations-just as we do; except that probably he has not the same self-consciousness." In other words, the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jeff, list, I agree that Peirce's post-1903 distinctions are semeiotic developments of more basic logical (or ontological) distinctions, or as you put it, "at root, the same basic conceptual distinctions worked out in more refined ways. The new terminology of immediate and dynamical for

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jon, list, I don’t see any advantage in “Virtual Object” as a replacement for “Immediate Object”; the difference between virtuality and immediacy is too great to use them as equivalent. But I’m still pondering the concept of “Virtual Interpretant” and haven’t made up my mind about that yet.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Objective Idealism

If we want to know what Peirce meant by “objective idealism,” we should consult his entry on “idealism” in the Century Dictionary (which is online), where it is listed as one variety of idealism; and we should acknowledge that he took the term from Schelling. It’s summed up this way in W8

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Jeff, this is quite an elaborate project you've laid out for us! I'm eager to see what comes out of it, but at the same time I feel the need to take it in small steps (anyway that's all I will have time to do). It seems to me that a pragmatic classification system always begins with a

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Just to reinforce Jon’s post just now, here is the full text of CP 6.24 (or EP1:292-3, 1891): [[ 24. The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will hardly find defenders today. Rejecting this, we are driven to

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Edwina, list, The reference you said you’d look up later is from “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities” (1868, CP 5.264-317), W2:212, EP1:29: [[ 2. The same formalism appears in the Cartesian criterion, which amounts to this: “Whatever I am clearly convinced of, is true.” If I were

[PEIRCE-L] Sign, representamen and triadicity

Gary, I like the way you’ve put it here very much. I think Edwina’s usage of the term sign/Sign is precise and consistent. My only disagreement is when she claims that it’s consistent with Peirce’s usage of the terms, which she hasn’t been doing recently. However, I can’t use the term

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation

Now, Jerry, don’t get angry. If you want to get a definite sense of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, it is necessary to think along with Peirce’s argument as he introduces and uses these terms in his argument. Very wretched, as he says, is the notion of these categories “that can be

RE: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation

Helmut, list, Ordinality comes into semiosis with the order of determination: the object determines the sign to determine the interpretant. In that order, the sign comes second. Peirce also says that the object has to affect the sign and not vice versa. The dynamic object has to be

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation

Jerry, What you say you “disagree” with is a very loose paraphrase of what I wrote, which was a rather simple point about Peircean phenomenology and nothing more. Jeff has found some complexities in it that I was not taking into account, and I think I see what he means. You seem to be

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation

Helmut, I think you’re getting much closer. But I think information also belongs more to the interpretant than to the immediate object. I would say (based on CP 8.314) that if you say to me “My dog is barking,” the immediate object is our shared collateral experience of the subject, ie. the

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation

Jerry, I mean that Firstness is not the quality of being first in a sequence or ordered collection of three (or any number of) members; Secondness is not the quality of being second in a sequence; and Thirdness is not the quality of being third in a sequence. [[ Firstness is that which

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation

Jerry, I don’t see what you are presenting an “alternative ordering” of. Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are not ordinal concepts in Peirce’s phenomenology. As for grasping Peircean terminology, I think what facilitates it best is paying close attention to the context of each usage

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation

Helmut, list, As luck would have it, I was just now looking through back issues of Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society online and discovered that Winfried Nöth himself, in a 2011 article, has covered the same ground as my post, and answered your question on the origin of the use

[PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, Thought and Representation

Peirceans, In a reply to one of Helmut’s posts last week, I quoted a paragraph from one of Peirce’s Lowell lectures. When I took a closer look at the context of that quote, it raised some questions that prompted an inquiry that took me through several other texts and eventually brought me to a

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Percepts and control

Helmut, you’ve raised here some of the important questions in biosemiotics, and I won’t attempt to give my answers today because I’m working on something else. Others have dealt with them before, both in print and on this list (or the biosemiotics list), but in order to really understand their

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Percepts and control

Helmut, my responses inserted: From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: 2-Aug-16 15:12 Dear Gary f., list, I think, to this topic suit Peirces three categorical modes of consciousness. Primisense, altersense, medisense: "nd | Forms of Consciousness [R] | CP 7.551 There

[PEIRCE-L] Percepts and control

Another partially Peircean post from my blog, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2016/08/831/ : Gary f. For Peirce, thoughts are not enclosed within our brains or individual minds - and neither are percepts. If they were, perception could not open up the

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Mind evolving

Helmut, My own reference to time scale was in connection with the controversy in evolutionary biology between “gradualists” and “saltationists” (believers in “punctuated equilibrium”), and my point was that on the evolutionary time scale, a “sudden event” can take a hundred thousand years

