Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Liz R]

On Friday 13 September 2024 at 11:47:31 UTC+12 Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 9:28 AM Liz R wrote:

Yes I wondered about that, but it's possible that physics isn't 
*intrinsically* random.


No, that isn't possible. Randomness is intrinsic, and not derivable from 
anything else.


This is the sort of thing that made me think of "oracles". What sort of 
physical (or mathematical) process could, at least in principle, be 
intrinsically random? (Rather than apparently random due to ignorance of an 
underlying lower-level deterministic mechanism.) An oracle that delivers 
the next digit in Chaitin's constant, as mentioned by Russell, might be the 
sort of thing - which could mean a suitable source of randomness in physics 
is the "universal dovetailer" or something similar.


It could be based on something computable, and only appear random from our 
perspective - presumbly some versions of many-worlds would fit the bill.


No, many-worlds is a decided failure as far as randomness is concerned. You 
cannot get intrinsic randomness as exhibited by quantum phenomena from a 
deterministic theory such as many-worlds.


I thought you could get the appearance of randomness from a first-person 
perspective in MW? Has that been shown to not work?


Also, although various attempts to show hidden variables have fallen down, 
it's always possible something of that sort might be involved that we 
haven't thought of yet.


That is just a cheap let-out: "It could be something we haven't thought of 
yet. There are very good reason to think that intrinsic randomness cannot 
arise from a deterministic theory.  You can get randomness from ignorance, 
as in classic statistical mechanics, but that is not intrinsic -- things 
are still deterministic if you have complete knowledge. Which is not the 
case in QM.

Well, yes - by definition, intrinsic randomness can't arise from a 
deterministic theory. However, I will wait for your ideas on the types of 
physical or mathematical processes that could lead to intrinsic randomness 
before commenting on this further, as I can't get past that first hurdle 
yet!


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Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Liz R]

On Friday 13 September 2024 at 12:20:01 UTC+12 Russell Standish wrote:

One of the consequences of the universal dovetailer argument is that 
if conciousness is computational, then physics is not.


That's interesting. I don't see how that could happen, would you mind 
elaborating? (I've read "The Amoeba's Secret" thanks to you but I can't 
remember this part).

 

Intrinsic 
randomness arises from the first person view of the operation of the 
dovetailer. 


I can see that, at least, I think it's similar to the idea of apparent 
randomness in many-worlds?
 

Perhaps what you're thinking of is oracles solving computationally 
impossible problems, such as delivering the successive digits of the 
Chaitin probablility Ω. 

A corrolary of this is that a computational physics à la Konrad Zuse's 
Rechnender Raum would rule out computationalism, and consequently 
physical supervenience. 


I can see how that follows from the first paragraph, but as mentioned I 
can't think how computational consciousness leads to non-computational 
physics (or exactly what that means).

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Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Liz R]

Yes I wondered about that, but it's possible that physics isn't 
*intrinsically* random. It could be based on something computable, and only 
appear random from our perspective - presumbly some versions of many-worlds 
would fit the bill. Also, although various attempts to show hidden 
variables have fallen down, it's always possible something of that sort 
might be involved that we haven't thought of yet. It's also possible that 
time symmetry could act in that sort of way, making apparent randomness 
from a failure to take all the boundary conditions into account 
(entanglement becomes far less spooky if you allow for quantum objects not 
distinguishing between directions in time, for example).

On Friday 13 September 2024 at 10:39:26 UTC+12 Brent Meeker wrote:

> But physics isn't computable, it includes quantum mechanics which 
> introduces randomness.  
>
> Brent
>
>
>
> On 9/12/2024 3:10 PM, Liz R wrote:
>
> On the subject of whether consciousness is computation (or is it 
> "supervenes on computation" or something? Anyway...) - if it turns out that 
> physics is computable, that undercuts that question, in that assuming 
> consciousness is the product of physics, it must also be. the product of 
> computation (possibly at a level far below that of frain cells)
>
> On Tuesday 10 September 2024 at 06:14:22 UTC+12 Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>
>> On 9/9/2024 5:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> *No. Mathematics can describe computation, but it is not computation. 
>> That’s why the semiconductor industry exists, software alone is not 
>> sufficient, in fact, software alone can’t do anything.  If you actually 
>> want to DO something, if you want something to change over an interval of 
>> time, then matter is required. That's why the information in a book can't 
>> do anything if it's just sitting on a shelf, that information can only 
>> cause something to change if a person or, as we've seen very recently, an 
>> AI, reads it.  And both the person and the AI are made of atoms. And atoms 
>> are physical.  * 
>>
>> *Computation involves the manipulation of information, and the minimum 
>> amount of energy needed to perform a calculation is greater than zero.  
>> Also, the amount of information that you can stuff into a volume of space 
>> is finite, if there is too much information then the volume turns into a 
>> Black Hole where the information, if it still even exists, is 
>> inaccessible. So information is physical and computation is a physical 
>> process. *
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *I generally agree with John, but I would point out that computation is a 
>> physical process that realizes a mathematical process.  Sure it's more 
>> complicated because it depends on the physics, but that is incidental to 
>> the computation.  So it's kind of the reverse of using mathematics to 
>> describe something.  In a computational process it's the mathematics that's 
>> essential. That, in itself doesn't answer the question of whether 
>> consciousness is computation, but nerves are physiological structures whose 
>> essential function is transmitting information.  So I would say 
>> consciousness originates with the evolution of nerves and eventually the 
>> central nervous system.  I see consciousness has having several levels from 
>> simple detecting and reacting to immediate surroundings, to internal models 
>> of self versus others, to planning and projection, to language and 
>> abstraction.  So conscious is implicitly information processing, but not 
>> all of it is what humans think of as being conscious, having an inner 
>> narrative. Brent*
>>
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Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Liz R]

On the subject of whether consciousness is computation (or is it 
"supervenes on computation" or something? Anyway...) - if it turns out that 
physics is computable, that undercuts that question, in that assuming 
consciousness is the product of physics, it must also be. the product of 
computation (possibly at a level far below that of frain cells)

On Tuesday 10 September 2024 at 06:14:22 UTC+12 Brent Meeker wrote:

>
> On 9/9/2024 5:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
> *No. Mathematics can describe computation, but it is not computation. 
> That’s why the semiconductor industry exists, software alone is not 
> sufficient, in fact, software alone can’t do anything.  If you actually 
> want to DO something, if you want something to change over an interval of 
> time, then matter is required. That's why the information in a book can't 
> do anything if it's just sitting on a shelf, that information can only 
> cause something to change if a person or, as we've seen very recently, an 
> AI, reads it.  And both the person and the AI are made of atoms. And atoms 
> are physical.  * 
>
> *Computation involves the manipulation of information, and the minimum 
> amount of energy needed to perform a calculation is greater than zero.  
> Also, the amount of information that you can stuff into a volume of space 
> is finite, if there is too much information then the volume turns into a 
> Black Hole where the information, if it still even exists, is 
> inaccessible. So information is physical and computation is a physical 
> process. *
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *I generally agree with John, but I would point out that computation is a 
> physical process that realizes a mathematical process.  Sure it's more 
> complicated because it depends on the physics, but that is incidental to 
> the computation.  So it's kind of the reverse of using mathematics to 
> describe something.  In a computational process it's the mathematics that's 
> essential. That, in itself doesn't answer the question of whether 
> consciousness is computation, but nerves are physiological structures whose 
> essential function is transmitting information.  So I would say 
> consciousness originates with the evolution of nerves and eventually the 
> central nervous system.  I see consciousness has having several levels from 
> simple detecting and reacting to immediate surroundings, to internal models 
> of self versus others, to planning and projection, to language and 
> abstraction.  So conscious is implicitly information processing, but not 
> all of it is what humans think of as being conscious, having an inner 
> narrative. Brent*
>

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Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Liz R]

In order to test Bruno's hypothesis, it would be necessary to know if 
reality is Turing complete ("computable" for short). Hence my mention of 
oracles and singularities, which presumably aren't computable. I would 
imagine that reality is in principle computable, given its quantum nature 
and discoveries like black hole entropy and information content - though 
probably at a level below what we can currently access.

Interesting that this limits our ability to know the foundational basis of 
reality - or do you think we might be able to get around that one day?

On Thursday 12 September 2024 at 19:10:55 UTC+12 Russell Standish wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 11, 2024 at 11:48:02PM -0700, Liz R wrote:
> > Thanks, Russell. Bruno tried to explain this to me a while ago but I 
> probably
> > didn't take it all in. Am I right in thinking this has something to do 
> with "no
> > oracles" - that is, reality contains no sources of infinite 
> unpredictable data?
> > A naked signularity would presumably count as an oracle, while it 
> appears any
> > area of space-time contains finite data (the Deckenstein bound?) - does 
> that
> > make it Turing complete, in principle? Or am I talking nonsense?
>
> It sounds vaguely plausible, but could well be the latter :). At least
> its not egregious nonsense like immigrants eating you pets :P.
>
> Cheers
>
> -- 
>
>
> 
> Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
> http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
> 
>

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Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Liz R]

Thanks, Russell. Bruno tried to explain this to me a while ago but I 
probably didn't take it all in. Am I right in thinking this has something 
to do with "no oracles" - that is, reality contains no sources of infinite 
unpredictable data? A naked signularity would presumably count as an 
oracle, while it appears any area of space-time contains finite data (the 
Deckenstein bound?) - does that make it Turing complete, in principle? Or 
am I talking nonsense?

On Thursday 12 September 2024 at 18:39:30 UTC+12 Russell Standish wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 11, 2024 at 09:40:32PM -0700, Liz R wrote:
> > Well, exactly. It's Peano or whatever, so a small subset. Bruno and 
> Tegmark
> > have this idea - I find Tegmark easier to follow personally - that 
> because
> > physics is possibly isomorphic to some set of equations that describe 
> reality,
> > Occam suggests that we don't actually need reality to exist, only the
> > equations.
> >
>
> It is more that whatever foundational basis of reality is, so long as
> it is Turing complete, a computationlist mind cannot distinguish it
> from any other Turing complete substrate. It is almost assuredly not
> the reality we see. In another sense, our reality supervenes on all
> possible universal Turing machines. The question of what is the
> foundational reality has no answer - epistemologically equivalent to
> asking how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.
>
>
>
> -- 
>
>
> 
> Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
> http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
> 
>

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Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Liz R]

Well, exactly. It's Peano or whatever, so a small subset. Bruno and Tegmark 
have this idea - I find Tegmark easier to follow personally - that because 
physics is possibly isomorphic to some set of equations that describe 
reality, Occam suggests that we don't actually need reality to exist, only 
the equations.

YMMV...!

On Thursday 12 September 2024 at 16:35:04 UTC+12 Brent Meeker wrote:

> What do you conceive of as "true".  I think of all mathematics as having 
> the form: Given these axioms and these rules of inference then these 
> theorems follow.  Bruno only posits a small part of mathematics as true.  
> I'm not sure how he relates "true" and "exists".
>
> Brent
>
>
>
> On 9/11/2024 8:36 PM, Liz R wrote:
>
> The question is whether or not maths exists independently of the material 
> universe. Some people think it does (that it's true in all worlds, 
> regardless of their laws of physics) while others think that it's a human 
> invention approximating to physical phenomena. Personally I'm inclined to 
> think that maths is true regardless of which universe you're in, or indeed 
> true whether or not any universes exist. This is Max Tegmark's view, for 
> example, as described in his book "Our Mathematical Universe". His idea 
> (which is in the same ballpark as Bruno's, but approaching it from, as it 
> were, the opposite direction) is that maths is necessarily true, and 
> therefore makes a foundation on which to build an ontology that gets 
> "somethig from nothing".
>
> I'm not sure how one can test this, however.
>
> On Wednesday 11 September 2024 at 08:53:55 UTC+12 John Clark wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Sep 10, 2024 at 4:44 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>> *>* *Given any sequence of states you can label them so as to represent 
>>> a computation.  So I think the physics is really incidental to the 
>>> computation.*
>>>
>>
>> *You need to make the labels, and making something involves a change, and 
>> a change cannot happen without the involvement of matter and the laws of 
>> physics.  *
>>
>>   John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis 
>> <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis>
>> uwx
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>
>
>

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Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Liz R]

The question is whether or not maths exists independently of the material 
universe. Some people think it does (that it's true in all worlds, 
regardless of their laws of physics) while others think that it's a human 
invention approximating to physical phenomena. Personally I'm inclined to 
think that maths is true regardless of which universe you're in, or indeed 
true whether or not any universes exist. This is Max Tegmark's view, for 
example, as described in his book "Our Mathematical Universe". His idea 
(which is in the same ballpark as Bruno's, but approaching it from, as it 
were, the opposite direction) is that maths is necessarily true, and 
therefore makes a foundation on which to build an ontology that gets 
"somethig from nothing".

I'm not sure how one can test this, however.

On Wednesday 11 September 2024 at 08:53:55 UTC+12 John Clark wrote:

> On Tue, Sep 10, 2024 at 4:44 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
> *>* *Given any sequence of states you can label them so as to represent a 
>> computation.  So I think the physics is really incidental to the 
>> computation.*
>>
>
> *You need to make the labels, and making something involves a change, and 
> a change cannot happen without the involvement of matter and the laws of 
> physics.  *
>
>   John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis 
> 
> uwx
>
>
>
>
>>

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Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Liz R]

Thanks Russell. Hope you are all well on the Everything list.

On Monday 29 April 2024 at 17:04:14 UTC+12 Russell Standish wrote:

> I did get a response from him when I suggested making Amoeba's Secret
> open access.
>
> According to Kim Jones, who visited him 2022, he is well and taking a
> break from the Everything List.
>
> Cheers
>
> On Mon, Apr 29, 2024 at 03:09:22PM +1200, LizR wrote:
> > Hi Russell,
> > 
> > Do you have any news of Bruno? I see his last contribution here was a
> > couple of years ago.
> > 
> > Best wishes,
> > Liz
> > 
> > On Sat, 12 Aug 2023 at 22:15, Russell Standish  
> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi guys,
> > >
> > > I finally got around to doing something I meant to do years ago - I
> > > have released the English translation of "Amoeba's Secret" as a freely
> > > downloadable PDF under the Creative Commons CC-BY license at
> > > https://www.hpcoders.com.au/docs/amoebassecret.pdf .
> > >
> > > Bruno Marchal was a long time contributer to this list, and this
> > > semi-autobiography is also one of the clearest explanations of his
> > > ideas.
> > >
> > > Enjoy,
> > >
> > > --
> > >
> > > 
> 
> > > Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> > > Principal, High Performance Coders hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
> > > http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> > > 
> 
> > >
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> .
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> 
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>
> 
>

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My son the mathematician

[Liz R]

Here is his first co-authored paper (at the age of 20).

Topology and its Applications 

Volume 254 
, 1 
March 2019, Pages 85-100

Extending bonding functions in generalized inverse sequences
Iztok Banič, 
 
SimonGoodwin and 

MichaelLockyer 

 


(he's the one in the middle)

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0166864118304449


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Re: Black holes and the information paradox

[Liz R]

I thought QM was deterministic, at least mathematically - and I guess in 
the MWI?

I mean everyone can't have forgotten quantum indeterminacy when discussing 
the BHIP, surely?

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Re: What is the largest integer you can write in 5 seconds?

[Liz R]

I have a simpler answer!

"the largest integer you can write in 5 seconds"

...can be written in 5 seconds.

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Re: What is the largest integer you can write in 5 seconds?

[Liz R]

Graham's number tetrated Graham's number times? That took about 5 seconds, 
does it come close?

On Wednesday, 6 March 2019 07:06:24 UTC+13, John Clark wrote:
>
> It's easy to prove that the Busy Beaver Function grows faster than *ANY* 
> computable function because if there were such a faster growing function 
> you could use it to solve the Halting Problem. So if you're ever in a 
> contest to see who can name the largest integer in less than 5 seconds just 
> write BB(9000) and you'll probably win.
>
> John K Clark
>
>

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Is Google groups shutting down?

[Liz R]

If so is the EL going somewhere else?

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

[Liz R]

On Saturday, 28 December 2013 06:18:26 UTC+13, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
>
> Many worlds is probably the most outlandishly improbable theory of all 
> time, and should have been laughed out of existence as soon as it was 
> proposed. Do
>

Fortunately, science is not decided on what seems probable to humans, or we 
would never have realised that there is anything except the Earth and some 
lights in the sky. The MWI is very far from the most outlandishly 
improbable theory of all time, I can name a dozen ontological theories that 
are more outlandish without even asking WIkipedia, such as the idea that 
the world was created by the shenannigans of various gods.

you actually understand what it says or implies? Basically that every 
> quantum event that ever occured in the history of the universe spawns an 
> entire new universe of all its possible outcomes and every event in every 
> one of those new universes does the same. This immediately exponentially 
> escalates in the first few minutes of the universe into uncountable new 
> universes and has been expanding exponentially ever since over 14.7 billion 
> years! Just try to calculate the
>

The MWI is a straight interpretation of our best theory of matter - an 
interpretation that removes any extra assumptions (wave function collapse, 
pilot waves, wave-particle duality etc). It is simply what the relevant 
equations say, converted without interpretation to human language (if one 
leaves aside the actual phrase "many worlds", which is misleading). The 
equations imply that all possible outcomes occur for a given quantum event, 
or to be exact that the entities we regard as particles are in fact waves, 
capable of interfering with themselves, but only detectable (I suppose 
"entanglable" would be a better word) by a process of localisation that is, 
I'm told, neatly explained by decoherence. This implies that the universal 
wavefunction is constantly spreading and differentiating. This is generally 
characterised as "parallel universes coming into existence" but that isn't 
a completely accurate description (and in any case it is quite possible 
that space and time are emergent properties of the universal wavefunction).
 

> number of new universe that now exist. It's larger than the largest number 
> that could ever be imagined or even written down. There is not enough paper 
> in the universe, or enough computer memory in the entire universe to even 
> express a number this large! Doesn't anyone ever use common sense and think 
> through these things to see how stupid they are? And it violates all sorts 
> of conservations since energy eg. is multiplied exponentially beyond 
> counting. Geeez, it would be impossible to come up with something dumber, 
> especially when it is completely clear that decoherence theory falsifies it 
> conclusively.
>

If that was a correct description of the MWI, you might have a point, but 
it isn't. Oddly enough clever people *have* thought about this, some of 
them on this very list. Have you read "The Fabric of Reality" by David 
Deutsch? That's what Americans would call "MWI 101" or "The MWI for 
dummies". If you have, you will know that the MWI posits a continuum of 
"worlds" which can only ever differentiate, not "split" or "branch" or any 
of the other common misconceptions. The fact that the universe can generate 
greater and greater detail indefinitely (or possibly only to certain 
physical limits, like the Bekenstein bound) is no more surprising than the 
fact that in GR a finite universe can expand to infinite size (under 
certain conditions), or that the centre of a black hole (according to GR) 
is a singularity of infinite density. These are all properties of the 
continuum, a mathematical object that may or may not describe space-time 
(if it doesn't, it does so to very high precision, apparently many orders 
of magnitude smaller than the Planck length). The idea that the MWI 
violates the conservation of energy was laid to rest a long time ago. A 
simple example is a quantum computer factoring a 500 bit number. The 
equations of QM say that this is physically possible, even if we have 
trouble doing it in practice - it requires 500 qubits to be suitably 
prepared and then shaken down somehow (with Shor's algorithm, I think) to 
obtain the result. QM says this happens by generating a superposition of 2 
to the power of 500 quantum states, which according to my trusty calculator 
is quite a lot. These superpositions are in fact capable of decohering into 
2^500 possible states, although Shor's algo or whatever ensures that 
99.999...% of these give the right answer. The question is, how or where do 
all these states exist? QM says they all exist right here, in "our 
universe" (which the MWI claims is a convenient fiction, of course) - but 
how can 2^500 states exist at the same time for the same qubits (which are 
normally atoms, but could in theory be photons, electrons, etc) ? Where is 
the calculation perform

Re: Unexpected Hanging

[Liz R]

If someone told me that I was going to be hung, I can assure you I would be 
expecting it every day. I wouldn't bother with any logical analysis.

(The unexpected exam, on the other hand...)


On Thursday, 12 September 2013 21:33:24 UTC+12, telmo_menezes wrote:
>
> Time for some philosophy then :) 
>
> Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep: 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox 
>
> Probably many of you already know about it. 
>
> What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this 
> introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's 
> clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is 
> false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that 
> I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct? 
>
> Cheers, 
> Telmo. 
>

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RE: The universe cannot be a machine.

[William R. Buckley]

 

Sorry, Roger but this is a terribly naïve view of 

the physical universe.  For instance, how do you 

distinguish between machine and non-machine?

 

wrb

 

Hi 

 

The universe cannot be a machine. 

For life cannot exist without an intelligent observer

(to find food to eat, to judge friend from foe, etc.)

 

Is artificial intelligence possible ? No.

 

Why ? There cannot be a science of intelligence.
Intelligence is the ability to make autonomous choices,
not choices based on some external algorithm or computer program
such as in the game of Life.

 

Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 5/1/2013

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RE: Losing Control

[William R. Buckley]

 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Stathis Papaioannou
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 8:04 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Losing Control

 



On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 3:51 AM, Craig Weinberg  > wrote:

>> If a person is put through a mincer the atoms are all still there, but
>> in a different arrangement. The way the atoms are arranged is
>> important for life and consciousness.
>
>
> Sure. If the wrong atoms were replaced in the right arrangement the person
> could still have the same shaped body but they would be dead. That's
beside
> the point though. The composition and arrangement of atoms are both
> important for life and consciousness, but nowhere near as important as the
a
> priori possibility of life and consciousness in the universe. Yes,
> particular private experiences correspond to particular public machines,
but
> that does not mean that public machines are themselves anything more than
an
> experience. Unexperienced machines however, are indistinguishable from
> nothingness so that does not seem like a plausible source for experience.



 

That an environment supports living systems is certainly more important that
the 

living systems that occur; without the former the latter does not exist.

 

So, what are the necessary and sufficient characters of an environment that
it 

should consequently support living systems?

 


If the right atoms are placed in the right configuration then life or
consciousness occurs. Your theory does not really add anything: what would
it look like if the atoms or the configuration or the universe lack the
essential ingredient you claim but had every other physical property
unchanged? The person would function identically by any test but you would
claim he is not only not conscious but also not living? How would you decide
this and how do you know that the people around you haven't been replaced
with these unfortunate creatures?

>> Do you think that it is possible to organise the same matter in the
>> same configuration as an X and not get something that behaves as an X?
>> Could you give an example of such an experiment to make this clear?
>
>
> Until we create a living organism from scratch, we have no reason to
assume
> that any cell can be created externally just by expected chemical means.
It
> may not work that way.

I'm not proposing a technology, I'm proposing that as a thought experiment
the atoms are configured in the form of a cell. You have said that atoms in
cells follow the laws of physics, so the atoms in this artificial cell,
being the same type in the same configuration, would follow the same laws of
physics and behave in a similar manner. Unless there is some essential
non-physical ingredient which is missing how could it be otherwise?

> If you built a city that is materially identical to Rome of 100AD, it will
> not behave as Rome of 400AD. If you put modern people who are genetically
> identical to the population of Rome in 100AD, that city will not replay
its
> role in the history of the world.

Rome itself would not have played the same role if a dust mote had got into
Julius Caesar's eye, so obviously a copy of Rome would not play out the same
role. You can't hold the copy to higher standards than the original.

> Two identical cars come off the assembly line, yet they cannot drive to
the
> same exact places at the same exact time.
>
> If you start seeing the universe as a directly experienced process rather
> than fixed bodies in space, you might begin to see how forms and functions
> can only be subordinate to that which appreciates them.

But if I buy a particular model of car I don't want it to drive to the same
place as the prototype, I want it to have the same power, fuel efficiency,
steering etc. as the prototype. That is also what would be required of a
copy of a person: not that he live out exactly the same life, but that he
respond to similar situations in the same way as the original. As with the
car, you don't need an exhaustive list of all the situations the person will
encounter in order to program this in.

>> We are tied to a particular type of matter but all the matter is all
>> made of the same subatomic particles and it doesn't matter which
>> supernova the atoms were formed in. That is, the matter's history is
>> of no significance whatsoever. The only thing of significance is the
>> matter's type and configuration.
>
>
> Yet we are all made of the same nucleic acids, proteins, etc but our
> personal history is of tremendous significance. How do you explain this
> discrepancy?

