Jerry R., List:
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course [because B];
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
This is propositional logic, so as you anticipated, we have to convert it
into predicate logic--a syllogism in the strict,
Hi everyone,
There is multiplicity of ideas now flowing.
My intention for this thread has been close to Peirce:
“A certain amount of labor must be bestowed upon their literary polish; for
my purpose requires that they should be read by persons who are not
professional logicians. Indeed, for
Ben, Jon S, list,
I did find the example CP 2.711 (the decapitated frog example as
representing something like a syllogism in Barbara) a bit 'peculiar', Ben.
But *that'*s neither here not there, and I did find intriguing.
Today I'll merely try one last time to explain why I find the categorial
Jon S., Gary R., list,
My diagram arises from a particular account by Peirce of deduction. Gary
R. may have some other passages from Peirce in mind.
Best, Ben
On 5/1/2016 4:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
List:
Ben U. and I seem to be on the same page here. He diagrammed
deduction thus
Thanks, Ben.
Your responses are clear.
My views differ somewhat, but here and now is not the place for a discussion as
I have other pressing concerns.
Cheers
Jerry
> On May 1, 2016, at 3:30 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>
> Jerry C., list,
>
> Abduction starts from an
3-8354
From: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, April 29, 2016 1:55 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this mes
Ben, List:
While I agree with the first part of this post, these sections raise questions.
Questions interwoven.
> On May 1, 2016, at 12:57 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>
> In abduction, the 'result' is the surprising observation in one of the
> premisses. In deduction, it's
Hi, Gary R., list
As far as I know, the main reason for the ordering of the premisses in
the traditional categorical syllogistic forms is for consistency in
comparisons among the forms: one always puts the major premiss first,
the minor premiss second, and the conclusion third, in order that
Gary R., List:
GR: "I am keenly interested in the categoriality of the different paths
the three inference patterns take. I am not alone in associating 'rule'
with 3ns and 'case' with 2ns. Indeed, it seems to me that *in a strong
sense* these two terms, 'rule' and 'case' are, shall we say,
suggestion Paavola is
> making is simply false.
>
>
> Am I missing something?
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
>
> --
&g
55 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
Correction:
In my last post I wrote "Your order here (result/rule/ergo case) was also
recently suggested by Jon S as a possible 'inversion' of rule/case/result for
abduction."
But, now I recall that Jon S gave the
Ben, list,
Thanks for your two recent posts in this thread. I've been reflecting on
them--and the whole matter of abduction--but I'm not sure exactly where to
take that reflection at the moment. Still, I believe that continuing the
inquiry might prove quite well worth the effort.
There are
Ben, List:
This is an aside to major thread. But it offer an innovative hypothesis on the
meaning of “abduction” in conjunction with the meaning of ‘syllogisms’ in CSPs
determinations of arguments.
The relationship between the concept of “atom” and of “molecule” was rather
fuzzy in CSP’s
Gary R., list,
I got careless in my previous message.
I said that "There is /F/, ergo anything is /F/" ("∃/F/∴∀/F/") would be
abductive; however, in a stipulatedly non-empty universe, its conclusion
entails its premiss, and so for my part I would rather call it inductive
than abductive, at
Gary R., list,
I got careless in my previous message.
I said that "There is /F/, ergo anything is /F/" ("∃/F/∴∀/F/") would be
abductive; however, in a stipulatedly non-empty universe, its conclusion
entails its premiss, and so for my part I would rather call it inductive
than abductive, at
Jerry R., List:
No doubt the point that you want to make is very clear in your own mind.
Unfortunately, it remains quite obscure in your messages, at least as I
read them. What exactly do you mean here by "that supposition" or "that
rule of 'one two three'"? I already affirm Peirce's categories
Hi Ben,
Imagine Kepler having access to many A’s. That is, A’, A’’, A’’’, A,
etc…
These multiple hypotheses are all intended to be different in kind, with
the intention of matching a representation for observation C.
