Re: Perpetual Motion Machines
Brent, You are ignoring the fact that Dr. Katz is in a superposition of states. Bruno, one can assume that he wears a lead apron to protect him from radioactivity - but not from the explosion. But I agree with you with regards Everett, or Mechanism cannot make sense in the first person view. No 1p-diary can contain the statement “I did not survive”. In my post I am trying to lead to this question: Are the laws of physics /anthropically and independently/ determined by each observer? From Katz's point of view he is conducting a quantum Zeno experiment (well known effect that suppresses quantum transitions when measurements are performed very frequently). From the point of view of a person outside the chamber, he is conducting a Tegmark style suicide experiment. We may take for granted that /from his point of view/ the radium near the counter is not radioactive. We are faced with a counterfactual: since the radium is not radioactive, turning off the counter would not make any difference from Katz's point of view. Another question is whether /identical /radium samples far away from the counter would have the same radioactivity as the one near the counter, (even though the counter is not operative.) Why or why not? In other words are /the fundamental forces that control radioactivity/ affected throughout Katz's lab? The second part of my post had to do with the second law. What would Katz perceive if the radium source was replaced by a heat flow device designed to trigger the explosive? Would he perceive /heat quantization/ as an anthropically determined phenomenon (in analogy to the quantization of electron's orbit in our world)? George On 12/31/2019 7:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 Dec 2019, at 05:02, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote: On 12/30/2019 5:44 PM, George Levy wrote: On 12/29/2019 4:34 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: George, Does your interpretation of Boltzmann's view on the conservation of energy invoke any observer like Boltzmann's Brain or Wigner's Friend? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wigner%27s_friend You know, we need all the Friends we can get? ;-D We are all Wigner’s friends, aren’t we? Except that Wigner still had some objectivism left in him, which led him to ask a friend to act as an intermediary between him and Schrodinger’s cat when he could have stepped into Schrodinger’s chamber and conducted the experiment himself. Writing the paper “Loschmidt’s paradox, extended to CPT symmetry…” led me to question how natural laws such as forces, conservation, quantization and the second law emerge from Quantum Mechanics. The following thought experiments involve Dr. Katz, a very dear, close and nonfactual colleague of Schrodinger and Wigner. You could call him Schrodinger’s Katz. Dr. Katz has a PhD in physics. As a a pure subjectivist, he volunteers in experiments conducted in the famous Schrodinger’s chamber which contains a radium sample, near a Geiger counter, connected to a detonator set to trigger one ton of TNT (replacing, a la Tegmark, the original vial of cyanide envisaged by Schrodinger.) These experiments involve the first and second laws of thermodynamics. I do not have any firm answer to any of these experiments, but I think they are worth sharing. 1)*First Law -* These experiments aim at determining whether the forces of nature (gravity, electromagnetism and the strong and weak forces) are constant from the point of view of an observer. *a)*Dr. Katz measures the radioactivity of the radium sample near the Geiger counter. Does the measurement show that radium is /not radioactive/? *b)*He then measures the radioactivity of a /second radium sample far away/ from the counter. Is it radioactive? Is there a difference between the radioactivity of the two samples? Why or why not? *c)*Dr. Katz may conclude that radium is simply not radioactive and, therefore, the radium-counter-explosive link is not operational. He turns off the inoperational counter and again measures the radioactivity of both radium samples (near and far from the counter) Is there any change in the measurements? *d)*He then measures the radioactivity of a polonium sample far from the counter. What does he find? *e)*Finally, he opens (from the inside) the door of the chamber, steps outside, and repeat radioactivity measurement on radium and polonium samples located outside. What does he find? The same as or different from the inside? How does Dr. Katz explain his findings? Are the (electromagnetic, strong, weak) forces the same inside and outside the chamber? Is energy conserved? 2)*Second Law.* (These experiments attempt to link quantization to the second law) Dr. Schrodinger replaces the radium sample and Geiger counter by a heat flow device comprised of a metal bar, hot at one end and cold at the other, and a differential thermometer that
Re: Perpetual Motion Machines
On 12/29/2019 4:34 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: George, Does your interpretation of Boltzmann's view on the conservation of energy invoke any observer like Boltzmann's Brain or Wigner's Friend? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wigner%27s_friend You know, we need all the Friends we can get? ;-D We are all Wigner’s friends, aren’t we? Except that Wigner still had some objectivism left in him, which led him to ask a friend to act as an intermediary between him and Schrodinger’s cat when he could have stepped into Schrodinger’s chamber and conducted the experiment himself. Writing the paper “Loschmidt’s paradox, extended to CPT symmetry…” led me to question how natural laws such as forces, conservation, quantization and the second law emerge from Quantum Mechanics. The following thought experiments involve Dr. Katz, a very dear, close and nonfactual colleague of Schrodinger and Wigner. You could call him Schrodinger’s Katz. Dr. Katz has a PhD in physics. As a a pure subjectivist, he volunteers in experiments conducted in the famous Schrodinger’s chamber which contains a radium sample, near a Geiger counter, connected to a detonator set to trigger one ton of TNT (replacing, a la Tegmark, the original vial of cyanide envisaged by Schrodinger.) These experiments involve the first and second laws of thermodynamics. I do not have any firm answer to any of these experiments, but I think they are worth sharing. 1)*First Law -* These experiments aim at determining whether the forces of nature (gravity, electromagnetism and the strong and weak forces) are constant from the point of view of an observer. *a)*Dr. Katz measures the radioactivity of the radium sample near the Geiger counter. Does the measurement show that radium is /not radioactive/? *b)*He then measures the radioactivity of a /second radium sample far away/ from the counter. Is it radioactive? Is there a difference between the radioactivity of the two samples? Why or why not? *c)*Dr. Katz may conclude that radium is simply not radioactive and, therefore, the radium-counter-explosive link is not operational. He turns off the inoperational counter and again measures the radioactivity of both radium samples (near and far from the counter) Is there any change in the measurements? *d)*He then measures the radioactivity of a polonium sample far from the counter. What does he find? *e)*Finally, he opens (from the inside) the door of the chamber, steps outside, and repeat radioactivity measurement on radium and polonium samples located outside. What does he find? The same as or different from the inside? How does Dr. Katz explain his findings? Are the (electromagnetic, strong, weak) forces the same inside and outside the chamber? Is energy conserved? 2)*Second Law.* (These experiments attempt to link quantization to the second law) Dr. Schrodinger replaces the radium sample and Geiger counter by a heat flow device comprised of a metal bar, hot at one end and cold at the other, and a differential thermometer that measures the temperature difference between the two ends of the bar. When the difference falls below a predetermined value, the thermometer triggers the explosive. Dr. Katz is willing to conduct experiments in this new chamber. *a)*Dr. Katz measures the temperature difference of the bar. Again, following Tegmark’s cue, one may believe that the temperature difference never falls below the predetermined value. *b)*Dr. Katz measures heat flow in a metal bar far away from the thermometer. Does he observe the same kind of anomaly as close to the thermometer? How does Katz explain what he measures?Does his explanation involve quantization of thermal energy? *c)*What if he opens the door and steps outside the chamber? Does he observe any difference in heat flow? I do not have any firm answers to any of these thought experiments - just guesses. Do you know the answers? George -Original Message- From: George Levy To: everything-list Sent: Mon, Dec 23, 2019 10:11 pm Subject: Re: Perpetual Motion Machines Hi everyone I do not post often, but now is an opportune time to post on perpetual motion machines and the second law. John Clark posted "The other type of Perpetual Motion Machine would violate the second law of thermodynamics, you couldn't create energy from nothing but you could keep recycling the same energy and keep extracting work out of it forever. That would violate not just a law of physics but a law of logic too. If you could do that then you could also make entropy decrease, but that would be illogical because there is no getting around the fact that there are just more ways something can be disorganized than organized. and quoting Hawking: Disorder increases with time because we measure time in the direction in which disorder increases. — Stephen W. Hawking <https://todayinsci.com/H/Hawking
Re: Perpetual Motion Machines
Hi everyone I do not post often, but now is an opportune time to post on perpetual motion machines and the second law. John Clark posted "The other type of Perpetual Motion Machine would violate the second law of thermodynamics, you couldn't create energy from nothing but you could keep recycling the same energy and keep extracting work out of it forever. That would violate not just a law of physics but a law of logic too. If you could do that then you could also make entropy decrease, but that would be illogical because there is no getting around the fact that there are just more ways something can be disorganized than organized. and quoting Hawking: Disorder increases with time because we measure time in the direction in which disorder increases. — Stephen W. Hawking <https://todayinsci.com/H/Hawking_Stephen/HawkingStephen-Quotations.htm> https://todayinsci.com/QuotationsCategories/A_Cat/ArrowOfTime-Quotations.htm In other words systems are more likely to change from organized to disorganized. There is an arrow of time and the second law as currently understood supervenes on it. The problem with this approach is that relying on time asymmetry alone is narrow-focused and very much 19th century thinking. Physics of the 20th and 21st century taught us that time symmetry must be considered in combination with charge and parity. Therefore, to be accurate, one must consider the second law in the context of full-fledged CPT symmetry. I just published a paper discussing this very topic. Loschmidt’s Paradox, Extended to CPT Symmetry, Bypasses Second Law <https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=97267> (The html version at the site does not render the drawings properly, you will need to download the pdf version to display the drawings) The original Loschmidt's paradox states: if all physical processes are truly microscopically time-reversible, then any entropy increasing process is as probable as a corresponding entropy decreasing process. Therefore, according to physical laws the change in entropy must be zero. However, as proven by Boltzmann in his H-Theorem, entropy must increase with time. This paper extends Loschmidt's paradox to CPT symmetry: if the laws of nature are truly CPT symmetrical and reversible, then a system could return to a previous state /even in the presence of an arrow of time,/ thereby restoring its entropy to its original value. This version of the paradox renders moot the arrow of time assumption and bypasses the H-Theorem. The paper includes a theoretical discussion, simulation and experimental data. George Levy Irvine California On 11/29/2019 6:56 AM, John Clark wrote: All this talk about energy conservation has got me thinking about Perpetual Motion Machines, there are 2 types, both are impossible but one is more impossible than the other. One type would violate the known laws of physics, or maybe not; it seems to me that in an accelerating universe it would be possible, at least in theory, to extract work (force over a distance) from nothing and keep doing so forever. The other type of Perpetual Motion Machine would violate the second law of thermodynamics, you couldn't create energy from nothing but you could keep recycling the same energy and keep extracting work out of it forever. That would violate not just a law of physics but a law of logic too. If you could do that then you could also make entropy decrease, but that would be illogical because there is no getting around the fact that there are just more ways something can be disorganized than organized. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2TGSjszwavfygMdKsqswq263PNvBKCS8b0ujeP-UZMLw%40mail.gmail.com <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2TGSjszwavfygMdKsqswq263PNvBKCS8b0ujeP-UZMLw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/dc42d570-5388-89aa-f199-763ea47eb27d%40quantics.net.
Re: Quantum Mechanics Violation of the Second Law
Thanks Bruno On 11/11/2015 12:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi George, Congratulations! Best wishes for you and your amazing work. I am not convinced but that might only be due to my incompetence in the field. I will make a further look. Bruno On 10 Nov 2015, at 23:10, George Levy wrote: I would like to update the members of this list on what I have been up to recently (and revive an old thread). My latest paper "Quantum Game Beats Classical Odds - Thermodynamics Implications" has just been published by the Journal Entropy under the section "Statistical Mechanics" after a strict and thorough peer review. The implications are that it is possible to beat the laws of Classical Physics using a Quantum Mechanical effect. Given the right conditions it should be possible to produce a spontaneous temperature gradient in a thermoelectric material without any electrical input - and vice versa, to produce an electrical output without a temperature difference input. Here is the link to the paper at the Journal Entropy: http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/17/11/7645 I presented an earlier paper in Vancouver, Canada, which was also approved for publication by the /11th International Conference on Ceramic Materials & Components for Energy & Environmental Applications/. It is now undergoing editorial and format changes. The paper is currently available at ResearchGate at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283645102_Anomalous_Temperature_Gradient_in_Non-Maxwellian_Gases Best George -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Quantum Mechanics Violation of the Second Law
I would like to update the members of this list on what I have been up to recently (and revive an old thread). My latest paper "Quantum Game Beats Classical Odds - Thermodynamics Implications" has just been published by the Journal Entropy under the section "Statistical Mechanics" after a strict and thorough peer review. The implications are that it is possible to beat the laws of Classical Physics using a Quantum Mechanical effect. Given the right conditions it should be possible to produce a spontaneous temperature gradient in a thermoelectric material without any electrical input - and vice versa, to produce an electrical output without a temperature difference input. Here is the link to the paper at the Journal Entropy: http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/17/11/7645 I presented an earlier paper in Vancouver, Canada, which was also approved for publication by the /11th International Conference on Ceramic Materials & Components for Energy & Environmental Applications/. It is now undergoing editorial and format changes. The paper is currently available at ResearchGate at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283645102_Anomalous_Temperature_Gradient_in_Non-Maxwellian_Gases Best George -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Kabbalah and the Multiverse
Dear Rabbi Rabbi Rabbit wrote: What is surprising about Abulafia is that he did not reach this state by suppressing his conscious mind, as most mystics do by repetition of a single formula/mantra, but by overstimulating it with letter combinations accompanied by body motions. Too much information is no information at all and a white sheet of paper carries just as much information as a black one. So overstimulating one's mind with a barrage of letters may achieve the same results as understimulating it. Abulafia may have been suppressing his conscious mind by overstimulating it. I haven't thought enough how the technique of letter combinations could be related to consciousness. Any ideas? Numbers and more generally mathematics and logic (more precisely self referential logic) is an essential requirement of consciousness. Using the same Anthropic reasoning that I used in my previous post, one could infer that mathematics and logic also co-emerged with consciousness and the world out of chaos. - Bruno is an expert in the field of self referential logical system. Who knows, self referential logical systems implemented in software may become a reality within our lifetime. George -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Kabbalah and the Multiverse
Hi John Thanks for your appreciation. John Mikes wrote: Dear George, I was missing more of your contributions on this list lately (years?). Let me reflect to a few of your topics: *Chaos.* A decade or so ago I was named 'resident chaotician' on another list - later changed my mind when I was disenchanted by the 'physical chaologists' who picked some 'chaotic' problems that seemed to them as calculable in the original (greek mythological) chaos: the unfathomable uncalculable (pre-geometrical?) plenitude of which the Chronos-Zeus family derived our Kraxlwerk (world). Since then I put 'chaos' into the maze of scale-differences (more than just SOME orders of magnitude?) that conflate our math-based thinking. We learn to think about 'chaotic' (very slowly, but we do, indeed). Thank you for leading (me?) towards Tohu-va-Bohu (what I always wrote in one 'tohuvabohu' in ANY language and applied it for some unresolvable mixup in a conglomerate. The Tohu va Bohu is the nothingness full of potentiality. It reminds me of my son's room when he was a teenager. *And God saw the light and it was good* is translated in some other languages as And God saw THAT the light was good (Rabbit: which one is close to the original?) With my limited knowledge of Hebrew I can translate it as And God saw the light because-good (ki-tov). I will let the rabbi confirm. Interestingly it is the first mention of good therefore you can take it as a definition. Pursuing the reasoning in my previous post, Goodness is defined as the awakening consciousness coemergent with, and creating, the world. In other words creation is goodness itself. Does not underline an omniscient God. Now - your God = Consciousness is to my liking: I could not identify either of them. I consider Ccness a covering noumenon of many phenomena detected over a long cultural history and in my speculations I boiled it down to responding to information - self-recursively, or not. E.g. the response of an electron to a + charge etc. So it really covers the entire World as you connotation would imply for God = Consciousness. Yes. God=Consciousness=World kind of a trinity...(please take this as a joke) :-) From this position it is obvious that I am not much for the Anthropic Principle. It is a backwards thinking from visualizing US (as God's children?) as the main actors in the world. We are not. George -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Kabbalah and the Multiverse
Hi Rabbi Rabbit. Welcome I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I have been reading it. Here is a possible connection between the Kabbalah and the Multiverse, which I will describe in a bulleted fashion for brevity. The initial chaos, Tohu va Bohu, (from which the French word tohu bohu) is equivalent to what is known in this list as the Plenitude. The first light Or is not a physical light at all but it is the awakening of consciousness. The separation that God performs (And God divided the light from the darkness), is mediated by what is called on this list the Anthropic Principle. In essence, the just awakened consciousness can only be aware of the part of the Tohu va Bohu that can support the consciousness's own existence. Consciousness can only see order in the world that it perceives. The sentence And God saw the light and it was good is interesting because consciousness is a self referencing phenomenon. God saw the light but consciousness also saw the light - itself. This means that God and consciousness are identical. God, consciousness and the world co-emerge out of chaos. Consciousness filters the world out of Chaos. More specifically, _any instance_ of consciousness to be what it is (in the human experience, with consistent memories and logical capabilities) requires the corresponding world to be what it is (to be ordered, with consistent histories and logical physical laws). Consciousness and the world mirror each other and therefore, they are in their own image. There can be many different consciousnesses, each one being in fact a whole world. Best Regards George Rabbi Rabbit wrote: Dear Jason, My assumption is that the Name of God, according to Abraham Abulafia, could be made of any possible combination of the 22 letters, as long as this name does not exceed 22 characters. This includes repetitions of letters and any combination between 1 and 22 characters. Thank you for your wise remark, it was indeed not clear enough as I formulated it previously. Yours truly, R. Rabbit -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The seven step-Mathematical preliminaries
A good model of the naturalist math that Torgny is talking about is the overflow mechanism in computers. For example in a 64 bit machine you may define overflow for positive integers as 2^^64 -1. If negative integers are included then the biggest positive could be 2^^32-1. Torgny would also have to define the operations +, - x / with specific exceptions for overflow. The concept of BIGGEST needs to be tied with _the kind of operations you want to apply to_ the numbers. George Brent Meeker wrote: Quentin Anciaux wrote: You have to explain why the exception is needed in the first place... The rule is true until the rule is not true anymore, ok but you have to explain for what sufficiently large N the successor function would yield next 0 and why or to add that N and that exception to the successor function as axiom, if not you can't avoid N+1. But torgny doesn't evacuate N+1, merely it allows his set to grows undefinitelly as when he has defined BIGGEST, he still argues BIGGEST+1 makes sense , is a natural number but not part of the set of natural number, this is non-sense, assuming your special successor rule BIGGEST+1 simply does not exists at all. I can understand this overflow successor function for a finite data type or a real machine registe but not for N. The successor function is simple, if you want it to have an exception at biggest you should justify it. You don't justify definitions. How would you justify Peano's axioms as being the right ones? You are just confirming my point that you are begging the question by assuming there is a set called the natural numbers that exists independently of it's definition and it satisfies Peano's axioms. Torgny is denying that and pointing out that we cannot know of infinite sets that exist independent of their definition because we cannot extensively define an infinite set, we can only know about it what we can prove from its definition. So the numbers modulo BIGGEST+1 and Peano's numbers are both mathematical objects. The first however is more definite than the second, since Godel's theorems don't apply. Which one is called the *natural* numbers is a convention which might not have any practical consequences for sufficiently large BIGGEST. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Consciousness is information?