It's not a discrepancy. Even people who are genetically identical, or
machines which are physically identical from the factory, end up different
due to different personal histories. What is of no significance whatsoever
is the history of the matter that went into the construction of the person
or machine.

>> Consciousness is not detectable, only the physical pr

RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

 

The context takes all action, to include the action 

of doing nothing at all.

 

Once the signal is given by the transmitter, then sure it is up to the
receiver of the signal to interpret it. How the transmitter formats the
signal will influence the receiver's reception and interpretation
possibilities though.
 

How the transmitter formats signal, what sign the transmitter sends will
influence the 

receiver's reception but only to the extent that the transmitted signal
corresponds to 

a priori defined acceptance criteria in the receiver.  This criteria is not
under the influence 

of the transmitter.

 

wrb 

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RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

Right there, that is the problem: your reliance upon consciousness 

for your argumentation.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 9:34 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Thursday, March 7, 2013 12:21:57 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

Craig:

 

When you say that "interpretation is consciousness" you contradict 

your prior statements regarding semiosis, that acceptance and action 

are not value.


I'm not sure what you're getting at. Acceptance in the sense of receiving a
sign is not the same as valuing, interpreting, or being conscious of a sign.
A router receives an electronic signal, but it has no interpretation or
value of it beyond routing it to the next router.

Craig

 

wrb

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com  ] On Behalf Of Craig
Weinberg
Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 8:05 AM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com  
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Thursday, March 7, 2013 6:55:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 

On 05 Mar 2013, at 19:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 12:03:28 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

Craig:

 

You statement of need for a human to observe the 

pattern is the smoking gun to indicate a misunderstanding 

of semiotic theory on your part.


I don't think that it has to be humans doing the observing at all. 
 

 

Specifically, you don't need a human; a machine will do.


A machine can only help another non-machine interpret something. I don't
think that they can interpret anything for 'themselves'.

 

You should study machine's self-reference. It is easy to program a machine
interpreting data, by itself and for herself. This is not like
consciousness. this is testable and already done.

You confuse the notion of machine before Post, Church Turing and after.


Interpretation is consciousness though. What is tested is that results
correspond with expectations in a way which is meaningful to us, not to the
machine. I can use a mirror to reflect an image that I see, but that doesn't
mean that the mirror intends to reflect images, or knows what they are, or
has an experience of them. We can prove that the image is indeed consistent
with our expectations of a reflected original though.

Craig
 

 

 

 

Bruno

 

 

 

 

 

Not all machines are man-made.


True, but what we see as natural machines may not be just machines. Man-made
machines may be just machines.

Craig

 

wrb

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com [mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com] On
Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 5:24 AM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 2:06:20 AM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

There is information (I take information to be a 
manifestation of entropy) and it is always represented 
in the form of a pattern (a distribution) of the units 
of mass/energy of which the Universe is composed.  


I can agree that information could be considered a manifestation of entropy,
to the extent that entropy is necessary to provide a contrast space for a
distribution. To string an ellipses together, you need one dot, repetition,
space, and a quality of measurement which yokes together the three dots
aesthetically. Beyond that, you also need human observer with human visual
sense to turn the distribution into a 'pattern'. Without that, of course,
even distribution cannot cohere into "a" distribution, as there is no scale,
range, quality, etc to anchor the expectation. If we are a microbe, we may
not ever find our way from one dot to the next.

I 
think that semiotic signs are simply specific bits 
of information; I will use the terms synonymously. 

Information has meaning only within context.  For many 
people, context is taken to mean one piece of information 
as compared to another piece of information.  I do not 
take this meaning of context when I discuss semiotics. 
Instead, I take semiotic context to be the acceptor of 
the information.  Hence, all meaning resides a priori 
within information acceptors. 


Agree. Well, transmitters form the signs from their own sense of meaning as
well. That's how we are having this discussion.
 


What you know you have always known; the sign merely 
serves to bring that knowledge to your conscious mind. 


Right. I mean it might be a bit more complicated as far as novelty goes. I
don't know if the state of unconscious information is really what I "have
always known" but that this particular constellation of meanings reflects
the Totality in a way that it is only trivially novel. Like if you hit a
jackpot on a slot machine - that may not have happened before, but the slot
machine is

RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

A machine can accept sign and yield alteration of 

its configuration (add to its parts, delete from its 

parts but most of all alter the complexity of its 

parts and their arrangement) such that the machine 

develops its ability to:

 

1.   accept sign - one yield you did not consider

2.   increase the complexity of constructs - another 

yield you did not consider

3.   acquire Turing competence from incompetence - a 

third yield you did not consider

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 8:33 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Thursday, March 7, 2013 1:39:25 AM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

I have before claimed that the computer is 
a good example of the power of semiosis. 

It is simple enough to see that the mere 
construction of a Turing machine confers 
upon that machine the ability to recognise 
all computations; to generate the yield of 
such computations. 

In this sense, a program (the source code) 
is a sequence of signs that upon acceptance 
brings the machine to generate some 
corresponding yield; a computation. 

Also, the intention of an entity behind sign 
origination has nothing whatsoever to do with 
the acceptability of that sign by some other 
entity, much less the meaning there taken for 
the sign. 

The meaning of a sign is always centered upon 
the acceptor of that sign. 


I agree but I don't think the machine can accept any sign. It can copy them
and perform scripted transformations on them, but ultimately there is no
yield at all. The Turing machine does not no that it has yielded a result of
a computation, and more than a bucket of water knows when it is being
emptied. In fact, you could make a Turing machine out of nothing but buckets
of water on pulleys and it would literally be some pattern of filled buckets
which is supposed to be meaningful as a sign or yield to the 'machine'
(collection of buckets? water molecules? convection currents? general
buckety-watery-movingness?)

Craig

 


wrb 



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RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

The sign is what it is and contexts react to signs.

 

The other words you use in your argumentation 

are unnecessary at the very least, and I think they 

lead to muddled thinking on your end.

 

The sign takes no action; it simply is.

 

The context takes all action, to include the action 

of doing nothing at all.

 

Meaning is no more nor no less than the action 

taken by the context.

 

The sign does not have some magical character 

called *sensitivity to detectability*

 

Semiotics has nothing to do with Shannon’s

information transmission problem.  The reason 

for this is that Shannon assumes that both 

transmitter and receiver share a common 

context.  You, on the other hand, don’t have 

that luxury.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 8:17 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Wednesday, March 6, 2013 12:09:28 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

Now we are getting some place.

 

Exactly.  There is simply action.

 

Contexts react to sign.


They react to their interpretations of a sign. The sign itself is a figure -
a disposable form hijacked by the intention of the transmitter. The sign
depends on sensitivities to be detected. When it is detected, it is not
detected as the sign intended by the transmitter unless the semiosis is well
executed, which is up to both the transmitter and receiver's intentional and
unintentional contributions.

Craig
 

 

Nothing more.  Nothing less.

 

The complexity of action is open ended.

 

wrb

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com  ] On Behalf Of Craig
Weinberg
Sent: Wednesday, March 06, 2013 4:12 AM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com  
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 5:48:19 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

Craig:

 

The mistake you make is clearly stated in your words:

 

“…doesn’t mean that they communicated with judgment.”

 

You are anthropomorphizing.  The value is no more nor no 

less than the action taken upon signal acceptance.


That's ok, but it means there is no value. There is simply action.

Craig
 

 

wrb

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com [mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com] On
Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 1:27 PM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 3:07:00 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

The fact that a machine can act in a discriminatory based 

upon some signal (sign, information) input is demonstration 

of value judgment.


Only in our eyes, not in its own eyes. It's like telling a kid to say some
insult to someone in another language. The fact they are able to carry out
your instruction doesn't mean that they communicated with judgment.
 

 

Just as there is no *in* in a machine, so to there is no *in* 

in a biological organism; they both, machine and organism, 


But there is an 'in' with respect to the experience of an organism - only
because we know it first hand. There would seem to be no reason why a
machine couldn't have a similar 'in', but it actually seems that their
nature indicates they do not. I take the extra step and hypothesize exactly
why that is - because experience is not generated out of the bodies
associated with them, but rather the bodies are simply a public view of one
aspect of the experience. If you build a machine, you are assembling bodies
to relate to each other, as external forms, so that no interiority 'emerges'
from the gaps between them.
 

are forms that treat other forms in certain proscribed ways.

 

You cannot demonstrate otherwise.


Sure I can. Feelings, colors, personalities, intentions, historical
zeitgeists...these are not forms relating to forms.

Craig
 

 

wrb

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com [mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com] On
Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 10:37 AM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 3:53:31 AM UTC-5, Alberto G.Corona wrote:

Let´s say that what we call "information" is an extended form of sensory
input. What makes this input "information" is the usability of this input
for reducing the internal entropy of the receiver or increase the internal
order. The receiver can be a machine, a cell, a person or a society for
example. If the input do not produce this effect in the receiver, then that
input is not information.


The increase of internal order of the receiver is a symptom of an experience
of being informed but they are not the same thing. It's not really even
relevant in most cases. I would not call it an extended form of sensory
input, but a reduction of sensory experie

RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

I think that like light, being composed of two propagating 

waves, we should find sound to be composed of propagating 

pressure waves regardless of media.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 8:10 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 10:55:31 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

The falling tree makes sound, the wind make sound, the . makes sound 

regardless of your presence (or the presence of others) to hear that sound.


Regardless of my presence, of course, but to make sound, you need an ear and
a medium which vibrates that ear. If you take the atmosphere away, then of
course the falling tree could not make a sound to anyone. For the same
reason, if you take all of the ears away, then there can be no such thing as
sound.
 

 

To argue anything else is utter nonsense.

To the contrary. To assume that physics can simply 'exist' outside of a
context of detection and participation is a statement of religious faith. We
have never experienced an unexperienced world, so it would be unscientific
to presume such a thing. This has nothing to do with human experience, its
ontology.

Craig
 

 

wrb

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com  ] On Behalf Of Craig
Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 7:34 PM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com  
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 5:52:32 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

I do not hold that the acceptor must exist, for then I 

am making a value judgment, and I have already scolded 

Craig for the same thing.

 

Think of it this way.  A volume of gas has a measure of 

entropy.  This means that the molecules are found in 


found by what?
 

a specific sequence of microstates, and those microstates 

constitute an information state of the molecules.  


Who is it constituted to though? Empty space? The molecules as a group? Each
molecule? What is validating that these molecules exist in some way - that
there is a such thing as a microstate which can be detected in some way by
something... and what is detection? How does it work?

When these things are taken as axiomatic, then we are just reiterating those
axioms when we claim that no acceptor must exist. In my understanding, exist
and acceptor are the same thing.

 

Alter 

that microstate sequence (as by adding or removing 

entropy) and the description of the microstate sequence 

changes correspondingly; entropy is information.


Only if something can detect their own description of the microstate as
having changed. We cannot assume that there is any change at all if nothing
can possibly detect it. For example, if I take make a movie of ice cubes
melting in a glass, even though that is a case of increasing thermodynamic
entropy, we will see a lower cost of video compression in a movie of the
glass after the ice has melted completely. In that case the image
description can be made to follow either increasing or decreasing
information entropy depending on whether you play the movie forward and
backward. There is no link between microstate thermodynamic entropy and
optical description information entropy.

Craig

 

Acceptors and signals; contexts and signs; .

 

wrb

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com [mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com] On
Behalf Of John Mikes
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 1:13 PM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 

Dear Bil B. you probably have thought in these lines during similar long
periods as I did. It was ~2 decades ago when I defined 

i n f o r m a t i o n  as something with (at least) 2 ends: 

1. the notion (in whatever format it shows up)  - and

2. the acceptor (adjusting the notion in whatever context it can be 

perceived - appercipiated (adjusted>). 

I have no idea how to make a connection between information (anyway how one
defines it) and the (inner?) disorder level of anything (entropy?). I
dislike this thermodynamic term alltogether. 

 

Later on I tried to refine my wording into:

RELATIONS and the capability of recognizing them. That moved away from a
'human(?)' framework. E. g. I called the 'closeness of a '(+)' charge to a
'(-)' potential an information so it came close to SOME consciousness (=(?)
response to relations), no matter in what kind of domain. 

 

Do you feel some merit to my thinking?

 

John Mikes

On Tue, Mar 5, 2013 at 2:06 AM, William R. Buckley 
wrote:

There is information (I take information to be a
manifestation of entropy) and it is always represented
in the form of a pattern (a distribution) of the units
of mass/energy of which the Universe is composed.  I
think that semiotic signs are simply specific bits
of information; I will use the terms synony

RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

Craig:

 

When you say that "interpretation is consciousness" you contradict 

your prior statements regarding semiosis, that acceptance and action 

are not value.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 8:05 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Thursday, March 7, 2013 6:55:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 

On 05 Mar 2013, at 19:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:







On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 12:03:28 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

Craig:

 

You statement of need for a human to observe the 

pattern is the smoking gun to indicate a misunderstanding 

of semiotic theory on your part.


I don't think that it has to be humans doing the observing at all. 
 

 

Specifically, you don't need a human; a machine will do.


A machine can only help another non-machine interpret something. I don't
think that they can interpret anything for 'themselves'.

 

You should study machine's self-reference. It is easy to program a machine
interpreting data, by itself and for herself. This is not like
consciousness. this is testable and already done.

You confuse the notion of machine before Post, Church Turing and after.


Interpretation is consciousness though. What is tested is that results
correspond with expectations in a way which is meaningful to us, not to the
machine. I can use a mirror to reflect an image that I see, but that doesn't
mean that the mirror intends to reflect images, or knows what they are, or
has an experience of them. We can prove that the image is indeed consistent
with our expectations of a reflected original though.

Craig
 

 

 

 

Bruno

 

 





 

 

Not all machines are man-made.


True, but what we see as natural machines may not be just machines. Man-made
machines may be just machines.

Craig

 

wrb

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com [mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com] On
Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 5:24 AM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 2:06:20 AM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

There is information (I take information to be a 
manifestation of entropy) and it is always represented 
in the form of a pattern (a distribution) of the units 
of mass/energy of which the Universe is composed.  


I can agree that information could be considered a manifestation of entropy,
to the extent that entropy is necessary to provide a contrast space for a
distribution. To string an ellipses together, you need one dot, repetition,
space, and a quality of measurement which yokes together the three dots
aesthetically. Beyond that, you also need human observer with human visual
sense to turn the distribution into a 'pattern'. Without that, of course,
even distribution cannot cohere into "a" distribution, as there is no scale,
range, quality, etc to anchor the expectation. If we are a microbe, we may
not ever find our way from one dot to the next.

I 
think that semiotic signs are simply specific bits 
of information; I will use the terms synonymously. 

Information has meaning only within context.  For many 
people, context is taken to mean one piece of information 
as compared to another piece of information.  I do not 
take this meaning of context when I discuss semiotics. 
Instead, I take semiotic context to be the acceptor of 
the information.  Hence, all meaning resides a priori 
within information acceptors. 


Agree. Well, transmitters form the signs from their own sense of meaning as
well. That's how we are having this discussion.
 


What you know you have always known; the sign merely 
serves to bring that knowledge to your conscious mind. 


Right. I mean it might be a bit more complicated as far as novelty goes. I
don't know if the state of unconscious information is really what I "have
always known" but that this particular constellation of meanings reflects
the Totality in a way that it is only trivially novel. Like if you hit a
jackpot on a slot machine - that may not have happened before, but the slot
machine is designed to payout whenever it does. The jackpot already exists
as a potential and sooner or later it will be realized.
 


That you may have intention and so comport your delivery 
of information to another acceptor has not bearing upon 
the subsequent acceptance or rejection of that information 
by the target acceptor.  Acceptance or rejection of 
information is determined solely by the accepting or 
rejecting context (acceptor). 


Agree. But the converse - the acceptor can only accept information which has
been included for delivery by intention (or accidentally I suppose).
 


Your mere presence sends information regardless of some 
conscious intent.  Indeed, your absence does equally 
delive

RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

I have before claimed that the computer is
a good example of the power of semiosis.

It is simple enough to see that the mere 
construction of a Turing machine confers 
upon that machine the ability to recognise 
all computations; to generate the yield of 
such computations.

In this sense, a program (the source code)
is a sequence of signs that upon acceptance 
brings the machine to generate some 
corresponding yield; a computation.

Also, the intention of an entity behind sign 
origination has nothing whatsoever to do with 
the acceptability of that sign by some other 
entity, much less the meaning there taken for 
the sign.

The meaning of a sign is always centered upon 
the acceptor of that sign.

wrb


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RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

I should have added that the context sensitivity of the 

relationship between sign and action is pure subjectivity.

 

Any context able to evaluate itself will conclude that its 

actions are a direct consequence of choice taken by that 

context; i.e. values.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Wednesday, March 06, 2013 4:12 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 5:48:19 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

Craig:

 

The mistake you make is clearly stated in your words:

 

".doesn't mean that they communicated with judgment."

 

You are anthropomorphizing.  The value is no more nor no 

less than the action taken upon signal acceptance.


That's ok, but it means there is no value. There is simply action.

Craig
 

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RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

Now we are getting some place.

 

Exactly.  There is simply action.

 

Contexts react to sign.

 

Nothing more.  Nothing less.

 

The complexity of action is open ended.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Wednesday, March 06, 2013 4:12 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 5:48:19 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

Craig:

 

The mistake you make is clearly stated in your words:

 

“…doesn’t mean that they communicated with judgment.”

 

You are anthropomorphizing.  The value is no more nor no 

less than the action taken upon signal acceptance.


That's ok, but it means there is no value. There is simply action.

Craig
 

 

wrb

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com  ] On Behalf Of Craig
Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 1:27 PM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com  
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 3:07:00 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

The fact that a machine can act in a discriminatory based 

upon some signal (sign, information) input is demonstration 

of value judgment.


Only in our eyes, not in its own eyes. It's like telling a kid to say some
insult to someone in another language. The fact they are able to carry out
your instruction doesn't mean that they communicated with judgment.
 

 

Just as there is no *in* in a machine, so to there is no *in* 

in a biological organism; they both, machine and organism, 


But there is an 'in' with respect to the experience of an organism - only
because we know it first hand. There would seem to be no reason why a
machine couldn't have a similar 'in', but it actually seems that their
nature indicates they do not. I take the extra step and hypothesize exactly
why that is - because experience is not generated out of the bodies
associated with them, but rather the bodies are simply a public view of one
aspect of the experience. If you build a machine, you are assembling bodies
to relate to each other, as external forms, so that no interiority 'emerges'
from the gaps between them.
 

are forms that treat other forms in certain proscribed ways.

 

You cannot demonstrate otherwise.


Sure I can. Feelings, colors, personalities, intentions, historical
zeitgeists...these are not forms relating to forms.

Craig
 

 

wrb

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com [mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com] On
Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 10:37 AM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 3:53:31 AM UTC-5, Alberto G.Corona wrote:

Let´s say that what we call "information" is an extended form of sensory
input. What makes this input "information" is the usability of this input
for reducing the internal entropy of the receiver or increase the internal
order. The receiver can be a machine, a cell, a person or a society for
example. If the input do not produce this effect in the receiver, then that
input is not information.


The increase of internal order of the receiver is a symptom of an experience
of being informed but they are not the same thing. It's not really even
relevant in most cases. I would not call it an extended form of sensory
input, but a reduction of sensory experience. Input is not a physical
reality, it is a conceptual label.

Consider Blindsight:

I hold up two fingers and ask how many fingers? 

"I don't know.'

Guess

'two'.

This example tells us about information without tying it to decreased
entropy. My two fingers are a form. I am putting them into that form, so the
process of my presenting my fingers is a formation of a sign. 

The sign is not information at this point. It means something different to
an ant or a frog than it does to a person looking at it. If you can't see,
there is no formation there at all unless you can collide with my fingers.

When the patient responds that they don't know how many fingers, it is
because they personally have no experience of seeing it. They are not being
informed personally by the form of my fingers in front of their face because
they have blindsight.

When they guess correctly, they still have not been informed. Only we know
that the information is correct. At this point you could say that there is
some decrease in information entropy of the receiver as far as we are
concerned, but in fact, for the receiver themselves, they have not increased
any internal order.

A machine has blindsight about everything. They can be queried and produce
valid responses to inform us, but they are never informed themselves. There
is no 'in' in a machine, it is an organization of forms which treat other
forms in a proscribed way. Forms a

RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

The falling tree makes sound, the wind make sound, the . makes sound

regardless of your presence (or the presence of others) to hear that sound.

 

To argue anything else is utter nonsense.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 7:34 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 5:52:32 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

I do not hold that the acceptor must exist, for then I 

am making a value judgment, and I have already scolded 

Craig for the same thing.

 

Think of it this way.  A volume of gas has a measure of 

entropy.  This means that the molecules are found in 


found by what?
 

a specific sequence of microstates, and those microstates 

constitute an information state of the molecules.  


Who is it constituted to though? Empty space? The molecules as a group? Each
molecule? What is validating that these molecules exist in some way - that
there is a such thing as a microstate which can be detected in some way by
something... and what is detection? How does it work?

When these things are taken as axiomatic, then we are just reiterating those
axioms when we claim that no acceptor must exist. In my understanding, exist
and acceptor are the same thing.

 

Alter 

that microstate sequence (as by adding or removing 

entropy) and the description of the microstate sequence 

changes correspondingly; entropy is information.


Only if something can detect their own description of the microstate as
having changed. We cannot assume that there is any change at all if nothing
can possibly detect it. For example, if I take make a movie of ice cubes
melting in a glass, even though that is a case of increasing thermodynamic
entropy, we will see a lower cost of video compression in a movie of the
glass after the ice has melted completely. In that case the image
description can be made to follow either increasing or decreasing
information entropy depending on whether you play the movie forward and
backward. There is no link between microstate thermodynamic entropy and
optical description information entropy.

Craig

 

Acceptors and signals; contexts and signs; .

 

wrb

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com  ] On Behalf Of John Mikes
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 1:13 PM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com  
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 

Dear Bil B. you probably have thought in these lines during similar long
periods as I did. It was ~2 decades ago when I defined 

i n f o r m a t i o n  as something with (at least) 2 ends: 

1. the notion (in whatever format it shows up)  - and

2. the acceptor (adjusting the notion in whatever context it can be 

perceived - appercipiated (adjusted>). 

I have no idea how to make a connection between information (anyway how one
defines it) and the (inner?) disorder level of anything (entropy?). I
dislike this thermodynamic term alltogether. 

 

Later on I tried to refine my wording into:

RELATIONS and the capability of recognizing them. That moved away from a
'human(?)' framework. E. g. I called the 'closeness of a '(+)' charge to a
'(-)' potential an information so it came close to SOME consciousness (=(?)
response to relations), no matter in what kind of domain. 

 

Do you feel some merit to my thinking?

 

John Mikes

On Tue, Mar 5, 2013 at 2:06 AM, William R. Buckley  > wrote:

There is information (I take information to be a
manifestation of entropy) and it is always represented
in the form of a pattern (a distribution) of the units
of mass/energy of which the Universe is composed.  I
think that semiotic signs are simply specific bits
of information; I will use the terms synonymously.

Information has meaning only within context.  For many
people, context is taken to mean one piece of information
as compared to another piece of information.  I do not
take this meaning of context when I discuss semiotics.
Instead, I take semiotic context to be the acceptor of
the information.  Hence, all meaning resides a priori
within information acceptors.

What you know you have always known; the sign merely
serves to bring that knowledge to your conscious mind.

That you may have intention and so comport your delivery
of information to another acceptor has not bearing upon
the subsequent acceptance or rejection of that information
by the target acceptor.  Acceptance or rejection of
information is determined solely by the accepting or
rejecting context (acceptor).

Your mere presence sends information regardless of some
conscious intent.  Indeed, your absence does equally
deliver information, for the target acceptor will see
a definite difference in available information sources
whether you are present or not.

Consider a line worker in a bean processing plant where
the task is t

RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

I do not hold that the acceptor must exist, for then I 

am making a value judgment, and I have already scolded 

Craig for the same thing.

 

Think of it this way.  A volume of gas has a measure of 

entropy.  This means that the molecules are found in 

a specific sequence of microstates, and those microstates 

constitute an information state of the molecules.  Alter 

that microstate sequence (as by adding or removing 

entropy) and the description of the microstate sequence 

changes correspondingly; entropy is information.

 

Acceptors and signals; contexts and signs; .

