On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 10:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Answer, or re-answer to question 1.
John Clark doesn't even remember what question 1 was and doubts it is
worth looking up because of a suspicion it involves personal pronouns and
rugs for sweeping sloppy
On 14 Aug 2016, at 18:26, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Aug 14, 2016 at 11:45 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
>> I saw only a apple, my friend saw only a banana, what is
THE one and only fruit that BOTH me AND my friend saw? Silly
question.
> I agree so much with you
On Sun, Aug 14, 2016 at 11:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> I saw only a apple, my friend saw only a banana, what is *THE* one and
>> only fruit that *BOTH* me *AND* my friend saw? Silly question.
>
>
> >
> I agree so much with you on this!
>
> Although the
On 12 Aug 2016, at 18:40, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Aug 12, 2016 at 10:42 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
"The" first person experience you will live is "the" experience,
that both copies witnesses when I interview them both
I saw only a apple, my friend saw only a banana,
On Fri, Aug 12, 2016 at 10:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
"The" first person experience you will live is "the" experience, that both
> copies witnesses when I interview them both
I saw only a apple, my friend saw only a banana, what is *THE* one and
only fruit that *BOTH* me
On 11 Aug 2016, at 20:18, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Aug 11, 2016 at 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
>> in general it's not true that they will perceiving
different things, if you were the identical copy and in a
symmetrical environment and facing your original
On Thu, Aug 11, 2016 at 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> in general it's not true that they will
>>
>> perceiving different things
>>
>> , if you were the identical copy and in a symmetrical environment and
>> facing your original the two of you would see identical
On 09 Aug 2016, at 19:32, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 at 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
> a nine years old child get the point
And I might get your point if I had the mentality of a nine year
old child, or of something similar like an ancient Greek.
On 09 Aug 2016, at 23:30, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Aug 8, 2016 at 8:51 PM, Brent Meeker
wrote:
> I think the default assumption is that consciousness
supervenes on the brain, so two different brains will realize two
different consciousnesses because they are at
On 09 Aug 2016, at 07:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 3:14 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/8/2016 7:03 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 10:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think Russell is just saying
On 09 Aug 2016, at 02:57, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 9 August 2016 at 03:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/8/2016 6:18 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Monday, 8 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On Mon, Aug 8, 2016 at 8:51 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> I think the default assumption is that consciousness supervenes on the
> brain, so two different brains will realize two different consciousnesses
> because they are at different locations and perceiving different
On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 at 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> a nine years old child get the point
And I might get your point if I had the mentality of a nine year old
child, or of something similar like an ancient Greek.
John K Clark
--
You received this message
On 09 Aug 2016, at 01:03, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 09:06:20PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 8/08/2016 8:38 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Aug 07, 2016 at 09:24:31AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
However, still no justification has been given for the assumption
On 08 Aug 2016, at 19:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/8/2016 6:18 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Monday, 8 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be
digitized so
On 09 Aug 2016, at 01:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 9:05 am, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 10:01:49AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added
axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate
On 09 Aug 2016, at 01:15, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 12:39 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Aug 2016, at 01:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 8/08/2016 1:30 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But in step 3, I ma very careful to not use the notion of
"consciousness", and instead a simple 3p notion of
On 9/08/2016 4:08 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/8/2016 10:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
You seem to be agreeing that this is, at bottom, an empirical
matter. If we do the experiment and duplicate a conscious being,
then separate the duplicates, we could ask one whether or not it
was still
On 8/8/2016 10:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Yes, that makes sense. But the rovers are not conscious.
Why not? Suppose they are. If you would say "yes to the doctor"
then you must believe that AI is possible.
I have no reason to suppose that AI is not possible. But the Mars
rovers are
On 8/8/2016 10:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
You seem to be agreeing that this is, at bottom, an empirical
matter. If we do the experiment and duplicate a conscious being,
then separate the duplicates, we could ask one whether or not it was
still aware of its duplicate. If the answer is "No",
On 9/08/2016 3:14 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/8/2016 7:03 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 10:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added
axiom/assumption that the
On 8/8/2016 7:03 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 10:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added
axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have
On 9/08/2016 10:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added
axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate
consciousnesses at least as soon as they
On 9 August 2016 at 03:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 8/8/2016 6:18 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, 8 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> Not necessarily. A digital computer
On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added
axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate
consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different perceptions
If that is what
On 9/08/2016 9:05 am, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 10:01:49AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added
axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate
consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different
On 9/08/2016 9:03 am, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 09:06:20PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 8/08/2016 8:38 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Aug 07, 2016 at 09:24:31AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
However, still no justification has been given for the assumption
that the
On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption
that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate consciousnesses at
least as soon as they have different perceptions
If that is what you have to do, why not admit it openly?