Kelly Harmon wrote: What if you used a lookup table for only a single neuron in a computer simulation of a brain? Hi Kelly Zombie arguments involving look up tables are faulty because look up tables are not closed systems. They require someone to fill them up. To resolve these arguments you need to include the creator of the look up table in the argument. (Inclusion can be across widely different time periods and spacial location) George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Changing the past by forgetting
I agree with Anna. In addition, it all depends on where you define the boundary of the self. Just the brain? Brain + body? Brain + body + immediate surrounding (prescription glasses being worn, automobile being driven, binoculars or computer being used) ? Brain + body + Whole causally connected universe (CCU)? There are good arguable reasons for including the CCU as part of the self. Forgetting would then mean resetting the CCU to the last remembered state. In this case we have an identity relationship between the self and the universe it inhabits. Resetting the self is the same as resetting the universe. No more problem or paradox associated with forgetting! George A. Wolf wrote: Thanks! This is like undoing historical events. If you forget about the fact that dinosaurs ever lived on Earth and there is an alternative history that led to your existence in the multiverse, and you do the memory erasure also in sectors were dinosaurs never lived, you have some nonzero probability of finding yourself on an Earth were the dinosaurs never lived. The problem I'm having with this line of reasoning is that memory isn't a fixed physical object. Memory is reconstructive, and depends upon emotional triggers both at the time when the memory was encoded and at the time when it re-examined in the conscious mind. No memories are particularly accurate. Most of the time, I'm not aware that dinosaurs existed because I'm not thinking about it, or any other part of Earth's history, for that matter...but I don't seem to have the experience that my environment is impoverished of history altogether just because I hadn't been thinking hard enough about it. As another example, people who have false recovered memories through psychotherapy invariably end up unable to confirm them when they look for facts to back up their new memories, and that happens in my universe even though I personally don't have any information to confirm or deny their memories. In other words, I don't see why forgetting something is any more likely to change events than simply being wrong about having the memory in the first place, the latter of which happens constantly. If you want to argue about what nonzero probability implies, you'd have a hard time showing that anything non-contradictory at all has a nonzero probability of being true. :) Because of the entanglement, I don't think you can, in general, reverse the spin state of the particle without reversing what is known about it by the rest of the world. The rest of the world? What's that? Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Changing the past by forgetting
I agree with Anna. In addition, it all depends on where you define the boundary of the self. Just the brain? Brain + body? Brain + body + immediate surrounding (prescription glasses being worn, automobile being driven, binoculars or computer being used) ? Brain + body + Whole causally connected universe (CCU)? There are good arguable reasons for including the CCU as part of the self. Forgetting would then mean resetting the CCU to the last remembered state. In this case we have an identity relationship between the self and the universe it inhabits. Resetting the self is the same as resetting the universe. No more problem or paradox associated with forgetting! George A. Wolf wrote: Thanks! This is like undoing historical events. If you forget about the fact that dinosaurs ever lived on Earth and there is an alternative history that led to your existence in the multiverse, and you do the memory erasure also in sectors were dinosaurs never lived, you have some nonzero probability of finding yourself on an Earth were the dinosaurs never lived. The problem I'm having with this line of reasoning is that memory isn't a fixed physical object. Memory is reconstructive, and depends upon emotional triggers both at the time when the memory was encoded and at the time when it re-examined in the conscious mind. No memories are particularly accurate. Most of the time, I'm not aware that dinosaurs existed because I'm not thinking about it, or any other part of Earth's history, for that matter...but I don't seem to have the experience that my environment is impoverished of history altogether just because I hadn't been thinking hard enough about it. As another example, people who have false recovered memories through psychotherapy invariably end up unable to confirm them when they look for facts to back up their new memories, and that happens in my universe even though I personally don't have any information to confirm or deny their memories. In other words, I don't see why forgetting something is any more likely to change events than simply being wrong about having the memory in the first place, the latter of which happens constantly. If you want to argue about what nonzero probability implies, you'd have a hard time showing that anything non-contradictory at all has a nonzero probability of being true. :) Because of the entanglement, I don't think you can, in general, reverse the spin state of the particle without reversing what is known about it by the rest of the world. The rest of the world? What's that? Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: language, cloning and thought experiments
Jack, You say Q_i (which is _your_ utility per unit measure for the observer i). This is an oxymoron. How can observer i know or care what YOUR Q (Quality) is? How can this observer feel what it feels being you?. The only observer that matters in evaluating your Q is you as a self-observer. The sum is no sum at all: U = M_o Q_o where o = you as observer. George Wei Dai wrote: Jack Mallah wrote: They might not, but I'm sure most would; maybe not exactly that U, but a lot closer to it. Can you explain why you believe that? No. In U = Sum_i M_i Q_i, you sum over all the i's, not just the ones that are similar to you. Of course your Q_i (which is _your_ utility per unit measure for the observer i) might be highly peaked around those that are similar to you, but there's no need for a precise cutoff in similarity. And it's even very likely that it will have even higher peaks around people that are not very much like you at all (these are the people that you would sacrifice yourself for). By contrast, in your proposal for U, you do need a precise cutoff, for which there is no justification. Ok, I see what you're saying, and it is a good point. But most people already have a personal identity that is sufficiently well-defined in the current environment where mind copying is not possible, so in practice deciding which i's to sum over isn't a serious problem (yet). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Measure Increases or Decreases? - Was adult vs. child
Hi Jack Nice to see you again. The assumption that measure decreases continuously has been accepted too easily. This is, however, really the crux of the discussion. One could argue that measure actually increases continuously and corresponds to the increase in entropy occurring in everyday life. So even if you are 90 or 100 years old you could still experience an increase in measure. On the other hand, when you are really close to a near death event then you may argue that measure decreases. Whether the increase compensates for the decrease is debatable. In any case, measure is measured over a continuum and its value is infinite to begin with. So whether it increases or decreases may be a moot point. This being said, this issue is not easily dismissed and will impact ethics and philosophy for years to come. As I said, the increase or decrease in measure is at the crux of this problem.Your paper really did not illuminate the issue in a satisfactory manner. George Jack Mallah wrote: --- On Sun, 2/8/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Suppose you differentiate into N states, then on average each has 1/N of your original measure. I guess that's why you think the measure decreases. But the sum of the measures is N/N of the original. I still find this confusing. Your argument seems to be that you won't live to 1000 because the measure of 1000 year old versions of you in the multiverse is very small - the total consciousness across the multiverse is much less for 1000 year olds than 30 year olds. But by an analogous argument, the measure of 4 year old OM's is higher than that of 30 year old OM's, since you might die between age 4 and 30. But here you are, an adult rather than a child. You might die between 4 and 30, but the chance is fairly small, let's say 10% for the sake of argument. So, if we just consider these two ages, the effective probability of being 30 would be a little less than that of being 4 - not enough less to draw any conclusions from. The period of adulthood is longer than that of childhood so actually you are more likely to be an adult. How likely? Just look at a cross section of the population. Some children, more adults, basically no super-old folks. Should you feel your consciousness more thinly spread or something? No, measure affects how common an observation is, not what it feels like. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Measure Increases or Decreases? - Was adult vs. child
Jack Mallah wrote: Hi George. The everything list feels just like old times, no? Which is nice in a way but has a big drawback - I can only take so much of arguing the same old things, and being outnumbered. And that limit is approaching fast again. At least I think your point here is new to the list. I have also been overwhelmed by the volume on this list. The idea is not to take more than you can chew. --- On Wed, 2/11/09, George Levy gl...@quantics.net wrote: One could argue that measure actually increases continuously and corresponds to the increase in entropy occurring in everyday life. So even if you are 90 or 100 years old you could still experience an increase in measure. I guess you are basing that on some kind of branch-counting idea. If that were the case, the Born Rule would fail. Perhaps the probability rule would be more like proportionality to norm^2 exp(entropy) instead of just norm^2. If that was it, then for example unstable nuclei would be observed to decay a lot faster than the Born Rule predicts. Yes I am linking the entropy to MW branching. So if you start with a low entropy state such as the Big Bang or having $1 million after a QS your entropy is going to increase. (There are many ways I could spend that million). The number of possible states you can reach increases, hence your entropy increases. You say that the Born Rule would fail if measure *increases*. Here is a counterexample: Using your own argument I could say that the Born rule would fail if measure *decreases *according to function f(t). For example it could be norm^2 f(t) . So using your own argument since the Born rule is only norm^2 therefore measure stays constant? I do not understand why you say that the Born rule would fail. Linking entropy with measure may bring some interesting insights. Let's see how far we can go with this. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Probability
Hi
I haven't contributed to the list recently but probability is a topic
that interests me and which I discussed several years ago. I have a
relativist interpretation of the MW.
To apply Probabilities to the MW _every probability should be stated as
a conditional probability, that is conditional on the existence of the
observer:_
For example:
P{event X} is meaningless
P{ event X / observer A} is the probability that observer A sees event X.
Obviously we have:
P{ Observer A / Observer A } = 1
Things become interesting when we have two observers A and B observing
the same event X. (Recall Einstein thought experiment on simultaneity).
_Case 1: Classical case: Event X totally decoupled from the existence of
observer A and B_
When the existences of A and B are not contingent on X we have
P{X/A} = P{X/B}
and both A and B agree on the objectivity of their observation. They
call this probability P{X} even though strictly speaking P{ X} is
meaningless.
This case represents the classical case: all observers see an objective
reality in which all events have the same probabilities.
_Case 2: Tegmark case: Existence of A is 100% contingent on X._
In this case, the observed probabilities are different:
P{X/A} P{X/B}
For example let's consider Tegmark Quantum Mechanics suicide thought
experiment. Let us say that A is the observer playing the lottery event
X and B is passive.
B may observe the probability of A winning the lottery as
P{ X/B } = 0.01
Since A is contingent on X:
P{ A/B} = 0.01
Note that if B attempts to use Bayes rule to compute P{X} (or P{A})
he'll use
P{X} = P{X/B} P{B}; However B has no access to P{B}. He actually uses
P{B/B}. So for B Bayes rule becomes:
P{X} = P{X/B} P{B/B} = 0.01 x 1 = 0.01 ; B is a third person.
Most of the time he sees A dying.
Since A is 100% contingent on X and vice versa, A observes
P{X/A} = 1
If A attempts to compute P{X} using Bayes rule he'll get:
P{X} = P{X/A} P{A}; However P{A} does not make sense. A must use P{A/A}.
So for A Bayes rule becomes:
P{X} = P{X/A} P{A/A} = 1 x 1 = 1; A is the first person. He always sees
himself alive.
_Case 3. Both A and B are contingent on X in different degrees._
Assume that A is test pilot flying a very dangerous plane. B is in the
control tower. C is far away.
X is a successful flight; X1 is a plane crash on the ground killing A;
X2 is the plane crashing in the control tower killing A and B.
Let P{X/C} = 0.7; P{X1/C} = 0.2, P{X2/C} = 0.1
P{X} as seen by C = 0.7.
Calculating P{X} according to B is more tricky. The events that B sees
are the successful flight and the crash in the ground. He does not see
the crash in the control tower.
To get P{X} as seen by B we need to normalize the probability to cover
only the events seen by B:
According to B: P{X} + P{X1} = 1
Therefore: P{X} = 0.7/(0.7+0.2) = 0.77 and P{X1} = 0.23.
So according to B P{X} = 0.77.
A does not see any of the crashes. So:
P{X} as seen by A = 1.0
This last example illustrates how three different observers can see
three different probabilities.
George Levy
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Re: RE : Re: Discussion of the MUH
Hi Brian As Russell said, we have been discussing this topic for at least a decade. We all respect each other. I am sure that Bruno did not mean harm when he made his comment. You bring up an interesting question: the relationship between Fuzzy logic and the MUH and you state that Fuzzy logic is a superset of deterministic logic. Isn't true that Fuzzy Logic can be implemented by means of a Turing Machine? Since a Turing Machine is purely deterministic it means that Fuzzy logic is actually a subset of logic. Hence the ad hoc introduction of Fuzzy logic may be unnecessary in the context of MUH. I don't think that the indeterminacy that we are considering here is fundamental or derives from an axiomatic approach. It is rather a consequence of living in many worlds simultaneously. When I make a measurement, a number of I's make(s) a measurements. The result of the measurement that each I perceive(s) defines the world where the I actually am (is). As you can see English is not rich enough to talk about I in the third person or in the plural. If there is a need for Fuzzy Logic, it would have to be a kind of logic adapted to deal with the MUH. I don't know enough to say if there is such a logic. George Brian Tenneson wrote: We get Tegmark on this list occasionally. He, like you, needs to acquaint himself more with the core concepts of THIS discussion. In his last post to us he admitted as much. By THIS discussion, did you mean the aspects of the connections to Fuzzy Logic and the MUH that I am discussing in THIS thread? Can we +please+ either talk about the first post on THIS thread or anything at least somewhat related or post in a different thread? I did not come here to argue about who is diverting the topic away. Please don't reply in THIS thread if you aren't going to discuss THIS topic (connections between Fuzzy Logic and the MUH). Thanks. I did not post my ideas in a random person's thread. If I did, I would be called a troll, perhaps, or at least, unnecessarily diverting the thread. It is insulting to me to be said I'm looking for attention. Why use THIS thread's bandwidth to analyze my psychological makeup? Thanks. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: dark energy
Hal Ok, there is no feeling but there is motivation. There is no feeling of motivation and there is motivation without feeling. This is totally alien or the English language is broken. George Hal Ruhl wrote: Hi George: I see no feeling of anything in a Something. There is only an absence of the information needed to answer meaningful questions that are asked and must is be answered. Hal Ruhl At 11:13 PM 1/17/2008, you wrote: Hal, Allright. You are saying that incompleteness is the (only) motivator of the members. In other words the members feel motivated by incompleteness. They do have the feeling of being incomplete that motivates their behavior. Is this correct? George Hal Ruhl wrote: Hi George: I see no motivator to any dynamics within the Everything other than the incompleteness of some of its members and the unavoidable necessity to progressively resolve this incompleteness. Hal Ruhl At 12:29 AM 1/17/2008, you wrote: Hal Ruhl wrote: This is an automatic process like a mass has to answer to the forces [meaningful questions] applied to it. What in the psyche of the mass makes it answer to the forces? George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: dark energy
Hal, Allright. You are saying that incompleteness is the (only) motivator of the members. In other words the members feel motivated by incompleteness. They do have the feeling of being incomplete that motivates their behavior. Is this correct? George Hal Ruhl wrote: Hi George: I see no motivator to any dynamics within the Everything other than the incompleteness of some of its members and the unavoidable necessity to progressively resolve this incompleteness. Hal Ruhl At 12:29 AM 1/17/2008, you wrote: Hal Ruhl wrote: This is an automatic process like a mass has to answer to the forces [meaningful questions] applied to it. What in the psyche of the mass makes it answer to the forces? George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: dark energy
Hal, I cannot follow you: one the one hand you say: Something if incomplete will have to increase its completeness to answer meaningful questions which implies volition and therefore spirit; and on the other hand you say: There is no intent to imply some sort of choice on the part of the Something. which denies spirit, and on the third hand: the quest is an ... system induced need for a ongoing influx of information in which the term need goes back to supporting a spirit-based system. George Hal Ruhl wrote: Hi George: I use the term quest because a Something if incomplete will have to increase its completeness to answer meaningful questions that get asked but it can not answer. The motivator is partly external - an answer [mostly more than one is available] is out there in the unexplored Everything and partly internal - the particular question must be answered. There is no intent to imply some sort of choice on the part of the Something. To use your last thoughts below the quest is an [Everything, Something, Nothing] system induced need for a ongoing influx of information into the particular Something from the Everything [the boundary of the particular Something with the Everything alters to include more of the Everything. The Something encompasses an ever increasing portion of the Everything but it must do so. In this case I currently see no higher level of driver for any sub component of the Something including what one might call an observer. I may need to reconsider when I get to that point in Russell's book but my time restraints force me to take considerable time doing so. Hal Ruhl At 02:21 PM 1/16/2008, you wrote: Hi Hal, This topic interests me, but I find it difficult to go past the second sentence in your post. The phrase Something is on a quest carries a lot of baggage, in particular that Something has intention, purpose and motivation. Either we have to assume that this intention is produced by a fundamental spirit or soul that you have assigned to the Something, or that the intention is emergent from a complex consciousness simulation possibly involving Quantum Mechanics. If you assume a spirit or soul you are making a quasi religious assumption. Is this what you want? How do we explain spirit or soul? If you are assuming a complex consciousness simulation, there is a whole layer that needs to be explained which no one has yet fully explained yet. Usually scientists use objective and impersonal criteria such as energy minimization to explain how a reaction is driven in one particular direction. In chemistry, for example, Le Chatelier Principle is used. George Hal Ruhl wrote: I have touched on this subject before but the following is my current view of Dark Energy In my approach a Something is on a quest for completeness within the Everything. Based on this, the following points can be made: 1) The number of current incompleteness sites for a given Something would be at least proportional to the surface area of its boundary with the rest of the Everything if not proportional to its volume. 2) Thus the larger [more information content] a Something is [has] the more such sites it has and the larger any given step in the quest can be. 3) This gives an increase in the average information influx as the quest progresses. 4) If the universe described by that Something has a maximum finite information packing density in its space then an accelerating increase in the size of that space should be observed since both the volume and surface area of a Something inside the Everything increases as the quest progresses. Hal Ruhl --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: dark energy
Hal Ruhl wrote: This is an automatic process like a mass has to answer to the forces [meaningful questions] applied to it. What in the psyche of the mass makes it answer to the forces? George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Bruno Yes I am particularizing things... But the end justifies the means. I am being positivist, trying to express these rules as a function of an observer. In any case, once the specific example is worked out, we can fall back on the general case. Your feedback about exist not really being adequate to express truth is well noted. Let me change the proposed rules to express truth as a function of an axiomatic system A existing as data either in the memory of M or as a axiomatic substrate for a simulated world W. Let's try the following: In a world W simulated according to the axiomatic data system A, there is a machine M, data p and data q such that 1) If M has access to p (possibly in its memory), then p exists in W. (exist=being simulated in W according to A ) 2) If M has access to p, then M has access to the access point to p. 3) If M has access to the information relating or linking p to q then if M has access to p, it also has access to q. Now we can make the statements reflexive ( I don't know if this is the right word) by setting data p = Machine description M. In a simulated world W following the axiomatic data system A there is a machine M=p and data q such that 1) If M has access to M then M exists in W. (reflexivity?) 2) If M has access to M, then M has access to the access point to M. (Infinite reflexivity? - description of consciousness?) 3) If M has information describing q as a consequence of M in accordance with A, then if M has access to M, it also has access to q. (This is a form of Anthropic principle) I am not sure if this is leading anywhere, but it's fun playing with it. Maybe a computer program could be written to express these staqtements. George Bruno Marchal wrote: George, you can do that indeed, but then you are particularizing things. This can be helpful from a pedagogical point of view, but the advantage of the axiomatic approach (to a knowledge theory) is that once you agree on the axioms and rules, then you agree on the consequences independently of the particular instantiation you think about. Word like machine, access, memory, world, data, are, fundamentally harder than the simple idea of knowledge the modal S4 axioms convey. Using machines, for example, could seem as a computationalist restriction, when the axioms S4 remains completely neutral, etc. Also, acceding a memory is more opinion than knowledge because we can have false memory for example. (And then what are the inference rules of your system?). S4 is a normal modal logic with natural Kripke referentials (transitive, reflexive accessibility relations). A bit more problematic is your identification of true with exist. This hangs on possible but highly debatable and complex relations between truth and reality. This is interesting per se, but imo a bit out of topics, or premature (in current thread). Perhaps we will have opportunity to debate on this, but I want make sure that what I am explaining now does not depend on those possible relations (between truth and reality). Bruno Le 24-nov.-07, à 21:23, George Levy a écrit : Bruno thank you for this elaborate reply. I would like these three statements to make use of cybernetic language, that is to be more explicit in terms of the machine or entity to which they refer. Would it be correct to rephrase the statements in the active tense, using the machine as the subject, replacing proposition p by the term data and replacing true by exist? The statements would then be: In a world W there is a machine M, data p and data q such that 1) If M has access to p (possibly in its memory), then p exists in W. 2) If M has access to p, then M has access to the access point to p. 3) If M has access to the information relating or linking p to q then if M has access to p, it also has access to q. I assumed that the term has access means in its memory... but it does not have to. I also assumed in statements 3 that the multiple uses of M refers to the same machine. I guess there may be cases where multiple machines can have access to the dame data. Same with statement 4 George Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 22-nov.-07, à 20:50, George Levy a écrit : Hi Bruno, I am reopening an old thread ( more than a year old) which I found very intriguing. It leads to some startling conclusions. Le 05-août-06, à 02:07, George Levy a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote:I think that if you want to make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some way. Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower
Re: Are First Person prime?