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of John Mikes
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 1:13 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 

Dear Bil B. you probably have thought in these lines during similar long
periods as I did. It was ~2 decades ago when I defined 

i n f o r m a t i o n  as something with (at least) 2 ends: 

1. the notion (in whatever format it shows up)  - and

2. the acceptor (adjusting the notion in whatever context it can be 

perceived - appercipiated (adjusted>). 

I have no idea how to make a connection between information (anyway how one
defines it) and the (inner?) disorder level of anything (entropy?). I
dislike this thermodynamic term alltogether. 

 

Later on I tried to refine my wording into:

RELATIONS and the capability of recognizing them. That moved away from a
'human(?)' framework. E. g. I called the 'closeness of a '(+)' charge to a
'(-)' potential an information so it came close to SOME consciousness (=(?)
response to relations), no matter in what kind of domain. 

 

Do you feel some merit to my thinking?

 

John Mikes

On Tue, Mar 5, 2013 at 2:06 AM, William R. Buckley 
wrote:

There is information (I take information to be a
manifestation of entropy) and it is always represented
in the form of a pattern (a distribution) of the units
of mass/energy of which the Universe is composed.  I
think that semiotic signs are simply specific bits
of information; I will use the terms synonymously.

Information has meaning only within context.  For many
people, context is taken to mean one piece of information
as compared to another piece of information.  I do not
take this meaning of context when I discuss semiotics.
Instead, I take semiotic context to be the acceptor of
the information.  Hence, all meaning resides a priori
within information acceptors.

What you know you have always known; the sign merely
serves to bring that knowledge to your conscious mind.

That you may have intention and so comport your delivery
of information to another acceptor has not bearing upon
the subsequent acceptance or rejection of that information
by the target acceptor.  Acceptance or rejection of
information is determined solely by the accepting or
rejecting context (acceptor).

Your mere presence sends information regardless of some
conscious intent.  Indeed, your absence does equally
deliver information, for the target acceptor will see
a definite difference in available information sources
whether you are present or not.

Consider a line worker in a bean processing plant where
the task is to cull *bad* dried beans from *good* dried
beans as they go by on a conveyor belt; the *bad* beans
are removed by hand, so the line worker is constantly
looking for *bad* beans while constantly being aware
of the fact that not many of the beans are *bad*.  The
consciousness is aware of both that which is present
and that which is not present.

Further, what any information that you emit means to
you is irrelevant to the meaning that another may take
for that information.  Indeed, it is via reliance upon
-Cultural Norms- that your point regarding Morse Code
becomes relevant.  It is perfectly reasonable for an
ornery person to simply reject such norms and act
otherwise; your expectation originates in you, not
the targets of information you broadcast.

>>The truth of your statement is no reply to my claim,
>>that how another receiver of signs responds is
>>irrelevant to your knowledge, save the one case of
>>conveyance of knowledge between semiotic units;
>>where you intend for knowledge to be conveyed.  In
>>that case, it is behooving of the sender to ensure
>>that the receiver can receive and understand the
>>message. 
>
>I'm not sure what you are bringing up here, but I
>would say that my point is that all messages have
>multiple levels of reception, perhaps as many levels
>as their are receivers in the universe. At the same
>time, if we are assuming human senders and receivers
>and a content range which is highly normative and
>practical (i.e. Morse code alphabet rather than
>emoticons, inside jokes, etc), then the information
>entropy is reduced dramatically.
>
>Maybe you can give me a

RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

Craig:

 

The mistake you make is clearly stated in your words:

 

“…doesn’t mean that they communicated with judgment.”

 

You are anthropomorphizing.  The value is no more nor no 

less than the action taken upon signal acceptance.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 1:27 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 3:07:00 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

The fact that a machine can act in a discriminatory based 

upon some signal (sign, information) input is demonstration 

of value judgment.


Only in our eyes, not in its own eyes. It's like telling a kid to say some
insult to someone in another language. The fact they are able to carry out
your instruction doesn't mean that they communicated with judgment.
 

 

Just as there is no *in* in a machine, so to there is no *in* 

in a biological organism; they both, machine and organism, 


But there is an 'in' with respect to the experience of an organism - only
because we know it first hand. There would seem to be no reason why a
machine couldn't have a similar 'in', but it actually seems that their
nature indicates they do not. I take the extra step and hypothesize exactly
why that is - because experience is not generated out of the bodies
associated with them, but rather the bodies are simply a public view of one
aspect of the experience. If you build a machine, you are assembling bodies
to relate to each other, as external forms, so that no interiority 'emerges'
from the gaps between them.
 

are forms that treat other forms in certain proscribed ways.

 

You cannot demonstrate otherwise.


Sure I can. Feelings, colors, personalities, intentions, historical
zeitgeists...these are not forms relating to forms.

Craig
 

 

wrb

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com  ] On Behalf Of Craig
Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 10:37 AM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com  
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 3:53:31 AM UTC-5, Alberto G.Corona wrote:

Let´s say that what we call "information" is an extended form of sensory
input. What makes this input "information" is the usability of this input
for reducing the internal entropy of the receiver or increase the internal
order. The receiver can be a machine, a cell, a person or a society for
example. If the input do not produce this effect in the receiver, then that
input is not information.


The increase of internal order of the receiver is a symptom of an experience
of being informed but they are not the same thing. It's not really even
relevant in most cases. I would not call it an extended form of sensory
input, but a reduction of sensory experience. Input is not a physical
reality, it is a conceptual label.

Consider Blindsight:

I hold up two fingers and ask how many fingers? 

"I don't know.'

Guess

'two'.

This example tells us about information without tying it to decreased
entropy. My two fingers are a form. I am putting them into that form, so the
process of my presenting my fingers is a formation of a sign. 

The sign is not information at this point. It means something different to
an ant or a frog than it does to a person looking at it. If you can't see,
there is no formation there at all unless you can collide with my fingers.

When the patient responds that they don't know how many fingers, it is
because they personally have no experience of seeing it. They are not being
informed personally by the form of my fingers in front of their face because
they have blindsight.

When they guess correctly, they still have not been informed. Only we know
that the information is correct. At this point you could say that there is
some decrease in information entropy of the receiver as far as we are
concerned, but in fact, for the receiver themselves, they have not increased
any internal order.

A machine has blindsight about everything. They can be queried and produce
valid responses to inform us, but they are never informed themselves. There
is no 'in' in a machine, it is an organization of forms which treat other
forms in a proscribed way. Forms are copied, transformed, and presented in a
context that it has no experience of. My computer sees nothing that I see on
this screen. It reads nothing that I type here. It doesn't know what the
Everything List is - not even Google knows what it is - only that the string
of characters in the name is to be associated with an ip address.

Craig

 

2013/3/2 William R. Buckley 


>Thinking about how information content of a message

Big mistake.  Information is never contained with but
exactly one exception, an envelope.

I made this point with Jesper Hoffmeyer

RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

The machine is informed.  Acceptance demonstrates the act of becoming 

informed.  The yield of such acceptance is called meaning.

 

Easily, trivially, this language can be applied to machine and organism
without 

concomitant observation of the slightest distinction between them.

 

The definition of a being has nothing to do (imposes no causal consequence) 

with a sign.  Signs can be accepted by organisms and machines
(non-organisms?) 

with equal dexterity to provide equal meaning.  A community of machines
(like 

Robbie the Robot) can equally define meaning to things as can a community of


beings.  That you claim need to impose human interpretation in order to
obtain 

meaning is strictly the bailiwick of anthropomorphism.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 1:10 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 3:03:31 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

Craig,

 

You build an automaton, place it and turn it on, and from that point in time
forward 

the automaton reacts to acceptable information all on its own.


Reacts, yes, but it isn't informed by the reaction.
 

 

You contradict yourself - - I don't think it has to be human - machines only
help 

non-machines to interpret -


Where was the contradiction?
 

- and if the human point is important, then surely 

you will accept your definition to be that it must be biological life, for a
machine 

cannot be alive.


A living being can be used as a machine, but it is not defined by that
function.  

 

A machine is either a machine or it is not a machine - a machine cannot be
both 

a machine and not a machine at the same time.


A creature can be more than a machine, but still act as a machine in many
ways.

Craig
 

 

wrb 

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com  ] On Behalf Of Craig
Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 10:14 AM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com  
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 12:03:28 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

Craig:

 

You statement of need for a human to observe the 

pattern is the smoking gun to indicate a misunderstanding 

of semiotic theory on your part.


I don't think that it has to be humans doing the observing at all. 
 

 

Specifically, you don't need a human; a machine will do.


A machine can only help another non-machine interpret something. I don't
think that they can interpret anything for 'themselves'.
 

 

Not all machines are man-made.


True, but what we see as natural machines may not be just machines. Man-made
machines may be just machines.

Craig

 

wrb

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com [mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com] On
Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 5:24 AM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 2:06:20 AM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

There is information (I take information to be a 
manifestation of entropy) and it is always represented 
in the form of a pattern (a distribution) of the units 
of mass/energy of which the Universe is composed.  


I can agree that information could be considered a manifestation of entropy,
to the extent that entropy is necessary to provide a contrast space for a
distribution. To string an ellipses together, you need one dot, repetition,
space, and a quality of measurement which yokes together the three dots
aesthetically. Beyond that, you also need human observer with human visual
sense to turn the distribution into a 'pattern'. Without that, of course,
even distribution cannot cohere into "a" distribution, as there is no scale,
range, quality, etc to anchor the expectation. If we are a microbe, we may
not ever find our way from one dot to the next.

I 
think that semiotic signs are simply specific bits 
of information; I will use the terms synonymously. 

Information has meaning only within context.  For many 
people, context is taken to mean one piece of information 
as compared to another piece of information.  I do not 
take this meaning of context when I discuss semiotics. 
Instead, I take semiotic context to be the acceptor of 
the information.  Hence, all meaning resides a priori 
within information acceptors. 


Agree. Well, transmitters form the signs from their own sense of meaning as
well. That's how we are having this discussion.
 


What you know you have always known; the sign merely 
serves to bring that knowledge to your conscious mind. 


Right. I mean it might be a bit more complicated as far as novelty goes. I
don't know if the state of unconscious information is really what I "have
always known" but that this particular constellation of meanings reflects
the Tota

RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

The fact that a machine can act in a discriminatory based 

upon some signal (sign, information) input is demonstration 

of value judgment.

 

Just as there is no *in* in a machine, so to there is no *in* 

in a biological organism; they both, machine and organism, 

are forms that treat other forms in certain proscribed ways.

 

You cannot demonstrate otherwise.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 10:37 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 3:53:31 AM UTC-5, Alberto G.Corona wrote:

Let´s say that what we call "information" is an extended form of sensory
input. What makes this input "information" is the usability of this input
for reducing the internal entropy of the receiver or increase the internal
order. The receiver can be a machine, a cell, a person or a society for
example. If the input do not produce this effect in the receiver, then that
input is not information.


The increase of internal order of the receiver is a symptom of an experience
of being informed but they are not the same thing. It's not really even
relevant in most cases. I would not call it an extended form of sensory
input, but a reduction of sensory experience. Input is not a physical
reality, it is a conceptual label.

Consider Blindsight:

I hold up two fingers and ask how many fingers? 

"I don't know.'

Guess

'two'.

This example tells us about information without tying it to decreased
entropy. My two fingers are a form. I am putting them into that form, so the
process of my presenting my fingers is a formation of a sign. 

The sign is not information at this point. It means something different to
an ant or a frog than it does to a person looking at it. If you can't see,
there is no formation there at all unless you can collide with my fingers.

When the patient responds that they don't know how many fingers, it is
because they personally have no experience of seeing it. They are not being
informed personally by the form of my fingers in front of their face because
they have blindsight.

When they guess correctly, they still have not been informed. Only we know
that the information is correct. At this point you could say that there is
some decrease in information entropy of the receiver as far as we are
concerned, but in fact, for the receiver themselves, they have not increased
any internal order.

A machine has blindsight about everything. They can be queried and produce
valid responses to inform us, but they are never informed themselves. There
is no 'in' in a machine, it is an organization of forms which treat other
forms in a proscribed way. Forms are copied, transformed, and presented in a
context that it has no experience of. My computer sees nothing that I see on
this screen. It reads nothing that I type here. It doesn't know what the
Everything List is - not even Google knows what it is - only that the string
of characters in the name is to be associated with an ip address.

Craig

 

2013/3/2 William R. Buckley  >


>Thinking about how information content of a message

Big mistake.  Information is never contained with but
exactly one exception, an envelope.

I made this point with Jesper Hoffmeyer regarding a
statement in his book Biosemiotics, that information
is represented but not contained in that representation.
That marks of chalk upon slate may be taken to represent
information at a meta level above the reality of streaks
of a deformed amorphous solid has nothing to do with
the information represented by that deformation, nor the
increase of entropy associated with the greater disorder
obtained from that deformation; these are but three of
the *informations* to be found upon review of those
streaks.  Entropy is how nature sees information (not
yet an established fact but I think the tea leaves read
clear enough) but that has (presumably) nothing to do
with how intelligent individuals see information, or
as von Uexküll called such phenomena, signs.

Most definitely the information is not to be found
within the material of its expression, its representation.
Rather, the information is already to be found within the
interpreter.

That which is information is so by virtue of the acceptor
of that information; else, it is noise.

And, write the information on a piece of paper and seal
the paper within an envelope and you may justifiably
claim that the information is contained; else, you are
deluding yourself.


>has an inversely proportionate relationship with the
>capacity of sender and receiver to synchronize with
>each other.
>



wrb




 
 

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RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

Craig,

 

You build an automaton, place it and turn it on, and from that point in time
forward 

the automaton reacts to acceptable information all on its own.

 

You contradict yourself - - I don't think it has to be human - machines only
help 

non-machines to interpret - - and if the human point is important, then
surely 

you will accept your definition to be that it must be biological life, for a
machine 

cannot be alive.

 

A machine is either a machine or it is not a machine - a machine cannot be
both 

a machine and not a machine at the same time.

 

wrb 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 10:14 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 12:03:28 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

Craig:

 

You statement of need for a human to observe the 

pattern is the smoking gun to indicate a misunderstanding 

of semiotic theory on your part.


I don't think that it has to be humans doing the observing at all. 
 

 

Specifically, you don't need a human; a machine will do.


A machine can only help another non-machine interpret something. I don't
think that they can interpret anything for 'themselves'.
 

 

Not all machines are man-made.


True, but what we see as natural machines may not be just machines. Man-made
machines may be just machines.

Craig

 

wrb

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com  ] On Behalf Of Craig
Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 5:24 AM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com  
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 2:06:20 AM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

There is information (I take information to be a 
manifestation of entropy) and it is always represented 
in the form of a pattern (a distribution) of the units 
of mass/energy of which the Universe is composed.  


I can agree that information could be considered a manifestation of entropy,
to the extent that entropy is necessary to provide a contrast space for a
distribution. To string an ellipses together, you need one dot, repetition,
space, and a quality of measurement which yokes together the three dots
aesthetically. Beyond that, you also need human observer with human visual
sense to turn the distribution into a 'pattern'. Without that, of course,
even distribution cannot cohere into "a" distribution, as there is no scale,
range, quality, etc to anchor the expectation. If we are a microbe, we may
not ever find our way from one dot to the next.

I 
think that semiotic signs are simply specific bits 
of information; I will use the terms synonymously. 

Information has meaning only within context.  For many 
people, context is taken to mean one piece of information 
as compared to another piece of information.  I do not 
take this meaning of context when I discuss semiotics. 
Instead, I take semiotic context to be the acceptor of 
the information.  Hence, all meaning resides a priori 
within information acceptors. 


Agree. Well, transmitters form the signs from their own sense of meaning as
well. That's how we are having this discussion.
 


What you know you have always known; the sign merely 
serves to bring that knowledge to your conscious mind. 


Right. I mean it might be a bit more complicated as far as novelty goes. I
don't know if the state of unconscious information is really what I "have
always known" but that this particular constellation of meanings reflects
the Totality in a way that it is only trivially novel. Like if you hit a
jackpot on a slot machine - that may not have happened before, but the slot
machine is designed to payout whenever it does. The jackpot already exists
as a potential and sooner or later it will be realized.
 


That you may have intention and so comport your delivery 
of information to another acceptor has not bearing upon 
the subsequent acceptance or rejection of that information 
by the target acceptor.  Acceptance or rejection of 
information is determined solely by the accepting or 
rejecting context (acceptor). 


Agree. But the converse - the acceptor can only accept information which has
been included for delivery by intention (or accidentally I suppose).
 


Your mere presence sends information regardless of some 
conscious intent.  Indeed, your absence does equally 
deliver information, for the target acceptor will see 
a definite difference in available information sources 
whether you are present or not. 

Consider a line worker in a bean processing plant where 
the task is to cull *bad* dried beans from *good* dried 
beans as they go by on a conveyor belt; the *bad* beans 
are removed by hand, so the line worker is constantly 
looking for *bad* beans while constantly being aware 
of the fact that not many of the beans are *bad

RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

Craig:

 

You statement of need for a human to observe the 

pattern is the smoking gun to indicate a misunderstanding 

of semiotic theory on your part.

 

Specifically, you don't need a human; a machine will do.

 

Not all machines are man-made.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 5:24 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 2:06:20 AM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

There is information (I take information to be a 
manifestation of entropy) and it is always represented 
in the form of a pattern (a distribution) of the units 
of mass/energy of which the Universe is composed.  


I can agree that information could be considered a manifestation of entropy,
to the extent that entropy is necessary to provide a contrast space for a
distribution. To string an ellipses together, you need one dot, repetition,
space, and a quality of measurement which yokes together the three dots
aesthetically. Beyond that, you also need human observer with human visual
sense to turn the distribution into a 'pattern'. Without that, of course,
even distribution cannot cohere into "a" distribution, as there is no scale,
range, quality, etc to anchor the expectation. If we are a microbe, we may
not ever find our way from one dot to the next.



I 
think that semiotic signs are simply specific bits 
of information; I will use the terms synonymously. 

Information has meaning only within context.  For many 
people, context is taken to mean one piece of information 
as compared to another piece of information.  I do not 
take this meaning of context when I discuss semiotics. 
Instead, I take semiotic context to be the acceptor of 
the information.  Hence, all meaning resides a priori 
within information acceptors. 


Agree. Well, transmitters form the signs from their own sense of meaning as
well. That's how we are having this discussion.
 


What you know you have always known; the sign merely 
serves to bring that knowledge to your conscious mind. 


Right. I mean it might be a bit more complicated as far as novelty goes. I
don't know if the state of unconscious information is really what I "have
always known" but that this particular constellation of meanings reflects
the Totality in a way that it is only trivially novel. Like if you hit a
jackpot on a slot machine - that may not have happened before, but the slot
machine is designed to payout whenever it does. The jackpot already exists
as a potential and sooner or later it will be realized.
 


That you may have intention and so comport your delivery 
of information to another acceptor has not bearing upon 
the subsequent acceptance or rejection of that information 
by the target acceptor.  Acceptance or rejection of 
information is determined solely by the accepting or 
rejecting context (acceptor). 


Agree. But the converse - the acceptor can only accept information which has
been included for delivery by intention (or accidentally I suppose).
 


Your mere presence sends information regardless of some 
conscious intent.  Indeed, your absence does equally 
deliver information, for the target acceptor will see 
a definite difference in available information sources 
whether you are present or not. 

Consider a line worker in a bean processing plant where 
the task is to cull *bad* dried beans from *good* dried 
beans as they go by on a conveyor belt; the *bad* beans 
are removed by hand, so the line worker is constantly 
looking for *bad* beans while constantly being aware 
of the fact that not many of the beans are *bad*.  The 
consciousness is aware of both that which is present 
and that which is not present. 


Yes, the expectation is key. I call that the perceptual inertial frame.
There is an accumulated inertia of expectations which filters, amplifies,
distorts, etc.


Further, what any information that you emit means to 
you is irrelevant to the meaning that another may take 
for that information. 


Then how does art work? Music? Certainly it is pretty clear that what
emitting Iron Man meant to Black Sabbath is different from what emitting the
Four Seasons meant to Vivaldi. I agree that the receiver bears the brunt of
the decoding, but why deny that the broadcaster can do intentional encoding,
when they know the audience?
 

 Indeed, it is via reliance upon 
-Cultural Norms- that your point regarding Morse Code 
becomes relevant.  It is perfectly reasonable for an 
ornery person to simply reject such norms and act 
otherwise; your expectation originates in you, not 
the targets of information you broadcast. 

>>The truth of your statement is no reply to my claim, 
>>that how another receiver of signs responds is 
>>irrelevant to your knowledge, save the one case of 
>>conveyance of knowledge bet

RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

There is information (I take information to be a 
manifestation of entropy) and it is always represented 
in the form of a pattern (a distribution) of the units 
of mass/energy of which the Universe is composed.  I 
think that semiotic signs are simply specific bits 
of information; I will use the terms synonymously.

Information has meaning only within context.  For many 
people, context is taken to mean one piece of information 
as compared to another piece of information.  I do not 
take this meaning of context when I discuss semiotics.
Instead, I take semiotic context to be the acceptor of 
the information.  Hence, all meaning resides a priori 
within information acceptors.

What you know you have always known; the sign merely 
serves to bring that knowledge to your conscious mind.

That you may have intention and so comport your delivery 
of information to another acceptor has not bearing upon 
the subsequent acceptance or rejection of that information 
by the target acceptor.  Acceptance or rejection of 
information is determined solely by the accepting or 
rejecting context (acceptor).

Your mere presence sends information regardless of some 
conscious intent.  Indeed, your absence does equally 
deliver information, for the target acceptor will see 
a definite difference in available information sources 
whether you are present or not.

Consider a line worker in a bean processing plant where 
the task is to cull *bad* dried beans from *good* dried 
beans as they go by on a conveyor belt; the *bad* beans 
are removed by hand, so the line worker is constantly 
looking for *bad* beans while constantly being aware 
of the fact that not many of the beans are *bad*.  The 
consciousness is aware of both that which is present 
and that which is not present.

Further, what any information that you emit means to 
you is irrelevant to the meaning that another may take 
for that information.  Indeed, it is via reliance upon 
-Cultural Norms- that your point regarding Morse Code 
becomes relevant.  It is perfectly reasonable for an 
ornery person to simply reject such norms and act 
otherwise; your expectation originates in you, not 
the targets of information you broadcast.

>>The truth of your statement is no reply to my claim, 
>>that how another receiver of signs responds is 
>>irrelevant to your knowledge, save the one case of 
>>conveyance of knowledge between semiotic units; 
>>where you intend for knowledge to be conveyed.  In 
>>that case, it is behooving of the sender to ensure 
>>that the receiver can receive and understand the 
>>message. 
>
>I'm not sure what you are bringing up here, but I 
>would say that my point is that all messages have 
>multiple levels of reception, perhaps as many levels 
>as their are receivers in the universe. At the same 
>time, if we are assuming human senders and receivers 
>and a content range which is highly normative and 
>practical (i.e. Morse code alphabet rather than 
>emoticons, inside jokes, etc), then the information 
>entropy is reduced dramatically.
>
>Maybe you can give me an example of that you mean 
>by the irrelevance of the receiver's knowledge. Does 
>that include the expectation of the possibility of 
>there being a receiver?
> 
>>In all other cases, the recipient response is 
>>irrelevant; all values and measures originate in 
>>the sender of the message.
>
>I would tend to agree with that, although the 
>expectation of the recipient response informs the 
>motives, values, and measures of the sender - 
>otherwise there would be no message being sent.
>
> 
>>The receiver of transmitted information is 
>>irrelevant to the mechanics of that transmission.
>
>I'm not sure what you mean. Again, maybe an example 
>would help. We expect that human audiences can see, 
>so we have TV screens to provide optical stimulation. 
>If we didn't have eyes, there would be no mechanism 
>of TV.
>

The word should have been *reception* - receipt of 
information (acceptance of a sign) is a function of 
the value that the acceptor puts on that sign.  That 
value is most certainly not tied to the delivery 
mechanism, even if some delivery mechanisms are 
preferred over others.

What matters to information acceptance is disposition 
of the acceptor to that acceptance.  If the acceptor 
does not *like* the sign, it will reject the sign; of 
course, this means that all signs are accepted just 
long enough to decide if they are sufficiently meaningful 
or not; if so, they are accepted else they are rejected.

>Craig
>
>>wrb
>

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RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

Craig:

 

An excellent reply will come shortly.