On 8/8/2016 4:05 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 10:01:49AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added
axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate
consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different
On 9/08/2016 12:39 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Aug 2016, at 01:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 8/08/2016 1:30 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But in step 3, I ma very careful to not use the notion of
"consciousness", and instead a simple 3p notion of first person.
usually many relates it two
On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 10:01:49AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added
> axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate
> consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different perceptions.
> This is exactly what you would
On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 09:06:20PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 8/08/2016 8:38 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
> >On Sun, Aug 07, 2016 at 09:24:31AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >>However, still no justification has been given for the assumption
> >>that the duplicated consciousness
On 8/8/2016 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Aug 2016, at 22:32, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/7/2016 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So I suggest that instead of starting with the hypothesis that
consciousness is a computation,
Please, I insist that consciousness is NOT a computation.
I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption
that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate consciousnesses at
least as soon as they have different perceptions. This is exactly what
you would predict from supposing that consciousness is a product of
physical
On 08 Aug 2016, at 01:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 8/08/2016 1:30 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But in step 3, I ma very careful to not use the notion of
"consciousness", and instead a simple 3p notion of first person.
usually many relates it two consciousness and assumes that when the
guy
On 07 Aug 2016, at 23:14, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be
digitized so that its registers run synchronously. Otherwise "the
state" is ill defined. The finite speed of light means that
On 07 Aug 2016, at 22:32, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/7/2016 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So I suggest that instead of starting with the hypothesis that
consciousness is a computation,
Please, I insist that consciousness is NOT a computation.
Consciousness is an 1p notion, and you
On Monday, 8 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be digitized
>>> so that its registers run synchronously. Otherwise "the state" is ill
>>> defined. The finite
On 8/08/2016 8:38 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Aug 07, 2016 at 09:24:31AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
However, still no justification has been given for the assumption
that the duplicated consciousness differentiates on different
inputs. And consciousness is what computationalism is
On Sun, Aug 07, 2016 at 09:24:31AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> However, still no justification has been given for the assumption
> that the duplicated consciousness differentiates on different
> inputs. And consciousness is what computationalism is supposed to be
> giving an account of.
>
On 8/08/2016 1:30 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But in step 3, I ma very careful to not use the notion of
"consciousness", and instead a simple 3p notion of first person.
usually many relates it two consciousness and assumes that when the
guy say "I see Moscow", they are conscious, but that is
On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be
digitized so that its registers run synchronously. Otherwise "the
state" is ill defined. The finite speed of light means that
spacially separated regions cannot be synchronous. Even
On 8/7/2016 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So I suggest that instead of starting with the hypothesis that
consciousness is a computation,
Please, I insist that consciousness is NOT a computation.
Consciousness is an 1p notion, and you cannot identify it with *any* 3p.
But then you must
On 07 Aug 2016, at 15:06, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Friday, 5 August 2016, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 06:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/4/2016 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker
On Sunday, August 7, 2016 at 4:27:56 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 06 Aug 2016, at 20:00, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> C. An UD will realize all possible computation, and hence the totality of
> reality.
>
>
>
> Brent, please reread the UDA.
>
Perhaps but perhaps you should reread it.
On 07 Aug 2016, at 01:24, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 7/08/2016 9:00 am, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Aug 04, 2016 at 07:51:22PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
Methinks you are unnecessarily assuming
On 06 Aug 2016, at 20:35, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Aug 6, 2016 at 9:17 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
> It was the question 2 which does not involve duplication.
Question 2: if I am sure at time t that at time q, q > t, I will be
uncertain of the outcome of some
On 06 Aug 2016, at 20:00, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/6/2016 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If we think about engineering an autonomous being it becomes
obvious that this is a good architecture. Decision making should
be hierarchical with only a few requiring system-wide
consideration.
On Friday, 5 August 2016, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 05 Aug 2016, at 06:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
> On 8/4/2016 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker
On 7/08/2016 9:00 am, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Aug 04, 2016 at 07:51:22PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
Methinks you are unnecessarily assuming transitivity again.