Bruno thank you for this elaborate reply. I would like these three statements to make use of cybernetic language, that is to be more explicit in terms of the machine or entity to which they refer. Would it be correct to rephrase the statements in the active tense, using the machine as the subject, replacing proposition p by the term data and replacing true by exist? The statements would then be: In a world W there is a machine M, data p and data q such that 1) If M has access to p (possibly in its memory), then p exists in W. 2) If M has access to p, then M has access to the access point to p. 3) If M has access to the information relating or linking p to q then if M has access to p, it also has access to q. I assumed that the term has access means in its memory... but it does not have to. I also assumed in statements 3 that the multiple uses of M refers to the same machine. I guess there may be cases where multiple machines can have access to the dame data. Same with statement 4 George Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 22-nov.-07, à 20:50, George Levy a écrit : Hi Bruno, I am reopening an old thread ( more than a year old) which I found very intriguing. It leads to some startling conclusions. Le 05-août-06, à 02:07, George Levy a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote:I think that if you want to make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some way. Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower, and in that case, are you willing to accept the traditional axioms for knowing. That is: 1) If p is knowable then p is true; 2) If p is knowable then it is knowable that p is knowable; 3) if it is knowable that p entails q, then if p is knowable then q is knowable (+ some logical rules). Bruno, what or who do you mean by it in statements 2) and 3). The same as in it is raining. I could have written 1. and 2. like 1) knowable(p) - p 2) knowable(p) - knowable(knowable(p)) In this way we can avoid using words like it, or even like true. p is a variable, and is implicitly universally quantified over. knowable(p) - p really means that whatever is the proposition p, if it is knowable then it is true. The false is unknowable (although it could be conceivable, believable, even provable (in inconsistent theory), etc. The p in 1. 2. and 3. is really like the x in the formula (sin(x))^2 + (cos(x))^2 = 1. knowable(p) - p really means that we cannot know something false. This is coherent with the natural language use of know, which I illustrate often by remarking that we never say Alfred knew the earth is flat, but the he realized he was wrong. We say instead Alfred believed that earth is flat, but then . The axiom 1. is the incorrigibility axiom: we can know only the truth. Of course we can believe we know something until we know better. The axiom 2. is added when we want to axiomatize a notion of knowledge from the part of sufficiently introspective subject. It means that if some proposition is knowable, then the knowability of that proposition is itself knowable. It means that when the subject knows some proposition then the subject will know that he knows that proposition. The subject can know that he knows. In addition, what do you mean by is knowable, is true and entails? All the point in axiomatizing some notion, consists in giving a way to reason about that notion without ever defining it. We just try to agree on some principles, like 1.,2., 3., and then derives things from those principles. Nuance can be added by adding new axioms if necessary. Of course axioms like above are not enough, we have to use deduction rules. In case of the S4 theory, which I will rewrite with modal notation (hoping you recognize it). I write Bp for B(p) to avoid heaviness in the notation, likewize, I write BBp for B(B(p)). 1) Bp - p (incorrigibility) 2) Bp - BBp (introspective knowledge) 3) B(p-q) - (Bp - Bq) (weak omniscience, = knowability of the consequences of knowable propositions). Now with such axioms you can derive no theorems (except the axiom themselves). So you need some principles which give you a way to deduce theorems from axioms. The usual deduction rule of S4 are the substitution rule, the modus ponens rule and the necessitation rule. The substitution rule say that you can substitute p by any proposition (as far as you avoid clash of variable, etc.). The modus ponens rule say that if you have already derived some formula A, and some formula A - B, then you can derive B. The necessitation rule says that if you have already derive A, then you can derive BA. Are is knowable, is true and entails
Re: Are First Person prime?
Hi Bruno, I am reopening an old thread ( more than a year old) which I found very intriguing. It leads to some startling conclusions. Le 05-août-06, à 02:07, George Levy a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote:I think that if you want to make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some way. Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower, and in that case, are you willing to accept the traditional axioms for knowing. That is: 1) If p is knowable then p is true; 2) If p is knowable then it is knowable that p is knowable; 3) if it is knowable that p entails q, then if p is knowable then q is knowable (+ some logical rules). Bruno, what or who do you mean by it in statements 2) and 3). In addition, what do you mean by is knowable, is true and entails? Are is knowable, is true and entails absolute or do they have meaning only with respect to a particular observer? Can these terms be relative to an observer? If they can, how would you rephrase these statements? George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
One more question: can or should p be the observer? George George Levy wrote: Hi Bruno, I am reopening an old thread ( more than a year old) which I found very intriguing. It leads to some startling conclusions. Le 05-août-06, à 02:07, George Levy a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote:I think that if you want to make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some way. Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower, and in that case, are you willing to accept the traditional axioms for knowing. That is: 1) If p is knowable then p is true; 2) If p is knowable then it is knowable that p is knowable; 3) if it is knowable that p entails q, then if p is knowable then q is knowable (+ some logical rules). Bruno, what or who do you mean by it in statements 2) and 3). In addition, what do you mean by is knowable, is true and entails? Are is knowable, is true and entails absolute or do they have meaning only with respect to a particular observer? Can these terms be relative to an observer? If they can, how would you rephrase these statements? George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi
A theory of everyting is sweeping the Physics community. The theory by Garrett Lisi is explained in this Wiki entry. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/An_Exceptionally_Simple_Theory_of_Everything A simulation of E8 can be found a the New Scientist. http://www.newscientist.com/channel/fundamentals/dn12891-is-mathematical-pattern-the-theory-of-everything.html The Wiki entry http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E8_%28mathematics%29 on E8 is also interesting. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: OM measure and universe size
Sorry the nice equation formats did not make it past the server. Anyone
interested in the equations can find them at the associated wiki links.
George
Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Nov 02, 2007 at 12:20:35PM -0700, George Levy wrote:
Russel,
We are trying to related the expansion of the universe to decreasing
measure. You have presented the interesting equation:
H = C + S
Let's try to assign some numbers.
1) Recently an article
http://space.newscientist.com/article/dn12853-black-holes-may-harbour-their-own-universes.html
appeared in New Scientist stating that we may be living inside a black
hole, with the event horizon being located at the limit of what we can
observe ie the radius of the current observable universe.
2) Stephen Hawking
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_hole_thermodynamics showed that the
entropy of a black hole is proportional to its surface area.
S_{BH} = \frac{kA}{4l_{\mathrm{P}}^2}
where where k is Boltzmann's constant
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boltzmann%27s_constant, and
l_{\mathrm{P}}=\sqrt{G\hbar / c^3} is the Planck length
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planck_length.
Thus we can say that a change in the Universe's radius corresponds to a
change in entropy dS. Therefore, dS/dt is proportional to dA/dt and to
8PR(dR/dt) R being the radius of the Universe and P = Pi. Let's assume
that dR/dt = c
Therefore
dS/dt = (k/4 L^2) 8PRc = 2kPRc/ L^2
Since Hubble constant http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hubble%27s_law is
71 ± 4 (km http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kilometer/s
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second)/Mpc
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megaparsec
which gives a size of the Universe
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Observable_universe from the Earth to the
edge of the visible universe. Thus R = 46.5 billion light-years in any
direction; this is the comoving radius
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radius of the visible universe. (Not the
same as the age of the Universe because of Relativity considerations)
Now I have trouble relating these facts to your equation H = C + S or
maybe to the differential version dH = dC + dS. What do you think? Can
we push this further?
George
I think that the formula you have above for S_{BH} is the value that
should be taken for the H above. It is the maximum value that entropy
can take for a volume the size of the universe.
The internal observed entropy S, will of course, be much lower. I
don't have a formula for it off-hand, but it probably involves the
microwave background temperature.
Cheers
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Re: OM measure and universe size
Russel,
We are trying to related the expansion of the universe to decreasing
measure. You have presented the interesting equation:
H = C + S
Let's try to assign some numbers.
1) Recently an article
appeared in New Scientist stating that we may be living "inside" a
black hole, with the event horizon being located at the limit of what
we can observe ie the radius of the current observable universe.
2) Stephen
Hawking showed that the entropy of a black hole is proportional to
its surface area.
where where k is Boltzmann's constant, and is the Planck
length.
Thus we can say that a change in the Universe's radius corresponds to a
change in entropy dS. Therefore, dS/dt is proportional to dA/dt and to
8PR(dR/dt) R being the radius of the Universe and P = Pi. Let's assume
that dR/dt = c
Therefore
dS/dt = (k/4 L^2) 8PRc = 2kPRc/ L^2
Since Hubble
constant is 71 4 (km/s)/Mpc
which gives a size of the
Universe from the Earth to the edge of the visible universe. Thus R
= 46.5 billion light-years in any direction; this is the
comoving radius
of the visible universe. (Not the same as the age of the Universe
because of Relativity considerations)
Now I have trouble relating these facts to your equation H = C + S or
maybe to the differential version dH = dC + dS. What do you think? Can
we push this further?
George
Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Oct 31, 2007 at 05:11:01PM -0700, George Levy wrote:
Could we relate the expansion of the universe to the decrease in
measure of a given observer? High measure corresponds to a small
universe and conversely, low measure to a large one. For the observer
the decrease in his measure would be caused by all the possible mode of
decay of all the nuclear particles necessary for his consciousness.
Corresponding to this decrease, the radius of the observable universe
increases to make the universe less likely.
This would provide an experimental way to measure absolute measure.
I am not a proponent of ASSA, rather I believe in RSSA and in a
cosmological principle for measure: that measure is independent of when
or where the observer makes an observation. However, I thought that
tying cosmic expansion to measure may be an interesting avenue of inquiry.
George Levy
There is a relationship, though perhaps not quite what you think. The
measure of an OM will be 2^{-C_O}, where C_O is the amount of
information about the universe you know at that point in time
(measured in bits). The physical complexity C of the universe at a point
in time is in some sense the limit of all that is possible to know
about the universe, ie C_O = C.
C is related to the size of the universe by the equation H = C + S,
where S is the entropy of the universe (measured in bits), and H is
the maximum possible entropy that would pertain if the universe were
in equilibrium. H is a monotonically increasing function of the size
of the universe - something like propertional to the volume (or
similar - I forget the details). S is also an increasing function (due
to the second law), but doesn't increase as fast as H. Consequently C
increases as a function of universe age, and so C_O can be larger now
than earlier in the universe, implying smaller OM measures.
However, it remains to be seen whether the anthropic reasons for
experiencing a universe 10^9 years and of large complexity we
currently see is necessary...
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Ho Bruno Sorry, I have been unclear with myself and with you. I have been lumping together the assumption of an objective physical world and an objective platonic world. So you are right, I do reject the objective physical world, but why stop there? Is there a need for an objective platonic world? Would it be possible to go one more step - the last step hopefully - and show that a the world that we perceive is solely tied to our own consciousness? So I am more extreme than you thought. I believe that the only necessary assumption is the subjective world. Just like Descartes said: Cogito... I think that the world and consciousness co-emerge together, and the rules governing one are tied to the rules governing the other. In a sense Church's thesis is tied to the Anthropic principle. Subjective reality also ties in nicely with relativity and with the relative formulation of QT. This being said, I am not denying physical reality or objective reality. However these may be derivable from purely subjective reality. Our experience of a common physical reality and a common objective reality require the existence of common physical frame of reference and a common platonic frame of reference respectively. A common platonic frame of reference implies that there are other platonic frames of references.This is unthinkable... literally. Maybe I have painted myself into a corner Yet maybe not... No one in this Universe can say... George Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi George, I think that we agree on the main line. Note that I never have pretended that the conjunction of comp and weak materialism (the doctrine which asserts the existence of primary matter) gives a contradiction. What the filmed-graph and/or Maudlin shows is that comp makes materialism empty of any explicative power, so that your ether image is quite appropriate. Primary matter makes, through comp, the observation of matter (physics) and of course qualia, devoied of any explanation power even about just the apparent presence of physical laws. I do think nevertheless that you could be a little quick when asserting that the mind-body problem is solved at the outset when we abandon the postulate of an objective (I guess you mean physical) world. I hope you believe in some objective world, being it number theoretical or computer science theoretical, etc. You point 3) (see below) is quite relevant sure, Bruno Le 08-oct.-07, à 05:10, George Levy a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: I think that Maudlin refers to the conjunction of the comp hyp and supervenience, where consciousness is supposed to be linked (most of the time in a sort of real-time way) to the *computational activity* of the brain, and not to the history of any of the state occurring in that computation. If you decide to attach consciousness to the whole physical history, then you can perhaps keep comp by making the substitution level very low, but once the level is chosen, I am not sure how you will make it possible for the machine to distinguish a purely arithmetical version of that history (in the arithmetical plenitude (your wording)) from a genuinely physical one (and what would that means?). Hmmm... perhaps I am quick here ... May be I also miss your point. This is vastly more complex than the seven first steps of UDA, sure. I have to think how to make this transparently clear or ... false. As you know I believe that the physical world can be derived from consciousness operating on a platonic arithmetic plenitude. Consequently, tokens describing objective instances in a physical world cease to be fundamental. Instead, platonic types become fundamentals. In the platonic world each type exists only once. Hence the whole concept of indexicals looses its functionality. Uniqueness of types leads naturally to the merging universes: If two observers together with the world that they observe (within a light cone for example) are identical then these two observers are indistinguishable from themselves and are actually one and the same. I have argued (off list) about my platonic outlook versus the more established (objective reality) Aristotelian viewpoint and I was told that I am attempting to undo more than 2000 years of philosophy going back to Plato. Dealing with types only presents formidable logical difficulties: How can types exist without tokens? I find extremely difficult to prove that the absence of an objective reality at the fundamental level. Similarly, about a century ago people were asking how can light travel without Ether. How can one prove that Ether does not exist? Of course one can't but one can show that Ether is not necessary to explain wave propagation. Similarly, I think that the best one can achieve is to show that the objective world is not necessary for consciousness to exist and to perceive or observe a world. However, some points can be made: getting rid of the objective world postulate has the following
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Oops: replace Newton's demon by Maxwell's demon. George George Levy wrote: Hi Bruno, Yes I am still on the list, barely trying to keep up, but I have been very busy. Actually the ball was in my court and I was supposed to answer to your last post to me about a year ago!!!. Generally I agree with you on many things but here I am just playing the devils' advocate. The Maudlin experiment reminds me of an attempt to prove the falsity of the second law of thermodynamics using Newton's demon. As you probably know, this attempt fails because the thermodynamics effect on the demon is neglected when in fact it should not be The Newton Demon experiment is not thermodynamically closed. If you include the demon in a closed system, then the second law is correct. Similarly, Maudlin's experiment is not informationally closed because Maudlin has interjected himself into his own experiment! The accidentally correctly operating machines need to have their tape rearranged to work correctly and Maudlin is the agent doing the rearranging. So essentially Maudlin's argument is not valid as an attack on physical supervenience. As you know, I am at the extreme end of the spectrum with regards the physical world supervening on consciousness. (Mind over matter instead of matter over mind), so I would very much like to see an argument that could prove it, but in my opinion Maudlin's does not cut it. More comments below. Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi George, Are you still there on the list? I am really sorry to (re)discover your post just now, with a label saying that I have to answer it, but apparently I didn't. So here is the answer, with a delay of about one year :( Le 08-oct.-06, à 08:00, George Levy wrote : Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my computer. (The original at the Iridia web site http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.) Apparently it works now. You have to scroll on the pdf document to see the text. In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of consciousness which is comprised partially of a later physical process and partially of the recording of an earlier physical process. Right. It is possible to resolve the paradox simply by saying that consciousness involves two partial processes ... Why? With comp, consciousness can be associated with the active boolean graph, the one which will be recorded. No need of the second one. Yes, but in the eyes of a materialist but I have restored the possibility that consciousness can supervene on the physical. I have exposed Maudlin's trickery. I agree that consciousness can be associated with a boolean graph and that there is no need for physical substrate. However, Maudlin does not prove this case because he got involved in his own experiment. ... each occupying two different time intervals, the time intervals being connected by a recording, such that the earlier partial process is combined with the later partial process, the recording acting as a connection device. But is there any sense in which consciousness can supervene on the later partial process? All the trouble is there, because the later process has the same physical process-features than the active brain, although by construction there is no sense to attribute it any computational process (like a movie). I am not saying that consciousness supervene on the physical substrate. ok. All I am saying is that the example does not prove that consciousness does not supervene the physical. Yes, you are right from a logical point of view, but only by assuming some form of non-computationalism. With comp + physical supervenience, you have to attach a consciousness to the active boolean graph, and then, by physical supervenience, to the later process, which do no more compute. (And then Maudlin shows that you can change the second process so that it computes again, but without any physical activity of the kind relevant to say that you implement a computation. So, physical supervenience is made wrong. Yes but Maudlin cheated by interjecting himself into his experiment. So this argument does not count. The example is just an instance of consciousness operating across two different time intervals by mean of a physical substrate and a physical means (recording) of connecting these two time intervals. The problem is that with comp, consciousness has to be associated to the first process, and by physical supervenience, it has to be attached also to the second process. But then you can force the second process to do the correct computation (meaning that it handles the counterfactuals), without any genuine physical activity (reread Maudlin perhaps, or its translation in term of filmed graph like in chapter trois of Conscience et Mécanisme). So
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Hi Bruno, Yes I am still on the list, barely trying to keep up, but I have been very busy. Actually the ball was in my court and I was supposed to answer to your last post to me about a year ago!!!. Generally I agree with you on many things but here I am just playing the devils' advocate. The Maudlin experiment reminds me of an attempt to prove the falsity of the second law of thermodynamics using Newton's demon. As you probably know, this attempt fails because the thermodynamics effect on the demon is neglected when in fact it should not be The Newton Demon experiment is not thermodynamically closed. If you include the demon in a closed system, then the second law is correct. Similarly, Maudlin's experiment is not informationally closed because Maudlin has interjected himself into his own experiment! The accidentally correctly operating machines need to have their tape rearranged to work correctly and Maudlin is the agent doing the rearranging. So essentially Maudlin's argument is not valid as an attack on physical supervenience. As you know, I am at the extreme end of the spectrum with regards the physical world supervening on consciousness. (Mind over matter instead of matter over mind), so I would very much like to see an argument that could prove it, but in my opinion Maudlin's does not cut it. More comments below. Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi George, Are you still there on the list? I am really sorry to (re)discover your post just now, with a label saying that I have to answer it, but apparently I didn't. So here is the answer, with a delay of about one year :( Le 08-oct.-06, à 08:00, George Levy wrote : Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my computer. (The original at the Iridia web site http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.) Apparently it works now. You have to scroll on the pdf document to see the text. In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of consciousness which is comprised partially of a later physical process and partially of the recording of an earlier physical process. Right. It is possible to resolve the paradox simply by saying that consciousness involves two partial processes ... Why? With comp, consciousness can be associated with the active boolean graph, the one which will be recorded. No need of the second one. Yes, but in the eyes of a materialist but I have restored the possibility that consciousness can supervene on the physical. I have exposed Maudlin's trickery. I agree that consciousness can be associated with a boolean graph and that there is no need for physical substrate. However, Maudlin does not prove this case because he got involved in his own experiment. ... each occupying two different time intervals, the time intervals being connected by a recording, such that the earlier partial process is combined with the later partial process, the recording acting as a connection device. But is there any sense in which consciousness can supervene on the later partial process? All the trouble is there, because the later process has the same physical process-features than the active brain, although by construction there is no sense to attribute it any computational process (like a movie). I am not saying that consciousness supervene on the physical substrate. ok. All I am saying is that the example does not prove that consciousness does not supervene the physical. Yes, you are right from a logical point of view, but only by assuming some form of non-computationalism. With comp + physical supervenience, you have to attach a consciousness to the active boolean graph, and then, by physical supervenience, to the later process, which do no more compute. (And then Maudlin shows that you can change the second process so that it computes again, but without any physical activity of the kind relevant to say that you implement a computation. So, physical supervenience is made wrong. Yes but Maudlin cheated by interjecting himself into his experiment. So this argument does not count. The example is just an instance of consciousness operating across two different time intervals by mean of a physical substrate and a physical means (recording) of connecting these two time intervals. The problem is that with comp, consciousness has to be associated to the first process, and by physical supervenience, it has to be attached also to the second process. But then you can force the second process to do the correct computation (meaning that it handles the counterfactuals), without any genuine physical activity (reread Maudlin perhaps, or its translation in term of filmed graph like in chapter trois of Conscience et Mécanisme). So, postulating comp, we have to associate the many possible physical brains to a type of computation
