Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 21 Sep 2009, at 23:48, m.a. wrote: And when pressed as to exactly how the Heisenberg compensators worked, the spokesman replied, Very well, thank you. :) That's the problem. Star strek teleportation has been invented well before Bennett Al. discovered quantum teleportation, and a priori, from the vague description of how teleportation works in Star Strek, we can say nothing, except that it looks like classical teleportation. Actually the Heisenberg compensators, if they compensate really the Heisenberg uncertainties, would make such machine impossible: you just cannot compensate the Heisenberg uncertainties, unless those compensators send the classical bits needed to effectuate a quantum teleportation, and this would explain, retrospectively, why in star strek those devices always (?) annihilate the original... and why Star Strek did not exploit the self-duplication and self- indeterminacy, unlike the movie the prestige for example. This is not relevant for comp, note, because the global comp indeterminacy bears on the states generated by the UD, and if quantum cloning is impossible, the multiple preparation of similar states is quantum possible and effectively done by the Universal Dovetailer. You current quantum state is provably generated by the UD, an infinite number of times, at all level of substitution. Remember that quantum mechanics is Turing emulable. By quantum linearity, slight errors does not grow up, so that, in a sense, quantum mechanics is more easy to emulate than classical physics where chaos can make some need of infinite precision. Some classical analog machine will be not Turing emulable. Brains are well described by classical analog machines, but then to make it stable and robust, have a big redundancy to *compensate* sub-level discrepancies, making us most plausibly Turing emulable. If not, just smoking a cigarette would destroy our identity. Bruno - Original Message - From: ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, September 21, 2009 4:30 PM Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology Bruno and others, here is how a Star Trek transporter work(taken from Memory Alpha): A typical transport sequence began with a coordinate lock, during which the destination was verified and programmed, via the targeting scanners. Obtaining or maintaining a transporter lock enables the transporter operator to know the subject's location, even in motion, allowing the beaming process to start more quickly. This is an essential safety precaution when a starship away team enters a potentially dangerous situation that would require an emergency beam- out. A transporter lock is usually maintained by tracing the homing signal of a communicator or combadge. When there is a risk that such devices would be lost in the field or are otherwise unavailable, personnel may be implanted with a subcutaneous transponder before an away mission to still provide a means to maintain a transporter lock. Alternatively, sensors may be used to scan for the biosign or energy signature of a subject, which can then be fed into the transporter's targeting scanner for a lock. Next, the lifeform or object to be beamed was scanned on the quantum level using a molecular imaging scanner. At this point, Heisenberg compensators take into account the position and direction of all subatomic particles composing the object or individual and create a map of the physical structure being disassembled amounting to billions of kiloquads of data. Simultaneously, the object is broken down into a stream of subatomic particles, also called the matter stream. The matter stream is briefly stored in a pattern buffer while the system compensates for Doppler shift to the destination. The matter stream is then transmitted to its destination via a subspace frequency. As with any type of transmission of energy or radiation, scattering and degradation of the signal must be monitored closely. The annular confinement beam (ACB) acts to maintain the integrity of the information contained in the beam. Finally, the initial process is reversed and the object or individual is reassembled at the destination. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: list archive
I've placed a compressed mbox file at http://www.ibiblio.org/weidai/everything-archive/. Add everything.bz2 to this path for the full URL. (I'm trying not to post the full URL directly so the email addresses inside won't get harvested by web robots.) It should be complete as of now. I'll update it upon request, so anyone who wants to have it updated in the future, please email me directly. BTW, it's 26 MB compressed, 155 MB uncompressed. -- From: Miroslav Dobsicek m.dobsi...@gmail.com Sent: Monday, September 21, 2009 1:31 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: list archive Hi everybody, I had a hard disk failure recently and lost my archived emails approximately from May 2009 up to now (few months). Could somebody who is keeping all the emails from this mailing group send me an exported mbox or something similar? Thanks a lot! mirek --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Sep 2009, at 23:48, m.a. wrote: *And when pressed as to exactly how the Heisenberg compensators worked, the spokesman replied, Very well, thank you.* :) That's the problem. Star strek teleportation has been invented well before Bennett Al. discovered quantum teleportation, and a priori, from the vague description of how teleportation works in Star Strek, we can say nothing, except that it looks like classical teleportation. Actually the Heisenberg compensators, if they compensate really the Heisenberg uncertainties, would make such machine impossible: you just cannot compensate the Heisenberg uncertainties, unless those compensators send the classical bits needed to effectuate a quantum teleportation, and this would explain, retrospectively, why in star strek those devices always (?) annihilate the original... and why Star Strek did not exploit the self-duplication and self-indeterminacy, unlike the movie the prestige for example. This is not relevant for comp, note, because the global comp indeterminacy bears on the states generated by the UD, and if quantum cloning is impossible, the multiple preparation of similar states is quantum possible and effectively done by the Universal Dovetailer. You current quantum state is provably generated by the UD, an infinite number of times, at all level of substitution. That raises a question which has bothered me. Since the UD and it's operations and states exist in the sense of abstract mathematics, then the same state/calculation can only occur once - there are no different instances of the number 2. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 18 Sep, 00:26, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/17 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Yep, and if the conclusion is ontological, the process that reaches it is ontological. Bruno thinks he can reach an ontological assumption starting with pure maths. But he can't. mathematical existence means that mathematicians take certain exists statements to be true. Whether exists should be taken literally in the mathematical context is an ontological question, as the material in the first posting indicates But surely what is 'literally' the case depends critically on one's starting assumptions. If one starts with a theoretical commitment to the primacy of the physical, then the status of mathematics is obviously rendered formal or metaphorical with respect to this. OTOH if one starts from the theoretical primacy of number - irrespective of whether one labels such primacy 'arithmetical' or 'platonic' - the opposite is the case, That is pretty much what I have been saying. But note that there is a difference between assuming something because you think it is incontrovertible (deduction) and assuming it because its consequences match observation (abduction) and indeed Bruno argues precisely how and why, on the basis of the MGA, one cannot take the status of matter (as opposed to its appearances) 'literally' from the perspective of computational theory. No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as well as CTM. In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either explanatory scheme. Who's been doing that? The opinions cited in the first posting assume the first of these theoretical commitments and hence choose to take the primacy of matter as their inferential fons et origo. Comp takes the opposite position. The rest is a research programme, isn't it? Yes. For my money, metaphysics is a subject-matter. It is not an epistemological modus-operandi involving declarations of irrefutable certainty. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 18 Sep, 08:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I start from pure cognitive science. Saying yes to the doctor is not pure math. Saying yes to the doctor does not show that i am being run on an immateial UD. The existence of an immaterial UD needs to be argued separately. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: list archive