No, I was just referring to the
On Thu, Aug 04, 2016 at 07:51:22PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
> >>Methinks you are unnecessarily assuming transitivity again.
> >
> >No, I was just referring to the continuation of a single
>
On Sat, Aug 6, 2016 at 9:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> It was the question 2 which does not involve duplication.
> *Question 2*: if I am sure at time t that at time q, q > t, I will be
> uncertain of the outcome of some experience x, then I am uncertain about
> the
On 8/6/2016 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If we think about engineering an autonomous being it becomes obvious
that this is a good architecture. Decision making should be
hierarchical with only a few requiring system-wide consideration.
With RF communication this autonomous being could
On 06 Aug 2016, at 03:43, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Aug 5, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
>>>>Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will see next
is not ambiguous as long as "YOU" duplicating machine are not around.
>>> So, you are OK that the guy
On 05 Aug 2016, at 20:20, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/5/2016 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 06:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/4/2016 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker
wrote:
On 8/4/2016 2:57 AM,
On 06 Aug 2016, at 07:19, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 6/08/2016 12:58 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 13:23, Bruce Kellett wrote
He writes in the diaries what he sees: it is just a matter of the
protocol whether he writes the name of the city in
which each diary is
On 05 Aug 2016, at 20:35, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/5/2016 4:23 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
We can associate a mind to a body, but the mind itself (the 1p)
can be (and must be) associated with many different bodies, in the
physical universe and later in arithmetic.
You seem to accept my
On 6/08/2016 2:36 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 14:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The difficulty is with your assumption that differentiation into two
persons is inevitable.
It is not an assumption. With the protocol and the hypothesis, the
diaries have differentiated.
Diaries are
On 6/08/2016 12:58 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 13:23, Bruce Kellett wrote
He writes in the diaries what he sees: it is just a matter of the
protocol whether he writes the name of the city in which each diary
is located in that particular diary, or if he writes in both diaries
On Fri, Aug 5, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> >>>>
>>> Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will see next is not ambiguous
>>> as long as "YOU" duplicating machine are not around.
>>
>>
>> >
>>> >>
>>>
>>> So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write
On 8/5/2016 4:23 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
We can associate a mind to a body, but the mind itself (the 1p) can
be (and must be) associated with many different bodies, in the
physical universe and later in arithmetic.
You seem to accept my point -- there is still only one mind even after
On 8/5/2016 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 06:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/4/2016 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker > wrote:
On 8/4/2016 2:57 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
On 05 Aug 2016, at 14:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 9:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 00:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 1:28 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/4/2016 2:51 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm,
On Fri, Aug 5, 2016 at 4:17 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 05 Aug 2016, at 15:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On 5/08/2016 10:11 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>> On 5/08/2016 9:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Just tell me if you are OK with question 1. The Helsinki guy is
On 05 Aug 2016, at 13:23, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 6:12 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 04:13, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 3:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Aug 2016, at 04:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 1:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Aug 2016, at
On 05 Aug 2016, at 15:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 10:11 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 9:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Just tell me if you are OK with question 1. The Helsinki guy is
told that BOTH copies will have a hot drink after the
reconstitutions, in both Moscow and
On 5/08/2016 10:11 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 9:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Just tell me if you are OK with question 1. The Helsinki guy is told
that BOTH copies will have a hot drink after the reconstitutions, in
both Moscow and Washington. Do you agree that the Helsinki guy (a
On 5/08/2016 9:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 00:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 1:28 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/4/2016 2:51 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at
On 05 Aug 2016, at 00:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 1:28 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/4/2016 2:51 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 04:27:21PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On
On 5/08/2016 6:12 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 04:13, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 3:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Aug 2016, at 04:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 1:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
You use the assumption
On 05 Aug 2016, at 06:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/4/2016 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/4/2016 2:57 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The problem with (3) is a general problem with multiverses. A
single,
On 05 Aug 2016, at 04:13, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 3:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Aug 2016, at 04:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 1:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
You use the assumption that the duplicated consciousnesses
On 04 Aug 2016, at 19:53, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Marchal wrote:
> The question is not about duplication.
OK.
And that part is still OK. Assigning probabilities about what
"YOU" will see next is not ambiguous as long as "YOU"
On 04 Aug 2016, at 19:53, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Marchal wrote:
> The question is not about duplication.
OK.