Re: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Brent meeker writes: It could be argued that not even God could create a world in which there are no accidents, conflicts of interest, disappointments, and so on, at least not without severely limiting his creatures' freedom. However, it would have been possible for God to limit the capacity for suffering, favouring pleasure rather than avoidance of pain as a motivating factor. A sado-masochistic world would do the trick, wouldn't it? George :-) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 09-oct.-06, 21:54, George Levy a crit : To observe a split consciousness, you need an observer who is also split, ? This is simple. The time/space/substrate/level of the observer must match the time/space/substrate/level of what he observes. The Leibniz analogy is good. In your example if one observes just the recording without observing the earlier creation of the recording and the later utilization of the recording, then one may conclude rightfully that the recording is not conscious. in sync with the split consciousness, across time, space, substrate and level (a la Zelazny - Science Fiction writer). In your example, for an observer to see consciousness in the machine, he must be willing to exist at the earlier interval, skip over the time delay carrying the recording and resume his existence at the later interval. If he observes only a part of the whole thing, say the recording, he may conclude that the machine is not conscious. This is unclear for me. Unless you are just saying like Leibniz that you will not "see" consciousness in a brain by examining it under a microscope. Note also that I could attribute consciousness to a recording, but this makes sense only if the recording is precise enough so that I could add the "Klaras" or anything which would make it possible to continue some conversation with the system. And then I do not attribute consciousness to the physical appearance of the system, but to some people which manifests him/it/herself through it. Adding Klaras complicate the problem but the result is the same. Klaras must be programmed. Programming is like recording, a means for inserting oneself at programming time for later playback at execution time. I have already shown that Maudlin was cheating by rearranging his tape, in effect programming the tape. So I agree with you if you agree that programming the tape sequence is just a means for connecting different pieces of a conscious processes where each piece operates at different times. In addition, if we are going to split consciousness maximally in this fashion, the concept of observer becomes important, something you do not include in your example. Could you elaborate. I don't understand. As a consequence of the reasoning the observer (like the knower, the feeler) will all be very important (and indeed will correspond to the hypostases (n-person pov) in the AUDA). But in the reasoning, well either we are valid going from one step to the next or not, and I don't see the relevance of your point here. I guess I miss something. I do not understand the connection with the hypostases in the AUDA. However, it is true that the conscious machine is its own observer, no matter how split its operation is. (i.e., time sharing, at different levels... etc). However, the examples will be more striking if a separate observer is introduced. Of course the separate observer will have to track the time/space/substrate/level of the machine to observe the machine to be conscious (possibly with a Turing test). Forgive me for insisting on a separate observer, but I think that a relativity approach could bear fruits. You could even get rid of the recording and replace it with random inputs (happy rays in your paper). As you can see with random inputs, the machine is not conscious to an observer anchored in the physical. The machine just appears to follow a random series of states. But if the machine can be observed to be conscious if it is observed precisely at those times when the random inputs match the counterfactual recording. So the observer needs to "open his eyes" precisely only at those times. So the observer needs to be linked in some ways to the machine being conscious. If the observer is the (self reflecting) machine itself there is no problem, the observer will automatically be conscious at those times. If the observer is not the machine, we need to invoke a mechanism that will force him to be conscious at those times. It will have to be almost identical to the machine and will have to accept the same random data So in a sense the observer will have to be a parallel machine with some possible variations as long as these variations are not large enough to make the observer and the machine exist on different time/space/substrate/level. Therefore from the point of view of the second machine, the first machine appears conscious. Note that for the purpose of the argument WE don't have to assume initially that the second machine IS conscious, only that it can detect if the first machine is conscious. Now once we establish that the first machine is conscious we can infer that the second machine is also conscious simply because it is identical. The example is of course a representation of our own (many)world. (**) I am open to thoroughly discuss this, for example in november. Right now I am a bit over-
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 08-oct.-06, 08:00, George Levy a crit : Bruno, Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my computer. (The original at the Iridia web site http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.) Thanks for telling. I know people a reconfiguring the main server at IRIDIA, I hope it is only that. In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of consciousness which is comprised partially of a later physical process and partially of the recording of an earlier physical process. It is possible to resolve the paradox simply by saying that consciousness involves two partial processes each occupying two different time intervals, the time intervals being connected by a recording, such that the earlier partial process is combined with the later partial process, the recording acting as a connection device. I mainly agree. But assuming comp it seems to me this is just a question of "acceptable" implementation of consciousness. Once implemented in any "correct" ways, the reasoning shows, or is supposed to show, that the inner first person experience cannot be attributed to the physical activity. The "physical" keep an important role by giving the frame of the possible relative manifestations of the consciousness. But already at this stage, consciousness can no more been attached to it. On the contrary, keeping the comp hyp, the physical must emerge from the coherence of "enough" possible relative manifestations. I am not saying that consciousness supervene on the physical substrate. All I am saying is that the example does not prove that consciousness does not supervene the physical. The example is just an instance of consciousness operating across two different time intervals by mean of a physical substrate and a physical means (recording) of connecting these two time intervals. In this case, would you take this as an argument for the necessity of the physical, you would change the notion of physical supervenience a lot. You would be attaching consciousness to some history of physical activity. I agree with all this. I would be changing the notion of physical supervenience such that the physical substrate can be split into time intervals connected by recordings. . But why stop here. We could create an example in which the substrate is maximally split, across time, space, substrate and level. On the other hand, widening the domain of supervenience (time, space, substrate and level) does not seem to eliminate the need for the physical. Here I am arguing against myself... We may solve the problem if we make supervenience recursive, i.e.. software supervening on itself without needing a physical substrate just like photons do not need Ether. In addition, if we are going to split consciousness maximally in this fashion, the concept of observer becomes important, something you do not include in your example. To observe a split consciousness, you need an observer who is also split, in sync with the split consciousness, across time, space, substrate and level (a la Zelazny - Science Fiction writer). In your example, for an observer to see consciousness in the machine, he must be willing to exist at the earlier interval, skip over the time delay carrying the recording and resume his existence at the later interval. If he observes only a part of the whole thing, say the recording, he may conclude that the machine is not conscious. But if you keep comp, you will not been able to use genuinely that past physical activity. If you could, it would be like asking to the doctor an artificial brain with the guarantee that the hardware of that brain has been gone through some genuine physical stories, although no memory of those stories are needed in the computation made by the new (artificial) brain; or if such memory *are* needed, it would mean the doctor has not made the right level choice. Now, when you say the reasoning does not *prove* that consciousness does not supervene the physical, you are correct. But sup-phys says there is no consciousness without the physical, i.e. some physical primary ontology is needed for consciusness, and that is what the reasoning is supposed to be showing absurd: not only we don't need the physical (like thermodynamicians do not need "invisible horses pulling cars"), but MOVIE-GRAPH + UDA (*) makes obligatory the appearance of the physical emerging from *all* (relative) computations, making twice the concept of primitive matter useless. OK? ...I realize I could be clearer(**) (*) Caution: in "Conscience et Mecanisme" the movie-graph argument precedes the UD argument (the seven first step of the 8-steps-version of the current UDA). In my Lille thesis, the movie graph follows the UD argument for eliminat
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Bruno, Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my computer. (The original at the Iridia web site http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.) In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of consciousness which is comprised partially of a later physical process and partially of the recording of an earlier physical process. It is possible to resolve the paradox simply by saying that consciousness involves two partial processes each occupying two different time intervals, the time intervals being connected by a recording, such that the earlier partial process is combined with the later partial process, the recording acting as a connection device. I am not saying that consciousness supervene on the physical substrate. All I am saying is that the example does not prove that consciousness does not supervene the physical. The example is just an instance of consciousness operating across two different time intervals by mean of a physical substrate and a physical means (recording) of connecting these two time intervals. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Bruno, Stathis, Thank you Stathis for the summary. I do have the paper now and I will read it carefully. Based on Sathis summary I still believe that Maudlin is fallacious. A computer program equivalent to Maudlin's construction can be written as: IF (Input = -27098217872180483080234850309823740127) THEN (Output = 78972398473024802348523948518347109) ELSE Call Conscious_Subroutine ENDIF. If the input 27098217872180483080234850309823740127 is always given then the ELSE clause is never invoked. The point is that to write the above piece of code, Maudlin must go through the trouble of calculating perhaps on his hand calculator the answer 78972398473024802348523948518347109 that the Conscious_Subroutine would have produced had it been called. (Notice the conditional tense indicating the counterfactual). He then inserts the answer in the IF clause at programming time. In so doing he must instantiate in his own mind and/or calculator the function of the Conscious_Subroutine for the particular case in which input = 27098217872180483080234850309823740127, If the single numeral input is replaced by a function with multiple numerical inputs, Maudlin trick could be expanded by using tables to store the output and instead of using an IF statement, Maudlin could use a CASE statement. But then, Maudlin would have to fill up the whole table with the answers that the Conscious_Subroutine would have produced. In the ultimate case you could conceive of a huge table that contains all the answers that the Conscious_Subroutine would ever answer to any question. This table however must be filled up. In the process of filling up the table you must instantiate all state of consciousness of the Conscious_Subroutine. Bruno, says: BTW I thought you did understand the physics/psychology (theology/computer-science/number-theory) reversal. What makes you changing your mind? (just interested). I did not change my mind. I just believe that Maudlin's reasoning is faulty. By calculating the output Maudlin inserts himself and possibly his calculator in the conscious process. To understand the insertion of Maudlin into the consciousness of The Conscious_Subroutine, you must agree that this consciousness is independent of time, space, substrate and level. This Maybe is the Moral of Maudlin's Machinations...? George Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 03-oct.-06, 21:33, George Levy a crit : Bruno, I looked on the web but could not find Maudlin's paper. Mmh... for those working in an institution affiliated to JSTOR, it is available here: http://www.jstor.org/view/0022362x/di973301/97p04115/0 I will search if some free version are available elsewhere, or put a pdf-version on my web page. So I just go by what you are saying. I still stand by the spirit of what I said but I admit to be misleading in stating that Maudlin himself is part of the machine. It is not Maudlin, but Maudlin's proxy or demon, the Klaras which is now parts of the machine. Maudlin used the same trick that Maxwell used. He used a the demon or proxy to perform his (dirty) work. It seems to me that if you trace the information flow you probably can detect that Maudlin is cheating: How are the protoolympia and the Klaras defined? Maudlin is cheating ? No more than a doctor who build an artificial brain by copying an original at some level. Remember we *assume* the comp hypothesis. To design his protoolympia and the Klaras he must start with the information about the machine and the task PI. If he changes task from PI to PIprime than he has to apply a different protoolympia and different Klaras, and he has to intervene in the process! Yes but only once. Changing PI to PIprime would be another thought experiment. I don't see the relevance. I know you got the paper now. It will help in this debate. Maudlin's argument is far from convincing. BTW I thought you did understand the physics/psychology (theology/computer-science/number-theory) reversal. What makes you changing your mind? (just interested). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Oops. Read: IF (Input = 27098217872180483080234850309823740127) George George Levy wrote: Bruno, Stathis, Thank you Stathis for the summary. I do have the paper now and I will read it carefully. Based on Sathis summary I still believe that Maudlin is fallacious. A computer program equivalent to Maudlin's construction can be written as: IF (Input = -27098217872180483080234850309823740127) THEN (Output = 78972398473024802348523948518347109) ELSE Call Conscious_Subroutine ENDIF. If the input 27098217872180483080234850309823740127 is always given then the ELSE clause is never invoked. The point is that to write the above piece of code, Maudlin must go through the trouble of calculating perhaps on his hand calculator the answer 78972398473024802348523948518347109 that the Conscious_Subroutine would have produced had it been called. (Notice the conditional tense indicating the counterfactual). He then inserts the answer in the IF clause at programming time. In so doing he must instantiate in his own mind and/or calculator the function of the Conscious_Subroutine for the particular case in which input = 27098217872180483080234850309823740127, If the single numeral input is replaced by a function with multiple numerical inputs, Maudlin trick could be expanded by using tables to store the output and instead of using an IF statement, Maudlin could use a CASE statement. But then, Maudlin would have to fill up the whole table with the answers that the Conscious_Subroutine would have produced. In the ultimate case you could conceive of a huge table that contains all the answers that the Conscious_Subroutine would ever answer to any question. This table however must be filled up. In the process of filling up the table you must instantiate all state of consciousness of the Conscious_Subroutine. Bruno, says: BTW I thought you did understand the physics/psychology (theology/computer-science/number-theory) reversal. What makes you changing your mind? (just interested). I did not change my mind. I just believe that Maudlin's reasoning is faulty. By calculating the output Maudlin inserts himself and possibly his calculator in the conscious process. To understand the insertion of Maudlin into the consciousness of The Conscious_Subroutine, you must agree that this consciousness is independent of time, space, substrate and level. This Maybe is the Moral of Maudlin's Machinations...? George Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 03-oct.-06, 21:33, George Levy a crit : Bruno, I looked on the web but could not find Maudlin's paper. Mmh... for those working in an institution affiliated to JSTOR, it is available here: http://www.jstor.org/view/0022362x/di973301/97p04115/0 I will search if some free version are available elsewhere, or put a pdf-version on my web page. So I just go by what you are saying. I still stand by the spirit of what I said but I admit to be misleading in stating that Maudlin himself is part of the machine. It is not Maudlin, but Maudlin's proxy or demon, the Klaras which is now parts of the machine. Maudlin used the same trick that Maxwell used. He used a the demon or proxy to perform his (dirty) work. It seems to me that if you trace the information flow you probably can detect that Maudlin is cheating: How are the protoolympia and the Klaras defined? Maudlin is cheating ? No more than a doctor who build an artificial brain by copying an original at some level. Remember we *assume* the comp hypothesis. To design his protoolympia and the Klaras he must start with the information about the machine and the task PI. If he changes task from PI to PIprime than he has to apply a different protoolympia and different Klaras, and he has to intervene in the process! Yes but only once. Changing PI to PIprime would be another thought experiment. I don't see the relevance. I know you got the paper now. It will help in this debate. Maudlin's argument is far from convincing. BTW I thought you did understand the physics/psychology (theology/computer-science/number-theory) reversal. What makes you changing your mind? (just interested). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
List members I scanned Maudlin's paper. Thank you Russell. As I suspected I found a few questionable passages: Page417: line 14: "So the spatial sequence of the troughs need not reflect their 'computational sequence'. We may so contrive that any sequence of address lie next to each other spatially." Page 418 line 5: "The first step in our construction is to rearrange Klara's tape so that address T[0] to T[N] lie spatially in sequence, T[0] next to T[1] next to T[2], etc... How does Maudlin know how to arrange the order of the tape locations? He must run his task Pi in his head or on a calculator. Maudlin's reaches a quasi religious conclusion when he states: "Olympia has shown us a least that some other level beside the computational must be sought. But until we have found that level and until we have explicated the relationship between it and the computational structure, the belief that ...of pure computationalism will ever lead to the creation of artificial minds or the the understanding of natural ones, remains only a pious hope." Let me try to summarize: Maudlin is wrong in concluding that there must be something non-computational necessary for consciouness. Maudlin himself was the unwitting missing consciousness piece inserted in his machine at programming time i.e., the machine's consciouness spanned execution time and programming time. He himself was the unwitting missing piece when he design his tape. The correct conclusion IMHO is that consciousness is independent of time, space, substrate and level and in fact can span all of these just as Maudlin partially demonstrated - but you still need an implementation -- so what is left? Like the Cheshire cat, nothing except the software itself: Consistent logical links operating in a bootstrapping reflexive emergent manner. Bruno is right in applying math/logic to solve the consciousness/physical world (Mind/Body) riddle. Physics can be derived from machine psychology. George Russell Standish wrote: If I can sumarise George's summary as this: In order to generate a recording, one must physically instantiate the conscious computation. Consciousness supervenes on this, presumably. Maudlin say aha - lets take the recording, and add to it an inert machine that handles the counterfactuals. This combined machine is computationally equivalent to the original. But since the new machine is physically equivalent to a recording, how could consciousness supervene on it. If we want to keep supervenience, there must be something noncomputational that means the first machine is conscious, and the second not. Marchal says consciousness supervenes on neither of the physical machines, but on the abstract computation, and there is only one consciousness involved (not two). Of course, this all applies to dreaming machines, or machines hooked up to recordings of the real world. This is where I concentrate my attack on the Maudlin argument (the Multiverse argument). Cheers --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Maudlin's argument
Bruno Marchal wrote in explaining Maudlin's argument: "For any given precise running computation associated to some inner experience, you can modify the device in such a way that the amount of physical activity involved is arbitrarily low, and even null for dreaming experience which has no inputs and no outputs. Now, having suppressed that physical activity present in the running computation, the machine will only be accidentally correct. It will be correct only for that precise computation, with unchanged environment. If it is changed a little bit, it will make the machine running computation no more relatively correct. But then, Maudlin ingenuously showed that counterfactual correctness can be recovered, by adding non active devices which will be triggered only if some (counterfactual) change would appear in the environment. I believe the argument is erroneous. Maudlin's argument reminds me of the fallacy in Maxwell's demon. To reduce the machine's complexity Maudlin must perform a modicum of analysis, simulation etc.. to predict how the machine performs in different situations. Using his newly acquired knowledge, he then maximally reduces the machine's complexity for one particular task, keeping the machine fully operational for all other tasks. In effect Maudlin has surreptitiously inserted himself in the mechanism. so now, we don't have just the machine but we have the machine plus Maudlin. The machine is not simpler or not existent. The machine is now Maudlin! In conclusion, the following conclusion reached by Maudlin and Bruno is fallacious. "Now this shows that any inner experience can be associated with an arbitrary low (even null) physical activity, and this in keeping counterfactual correctness. And that is absurd with the conjunction of both comp and materialism." Maudlin's argument cannot be used to state that "any inner experience can be associated with an arbitrary low (even null) physical activity." Thus it is not necessarily true that comp and materialism are incompatible. I think the paradox can be resolved by tracing how information flows and Maudlin is certainly in the circuit, using information, just like Maxwell's demon is affecting entropy. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Solipsism unplugged
The scientist could prove that he is not alone by invoking the principle of sufficient reason: nothing is arbitrary and exist with no reason. If something exists in a particular arbitrary way (himself) with no reason for him to be in that particular way, then all other alternatives of him must also exist (the Plenitude). Hence he is not alone. Solipsism is dead. George Colin Hales wrote: This is an extract from the full work on solipsism. It is one special section written in the first person, for what else could a solipsist scientist do? I'd be interested in any comments... it paints a rather bizarre picture of science. - I, Solipsist Scientist Copyright(c) 2006. Colin Hales. All rights reserved. - I am a solipsist scientist in that I accept that my mind, which is producing the dialogue you now read, is the one and only conclusively proven mind and possibly the only mind. My mind is an image in a kind of mirror; a phenomenal mirror. The image I see and feel and smell and taste is all I have to enact my craft, my science. Modern neuroscience shows me my brain in the act of being a mirror for me. The image is what philosophy calls my phenomenal consciousness or my phenomenality. I can experiment on my own phenomenality say, by closing my eyes, which I note has a dramatic effect on my ability to do science. When I sleep dreamlessly my phenomenality is absent and when I awake the apparent external world in my mirror is consistently behaving as if it recently had me asleep in it. Yet, as a solipsist I am forced to question the actual existence of what is depicted in my mirror. It is only an image, after all, and images can be fabricated. As a solipsist I attribute this apparent external world depicted within my mirror to be the work of the 'magical fabricator'. At the same time I must find it remarkable that my phenomenality somehow, via the mysterious solution to the 'hard problem', appears to intimately connect me to an external world. I know that my sensory data (nerve signals from the peripheral nervous system that have no innate phenomenality) are used by my apparent brain to create my phenomenality. As a scientist my job is to extract and depict regularity in the appearances within my phenomenal mirror's image as scientifically justified beliefs in the form of useful, predictive generalisations. I know that when I do science what I am doing is correlating the appearances of the contents of my phenomenality. The most obvious evidence of this in any of my scientific papers is that of the 'test' subject in contrast to the 'control' subject. In the case of Newtonian dynamics I would be correlating the behaviour of a mass and the space it inhabits. All of this makes very good sense to me. Yet I am troubled. Within my mirror's image are what appear to be other scientists with brains that look the same as mine. These scientists are merely fabrications in my own mirror's image. Yet despite being mere fabrications they appear, to me, to do science on exquisitely novel things just as well as I do using my real mind. At the same time I cannot see the image in their mirror and vice versa. All report seeing only brain material. I take this as lending support to my solipsism in that I can claim their minds not to exist, which is consistent with my conviction that the external world does not exist. If I am right, and my image(mind) is the only image(mind), then their science is done without any image of their own. The 'magical fabricator' of my image goes to an amazing amount of trouble to make it appear 'as-if' the external world shown to me in my mirror does exist. The scientists within it behave 'as-if' they had the kind of mind I know I must have to do science. To be a solipsist scientist in this circumstance is to live in cooperation with this extravagant fabrication including apparent scientists as adept as myself. As a solipsist scientist, inwardly and silently I deny (remain scientifically unable to confirm) that an external world exists. But as a scientist within this apparent world I am fundamentally conflicted. To be consistent with the behaviour of all the other scientists, outwardly I am forced to act 'as-if' there was an external reality. Also, inwardly I know my mind is the only proven reality, yet to my scientist colleagues, to remain consistent I must deny my own mind as much as I deny theirs. I live in this situation of denial that I have something more than my colleagues have. I am thus doubly conflicted, for I must also act 'as-if' I have no mind, for to declare otherwise is to be inconsistent with my claims about my scientist colleagues, to whom I am identical. Yet despite this odd personal situation the system works, in a way. My scientist colleagues continue to act as-if they had minds. Their scientific lives - our lives - of appearance correlation go on as usual. The whole system is