Great. Thank you! mirek Wei Dai wrote: I've placed a compressed mbox file at http://www.ibiblio.org/weidai/everything-archive/. Add everything.bz2 to this path for the full URL. (I'm trying not to post the full URL directly so the email addresses inside won't get harvested by web robots.) It should be complete as of now. I'll update it upon request, so anyone who wants to have it updated in the future, please email me directly. BTW, it's 26 MB compressed, 155 MB uncompressed. -- From: Miroslav Dobsicek m.dobsi...@gmail.com Sent: Monday, September 21, 2009 1:31 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: list archive Hi everybody, I had a hard disk failure recently and lost my archived emails approximately from May 2009 up to now (few months). Could somebody who is keeping all the emails from this mailing group send me an exported mbox or something similar? Thanks a lot! mirek --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
It does show that you're nothing more than a program... which exists (mathematically) independantly of any of it's instantiation. Regards, Quentin 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 18 Sep, 08:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I start from pure cognitive science. Saying yes to the doctor is not pure math. Saying yes to the doctor does not show that i am being run on an immateial UD. The existence of an immaterial UD needs to be argued separately. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep, 12:07, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: It does show that you're nothing more than a program... which exists (mathematically) independantly of any of it's instantiation. Such existence is blatant Platonism. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: list archive
Mirek, I found Outlook Express, but there are no FOR-MIREK files there. marty a. - Original Message - From: Miroslav Dobsicek m.dobsi...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, September 21, 2009 7:26 PM Subject: Re: list archive As have Russel wrote .. mbox is a type of file with certain structure for storing emails. 1. step open your email client, create a new folder, eg. FOR-MIREK, *copy* to this folder desired emails 2. step a\ Thunderbird (Mozilla) Dive into the depths of your hard drive, find where Thunderbird and its data are installed, and there will be two files: FOR-MIREK and FOR-MIREK.msf. b\ MS Outlook (and similar software) Somewhere in the menu there should be an option to save/export emails in a given folder. While exporting, mbox file format is the preferred outcome, but in principle I can deal with other formats too. 3. step Send an email and attach the file FOR-MIREK. Cheers, mirek m.a. wrote: Mirek, What's an MBOX and how do you send it? marty a. Hi everybody, I had a hard disk failure recently and lost my archived emails approximately from May 2009 up to now (few months). Could somebody who is keeping all the emails from this mailing group send me an exported mbox or something similar? Thanks a lot! mirek --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 22 Sep, 12:07, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: It does show that you're nothing more than a program... which exists (mathematically) independantly of any of it's instantiation. Such existence is blatant Platonism. No it's what a program is... Would you be different if instantiated on a x86 computer than on an ARM based one ? -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep, 12:59, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 22 Sep, 12:07, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: It does show that you're nothing more than a program... which exists (mathematically) independantly of any of it's instantiation. Such existence is blatant Platonism. No it's what a program is... Would you be different if instantiated on a x86 computer than on an ARM based one ? There's a difference between being independent of any specific instantiation and being independent of all instantiations. Platonism is not proved by multiple realisability. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
Is mathematic dependant on human being from your point of view ? That's what I understand. 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 22 Sep, 12:59, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 22 Sep, 12:07, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: It does show that you're nothing more than a program... which exists (mathematically) independantly of any of it's instantiation. Such existence is blatant Platonism. No it's what a program is... Would you be different if instantiated on a x86 computer than on an ARM based one ? There's a difference between being independent of any specific instantiation and being independent of all instantiations. Platonism is not proved by multiple realisability. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep, 13:15, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Is mathematic dependant on human being from your point of view ? That's what I understand. Yes, exactly. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep, 14:37, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: But surely what is 'literally' the case depends critically on one's starting assumptions. If one starts with a theoretical commitment to the primacy of the physical, then the status of mathematics is obviously rendered formal or metaphorical with respect to this. OTOH if one starts from the theoretical primacy of number - irrespective of whether one labels such primacy 'arithmetical' or 'platonic' - the opposite is the case, That is pretty much what I have been saying. But note that there is a difference between assuming something because you think it is incontrovertible (deduction) and assuming it because its consequences match observation (abduction) One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach over the other, but it isn't forced. Indeed, in the case of the MGA, if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then the abduction is only to be expected. I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does not need premises of its own but negates the premises of its counterargumetns. Not that I accept it But if you agree with my formulation, I'm confused by what you go on to say below: and indeed Bruno argues precisely how and why, on the basis of the MGA, one cannot take the status of matter (as opposed to its appearances) 'literally' from the perspective of computational theory. No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as well as CTM. Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least one case. He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. If you can show where he goes wrong, you may consider CTM+PM has been defended. OTOH if one agrees with him, this obscures the association of consciousness with physics 'qua computatio'. In this case, one could choose to abandon either CTM or PM. If the latter, the move from MGA to UDA requires the reversal of the theoretical primacy of matter and (at least a branch of) mathematics. There is no UDA without a Platonic UD. When you respond That is pretty much what I have been saying you are agreeing, aren't you, that what you mean by Platonism - whether or not you accept the MGA as motivating its entailment by CTM - is just a theoretical commitment to the primacy of the mathematical, as opposed to the material? Yes. And this seems pretty much indistinguishable from Arithmetical Realism to me. I think Bruno's use fo AR is ambiguous. Sometimes he uses it to mean Platonism. sometimes he uses it to mean bivalence. In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either explanatory scheme. Who's been doing that? This seems an odd question at this stage. I thought you were insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of Platonism to justify the UDA He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively. The opinions cited in the first posting assume the first of these theoretical commitments and hence choose to take the primacy of matter as their inferential fons et origo. Comp takes the opposite position. The rest is a research programme, isn't it? Yes. For my money, metaphysics is a subject-matter. It is not an epistemological modus-operandi involving declarations of irrefutable certainty. Well then, surely we can agree. One finds grounds for preferring a theoretical point of departure, and then one gets down to work. Comp is open to empirical refutation, so it's research. Is your problem that MGA is a declaration of irrefutable certainty? No. But is has assumptions of its own. If so, it shouldn't be. Like any deductive argument, it is open to refutation if one can find an error. Further, even if one can't, this doesn't force a commitment to Arithmetical Realism, it simply puts the coherency of CTM+PM into doubt. Which could lead to PM-CTM as in Maudlin's argument. Maudlin of course is *not* assuming Platonism. Either conclusion might motivate a preference for one research approach over another. David --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep 2009, at 10:50, Flammarion wrote: No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as well as CTM. CTM needs Church thesis (to define the C of