If you deduce the products of these different hypotheses and
Jon,
ha! Thank you for your honest and clear input. I submit that if you were
to accept that supposition (that is, if you adopt that rule of "one two
three" as true), you will find that it will lead you to acceptance of the
truth. That is, if not this, which? Two?
one, two, three...chance,
Jerry R., List:
You apparently find the absence of the letter B in CP 5.189 very
surprising--thus demanding of an explanation--and suspect (i.e.,
hypothesize) that this was a quite deliberate omission by Peirce, such that
there must be some deeply meaningful reason behind it. You even go so far
Hi, Gary,
I agree with most of what you say, only I don't see hypothesization of a
rule in the beans example. On the other hand, Peirce is explicit about
hypothesizing a new general (or rule) in the 1903 quote.
[] The mind seeks to bring the facts, as modified by the new
discovery,
Jon,
Yes, it is odd that I should cite something I haven’t read carefully. My
explanation is that I recognized the general structure of his argument and
am occupied by other matters. Moreover, I don’t believe you would accept
the reference as the “burst-like” reason you seek to transform your
Jerry R., List:
It seems odd to cite something that you admit not having read carefully.
Here is the relevant passage.
"The supposition that the antecedent A could come to the conclusion C is
nothing but a suspicion, due to the incoherence of an expectation or the
inconsistency of a belief.
Jon,
Uwe Wirth's essay relates to ours. I don't agree with everything he says
(and have not read it carefully) but there are overlapping themes, such as
an explicit account of B as "background-presupposition".
http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/p-abdwir.htm
Where do you suppose he came up
Jerry R., List:
I am afraid that I remain at a loss. I see no answers to my questions in
your response, and can find no thread that ties together your series of
quotes from Peirce and others. Our ways of thinking--or at least our ways
of expressing our thoughts--seem to be incompatible, so I
Thanks Jon,
I appreciate your earnest questioning.
If you don't mind, allow me to proceed with this discussion along my terms
and not yours and ask:
Why is it that Peirce's foremost contribution to philosophy is said to be
his logic of discovery, viz., abduction, which is ampliative and not
Jerry R., List:
I just came across a couple of additional data points that seem relevant.
First, in CP 8.209 (1905): "... abduction is the inference of the truth of
the minor premiss of a syllogism of which the major premiss is selected as
known already to be true while the conclusion is found
Jerry R., List:
I appreciate your efforts to clarify where you would like to take this
discussion, but I must continue to confess that "I do not understand
you," although I would certainly not characterize myself as "an angry man"
in this context. :-)
JR: "That is, the possibility for
Gary and list,
I think you hit upon a critical point about genuine doubt in abduction. A
genuine inquirer is noticing something that goes against what he genuinely
believes, more correctly a genuine paradox, and is attempting a genuine
re-ordering of his experience that would resolve the
Ben, list,
You gave Peircean examples whereas the rule (or law) is *already known*
either before or after the surprising fact. This seems all well and good to
me for certain types of abductions, say, those involved in sleuthing,
Sherlock Holmes style.
But what of those inquiries in which the
Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Sent:* Tuesday, April 26, 2016 10:09 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
>
> Edwina,
>
>
>
> Your statement, “I don't think introducing passion/emotion into the
> l
-
From: Jerry Rhee
To: Jon Alan Schmidt
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2016 10:09 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
Edwina,
Your statement, “I don't think introducing passion/emotion into the logical
format is relevant” is precisely
Edwina,
Your statement, “I don't think introducing passion/emotion into the logical
format is relevant” is precisely the point. It’s typically the case that
when the structure of the argument needs modifying, the reason given is
that you can’t change it because…the past.
Regardless, the
, my assertion that it rained, based on my wet car, has no
validity.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Jerry Rhee
To: Jon Alan Schmidt
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2016 8:30 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
“The Spinozist state
“The Spinozist state, then, transforms *passion* into the servant of reason
by the rational understanding of man’s passionate nature. Philosophy is
the highest power for all men, even though its teaching must be presented
in a form suited for the public mind.” ~ Strauss and Cropsey
Is CP
Jerry R., List:
Ben U., Edwina, and I have already explained in various ways--what we
find in CP 5.189 is NOT *modus ponens*, it is "affirming the consequent,"
which is deductively invalid; and it is NOT a syllogism in the strict
technical sense, because it expresses propositional logic, not
philosophical theorizing about the principles
> of logic at CP 5.189-94?
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
>
> --
> *From:* Benjam
ciate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com><mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2016 1:50 PM
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Benjamin Udell; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:p
My apologies, I need to make a correction to the last paragraph of my
previous message; see below for the revised version. *Modus ponens* and
"affirming the consequent" pertain only to propositional logic, not
predicate logic.