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Mind evolving

Helmut et al., Regarding Ben Novak’s post, it’s vintage Chesterton, but how it relates to Peirce’s cosmology is not very clear to me. Perhaps the point is that Peirce’s cosmology is part of his metaphysics and is therefore based on logic, not on physics. But I’m only guessing. Maybe Kirsti

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The auhor's claim: There is no *distinctly* scientific method

Stefan, I would concur with everything you say here. “Revolt against authority” as a founding myth of “modern science” is, to me, not a hypothesis but an oversimplified story (all stories are simplified to some degree). One can find traces of it in, for example, the “Cosmos” television series,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The auhor's claim: There is no *distinctly* scientific method

Stefan, I think the “founding myth of modern science” is that it led a revolt against established authority by bringing experiential observation of nature into the loop; and historically, there’s a lot of truth to that. But science in the Peircean sense was always a loop, going back to

[PEIRCE-L] Mind evolving

Here's another Peircean post from my blog, a rather long one linking Peirce's cosmology with semiotic causality. Gary f. According to Peirce's cosmological hypothesis, evolution is a continuing process of growth which accounts for both the diversity and the regularities we observe in a

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Percepts and objects

Ben, Clark, Indeed, one person’s signal is another’s noise, and vice versa. You anticipated my next blog post: http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2016/06/inside-the-external/ gary f. p.s. Clark: I don’t see a pun there … Did you mean that last remark literally? From: Clark Goble

RE: [PEIRCE-L] on the reality of objects

Clark, very nice collection of excerpts you posted there. I think my blog post for today is roughly in the same ballpark: Direct perception is both the intimate beginning and the ultimate ideal of Theory. Direct perception occurs immediately, ‘before

[PEIRCE-L] on the reality of objects

tainer and the Destroyer are done with us. [gnox] { http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.e

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

Thanks for clearing that up for us, Jerry. Gary f. From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] Sent: 25-May-16 13:18 Gary F and list, I fail to see why you picked out that portion of the quote. So, if the logician looks to the ethicist for the aims of action... the ethicist

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

Jon, [[ Selecting the means to achieve a taken-for-granted end is the common perception of what engineering is all about--techne and poiesis. However, I have argued elsewhere that it is more properly viewed as the exercise of context-sensitive judgment--phronesis and praxis. ]] OK. But

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

Jon, Ben, list, Js: I did not say anything about a particular feeling of dissatisfaction, only that we engage in inquiry when we are dissatisfied with our current knowledge; i.e., when we experience the irritation of (genuine) doubt. gf: OK, I guess we have a case of polyversity here. To

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

Jon, Ben’s post has said a lot of what I would have said, so I’ll just add a few notes by insertion here … From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 19-May-16 09:13 Gary F., List: Gf: Science as a discipline of engineering? That’s too much of a stretch for me

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

Jon A.S., Science as a discipline of engineering? That’s too much of a stretch for me. Engineering, as I understand it, always involves some technology, some manipulation of the physical world for some conscious purpose other than discovery of its nature. The conception or selection of that

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

Jon, is it possible that your “logic of ingenuity” is Phyllis Chiasson’s “retroduction”? Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 17-May-16 21:27 To: Gary Richmond Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

Jon A.S. proposes that both inquiry and ingenuity are motivated more fundamentally by dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs. Agreed. And this could apply to artistic creation as well: the artist looks out at what’s been done in his or her field and thinks “There must be more to

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

Jon Alan, Gary R and list, I think there is an alternative to agreeing to disagree on this question. If one thinks of inquiry as a cycle, more or less as I’ve presented it in Turning Signs (especially Chapter 9, http://gnusystems.ca/TS/mdl.htm ), then it becomes clear that the choice of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce on the Definition of Determination

Gary R, you wrote (in reference to my post yesterday): I agree that there is a reciprocity in semiosic determination, that 2ns and 3ns "call for" each other, that that is what makes of any given semiosis a genunie triadic relation. But I think you may be hinting at something deeper here, so

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce on the Definition of Determination

Since my blog post for today concerns the relationship between existence and determination, I’m copying it here under this subject line. The blog version is at http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2016/05/niche-fulfillment/ . Gary f. } Innocence sees that this is it, and finds it world enough, and

[PEIRCE-L] semiotics, esthetics and ethics

And now for something completely different … My latest blog post is not directly related to any of the recent threads here, but since its content is mostly Peircean, I’m copying it here from http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2016/05/abstraction-and-self-control/ You can read it there in a different

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce on the Definition of Determination

Clark, if you’re referring to this — More what I was getting at is that logically red as a class of wavelengths in a given language/culture is entailed by a narrower color within those wavelengths. I would call that a psycholinguistic issue, not a logical one. The logical point is that scarlet