 

Minimally, I will show you how your intent in irrelevant to 

the message receiver.

 

I do need a little time to construct the argument, given 

a few chores around the farm (we work from 6AM to 

12PM 365.25 +/- days per year).

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Saturday, March 02, 2013 4:48 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Saturday, March 2, 2013 6:40:44 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

Craig:

 

The truth of your statement is no reply to my claim, that how another 

receiver of signs responds is irrelevant to your knowledge, save the one 

case of conveyance of knowledge between semiotic units; where you 

intend for knowledge to be conveyed.  In that case, it is behooving of 

the sender to ensure that the receiver can receive and understand the 

message. 


I'm not sure what you are bringing up here, but I would say that my point is
that all messages have multiple levels of reception, perhaps as many levels
as their are receivers in the universe. At the same time, if we are assuming
human senders and receivers and a content range which is highly normative
and practical (i.e. Morse code alphabet rather than emoticons, inside jokes,
etc), then the information entropy is reduced dramatically.

Maybe you can give me an example of that you mean by the irrelevance of the
receiver's knowledge. Does that include the expectation of the possibility
of there being a receiver?
 

In all other cases, the recipient response is irrelevant; all 

values and measures originate in the sender of the message.


I would tend to agree with that, although the expectation of the recipient
response informs the motives, values, and measures of the sender - otherwise
there would be no message being sent.
 

 

The receiver of transmitted information is irrelevant to the mechanics 

of that transmission.


I'm not sure what you mean. Again, maybe an example would help. We expect
that human audiences can see, so we have TV screens to provide optical
stimulation. If we didn't have eyes, there would be no mechanism of TV.

Craig
 

 

wrb

 

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RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

Craig:

 

The truth of your statement is no reply to my claim, that how another 

receiver of signs responds is irrelevant to your knowledge, save the one 

case of conveyance of knowledge between semiotic units; where you 

intend for knowledge to be conveyed.  In that case, it is behooving of 

the sender to ensure that the receiver can receive and understand the 

message.  In all other cases, the recipient response is irrelevant; all 

values and measures originate in the sender of the message.

 

The receiver of transmitted information is irrelevant to the mechanics 

of that transmission.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Saturday, March 02, 2013 1:50 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Saturday, March 2, 2013 3:59:14 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

 

>I can use a phonetic transliteration to recite an Arabic 
>prayer without even knowing what words are being spoken, 
>let alone the meaning of those words. 

If your argument is that you have no knowledge of what you 
are doing, of the sounds you make in recitation, then you 
have capitulated. 

In performing the act described above, you know your purpose 
and how another receiver of those signs responds is irrelevant. 


There are multiple purposes and expectations. In reciting the prayer, I can
fulfill the expectations of Arabic speakers as far as proper diction. I can
fulfill the expectations of Arabic text recognition by faithfully matching
the correct glyphs with the expected phonemes. But no mater what I do, I
cannot fulfill any expectation of understanding verbal-semantic content of
what is being said.  I might be able to intuit some emotive content on the
onomatopoeic level, or by reading the emotional temperature in the room, but
my understanding still lacks an important level of communication. Even the
receivers are not equal. Young and old, religious and secular, each have
different ways of receiving the prayer.

Craig


wrb 




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RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

>I can use a phonetic transliteration to recite an Arabic 
>prayer without even knowing what words are being spoken, 
>let alone the meaning of those words.

If your argument is that you have no knowledge of what you 
are doing, of the sounds you make in recitation, then you 
have capitulated.

In performing the act described above, you know your purpose 
and how another receiver of those signs responds is irrelevant.

wrb



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RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Saturday, March 02, 2013 6:02 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information



On Saturday, March 2, 2013 12:37:15 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 3/1/2013 8:39 PM, William R. Buckley wrote: 
> And therein do you see the arbitrariness of either choice. 
> 
> The universe is subjective, not objective. 

Is that just your opinion...or is it objectively true. 

It's an educated guess, and a provocation. On what basis do we presume that
objectivity is possible? Because our subjective experience is used to
thinking of it that way?
 

WRB-  BINGO!!!


> 
> Read on semiotic theory as it will give much enlightenment 
> on this issue, that is *meaning* versus *information* 

Was there something that I said which would suggest that I hadn't read
semiotic theory?
 
> 
> The fact that the interpreter can interpret means that the 
> interpreter already knows the meaning of any accepted 
> informational form.  Isn't this how compilers and interpreters 
> in a computer work? 

There is no "the meaning", there are many meanings in various sensory
modalities:

Optical forms = visually informing - subconscious
Graphic forms = phonetically informing - learning makes conscious experience
subconscious. (MIS-IS-IP-EE = Mississippi = funny word)
Grammatic forms = semantically informing - learning matches optical,
graphical, and verbal forms to conceptual experiences.(Mississippi = river
in the US).
Beyond the explicit message, the context of the messaging, and of the
interpreter can become more important that the explicit message. Mississippi
could be a safe word in some kind of sex scandal about to expose a
politician, or it could trigger a post-hypnotic suggestion a la Manchurian
Candidate.

How compilers and interpreters work is nothing like this. The computer stack
looks like this:

Physical forms = wires and microprocessors. There is no optical or audio
experience here, only the electronic or mechanical connection between
microelectronic events.
Mathematical functions = physical properties of transistors allow for basic
switching and checking the status of switches. 
As we might build a castle out of toothpicks, mathematical functions can be
used to take on various technological facades - from dot-matrix printing
that reminds us of letters to video screens with cartoons which remind us of
people.

In all of these cases, unlike a person, the computer does not grow to learn
meanings, only to match characters and words to their statistically likely
consequences. If you say Bonjour to the computer - it recognizes your input
and searches the most likely output, but it has no idea what it is saying or
who it is talking to. There's not person there, it's just a bunch of very
small windmills.



WRB- There is no difference between your acceptance of information and the 
acceptance of information by a computer; that is, unless you hold to notions

of intelligent design.




Sure.  The Mars rover interprets the image of a rock because it was
programmed to or 
learned to so interpret the image. 

It's program knows nothing about images or rocks. It knows the data which
has been defined. We are the ones who defined them that way to correspond to
our experiences of images in the rocks. As with all machines, the Mars Rover
is forever in the dark.
 
 Its interpretation is realized by its behavior in 
going around the rock showing that for the rover the 'meaning' of the rock
was 'an 
obstruction'.  If the rock had looked differently or been in a different
place it might 
have been interpreted as a 'geological specimen'. 

Then when we test the Rover with a fake rock, produced by a subroutine in
the rockless lab, it's identical behavior of going around the rock that
isn't there shows that there was never any meaning for rocks or obstructions
or geological specimen. It's responding to programs, not to presences.


WRB-  As with the Einsteinian Elevator experiment, the Rover control
software can't tell 
if it is a real rock, in the real world, or a fake rock in a computational
space.  For you 
to hold otherwise suggests that you don't understand semiotic theory.



Craig
 

Brent 

> 
> wrb 
> 
>> -Original Message- 
>> From: everyth...@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- 
>> li...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb 
>> Sent: Friday, March 01, 2013 7:11 PM 
>> To: everyth...@googlegroups.com 
>> Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information 
>> 
>> On 3/1/2013 5:27 PM, William R. Buckley wrote: 
>>>> Thinking about how information content of a message 
>>> Big mistake.  Information is never contained with but 
>>> exactly one exception, an envelope.

RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

And therein do you see the arbitrariness of either choice.

The universe is subjective, not objective.

Read on semiotic theory as it will give much enlightenment 
on this issue, that is *meaning* versus *information*

The fact that the interpreter can interpret means that the 
interpreter already knows the meaning of any accepted 
informational form.  Isn't this how compilers and interpreters 
in a computer work?

wrb

> -Original Message-
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
> l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb
> Sent: Friday, March 01, 2013 7:11 PM
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information
> 
> On 3/1/2013 5:27 PM, William R. Buckley wrote:
> >> Thinking about how information content of a message
> > Big mistake.  Information is never contained with but
> > exactly one exception, an envelope.
> >
> > I made this point with Jesper Hoffmeyer regarding a
> > statement in his book Biosemiotics, that information
> > is represented but not contained in that representation.
> > That marks of chalk upon slate may be taken to represent
> > information at a meta level above the reality of streaks
> > of a deformed amorphous solid has nothing to do with
> > the information represented by that deformation, nor the
> > increase of entropy associated with the greater disorder
> > obtained from that deformation; these are but three of
> > the *informations* to be found upon review of those
> > streaks.  Entropy is how nature sees information (not
> > yet an established fact but I think the tea leaves read
> > clear enough) but that has (presumably) nothing to do
> > with how intelligent individuals see information, or
> > as von Uexküll called such phenomena, signs.
> >
> > Most definitely the information is not to be found
> > within the material of its expression, its representation.
> > Rather, the information is already to be found within the
> > interpreter.
> 
> But where is it found within the interpreter?  When the Mars Rover
> receives photons in
> it's camera which it interprets as an obstructing rock that
> interpretation is "just"
> physical tokens too. So isn't it a matter viewpoint whether to look at
> the causal chain of
> tokens or look at the behavior and call it interpreting information?
> 
> Brent
> 
> >
> > That which is information is so by virtue of the acceptor
> > of that information; else, it is noise.
> >
> > And, write the information on a piece of paper and seal
> > the paper within an envelope and you may justifiably
> > claim that the information is contained; else, you are
> > deluding yourself.
> >
> >> has an inversely proportionate relationship with the
> >> capacity of sender and receiver to synchronize with
> >> each other.
> >>
> > 
> >
> > wrb
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> 
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RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

[William R. Buckley]

>Thinking about how information content of a message

Big mistake.  Information is never contained with but 
exactly one exception, an envelope.

I made this point with Jesper Hoffmeyer regarding a 
statement in his book Biosemiotics, that information 
is represented but not contained in that representation.
That marks of chalk upon slate may be taken to represent 
information at a meta level above the reality of streaks 
of a deformed amorphous solid has nothing to do with 
the information represented by that deformation, nor the 
increase of entropy associated with the greater disorder 
obtained from that deformation; these are but three of 
the *informations* to be found upon review of those 
streaks.  Entropy is how nature sees information (not 
yet an established fact but I think the tea leaves read 
clear enough) but that has (presumably) nothing to do 
with how intelligent individuals see information, or 
as von Uexküll called such phenomena, signs.

Most definitely the information is not to be found 
within the material of its expression, its representation.
Rather, the information is already to be found within the 
interpreter.

That which is information is so by virtue of the acceptor 
of that information; else, it is noise.

And, write the information on a piece of paper and seal 
the paper within an envelope and you may justifiably 
claim that the information is contained; else, you are 
deluding yourself.

>has an inversely proportionate relationship with the 
>capacity of sender and receiver to synchronize with 
>each other.
>



wrb



 
 

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Re: Is there an aether ?

[Laurent R Duchesne]

Empty Space is not Empty! 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y4D6qY2c0Z8 

The so-called Higgs field is just another name for Einstein's gravitational 
aether. Mass is the result of matter's field interactions within itself and 
the space in which it sits, hence, the Higgs mechanism. 

Particles can emerge anywhere and as needed, e.g., particle pair creation, 
but from where, and what do they feed from, creation ex nihilo? That seems 
like a physical impossibility. Anyway, why would we have wave-particle 
complementarity if it were not because matter depends on the substrate? 
Isn't this the reason why we need a Higgs mechanism? 

Quantization and organization of space is orchestrated by matter fields 
which originate from, and follow, exclusive dimensions already existing as 
matter. Energy being quantized into particles by spontaneously emitted 
sub-atomic particles (Higgs boson?) in hyperspace. 

Matter is a continuous, time dependent, and thermodynamically open, 
self-organizing process. Particles, as they move through the CBR, need to 
continuously re-ordinate the space that constitutes them. Particles are in 
constant motion, continuously processing space/information. Matter is 
formed by this process, and mass increases directly proportional to the 
amount of process. This is why the denser a particle is, or the faster it 
moves in relation to other objects, the more massive it becomes. Mass is 
directly proportional to process. 

Information (geometry) starts with the quantum. Existence starts with the 
quantum. Before the quantum there is aether. There can be an aether without 
quanta, but there can be no quanta without an aether. Matter is dependent 
on the aether (aka., Higgs field), it depends on the background as an 
energy supply, hence, wave-particle complementarity. 

Aether is the empty space on which the universe sits. It is the 
physicalists' god. 

-- 
Laurent 

http://www.aether-is-one.com 

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RE: Against Mechanism

[William R. Buckley]

Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something
(consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from
theories already extrapolated. 

 

 

Bruno has it down!

 

 

 

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RE: Biography, roger clough, Soles, 1963

[William R. Buckley]

Nice to know something of the man on the other end of these emails!

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough
Sent: Wednesday, November 28, 2012 7:25 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Biography, roger clough, Soles, 1963

 

 

 

 

Hi guys,

 

Attached is my just-written biography for 

an upcoming 50th year reunion book.  

I thougbht I'd pass it on.

 

Layette Collage is in Easton, PA

 

 

 

 [rclo...@verizon.net]  

11/28/2012 

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

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RE: A test for solipsism

[William R. Buckley]

> Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you.
> 
> But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists,
> without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they
> might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is
> no solipsist.
> 
> There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY definition,
> almost. A zombie behaves exactly like a human being. There is no 3p
> features that you could use at all to make a direct test. Now a theory
> which admits zombie, can have other features which might be testable,
> and so some indirect test are logically conceivable, relatively to
> some theory.
> 
> Bruno
> 

Bingo!

wrb

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RE: RE: A test for solipsism

[William R. Buckley]

> Hi William R. Buckley
> 
> You can speak to a potential test subject,
> but it can only reply if it indeed has a mind.

This is an assumption you make.

> This is the Turing test, the results of which are not 
> certain.  But it is the only test I can think of unless 
> you want to get into the Chinese room argument, etc.
> 
> If it does not reply, it's a zombie.

Another assumption.  In this case, you can talk to me and 
I will refuse to reply.  That make me a zombie?

> But just to be certain,
> if it does, as a Turing test, I would ask a series of questions
> a zombie (someone without a mind) would probably not know,
> such as
> 
> 1) what color are your eyes ?
> 2) What color are my eyes ?
> 3) What is your mother's name ?
> 4) How many fingers am I holding up ?
> 5) What color is a plenget ?
> 6) Who are you going to vote for in the upcoming election?
> 7) What is your birth date?
> 8) Where were you born?
> 9) How tall am I ?
> 10) Am I taller than you are ?
> 10) Do you prefer vanillaberries to Mukle pudding ?

If one is able to fabricate (lie) with perfect recall (remembering 
all the lies), then one need not know anything in order to give you 
answer to all questions.

Your thought process is muddled, Mr. Clough.

wrb

> etc.
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/19/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
> 
> 
> - Receiving the following content -
> From: William R. Buckley
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-18, 21:36:39
> Subject: RE: A test for solipsism
> 
> 
> Just because the individual holds the position that he/she is the
> only living entity in all the universe does not imply that such a
> person (the solipsist) is incapable of carrying on a conversation,
> even if that conversation is with an illusion.
> 
> For instance, I have no logical reason to believe that you, Roger
> Clough, exist. You may in fact exist, and you may in fact be a
> figment of my imagination; logically, I cannot tell the difference.
> 
> Yet, I can exchange written dialog with you, in spite of any belief
> I may hold regarding your existence in the physical universe.
> 
> wrb
> 
> 
> > -Original Message-
> > From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
> > l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough
> > Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 10:13 AM
> > To: everything-list
> > Subject: A test for solipsism
> >
> > Hi Bruno Marchal
> >
> > Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig
> > believes about the p-zombie.
> >
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
> >
> > "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and
> > perception is a hypothetical being
> > that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it
> > lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is
> > poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain
> > though it behaves
> > exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from
> the
> > stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."
> >
> > My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say
> that
> > if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
> > which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in
> typing
> > the first part of this sentence.
> >
> >
> > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> > 10/17/2012
> > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
> >
> >
> > - Receiving the following content -
> > From: Bruno Marchal
> > Receiver: everything-list
> > Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36
> > Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of
> > overlycomplexcomputations ?
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
> >
> > Hi Stephen P. King
> >
> > Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
> > consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
> > the level of noncomputability. He just seems to
> > say that intuiton does. But that just seems
> > to be a conjecture of his.
> >
> >
> > ugh, rclo...@verizon.net
> > 10/16/2012
> > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
> >
> >
> > Hi Roger,
> >
> > IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the
> > content of consciousness, 

RE: A test for solipsism

[William R. Buckley]

Just because the individual holds the position that he/she is the 
only living entity in all the universe does not imply that such a 
person (the solipsist) is incapable of carrying on a conversation, 
even if that conversation is with an illusion.

For instance, I have no logical reason to believe that you, Roger 
Clough, exist.  You may in fact exist, and you may in fact be a 
figment of my imagination; logically, I cannot tell the difference.

Yet, I can exchange written dialog with you, in spite of any belief 
I may hold regarding your existence in the physical universe.

wrb


> -Original Message-
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
> l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough
> Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 10:13 AM
> To: everything-list
> Subject: A test for solipsism
> 
> Hi Bruno Marchal
> 
> Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig
> believes about the p-zombie.
> 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
> 
> "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and
> perception is a hypothetical being
> that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it
> lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is
> poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain
> though it behaves
> exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the
> stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."
> 
> My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that
> if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
> which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing
> the first part of this sentence.
> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/17/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
> 
> 
> - Receiving the following content -
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36
> Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of
> overlycomplexcomputations ?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:
> 
> 
> On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
> 
> Hi Stephen P. King
> 
> Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
> consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
> the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to
> say that intuiton does. But that just seems
> to be a conjecture of his.
> 
> 
> ugh, rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/16/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
> 
> 
> Hi Roger,
> 
> IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the
> content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...
> 
> 
> 
> So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the
> existence of p-zombie?
> 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
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RE: The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable

[William R. Buckley]

> 
> $$$ 1) Well it's an indeterminantcy, but which path is chosen is
> done by the geometry of the location
> or test probe, not the same I would think as logical choice (?)
> So I would say "no."
> ...
> Note that intelligence requires the ability to select.
> 
> 
> BRUNO:  OK. But the ability to selct does not require intelligence,
> just interaction and some memory.

I can make a selection without the use of memory.  We call such 
choices by the term

arbitrary



wrb

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RE: Can a computer make independent choices ?

[William R. Buckley]

Roger:

Please then describe for us in detail however painstaking 
that model of consciousness which you hold, and your means 
of determining intelligence.  That is, present for us in 
clear text your measures; the waving of hands is specifically 
disallowed as an offering of answer to this challenge.

wrb



> -Original Message-
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
> l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough
> Sent: Tuesday, September 25, 2012 5:26 AM
> To: everything-list
> Subject: Can a computer make independent choices ?
> 
> Hi Stephen P. King
> 
> I don't deny that a computer can optimize itself,
> but I deny that the operation is autonomous,
> meaning independent, for ultimately it is software
> dependent, using a program written by an outsider.
> True intelligence and true consciousness must be
> to whatever extent possible independent of outside
> help or perspective.
> 
> Isn't the self 1p ? not sure.
> 
> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 9/25/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
> 
> 
> - Receiving the following content -
> From: Stephen P. King
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-09-24, 10:39:14
> Subject: Re: questions on machines, belief, awareness, and knowledge
> 
> 
> On 9/24/2012 9:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
> > Hi meekerdb
> >
> > The computer can mechanically prove something,
> > but it cannot know that it did so. It cannot
> > sit back with a beer and muse over how smart it is.
> >
> >
> Hi Roger,
> 
>  What you are considering that a computer does not have is the
> ability to model itself within its environment and compute
> optimizations
> of such a model to guide its future choices. This can be well
> represented within a computational framework and it is something that
> Bruno has worked out in his comp model. (My only beef with Bruno is
> that
> his model is so abstract that it is completely disconnected from the
> physical world and thus has a "body" problem.)
> 
> --
> Onward!
> 
> Stephen
> 
> http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
> 
> 
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RE: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

[William R. Buckley]

While at any moment the tape may be finite, that it can at need grow is the
fundamental notion of infinite.  One can hardly 

take a set of LARGE size (like half of the infinite set) and, say by
weighing or by volumetric scale, determine if it is different 

from any truly infinite set.  The point you make is a subjective one.  The
net result of Turing's specification is that the tape is 

infinite, effective (functional) though the definition may be.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Quentin Anciaux
Sent: Tuesday, September 04, 2012 9:10 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

 

2012/9/4 William R. Buckley 

Seems funny that Turing ".assumed that machines could not operate with
infinite numbers." given that the tape is assumed to be infinite.


Not really infinite but it has no boundaries, it can always extend if
needed. At any given time the used tape is of finite length.

Quentin
 

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of John Clark
Sent: Tuesday, September 04, 2012 8:59 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

On Mon, Sep 3, 2012 at 9:11 AM, benjayk 
wrote:

 

> Showing scientifically that nature is infinite isn't really possible.


Maybe not. In Turing's proof he assumed that machines could not operate with
infinite numbers, so if there is a theory of everything (and there might not
be) and if you know it and if you can use nothing but that to show
independently of Turing that no machine can solve the Halting Problem then
that would prove that irrational numbers with a infinite number of digits
play no part in the operation of the universe; on the other hand if this new
physical theory shows you how to make such a machine then we'd know that
nature understands and uses infinity. I admit that I used the word " if " a
lot in all that.

   John K Clark
 

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RE: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

[William R. Buckley]

Seems funny that Turing ".assumed that machines could not operate with
infinite numbers." given that the tape is assumed to be infinite.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of John Clark
Sent: Tuesday, September 04, 2012 8:59 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

On Mon, Sep 3, 2012 at 9:11 AM, benjayk 
wrote:

 

> Showing scientifically that nature is infinite isn't really possible.


Maybe not. In Turing's proof he assumed that machines could not operate with
infinite numbers, so if there is a theory of everything (and there might not
be) and if you know it and if you can use nothing but that to show
independently of Turing that no machine can solve the Halting Problem then
that would prove that irrational numbers with a infinite number of digits
play no part in the operation of the universe; on the other hand if this new
physical theory shows you how to make such a machine then we'd know that
nature understands and uses infinity. I admit that I used the word " if " a
lot in all that.

   John K Clark
 

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Re: The indestructable Pareto distribution

[R AM]

Marxism is more a criticism of capitalism than an economic system. I guess
the system should be called centralized planning.

The system and the policy can make a big difference in distributio of
wealth. The nordic countries are very egalitarian (and rich) countries. So
it was Japan. Germany is more equal than the USA. In fact the US is an
outlier among the rich countries (much more unequal than the rest).

Also, until the end of the seventies, inequalities did grow much slowly
than after the eighties.

Policies and systems do make a difference.
 El sep 3, 2012 1:57 p.m., "Roger Clough"  escribió:

>  Hi R AM
>
> Many economists find that an incredible number of things fit
> the Pareto distriution:
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_distribution
>
> such that, to make up an example, 20% of the people
> own 80% of the wealth.
>
> In some cases, the effect might be second order, so don't ask me for
> proof,
> but it seems to be inescapable:
>
> 1) It doesn't matter much what the economic system is or who is president,
> it's very stubborn.
>
> 2) I don't think that even Marxism can change thIS fundamental
> distribution of wealth.
>
> 3) It's also probably why taxing the rich ultimnately  doesn''t work,
> it lowers everybody's income to fit the curve.  A nd why trickle
> down doesn't work.
>
>
> Roger
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 9/3/2012
> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
> so that everything could function."
>
> - Receiving the following content -
> *From:* R AM 
> *Receiver:* everything-list 
> *Time:* 2012-08-31, 13:09:44
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Marxism and the pursuit of money, sex and power
>
>   The L-Curve: A Graph of the US Income Distribution
>
> http://www.lcurve.org/
>
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Re: Re: Marxism and the pursuit of money, sex and power

[R AM]

The L-Curve: A Graph of the US Income Distribution

http://www.lcurve.org/

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RE: Non-causal evolution and the innate intelligence of life.

[William R. Buckley]

Roger:

 

I rather think you can find many examples of causal, deterministic behavior
in biological context.

 

The behavior of ATP Synthase is a case in point.

 

You humble opinion is true that, just an opinion.  Observed behavior and
good old fashioned 

measurements strongly suggest you are wrong.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough
Sent: Friday, August 31, 2012 5:40 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Non-causal evolution and the innate intelligence of life.