And that part is still OK. Assigning probabilities about what
"YOU" will see next is not ambiguous as long as "YOU"
On 8/4/2016 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker > wrote:
On 8/4/2016 2:57 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The problem with (3) is a general problem with multiverses. A
single,
On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 8/4/2016 2:57 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> The problem with (3) is a general problem with multiverses. A single,
> infinite universe is an example of a multiverse theory, since there will be
> infinite copies of
On 5/08/2016 3:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Aug 2016, at 04:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 1:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
You use the assumption that the duplicated consciousnesses
automatically differentiate when receiving different
On 5/08/2016 1:28 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/4/2016 2:51 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 04:27:21PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 3/08/2016 12:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
However,
On 8/4/2016 2:57 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 August 2016 at 11:16, Brent Meeker > wrote:
On 8/3/2016 5:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 3 August 2016 at 16:02, Brent Meeker
On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Marchal wrote:
>
> >
>> The question is not about duplication.
>
>
> OK.
>
>
> And that part is still OK. Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will
see next is not ambiguous as long as "YOU" duplicating machine are not
around.
>
>
On 04 Aug 2016, at 04:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 1:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 3/08/2016 2:55 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Aug 2016, at 14:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 2/08/2016 3:07 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Aug 2016, at
On 04 Aug 2016, at 03:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/3/2016 5:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 3 August 2016 at 16:02, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/2/2016 10:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker
On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 5:15 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 03 Aug 2016, at 21:01, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>>
>> On 8/3/2016 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 02 Aug 2016, at 20:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>
>>>
On 8/2/2016 6:15 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 03 Aug 2016, at 19:20, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 2:56 PM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
> The question is not about duplication.
OK.
> Do you agree that if today, someone is "sure" that tomorrow
(or any precise time later) he will be uncertain of an
On 8/4/2016 2:51 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 04:27:21PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 3/08/2016 12:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
However, we are being asked to consider two
On 03 Aug 2016, at 21:01, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/3/2016 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Aug 2016, at 20:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/2/2016 6:15 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It's not that it can't, but rather that it doesn't, and if it
does then that would require some extra
On 4 August 2016 at 11:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 8/3/2016 5:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 3 August 2016 at 16:02, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 8/2/2016 10:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, 3 August
On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 04:27:21PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 3/08/2016 12:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
However, we are being asked to consider two conscious states where the
conscious state differs
On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 04:27:21PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 3/08/2016 12:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
However, we are being asked to consider two conscious states where the
conscious state differs by at least one bit - the W/M bit.
On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 04:27:21PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 3/08/2016 12:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> >However, we are being asked to consider two conscious states where the
> >conscious state differs by at least one bit - the W/M bit. Clearly, by the YD
> >assumption, both states
On 4/08/2016 1:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 3/08/2016 2:55 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Aug 2016, at 14:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 2/08/2016 3:07 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Aug 2016, at 09:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Consider ordinary
On 8/3/2016 5:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 3 August 2016 at 16:02, Brent Meeker > wrote:
On 8/2/2016 10:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker
wrote:
On 3 August 2016 at 16:02, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 8/2/2016 10:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 8/2/2016 3:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, 3
On Wed, Aug 3, 2016 at 3:01 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> I've given up following your exchanges with Clark. They seem to be about
> semantics.
I certainly hope so, semantics is the branch of
logic concerned with meaning
.
John K Clark
--
You received
On 8/3/2016 7:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Aug 2016, at 22:41, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/2/2016 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But the argument seems somewhat circular since you assume that the
different physical processes associated with location make the
thoughts different.
On 8/3/2016 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Aug 2016, at 20:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/2/2016 6:15 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It's not that it can't, but rather that it doesn't, and if it does
then that would require some extra physical explanation, a radio
link between brains
On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 2:56 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> The question is not about duplication.
OK.
>
> Do you agree that if today, someone is "sure" that tomorrow (or any
> precise time later) he will be uncertain of an outcome of a certain
> experience, then he
On Wed, Aug 3, 2016 at 4:40 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 02 Aug 2016, at 22:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>>
>> On 8/2/2016 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> Not at all. The existence of the computations is an elementary
>>> metatheorem about Robinson Arithmetic, and
On 03 Aug 2016, at 08:50, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 3/08/2016 4:37 pm, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:
The suggestion that the one consciousness could inhabit more
than one physical
body does not predict telepathy -- it could merely indicate that
consciousness
is not localized to a
On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 3/08/2016 3:19 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker
wrote:
On 8/2/2016 3:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker
wrote:
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