CTM). This requires Arithmetical Realism, that is the belief that classical logic can be applied in the number realm. (and there is an intuitionist variant which works as well). I make clear Arithmetical realism to avoid lengthy discussion with exotic philososophies of mathematics, like utltrafinitism, abusive formalism, etc. I prefer to reserve Platonism for the deeper (neo)platonist idea that what we see and measure is the border, shadow or projection of something else. And that is part of the *consequences* of UDA1-8. I have never met any defenders of CTM who is not an arithmetical realist, which is not so astonishing, given that the mere acquaintance with the idea of programming a computer, and reasoning on computers relies on this very usual and common notion, more or less taught in school. Then the seven first step of UDA relies on CTM. Actually only the seventh requires Church Thesis. And it is at the eigth steps, the ancien preamble which can be read independently, which 'reminds us' that linking consciousness to physical activity (physical supervenience thesis) is just epistemologically incompatible with the CTM idea, unless you (re)define the physical as the border of the universal machine first person (plural) indeterminacies. This is mathematically definable, and its makes the comp theory testable. Comp is just a weaker and preciser version than Putnam functionalism. The existence of the level is itself a non constructive existence, which necessitates the realism. You did not answer my question: can you doubt about the existence of primary matter? Would you be so astonished if the physicists themselves would resume the unification of forces by a relation among natural numbers? I could have use the combinators. I made a try on the list. No need to be sanguine on the positive integers. I could have use real numbers + a trigonometric function. To be realist about them consists in believing that their digital computations stop or does not stop independently of any consideration. You introduce confusion by using the term Platonism here. I know that mathematicians use sometimes Platonism in that sense (of accepting classical logic, and the truth of mathematical statements, including the non constructive one), but in the present context it hides the main facts which is that MGA makes it necessary to redefine the notion of matter. Observable Matter becomes an invariant for a digital notion of universal machine's observation. After the seventh thread, we will come back on the eight step. I suggest you follow that, and tell us where you object. You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep 2009, at 10:57, Flammarion wrote: On 18 Sep, 08:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I start from pure cognitive science. Saying yes to the doctor is not pure math. Saying yes to the doctor does not show that i am being run on an immateial UD. That is why I use a material UD up to step seven. This provides the main part of the reversal. The existence of an immaterial UD needs to be argued separately. No. The existence of the immaterial UD is a consequence of Church thesis. That such an immaterial UD is necessarily enough is argued separately in step 8 (MGA). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep, 15:10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 10:50, Flammarion wrote: No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as well as CTM. CTM needs Church thesis (to define the C of CTM). This requires Arithmetical Realism, that is the belief that classical logic can be applied in the number realm. (and there is an intuitionist variant which works as well). Classical logic doesn't give you an immaterial UD I make clear Arithmetical realism to avoid lengthy discussion with exotic philososophies of mathematics, like utltrafinitism, abusive formalism, etc. A justification of the assimption that numbers exist immaterially is just what is needed. I prefer to reserve Platonism for the deeper (neo)platonist idea that what we see and measure is the border, shadow or projection of something else. And that is part of the *consequences* of UDA1-8. Platonism is often used just to mean that numbers exist immaterially., e.g by Penrose. I have never met any defenders of CTM who is not an arithmetical realist, which is not so astonishing, given that the mere acquaintance with the idea of programming a computer, and reasoning on computers relies on this very usual and common notion, more or less taught in school. If realism means bivalence, that is probably true. The problem is using bivalence to smuggle in Platonism. Then the seven first step of UDA relies on CTM. Actually only the seventh requires Church Thesis. And it is at the eigth steps, the ancien preamble which can be read independently, which 'reminds us' that linking consciousness to physical activity (physical supervenience thesis) is just epistemologically incompatible with the CTM idea, unless you (re)define the physical as the border of the universal machine first person (plural) indeterminacies. That CTM and phsycialism are incopatible is a philsophical arguemnt, not a mathematical proof, and it has counter-arguments, eg. Colin Klein's response to Maudlin's Olympia. This is mathematically definable, and its makes the comp theory testable. Comp is just a weaker and preciser version than Putnam functionalism. The existence of the level is itself a non constructive existence, which necessitates the realism. You did not answer my question: can you doubt about the existence of primary matter? Yes. Can you doubt the actual existence of numbers? Would you be so astonished if the physicists themselves would resume the unification of forces by a relation among natural numbers? I could have use the combinators. I made a try on the list. No need to be sanguine on the positive integers. I could have use real numbers + a trigonometric function. To be realist about them consists in believing that their digital computations stop or does not stop independently of any consideration. You introduce confusion by using the term Platonism here. I know that mathematicians use sometimes Platonism in that sense (of accepting classical logic, and the truth of mathematical statements, including the non constructive one), but in the present context it hides the main facts which is that MGA makes it necessary to redefine the notion of matter. Observable Matter becomes an invariant for a digital notion of universal machine's observation. After the seventh thread, we will come back on the eight step. I suggest you follow that, and tell us where you object. You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there? Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep 2009, at 08:37, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Sep 2009, at 23:48, m.a. wrote: *And when pressed as to exactly how the Heisenberg compensators worked, the spokesman replied, Very well, thank you.* :) That's the problem. Star strek teleportation has been invented well before Bennett Al. discovered quantum teleportation, and a priori, from the vague description of how teleportation works in Star Strek, we can say nothing, except that it looks like classical teleportation. Actually the Heisenberg compensators, if they compensate really the Heisenberg uncertainties, would make such machine impossible: you just cannot compensate the Heisenberg uncertainties, unless those compensators send the classical bits needed to effectuate a quantum teleportation, and this would explain, retrospectively, why in star strek those devices always (?) annihilate the original... and why Star Strek did not exploit the self-duplication and self-indeterminacy, unlike the movie the prestige for example. This is not relevant for comp, note, because the global comp indeterminacy bears on the states generated by the UD, and if quantum cloning is impossible, the multiple preparation of similar states is quantum possible and effectively done by the Universal Dovetailer. You current quantum state is provably generated by the UD, an infinite number of times, at all level of substitution. That raises a question which has bothered me. Since the UD and it's operations and states exist in the sense of abstract mathematics, then the same state/calculation can only occur once - there are no different instances of the number 2. If this where true, comp would predict white noise in all circumstances. The measure on a computational states is only a relative measure on the computations going through that states. It is a consequence of the structure of the phi_i that all computable (partial) functions are represented by infinitely many programs, including stupid chains of universal systems simulating universal systems. Actually there is a formidable redundancy in UD*. It is a deep object, unlike its Chaitin-Solovay-Kolmogorov compression. Its border can be compared to the border of the Mandelbrot set, with everything resumed in every part, but disposed in geometrical elegant patterns. In the UD* stories, the number two, not just you and me, will get infinitely many relative incarnations, in infinitely many contexts. Comp predicts that below our (common) substitution level, we should met the (sharable) comp indeterminacy, and somehow Everett QM confirms this. AUDA makes this more precise formally, but intuitively Everett physics is a lucky event for comp, even through just UDA, if I can say. Like Church and Gödel. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote: You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there? Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). This is in the eight step. I don't know which game you are playing, Peter, you never address the point. I have no clue what you mean by an immaterial UD, or actual existing numbers. I believe that to say yes to someone who will replace my brain by a digital machine, in this in the sense of believing that it is the computation that matter at some level, I have to trust a minimal amount of computer science. If you agree that the proof of the existence of two irrational numbers such that x^y is rational does provide information, then by MG Argument you may understand the point or find a flaw, fatal or not. Who knows? I think you agree that dreamy-consciousness can supervene on the physical laser-boolean graph activity. Does dreamy-consciousness supervenes on the movie of the laser-boolean graph activity? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote: You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there? Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). This is in the eight step. I don't know which game you are playing, Peter, you never address the point. I have no clue what you mean by an immaterial UD, or actual existing numbers. I mean exactly what you mean by existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism I believe that to say yes to someone who will replace my brain by a digital machine, in this in the sense of believing that it is the computation that matter at some level, I have to trust a minimal amount of computer science. If you agree that the proof of the existence of two irrational numbers such that x^y is rational does provide information, then by MG Argument you may understand the point or find a flaw, fatal or not. Who knows? How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD? I think you agree that dreamy-consciousness can supervene on the physical laser-boolean graph activity. Does dreamy-consciousness supervenes on the movie of the laser-boolean graph activity? I don't beleive it supervenes on causally-disconnected frames, no. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote: He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. You are in a third person way. If you are a program relatively to any real world, you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD, and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person sense). And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything epistemological. Then, what you call primary matter is explained by the appearances of some irreductible invariant in universal 'dreams'. The real question is why is it so symmetrical, is information preserved, is the empirical world coherent with the comp physics, etc. Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or without comp). Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it follows from comp)? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote: He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. You are in a third person way. That is still not possible if there are no immaterial entities. If you are a program relatively to any real world, you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD, and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person sense). Not if there is no immaterial (or as you call it, arithmetic) UD. And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything epistemological. A material UD cannot be redundant unless there is an immaterial one to take its place. Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or without comp). Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it follows from comp)? There is no problem attaching consc to PM. There is a problem attachign consc. to mathematical structures, whether phsycially emodied or not. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep 2009, at 17:18, Flammarion wrote: On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote: You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there? Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). This is in the eight step. I don't know which game you are playing, Peter, you never address the point. I have no clue what you mean by an immaterial UD, or actual existing numbers. I mean exactly what you mean by existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism I mean that the truth status of statement having the shape ExP(x), with P written in first order arithmetic is true or false independently of me or of any consideration. I believe that to say yes to someone who will replace my brain by a digital machine, in this in the sense of believing that it is the computation that matter at some level, I have to trust a minimal amount of computer science. If you agree that the proof of the existence of two irrational numbers such that x^y is rational does provide information, then by MG Argument you may understand the point or find a flaw, fatal or not. Who knows? How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD? It is program without input which generates all the Pi, that is programs computing the phi_i, together with their arguments and dovetel on the execution of the computations. It is equivalent with the finite + infinite proof of the Sigma_1 sentences (those with the shape ExP(x) with P decidable). I think you agree that dreamy-consciousness can supervene on the physical laser-boolean graph activity. Does dreamy-consciousness supervenes on the movie of the laser-boolean graph activity? I don't beleive it supervenes on causally-disconnected frames, no. I agree with you. The movie cannot bring consciousness through comp, yet the physical activity of the movie can be made similar to the physical activity of the boolean graph. That is why if we want to keep the causal connectness relevant for having a computation, we have to replace the physical supervenience by the computaitonal supervenience, which is a very solid mathematical (even arithmetical, combinatoric, ...) notions, thanks to that unexpected Church thesis. But then physical connection get blurred below our substitution level where an infinity of computations compete. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote: On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote: He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. You are in a third person way. That is still not possible if there are no immaterial entities. I agree. But as far as I look to what is sharable among us I see only numbers. All papers in physics relies on theories relating measurable numbers through mathematical relation. the e-rest is already instinctive bets and qualia. But I see immaterial entities all the time: people, images, games, nations, programs, melodies, planets, galaxies, plants, and the famous bosons and fermions, which are famous for taking formalism so seriously :) If you are a program relatively to any real world, you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD, and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person sense). Not if there is no immaterial (or as you call it, arithmetic) UD. But it is a theorem of arithmetic that the UD exists. (accepting Church thesis, I mean CT is not a theorem of arithmetic, and probably false from an (arithmetical) first person point of view like Bp p). And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything epistemological. A material UD cannot be redundant unless there is an immaterial one to take its place. It exists like PI, gamma, and some constructive real, but it is probably richer in the internal information. It does not mean that we have to believe in some immaterial realm, but only that we have to trust classical logic on arithmetical proposition. Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or without comp). Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it follows from comp)? There is no problem attaching consc to PM. There is a problem attachign consc. to mathematical structures, whether phsycially emodied or not. To attach mind on Matter? there is a sort of consensus that with or without comp, the mind body problem is unsolved. the closer to the comp consequence, on the consciousness issue (not on matter) is Colin McGuin (the mysterianist). Then you seem to forget that computer science provide a very clean theory of self-reference, and (immaterial) machine themselves proves interesting things about what they can prove (know, observe, bet on...). Everett made QM intelligible by a use of comp. With Matter, except for quantum computation, the notion of computation is still not clearly defined (as we can expect from UDA/MGA). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: There is no problem attaching consc to PM. What do you mean by this? David On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote: He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. You are in a third person way. That is still not possible if there are no immaterial entities. If you are a program relatively to any real world, you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD, and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person sense). Not if there is no immaterial (or as you call it, arithmetic) UD. And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything epistemological. A material UD cannot be redundant unless there is an immaterial one to take its place. Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or without comp). Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it follows from comp)? There is no problem attaching consc to PM. There is a problem attachign consc. to mathematical structures, whether phsycially emodied or not. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote: You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there? Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). This is in the eight step. I don't know which game you are playing, Peter, you never address the point. I have no clue what you mean by an immaterial UD, or actual existing numbers. I mean exactly what you mean by existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism I mean that the truth status of statement having the shape ExP(x), with P written in first order arithmetic is true or false independently of me or of any consideration. But that doesn't mean the same thing at all. Formalists can accept such truths, they just don't think that truths about what exists mathematically use a literal sense of truth. I believe that to say yes to someone who will replace my brain by a digital machine, in this in the sense of believing that it is the computation that matter at some level, I have to trust a minimal amount of computer science. If you agree that the proof of the existence of two irrational numbers such that x^y is rational does provide information, then by MG Argument you may understand the point or find a flaw, fatal or not. Who knows? How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD? It is program without input which generates all the Pi, that is programs computing the phi_i, together with their arguments and dovetel on the execution of the computations. It is equivalent with the finite + infinite proof of the Sigma_1 sentences (those with the shape ExP(x) with P decidable). I don;t see what that has to do with information. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep, 17:16, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote: On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote: He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. You are in a third person way. That is still not possible if there are no immaterial entities. I agree. But as far as I look to what is sharable among us I see only numbers. Is that supposed to be an argument for Platonism? Why should what exists be limited to what is shareable among humans? All papers in physics relies on theories relating measurable numbers through mathematical relation. The properties fo the map need not be the properties of the territory. the e-rest is already instinctive bets and qualia. But I see immaterial entities all the time: people, images, games, nations, programs, melodies, planets, galaxies, plants, and the famous bosons and fermions, which are famous for taking formalism so seriously :) If you are a program relatively to any real world, you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD, and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person sense). Not if there is no immaterial (or as you call it, arithmetic) UD. But it is a theorem of arithmetic that the UD exists. (accepting Church thesis, I mean CT is not a theorem of arithmetic, and probably false from an (arithmetical) first person point of view like Bp p). CT only that it exists mathematically, which, if formalism is correct, means no more than mathematicians take it seriously. CT does not prove Platonism. And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything epistemological. A material UD cannot be redundant unless there is an immaterial one to take its place. It exists like PI, gamma, and some constructive real, but it is probably richer in the internal information. It does not mean that we have to believe in some immaterial realm, but only that we have to trust classical logic on arithmetical proposition. If the UD has no actual existence, material or immaterial, I am not running on it. Existing in the sense that formalists think Pi exists -- in people's minds, like Sherlock Holmes -- is not enought to support RITSIAR. Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or without comp). Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it follows from comp)? There is no problem attaching consc to PM. There is a problem attachign consc. to mathematical structures, whether phsycially emodied or not. To attach mind on Matter? there is a sort of consensus that with or without comp, the mind body problem is unsolved. the closer to the comp consequence, on the consciousness issue (not on matter) is Colin McGuin (the mysterianist). Then you seem to forget that computer science provide a very clean theory of self-reference, and (immaterial) machine themselves proves interesting things about what they can prove (know, observe, bet on...). Everett made QM intelligible by a use of comp. With Matter, except for quantum computation, the notion of computation is still not clearly defined (as we can expect from UDA/MGA). So how can engineers build computers out of matter? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: There is no problem attaching consc to PM. What do you mean by this? since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would be a property. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: There is no problem attaching consc to PM. What do you mean by this? since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would be a property. That's kind of funny you denying any existence to mathematical existence and aknowledging at the same time the existence of a propertyless thing. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 21 Sep, 08:58, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Sep 2009, at 02:49, Brent Meeker wrote: So does being pure thought mean without a reference, i.e. a fiction? As in Sherlock Holmes is a pure thought? Consider the Many world theory of Everett, or the many histories of comp. Does it make sense to say that Sherlock Holmes exists in such structure? The problem is that a fiction like Sherlock Holmes is not well defined. It is a bit like unicorns. I would not compare such essentially fictional construction with a mathematical object, like a computation or like a number, which admits forms of realism. I would not compare them in rigour or clarity. I would compare them in ontology. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep 2009, at 19:22, Flammarion wrote: On 22 Sep, 17:16, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote: On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote: He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. You are in a third person way. That is still not possible if there are no immaterial entities. I agree. But as far as I look to what is sharable among us I see only numbers. Is that supposed to be an argument for Platonism? Why should what exists be limited to what is shareable among humans? In the comp hypothesis I don't limit what exists to what is sharable, quite contrary with the qualia theories. All papers in physics relies on theories relating measurable numbers through mathematical relation. The properties fo the map need not be the properties of the territory. Of course, but comp entails constraints and make possible some fixed points. Comp makes obvious some role of computer science, a branch of math, and the study of the consequences of the computationalist hypotyhesis, in what? math, physics ... To already choose would be to already known the answer. That's why it is preferable to use the vocable of 'theology'. After all it is a belief in a form of (material at first, but not necessarily primitively material) rencarnation. And then G* can be described as the logic of general propositional theology of the (Löbian) Universal Machine. And at the beginning of the reasoning the theology is agnostic on Plato or Aristotle, Primary Matter, Gods, whatever. We assume numbers and programs, physical machine implementing the genuine relation between numbers which sustained us relatively to our most probable history. the e-rest is already instinctive bets and qualia. But I see immaterial entities all the time: people, images, games, nations, programs, melodies, planets, galaxies, plants, and the famous bosons and fermions, which are famous for taking formalism so seriously :) If you are a program relatively to any real world, you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD, and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person sense). Not if there is no immaterial (or as you call it, arithmetic) UD. But it is a theorem of arithmetic that the UD exists. (accepting Church thesis, I mean CT is not a theorem of arithmetic, and probably