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce on the Definition of Determination

Clark, List, It’s true that this discourse has an ontological aspect, i.e. takes us into metaphysics, as Peirce usually called that science. But for Peirce, this is not really a distinct kind of analysis, but rather a development of logic as semiotic itself. “Metaphysics consists in the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce on the Definition of Determination

terpretant, or a fact can determine another fact? Gary f. } Each person wears a different uniform. [gnox] { <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: 5-May-16 21:08 To: 'Peirce

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce on the Definition of Determination

Jeff D., List, I’ve been too sick to think straight for the past week, so pardon my belated response to your post, Jeff. My replies are inserted below.— gary f. From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: 24-Apr-16 19:49 List, The first question I'd like to

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Determination, etc.

Helmut, Yes, by all means write it down step by step, and think it through before you share it with us, whether it’s a “new theory” or not. That’s what I did with both of my recent long posts. Also, since they were about Peirce’s concept of “determination,” I was careful to include his

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Determination, etc.

you will have time to take it up. Gary f. } One person's distraction is another's revelation. [gnox] { <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] Sent: 10-Apr-16 14:15 Hi Gary f and list,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Determination, etc.

List, Another long post, this time mostly relating the Peircean concepts of determination and causation. The formatting and embedded links will work better in the web version, http://gnusystems.ca/TS/css.htm#causdetrmn , but here it is anyway. Gary f. In the stream of consciousness,

[PEIRCE-L] RE: Systems Of Interpretation

Jon, rather than repeat what you've said umpteen times before in this "very old" discussion, I'd suggest that you read BOTH passages that I quoted (you ignored the second one) in their original context. It might call into question your assertion about what Peirce's existential graphs "serve to

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Systems Of Interpretation

Jon wrote, [[ Peirce's existential graphs are a general calculus for expressing the same subject matter as his earlier logic of relative terms and thus they serve to represent the structures of many-place relations. ]] Peirce wrote, [[[ this system is not intended as a calculus, or

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jeff, list, Thanks for the positive response, Jeff! As for where the discussion goes from here, that's up to you and whoever else wants to follow up on specific ideas in it. A closer look at determination and reference would certainly be worthwhile. Another matter that seems to me closely

[PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Peirceans, It’s been months since I posted to this thread about the “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations”, and it’s taken me awhile to decide how to continue, as I felt some recontextualizing was needed. Meanwhile I noticed many connections with what I’ve already said online in

[PEIRCE-L] Relevance in context

A post from my blog aftersigns, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2016/02/relevance-in-context/: Sperber and Wilson (1995, 142) suggest that the goal of the comprehension process is [[ to maximize the relevance of any information being processed. . people hope that the assumption being processed is

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: How do Peirce's categories best fit the study of the arts?

What sign are you, Jon? Sorry, I couldn't resist ... >From your comment, it sounds like you are working with a debased concept of >"aesthetics" which many confuse with Peirce's normative science which goes by >that name, thus breaking its cognitive continuity with the realms of empirical

RE: [PEIRCE-L] How do Peirce's categories best fit the study of the arts?

Adrian, So far I've only read the Introduction to Ecologies of the Moving Image, but looking forward to the rest of it; I've given some thought to Peirce's categories in relation to both the arts and geography, because of my connection with a local organization whose focus is "Land | Art." So

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Can we encompass spirituality, democracy and science in one culture?

Hello Søren, As I tried to say, it’s my book as a whole that offers an answer your question, and this one post is only a fragment of it. I copy some of my blog posts here, when they have something to say about Peirce, because Gary R. asked me to, a few months ago. The connection with

[PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Continuing with "Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations": After introducing the three trichotomies of signs, Peirce embarks on a digression (from his main task of classification) which is mainly about the nature of propositions and arguments and the difference between them. But this

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jeff, I’ll take a crack at it, inserting my answers after your questions. Gary f. -Original Message- From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: 4-Jan-16 19:37 Hello, I'd like to follow up on the post that Gary F. made some weeks back about the first

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The categorial "mirror image" of 'determination' and 'representation'.