It's a mad mad mad world (was computationalism and supervenience)
If you're not sure that you are sane, then you must be crazy to say "Yes Doctor.".. ...yet a man could say it but not a "sane" machine. Bruno's quest based on machine psychology runs the risk of leaving unanswered the really big quest based on human psychology. George Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 21-aot-06, 07:11, Stathis Papaioannou a crit : It seems to me that there are two main sticking points in the discussions on several list threads in recent weeks. One is computationalism: is it right or wrong? This at least is straightforward in that it comes down to a question of faith, in the final analysis, as to whether you would accept a digital replacement brain or not (Bruno's "yes doctor" choice). Yes. Unfortunately this gives not a purely operational definition of comp. Someone could say yes to the doctor, just thinking that God exists, and that God is infinitely Good so that he will manage to resuscitate him through the reconstitution (he believes also God is infinitely powerful). So comp is really the belief that you can survive with an artificial brain *qua computatio", that is, through the respect of some digital relation only. The other sticking point is, given computationalism is right, what does it take to implement a computation? There have been arguments that a computation is implemented by any physical system (Putnam, Searle, Moravec) and by no physical system (Maudlin, Bruno Marchal). OK. To be sure Maudlin would only partially agree. Maudlin shows (like me) that we have: NOT COMP or NOT PHYSICAL SUPERVENIENCE But apparently Maudlin want to keep physical supervenience, and thus concludes there is a problem with comp. I keep comp, and thus I conclude there is a problem with physical supervenience. Actually I just abandon the thesis of the physical supervenience, to replace it by a thesis of number-theoretical supervenience. The discussion about Platonism and the ontological status of mathematical structures, in particular, relates to this second issue. Bruno alludes to it in several papers and posts, and also alludes to his "movie graph argument", but as far as I can tell that argument in its entirety is only available in French. That's true. I should do something about that. I don't feel it is so urgent in the list because there are more simple problem to tackle before, and also, most "MWI", or "Everything"-people can easily imagine the UD doesn't need to be run. But this is a subtle problem for those who have faith in their uniqueness or in the uniqueness of the world. Still you are right, I should write an english version of the movie graph. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
It's a mad mad mad world (was computationalism and supervenience)]
Slight correction: If you are sane then you're not sure that you are sane, then you would have to be crazy to say "Yes Doctor.".. ...yet a man could say it but not a "sane" machine. Bruno's quest based on machine psychology runs the risk of leaving unanswered the really big quest based on human psychology. George Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 21-aot-06, 07:11, Stathis Papaioannou a crit : It seems to me that there are two main sticking points in the discussions on several list threads in recent weeks. One is computationalism: is it right or wrong? This at least is straightforward in that it comes down to a question of faith, in the final analysis, as to whether you would accept a digital replacement brain or not (Bruno's "yes doctor" choice). Yes. Unfortunately this gives not a purely operational definition of comp. Someone could say yes to the doctor, just thinking that God exists, and that God is infinitely Good so that he will manage to resuscitate him through the reconstitution (he believes also God is infinitely powerful). So comp is really the belief that you can survive with an artificial brain *qua computatio", that is, through the respect of some digital relation only. The other sticking point is, given computationalism is right, what does it take to implement a computation? There have been arguments that a computation is implemented by any physical system (Putnam, Searle, Moravec) and by no physical system (Maudlin, Bruno Marchal). OK. To be sure Maudlin would only partially agree. Maudlin shows (like me) that we have: NOT COMP or NOT PHYSICAL SUPERVENIENCE But apparently Maudlin want to keep physical supervenience, and thus concludes there is a problem with comp. I keep comp, and thus I conclude there is a problem with physical supervenience. Actually I just abandon the thesis of the physical supervenience, to replace it by a thesis of number-theoretical supervenience. The discussion about Platonism and the ontological status of mathematical structures, in particular, relates to this second issue. Bruno alludes to it in several papers and posts, and also alludes to his "movie graph argument", but as far as I can tell that argument in its entirety is only available in French. That's true. I should do something about that. I don't feel it is so urgent in the list because there are more simple problem to tackle before, and also, most "MWI", or "Everything"-people can easily imagine the UD doesn't need to be run. But this is a subtle problem for those who have faith in their uniqueness or in the uniqueness of the world. Still you are right, I should write an english version of the movie graph. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: I think, was Difficulties in communication. . .
Brent Meeker wrote: George Levy wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: That brings us back to Descartes "I think therefore I am"; which Russell pointed out was an unsupported inference. IMHO everything hinges on "I think." "I think" MUST BE THE STARTING POINT - for any conscious observer THERE IS NO OTHER OBSERVABLE STARTING POINT! Are you disputing Russell's point that "I" is a construct and "thinking" is all you have without inference? Yes. I am disputing what Russell said: "I think" IS THE ONE AND ONLY STARTING POINT for any conscious thought process. It is both an observation and an axiom. Developing the concept of "I think" in a formal mathematical fashion as Bruno is attempting to do is IMO the right way to proceed. I also believe that "I think" leads to a relative (or relativistic) TOE - probably a very extreme view. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: I think, was Difficulties in communication. . .
Brent Meeker wrote: George Levy wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: George Levy wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: That brings us back to Descartes "I think therefore I am"; which Russell pointed out was an unsupported inference. IMHO everything hinges on "I think." "I think" MUST BE THE STARTING POINT - for any conscious observer THERE IS NO OTHER OBSERVABLE STARTING POINT! Are you disputing Russell's point that "I" is a construct and "thinking" is all you have without inference? Yes. I am disputing what Russell said: "I think" IS THE ONE AND ONLY STARTING POINT for any conscious thought process. It is both an observation and an axiom. Developing the concept of "I think" in a formal mathematical fashion as Bruno is attempting to do is IMO the right way to proceed. I also believe that "I think" leads to a relative (or relativistic) TOE - probably a very extreme view. George As I understand him, Bruno agrees with Russell that "I" is a construct or inference. I think you are right. Bruno is not as extreme as I am but I am not sure exactly where he stands. He may be non-committed or he may not know how to reconcile my viewpoint with his math. It would be nice if we could reconcile the two viewpoints!!! That's why there can be 1st-person indeterminancy. No. This is not why. In fact, first person indeterminacy probably reinforces my point. First person indeterminacy comes about because there are several links from one observer moment (could be called "I" state) to the next logical (or historically consistent) logical moment. As you can see everything hinges on the "I" states. You can view I states either as nodes or as branches depending how you define the network. Of course those logical links are emergent as figment of imagination of the "I" in an anthropy kind of way. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime? - time
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Bruno, I spent some (!) time on speculating on 'timelessness' - Let me tell up front: I did not solve it. Hi John For example, we can conceive of a consciousness generated by a computer operating in a time share mode where the time share occur every thousand years. The important thing is that there should be a logical flow in the computation, and it really does not matter what is the time scale, the sampling, in which dimension you operate or the level of computation. (you could be operating across several levels) The only thing that matters is that each point of the computation be connected to the next one by a valid logical link, as in a network. This logical network in fact frees you from having to specify a dimension such as time or a level of computation. The logical connections (or consistent histories as Bruno calls them) in the network are in fact emergent according to the Anthropic principle. The logical links (or consistencies) exist because you are there to observe them. Just as a Rorschach test . You are making the links as you go along. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
David Nyman wrote: Third person perception comes about when several observers share the same perception because they share the same environmental contingencies on their existence. In effect these observers share the same "frame of reference." I see many similarities with relativity theory which I have discussed numerous times on this list in the past. Let's be clear: all these observer have a first person perspective, however this first person perspective appears to be the same across observers, and therefore appears to be *independent* of the observers. This perspective can be called *objective* but we must keep in mind that it is the same only because the frame of reference is the same. Thus the concept of objectivity loses its meaning unless we raise the meaning to a higher level and accept that different observers will predictably see different things, just like in relativity theory different observers may predictably make different measurements of the same object. Again I agree here. In the terminology I've been using, the frame of reference would be communicated in terms of the 'shareable knowledge base', or inter-personal (third person) discourse. What you are saying above seems consistent with Colin Hales' views both on 1-person primacy and the nature of 3-person. Any comments on those? I am sorry David, I have not been following all threads very closely - It would take a full time commitment to do so. Perhaps each post, especially the long ones, should be preceded by an abstract. ;-) Could you point me in the right direction? George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
David Nyman wrote: George Levy wrote: Not at all. A bidirectional contingency is superfluous. The only relevent contingency is: If the observed event will result in different probabilities of survival for myself and for others observing me, then our perceptions will be different. I understand this way of putting it. Third person perception comes about when several observers share the same perception because they share the same environmental contingencies on their existence. In effect these observers share the same "frame of reference." I see many similarities with relativity theory which I have discussed numerous times on this list in the past. Let's be clear: all these observer have a first person perspective, however this first person perspective appears to be the same across observers, and therefore appears to be *independent* of the observers. This perspective can be called *objective* but we must keep in mind that it is the same only because the frame of reference is the same. Thus the concept of objectivity loses its meaning unless we raise the meaning to a higher level and accept that different observers will predictably see different things, just like in relativity theory different observers may predictably make different measurements of the same object. Again I agree here. In the terminology I've been using, the frame of reference would be communicated in terms of the 'shareable knowledge base', or inter-personal (third person) discourse. What you are saying above seems consistent with Colin Hales' views both on 1-person primacy and the nature of 3-person. Any comments on those? David Colin Hales remarks seem to agree with what I say. However, I do not deny the existence of a third person perspective. I only say that it is secondary and an illusion brought about by having several observers share the same frame of reference. This frame of reference consists of identical contingencies on their existence. I have a little bit of trouble understanding your terms: "shared knowledge base" and interpersonal discourse. One way to force your nomenclature and mine to be identical is to say that "share knowledge base" and interpersonal discourse" are completely dependent on physical laws which are completely dependent of the shared contingencies. Thus our basic thinking process is rooted in the physical objects comprising our brain. These physical objects owe their existence to our shared contingencies. Here we are developing an equivalence between mental processes and physical processes. In other words I can imagine any process that the universe is capable of supporting, and it is possible to simulate in the universe any thought process that I am capable of imagining. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
1Z wrote: I don't even know what you mean by "first person". David Nyman wrote: Peter It's a bit late in the day perhaps to tell me you 'don't even know what I mean by first person'! However, I'll have another go. I'm concerned to distinguish two basic meanings, which failing to specify IMO causes a lot of confusion: 1) First person 1 (FP1) - the point-of-view that is directly claimed by an individual (FP1i) such as David or Peter, or what is generally meant when the word 'I' is directly uttered by such a person. 2) First person 2 (FP2) - representations of an FP1 point-of-view as modelled within members of the FP1 community. The usage of 'David' or 'Peter' in point 1) exemplifies one type of such representation, whose presumed referent is an FP1i person. Here is an explanation more grounded in Physics: The concept of "first person" comes directly from the Everett manyworlds, Schoedinger cat experiment and the quantum suicide (thought) experiment. In a quantum suicide the subject of the experiment does not see himself dying. He can only see himself continuing living along a branch of the manyworld in which his experiment went awry. His perception is first person. Witnesses to the experiment are likely to see the subject die and their point of view is third person. Thus first person and third person imply some kind of "relativity" contingent on the observer's own existence. More generally, one can assume that the laws of physics themselves are contingent on the observer -ie. the world is being destroyed every nanoseconds or faster when it diverges into MW branches not supporting life. - the only worlds we can observe are those worlds upholding those physical laws supporting life. According to this hypothesis our primary perception of the world is first person. Thus first person perception of the world comes about when our own existence is contingent on our observation. Third person perception comes about in situations when our own existence is not contingent on our observation. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
David Nyman wrote: George Levy wrote: Thus first person perception of the world comes about when our own existence is contingent on our observation. Hi George I think I agree with this. It could correspond with what I'm trying to model in terms of FP1 etc. Perhaps it might be expressed as: First person perception of the world comes about when our own observation and existence are mutually contingent Not at all. A bidirectional contingency is superfluous. The only relevent contingency is: If the observed event will result in different probabilities of survival for myself and for others observing me, then our perceptions will be different. Third person perception comes about in situations when our own existence is not contingent on our observation. Now here I'm not so clear. In sum, I'm not clear what sort of observation is *not* contingent on our existence, except someone else's observation, and so far as I can see this is always first person by your definition. Do you simply mean to define any observation not involving ourselves as 'third person' from our point-of-view? Third person perception comes about when several observers share the same perception because they share the same environmental contingencies on their existence. In effect these observers share the same "frame of reference." I see many similarities with relativity theory which I have discussed numerous times on this list in the past. Let's be clear: all these observer have a first person perspective, however this first person perspective appears to be the same across observers, and therefore appears to be *independent* of the observers. This perspective can be called *objective* but we must keep in mind that it is the same only because the frame of reference is the same. Thus the concept of objectivity loses its meaning unless we raise the meaning to a higher level and accept that different observers will predictably see different things, just like in relativity theory different observers may predictably make different measurements of the same object. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
1Z wrote: George Levy wrote: A conscious entity is also information. I am assuming here that a conscious entity is essentially "software." George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Bruno Marchal wrote: Would it be possible to map your three axiomatic lines replacing "knowable" by "think" and "true" by "exist." ... See my conversation with 1Z (Peter D. Jones). I will define "exist" by " "exist" is true". Then we have: 1 If p thinks then p exists; This does not make sense at all, I prefer to say honestly. It is not the proposition p which thinks, and I don't understand what would it means that a proposition exists. I dont' really see any problem if we think of a conscious entity just like a proposition as information. Proposition p is information which can be either true or false. A conscious entity is also information. In this case, if the information is true then the entity exists. I guess you are perhaps saying here that If a Machine(entity) thinks then it exists. Then OK. But as you know I don't believe the reverse is true. In particular I belief that the square root of two exist (perhaps under the form of a total computable function), but I would not say that the square root of two thinks. The English language is treacherous. we have to be careful when we use the word "exist." I think there are several kinds of existence. In any case to assert that the square root of two exists is assigning to the square root of two an existence independent of any observer, thereby negating the primacy of first person. I do think that the multiverse even got rich but devoid of consciousness (immaterial) comp-branches. 2 If p thinks then it is thinkable that p thinks; All right with the interpretation that "p" is some entity, not a proposition. Perhaps you are identifying machines and propositions? This can be done with the Fi and Wi , and it needs many cautions. Yes I am saying that machines, propositions, databases, programs, and conscious minds are different words for the same thing: information. Thus information can be true, false or unknown. 3 If it is thinkable that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks. One of the problem lies with the "it" word as in: "if 'it' is knowable" or "If 'it' is thinkable". What or who is "it?" Here again the English or French languages can be treacherous. 1 If p thinks then p exists; (This maps nicely with Descartes as stated from a third person) 2 If p thinks then p think that p thinks; (This is nice reflective statement essential to consciousness) 3 If p think that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks. (The phrase "p entails q" reminds me vaguely of the Anthropic principle. I am not sure what to make of this. My children think???) Your way of talking is a bit confusing as you seem to see by yourself :) The first two statements are relatively easy to understand. The first one is more or less what Descartes said. The second one is a reflective form probably necessary for consciousness. The third statement taken seriously is intringing. If entity p thinks that entity q is necessary for p's existence, then if p thinks then q thinks. In other words all necessary conditions for my own existence form a conscious entity. This is weird. It is as if I had my own personal Personal God or guardian angel. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Bruno Marchal wrote: I think that if you want to make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some way. Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower, and in that case, are you willing to accept the traditional axioms for knowing. That is: 1) If p is knowable then p is true; 2) If p is knowable then it is knowable that p is knowable; 3) if it is knowable that p entails q, then if p is knowable then q is knowable (+ some logical rules). Bruno, I like where this may be leading This may be the first step to your roadmap. As you know I have been a supporter of first person primitive for a long time. My roadmap was simple. It is a chain rule a la Descartes. I mentionned it before. Let me repost it: I think therefore I am (Descartes) I am therefore the world is (Anthropic principle) The world is therefore the plenitude is. (Principe of sufficient reason: if something is observed to be arbitrary and without any cause, then all other alternatives must also be realized) Let me make these statements more precise: I think what I think, therefore I am what I am. (Descartes augmented by defining my consciousness and being as a function of my thought process) I am what I am, therefore the world is what it is. (Anthropic principle augmented by defining the world in more precise terms as a function of exactly who I am - There is a strange echo from the burning bush in Exodus) The world is what it is, therefore the plenitude is. Would it be possible to map your three axiomatic lines replacing "knowable" by "think" and "true" by "exist." Then we have: If p thinks then p exists; If p thinks then it is thinkable that p thinks; If it is thinkable that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks. The phrase "it is thinkable" is undefined possibly because of third person (it?) inferencing. If we make it squarely first person then we have: If p thinks then p exists; (This maps nicely with Descartes as stated from a third person) If p thinks then p think that p thinks; (This is nice reflective statement essential to consciousness) If p think that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks. (The phrase "p entails q" reminds me vaguely of the Anthropic principle. I am not sure what to make of this. My children think???) George Levy --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: K the Master Set (+ partial answer to Tom's Diagonalization)
Hi Bruno Each one of us like to do what we do best and we apply our preferred techniques to the problem at hand. Thus a mechanic may solve the pollution problem by building electric cars, and the cook may solve the same problem by preparing vegetarian meals. As a mathematician you are trying to compose a theory of everything using mathematics, this is understandable, and you came up with COMP which is strongly rooted in mathematics and logic. I came up independently with my own concept involving a generalization of relativity to information theory ( my background is engineering/physics) and somehow we seem to agree on many points. Unfortunately I do not have the background and the time to give my ideas a formal background. It is just an engineering product and it feels right. I believe that what you are saying is right, however I am having some trouble following you, just like Norman Samish said. It would help if you outlined a roadmap. Then we would be able to follow the roadmap without having to stop and admire the mathematical scenery at every turn even though it is very beautiful to the initiated, I am sure. For example you could use several levels of explanation: a first level would be as if your were talking to your grandmother; a second level, talking to your kids (if they listen); a last level, talking to your colleagues. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Stephen Paul King wrote: little discussion has been given to the implications of taking the 1st person aspect as primary or fundamental. Could you point me toward any that you have seen? Hi Stephen Alas, I am a mere engineer, not a philosopher. The only author I can point you to is John Locke who I was told had some view similar to the ones I expressed. I have formed my opinions mostly independently in the process of writing a book (unpublished :'( ) I think that science is moving gradually toward first person - starting with Galileo's relativity, then Einstein's relativity and finally with QM (MWI). As science had progressed, the observer has acquired a greater and greater importance. Extrapolating to the limit, I becomes central and its existence anthropically defines (creates) the world where it resides. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Symmetry, Invarance and Conservation
Hi Stephen
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear George,
Could it be that Consciousness is more
related and identifiable with the "processing" of Information than with
Information itself?