false from an (arithmetical) first person point of view like Bp p). CT only that it exists mathematically, which, if formalism is correct, means no more than mathematicians take it seriously. CT does not prove Platonism. CT uses platonism in your sense. I mean CT uses the fact that a machine stop or not stop, to let the f_n disperse uncomputably into the phi_i. CT uses arithmetical realism. No more than what is needed to make debugging procedure in computer science/use. And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything epistemological. A material UD cannot be redundant unless there is an immaterial one to take its place. It exists like PI, gamma, and some constructive real, but it is probably richer in the internal information. It does not mean that we have to believe in some immaterial realm, but only that we have to trust classical logic on arithmetical proposition. If the UD has no actual existence, material or immaterial, I am not running on it. 1-you or 3-you. 3-you is in the UD by yes doctor + math, and 1-you is in by MGA. Existing in the sense that formalists think Pi exists -- in people's minds, like Sherlock Holmes -- is not enought to support RITSIAR. I love Pi, I have read a lot of books on it. I prefer gamma. Your comparison between Sherlock Holmes is non relevant. Numbers and programs obeys laws, like particles and waves. We have theories and a lot of results. It is very big field usually classified in the exact science (and thus with no pretension about application but through supplementary assumptions). Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or without comp). Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it follows from comp)? There is no problem attaching consc to PM. There is a problem attachign consc. to mathematical structures, whether phsycially emodied or not. To attach mind on Matter? there is a sort of consensus that with or without comp, the mind body problem is unsolved. the closer to the comp consequence, on the consciousness issue (not on matter) is Colin McGuin (the mysterianist). Then you seem to forget that computer
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep, 19:08, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: There is no problem attaching consc to PM. What do you mean by this? since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would be a property. That's kind of funny you denying any existence to mathematical existence and aknowledging at the same time the existence of a propertyless thing. *A* propertyless thing is fine. But there is a contradiciton in multiple proeprtiless things --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote: He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. You are in a third person way. If you are a program relatively to any real world, you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD, and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person sense). And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything epistemological. Then, what you call primary matter is explained by the appearances of some irreductible invariant in universal 'dreams'. The real question is why is it so symmetrical, is information preserved, is the empirical world coherent with the comp physics, etc. Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or without comp). But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head. Brent Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it follows from comp)? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
2009/9/22 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote: He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. You are in a third person way. If you are a program relatively to any real world, you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD, and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person sense). And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything epistemological. Then, what you call primary matter is explained by the appearances of some irreductible invariant in universal 'dreams'. The real question is why is it so symmetrical, is information preserved, is the empirical world coherent with the comp physics, etc. Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or without comp). But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head. Brent Well if reality emerge from computations, that will not render it less real... because it would be the real, then believing that does not render you painless and superman. Quentin Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it follows from comp)? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: The level 0 has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true by a computational observer (us if CTM is true). If a level 0 is part of the standard package of materialism, it is testable because small world materialism makes different predictions about what will be observed, particularly WRs, than mathematical many-worlds. To put it another way., the theories are as testable as each other. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: The level 0 has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true by a computational observer (us if CTM is true). If a level 0 is part of the standard package of materialism, it is testable because small world materialism makes different predictions about what will be observed, particularly WRs, than mathematical many-worlds. To put it another way., the theories are as testable as each other. No because computational observer has *no* access to any external thing. If you are computational in essence I can run you and give you any input I want and you can't rely on your measure to assert anything. Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On 1 Sep, 18:35, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: What this shows is that CTM and comp are not different, but rather that comp is CTM properly understood. Its 'supervention' on virtualisation - i.e. a bottomless stack as perceived from inside - means that demanding that it further supervene on distinguishable 'platonic entities' is equivalent to demanding that it further supervene on PM, and hence equally superfluous. That is, you can believe it if you like but it is inconsequential. I realise that these conclusions are surprising (they certainly surprise me) and that of course they are not what most believers (and it is a belief) in CTM assume; but that does not mitigate their force. Bruno can conclude that but he certainly shouldn't assume it. What is consequent on all of this is that prior acceptance of CTM nullifies the force of your sceptical argument, because in making the assumption you have perforce abandoned scepticism with regard to its necessary consequences. If you like, belief in CTM is belief in the ghost in the machine, and ghosts and machines don't interact. You may regain your more general scepticism at the cost of relinquishing the assumption of CTM. Nothing of the kind follows from CTM unless you can make a MGA or Olympia argument work --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On 22 Sep, 21:29, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: The level 0 has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true by a computational observer (us if CTM is true). If a level 0 is part of the standard package of materialism, it is testable because small world materialism makes different predictions about what will be observed, particularly WRs, than mathematical many-worlds. To put it another way., the theories are as testable as each other. No because computational observer has *no* access to any external thing. If you are computational in essence I can run you and give you any input I want and you can't rely on your measure to assert anything. It is very unlikely I would find myself in such a contrived scenario, when there are many other corners of Platonia I could land in. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 22 Sep, 21:29, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: The level 0 has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true by a computational observer (us if CTM is true). If a level 0 is part of the standard package of materialism, it is testable because small world materialism makes different predictions about what will be observed, particularly WRs, than mathematical many-worlds. To put it another way., the theories are as testable as each other. No because computational observer has *no* access to any external thing. If you are computational in essence I can run you and give you any input I want and you can't rely on your measure to assert anything. It is very unlikely I would find myself in such a contrived scenario, when there are many other corners of Platonia I could land in. Sure, but you can't have access to level 0 if you are computational, no matter what you say, it doesn't play a role. If it does had nothing to the computation (and it does had nothing), I see no reason to postulate one... to call it propertyless or whatever, it is useless. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