Gary R, Reverting to a post you made over a month ago … I had written something about genuine triadic relations, such as are embodied in the processes of representing and determining — which in my opinion are both genuine, partly because they are mirror images of each other. By that I meant

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Gary R, Having read your subsequent message, I’m looking forward in the new year to further explication of your schema of the ten classes of signs. So I think I’ll wrap up this thread with a few questions that I hope your new thread on the subject will answer. Mostly I’m just asking for

revised RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Sorry, folks, I was called away to domestic duties before I finished proofreading that last post properly, but sent it anyway. Here’s a corrected version, which should replace the earlier one. —gary f. Gary R, I guess we will have to disagree on these terminological issues. I have

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Gary R, I guess we will have to disagree on these terminological issues. I have every reason to believe that Peirce’s choice of terms in his “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” is as careful and exact as it is in the rest of the 1903 Syllabus, and for that matter as exact as

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Resuming the close examination of Peirce’s “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations”, we move on to the second trichotomy, which divides signs “according as the relation of the sign to its object consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jeff, Well, the only good way I know of understanding one of Peirce’s distinctions is to observe exactly how he applies it, and hope that the object he’s applying it to is something like what we find in our collateral experience as objects for the interpretants that Peirce’s applications

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jeff, list, It does get tricky when we consider the percept as a sign — as the excerpts you quote in your first two paragraphs (below) demonstrate; and I think it gets equally tricky when we consider the qualisign as a percept. But my more specific responses here will be inserted below,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

NDTR is an acronym for “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations,” EP2:289-99, fifth section of the 1903 Syllabus, and the main text this thread has been referring to, so far. Since I included in my post a few quotes from MS 7, which we discussed at some length back in the spring of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Franklin, Jeff, Just to clarify, a percept is a singular phenomenon: X appears. To perceive X as smoke is a perceptual judgment. The verbal expression of that judgment, “That is smoke,” is indeed a dicisign (proposition), uniting its subject (that) with a predicate (__ is smoke), which like

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Franklin, Yes, this excerpt from Peirce’s “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” demonstrates that according to the purpose of the analysis, a percept can be considered either as an object or a sign. (And of course signs can be objects of other signs, otherwise we could say nothing

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jeff, One comment inserted below, after your first paragraph. My response to your post as a whole is that most of it — and especially your attempt to situate Peirce in the history of Western philosophy — is “above my pay grade,” as Jon S. put it. To the extent that I follow your

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jon S., Jeff et al., Jon, thanks for jumping in here while I was occupied elsewhere. I’m essentially in agreement with what you say, but i’m responding here before reading subsequent posts in the thread, so for now I’ll just point to some Peirce texts relevant to these issues. The 1904

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jeff, some responses interleaved … Gary f. -Original Message- From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: 7-Dec-15 15:35 Gary F., Gary R., List, Sorry for the errors in transcribing Nathan's table. I put it into my notes, and then added a bunch of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jeff, responses interleaved again … Gary f. -Original Message- From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: 8-Dec-15 14:10 Hello Jon S., Gary F., List, Jon, given what you say in 1&2 below, then we do have a question. Gary F. says that qualisigns

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jon A.S., IF (I say If!) we can consider the percept as the subject of the perceptual judgment, then I think rhematic indexical sinsign is probably how I would classify it. However, I think we can just as well (maybe better) consider the percept as the object of the sign (the perceptual

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jeff, continuing my response to your post (copied below) JD: In "Peirce, Phenomenology and Semiotics," (In the Routledge Companion to Semiotics), Nathan Houser provides the following table as a way of clarifying Peirce's account of the universal categories. Structure of the Phaneron

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jeff, To some of your questions I have no answer because I don’t really understand what motivates your asking them, and I think you may be asking questions about qualisigns that just don’t apply to them. So I’ll just insert the answers I can give. Gary f. -Original

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Helmut, you ask, Have I understood correctly: --Embodiment means, that it is a complete triadic sign, eg.: (1), qualisign, is not embodied, (1.1), iconic qualisign, is not completely embodied either, but (1.1.1), rhematic iconic qualisign, is embodied? No, that can’t be it, because any

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jeff, I see that the list has been busy while I’ve been off doing other things, so it might take me awhile to catch up, starting with this message of yours. I too would like to learn more about the way Peirce is drawing on the phenomenological categories as he categorizes different kinds

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

To complete Peirce’s first trichotomy of sign types in NDTR, where the division is according to the nature of “the sign in itself” (rather than according to its relations to Object and Interpretant), we consider the sign which “is a general law” (CP 2.243). CP 2.246: A Legisign is a law

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Elementary Relatives or Individual Relatives

Jeff, This does clarify Peirce’s usage of terms like “individual relatives” and “elementary relatives,” as Jon’s post also does. Conceptually, though, it doesn’t show me anything I didn’t already see, at least when it comes to Peirce’s analysis of triadic relations in NDTR (and other late

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Elementary Relatives or Individual Relatives

Jon, This doesn't explain “the difference between relations proper and elementary relations” (which you said was "critically important to understand"), because the latter term is itself used in a specific "technical sense" by Peirce in the places you cite. It doesn't help to understand

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