I agree that consciousness is not just information. As you say,
consciousness seems to be associated with processing of information.
However, even "processing of information" is not sufficient. For
example a computer processes information but is not conscious. There is
also a need for self referentiality.
Consider the example often raised (I do not know
the original source) of a Book that contained a "complete description"
of Einstein's Brain. It was claimed that this book was in fact
equivalent to Einstein himself even to the degree that one could "have
a conversation with Einstein" by referencing the book. (Never mind the
fact that QM's non-cummutativity of canonical conjugate observables
make it impossible for *any* classical object to be completely
specified in a way that is independent of observational frame, but I
digress...)
http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/courses/intro/notes/einstein.html
I am questioning the idea that there can be a book containing a
"complete description" of Einstein's Brain that can be "read"
independently of your frame of reference. Is the book containing a
snapshot of the brain at a particular microsecond in Einstein's life?
In this case I doubt whether this book can be called conscious.
Or is it a video book containing the whole life history of Einstein's
brain? In which case, you'll have trouble "reading" the book unless
you change your frame of reference. If you push the "play" button on
the video player all you will see is a movie of Einstein brain
INTERACTING WITH ITS ENVIRONMENT - NOT YOUR ENVIRONMENT. (This is like
a hologram. Did you know that an object seen in a hologram casts a
shadow in the environment where the hologram is created but not in the
viewing environment?) Changing your frame of reference to Einstein's
environment would be extremely difficult - you'll need a time machine.
The only "practical?" way to get a good rendition of Einstein's brain
THAT INTERACTS WITH YOUR ENVIRONMENT is to simulate it on a computer.
Then you can call it conscious.
[snip]
Could it be that the "hard Problem" of
consciousness follows inevitably from our hard-headed insistence that
the Universe is Classical ("object have definite properties in
themselves") in spite of the massive pile of unassailable evidence
otherwise? If we treat Consciousness as "what a quantum
computer(brain!)does", i.e. process qubits, instead of a classical
object, maybe, just maybe we might find the "problem" not to be so
intractably "hard"after all! ;-)
You remind me of Penrose with whom I disagree. Using the quantum
computer paradigm is like shoving the mind-body and consciousness
problem under the quantum carpet. We must first get a good
understanding of self referential systems, classical or quantum. Bruno
seems to be on the right track but I think we are still waiting for the
linkage between diagonalization and self referentiality and
consciousness... (forgive me if I have missed something in his
argument)
"The message needs no medium!" Marshall McLuhan got it all wrong! :-)
George Levy
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Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Stephen Stephen Paul King wrote: I would like to point out that you may have inadvertently veered into the problem that I see in the Yes Doctor belief! It is entirely unverifiable. It is unverifiable from the 3rd person perspective. From the first person perspective it is perfectly verifiable. I will not observe any changes in myself after the (brain) substitution. This is a fundamental invariance and it is another argument why the first person perspective should be the primary one and the 3rd one should be the derived one. And here again specifying the frame of reference is important to avoid confusion. George Levy --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Symmetry, Invarance and Conservation (Was Number and function for non-mathematician)
In the July 1-7 2006 edition of New Scientist there is a review of the book "The Comprehensible Cosmos" by Victor Stenger. You can see here a power point presentation on symmetry by Stenger. Stenger discusses the idea of symmetry, in particular the work of Emmy Noether who proved that the conservation of energy is a direct consequence of time translation symmetry: the same result is obtained if an experiment is performed now or at a different time. Other natural laws can be traced to other symmetries: i.e., conservation of momentum to space translation symmetry etc... I think it may be valuable to express some of our ideas as symmetries/invariances/conservation/equivalence. For example the invariance/conservation of information with regard to the recording substrate is obvious. Information does not change if you transfer it from your hard drive to your floppy (ie., hardware translation symmetry.) This fact, however, may be of far reaching consequence. If one assumes that consciousness is a type of information then consciousness become independent of its physical basis: "The message is independent of the medium!" Or even better: "The message needs no medium!" Marshall McLuhan got it all wrong! :-) George Levy Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 05-juil.-06, 20:36, George Levy a crit : My background is more engineering and physics than mathematics and I do share some of Norman misgivings. Some of it has to do with terminology. For example the term "COMP hypothesis" does not carry any information. One of my old name for it was "digital mechanism hypothesis" Would it be more appropriate to rename it as an invariance, equivalence or conservation law? For example would it be appropriate to call it "invariance of consciousness with (change in physical) substrate?" It is more the assumption that there is a level of description of myself such that my consciousness is indeed invariant for functional digital substitution made at that level. You can invoke "physical" but then you must make the proof a bit longer. This is due to the fact that the UDA put doubt on the very meaning of the word physical, so you need to justify that the use of "physical" is harmless in the definition of comp. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Number and function for non-mathematician
Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Norman, Le 20-juin-06, 04:04, Norman Samish a crit : I've endured this thread long enough! Let's get back to something I can understand! My background is more engineering and physics than mathematics and I do share some of Norman misgivings. Some of it has to do with terminology. For example the term "COMP hypothesis" does not carry any information. Would it be more appropriate to rename it as an invariance, equivalence or conservation law? For example would it be appropriate to call it "invariance of consciousness with (change in physical) substrate?" George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A calculus of personal identity
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 23-juin-06, 07:29, George Levy a crit : In Bruno's calculus what are the invariances? (Comment on Tom Caylor's post) Logicians, traditionally, are interested in deduction invariant with respect of the interpretation. A typical piece of logic is that: from "p q" you can infer "p". And the intended meaning of this, is that that deduction is always valid: it does not depend of the interpretations of "p" and "q". Those who remember the Kripke semantics of the modal logical systems remember perhaps that a logical theory is an invariant for the trip from world to world when accessible, making the theorems true in all (locally and currently perhaps) accessible worlds. I suggest the following invariances which are possibly identical to the above statement about Kripke semantic, but have a more "physical" point of view. They may also be related to Church's thesis: 1) Invariance in the perception of one's own consciousness with changes in the substrate implementation : "Yes doctor" I agree that a prosthesis of part of my brain will not affect my consciousness. 2) Invariance in the perception of one's own consciousness with the MW branching: Bruno in Washington will feel just like Bruno in Moscow except for his perception of the environment. 3) Invariance in the laws of physics with substrate implementation: simulation performed on different computers are indistinguishable if they perform the same algorithms or functions. (Note that Invariance in the laws of physics is a general relativity postulate.) 4) Invariance in the laws of physics with MW branching: This invariance may be grounded in the requirement that consciousness must require physics with consistent histories and the absence of white rabbits Notice the parallel between consciousness and the laws of physics. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Stephen Stephen Paul King wrote: Since information is observer-dependent (Shannon) this issue brings us back to the observer. I think that eventually all observables will have to be traced back to the observer who is in fact at the nexus of the mind-body problem. [SPK] I agree! What is an Observer? If we are to use an axiomatic formulation of a TOE then the observer should be an axiom or even "The Axiom": ala Descartes "I think" and possibly more precisely and reflexively "I think what I think" with all the implied logical meaning and/or axiomatic system: This should cut through the Gordian Knot of the mind-body problem. We'll have to refer to Bruno's work to flesh out this idea in a formal fashion. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A calculus of personal identity
Lee Corbin wrote: I find that the 1st person accounts to be pretty subjective, actually. They also lead to inconsistencies and unnecessary differences of opinion. Interestingly the geocentric Aristotelian system was replaced by the heliocentric Copernican system. Then Relativity and Quantum Theory came along and restored the centrality of the observer with a vengence. Now the frame of reference that defines what is to be observed is not the Earth anymore but the observer himself or herself. Different observers make different observations, however the important thing is to find the invariances. In Bruno's calculus what are the invariances? (Comment on Tom Caylor's post) In history, the 1st person experience (e.g. the stars revolve around the Earth) are always upstaged sooner or later by actual, objective data. Objective data can only be deduced after all invariances are taken into account. Until then all data is subjective. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Stephen Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Quentin et al, I keep reading this claim that only the existence of the algorithm itself is necessary and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned for mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an implementation in terms of some Platonic Number, is sufficient to give a model of that can be used to derive anything like the world of appearences that we have. Is the world fundamentally physical or can it be reduced to ideas? This is an interesting issue. If a TOE exists then it would have to explain the physics and the objects. This reminds me of the Ether controversy. Is there a need for the Ether for waves to propagate? The most up-to-date answer is that waves carry their own physical substrate. They can be waves and/or particles. Similarly there should be equivalence between information and matter/energy. Thus a process or algorithm should have inherently within itself its own physical substrate. Since information is observer-dependent (Shannon) this issue brings us back to the observer. I think that eventually all observables will have to be traced back to the observer who is in fact at the nexus of the mind-body problem. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Lee, Lee Corbin wrote: George writes Is the world fundamentally physical or can it be reduced to ideas? This is an interesting issue. If a TOE exists then it would have to explain the physics and the objects. This reminds me of the Ether controversy. Is there a need for the Ether for waves to propagate? The most up-to-date answer is that waves carry their own "physical substrate." They can be waves and/or particles. Similarly there should be equivalence between information and matter/energy. Thus a process or algorithm should have inherently within itself its own physical substrate. Well, that sounds good to me, but what do I know. Since information is observer-dependent (Shannon) this issue brings us back to the observer. I think that eventually all observables will have to be traced back to the observer who is in fact at the nexus of the mind-body problem. But why can't photographic apparatuses, or amoeba, count as observers? (They don't have minds, right, or, uh, do they?) I really confess to not understanding the claim that information is observer dependent; if a region contained one of thirty-two possible binary bit strings of length 5, it seems to me that it would contain five bits, even if no light from it ever reached other parts of the universe. Lee If I say something to you in Sanskrit you will likely not understand it. It will carry zero information. However If I say it in English you will be much more likely to understand it. If I say to you that your name is Lee Corbin, it will not add any information to what you already know. Again, it will carry zero information. This is what Shannon calls Mutual Information. In the first case *you* don't have the decoder to translate Sanskrit to English. In the second case you have the decoder but for *you*, the information is not new: you already know that your name is Lee Corbin. Old information is no information at all. Received mutual information is dependent on the information that already exists in the mind of the receiver (or observer). In this sense Shannon's information theory is a relativity theory of information just like Galileo's dynamics and Einstein's relativity are relativity theories of physics and just like Everett's interpretation is a relativity theory of quantum events. This is the reason I believe that the observer is at the nexus of the mind-body problem and that eventually we'll find that the "mind" and the "body" are two aspects of the same thing. Bruno seems to be in the right track in developing a calculus of the soul (or consciousness). George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: *THE* PUZZLE (was: ascension, Smullyan, ...)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Proceeding that way you will run into trouble. But it is very easy to find the k. Let us be specific and let us imagine you have already written in Fortran a generator of all programs of the one-variable partial computable functions: F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 ... The list of programs is P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 ... Each Pi(n) computes Fi(n) Now program G in Fortran. It is something like that: Begin G Read X Call the generator of program up to X, giving PX Apply PX on X, and put the result in register 439 Add 1 to the content of register 439 Output the content of register 439 End Now, look at your list of programs Pi until you find it, and look at his number code (where n is the number code of Pn by definition). Finding your program in your list of programs should be easy given that the list P1 P2 P3 ... is ordered lexicographicaly (by length, and by alphabetical order for those of same length). So you can find it easily. Is number code is the number k. If you run G on k, your fortran interpreter will run for ever (and your fortran compiler will generate a code which run for ever). Speaking just a little bit loosely. Let's be more specific. Begin G Read X Call generator of program which produces P1, P2, P3..in sequence. Select Program PX. Compute the value PX(X). Save the value into register 439 Add 1 to content of register 439. Call this value Y Now look at the list of all programs P1(1), P2(2) The scanning program could be: i = 1(initiate counter i to 1) Start Loop If Pi(i) = Y then k=i; Exit Else i=i+1 End if End Loop My point is that the loop will never end and you will never find k. If you did find k then Pk(k) = P(k)+1 which is impossible. However, I don't see any problem in using P(x) for computing G(x) for any x --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: *THE* PUZZLE (was: ascension, Smullyan, ...)
I went on a 10 day trip during which I had no access to email... a lot has happened on this list since then. Bruno Marchal wrote: And fortran programs are fortran generable, so I can generate a sequence of all fortran one-variable program F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 (all means that soon or later this sequence goes trough any fortran programs: it is of course an infinite set) So, given that the sequence F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, ... is generable, the corresponding diagonal function G defined by G(n) = Fn(n) + 1 *is* programmable in fortran. So there *is* a k such that G = Fk And what will happen if I apply G on its own number-code k? Just this: your machine will crash! The fortran interpreter will go in loop or in an infinite computations. Ok. G(n) = Fn(n)+1 is computable. The hard part is finding the k such that G(k)=Fk(k). I could try scanning all instances of Fk(k) from k=0 to a very large number. The scan will never find a match.because there is no k that satisfies both G(k) = Fk(k)+1 and G(k)=Fk(k). The key point if, I may insist, is that 1) the superset (of programmable functions, not everywhere defined) is MECHANICALLY enumerable. You can write a fortran program generating their codes. 2) the subset of (computable function from N to N) is enumerable, but is NOT MECHANICALLY enumerable. The bijection with N exists, but is not programmable, in *any* programming language! George ? Are you ok. Hanging on Remember, I would like to know how all this relates to *me.* George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Reasons and Persons
Russell Standish wrote: This would imply that there exist "islands" of indentity, and having limited awareness in time and multispace, we can only ever be aware of one instance from each island, but that might change with technology. BTW another analogy is the islands of geneflow within biological species. Within biology, we have such things as ring species, where two species at a location (eg Britain) cannot interbreed, yet can interbreed with neighbouring species to the east and west in an interrupted chain that circumnavigates the pole. (Sorry I may not be explaining the concept of ring species too well - look up Wikipedia). In such a case, perhaps "ring identities" such as Jesse Mazer - Bruno Marchal do exist - but I'd like to be surer of the analogy. Also ring species are the exception, not the rule, in Nature. If we can define an intermediary state common to all species then we will have bridged all the isolated island. It seems that at the embryonic stage and possibly at the fetus stage, rhe nervous circuitry is so simple that it may be common between all individual of a specie and there are no identity islands. So we could say with near certainty that Bruno Marchal and Jesse Mazer used to be one and the same. In addition we may assume that embryonic and fetal development allows for a continuous distribution of neurons in the brain rather than in discrete space positions, and an incremental connectivity of the neurons such that any particular neuron may differ by a single connection. With these assumptions we may infer that there is a continuity in personal identity from anyone to anyone. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Ascension (was Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Meanwhile, I would like to ask George and the others if they have a good understanding of the present thread, that is on the fact that growing functions has been well defined, that each sequence of such functions are well defined, and each diagonalisation defines quite well a precise programmable growing function (growing faster than the one in the sequence it comes from). Just a tiny effort, and I think we will have all we need to go into the heart of the matter, and to understand why comp makes our universe a godelized one in the Smullyan sense. To speak only for myself, I think I have a sufficient understanding of the thread. Essentially you have shown that one cannot form a set of all numbers/functions because given any set of numbers/functions it is always possible, using diagonalization, to generate new numbers/functions: the Plenitude is too large to be a set. This leads to a problem with the assumption of the existence of a Universal Dovetailer whose purpose is to generate all functions. I hope this summary is accurate. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example
One can create faster and faster rising functions and larger and larger number until one is blue in the face. The point is that no matter how large a finite number n one defines, I can stand on the shoulder of giants and do better by citing n+1 using simple addition. Now if somehow one came up with a finite number n so large that I am not allowed to say n+1 as if I was up against an overflow limitation similar to that found in computers, then there would be no physical way for me to invent or cite a larger number. So it seems that if we are to define a largest finite number we must define it in conjunction with the number b of bits that we are allowed to use to express this number. For a given number of bits b the largest number would be n(b). If we use the Ackerman series of functions we need 1 bit for addition, 2 bits for multiplication, 3 bits for exponentiation, 4 bits for tetration etc... These bits are required in addition to the bits for the input parameter(s) of the function. What is the largest number of bits which are available to me to define an Ackerman function or some other fast rising function? Possibly the number of particles in the universe? I don't know if the fairy would be satisfied or if I could personally herd all those bits. Is she expecting me to hand in a piece of paper with the number written on it? Maybe then the answer would be the number generated by the largest Ackerman function that I can write with a very fine pen on this piece of paper. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Now I think I should train you with diagonalization. I give you an
exercise: write a program which, if executed, will stop on the biggest
possible natural number. Fairy tale version: you meet a fairy who
propose you a wish. You ask to be immortal but the fairy replies that
she has only finite power. So she can make you living as long as you
wish, but she asks precisely how long. It is up too you to describe
precisely how long you want to live by writing a program naming that
big (but finite) number. You have a limited amount of paper to write
your answer, but the fairy is kind enough to give you a little more if
you ask.