 

Hi William R. Buckley 

 

IMHO, stemming from the absence of self from materialistic philosophy,

the materialistic view of life is essentially causal, similar

to the billiard ball example. 

 

This is nonsense. Life is not causal and is not deterministic

any more than Congress is causal.  Life is more accurately

described as an infinite  set of representative governments,

(monads), each with a local representative and a constitution

it is expected to obey.  And plans and desires for the future.

 

So IMHO evolution is not random, it is self-guided and goal-directed.

 

 

Roger Clough,  <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net> rclo...@verizon.net

8/31/2012 

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 

so that everything could function."

- Receiving the following content - 

From: William R. Buckley <mailto:bill.buck...@gmail.com>  

Receiver: everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>  

Time: 2012-08-30, 16:27:53

Subject: RE: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

Bruno:

I rather take issue with the notion that the living cell is not controlled
by the genome.  As biosemioticians (like Marcello Barbieri) teach us, there 

are a number of codes used in biological context, and each has a governing
or controlling function within the corresponding context.  The genome 

is clearly at the top of this hierarchy, with Natural Selection and
mutational variation being higher-level controls on genome.

Readability I think is well understood in terms of interactions between
classes of molecules - ATP generation for one is rather well understood 

these days.

Programmers (well experienced professionals) are especially sensitive to
context issues.

wrb

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Thursday, August 30, 2012 10:12 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

On 29 Aug 2012, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:








On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 1:22:38 PM UTC-4, William R. Buckley wrote:

Cells are indeed controlled by software (as represented in wetware form -
i.e. DNA).

It isn't really clear exactly what controls what in a living cell. I can say
that cars are controlled by traffic signals, clocks, and calendars.

To whatever we ascribe control, we only open up another level of unexplained
control beneath it. What makes DNA readable to a ribosome? What makes
anything readable to anything?

Encoding and decoding, or application and abstraction, or addition and
multiplication, ...







Sense is irreducible. 

>From the first person perspective. Yes. For machine's too.






No software can control anything, even itself, unless something has the
power to make sense of it as software and the power to execute that sense
within itself as causally efficacious motive.

This seems to me like justifying the persistence of the physical laws by
invoking God. It is too quick gap filling for me, and does not explain
anything, as relying on fuzzy vague use of words. I might find sense there,
but in the context of criticizing mechanism, I find that suspicious, to be
frank.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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RE: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

[William R. Buckley]

Roger and Bruno:

 

No part of the DNA molecule controls life.  DNA is simply a description, a 

representation of information, a piece of paper upon which letters are 

written.

 

It is the letter order that controls life.  Nothing more.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough
Sent: Friday, August 31, 2012 2:44 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Re: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

Hi Bruno Marchal 

 

Sorry for the continual objections, but I'm just trying

to point out to you a hole in your thinking large enough to drive

a bus through. However, you keep ignoring my objections,

only intended to be constructive, which is rude. So

 

What parts or part of a DNA molecule controls life ?

The code is just a bunch of letters, same problem as

with the computer.  

 

Letters can't think. A thinker is needed.

 

To repeat, code by itself can't control anything.

The code is no different than a map without a reader.

 

 

Roger Clough,  <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net> rclo...@verizon.net

8/31/2012 

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 

so that everything could function."

- Receiving the following content - 

From: Bruno Marchal <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>  

Receiver: everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>  

Time: 2012-08-31, 05:28:13

Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

William, 

 

 

On 30 Aug 2012, at 22:27, William R. Buckley wrote:





Bruno:

I rather take issue with the notion that the living cell is not controlled by 
the genome.  As biosemioticians (like Marcello Barbieri) teach us, there

are a number of codes used in biological context, and each has a governing or 
controlling function within the corresponding context.  The genome

is clearly at the top of this hierarchy, with Natural Selection and mutational 
variation being higher-level controls on genome.

Readability I think is well understood in terms of interactions between classes 
of molecules � ATP generation for one is rather well understood

these days.

Programmers (well experienced professionals) are especially sensitive to 
context issues.

 

 

I agree with all this. I guess you know that. If you think I said anything 
incoherent with this, please quote me.

 

Bruno

 

 





wrb

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Thursday, August 30, 2012 10:12 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

On 29 Aug 2012, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:








On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 1:22:38 PM UTC-4, William R. Buckley wrote:

Cells are indeed controlled by software (as represented in wetware form � i.e. 
DNA).

It isn't really clear exactly what controls what in a living cell. I can say 
that cars are controlled by traffic signals, clocks, and calendars.

To whatever we ascribe control, we only open up another level of unexplained 
control beneath it. What makes DNA readable to a ribosome? What makes anything 
readable to anything?

Encoding and decoding, or application and abstraction, or addition and 
multiplication, ...







Sense is irreducible.

>From the first person perspective. Yes. For machine's too.






No software can control anything, even itself, unless something has the power 
to make sense of it as software and the power to execute that sense within 
itself as causally efficacious motive.

This seems to me like justifying the persistence of the physical laws by 
invoking God. It is too quick gap filling for me, and does not explain 
anything, as relying on fuzzy vague use of words. I might find sense there, but 
in the context of criticizing mechanism, I find that suspicious, to be frank.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 

 

 

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RE: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

[William R. Buckley]

Bruno:

 

Is not this quote of yours plain enough as evidence that you said something
incoherent:

 

"It isn't really clear exactly what controls what in a living cell."

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Friday, August 31, 2012 2:28 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

William,

 

 

On 30 Aug 2012, at 22:27, William R. Buckley wrote:





Bruno:

 

I rather take issue with the notion that the living cell is not controlled
by the genome.  As biosemioticians (like Marcello Barbieri) teach us, there

are a number of codes used in biological context, and each has a governing
or controlling function within the corresponding context.  The genome

is clearly at the top of this hierarchy, with Natural Selection and
mutational variation being higher-level controls on genome.

 

Readability I think is well understood in terms of interactions between
classes of molecules - ATP generation for one is rather well understood

these days.

 

Programmers (well experienced professionals) are especially sensitive to
context issues.

 

 

I agree with all this. I guess you know that. If you think I said anything
incoherent with this, please quote me.

 

Bruno

 

 





 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Thursday, August 30, 2012 10:12 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

 

On 29 Aug 2012, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:








On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 1:22:38 PM UTC-4, William R. Buckley wrote:

 

 

Cells are indeed controlled by software (as represented in wetware form -
i.e. DNA).

It isn't really clear exactly what controls what in a living cell. I can say
that cars are controlled by traffic signals, clocks, and calendars.

To whatever we ascribe control, we only open up another level of unexplained
control beneath it. What makes DNA readable to a ribosome? What makes
anything readable to anything?

 

Encoding and decoding, or application and abstraction, or addition and
multiplication, ...

 







Sense is irreducible.

 

>From the first person perspective. Yes. For machine's too.

 






No software can control anything, even itself, unless something has the
power to make sense of it as software and the power to execute that sense
within itself as causally efficacious motive.

 

This seems to me like justifying the persistence of the physical laws by
invoking God. It is too quick gap filling for me, and does not explain
anything, as relying on fuzzy vague use of words. I might find sense there,
but in the context of criticizing mechanism, I find that suspicious, to be
frank.

 

Bruno

 

 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 

 

 

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 

 

 

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RE: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

[William R. Buckley]

Bruno:

 

I rather take issue with the notion that the living cell is not controlled
by the genome.  As biosemioticians (like Marcello Barbieri) teach us, there 

are a number of codes used in biological context, and each has a governing
or controlling function within the corresponding context.  The genome 

is clearly at the top of this hierarchy, with Natural Selection and
mutational variation being higher-level controls on genome.

 

Readability I think is well understood in terms of interactions between
classes of molecules - ATP generation for one is rather well understood 

these days.

 

Programmers (well experienced professionals) are especially sensitive to
context issues.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Thursday, August 30, 2012 10:12 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

 

On 29 Aug 2012, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:







On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 1:22:38 PM UTC-4, William R. Buckley wrote:

 

 

Cells are indeed controlled by software (as represented in wetware form -
i.e. DNA).

It isn't really clear exactly what controls what in a living cell. I can say
that cars are controlled by traffic signals, clocks, and calendars.

To whatever we ascribe control, we only open up another level of unexplained
control beneath it. What makes DNA readable to a ribosome? What makes
anything readable to anything?

 

Encoding and decoding, or application and abstraction, or addition and
multiplication, ...

 






Sense is irreducible. 

 

>From the first person perspective. Yes. For machine's too.

 





No software can control anything, even itself, unless something has the
power to make sense of it as software and the power to execute that sense
within itself as causally efficacious motive.

 

This seems to me like justifying the persistence of the physical laws by
invoking God. It is too quick gap filling for me, and does not explain
anything, as relying on fuzzy vague use of words. I might find sense there,
but in the context of criticizing mechanism, I find that suspicious, to be
frank.

 

Bruno

 

 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 

 

 

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RE: RE: Re: Re: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibitintelligence

[William R. Buckley]

Yes, and that other thing is the interpreter and constructor which is directed 
by 

the information represented by the nucleotide sequence that is any particular 

DNA molecule.

 

Again, the genome is not inside the DNA; it is represented by the DNA.

 

The interpreter and constructor are the cell.

 

Information in context.

 

Just as von Neumann envisioned.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough
Sent: Thursday, August 30, 2012 9:53 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot 
exhibitintelligence

 

Hi William R. Buckley 

 

A set of instructions (DNA) can not create a living chimpanzee all by itself.

 

 

Roger Clough,  <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net> rclo...@verizon.net

8/30/2012 

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."

- Receiving the following content - 

From: William R. Buckley <mailto:bill.buck...@gmail.com>  

Receiver: everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>  

Time: 2012-08-30, 12:42:17

Subject: RE: Re: Re: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot 
exhibitintelligence

 

This statement is blatant vitalism, and in the traditional (ancient) sense:

　 So there has to be something else inside the DNA besides software.  

DNA has nothing inside of it that is critical to the message it represents.

wrb

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough
Sent: Thursday, August 30, 2012 9:13 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit 
intelligence

Hi Richard Ruquist 

IMHO software alone cannot create life, because life is subjective.

So there has to be something else inside the DNA besides software.  

Roger Clough,  <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net> rclo...@verizon.net

8/30/2012 

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."

- Receiving the following content - 

From: Richard Ruquist <mailto:yann...@gmail.com>  

Receiver: everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>  

Time: 2012-08-29, 16:27:17

Subject: Re: Re: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

What is DNA if not software?

On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 1:07 PM, Roger Clough  wrote:

Hi Richard Ruquist

　

Pre-ordained is a religious position 　

And we aren't controlled by software. 

　

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net

8/29/2012 

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."

- Receiving the following content - 

From: Richard Ruquist <mailto:yann...@gmail.com>  

Receiver: everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>  

Time: 2012-08-29, 07:37:02

Subject: Re: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

Roger, Do you think that humans do not function 

in accord with pre-ordained hardware and software? 

Richard

On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 7:31 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:

ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal 

I don't agree. Machines must function according to their software and hardware, 
neither of which are their own. 

BRUNO: A robot can already answer questions ,and talk, about its own software 
and hardware. The language Smalltalk makes this explicit by a command "self", 
but this can be done in all programming language by the use of a famous 
diagonalization trick, which I sum up often by: if Dx gives "x"x"", then D"D" 
gives "D"D"". D"D" gives a description of itself. 
You get self-duplicators and other self-referential construct by generalization 
of that constructive diagonal. A famous theorem by Kleene justifies its 
existence for all universal systems. 

ROGER:燛ither the operation follows pre-established rules or it does not.

If any operation follows rules, then it cannot come up with anything new, it is 
merely following

instructions so that any such result can be traced back in principle to some 
algorithm. 

If any operation does not follow rules, it can only generate gibberish. Which 
is to say that

synthetic statements cannot be generated by analytic thought. 


More below, but I will stop here for now.

--
Did the robot design its hardware ? No. So it is constrained by the hardware.
Did the robot write the original software that can self-construct (presumably 
according to some rules of construction) ? No. 
And so, machines cannot do anything not intended by the software author in his 
software program and constrained by the hardware. 

What you are missing here is the aspect of free will or at least 

RE: Re: Re: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

[William R. Buckley]

This statement is blatant vitalism, and in the traditional (ancient) sense:

  So there has to be something else inside the DNA besides software.  

 

DNA has nothing inside of it that is critical to the message it represents.

 

wrb

 

 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough
Sent: Thursday, August 30, 2012 9:13 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit 
intelligence

 

Hi Richard Ruquist 

 

IMHO software alone cannot create life, because life is subjective.

So there has to be something else inside the DNA besides software.  

 

 

Roger Clough,   rclo...@verizon.net

8/30/2012 

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."

- Receiving the following content - 

From: Richard Ruquist   

Receiver: everything-list   

Time: 2012-08-29, 16:27:17

Subject: Re: Re: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

What is DNA if not software?

On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 1:07 PM, Roger Clough  wrote:

Hi Richard Ruquist

　

Pre-ordained is a religious position 　

And we aren't controlled by software. 

　

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net

8/29/2012 

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."

- Receiving the following content - 

From: Richard Ruquist   

Receiver: everything-list   

Time: 2012-08-29, 07:37:02

Subject: Re: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

Roger, Do you think that humans do not function 

in accord with pre-ordained hardware and software? 

Richard

On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 7:31 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:

ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal 

I don't agree. Machines must function according to their software and hardware, 
neither of which are their own. 

BRUNO: A robot can already answer questions ,and talk, about its own software 
and hardware. The language Smalltalk makes this explicit by a command "self", 
but this can be done in all programming language by the use of a famous 
diagonalization trick, which I sum up often by: if Dx gives "x"x"", then D"D" 
gives "D"D"". D"D" gives a description of itself. 
You get self-duplicators and other self-referential construct by generalization 
of that constructive diagonal. A famous theorem by Kleene justifies its 
existence for all universal systems. 

ROGER:燛ither the operation follows pre-established rules or it does not.

If any operation follows rules, then it cannot come up with anything new, it is 
merely following

instructions so that any such result can be traced back in principle to some 
algorithm. 

If any operation does not follow rules, it can only generate gibberish. Which 
is to say that

synthetic statements cannot be generated by analytic thought. 


More below, but I will stop here for now.

--
Did the robot design its hardware ? No. So it is constrained by the hardware.
Did the robot write the original software that can self-construct (presumably 
according to some rules of construction) ? No. 
And so, machines cannot do anything not intended by the software author in his 
software program and constrained by the hardware. 

What you are missing here is the aspect of free will or at least partly free 
will. 

Intelligence is the ability to make choices on one's own. That means freely, of

its own free will. Following no rules of logic. Transcending logic, not limited 
by it.


BRUNO: Do you really believe that Mandelbrot expected the Mandelbrot set? He 
said itself that it has come as a surprise, despite years of observation of 
fractals in nature. 

ROGER: OK, it came intuitively, freely,爃e did not arrive at it 燽y logic, 
although it no doubt has its own logic.


BRUNO: Very simple program ("simple" meaning few Ks), can lead to tremendously 
complex behavior. If you understand the basic of computer science, you 
understand that by building universal machine, we just don't know what we are 
doing. To keep them slaves will be the hard work, and the wrong work. 

This was the issue you brought up before, which at that time I thought was 
miraculous, the Holy Grail I had been seeking.

But on reflection, I no longer believe that.牋IMHO anything that燼燾omputer does 
still must follow its own internal logic,

contrained by its爃ardware constraints and the constraint of its language, even 
if those calculations are of infinite complexity. 
Nothing magical can happen. There ought to be a theorem showing that that must 
be true. 


So machines cannot make autonomous decisions, they can only 
make decisions intended by the software programmer. 


BRUNO: 

RE: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

[William R. Buckley]

 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Thursday, August 30, 2012 8:50 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 



On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 4:43:38 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

On 8/29/2012 4:10 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Aug 28, 2012 at 7:21 PM, Craig Weinberg  > wrote:

 

> It's worth mentioning that Turing did not intend his test to imply that
machines could think, only that the closest we could come would be to
construct machines that would be good at playing The Imitation Game.


No you are entirely incorrect, that is not worth mentioning. There is no
difference between arithmetic and simulated arithmetic and no difference
between thinking and imitation thinking.   


Incorrect about what? Are you saying that Turing asserted that machines
could think, or that if we could not tell the difference between a machine
and a living person that means there is no difference?
 

 

> I have used the example of a trashcan lid in a fast food place that says
THANK YOU. 


And when a employee of a fast food restaurant says "THANK YOU" to the 47'th
customer for the 47'th time in the last hour he puts about as much thought
into the message as the trash can did.


Absolutely. The repetition makes it...automatic, and therefore disingenuous,
mechanical. Unconscious. 


  John K Clark

 

--

Hi Craig,

John C. Has a very good point here. The difference is in the framing.


Nah, his point is a conflation of appearances and reality. Like this
sentence. It is not a thought. It is not speaking. I am using these empty
forms to communicate my thought, my speaking. He is saying that if my
computer posts these words without me typing them in then it must mean
something just because nobody can tell the difference. It's the same as
saying that a glass of water must be the same as a glass of distilled
vinegar because they look the same.

 

Yes, the conclusion is errant.  However, whether they are or are not the
same requires further inquiry.  Neither side has yet enough information by
which to decide with certainty.

 

wrb



Craig

 

-- 
Onward!
 
Stephen
 
http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

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RE: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

[William R. Buckley]

Vitalism would be that there are some substances which are used by
biological organisms and others that are not. There would be no bump from
cell to animal to human being, or even from molecule to cell - vitalism
would be that living cells are composed of life-giving molecules which are
fundamentally different from non life-giving molecules. I'm not saying that
at all. I am saying that you can have all the organic chemistry you like and
you still won't get cells unless the molecules themselves figure out how to
make them. I don't say that silicon can't make cells, only that they haven't
so far, and that if we force silicon to act like cells, they won't be the
same as organic cells which generate themselves naturally.



They certainly won't be the same but, how will they differ?  Do you claim
that such a non-biological cell will not be able to perform each and every
action that is performed by a biological cell?  If you do make such claim,
on what basis, what justification do you make that claim?


 

Clearly you believe that organic chemistry has something that computer chips
lack; 


Clearly you believe that there is nothing that a ham sandwich has that a bag
of sand lacks.
 

perhaps you don't like the phrase "vital life force" for that difference and
prefer some other euphemism, but it amounts to the same thing.


No, it is not the same thing in any way. I am specifically saying that there
are no forces or fields in the universe. None. Not literally anyhow. No more
than there is a force which stops my car at a red light. There is only
sense: perception and participation on different levels of qualitative
depth.

 

> Programs can and do produce outcomes that are not directly anticipated by
the programmer


Absolutely!  

 

> but that these outcomes are trivial


If they could only do trivial stuff computers would not have become a
multitrillion dollar industry that has revolutionized the modern world.   


That's like saying 'If soft drinks were just carbonated sugar water with
drugs in it, they wouldn't have become a  multibillion dollar industry...".
It's a fallacy and a misrepresentation of my comment. I didn't ever say that
computers can only 'do trivial stuff', only that their capacity to exceed
the constraints of their programming is trivial. Computers have capacities
that far exceed our own, but only in some respects and not others. They are
good at doing boring repetitive shit that we can't stand doing. Why are they
good at it? Because they are unbelievably stupid. They will compute Pi to
the last digit until they corrode just because someone accidentally pressed
the enter key. Dumb. Not sentient. No awareness. They don't care, they don't
feel, they don't understand...anything at all. Those are things that we are
(supposedly) good at.

 

This is a problematic statement.  Consider Myhill's work on constructor
machines, where their abilities to construct is unbounded.  Each machine is
able to construct 

a machine having just slightly greater construction capacity, ad infinitum.
See the paper The Abstract Theory of Self-Reproduction as presented in Burks
collection Essays on Cellular Automata, U of Illinois Press, 1970.

 

>Conway's game of life can produce a new kind of glider, but it can't come
up with the invention of Elvis Presley, 


Not true. You can make a Turing Machine out of things other than a long
paper tape, you can make one out of the game of life by using the gliders to
send information; and if you started with the correct initial conditions you
could have a game of life Turing Machine instruct matter how to move so that
the matter was indistinguishable from the flesh and blood king of rock and
roll.  


You are missing my point entirely. It is no trick to make Elvis from a
machine which has the correct initial conditions to make Elvis. The point is
that no amount of GoL transitions strung together will ever become anything
other than what it is - recursively enumerated digits. There is nothing to
generate any qualities other than that in the machine or the program - any
patterns which we project on this data; 'gliders', 'cells', whatever, are
nothing but simulacra...the projections of our own psyche.

 

Thus my interest in constructing machines, not just Turing machines.
Biological organisms are at root built on the backs of constructing
machines.


 

 

> We only use materials which are subject to absolute control by outside
intervention and behave in an absolutely automatic way to sustain those
introduced controls. Living organisms are very much the opposite of that


The opposite of  "automatic way" is random way.


That is your completely unsupported prejudice. The legal system of every
human group that has ever persisted on Earth would disagree. The opposite of
automatic, according to them, is voluntary or intentional. Welcome to planet
Earth, where there are things we like to call living organisms who are able
to do things 'on purpose' rather than randomly or uncon

RE: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

[William R. Buckley]

Consider that we begin with a living, biological cell.

 

Next, we begin to remove systems and elements from the cell, 

and replace them with non-biological alternatives.  For example, 

we replace the genome and nucleic acid production system with 

a nanotechnology systems that yields the same nucleic acids as 

products, in the same amounts over time as occurs in the natural 

cell.

 

At what point does removal of some element yield irrevocable 

loss of state - it no longer lives but instead ceases all behavior, 

and returns to the non-living state?

 

Whatever is that element that yields such irrevocable loss of 

state, that is a vital element.  It is not a mystical or deistical 

definition.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Thursday, August 30, 2012 8:42 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Cc: johnkcl...@gmail.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 



On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 3:54:49 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Aug 28, 2012  Craig Weinberg  wrote:

 

> do not think that accusations of vitalism add anything to the issue. It's
really nothing but an ad hominem attack.


It's not ad hominem if its true. 


No, it doesn't matter what names you call someone, or whether you think they
are true, the point is that name calling is not a logical argument and that
it derails the discussion.
 

We can't be talking about anything except vitalism and as one of the most
enthusiastic apologists of the idea on this list I'm surprised you consider
the term an insult. 


It is because that you say that I have something to do with defending
vitalism that I know you don't understand my ideas. There is nothing special
about organic matter that makes life possible. There is nothing about matter
that makes anything possible. It is the sense that is made through matter
that makes things possible, and that sense has qualitative potentials which
are represented in particular ways. The way that biological qualities are
represented in space and matter is as living cells, tissues, and living
bodies. Being cell like doesn't make something alive, being alive leaves a
cell like footprint.
 

 

> We use certain materials for computer chips and not hamsters 


Because (you think) hamsters have some sort of horseshit vital force that
computer chips lack. 


Um, no. Because you can't control hamsters. I don't care if hamsters were
made of cobalt and zinc, you can't make a computer out of them because they
have their own agenda that you can't effectively control. I don't want to
sink to your level, but if you continue with your false accusations and ad
hominem horseshit, the I'm not going to bother with you.
 

 

> organic chemistry, biology, zoology, and anthropology present dramatic
qualitative breakthroughs in elaboration of sense.


That's exactly what I'm talking about, vitalism; a idea that sucked when it
was all the rage in the 18'th century and suckes even more so today.  


Your opinions about what sucks might be interesting to some people. You
should find them. To say that there is a qualitative breakthrough between
biology and zoology is vitalist how? I would say that the qualitative bump
from single cell to animal is even more significant than the bump from
molecule to cell, or atom to molecule. I am talking about a punctuated
equilibrium of scale and history, not a categorization of substances.

 

> This is not vitalism.


How would your above idea be any different if it were vitalism?? 


Vitalism would be that there are some substances which are used by
biological organisms and others that are not. There would be no bump from
cell to animal to human being, or even from molecule to cell - vitalism
would be that living cells are composed of life-giving molecules which are
fundamentally different from non life-giving molecules. I'm not saying that
at all. I am saying that you can have all the organic chemistry you like and
you still won't get cells unless the molecules themselves figure out how to
make them. I don't say that silicon can't make cells, only that they haven't
so far, and that if we force silicon to act like cells, they won't be the
same as organic cells which generate themselves naturally.