Sorry I wanted to write it does *add* nothing. Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can relate physically running a program on a computer, a 2009/9/22 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 22 Sep, 21:29, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: The level 0 has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true by a computational observer (us if CTM is true). If a level 0 is part of the standard package of materialism, it is testable because small world materialism makes different predictions about what will be observed, particularly WRs, than mathematical many-worlds. To put it another way., the theories are as testable as each other. No because computational observer has *no* access to any external thing. If you are computational in essence I can run you and give you any input I want and you can't rely on your measure to assert anything. It is very unlikely I would find myself in such a contrived scenario, when there are many other corners of Platonia I could land in. Sure, but you can't have access to level 0 if you are computational, no matter what you say, it doesn't play a role. If it does had nothing to the computation (and it does had nothing), I see no reason to postulate one... to call it propertyless or whatever, it is useless. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
Well little problem in gmail sorry. So I do it again /o\ Sorry I wanted to write it does *add* nothing. Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can relate physically running a program on a computer, and running it on an abaccus, with a pen and a sheet of paper, in my mind. The only relation is the abstract computation. Quentin 2009/9/22 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com Sorry I wanted to write it does *add* nothing. Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can relate physically running a program on a computer, a 2009/9/22 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 22 Sep, 21:29, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: The level 0 has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true by a computational observer (us if CTM is true). If a level 0 is part of the standard package of materialism, it is testable because small world materialism makes different predictions about what will be observed, particularly WRs, than mathematical many-worlds. To put it another way., the theories are as testable as each other. No because computational observer has *no* access to any external thing. If you are computational in essence I can run you and give you any input I want and you can't rely on your measure to assert anything. It is very unlikely I would find myself in such a contrived scenario, when there are many other corners of Platonia I could land in. Sure, but you can't have access to level 0 if you are computational, no matter what you say, it doesn't play a role. If it does had nothing to the computation (and it does had nothing), I see no reason to postulate one... to call it propertyless or whatever, it is useless. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
- Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, September 22, 2009 10:36 AM Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Sep 2009, at 23:48, m.a. wrote: *And when pressed as to exactly how the Heisenberg compensators worked, the spokesman replied, Very well, thank you.* :) Actually the Heisenberg compensators, if they compensate really the Heisenberg uncertainties, would make such machine impossible: you just cannot compensate the Heisenberg uncertainties, unless those compensators send the classical bits needed to effectuate a quantum teleportation, and this would explain, retrospectively, why in star strek those devices always (?) annihilate the original... and why Star Strek did not exploit the self-duplication and I thought more devoted Trekkies than I would have pointed out by now that Star Trek did indeed exploit self-duplication. There were several episodes in which transmission problems produced two Kirks or two Spocks. There were other episodes in which people going through the transporter were changed in subtle, overt or sinister ways.m.a. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On 13 Sep, 17:51, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/11 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I'm not sure I see what distinction you're making. If as you say the realisation of computation in a physical system doesn't cause consciousness, that would entail that no physically-realised computation could be identical to any mental state. That doesn't follow because causation and identity are different The realisation could be consciousness (fire IS combustion) without causing it (fire CAUSES smoke but it not smoke) So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original argument? I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go. You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless the realisation of a computation IS consciousness? If so, why didn't you say so? And how would that now influence your evaluation of CTM? This is what follows if one accepts the argument from MGA or Olympia that consciousness does not attach to physical states qua computatio. I find them both quite contestable If you would risk saying precisely why, you might have a counter-argument. e.g. http://philpapers.org/rec/KLEDIS I agree. Nonetheless, when two states are functionally equivalent one can still say what it is about them that is physically relevant. For example, in driving from A to B it is functionally irrelevant to my experience whether my car is fuelled by petrol or diesel. But there is no ambiguity about the physical details of my car trip or precisely how either fuel contributes to this effect. One can say what it is about physical systems that explains its ability to realise a certain computation. One can't say that there is anything that makes it exclusively able to. Equally one can explain various ways of getting from A to B, but one can't argue that there is only one possible way. The point at issue is not whether there is only one way to realise a computation, or to get from A to B. The point is that in the case of the journey, the transition from physical irrelevance to relevance is at the point where the physical result emerges as identical - i.e. as the same journey form A to B. In the case of the computation, no such physical identity of result ever emerges; Instead there is functional identity and functional relevance... all you have is a collection of heterogeneous physical processes, each merely *formally* identical to a given computation. It is a further - and physically entirely ad hoc - assumption that this heterogeneity of physical states is homogeneous with a single experiential state. It is not entirely ad hoc because not every physical system implements every computation. Yes, I agree. But if we're after a physical theory, we also want to be able to give in either case a clear physical account of their apprehensiveness, which would include a physical justification of why the fine-grained differences make no difference at the level of experience. THat would be because they make no computational difference, if CTM is correct. If all you have to offer is circular arguments we shall simply go round in circles. Saying CTM is wrong because it is based on computational equivalence not physical equivalence is circular. I can only suppose that complete arbitrariness would be a random association between physical states and mental states. This is not what is meant by arbitrary realisation. What is meant is that the requirement that a physical system be deemed conscious purely in virtue of its implementing a computation rules out no particular kind of physical realisation. Consequently a theory of this type is incapable of explicating general principles of physical-mental association independent of its functional posit. It isn't. Why is that a problem? The problem is that theories which aren't reducible to fundamental physics don't warrant consideration as physical theories. It is reducible, since you can give an account of why a particular physical system implements a particular computation. What you don't have it type-type identity. You can;t say that a particular type of system --electronic, organic, etc-- is associated with particular types of computation or mentation. Compuationalists see that as an advantage. It is not clear why you do not. This is amply demonstrated by the fact that, when reduced to a physical interpretation, CTM is in fact shown to entail gross implausibilities. SO it is alleged. Yes, but the upshot is that CTM is reduced to the theory that conscious states can be associated with material systems only in a manner that ex hypothesi must obscure any prospect of a general reduction of their detailed material causes, because any such causes could only be specific to each realisation. You can have as many material details as you like so
Re: Dreaming On