You can ask the question to very little children. The cutest answer I
got was "7 + 7 + 7 + 7 + 7" (by a six year old). Why seven? It was the
age of his elder brother!
Hint: try to generate an infinite set S of more and more growing and
(computable) functions, and then try to diagonalize it. S can be
{addition, multiplication, exponentiation, (?)}. More hints
and answers later. I let you think a little bit before. (Alas it looks
I will be more busy in may than I thought because my (math) students
want supplementary lessons this year ...).
Any potentially largest finite number n that I could name could be
incremented by 1 so this finite number could not be the largest. The
trick is not to name a particular number but to specify a method to
reach the unreachable.
Method 1) Use the fairy power against her. She says she has "finite
power". Ask for precisely the largest number of days she can provide
with her "finite power." This method is similar to the robber's
response when the victim asks him "how much money do you want?": "All
the money in your pocket."
Method 2) Use the concept of "limits" Ask for as many days it would
take to obtain a sum of 2 as terms in the series 1+1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 +
1/16. If the fairies knows any math she may argue that the series
never reaches 2. On the other hand I may argue that "in the limit" it
does reach 2.
Method 3) Come up with a unprovably non-halting problem: For
example ask for as many days as required digits in PI to prove that PI
has a single repetition of a form such that digits 1 to n match
digits n+1 to 2n. For example 2^0.5 = 1.4142135... has a single
repetition (1 4 match 1 4) in which digits 1 to 2 match digits 3 to 4.
Similarly 79^0.5=8.8881944 and 147^0.5= 12.12435565. Note that the
repetition must include all numbers 1 to n from the beginning and match
all number n+1 to 2n The problem with this approach is I don't know for
sure if PI is repeatable or non-repeatable (according to above
requirements.) I don't even know if this problem is unprovable. All I
know is that the probability for any irrational to have a single repeat
is about 0.. For PI the probability is much lower since I already
know PI to a large number of digits and as far as I can see it does not
repeat. However, with this approach I could be taking chances.
Diagonalization clearly allows you to specify a number outside any
given set of number, but I have not been able to weave it into this
argument.
George
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Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example
Bruno, Thank you for still working on my post. I am working on the reply, in particular designing the set of function or number that can be diagonalized to generate a large number. I shall be busy this weekend with family matters but I will reply to you in detail. I agree that the idea of quantum suicide did not originate with Tegmark, even though he is the one who popularized it. The idea also came to me independently in the early 1990's as I was pondering the Scroedinger cat experiment. What if I was the cat? How would I feel? What if I was the scientist conducting the experiment and I was inside a larger box enclosing the whole experiment? Would I feel the superposition? These are very obvious questions to ask. This Scroedinger cat experiment approximately dates to the 1920-1930's (?) and it is very well possible that others have had the same thought. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
The Riemann Zeta - Trouble opening posts
I have had trouble opening The Riemann Zeta Pythagorean TOE posts. As soon as I open the post my mail software (in Netscape) closes. I think there is an invisible character or command associated with the subject line, that forces the software to close. I have also experienced the same effect on two other occasions. The first required the word sponsor to be in the subject line. The second required the !!! to be in the subject line. My virus software did not detect any virus. If you continue this thread could you please erase the subject line and retype it. This should get rid of the phantom command. Has anyone else have the same problem? George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The Riemann Zeta Pythagorean TOE
I think there is a need for one more person. This is how I would define
first person pov and third person pov:
Third person is a single history pov that requires the
observation of
an event whose existence does not correlate with the existence of the
observer. This is the classical, objective, scientific pov.
First person is a single history pov that requires the
observation of an event whose existence correlates with the existence
of the observer. Thus in a Quantum suicide experiement the bomb never
goes off from the first person pov but almost always goes off from the
third person pov.
The additional required person(s) is/are the plural, in which one would
be aware of all the histories. There may even be a need for a first
person plural and a third person plural: in other words, even in the
plural our observation of multiple histories may be affected if the
event we are observing bears on our own existence. This is the pov in
experiments involving quantum superposition.
Tom, your definition of 3rd person is more like my definition of 3rd
person plural.
First person is a single history and corresponds to: "I" AND "the bomb
does not go off.".
Third person is a single history and corresponds to "I" AND the bomb
goes off/probability{bomb goes off}.
Plural person is multiple histories regarding the bomb, and corresponds
to "I" AND ("the bomb goes off" inclusive OR "the bomb does not go
off".) = "I"
George Levy
Tom Caylor wrote:
Bruno,
I have a couple of random thoughts, but I hope they are not too
incoherent (decoherent?) for someone to understand and see if it leads
anywhere.
First, it seems that the comp distinction between 1st and 3rd person
point-of-view can be expressed roughly as OR vs. AND respectively. In
other words, from the 1st person pov, I am either in one history OR the
other (say Moscow or Washington). From the 3rd person pov, someone is
both in one history AND the other history at the same time (perhaps
like quantum superposition?). Now roughly when we OR independent
probabilities we use ADDITION, and when we AND them we use
MULTIPLICATION. This rings a bell with Godel's sufficiently rich set
of axioms. It similarly rings a bell with the prime numbers. Could
there be a connection here through this means?
Secondly, conversely to your thoughts, perhaps given the above
connection to help out, could the proof of the Riemann Hypothesis
supply the elimination of white rabbits from comp?
Tom
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Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example
Bruno Marchal wrote: <> Le 25-mars-06, 00:51, George Levy a crit : Smullyan's white knigth had the mission to teach me about the logic of G and G*. Sorry, he failed. All right, but this is just because he miss Church Thesis and Comp. His purpose actually is just to introduce you to Godel and Lob theorems, not to computer science. The heart of the matter is that mathematical systems (machines, angels, whatever) cannot escape the diagonalisation lemma, and so life for them is like the life of those reasoners travelling on fairy knight Knave island with curious self-referential question. With comp *we* cannot escape those diagonal propositions. I am looking forward to examples involving people being diagonalized...hmmm Hilbert did come up with a thought experiment with an infinite number of people lodged in a hotel actually we want to go further than that and assume an infinite number of selves in the many-worldOnce upon many times (Ils etaient des fois...), there were several princesses...they looked into self referential magic mirrorsand they lived ever after. I would like someone to come up with an extreme adventure story like the travelling twin, Schroedinger's cat, or Tegmark's suicide experiment to illustrate G and G*. For example this story would describe a close brush with death.. It would create a paradox by juxtaposing 1) classical or common sense logic assuming a single world, I think you miss the diagonalization notion. I will work on that. I am looking forward to being diagonalized. I hope it won't hurt too much. I will give you "real examples", but don't throw out FU to quickly. \ OK. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example
Dear members of the list, Bruno and those who understand G. I have read or rather tried to read Smullyan's book. His examples are totally fabricated. I will never meet the white knight in the island of liars and truthtellers. I need examples which are relevant to life, at least the way I understand it in the context of the many-worlds. Einstein (or maybe someone writing about relativity) came up with the paradox of the travelling aging twin. Schroedinger came up with his cat's paradox. Tegmark came up with the quantum suicide experiment. Granted, I will never travel near the speed of light; I will never put a cat in a box equipped with a random and automatized killing device; and I will not attempt suicide; my wife would just kill me. However, these examples fired up my imagination: travelling near the speed of light, existing in a superposition of state, surviving a nuclear bomb under your chair. Smullyan's white knigth had the mission to teach me about the logic of G and G*. Sorry, he failed. The white knight does not fire up my imagination. I don't care about his island and about his questions. However I do care about life, death and immortality. The many-world does seem to guarantee a form of immortality, at least according to some interpretations. I consider this issue to be very relevant since sooner or later each one of us will be facing the issue of death or of non-death. I would like someone to come up with an extreme adventure story like the travelling twin, Schroedinger's cat, or Tegmark's suicide experiment to illustrate G and G*. For example this story would describe a close brush with death.. It would create a paradox by juxtaposing 1) classical or common sense logic assuming a single world, 2) classical or common sense logic assuming the many-world, and 3) G/G* logic assuming the many-world. What would the white knight do if he were living in the many-world? What kind of situations would highlight his talent to think in G. Would his behavior appear to be paradoxical from our logical point of view? George Levy --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and unreal things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness then is not a real property. I have to ask you one more time, but I'll reverse the question, what does it means for an object not to be real (hence being abstract) ? it is not a joke, I want to know. I will insert my grain of salt in a very active thread In my opinion, reality is relative, more precisely, the perception of reality depends on the level of implementation or the level of illusion. Here I use the term implementation to refer to third person perception and illusion to refer to first person perception. For example, a simulated character perceives simulated objects as real. He has the illusion that they are real. Similarly we perceive our world to be real. It kicks back. We have the illusion that our world is real. Is it? It all depends how you look at it. One could say that our consciousness is emergent by the bootstrapping of reflexive illusions: our world is an illusion that allows us to have the illusion that we exist. (I am not sure but it may be that my term "illusion" has the same meaning as the term "dream" that Bruno very often uses as in "we are dreaming machines." ) Thus, in my opinion, there is no absolute reality. All we have is the implementation/illusion of reality at our level of implementation/illusion. George Levy --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Unprovable Physical Truths and Unwinnable Arguments
There is a great article entitled "The Limts of Reason" by Gregory Chaitin in the March Issue of Scientific American page 74. I quote: "So perhaps mathematicians should not try to prove everything. Sometimes they should try to add new axioms. That is what you have got to do when you are faced with an irreducible fact. Physicists are willing to add new principles, new scientific laws, to understand new domains of experience... This caused me to think about unprovable physical truths or impossible measurements. A simple one includes a nice reflective component: "what do you look like in the mirror with the eyes closed?" I tried it on my wife when she was in a good mood. "Darling", I said, "did you ever think about what you look like in the mirror with your eyes closed?" "I know what I look like," she said. "I can imagine it." "Yeah, but you don't really know for sure." "I can find out by taking a photograph of myself with my eyes closed, if I wanted to, but that would be a really stupid thing to do." Ah ha! Now we are getting somewhere, I thought. Maybe I could squeeze in the concept of simultaneity a la Einstein. Then I turned to her and gave her the coup de grace, "Yeah but you won't know what you look like at the precise time you look in the mirror." She looked at me straight in the eyes and said, "George, you are giving me a headache!" The moral of the story is: do not experiment or argue with your wife. You always come out the loser, even if you win. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?
Norman Samish wrote: Why is there something rather than nothing? When I heard that Famous Question, I did not assume that nothing was describable - because, if it was, it would not be nothing. I don't think of nothing as an empty bitstring - I think of it as the absence of a bitstring - as no thing. Given that definition, is there a conceivable answer to The Famous Question? Norman It's always easy to answer a hard question with a question. So here are possible answers: Why not? or One could equate everything with total absence of information = nothing. So we get: Why is there something rather than everything? That question can be answered by invoking the Anthropic Principle. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Lobian Machine
Stathis, All I have to do is to use Godel second incompleteness theorem to prove that the psychiatrist cannot be sure of his own sanity. We'll have to assume that the psychiatrist can follow a mathematical argument. And if he doesn't I'll just go to the local university math department to back me up. The psychiatrist will then be forced either to lock up the whole math department or to accept what they say. Once the psychiatrist is convinced that he may not be sane himself, it'll be a piece of cake to convince him to take antipsychotic drugs. And maybe at this point he'll really go crazy and leave me alone. :-) I bet you never had to deal with patients as wily as me. Aye, there is method in my madness! :-P George Stathis Papaioannou wrote: George Levy writes: Bruno Marchal wrote: Godel's result, known as Godel's second incompleteness theorem, is that no consistent machine can prove its own consistency: IF M is consistent then M cannot prove its consistency Bruno, After I read your email, we had a gathering of family and friends, and my head being full of the subject of this post. I wanted to test the idea of Godel's second incompleteness theorem on the average people just to see how they would respond. I found the right place in the discussion to insert the paraphrase: If I am sane, it is impossible to know for sure that I am sane. This povoked some hilarity, especially with my kids (young adults) who probably view me as some kind of nutty professor. While this statement is mathematically true, it was not considered serious by the people I was talking with. I guess that the average human has no doubt about his own sanity.(But my kids had some doubts about mine) One way to prove that you are crazy is to assert that you are sane. This means that the average human is crazy! :-) If I am sane, it is impossible to know for sure that I am sane. Everybody believes he is sane, whether he is sane or not, and nobody can prove he is sane. In psychiatry, this is the key problem with delusions. If it were possible in general to prove one's own sanity, then deluded patients, who more often than not retain their ability to think logically, would be able to demonstrate to themselves that they were deluded. But by definition of a delusion, this is impossible. If you want to know what it is like for a psychotic patient to have forced treatment, imagine that people from the local psychiatric facility knock on your door tonight and, after interviewing you, politely explain that your belief that you are an engineer, married with adult children, own the house you are living in and the car in the driveway, and so on, is actually all a systematised delusion. All the evidence you present to show you are sane is dismissed as part of the delusion, and all the people you thought you could trust explain that they agree with the psychiatric team. You are then invited to start taking an antipsychotic drug which, over time, will rectify your deranged brain chemistry so that you come to understand that your current beliefs are delusional. If you refuse the medication, you will be taken to the psychiatric ward with the help of police, if necessary, where you will again be offered medication, perhaps in injection form if you continue to refuse tablets. Frightening, isn't it? Stathis Papaioannou _ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/
Re: Lobian Machine
Bruno Marchal wrote: Godel's result, known as Godel's second incompleteness theorem, is that no consistent machine can prove its own consistency: IF M is consistent then M cannot prove its consistency Bruno, After I read your email, we had a gathering of family and friends, and my head being full of the subject of this post. I wanted to test the idea of Godel's second incompleteness theorem on the average people just to see how they would respond. I found the right place in the discussion to insert the paraphrase: If I am sane, it is impossible to know for sure that I am sane. This povoked some hilarity, especially with my kids (young adults) who probably view me as some kind of nutty professor. While this statement is mathematically true, it was not considered serious by the people I was talking with. I guess that the average human has no doubt about his own sanity.(But my kids had some doubts about mine) One way to prove that you are crazy is to assert that you are sane. This means that the average human is crazy! :-) George
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Naming this field is difficult. This is why I made several suggestions none of which I thought were excellent. Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't think it is a question of vocabulary, It is only a question of vocabulary if you intend to communicate with other people. And this is where the difficulty lies. If you make the name too esoteric they will not even understand what the field is about. and actually I am not sure we are not in, well *perfect* perhaps not, but at least in an a larger matching area than you think. Perhaps, like so many, you have not yet really understand the impact of the discovery by Turing and its relation with Godel's theorem. When I talk on Platonia, it is really Platonia updated by Godel's and Lob's theorem. I hope you are open to the idea I could perhaps progress in my way of communicating that. It really concerns machines and even many non-machines. I think about abandoning comp for ind, where ind is for indexical, given that G and G* applies to almost anything self-referentially correct. I knew this for long, the comp hyp just makes the reasoning and the verification easier. I can already say that I disagree the word quantum should be in it. The name should not issue what will or should be derived by the theory. I do not fully understand the full ramification of how indexical relates to this field. However, I think that to use Indexical now is like Heisenberg using Entanglement instead of Quantum. Nobody would have understood what he was talking about. It was hard enough already to understand Quantum. BTW, COMP is not very good, because you have to explain what it is. At first glance it appears to be the Mechanist Philosophy and this is what I originally thought. I think the best approach is to use a compound expression to bridge the gap between different fields. (i.e., Quantum electro-chromo dynamics, electro-magnetism, physical chemistry) There is nothing surprising that quantum physics could be derived from quantum psycho mechanics. Of course it is surprising...not to you or me or others on the list because we have been talking about it for so long... but to the average scientist in the street... or the university. And these are the people you intend to communicate with. Plato is the one who introduced the word theology with the meaning of Science of Gods, and by extension I take it as the science of what we can hope or bet upon. It is just the truth *about* machine, and we can talk and reason about it without ever knowing that truth, given that no scientist at all can *know* the truth, at least as knowed. I think this science relates primarily to the self. As I said before, I think that it it the I that creates the (orderliness in the) world. This is not a new idea. Some philosophers have asserted this idea before. Does this makes I a god? Not in the traditional sense of Theology which carries too much baggage. This is my own emphasis which may not be shared by everyone on this list. I am aware of the popular meaning of psycho = crazy as John mentioned. We could draw from other language than the Greek (auto, psyche) or Latin (anima, spiritus) but we lose the ability to be widely understood: Hebrew: nefesh, neshamah Japanese: tamashii. Neshamah Mechanics is not going to fly. Tamashii Mechanics sounds like sushi to the average westerner. To talk on immortality issues (cf: quantum immortality or comp-immortality) without accepting we are doing theology is perhaps a form of lack of modesty. Nobody would dare to try to help me making a case for the use of the word theology? Of course we are doing theology but don't say it too loud or you'll get involved in a religious war. I think theology has too much baggage and is populated by people with faith - a virtue for them, a vice for us. :-) George
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Bruno, John and Stephen More on naming: I think the name should include the following concepts 1) modal or relativistic or relative formulation or first person, 2) quantum or quantics, 3) psycho or psyche or consciousness or ego, 4) mechanics or theory. So, picking one term from each row we could get names such as first person quantum psychomechanics or relative formulation of quantum psyche theory (this alludes to Everett's interpretation) Sounds impressive! :-) George
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Bruno I don't think either "machine psychology" or "machine theology" work because of the baggage those field already carry. In any case the attribute "machine" sends the wrong picture. And as you have pointed out the terms "computer science" and "number theory" do not capture the real issue of machine consciousness. In fact I do not think there is any word in English or French to describe what you are up to. Why don't you use a new word with no baggage to describe what you are doing? "Psychomechanics" is not listed in most dictionaries . Unfortunately, this word has already been invented. It can be found on Google in the context of animation and games and possibly Linguistics. It may be that others in this list can think of a better word. George
Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
Le 14-déc.-05, à 01:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : In the multiverse, only other people end up in dead ends. Although from a third person perspective every entity in the multiverse could be said to exist only transiently because at every point of an entity's history we can say that there sprouts a dead end branch of zero extent, from a first person perspective, these branches cannot by definition ever be experienced. If the laws of physics are contingent on the continuation of consciousness, it is very well possible that a very large majority of branches are very short and dead ends. In other words every nanoseconds we suffer a thousand deaths through events which are perceived to be unlikely due to the apparent stability of the physical laws, events such as proton decay, beta capture, nuclear fusion due to nucleus tunneling, etc... Bruno Marchal wrote: I know you have solved the only if part of following exercise: (W, R) is reflexive iff (W,R) respects Bp - p. I will come back on the if part later. Have you done this: showing that (W,R) is a Papaioannou multiverse iff(W,R) respects Dt - D(Bf). Note that this question is a little bit academical. I have already explain how I will choose the modal logics. Actually I will not choose them, I will extract them from a conversation with the machine (and its guardian angel). This will leave no choice. It will happen that the formula Dt - D(Bf) will appear in the discourse machine; indeed perhaps some of you know already that this is just the second incompleteness of Godel, once you interpret Bp by the machine proves p, coded in some language the machine can use. George
Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
Bruno Marchal wrote: we are conscious only because we belong to a continuum of infinite never ending stories ... ...that's what the lobian machine's guardian angel G* says about that: true and strictly unbelievable. Bruno Since you agree that the number of histories is on a continuum, you must accept that no matter how large or small a segment of the continuum is considered, the number of histories is the same. Hence measure is the same for any observer. George
Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: In addition to the above arguments, consider the problem from the point of view of the subject. If multiple copies of a person are created and run in parallel for a period, what difference does this make to his experience? It seems to me that there is no test or experiment the person could do which would allow him to determine if he is living in a period of high measure or low measure. If an OM is the smallest discernible unit of conscious experience, it therefore seems reasonable to treat multiple instantiations of the same OM as one OM. Yes Stathis, I agree with you completely. Bruno wrote: And this already comes from the fact that the "indistinguishabilitty/distinguishabilitty" crux is itself relative. By loosing memory something distinguishable can become indistinguishable, augmenting the class of (normal) self-consistent extensions. Bruno, I find this question extremely difficult. Is indistinguishability established at the physical level or at the psychological level? If we say it is established at the psychological level, then even mental errors ( ie.6+7=11) count in defining a whole world. This is the ultimate in relativism. I can find reasons to go either way. (Ultimately Undecided?) Then I am open that from the 1 point of view, fusion increases measure, duplication decreases measure; although from the 3 pov it is the contrary. I do not agree with you on this point Bruno. >From the one person point of view measures remains constant just like the speed of light, the mass of an electron, or the number of points in a line 1 meter long or 1 kilometer long. (the number of points in a continuum is always the same no matter what the length of the line is). The one person always observes a continuum in the number of opportunities available to him no matter what his past history is. >From the third person point of view, it makes sense to consider ratios in measures, just like it makes sense to take ratios of line segments of different lengths. George
Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
Hi Quentin, Stathis, Bruno Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi Georges, if you start from OMs as basic, then a branch is a set of OMs (only "consistent"/ordered set ?). Then it means a branch is unique. Some part of different branches could overlap, but as I don't understand what could be an absolute measure (meaning it never change and is fixed forever) between all branches, I don't see how to assert the measure of a branch... Also viewing from this point each 1st pov "lives" in its own branch (as a branch is an ordered set of OMs which in turn is associated to a 1st person). Hi Quentin, Stathis, Bruno It all depends how you see the plenitude, OMs and the branching. Is consciousness like a traveller in a network of roads traversing the plenitude, some roads branching some roads merging? If yes then you could have several independent consciousness occupying the same spot, or the same OM. Then their measure at that spot is their sum. This approach is a third person point of view and it leads to the concept of absolute measure. If you see consiousness as the road itself, then measure is not increased after a merge and does not decrease after a split. An OM is just a point on the road. If the road turns unexpectedly to avoids an obstacle (like quantum suicide or just plain death), then consiousness will just move on into a direction which has a low 3-rd person probability but unity first person probability. Viewing consciousness as a network of roads is a first person point of view and it leads to the concept of relative measure: Measure is always 1 where you are. >From a given point you may reach many points - Then measure increases with respect to that point. Or reversibly, from many points you may reach only one point. Then measure decreases. Bruno writes: neither elimination of information, nor duplication of information. The crux of the matter is the concept of indistinguishability: whether you consider two identical persons (OMs) occupying two identical universes the same person (point on the road). It is clear that if you consider the problem from the information angle, then duplication of information does not increase the measure of that information. This would support the relative interpretation of measure. George Quentin Le Jeudi 8 Décembre 2005 22:21, George Levy a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 05-déc.-05, à 02:46, Saibal Mitra a écrit : I still think that if you double everything and then annihilate only the doubled person, the probability will be 1. Actually I agree with this. So far we have been talking about splitting universes and people. Let's consider the case where two branches of the universe merge. In other words, two different paths eventually happen to become identical - Of course when this happens all their branching futures also become identical. Would you say that such a double branch has double the measure of a single branch even though the two branches are totally indistinguishable? How can you possibly assert that any branch is single, double, or a bundle composed of any number of identical individual branches? George
Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 05-dc.-05, 02:46, Saibal Mitra a crit : I still think that if you double everything and then annihilate only the doubled person, the probability will be 1. Actually I agree with this. So far we have been talking about splitting universes and people. Let's consider the case where two branches of the universe merge. In other words, two different paths eventually happen to become identical - Of course when this happens all their branching futures also become identical. Would you say that such a double branch has double the measure of a single branch even though the two branches are totally indistinguishable? How can you possibly assert that any branch is single, double, or a bundle composed of any number of identical individual branches? George
Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
Saibal Mitra wrote: Correction, I seem to have misunderstood Statis' set up. If you really create a new world and then create and kill the person there then the probability of survival is 1. This is different from quantum mechanical branch splitting. To see this, consider first what would have happened had the person not been killed. Then his measure would have doubled. But because he is killed in one of the two copies of Earth, his measure stays the same. In a quantum suicide experiment his measure would be reduced by a factor two. To say that measure is doubled or halved it is not sufficient to take the measure at the final point. You really must compare measure at two points, in effect take a ratio. So depending where the initial point is you could come to different conclusions. If your initial point is before the new world is created (and the clone in that world is killed), then, you are right. There is no change in the measure of the original person. However, if the initial point is taken after the world is created but before the clone is killed, then the measure of the clone goes to zero "in that world." One could always argue that the world branches and the clone continues living in other worlds. George
Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Stathis Papaioannou writes: If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I am instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there are several possible ways this might be interpreted from the 1st person viewpoint: (a) Pr(I live) = Pr(I die) = 0.5 (b) Pr(I live) = 1, Pr(I die) = 0 (c) Pr(I live) = 0, Pr(I die) = 1 Your example underscores the need for interpreting Pr as a relative concept ( this is my favorite point of view): c) is A observing A. It is seen through the first person A who is killed in one branch and live in another branch. This is called the first person on this list. a) is B observing A: It is seen through a first person B who witnesses the event hapenning to A but lives in both branches. His point of view is called the third person on this list: b) is C observing A. It is seen through a first person C who experiences the complement events of A. He lives when A dies and vice versa. The probability that he will see A live is 0. We do not have a name for this point of view on this list but I could suggest the complement first person. Thus all answers are correct depending on your relative point of view. George
Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
Please disregard previous post. The b and c cases were inverted. Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Stathis Papaioannou writes: If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I am instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there are several possible ways this might be interpreted from the 1st person viewpoint: (a) Pr(I live) = Pr(I die) = 0.5 (b) Pr(I live) = 1, Pr(I die) = 0 (c) Pr(I live) = 0, Pr(I die) = 1 Your example underscores the need for interpreting Pr as a relative concept ( this is my favorite point of view): b) is A observing A. It is seen through the first person A who is killed in one branch and live in another branch. This is called the first person on this list. a) is B observing A: It is seen through a first person B who witnesses the event hapenning to A but lives in both branches. His point of view is called the third person on this list: c) is C observing A. It is seen through a first person C who experiences the complement events of A. He lives when A dies and vice versa. The probability that he will see A live is 0. We do not have a name for this point of view on this list but I could suggest the complement first person. Thus all answers are correct depending on your relative point of view. George
Goldilock world
Along the line of Jorge Luis Borges a blackboard covered in chalk contains the library of Babel (everything) but no information. Similarly a white board covered with ink also contains no information. Interestingly, information is minimized or actually goes to zero when the world is too large as the plenitude, or too small. Information is maximized when the world is neither too large nor too small. We live in a Goldilock world. George
Re: Let There Be Something
I conjecture that if one can design physical laws for a universe capable of 1) supporting the NAND function 2) storing (locally) 1 bit, 3) transmitting 1 bit from one point to another point, then one could also generate a Turing machine in this universe which would then be capable of supporting machine duplication (life) and AI (consciousness.) The basic physical laws (TOE) in such a universe would be very simple. One would need 1) a logical law: NAND; 2) a state law to allow the existence of "states"; and a concept of extension or space such that different states can exist at different locations and be transmitted from one location to another location. A related question is what is the smallest number of dimension for such a universe, that can support life and consciousness. George Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Nov 04, 2005 at 12:18:01AM +0100, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi Russel, Le Jeudi 03 Novembre 2005 22:11, Russell Standish a ??crit??: Even then, there is still a loophole. I suspect that 3D environment are far more likely to evolve the complex structures needed for consciousness, so that conscious GoL observers are indeed a rare thing. I don't know if this is the case or not, but if true it would make a GoL example irrelevant. More interesting is to look at some 3D CA rules that appear to support universal computation - Andy Wuensche had a paper on this in last year's ALife in Boston. No arXiv ref I'm afraid, but you could perhaps email him for an eprint... Cheers But 3D, 2D CA is of no relevance... the way we see the computation through the gol as nothing in common with how hypothetical living being inside the gol would perceive their environment. Quentin True, but I suspect it does have impact on the likelihood of conscious observers arising in such a system. In a plenitude of CAs of different rules and dimensionality, initialised at random, I suspect that 3D or higher CAs will dominate the measure of those CAs that generate the complex data structures needed for conscious observers. Perhaps 3D is even favoured. This is, of course, a hunch to be proven or disproven by some future mathematical genius. Cheers
The Plenitude
From the thread Re: ROSS MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE - The Simplest Yet Theory of Everything Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 22-oct.-05, à 04:50, George Levy a écrit : The 3-plenitude is equivalent with the computationnal states accessed by the UD. It is also equivalent with the (finite and infinite) proofs of the Sigma_1 sentences, etc. The 1-plenitudes are then so big (provably) that they are not nameable. Approximations can be named though, and their logics can be assessed, and tested. Bruno, you are making a distinction between the 1-Plenitude(s) and the 3-Plenitude. This is new to me. I thought that the Plenitude was the same no matter who the observer is - in a sense, the ultimate invariant - and also infinite. Could you please elaborate on your thought. Thanks. George
Re: Let There Be Something
Hal Finney wrote: Anthropic reasoning is only explanatory if you assume the actual existence of an ensemble of universes, as multiverse models do. The multiverse therefore elevates anthropic reasoning from something of a tautology, a form of circular reasoning, up to an actual explanatory principle that has real value in helping us understand why the world is as we see it. Very good Hal. I agree with you. George
Re: ROSS MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE - The Simplest Yet Theory of Everything
Jesse wrote Well, you're free to define "negative mass" however you like, of course--but this is not how physicists would use the term. When you plug negative values of mass or energy into various physics equations it leads to weird consequences that we don't see in everyday life, such as the fact that negative-mass objects would be gravitationally repelled by positive-mass objects, rather than attracted to them. Jesse you are too quick. If you actually plug the right signs in Newton's equations: F=ma and F=Gmm'/r2 you'll discover that positive mass attracts everything including negative mass, and that negative mass repels everything including negative mass. The behavior is markedly different from that of matter and antimatter. So negative mass could never gravitationally form planets but could only exist in a gaseous or distributed form in the Universe and appear to cancel long range gravitational force (possibly what we are seeing with the Pioneer spacecrafts?) George Levy
Re: ROSS MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE - The Simplest Yet Theory of Everything
Russell Standish wrote: Incidently, here's my own theory on the origin of matter. (Special) relativistic quantum mechanics delivers the prediction of matter being in perfect balance with antimatter - this is well known from Dirac's work in the 1930s. However, if spacetime had a nonzero curvature, is this not likely to bias the balance between matter and antimatter, giving rise to the net presence of matter in our universe. It strikes me that mass curves spacetime is the wrong way of looking at General Relativity - causation should be seen the other way - curved spacetime generates mass. As I mentioned above, it is not surprising that spacetime is curved, what is surpising is that it is so nearly flat. Russell, you are confusing antimatter with negative matter/energy. According to convention antimatter has inverted electrical charge and therefore when the amount of matter and antimatter are in equal amount, the net charge is zero. Antimatter, however, has positive mass corresponding to positive energy in the sense of E=mc^2 . Consequently, antimatter as well as matter give space a positive curvature. Negative matter/energy however are different. If negative matter/energy could exist they would give space a negative curvature. Negative matter/energy may be identical to dark energy. George Levy
Re: subjective reality
Hi Godfrey, Bruno The "I" that I consider consists of a logical system that defines and coincides with the physical system that the "I" inhabits. Thus the world (the slice of the plenitude that we can observe) is anthropically constrained by the "I." [GK] So the "I" is (1) a logical system (2) a physical system inhabited (1) and (3) the set of anthropic constraints which delimits the whole of the (non-"I") universe (?) where (I am guessing) (1) and (2) find themselves! Is this what you are saying? [GL] I am sorry I was sloppy in my explanation. Let me try to be clearer. "I" is the kernel of consciousness. It does not include memories which are different for everyone and change as a person ages. I agree with you that since "I" is based on a logical system it must follow Goedel's theorem, perhaps at the border between incompleteness and inconsistency. It seems that is precisely what consciousness "feels" like. I am not saying that "I" is a physical system or is the world. Rather that the world that "I" perceive is anthropically constrained by the "I" and that the physical laws have the same limitations as the "I" including the incompleteness/inconsistency requirement. [GK] Hold on there! If all physics is reducible to "a logical system" why would there need be physics at all ? Why would you have to be the one answering Enstein's quandary? Wouldn't his "I", being the same as yours be able to answer himself? In other words: maybe your explanation of knowledge is incapable of explaining... ignorance? I think that a TOE would have to include an explanation of consciousness. In explaining the world we'll have to explain ourselves. [GL] Objective reality is an illusion that disappears when observers differ in their frame of reference. In this particular case, it does not exist when observers operate according to different but entirely consistent fundamental logics. In fact, such observers would have a lot of difficulty communicating since their worlds would be different slices of the plenitude. [GK] the "strangeness" of relativistic physics is that observers can actually compare and agree on their observations even when they have entirely different deployments in their different frames of reference! [GL] Before relativity, one might have argued that different observers experienced different laws of physics. For example, I might experience a gravitational field while you may experience an acceleration. Relativity is a set of far ranging laws that unified under the same umbrella what were deemed smaller ranging laws experienced by different observers. I am saying exactly the same thing. Different frames of reference will generate different perceived laws. Since the frames of reference I am discussing include logical systems, the perceived worlds will be different. [GL] Objective reality is an illusion that disappears when observers differ in their frame of reference. In this particular case, it does not exist when observers operate according to different but entirely consistent fundamental logics. In fact, such observers would have a lot of difficulty communicating since their worlds would be different slices of the plenitude. [BM] I would say, almost like a physicalist, that "objective reality" is what is common to all frame of reference. I would even say that "the physical laws" are exactly what is true in all observer-moment, relative state/worlds, etc. [GL] Einstein has demonstrated that under different state of motion and acceleration the old objective reality breaks down and a new objective reality must take its place. Objective reality depends on the range of the laws. Newton's laws are not true in all frame of reference in various kinds of motion, but Relativity provides unified laws that cover all frames of reference that differ according to their motion and their acceleration. QT/MWI offers a different kind of relativism. Shannon offers yet another kind of relativism. Why not just go all the way - no more objective reality. Each "I" has his own reality. If your accept this as a law then we have objective reality. :-) [BM] I could challenge you for giving me two entirely consistent logics having nothing in common, and sufficiently rich to keep natural numbers (but perhaps you don't put weight on arithmetical truth, in which case I could imagine some solution in a non comp framework) [GL I am not sure what you mean by your statement in parenthesis. Bruno, I am not an expert in logic. Perhaps you can help. Is it possible that "I" (and the anthropically derived world) may include all the (logical) systems "I" can imagine, and therefore it would be impossible for "I" to provide you with a system that "I" cannot imagine? So it is impossible for us to see beyond our slice of the plenitude. George
Re: subjective reality
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I also have some trouble with the idea that we "share an I", as you put it, as I don't know to what extent I do share mine with anyone! My notion is, instead, that the "I" is exactly what we DO NOT SHARE, what makes us different, while Reality is all the rest: what we DO share in a very obvious sense. Otherwise, why would we disagree? Do we slice the Plenitude in parallel? Hi Godfrey The "I" that I consider consists of a logical system that defines and coincides with the physical system that the "I" inhabits. Thus the world (the slice of the plenitude that we can observe) is anthropically constrained by the "I." A first consequence is that physics is perfectly rational and understandable since it matches the "I." (This is a response to Einstein's question of why is the world subject to rational analysis) A second consequence is that your logical system is the same as mine, - we share the same "I," - hence your world is the same as mine - we share the same world or perspective of the plenitude. Therefore, you and me appear to share an objective reality. Objective reality is an illusion that disappears when observers differ in their frame of reference. In this particular case, it does not exist when observers operate according to different but entirely consistent fundamental logics. In fact, such observers would have a lot of difficulty communicating since their worlds would be different slices of the plenitude. George
Re: subjective reality
Bruno Marchal wrote: . Lee Corbin wrote: My friends and I (and probably Daniel Dennett and so on) believe that people who demand a 1st person "account of the world" (e.g. Chalmers) will never get anywhere. Actually, this is one of the main point where I differ from George Levy (OK George?), although I could make sense of it. The point is, and Dennett agrees on this, that, in cognitive *science*, we need to develop some third person discourse on the first person discourses. OK, strictly speaking the quantum and physical discourses appears at some first person (plural) level. Chalmers is not getting anywhere(*), ok. Perhaps we agree on this. (*) Using Everett to defend dualism! See the quite good explanation how Everett is deeply monist in the book: PRIMAS H., 1981, Chemistry, Quantum Mechanics and Reductionism, Springer-Verlag, Berlin (second, corrected edition : 1983) Hi Bruno and Lee, I would invert Dennett's point to increase its emphasis: "we need to develop some first person discourses on the third person discourse." In other words, I believe that the foundation is first person, and that third person is a consequence of anthropically determined constraints that we must share. I have been quiet recently in part because of the sheer volume of this list. As you know Bruno I am an extreme believer in first person. I have acquired this position mainly by looking at two seemingly opposite trends in science. Scientific theories have become less and less anthropocentric removing the earth and man as the center of the universe. (Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Michelson-Morley). The Earth does not occupy a priviledged position. There is no Ether. There is no absolute. Paradoxically, the observer has acquired greater importance through the work (Relativity Theory, Quantum Theory with the MWI, Shannon's communication theory). Relativity of the observer seems to be pervasive, not just with regards "Relativity Theory" but also with regards Quantum Theroy. It is not a coincidence that Everett called his paper "Relative State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics." Everything is relative to the observer. So why not go all the way and take the first person as the base. This approach tackles the Mind-Body problem up-front rather than after the fact. "I" becomes fundamental: the starting assumption as well as an observable fact. "I" exists in the Plenitude and is constrained to see a slice of the Plenitude - the world it sees - by Anthropic constraints. Thus "I" and the world it sees share the same structure and logic whatever that logic may be. There are probably more than one I's/worlds/logics that satisfy this requirement. Bruno, you are the expert in logic. Subjective reality is fundamental. Objective reality arises because we share the same "I" and therefore the same world (slice view of the plenitude). George
Re: The Time Deniers and the idea of time as a dimension
Hal Finney wrote: Physicist Max Tegmark has an interesting discussion on the physics of a universe with more than one time dimension at http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/dimensions.html , specifically http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/dimensions.pdf . Wouldn't it be true that in the manyworld, every quantum branchings that is decoupled from other quantum branchings would in effect define its own time dimension? The number of decoupled branchings contained by the observable universe is very large. Linear time is only an illusion due to our limited perspective of the branching/merging network that our consciousness traverses. While our consciousness may spread over (experience) several OMs or nodes in that network, it can only perceive a single path through the network. George