 

Clearly you believe that organic chemistry has something that computer chips
lack; 


Clearly you believe that there is nothing that a ham sandwich has that a bag
of sand lacks.
 

perhaps you don't like the phrase "vital life force" for that difference and
prefer some other euphemism, but it amounts to the same thing.


No, it is not the same thing in any way. I am specifically saying that there
are no forces or fields in the universe. None. Not literally anyhow. No more
than there is a force which stops my car at a red light. There is only
sense: perception and participation on different levels of qualitative
depth.

 

> Programs can and do produce outcomes

RE: Re: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

[William R. Buckley]

Roger:

 

It is my contention, quite to the dislike of biologists generally methinks, 

that DNA is a physical representation of program.

 

Cells are indeed controlled by software (as represented in wetware form – i.e. 
DNA).

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough
Sent: Wednesday, August 29, 2012 10:07 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

Hi Richard Ruquist

 

Pre-ordained is a religious position  

And we aren't controlled by software. 

 

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net

8/29/2012 

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."

- Receiving the following content - 

From: Richard Ruquist   

Receiver: everything-list   

Time: 2012-08-29, 07:37:02

Subject: Re: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

Roger, Do you think that humans do not function 

in accord with pre-ordained hardware and software? 

Richard

On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 7:31 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:

ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal 

I don't agree. Machines must function according to their software and hardware, 
neither of which are their own. 

BRUNO: A robot can already answer questions ,and talk, about its own software 
and hardware. The language Smalltalk makes this explicit by a command "self", 
but this can be done in all programming language by the use of a famous 
diagonalization trick, which I sum up often by: if Dx gives "x"x"", then D"D" 
gives "D"D"". D"D" gives a description of itself. 
You get self-duplicators and other self-referential construct by generalization 
of that constructive diagonal. A famous theorem by Kleene justifies its 
existence for all universal systems. 

�

ROGER:燛ither the operation follows pre-established rules or it does not.

�

If any operation follows rules, then it cannot come up with anything new, it is 
merely following

instructions so that any such result can be traced back in principle to some 
algorithm. 

�

If any operation does not follow rules, it can only generate gibberish. Which 
is to say that

synthetic statements cannot be generated by analytic thought. 


More below, but I will stop here for now.

--
Did the robot design its hardware ? No. So it is constrained by the hardware.
Did the robot write the original software that can self-construct (presumably 
according to some rules of construction) ? No. 
And so, machines cannot do anything not intended by the software author in his 
software program and constrained by the hardware. 

What you are missing here is the aspect of free will or at least partly free 
will. 

Intelligence is the ability to make choices on one's own. That means freely, of

its own free will. Following no rules of logic. Transcending logic, not limited 
by it.


BRUNO:� Do you really believe that Mandelbrot expected the Mandelbrot set? He 
said itself that it has come as a surprise, despite years of observation of 
fractals in nature. 

�

ROGER:� OK, it came intuitively, freely,爃e did not arrive at it 燽y logic, 
although it no doubt has its own logic.


BRUNO: Very simple program ("simple" meaning few Ks), can lead to tremendously 
complex behavior. If you understand the basic of computer science, you 
understand that by building universal machine, we just don't know what we are 
doing. To keep them slaves will be the hard work, and the wrong work. 

�

This was the issue you brought up before, which at that time I thought was 
miraculous, the Holy Grail I had been seeking.

But on reflection, I no longer believe that.牋IMHO anything that燼燾omputer does 
still must follow its own internal logic,

contrained by its爃ardware constraints and the constraint of its language, even 
if those calculations are of infinite complexity. 
Nothing magical can happen. There ought to be a theorem showing that that must 
be true.�


So machines cannot make autonomous decisions, they can only 
make decisions intended by the software programmer. 


BRUNO: You hope. 


Bruno 








Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net   
8/28/2012 
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function." 
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-27, 09:52:32 
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence 




On 27 Aug 2012, at 13:07, Roger Clough wrote: 


Hi meekerdb 

IMHO I don't think that computers can have intelligence 
because intelligence consists of at least one ability: 
the ability to make autonomous choices (choices completely 
of one's own). Computers can do nothing on their own, 
they can 

RE: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

[William R. Buckley]

Stathis and Craig:

 

If the simulation is kept from you, and you only observe it via and
intervening 

wall (vision is prevented but hearing is facilitated) you will not know the 

difference.

 

Your arguments adhere to notions of objective reality.  There is no such
thing, 

as any competent physicist knows: measurement of the universe requires 

use of some part of the universe as gauge against some other part of the 

universe.  This is abject subjectivity.

 

wrb

 

 

 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2012 4:22 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

Stathis,

Yes you've got it. It's worth mentioning that Turing did not intend his test
to imply that machines could think, only that the closest we could come
would be to construct machines that would be good at playing 'The Imitation
Game <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test#cite_note-3> '

WRB,

How much sense would these words have to make before you would agree that
they are magically writing themselves? If they said "We are magic words that
write themselves" would that be convincing enough?

I have used the example of a trashcan lid in a fast food place that says
THANK YOU. Why don't I have to substantiate my claim that this isn't an
example of the trashcan being polite? Why would a million such trashcans
opening and closing with different phrases on them be any more plausibly
sentient?

>From my view, although as a technology enthusiast I take no joy in believing
it, AI is barking up entirely the wrong tree looking for
sentience/awareness/consciousness in functionalism - either digital or
physical. I think I know what consciousness is and why one type of
consciousness cannot necessarily be conjured out of another.

The key is to realize not only that models aren't real, but that the whole
idea of a model is an intellectual conceit. Models only resemble what they
model to the extent that the model maker can realize their criteria of
similarity - which is based entirely in the limitations of subjective sense.
A movie of Elvis is already a better Turing simulation of Elvis than any
other that will ever be produced. Put the footage of Elvis together in a
clever database with a dynamic search engine to animate it and you have a
simulation that will pass the test of the Imitation game, but it has no
Elvis in it whatsoever. It is a cartoon.

Craig



On Tuesday, August 28, 2012 6:58:41 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:

On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 8:03 AM, William R. Buckley 
 > wrote: 
> Your latest argument flies in the face of the Turing Test. 
> 
> 
> 
> If I give you a machine that looks like Elvis, sounds like Elvis, ., you 
> 
> would say (well, typical people would say) that the machine is 
> 
> Elvis. 
> 
> 
> 
> It is nevertheless a machine.  GoL is a machine, and it has universal 
> 
> qualities as a machine.  Further, we can generalise such machines 
> 
> to any purpose we choose. 
> 
> 
> 
> If I need to make them, I will design machines the size of cells, which 
> 
> agglomerate and yield higher-order structures, in exactly the fashion 
> 
> that biological cells so agglomerate, metamorphose and differentiate. 
> 
> 
> 
> How detailed a model is required before you are satisfied? 

I think Craig was saying that GoL can only ever be a simulation, so 
can never have Elvis' mass, for example. That's fair enough. However, 
Craig will go further and say that even if the simulation talks to you 
like Elvis, writes Elvis songs, sings like Elvis, etc., it will still 
be only like a film of Elvis, not like the biological being with 
Elvis' mind. 


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou 

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RE: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

[William R. Buckley]

Your latest argument flies in the face of the Turing Test. 

 

If I give you a machine that looks like Elvis, sounds like Elvis, ., you 

would say (well, typical people would say) that the machine is 

Elvis.

 

It is nevertheless a machine.  GoL is a machine, and it has universal 

qualities as a machine.  Further, we can generalise such machines 

to any purpose we choose.

 

If I need to make them, I will design machines the size of cells, which 

agglomerate and yield higher-order structures, in exactly the fashion 

that biological cells so agglomerate, metamorphose and differentiate.

 

How detailed a model is required before you are satisfied?

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2012 2:53 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

It isn't a claim, is a reductio ad absurdum. Since nothing but pixel
configurations have ever appeared in the context of GoL, there is no implied
expectation that there ever will be. Elvis fits the criteria, as does ice
cream cones, bags of money, nuclear submarines, and a sense of humor, of
things that will never appear in GoL. It is no different than shaking an
abacus in a certain way. With sophisticated machines you could indeed create
what seem like very special and interesting patterns of the abacus by
vibrating and turning it precisely - but that's it. That's all you are going
to ever get out of the damn abacus. It isn't going to jump up and make you
pancakes. It isn't a 'claim' to say that, it is an understanding of what is
actually possible, what isn't and why. 


On Tuesday, August 28, 2012 5:17:36 PM UTC-4, William R. Buckley wrote:

The burden of proof is not on me.  I am replying to your initial claim, that
Elvis will not appear in context of GoL.  

 

Intellectual honesty implies the proof is on you.

 

wrb

 

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com  ] On Behalf Of Craig
Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2012 2:08 PM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com  
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

It's intentional hyperbole, not a non-sequitur. I am making the comparison
between a program designed to produce simple patterns of pixels achieving a
trivial level of novelty within that constraint of design and the event of
any such program achieving an authentic transgression of its own
programmatic constraints.

There is no need to prove this claim as it is not a claim, it is a factual
description and a clarification of the implications of that description. If
you are claiming that GoL can produce something other than meaningless
iterations of quantitative pixels, then the burden of proof is on you. Where
is the Elvis?


On Tuesday, August 28, 2012 4:13:22 PM UTC-4, William R. Buckley wrote:

Proof of non-sequitur.  You assert that GoL cannot invent Elvis Presley.
You have no proof of this claim.  You simply claim it.  Further, see 

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non_sequitur_%28logic%29

 

Your relevant statement is:  Conway's game of life can produce a new kind of
glider, but it can't come up with the invention of Elvis Presley, regardless
of how sophisticated the game is. 

 

QED

 

 

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com [mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com] On
Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2012 12:45 PM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

On Tuesday, August 28, 2012 2:55:54 PM UTC-4, William R. Buckley wrote:

No, it is not ad hominem.  It is a serious issue.

Are they mutually exclusive? Telling someone they have a bad haircut could
be a serious issue too, but it doesn't mean it isn't ad hominem.
 

 

The discussion of COMP is one of essentialism.

 

Your first argument hinges upon a non-sequitur.

I can't defend against an unsupported accusation. All I can do is say, 'no
it doesn't'.

 

Your second argument hinges upon semiotics.  You have no way to 

compare your experience (conscious or otherwise) to that of any 

other creature; your umwelt is not my umwelt.


Your presumption of my capacities to compare experiences depends on exactly
the same capacity that mine does. If you are right that your umwelt is not
my umwelt, then how do you know that my umwelt doesn't contain yours?

Instead, why not assume a psychic unity of mankind. I don't have to assume
that I can't compare my experience to another creature at all. I can say
that if I step on a cat's tail and it reacts, that there is in fact every
reason to assume a comparable dimension of pain. It's sophistry to pretend
that we can't compare our own experience to others...we do it all the time.
Our sanity depends on it. It need not

RE: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

[William R. Buckley]

The burden of proof is not on me.  I am replying to your initial claim, that
Elvis will not appear in context of GoL.  

 

Intellectual honesty implies the proof is on you.

 

wrb

 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2012 2:08 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

It's intentional hyperbole, not a non-sequitur. I am making the comparison
between a program designed to produce simple patterns of pixels achieving a
trivial level of novelty within that constraint of design and the event of
any such program achieving an authentic transgression of its own
programmatic constraints.

There is no need to prove this claim as it is not a claim, it is a factual
description and a clarification of the implications of that description. If
you are claiming that GoL can produce something other than meaningless
iterations of quantitative pixels, then the burden of proof is on you. Where
is the Elvis?


On Tuesday, August 28, 2012 4:13:22 PM UTC-4, William R. Buckley wrote:

Proof of non-sequitur.  You assert that GoL cannot invent Elvis Presley.
You have no proof of this claim.  You simply claim it.  Further, see 

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non_sequitur_%28logic%29

 

Your relevant statement is:  Conway's game of life can produce a new kind of
glider, but it can't come up with the invention of Elvis Presley, regardless
of how sophisticated the game is. 

 

QED

 

 

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com  ] On Behalf Of Craig
Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2012 12:45 PM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com  
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

On Tuesday, August 28, 2012 2:55:54 PM UTC-4, William R. Buckley wrote:

No, it is not ad hominem.  It is a serious issue.

Are they mutually exclusive? Telling someone they have a bad haircut could
be a serious issue too, but it doesn't mean it isn't ad hominem.
 

 

The discussion of COMP is one of essentialism.

 

Your first argument hinges upon a non-sequitur.

I can't defend against an unsupported accusation. All I can do is say, 'no
it doesn't'.

 

Your second argument hinges upon semiotics.  You have no way to 

compare your experience (conscious or otherwise) to that of any 

other creature; your umwelt is not my umwelt.


Your presumption of my capacities to compare experiences depends on exactly
the same capacity that mine does. If you are right that your umwelt is not
my umwelt, then how do you know that my umwelt doesn't contain yours?

Instead, why not assume a psychic unity of mankind. I don't have to assume
that I can't compare my experience to another creature at all. I can say
that if I step on a cat's tail and it reacts, that there is in fact every
reason to assume a comparable dimension of pain. It's sophistry to pretend
that we can't compare our own experience to others...we do it all the time.
Our sanity depends on it. It need not be questioned as the questioning
itself implies a hyper-reality of sense comparison between umwelts which
would be inaccessible if your proposition was true. You cut off the limb you
are sitting on to try to hit me with it.
 

 

And, vitalism is not necessarily a call to Deity.  There are a great 

many non-deist connotations to vitality.


Who said anything about a deity?

Craig
 

 

wrb

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com [mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com] On
Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2012 10:51 AM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

I agree with what Roger is saying here (and have of course expressed that
before often) and do not think that accusations of vitalism add anything to
the issue. It's really nothing but an ad hominem attack.

I would only modify Roger's view in two ways:

1. Programs can and do produce outcomes that are not directly anticipated by
the programmer, but that these outcomes are trivial and do not transcend the
constraints of the program itself. Conway's game of life can produce a new
kind of glider, but it can't come up with the invention of Elvis Presley,
regardless of how sophisticated the game is. Blue cannot be generated by any
combination of black and white or one and zero.

2. Hardware does actually feel something, but not necessarily what we would
imagine. We use certain materials for computer chips and not hamsters or
milkshakes because reliable computation requires specific properties. We
only use materials which are subject to absolute control by outside
intervention and behave in an absolutely automatic way to sustain those
introduced controls. Living organisms are very much the opposite of that,
but that doesn't mean that inorganic

RE: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

[William R. Buckley]

My statement is not intended for either of these purposes:

 

1.  (of an argument or reaction) Arising from or appealing to the
emotions and not reason or logic.
2.  Attacking an opponent's motives or character rather than the policy
or position they maintain.

 

It is instead a serious statement.

 

I needn't supply argument to support a statement (you call accusation) when
you so admirably supply same.

 

The best you can do in comparing my umwelt with your umwelt is to adopt a
common standard, and spend 

eternity coming to agreement on every comparison.  You cannot directly
compare experiences; all comparisons 

are second hand, post experience.

 

You called upon the notion of a "magic juice of life-ness" in responding to
my statement, and therefore invoke 

(at minimum) some mystical conception, if not Deity.

 

wrb  

 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2012 12:45 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

On Tuesday, August 28, 2012 2:55:54 PM UTC-4, William R. Buckley wrote:

No, it is not ad hominem.  It is a serious issue.

Are they mutually exclusive? Telling someone they have a bad haircut could
be a serious issue too, but it doesn't mean it isn't ad hominem.
 

 

The discussion of COMP is one of essentialism.

 

Your first argument hinges upon a non-sequitur.

I can't defend against an unsupported accusation. All I can do is say, 'no
it doesn't'.

 

Your second argument hinges upon semiotics.  You have no way to 

compare your experience (conscious or otherwise) to that of any 

other creature; your umwelt is not my umwelt.


Your presumption of my capacities to compare experiences depends on exactly
the same capacity that mine does. If you are right that your umwelt is not
my umwelt, then how do you know that my umwelt doesn't contain yours?

Instead, why not assume a psychic unity of mankind. I don't have to assume
that I can't compare my experience to another creature at all. I can say
that if I step on a cat's tail and it reacts, that there is in fact every
reason to assume a comparable dimension of pain. It's sophistry to pretend
that we can't compare our own experience to others...we do it all the time.
Our sanity depends on it. It need not be questioned as the questioning
itself implies a hyper-reality of sense comparison between umwelts which
would be inaccessible if your proposition was true. You cut off the limb you
are sitting on to try to hit me with it.
 

 

And, vitalism is not necessarily a call to Deity.  There are a great 

many non-deist connotations to vitality.


Who said anything about a deity?

Craig
 

 

wrb

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com  ] On Behalf Of Craig
Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2012 10:51 AM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com  
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

I agree with what Roger is saying here (and have of course expressed that
before often) and do not think that accusations of vitalism add anything to
the issue. It's really nothing but an ad hominem attack.

I would only modify Roger's view in two ways:

1. Programs can and do produce outcomes that are not directly anticipated by
the programmer, but that these outcomes are trivial and do not transcend the
constraints of the program itself. Conway's game of life can produce a new
kind of glider, but it can't come up with the invention of Elvis Presley,
regardless of how sophisticated the game is. Blue cannot be generated by any
combination of black and white or one and zero.

2. Hardware does actually feel something, but not necessarily what we would
imagine. We use certain materials for computer chips and not hamsters or
milkshakes because reliable computation requires specific properties. We
only use materials which are subject to absolute control by outside
intervention and behave in an absolutely automatic way to sustain those
introduced controls. Living organisms are very much the opposite of that,
but that doesn't mean that inorganic matter has no experience or proto
experience on its own inertial frame of perception. It might, but we don't
know that. I would give the benefit of the doubt to all matter as having
common physical sense, but that organic chemistry, biology, zoology, and
anthropology present dramatic qualitative breakthroughs in elaboration of
sense.

This is not vitalism. There is no magic juice of life-ness, only a rough
segmentation or diffracted caste relation of participation richness and
significance intensity. A living baby is not the same thing as a spare tire
to us, but it isn't significantly different to a tsunami. Neither the
significance nor the insignificance is an '

RE: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

[William R. Buckley]

Proof of non-sequitur.  You assert that GoL cannot invent Elvis Presley.
You have no proof of this claim.  You simply claim it.  Further, see 

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non_sequitur_%28logic%29

 

Your relevant statement is:  Conway's game of life can produce a new kind of
glider, but it can't come up with the invention of Elvis Presley, regardless
of how sophisticated the game is. 

 

QED

 

 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2012 12:45 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

On Tuesday, August 28, 2012 2:55:54 PM UTC-4, William R. Buckley wrote:

No, it is not ad hominem.  It is a serious issue.

Are they mutually exclusive? Telling someone they have a bad haircut could
be a serious issue too, but it doesn't mean it isn't ad hominem.
 

 

The discussion of COMP is one of essentialism.

 

Your first argument hinges upon a non-sequitur.

I can't defend against an unsupported accusation. All I can do is say, 'no
it doesn't'.

 

Your second argument hinges upon semiotics.  You have no way to 

compare your experience (conscious or otherwise) to that of any 

other creature; your umwelt is not my umwelt.


Your presumption of my capacities to compare experiences depends on exactly
the same capacity that mine does. If you are right that your umwelt is not
my umwelt, then how do you know that my umwelt doesn't contain yours?

Instead, why not assume a psychic unity of mankind. I don't have to assume
that I can't compare my experience to another creature at all. I can say
that if I step on a cat's tail and it reacts, that there is in fact every
reason to assume a comparable dimension of pain. It's sophistry to pretend
that we can't compare our own experience to others...we do it all the time.
Our sanity depends on it. It need not be questioned as the questioning
itself implies a hyper-reality of sense comparison between umwelts which
would be inaccessible if your proposition was true. You cut off the limb you
are sitting on to try to hit me with it.
 

 

And, vitalism is not necessarily a call to Deity.  There are a great 

many non-deist connotations to vitality.


Who said anything about a deity?

Craig
 

 

wrb

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com  ] On Behalf Of Craig
Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2012 10:51 AM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com  
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

I agree with what Roger is saying here (and have of course expressed that
before often) and do not think that accusations of vitalism add anything to
the issue. It's really nothing but an ad hominem attack.

I would only modify Roger's view in two ways:

1. Programs can and do produce outcomes that are not directly anticipated by
the programmer, but that these outcomes are trivial and do not transcend the
constraints of the program itself. Conway's game of life can produce a new
kind of glider, but it can't come up with the invention of Elvis Presley,
regardless of how sophisticated the game is. Blue cannot be generated by any
combination of black and white or one and zero.

2. Hardware does actually feel something, but not necessarily what we would
imagine. We use certain materials for computer chips and not hamsters or
milkshakes because reliable computation requires specific properties. We
only use materials which are subject to absolute control by outside
intervention and behave in an absolutely automatic way to sustain those
introduced controls. Living organisms are very much the opposite of that,
but that doesn't mean that inorganic matter has no experience or proto
experience on its own inertial frame of perception. It might, but we don't
know that. I would give the benefit of the doubt to all matter as having
common physical sense, but that organic chemistry, biology, zoology, and
anthropology present dramatic qualitative breakthroughs in elaboration of
sense.

This is not vitalism. There is no magic juice of life-ness, only a rough
segmentation or diffracted caste relation of participation richness and
significance intensity. A living baby is not the same thing as a spare tire
to us, but it isn't significantly different to a tsunami. Neither the
significance nor the insignificance is an 'illusion', they are just measures
of the relations of the investment of experience across eons and species and
how that investment relates to the participants on every level.

Roger and Searle are correct however in pointing out that the machine has no
stake in the outcome of the program, nor can it. I suggest that there is an
experience there, but likely very primitive - a holding and releasing which
is what we know as electric current within the sem

RE: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

[William R. Buckley]

No, it is not ad hominem.  It is a serious issue.

 

The discussion of COMP is one of essentialism.

 

Your first argument hinges upon a non-sequitur.

 

Your second argument hinges upon semiotics.  You have no way to 

compare your experience (conscious or otherwise) to that of any 

other creature; your umwelt is not my umwelt.

 

And, vitalism is not necessarily a call to Deity.  There are a great 

many non-deist connotations to vitality.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2012 10:51 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

I agree with what Roger is saying here (and have of course expressed that
before often) and do not think that accusations of vitalism add anything to
the issue. It's really nothing but an ad hominem attack.

I would only modify Roger's view in two ways:

1. Programs can and do produce outcomes that are not directly anticipated by
the programmer, but that these outcomes are trivial and do not transcend the
constraints of the program itself. Conway's game of life can produce a new
kind of glider, but it can't come up with the invention of Elvis Presley,
regardless of how sophisticated the game is. Blue cannot be generated by any
combination of black and white or one and zero.

2. Hardware does actually feel something, but not necessarily what we would
imagine. We use certain materials for computer chips and not hamsters or
milkshakes because reliable computation requires specific properties. We
only use materials which are subject to absolute control by outside
intervention and behave in an absolutely automatic way to sustain those
introduced controls. Living organisms are very much the opposite of that,
but that doesn't mean that inorganic matter has no experience or proto
experience on its own inertial frame of perception. It might, but we don't
know that. I would give the benefit of the doubt to all matter as having
common physical sense, but that organic chemistry, biology, zoology, and
anthropology present dramatic qualitative breakthroughs in elaboration of
sense.

This is not vitalism. There is no magic juice of life-ness, only a rough
segmentation or diffracted caste relation of participation richness and
significance intensity. A living baby is not the same thing as a spare tire
to us, but it isn't significantly different to a tsunami. Neither the
significance nor the insignificance is an 'illusion', they are just measures
of the relations of the investment of experience across eons and species and
how that investment relates to the participants on every level.

Roger and Searle are correct however in pointing out that the machine has no
stake in the outcome of the program, nor can it. I suggest that there is an
experience there, but likely very primitive - a holding and releasing which
is what we know as electric current within the semiconductors. There is no
actual current, only excited-empowered molecules. There is no program, only
a mirroring of our meticulous transcription of human motive and its
inevitable tautological products. 

Since we are multi-layered, we can become confused when we assume that who
we are must be a monolithic representation of all that we are. If we expect
that the contents of all processes of the psyche should be available to our
verbal-cognitive specialists then we will be disappointed and turn to Libet.
We will mistake the automatism which supports lower levels of what we are
for the quasi-independence of the spectrum of identity which we embody.