Jon S.
On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 1:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
Jerry R., List:
*Modus ponens* is a deductively valid form of argument in propositional
logic. By contrast, as Edwina just pointed out, the form of (abductive)
argument in CP 5.189 is deductively INvalid; it commits the fallacy known
as "affirming the consequent."
Valid *modus ponens* = If p
chm...@gmail.com>
*Sent:* Monday, April 25, 2016 1:50 PM
*To:* Edwina Taborsky
*Cc:* Benjamin Udell; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All"
then q,
q,
Therefore p.
That's called the Fallacy of affirming the consequent.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Jerry Rhee
To: Benjamin Udell
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2016 2:05 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
Ben,
Thanks
Jerry R., list
Emotions, or emotion-producing characteristics, can be predicates, as
you say. The emotion of surprise mentioned in some of Peirce's schemata
of abductive inference is not among the terms (subject, middle,
predicate) under consideration there. They pertain instead to the
Hi, Gary,
Here the known rule is "All the beans from this bag are white." The
hypothesis is "These beans are from this bag." From there one may deduce
implications of these beans' being from this bag, tests of which would
usefully corroborate the rule if the rule were in doubt, but would not,
Jerry,
I've got to agree with Jon on this one.
Best,
Gary R
[image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 10:38 PM, Jerry Rhee
Jon,
Thanks for making your objections clear!
I must to say...I'm pretty proud of myself for my explication above.
*pat*pat* (myself on my back).
:)
Best,
Jerry Rhee
On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 7:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
wrote:
> Jerry R., List:
>
> Thank you for laying
Jerry R., List:
Thank you for laying this out so clearly. I still have to disagree, for
several reasons.
- A and C are not terms (subject/predicate/middle), they are
propositions.
- Peirce uses the rule/case/result formulations for syllogisms in
predicate logic; does he ever do so
alidity of arguments--such as an argument to an
> explanatory hypothesis. What obligations, if any, follow from the
> supposition that is formed as the conclusion of this abductive argument
> about the logical validity of abduction?
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Asso
niversity
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2016 1:50 PM
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Benjamin Udell; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
Edwina, List:
The rearranged fo
anschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com> ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Sent:* Monday, April 25, 2016 3:14 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
>
> Edwina, Ben, List:
>
>
then form?
> I prefer to see this as a propositional logic, ...which would be IF C
> facts, THEN A rule. There are C facts, and therefore, A rule.
>
> This is hypothetical not deductive or inductive.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> - Original Message -
> From: Benjamin
this into a syllogistic format:
> ALL beans from these bags are black.
> Some [surprise!] beans are black
> Therefore, some beans are from that bag.
>
> I've got three terms:
> beans from these bags
> some beans
> black
>
> Format: PM/SM/SP
> And it's invalid. Fallacies
.
Edwina
- Original Message -
*From:* Benjamin Udell <mailto:baud...@gmail.com>
*To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
*Sent:* Monday, April 25, 2016 2:17 PM
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
Jerry R.,
I'd
; I prefer to see this as a propositional logic, ...which would be IF C
> facts, THEN A rule. There are C facts, and therefore, A rule.
>
> This is hypothetical not deductive or inductive.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> - Original Message -
> From: Benjamin Udell
> To: pe
'..
The question remains - what is the logical format for generating hypotheses?
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Benjamin Udell ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2016 3:14 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189
Edwina, Ben, List:
I think that what Peirce meant by a "minor indirect probable syllogism" is
one with the form that he presented as "hypothesis" in CP 2.623.
*Rule.*--All the beans from this bag are white.
*Result.*--These beans are white.
.·.*Case.*--These beans are from this bag.
For
: Monday, April 25, 2016 2:17 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
Jerry R.,
I'd say that CP 5.189 is a "syllogism" in a broad sense admitted by Peirce,
though the broad senses are not usual senses nowadays. Usually people mean a
deductive categorical syllogism,
etical not deductive or inductive.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2016 12:16 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
Jon S., Jerry R., Edwina, Jim W., Ben N., list,
"Syllogism&qu
Hi,
It depends on what you take a syllogism to consist on. The modern
interpretation leaves out the ancient Greek understanding of time. As
you most probably know, CSP wa occupied with the problem of time as
something constantly evolving all his life.