On 22 Sep, 21:53, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Well little problem in gmail sorry. So I do it again /o\ Sorry I wanted to write it does *add* nothing. Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can relate physically running a program on a computer, and running it on an abaccus, with a pen and a sheet of paper, in my mind. The only relation is the abstract computation. 1. The notion of immaterial computation needs defense since all known computers are material 2. Level 0 as part of materialism makes a difference because it makes different predictions about what I will probably* observe. 3. Contrived BIV scenarios do not affect what I will probably* observe. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep, 19:56, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would be a property. In what might such attachment consist, in you view, beyond the mere assertion of its possibility? What does the attachment of a material property like charge or mass consist of? Such attachment is usually considered a metaphysical primitive. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original argument? I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go. You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless the realisation of a computation IS consciousness? If so, why didn't you say so? And how would that now influence your evaluation of CTM? Would you respond to this please? I find them both quite contestable If you would risk saying precisely why, you might have a counter-argument. e.g. http://philpapers.org/rec/KLEDIS Klein's criticism of Maudlin is concerned with constraining what might be considered a valid computational realisation. Were this accepted as reasonable, he could attack that particular reductio by disputing the adequacy of the realisation. This is however a separate question to the lack of any consistent justification of the association of homogeneous experiential states to heterogeneous physical ones, which does not depend on any particular reductio argument. Klein does not set out to address this issue, but tips his hand by remarking that I remain neutral between identifying the disposition with the first-order property or treating it as a second-order property that is realized in each case by some first-order property. The problem with CTM as a physical theory is that it violates normal standards of physical explanation. The very notion of computation is based not on a consistent self-selection of a specific physically-defined class of events, but rather on an external interpretation of a functionally-defined class. This is not problematic in the third-person sense, but if a first-person experiential state is to be considered equivalent merely to what we could say about something, then it is not a physical state in any normally understood sense. What would make a theory of consciousness a physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise relation between them. Such a theory would of course escape the vulnerability to accusations of lack of meaningful physical commitment inherent in MR. The point at issue is not whether there is only one way to realise a computation, or to get from A to B. The point is that in the case of the journey, the transition from physical irrelevance to relevance is at the point where the physical result emerges as identical - i.e. as the same journey form A to B. In the case of the computation, no such physical identity of result ever emerges; Instead there is functional identity and functional relevance... Sure, and that makes CTM a functional theory, supervening on functional relata, and appealing to a purely functional association with consciousness. In what remaining sense that makes any difference can CTM claim to be a materialist theory? To say that nonetheless it must be materially instantiated is no answer; it is merely begging the question. all you have is a collection of heterogeneous physical processes, each merely *formally* identical to a given computation. It is a further - and physically entirely ad hoc - assumption that this heterogeneity of physical states is homogeneous with a single experiential state. It is not entirely ad hoc because not every physical system implements every computation. The fact that not every physical system implements every computation doesn't reduce the ad-hoccery in the slightest, because the whole notion of implementation is immaterial from the outset. There's nothing physically fundamental about a computationally-defined 'realisation' - it is merely an externally-imposed interpretation of a physical state of affairs that is perfectly capable of causing whatever lies within its powers without such aid. The only interesting question from a physical perspective is what those powers might be. THat would be because they make no computational difference, if CTM is correct. If all you have to offer is circular arguments we shall simply go round in circles. Saying CTM is wrong because it is based on computational equivalence not physical equivalence is circular. I've made it abundantly clear that I'm not saying that CTM is wrong; I'm just saying that if it's right, then ex hypothesi this cannot be in virtue of the standard sense of physical causation invoked in any other context. That is not circular. What you're resisting is the conclusion that this has any necessary entailment for the direction of inference from the mathematical to the physical, or vice versa. I think that in common with reflexive believers in CTM - though you say you're not of their company - you are surreptitiously and unjustifiably conflating merely functionally-defined classes of physical events with primary physical causation, in order to ignore the intractable problem of justifying a consistent
Re: Dreaming On
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original argument? I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go. You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless the realisation of a computation IS consciousness? If so, why didn't you say so? And how would that now influence your evaluation of CTM? Would you respond to this please? I find them both quite contestable If you would risk saying precisely why, you might have a counter-argument. e.g. http://philpapers.org/rec/KLEDIS Klein's criticism of Maudlin is concerned with constraining what might be considered a valid computational realisation. Were this accepted as reasonable, he could attack that particular reductio by disputing the adequacy of the realisation. This is however a separate question to the lack of any consistent justification of the association of homogeneous experiential states to heterogeneous physical ones, which does not depend on any particular reductio argument. Klein does not set out to address this issue, but tips his hand by remarking that I remain neutral between identifying the disposition with the first-order property or treating it as a second-order property that is realized in each case by some first-order property. The problem with CTM as a physical theory is that it violates normal standards of physical explanation. The very notion of computation is based not on a consistent self-selection of a specific physically-defined class of events, but rather on an external interpretation of a functionally-defined class. This is not problematic in the third-person sense, but if a first-person experiential state is to be considered equivalent merely to what we could say about something, then it is not a physical state in any normally understood sense. What would make a theory of consciousness a physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise relation between them. Such a theory would of course escape the vulnerability to accusations of lack of meaningful physical commitment inherent in MR. Such a theory is available. It is the evolutionary account of the development of consciousness, c.f. Thomas Metzinger, Antonio Damasio, Julian Jaynes, Daniel Dennett. Knowing the physical function of a species sensors and the evolutionary history of it's environment you could infer what it is conscious of. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 22 Sep 2009, at 20:15, Flammarion wrote: On 22 Sep, 19:08, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: There is no problem attaching consc to PM. What do you mean by this? since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would be a property. That's kind of funny you denying any existence to mathematical existence and aknowledging at the same time the existence of a propertyless thing. *A* propertyless thing is fine. But there is a contradiciton in multiple proeprtiless things Why? And what's the relevance of this? Actually PM is even more non sensical if it is the lack of property which makes possible to attach qualia to it. Why would that piece of matter get the qualia seeing red, and that other piece of matter having the qualia seeing blue? MGA shows that matter is as much a problem than consciousness when we assume comp. Well, consciousness can at least be explained by the intrinsic gap between inferable truth and provable truth that all self- referential mathematical entity can discover about itself. Matter then emerge as a special modality (Bp Dp), needed for having a probability one for the proposition true in all consistent extension. The Dp is needed for preventing the cul-de-sac worlds where probabilities get awry. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