Craig


On Tuesday, August 28, 2012 12:13:23 AM UTC-4, William R. Buckley wrote:

Roger:

 

I suggest that at root, you have vitalist sympathies.

 

wrb

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com  ] On Behalf Of Roger
Clough
Sent: Monday, August 27, 2012 4:07 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

Hi meekerdb 

 

IMHO I don't think that computers can have intelligence

because intelligence consists of at least one ability:

the ability to make autonomous choices (choices completely

of one's own). Computers can do nothing on their own,

they can only do what softward and harfdware tells them to do. 

 

Another, closely related, reason, is that there must be an agent that does
the choosing,

and IMHO the agent has to be separate from the system.

Godel, perhaps, I speculate. 

 

 

Roger Clough,   rclo...@verizon.net

8/27/2012 

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."

- Receiving the following content - 

From: meekerdb   

Receiver: everything-list   

Time: 2012-08-26, 14:56:29

Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

 

On 8/26/2012 10:

RE: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

[William R. Buckley]

Bruno:

 

Will you please cite the theorem of Kleene.

 

 

 

All:

 

Living systems are not the material from which they are constructed (upon which 
they exist).

Living systems are rather the systems of processes and higher, which rest upon 
the material 

from which they are constructed.

 

Methinks that Roger mistakes life for the substrate.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2012 9:12 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

Hi Roger,

 

On 28 Aug 2012, at 14:40, Roger Clough wrote:





Hi Bruno Marchal 

 

I don't agree. Machines must function according to their software and hardware,

neither of which are their own. 

 

A robot can already answer questions ,and talk, about its own software and 
hardware. The language Smalltalk makes this explicit by a command "self", but 
this can be done in all programming language by the use of a famous 
diagonalization trick, which I sum up often by: if Dx gives  "x"x"", then D"D" 
gives "D"D"". D"D" gives a description of itself.

You get self-duplicators and other self-referential construct by generalization 
of that constructive diagonal. A famous theorem by Kleene justifies its 
existence for all universal systems.

 

 





And so, machines cannot do anything

not intended by the software author in his software program and constrained by 
the hardware.  

 

Do you really believe that Mandelbrot expected the Mandelbrot set? He said 
itself that it has come as a surprise, despite years of observation of fractals 
in nature. 

 

Very simple program ("simple" meaning few Ks), can lead to tremendously complex 
behavior. If you understand the basic of computer science, you understand that 
by building universal machine, we just don't know what we are doing. To keep 
them slaves will be the hard work, and the wrong work.

 

 





So machines cannot make autonomous decisions, they can only

make decisions intended by the software programmer.

 

You hope.

 

Bruno

 

 





 

 

Roger Clough,   rclo...@verizon.net

8/28/2012 

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."

- Receiving the following content - 

From: Bruno Marchal   

Receiver: everything-list   

Time: 2012-08-27, 09:52:32

Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

 

On 27 Aug 2012, at 13:07, Roger Clough wrote:





Hi meekerdb 

 

IMHO I don't think that computers can have intelligence

because intelligence consists of at least one ability:

the ability to make autonomous choices (choices completely

of one's own). Computers can do nothing on their own,

they can only do what softward and harfdware tells them to do. 

 

Another, closely related, reason, is that there must be an agent that does the 
choosing,

and IMHO the agent has to be separate from the system.

Godel, perhaps, I speculate. 

 

I will never insist on this enough. All the G鰀el's stuff shows that machines 
are very well suited for autonomy. In a sense, most of applied computer science 
is used to help controlling what can really become uncontrollable and too much 
autonomous, a bit like children education.  

 

Computers are not stupid, we work a lot for making them so.

 

Bruno

 

 





 

 

Roger Clough,   rclo...@verizon.net

8/27/2012 

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."

- Receiving the following content - 

From: meekerdb   

Receiver: everything-list   

Time: 2012-08-26, 14:56:29

Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

 

On 8/26/2012 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>>
>> I agree different implementations of intelligence have different 
>> capabilities and 
>> roles, but I think computers are general enough to replicate any 
>> intelligence (so long 
>> as infinities or true randomness are not required).
>
> And now a subtle point. Perhaps.
>
> The point is that computers are general enough to replicate intelligence EVEN 
> if 
> infinities and true randomness are required for it.
>
> Imagine that our consciousness require some ORACLE. For example under the 
> form of a some 
> non compressible sequence 11101111011000110101011011... (say)
>
> Being incompressible, that sequence cannot be part of my brain at my 
> substitution level, 
> because this would make it impossible for the doctor to copy my brain into a 
> finite 
> string. So such sequence operates "outside my brain", and if the doctor copy 
> me at the 
> right comp level, he will reconstitute me with the rig

RE: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

[William R. Buckley]

Roger:

 

I suggest that at root, you have vitalist sympathies.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough
Sent: Monday, August 27, 2012 4:07 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

Hi meekerdb 

 

IMHO I don't think that computers can have intelligence

because intelligence consists of at least one ability:

the ability to make autonomous choices (choices completely

of one's own). Computers can do nothing on their own,

they can only do what softward and harfdware tells them to do. 

 

Another, closely related, reason, is that there must be an agent that does
the choosing,

and IMHO the agent has to be separate from the system.

Godel, perhaps, I speculate. 

 

 

Roger Clough,   rclo...@verizon.net

8/27/2012 

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."

- Receiving the following content - 

From: meekerdb   

Receiver: everything-list   

Time: 2012-08-26, 14:56:29

Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

 

On 8/26/2012 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>>
>> I agree different implementations of intelligence have different
capabilities and 
>> roles, but I think computers are general enough to replicate any
intelligence (so long 
>> as infinities or true randomness are not required).
>
> And now a subtle point. Perhaps.
>
> The point is that computers are general enough to replicate intelligence
EVEN if 
> infinities and true randomness are required for it.
>
> Imagine that our consciousness require some ORACLE. For example under the
form of a some 
> non compressible sequence 11101111011000110101011011... (say)
>
> Being incompressible, that sequence cannot be part of my brain at my
substitution level, 
> because this would make it impossible for the doctor to copy my brain into
a finite 
> string. So such sequence operates "outside my brain", and if the doctor
copy me at the 
> right comp level, he will reconstitute me with the right "interface" to
the oracle, so I 
> will survive and stay conscious, despite my consciousness depends on that
oracle.
>
> Will the UD, just alone, or in arithmetic, be able to copy me in front of
that oracle?
>
> Yes, as the UD dovetails on all programs, but also on all inputs, and in
this case, he 
> will generate me successively (with large delays in between) in front of
all finite 
> approximation of the oracle, and (key point), the first person
indeterminacy will have 
> as domain, by definition of first person, all the UD computation where my
virtual brain 
> use the relevant (for my consciousness) part of the oracle.
>
> A machine can only access to finite parts of an oracle, in course of a
computation 
> requiring oracle, and so everything is fine.

That's how I imagine COMP instantiates the relation between the physical
world and 
consciousness; that the physical world acts like the oracle and provides
essential 
interactions with consciousness as a computational process. Of course that
doesn't 
require that the physical world be an oracle - it may be computable too.

Brent

>
> Of course, if we need the whole oracular sequence, in one step, then comp
would be just 
> false, and the brain need an infinite interface.
>
> The UD dovetails really on all programs, with all possible input, even
infinite non 
> computable one.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>

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RE: Mornings and afternoons

[William R. Buckley]

In all your statements, you are expressing subjectivity.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger 
Sent: Friday, August 17, 2012 2:55 PM
To: everything-list
Subject: Mornings and afternoons

 

Hi William R. Buckley 

 

To an idealist, the real universe is subjective,

it is made up of forms of mind.  But to

a realist, sticks and stones can break

your bones --- but thinking to do so usually

doesn't work.

 

In the morning I can be an idealist, in the afternoon

go out and enjoy nature as a realist. Sex is

also much better as a realist.

 

 

Roger ,  <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net> rclo...@verizon.net

8/17/2012 

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."

- Receiving the following content - 

From: William R. Buckley <mailto:bill.buck...@gmail.com>  

Receiver: everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>  

Time: 2012-08-17, 14:53:30

Subject: RE: 0s and 1s

 

Sorry, Roger:

The universe is purely subjective.

wrb

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger 
Sent: Friday, August 17, 2012 11:11 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: 0s and 1s

Hi John Clark 

You're wrong.

1) Very few if any high school students would even believe -- less claim --
that all that we know must come through the senses.

I don't think it's taught in science class. 

2) Your comment about 0s and 1s and ascii characters has nothing to do with
living experience or thought.

Roger ,  <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net> rclo...@verizon.net

8/17/2012 

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."

- Receiving the following content - 

From: John Clark <mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>  

Receiver: everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>  

Time: 2012-08-15, 11:39:24

Subject: Re: Is the Turing machine like a tabla rasa ?

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 Roger  wrote:

> What is it that Locke and Hume claimed ? 


Who cares? Today a bright high school physics or biology student understands
far more about the inter workings of the universe than either Locke or Hume.


> Turing machines cannot experience life. They can only experience 0s and
1s. 


And you can only experience the firings of the neurons in your brain and
Shakespeare only produced a sequence of ASCII characters. Do you fine
anything a bit simplistic in this worldview? 

John K Clark

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RE: 0s and 1s

[William R. Buckley]

Sorry, Roger:

 

The universe is purely subjective.

 

wrb

 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger 
Sent: Friday, August 17, 2012 11:11 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: 0s and 1s

 

Hi John Clark 

 

You're wrong.

 

1) Very few if any high school students would even believe -- less claim -- 
that all that we know must come through the senses.

I don't think it's taught in science class. 

 

 

2) Your comment about 0s and 1s and ascii characters has nothing to do with 
living experience or thought.

 

 

Roger ,   rclo...@verizon.net

8/17/2012 

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."

- Receiving the following content - 

From: John Clark   

Receiver: everything-list   

Time: 2012-08-15, 11:39:24

Subject: Re: Is the Turing machine like a tabla rasa ?

 

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012� Roger  wrote:

�> What is it that Locke and Hume claimed ? 


Who cares? Today a bright high school physics or biology student understands 
far more about the inter workings of the universe than either Locke or Hume. 

> Turing machines cannot experience life. They can only experience 0s and 1s. 


And you can only experience the firings of the neurons in your brain and 
Shakespeare only produced a sequence of ASCII characters. Do you fine anything 
a bit simplistic in this worldview? � 

� John K Clark

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RE: Re: Why AI is impossible

[William R. Buckley]

I used the term *omniscience* in a rather general way, as a substitute for the 
term *universal* 

though it should be said that the purpose was to serve as adjective to the term 
*computational* 

rather than the other way around, as might be expected when the phrase is given 
in the form of 

*computational omniscience*.  I like to play with language, and English has a 
rather free form.

 

Omniscience has a sense of universality to it, and it is not solely connected 
to deity; there is also 

notion of realm, and mathematics is such.  Hence, omniscience over computation 
(computational 

omniscience) represents not so much all knowing as all computable, and 
remember, all that is 

computable is so computable upon Turing machine as it might be anywhere else.

 

The Turing machine, simply by its construction, computes in this universal 
fashion, and no other 

means of computing provides answers beyond those provided by Turing machine.  
Hence, the 

Turing machine is not only universally competent as a computer, it also is 
computationally 

omniscient.

 

wrb

 

 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger 
Sent: Thursday, August 16, 2012 8:12 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Re: Re: Why AI is impossible

 

Hi Bruno Marchal 

 

The Bible teaches that God spends much of his time 

looking into men's hearts to see if love or evil rests there.

Would this be part of your definition of omniscience ?

 

 

Roger ,  <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net> rclo...@verizon.net

8/16/2012 

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."

- Receiving the following content - 

From: Bruno Marchal <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>  

Receiver: everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>  

Time: 2012-08-15, 03:38:37

Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

 

William, 

 

On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:02, William R. Buckley wrote:





Bruno:

You抳e turned things around.  The implication is context to information, not 
information to context.

And, I suggest you think very long and carefully about my statement regarding 
the computational

omniscience of the Turing machine.  Yes, you may call it universality but that 
word is in fact too

strong; omniscience is more accurate.

 

Omniscience concerns beliefs or knowledge, mainly propositions. This can be 
proved to be always incomplete for machine (and plausibly humans), never 
"omni". Universality concerns functions, or computations. By a sort of miracle 
(Church's thesis) this can be universal.

 

Put differently: procedural 'knowledge' can be universal. Assertive knowledge 
is always incomplete.

 

Bruno

 

 

 





Also, read Jesper Hoffmeyer抯 book Biosemiotics.

wrb

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 2:39 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

Hi William,

On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote:






Bruno:

>From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe

seems rather obvious.

I don't think anything is obvious here.

What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are dreaming? 
What is your theory of dream? What is your theory of mind?






Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient

I guess you mean universal. But universality is incompatible with omniscience, 
even restricted to number relations. Computational universality entails the 
impossibility of omniscience.






solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly

be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why,

Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable

computations. 

?






Somehow, where information is concerned, context

is king.

I agree with this. I would say that information is really context selection.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 

 

 

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T

RE: Is the Turing machine like a tabla rasa ?

[William R. Buckley]

Bruno:

 

Are you reading Stanley Salthy?   Know of his work in hierarchy theory?

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 12:56 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Is the Turing machine like a tabla rasa ?

 

 

On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:59, Roger wrote:





Hi Bruno Marchal 

 

What is it that Locke and Hume claimed ? That we can think nothing that

did not come through our senses, that is, from experience. But Turing
machines 

cannot experience life. They can only experience 0s and 1s. 

 

See my preview answer on this, and Jason's comment. You are flattening the
many possible hierarchies and loop possible for virtual universal entities.

 

Bruno

 

 





 

Roger ,   rclo...@verizon.net

8/14/2012 

- Receiving the following content - 

From: Bruno Marchal   

Receiver: everything-list   

Time: 2012-08-12, 05:06:41

Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI
ordescribing life

 

On 11 Aug 2012, at 10:30, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

> On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:
>> The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of
>> life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent.
>>
>> The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study 
>> of
>> artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
>> intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife 
>> research
>> is about AI.
>>
>
> What does intelligence means in this context that life is 
> unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock. 
> Where there is more intelligence?

Bacteria are provably Turing complete, rocks are not.

You might remind us what you mean by "intelligent". I tend to oppose 
it to competence and learning. Intelligence is needed for making 
competence capable of growing and diversified, but competence has a 
negative feedback on intelligence. I use intelligence in a sense 
closer to free-will and consciousness than an ability to solve 
problems. IQ tests concerns always form of competence (very basic one: 
they have been invented to detect mental disability).

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 

 

 

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RE: Why AI is impossible

[William R. Buckley]

Let's not ignore the most important point.

 

The machine has Turing closure solely due to the details of its
construction.

 

wrb

 

 

 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Quentin Anciaux
Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 11:25 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

 

 

2012/8/15 John Clark 

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 2:16 PM, William R. Buckley 
wrote:

> Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience  


I don't dislike the term, in fact I think I'd rather enjoy being omniscient
but unfortunately I'm not.  

 

> the Turing machine can compute all computable computations, 


Yes, and thus Turing proved that in general determining if a computer
program will ever stop is not computable;

all you can do is watch it and see what it does.


No, all you can know is that no *general* algorithm (as you pointed out) can
solve that. And I have to say it again, it doesn't mean that a particular
one cannot solve the halting problem for a particular algorithm. And unless
you prove that that particular algorithm is undecidable, then it is still
possible to find another algorithm that could decide on the halting of that
algorithm.
 

If you see it stop then obviously you know that it stopped but if its still
going then you know nothing, maybe it will eventually stop and maybe it will
not, you need to keep watching and you might need to keep watching forever.


It's obviously not true for *a lot* of algorithm

Quentin
 


  John K Clark 

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RE: Why AI is impossible

[William R. Buckley]

Again, not any published cellular automaton.

 

wrb

 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jason Resch
Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 7:51 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

 

 

 

On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 8:24 AM, William R. Buckley 
wrote:

No, Langton's loops do not count.  Nor do any published
cellular automaton.

 

William,

 

Do these count:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_Neumann_universal_constructor ?

 

 

Read these papers:

Computational Ontogeny, already published in Biological Theory

and

Constructor Ontogeny, accepted for full presentation at
ECTA-2012.
 

Send your email address and I will forward these papers.

 

 

I am interested in seeing these papers.  If you don't use e-mail to interact
with this list, you can go to the google group's page to get any poster's
e-mail address.  It has some anti-spam protection which is slightly safer
than posting one's e-mail address directly to this list.

 

Jason

 

 

wrb


> -Original Message-
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
> l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish

> Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 3:09 AM
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible
>

> On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 07:22:21PM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote:
> > Dear Russell:
> >
> > When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not
> > its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice.
> >
> > wrb
>
> I'm not entirely sure what you mean, but do Langton loops count?
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langton's_loops
>
> Cheers
>
> --
>
> ---
> -
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> ---
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RE: Why AI is impossible

[William R. Buckley]

No, Langton's loops do not count.  Nor do any published 
cellular automaton.

Read these papers:

Computational Ontogeny, already published in Biological Theory

and 

Constructor Ontogeny, accepted for full presentation at
ECTA-2012.

Send your email address and I will forward these papers.

wrb


> -Original Message-
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
> l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish
> Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 3:09 AM
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible
> 
> On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 07:22:21PM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote:
> > Dear Russell:
> >
> > When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not
> > its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice.
> >
> > wrb
> 
> I'm not entirely sure what you mean, but do Langton loops count?
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langton's_loops
> 
> Cheers
> 
> --
> 
> ---
> -
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> ---
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RE: Why AI is impossible

[William R. Buckley]

Ah, someone sharp enough to see the crux of the biscuit.

 

The machine has the interesting property that it can begin its behavior 

with very much less than one half of itself still not constructed, and yet 

it can with this small portion construct the remainder of its configuration.

 

Further, this configuration cannot self-replicate without having 100% of 

its configuration in the constructed state.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 8:58 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

 

On 8/14/2012 8:35 PM, William R. Buckley wrote: 

I have done exactly as I challenged Russell.


That you built a machine that built itself would imply that you built
yourself.  Which implies you arose from nothing, otherwise there would have
been a prior part of you which you didn't build.

Brent

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RE: Why AI is impossible

[William R. Buckley]

I have done exactly as I challenged Russell.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Brian Tenneson
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 8:26 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

 

John Russell and Katharine Russell might not agree.

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 8:23 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

On 8/14/2012 7:22 PM, William R. Buckley wrote: 

Dear Russell:
 
When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not 
its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice.


Every machine that built itself was not built by Russell.  

Brent

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RE: Why AI is impossible

[William R. Buckley]

Dear Russell:

When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not 
its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice.

wrb

> -Original Message-
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
> l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish
> Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 4:11 PM
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible
> 
> On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 11:16:47AM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote:
> > John:
> >
> >
> >
> > Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus
> universality, the
> > Turing machine
> >
> > can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue of
> its
> > construction.
> >
> >
> >
> > wrb
> 
> John is right - omniscience is a different concept to
> universality. For the sake of clearer conversation, it is better to
> keep that in mind, rather than arbitrarily redefining words "Humpty
> Dumpty" like.
> 
> Of course, if there is no accepted definition for a concept, it is OK
> to propose another one. But please restrict it to concepts that are
> logically sound, and be prepared to drop your own definition if a
> better one comes along.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> --
> 
> ---
> -
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> ---
> -
> 
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RE: Why AI is impossible

[William R. Buckley]

I think the limitation is better expressed as,

 

Halting problem - no one arbitrary algorithm can decide whether or not
another arbitrary algorithm will halt.

 

There are some cases, typically one to one, or one to some small and well
defined set, where decidability is 

satisfied.  There is no case of one to all others where decidability is
satisfied.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of John Clark
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 10:53 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

 

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 1:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

 

> Hmmm... well the halting problem is that there is no *general* algorithm
to decide wether or not a given program will stop


Yes. 

 

> it doesn't state that there is no algorithm that can determine if a
particular program will stop or not.


Obviously. It's easy to tell that some programs, like the program "add 1 to
the number 2  17 times then stop" will stop, but its not so easy for other
programs and the only way to know if the program will stop it to watch it
and see. And if the program never stops you can never know that because no
matter how many billions of years you've been watching it for all you know
it might stop in the next 5 seconds, or maybe the next 5 billion years, or
maybe never.

  John K Clark


 

 

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RE: Why AI is impossible

[William R. Buckley]

John:

 

Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus universality, the
Turing machine 

can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue of its
construction.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of John Clark
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 9:39 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

 

On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:09 PM, William R. Buckley 
wrote:

 

 > Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient[...]


Turing's entire reason for inventing what we now call a Turing Machine was
to prove that computational omniscience is NOT possible. He rigorously
proved that no Turing Machine, that is to say no computer, can determine in
advance if any given computer program will eventually stop. 


For example, it would be very easy to write a program to look for the first
even number greater than 2 that is not the sum of two prime numbers and then
stop. But will the machine ever stop? The Turing Machine doesn't know, I
don't know, you don't know, nobody knows. Maybe it will stop in the next  5
seconds, maybe it will stop in 5 billion years, maybe it will never stop. If
you want to know what the machine will do you just have to watch it and see,
and even the machine doesn't know what it will do until it does it.

  John K Clark




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RE: Peirce on subjectivity

[William R. Buckley]

Roger and Bruno:

 

Peirce’s philosophy is the strong basis for semiotic theory.

 

wrb

 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger 
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 5:00 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Peirce on subjectivity

 

Hi Bruno Marchal 

 

I'm way out of touch here. What is comp ?

 

I don't think you can have a symbolic theory of subjectivity, for theories  are 
contructed

in symbols, and subjectivity is awareness of the symbols  and hopefully what 
they mean.

 

CS Peirce differentiates the triadic connections between symbol and object and 
awareness

in his theory of categories:

 

FIRSTNESS (perceiving an object privately) -- raw experience of an apple

 

SECONDNESS (comparing inner and outer worlds)  - looking up the proper word 
symbol for the image in your memory

[Comparing is the basis of thinking.]

 

THIRDNESS: (doing or expressing publicly in words) - saying "That's an apple."  

 

 

 

Roger ,  <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net> rclo...@verizon.net

8/14/2012 

- Receiving the following content - 

From: Bruno Marchal <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>  

Receiver: everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>  

Time: 2012-08-13, 11:53:51

Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

 

Hi Jason, 

 

On 13 Aug 2012, at 17:04, Jason Resch wrote:





 

On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

William, 

 

On 12 Aug 2012, at 18:01, William R. Buckley wrote:





The physical universe is purely subjective.

 

That follows from comp in a constructive way, that is, by giving the means to 
derive physics from a theory of subejectivity. With comp any first order 
logical theory of a universal system will do, and the laws of physics and the 
laws of mind are not dependent of the choice of the initial universal system.

 

 

 

Bruno,

 

Does the universal system change the measure of different programs and 
observers, or do programs that implement programs (such as the UDA) end up 
making the initial choice of system of no consequence?

 

The choice of the initial universal system does not matter. Of course it does 
matter epistemologically. If you choose a quantum computing system as initial 
system, the derivation of the physical laws will be confusing, and you will 
have an hard time to convince people that you have derived the quantum from 
comp, as you will have seemed to introduce it at the start. So it is better to 
start with the less "looking physical" initial system, and it is preferable to 
start from one very well know, like number + addition and multiplication.

 

So, let us take it to fix the thing. The theory of everything is then given by 
the minimal number of axioms we need to recover Turing universality.

 

Amazingly enough the two following axioms are already enough, where the 
variable are quantified universally. I assume also some equality rules, but not 
logic!

 

x + 0 = x

x + s(y) = s(x + y)

 

x * 0 = 0

x*s(y) = (x *y) + x

 

This define already a realm in which all universal number exists, and all their 
behavior is accessible from that simple theory: it is sigma_1 complete, that is 
the arithmetical version of Turing-complete. Note that such a theory is very 
weak, it has no negation, and cannot prove that 0 ≠ 1, for example. Of course, 
it is consistent and can't prove that 0 = 1 either. yet it emulates a UD 
through the fact that all the numbers representing proofs can be proved to 
exist in that theory.

 

Now, in that realm, due to the first person indeterminacy, you are multiplied 
into infinity. More precisely, your actual relative computational state appears 
to be proved to exist relatively to basically all universal numbers (and some 
non universal numbers too), and this infinitely often.