(Thus it is of no use to stic into his
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2016 12:16 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
Jon S., Jerry R., Edwina, Jim W., Ben N., list,
"Syllogism" has been used more broadly in the past. I checked the Century
Dictionary's definition of syllogism
Thanks Ben, Kirsti and list...
So, would you say that CP 5.189 qualifies as syllogism, i.e., is it
"hypothesis" based on what you know of what Peirce said on Aristotle? Why
or why not?
What's the predicate, subject and middle term?
Thanks,
Jerry R
On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 12:19 PM,
CSP was thoroughly familiar with Aristotle, both his syllogisms and
their context in those times. It may be good to remember that
Aristotle's works, along all others, were translated into Latin by the
time we call the new age.
Translations always involve interpretation. Thus what has passed
Jon S., Jerry R., Edwina, Jim W., Ben N., list,
"Syllogism" has been used more broadly in the past. I checked the
Century Dictionary's definition of syllogism, of which Peirce was in charge.
List of words beginning with "S" at PEP-UQÁM:
Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> ; Peirce List
> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> ; Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Sent:* Sunday, April 24, 2016 1:48 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
>
> Ben,
>
>
>
> Tha
Alan Schmidt
Cc: Jerry LR Chandler ; Peirce List ; Edwina Taborsky
Sent: Sunday, April 24, 2016 1:48 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
Ben,
Thank you for your thoughts and I like your modified formulation, even though
it does not implement the logical structure
Ben,
Thank you for your thoughts and I like your modified formulation, even
though it does not implement the logical structure.
The Josephson X 2 addition also adds value.
I believe also that C and A should be dynamic, that is, the surprising fact
C that is observed is moving and the
Jerry C., List:
I must confess, I do not understand what specific point you are trying to
make with this response; please elaborate/clarify.
To supplement my previous comments--surprise and suspicion are not part of
the reasoning itself; i.e., not included within the syllogism. Surprise
(at the
to abandon one rule and generate another.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com>
> *Cc:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> ; Peirce-L
> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu&g
> On Apr 24, 2016, at 8:43 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> then the syllogism looks like this.
>
> A = X is Y.
> R = Y is Z.
> C = X is Z.
Really?
Perhaps you mean that the conclusion you seek can be reached by this clear,
distinct and logical expression of
e credible conjecture, as premisses*. On account of this
> Explanation, the inquirer is led to regard his conjecture, or hypothesis,
> with favour.”
>
> ~A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God
>
- Original Message -
>>>> *From:* Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.
As you can see, this is an IF-THEN format.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Jerry Rhee
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Sunday, April 24, 2016 4:22 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
Edwina and list,
Thanks again for your patience
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Saturday, April 23, 2016 10:18 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
Would you mind clarifying what you mean by "middle term C is undistributed",
please?
I think what I’m saying is closer to what the abduction would
this hypothesis
>> Therefore, this event is explained by this hypothesis.
>>
>> However, I think that Peirce was using an IF-THEN propositional logic,
>> where the hypothesis *is a proposition*. As a proposition, it is
>> abductive, it is hypothetical rather than necessa
e
> explainable.
>
> The above is not a syllogism but a proposition.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui
- Original Message -
From: Jerry Rhee
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Saturday, April 23, 2016 8:54 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
Thanks for your patience Edwina,
I dislike political correctness, too.
OK, if your objection
logism. [Fallacy of Four Terms]
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Saturday, April 23, 2016 8:25 PM
> *Subjec
, suspicious.
There's no such thing as a four-term syllogism. [Fallacy of Four Terms]
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Jerry Rhee
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Saturday, April 23, 2016 8:25 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
Thanks Edwina
.com>
> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Saturday, April 23, 2016 7:12 PM
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
>
> Hi everyone,
>
> I'm trying to figure something out. I've convinced myself but am not
> completely sure, so would like
Sent: Saturday, April 23, 2016 7:12 PM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
Hi everyone,
I'm trying to figure something out. I've convinced myself but am not
completely sure, so would like to work this out with the community.
I haven't read Aristotle. Are there steadfast
Hi everyone,
I'm trying to figure something out. I've convinced myself but am not
completely sure, so would like to work this out with the community.
I haven't read Aristotle. Are there steadfast rules to syllogism one must
never ever break or is there an essence? What is the intention of
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