 

So when you decide to do an experience of physics, dropping an apple, for 
example, the first person indeterminacy dictates that what you will  feel to be 
experienced is given by a statistic on all computations (provably existing in 
the theory above) defined with respect to all universal numbers. 

 

So if comp is correct, and if some physical law is correct (like 'dropped 
apples fall'), it can only mean that the vast majority of computation going in 
your actual comp state compute a state of affair where you see the apple 
falling. If you want, the reason why apple fall is that it happens in the 
majority of your computational extensions, and this has to be verified in the 
space of all computations. Everett confirms this very weird self-multiplication 
(weird with respect to the idea that we are unique and are living in a unique 
reality). This translated the problem of "why physical laws" into a problem of 
statistics in computer science, or in number theory.

 

Now, instead of using the four axioms above, I could have started with the 
combinators, and

RE: Why AI is impossible

[William R. Buckley]

Bruno:

 

You've turned things around.  The implication is context to information, not
information to context.

 

And, I suggest you think very long and carefully about my statement
regarding the computational 

omniscience of the Turing machine.  Yes, you may call it universality but
that word is in fact too 

strong; omniscience is more accurate.

 

Also, read Jesper Hoffmeyer's book Biosemiotics.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 2:39 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

 

Hi William,

 

On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote:





Bruno:

 

>From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe

seems rather obvious.

 

I don't think anything is obvious here.

What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are dreaming?
What is your theory of dream? What is your theory of mind?

 





 

Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient

 

I guess you mean universal. But universality is incompatible with
omniscience, even restricted to number relations. Computational universality
entails the impossibility of omniscience.

 

 





solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly

be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why,

Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable

computations.  

 

?

 

 





Somehow, where information is concerned, context

is king.

 

I agree with this. I would say that information is really context selection.

 

Bruno

 

 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 

 

 

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RE: Why AI is impossible

[William R. Buckley]

Please, a few foundational references on COMP that I 

might follow the discussion on Google EverythingList.

 

wrb

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RE: Why AI is impossible

[William R. Buckley]

Bruno:

 

>From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe 

seems rather obvious.

 

Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient 

solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly 

be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why, 

Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable 

computations.  Somehow, where information is concerned, context 

is king.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Monday, August 13, 2012 6:09 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

 

William,

 

On 12 Aug 2012, at 18:01, William R. Buckley wrote:





Roger:

 

Nothing in the universe is objective.  Objectivity is an ideal.

 

When the physicist seeks to make some measure of the

physical universe, he or she necessarily must use some other

part of the physical universe by which to obtain that measure.

 

QED.

 

You are quick here. 

 





 

The physical universe is purely subjective.

 

That follows from comp in a constructive way, that is, by giving the means
to derive physics from a theory of subejectivity. With comp any first order
logical theory of a universal system will do, and the laws of physics and
the laws of mind are not dependent of the choice of the initial universal
system.

 

Bruno

 

 





 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger 
Sent: Sunday, August 12, 2012 5:35 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Why AI is impossible

 

Hi Evgenii Rudnyi

 

This is not going to make you computer folks happy, sorry.

 

Life is whatever can experience its surroundings,

nonlife cannot do so.  That's the difference.

 

Intelligence requires the ability to experience what it is selecting.

So only life can have intelligence.

 

Life is subjective, nonlife is objective.

 

Computers cannot experience anything because they are not subjective,

only objective. Everytthing must be in words, not directly experienced.

Thus computers cannot be (truly) intelligent. And AI is impossible,

because only living items can experience the world..

 

 

Roger ,  <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net> rclo...@verizon.net

8/12/2012

- Receiving the following content -

From: Evgenii Rudnyi <mailto:use...@rudnyi.ru> 

Receiver: everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com> 

Time: 2012-08-11, 10:22:44

Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI
ordescribing life

 

On 11.08.2012 15:13 Stephen P. King said the following:
> On 8/11/2012 4:30 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>> On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:
>>> The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of
>>> life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent.
>>>
>>> The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of
>>> artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
>>> intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research
>>> is about AI.
>>>
>>
>> What does intelligence means in this context that life is
>> unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.
>> Where there is more intelligence?
>>
>> Evgenii
>>
> Dear Evgenii,
>
> A bacterium and a rock should not be put head to (no)head in this
> question. A bacterium has autonomy while a rock does not. It is better
> to see that the rock is just a small piece of an autonomous whole and
> then compare that whole to the (whole) bacterium.
>

My goal was just to try to understand what Russell meant by life is 
unintelligent. Say let us take some creations of AI and compare them 
with a bacterium. Where do we find more intelligence?

Evgenii

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RE: Why AI is impossible

[William R. Buckley]

Roger:

 

Nothing in the universe is objective.  Objectivity is an ideal.

 

When the physicist seeks to make some measure of the 

physical universe, he or she necessarily must use some other 

part of the physical universe by which to obtain that measure.

 

QED.

 

The physical universe is purely subjective.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger 
Sent: Sunday, August 12, 2012 5:35 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Why AI is impossible

 

Hi Evgenii Rudnyi 

 

This is not going to make you computer folks happy, sorry.

 

Life is whatever can experience its surroundings,

nonlife cannot do so.  That's the difference.

 

Intelligence requires the ability to experience what it is selecting.

So only life can have intelligence.

 

Life is subjective, nonlife is objective.

 

Computers cannot experience anything because they are not subjective, 

only objective. Everytthing must be in words, not directly experienced.

Thus computers cannot be (truly) intelligent. And AI is impossible,

because only living items can experience the world..

 

 

Roger ,   rclo...@verizon.net

8/12/2012 

- Receiving the following content - 

From: Evgenii Rudnyi   

Receiver: everything-list   

Time: 2012-08-11, 10:22:44

Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI
ordescribing life

 

On 11.08.2012 15:13 Stephen P. King said the following:
> On 8/11/2012 4:30 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>> On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:
>>> The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of
>>> life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent.
>>>
>>> The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of
>>> artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
>>> intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research
>>> is about AI.
>>>
>>
>> What does intelligence means in this context that life is
>> unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.
>> Where there is more intelligence?
>>
>> Evgenii
>>
> Dear Evgenii,
>
> A bacterium and a rock should not be put head to (no)head in this
> question. A bacterium has autonomy while a rock does not. It is better
> to see that the rock is just a small piece of an autonomous whole and
> then compare that whole to the (whole) bacterium.
>

My goal was just to try to understand what Russell meant by life is 
unintelligent. Say let us take some creations of AI and compare them 
with a bacterium. Where do we find more intelligence?

Evgenii

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Re: scientists simulate an entire organism in software for the first time ever

[R AM]

On Mon, Aug 6, 2012 at 10:29 AM, rclough  wrote:

> As I see it, intelligence is the ability to make choices completely on one's
> own. Autonomously.

Intelligence involves solving problems and making good choices.
Autonomy might be good or bad, depending on the context.


> But a computer program can only make choices that the programmer previously
> allowed.
> So in effect the choices are made by the computer programmer,

The programmer only specifies the rules for making choices, but not
the actual choices.
furthermore, the program can change its own rules via machine learning
or artificial evolution.

 The programmer
> is
> the puppet master..

No.

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Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead

[R AM]

On Sun, Aug 5, 2012 at 8:45 PM, Stephen P. King  wrote:
>
>
> Dear Brent,
>
> Your statement is a nonsequitur. In your acceptance of the definition of
> fascism (as given by fascism promoters) is a tacit acceptance of the
> existence of fascism as an actual matter of fact. The "atheists" that Bruno
> is criticising are making claims against the existence of the Christan or
> more generally the Abrahamic concept of god. Bruno's point might be
> construed as that any and all claims for or against a particular definition
> must assume as possibly existing the entity in question. The concept of God
> as defined by its usage by most philosophers (not just the small minority of
> Christian apologists) is nowhere isomorphic to the definition of God as
> defined by Christians and therefore is immune to your critique.
>
>
>
> This confirms what I have already explained. Atheism is a variant of
> christianism. They defend the same conception of God than the Christians, as
> you do all the time.
> Note that philosophers use often the term "God" in the general and original
> sense of theology: as being, by definition, the transcendental cause of
> everything.
>
>
>
> as "a force greater than myself" then I am a devout believer because I
> believe in gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong nuclear force. I
> believe in bulldozers too.
>
>
> But I have already told you that God is supposed to be responsible for our
> existence;
>
>
> Doesn't that responsibility require 'free will'?
>
>
> Why are you tacitly assuming the Abrahamic theory of free-will? You
> could accept the secular version as it is used in game theory (that I
> defined in a previous post) but you seem to ignore or refuse this
> possibility. Why do you think that the concept of autonomy or, its
> equivalent, agency (in economics) requires the Abrahamic theory? I think
> thou doth protest too much!
>
>
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
> ~ Francis Bacon
>
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Re: Free will: a definition

[R AM]

If rationality is used in the technical sense then the irrational category
becomes too broad because it includes doing the right thing under the
current resources (time, computing power, knowledge) and any other plain
dumb action.

El ago 3, 2012 1:16 a.m., "Russell Standish" 
escribió:
>
> On Thu, Aug 02, 2012 at 04:46:07PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> >
> > But then to compete with other agents it may well be optimum to
> > adopt a random policy and flip a coin.
>
> Of course. But rationality is not just about doing the optimal thing,
> its about knowing what is the optimal thing to do, and then doing it.
>
> One must add some caveats to this characterisation, of course - divine
> inspiration needs to be ruled out, for example. The knowledge must
> derived by logical reasoning from that available information, which is
> where the requirement for unlimited computational resources comes from.
>
> I do understand where you're coming from - everyday usage of the word
> rational is considerably looser than the technical meaning used in
> philosophy, economics, etc.
>
> Cheers
>
> --
>
>

> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>

>
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Re: Free will: a definition

[R AM]

> On 7/30/2012 7:05 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
>> With complete information, a totally rational being makes optimal
>> choices, and has no free will, but always beats an irrational being.
>>
>> Conversely, with incomplete information, a rational being will make a
>> wrong choice, or simply fail to make a choice at all, and so is
>> usually beaten by an irrational being.

With incomplete information, a rational being will make the best
choice under the available information and would beat an irrational
being most of the time.

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Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead

[R AM]

On Tue, Jul 31, 2012 at 1:19 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> I'm not clear on why you emphasize incomplete information?  What would
>> constitute complete information? and why how would that obviate 'free will'.
>> Is it coercive?
>
>
> I agree with Russell's answer. If the information was complete (with respect
> to what is relevant), then there would be no choice at all. I would know
> that right I will make a cup of coffee, or perhaps not, instead of
> hesitating about it.

Then, the less we know, the freer is our will?

When making decisions, what we want is to make the right decision. And
therefore, we need as much information as possible. The best situation
is when we have so much knowledge that there is no alternative. That's
the best situation (not the worst)!

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RE: scientists simulate an entire organism in software for the first time ever

[William R. Buckley]

I think it is more like, "there's a program in your bug."

wrb

> -Original Message-
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
> l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb
> Sent: Sunday, July 22, 2012 7:41 PM
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: scientists simulate an entire organism in software for the
> first time ever
> 
> On Sun, Jul 22, 2012 at 11:52:18AM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
> >> This is great news for Bruno! ;-)
> >>
> >>I was interested in the computational complexity factor involved.
> >>
> >>
> >> http://venturebeat.com/2012/07/21/big-leap-in-bio-engineering-
> scientists-simulate-an-entire-organism-in-software-for-the-first-time-
> ever/
> 
> Gives new meaning to "there's a bug in your program."
> 
> Brent
> 
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RE: scientists simulate an entire organism in software for the first time ever

[William R. Buckley]

I, for one, remain skeptical.

wrb


> -Original Message-
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
> l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish
> Sent: Sunday, July 22, 2012 4:17 PM
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: scientists simulate an entire organism in software for the
> first time ever
> 
> 
> The siginficance is that this is one of the open problems of
> Artificial Life:
> 
> @Article{Bedau-etal00,
>   author = {Mark A. Bedau and John S. McCaskill and Norman
>   H. Packard and Steen Rasmussen and Chris Adami and David G. Green
>   and Takashi Ikegami and Kinihiko Kaneko and Thomas S. Ray},
>   title =  {Open Problems in Artificial Life},
>   journal ={Artificial Life},
>   year =   2000,
>   volume = 6,
>   pages =  {363--376}
> }
> 
> (or see http://www.alife.org/alife8/open-prob.html)
> 
> Only took 12 years. Oh well, 1 down, 13 more to go...
> 
> Cheers
> 
> 
> On Sun, Jul 22, 2012 at 11:52:18AM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
> > This is great news for Bruno! ;-)
> >
> > I was interested in the computational complexity factor involved.
> >
> >
> > http://venturebeat.com/2012/07/21/big-leap-in-bio-engineering-
> scientists-simulate-an-entire-organism-in-software-for-the-first-time-
> ever/
> >
> >
> > --
> > Onward!
> >
> > Stephen
> >
> > "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
> > ~ Francis Bacon
> >
> >
> > --
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
> Groups "Everything List" group.
> > To post to this group, send email to everything-
> l...@googlegroups.com.
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> list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
> 
> --
> 
> ---
> -
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> ---
> -
> 
> --
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Re: Unto Others (very interesting)

[R AM]

On Thu, Jul 19, 2012 at 5:19 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 7/19/2012 1:43 AM, R AM wrote:
>>
>>   free markets produce the types of social systems that best enable
>> people to interact in a way that puts them on the oxytocin-empathy?
>> Really I thought it was each one on its own.
>
>
> I think that's the interesting point: those two are not contrary.

I think friendship may release oxytocin, but free-markets relations
won't. In any case, that's something that can be found out
empirically, I guess.

> Brent
>
>
>>
>> On Thu, Jul 19, 2012 at 6:47 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>>
>>> This may be of interest to those recently discussing free-riders.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>  Original Message 
>>>
>>> Unto Others
>>>
>>> BY MICHAEL SHERMER
>>>
>>> It is the oldest and most universally recognized moral principle that was
>>> codified over two millennia ago by the Jewish sage Hillel the Elder:
>>> “Whatsoever thou wouldst that men should not do to thee, do not do that
>>> to
>>> them. This is the whole Law. The rest is only explanation.” That
>>> explanation
>>> has been the subject of intense theological and philosophical disputation
>>> for millennia, and recently scientists are weighing in with naturalistic
>>> accounts of morality, such as the two books under review here.
>>>
>>> Paul J. Zak is an economist and pioneer in the new science of
>>> neuroeconomics who built his reputation on research that identified the
>>> hormone oxytocin as a biological proxy for trust. As Zak documents,
>>> countries whose citizens trust one another have higher average GDPs, and
>>> trust is built through mutually-beneficial exchanges that result in
>>> higher
>>> levels of oxytocin as measured in blood draws of subjects in economic
>>> exchange games as well as real-world in situ encounters. The Moral
>>> Molecule
>>> is an engaging and enlightening popular account of Zak’s decade of
>>> intense
>>> research into how this molecule evolved for one purpose—pair bonding and
>>> attachment in social mammals—and was co-opted for trust between
>>> strangers.
>>> The problem to be solved here is why strangers would be nice to one
>>> another. Evolutionary “selfish gene” theory well accounts for why we
>>> would
>>> be nice to our kin and kind—they share our genes so being altruistic and
>>> moral has an evolutionary payoff in our genes being indirectly propagated
>>> into future generations. The theory of kin selection explains how this
>>> works, and the theory of reciprocal altruism—I’ll scratch your back if
>>> you’ll scratch mine—goes a long way toward explaining why unrelated
>>> people
>>> in a social group would be kind to one another: my generosity to you
>>> today
>>> when my fortunes are sound will pay off down the road when life is good
>>> to
>>> you and my luck has run out. What Zak has so brilliantly done is to
>>> identify
>>> the precise biological pathways that explain the mechanics of how this
>>> system evolved and operates today.
>>> Order the hardcover from Amazon
>>> Order the Kindle Edition
>>> The Moral Molecule is loaded with first-person accounts of how Zak got
>>> his
>>> data, starting with a wedding he attended in the English countryside to
>>> draw
>>> the blood and measure the oxytocin levels of the bride, groom, and
>>> accompanying parents before and after the vows. The half-life of oxytocin
>>> is
>>> measured in minutes, so Zak had to draw 24 blood samples in under ten
>>> minutes that then had to be frozen and shipped back to his lab for
>>> analysis,
>>> the results of which “could be mapped out like the solar system, with the
>>> bride as the sun,” he vividly recalls. The bride’s oxytocin level shot up
>>> by
>>> 28 percent after vows were spoken, “and for each of the other people
>>> tested,
>>> the increase in oxytocin was in direct proportion to the likely intensity
>>> of
>>> emotional engagement in the event.” Bride’s mother: up 24 percent.
>>> Groom’s
>>> father: up 19 percent. The groom: up only 13 percent. Why? It turns out
>>> that
>>> testosterone interferes with the release of oxytocin, and Zak measured a
>>> 100
>>> percent increase in the groom’s testosterone level after his vows were
>>> p

Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead

[R AM]

On Thu, Jul 19, 2012 at 12:33 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> Le 18-juil.-12, à 15:28, R AM a écrit :
>
>
>> On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 2:12 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>
> I gave a definition of compatibilist free-will which is not "without
> coercion". I define free-will as the ability to make willing-full choice in
> absence of complete information, and in the presence of the awareness of our
> ignorance for some near future. I can practice that free-will even alone at
> home, like when hesitating between coffee and tea.

Why not call it decision making? or will? why free-will? free from what?

> I guess you mean by "metaphysical free-will" the usual spurious definition
> based on third person indeterminacy.

I think metaphysical free-will implies third person indeterminacy. But
free-will is perceived by people as some sort of "power" to make
absolutely free decisions.

> It does not exist if we assume
> computationalism. But a slight difference introduced in that definition
> (replace the 3-indeterminacy by a weaker self-indeterminacy, based on Turing
> and not on the first person indeterminacy) makes the notion full of sense,
> and provable for all universal machine having enough cognitive abilities
> (Löbian).

Indeterminacy is a consequence of metaphysical free-will, but it's not
free-will in itself. Your first-person indeterminacy implies that all
possible decisions are made. I don't think this fits well with the
idea of metaphysical free-will.

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Re: Unto Others (very interesting)

[R AM]

 free markets produce the types of social systems that best enable
people to interact in a way that puts them on the oxytocin-empathy?
Really I thought it was each one on its own.

On Thu, Jul 19, 2012 at 6:47 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
> This may be of interest to those recently discussing free-riders.
>
> Brent
>
>  Original Message 
>
> Unto Others
>
> BY MICHAEL SHERMER
>
> It is the oldest and most universally recognized moral principle that was
> codified over two millennia ago by the Jewish sage Hillel the Elder:
> “Whatsoever thou wouldst that men should not do to thee, do not do that to
> them. This is the whole Law. The rest is only explanation.” That explanation
> has been the subject of intense theological and philosophical disputation
> for millennia, and recently scientists are weighing in with naturalistic
> accounts of morality, such as the two books under review here.
>
> Paul J. Zak is an economist and pioneer in the new science of
> neuroeconomics who built his reputation on research that identified the
> hormone oxytocin as a biological proxy for trust. As Zak documents,
> countries whose citizens trust one another have higher average GDPs, and
> trust is built through mutually-beneficial exchanges that result in higher
> levels of oxytocin as measured in blood draws of subjects in economic
> exchange games as well as real-world in situ encounters. The Moral Molecule
> is an engaging and enlightening popular account of Zak’s decade of intense
> research into how this molecule evolved for one purpose—pair bonding and
> attachment in social mammals—and was co-opted for trust between strangers.
> The problem to be solved here is why strangers would be nice to one
> another. Evolutionary “selfish gene” theory well accounts for why we would
> be nice to our kin and kind—they share our genes so being altruistic and
> moral has an evolutionary payoff in our genes being indirectly propagated
> into future generations. The theory of kin selection explains how this
> works, and the theory of reciprocal altruism—I’ll scratch your back if
> you’ll scratch mine—goes a long way toward explaining why unrelated people
> in a social group would be kind to one another: my generosity to you today
> when my fortunes are sound will pay off down the road when life is good to
> you and my luck has run out. What Zak has so brilliantly done is to identify
> the precise biological pathways that explain the mechanics of how this
> system evolved and operates today.
> Order the hardcover from Amazon
> Order the Kindle Edition
> The Moral Molecule is loaded with first-person accounts of how Zak got his
> data, starting with a wedding he attended in the English countryside to draw
> the blood and measure the oxytocin levels of the bride, groom, and
> accompanying parents before and after the vows. The half-life of oxytocin is
> measured in minutes, so Zak had to draw 24 blood samples in under ten
> minutes that then had to be frozen and shipped back to his lab for analysis,
> the results of which “could be mapped out like the solar system, with the
> bride as the sun,” he vividly recalls. The bride’s oxytocin level shot up by
> 28 percent after vows were spoken, “and for each of the other people tested,
> the increase in oxytocin was in direct proportion to the likely intensity of
> emotional engagement in the event.” Bride’s mother: up 24 percent. Groom’s
> father: up 19 percent. The groom: up only 13 percent. Why? It turns out that
> testosterone interferes with the release of oxytocin, and Zak measured a 100
> percent increase in the groom’s testosterone level after his vows were
> pronounced! How far will Zak go to get his data? In the western highlands of
> Papua New Guinea he set up a make-shift lab to draw the blood from tribal
> warriors before and after they performed a ritual dance, discovering that
> the “band of brothers” phenomena has a molecular basis in oxytocin.
> The Moral Molecule aims to explain “the source of love and prosperity,”
> which Zak identifies in a causal chain from oxytocin to empathy to morality
> to trust to prosperity. Numerous experiments he has conducted in this lab
> that are detailed in the book demonstrate that subjects who are cooperative
> and generous in a trust game have higher levels of oxytocin, and infusing
> subjects with oxytocin through a nose spray causes their generosity and
> cooperativeness to increase. Zak concludes his book with a thoughtful
> discussion of how liberal democracies and free markets produce the types of
> social systems that best enable people to interact in a way that puts them
> on the oxytocin-empathy-morality-trust-prosperity positive feedback loop.
> Every corporate CEO and congressman should read this book before making
> important decisions.
> In Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and Shame the USC
> evolutionary anthropologist Christopher Boehm tackles head-on the
> “free-rider” problem in explaining the orig

Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead

[R AM]

On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 8:51 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 7/18/2012 6:28 AM, R AM wrote:
>
> Dear Bruno, compatibilist free-will is defined as "without coercion".
> Metaphisical (non-compatibilist) free-will is a property or ability people
> claim to have when making decisions (i.e. they are so absolutely free that
> even natural law does not coerce them). Compatibilist free-will is NOT
> something people have, since it is defined by the external situation to the
> agent (i.e. the agent is not externally constrained).
>
>
> That seems like a strange conception of what it means "to have".  I have a
> motorcycle.  The fact that it is external and is mine because I paid for it
> and it is registered in my name doesn't negate my having it.
>

I don't think we say we have free-will in the same sense than owning a
motorcycle.

Here is an example of what I mean:

1) Someone is coercing you to give some secret information. A member of
your family will be killed if you don't comply. You decide to provide the
information: you are coerced => no compatibilist free-will, but you still
exercised your "metaphysical free-will".

2) You decide to provide the information without coercion. Here you have
both metaphysical and compatibilist free-will (you have not been coerced).

>From the point of view of compatibilist free-will, the only difference
between 1 and 2 is the external situation (the coercion). Compatibilist
free will is not something you have, or something you do, or a "power" of
you. It's something that happens to you.

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Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead

[R AM]

On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 2:12 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> Well ...  you are the one who continue to mock free-will, despite many of
> us have given new precise, and compatibilist, definition of it, and you do
> this without making precise that you limit yourself to the non sensical
> notion.
>
>
Dear Bruno, compatibilist free-will is defined as "without coercion".
Metaphisical (non-compatibilist) free-will is a property or ability people
claim to have when making decisions (i.e. they are so absolutely free that
even natural law does not coerce them). Compatibilist free-will is NOT
something people have, since it is defined by the external situation to the
agent (i.e. the agent is not externally constrained).

I think you have also defined free-will as not knowing (even in principle)
what we will finally do. But this is again not something people have, but
just something that happens to us.

To reiterate, compatibilist free-will is not a property of the agents
involved, and thus, it is hardly "that something" people claim to have.
Compatibilist free-will is just a way of telling people that they will be
considered responsible even though they do not have metaphisical free-will.

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