Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
No, it won't be bored because there is no way for it to know that it is going
through the
first or the second run. The point I was trying to make is that there is no
real basis for
distinguishing between a recording and a program,
There is a basis for
John,
Le 23-août-06, à 22:24, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
As I 'believe': anything recognized by our 'senses' are our mental
interpretations of the unattainable 'reality' (if we condone its
validity). My world is a posteriori.
This is almost my favorite way to explain Plato in one
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or
relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe
that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain
is almost completely cut out from the
Le 23-août-06, à 03:58, Brent Meeker a écrit :
People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or
relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe
that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain
is almost completely cut out from
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
Almost is not completely. In any case, I don't think consciousness is
maintained
indefinitely with no inputs. I think a brain-in-a-vat would go into an
endless
loop without external stimulus.
That's an assumption,
No, it has
Wednesday, August 23, 2006 10:31
AM
Subject: Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS:
ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 23-août-06, à 03:58, Brent Meeker a écrit
: People who believes that inputs (being either
absolute-material or relative-platonical) are needed for
consciousness should not beli
Brent meeker writes (quoting Peter Jones, Quentin Anciaux and SP):
Hi,
Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically
like a recording. Would that count as a program at
Le 22-août-06, à 15:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
OK, I suppose you could say I'm intelligent but not I + my
environment are intelligent.
That still allows that an inputless program might contain intelligent
beings, and you are left
with the problem of how to decide whether a
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 22-août-06, à 15:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
OK, I suppose you could say I'm intelligent but not I + my
environment are intelligent.
That still allows that an inputless program might contain intelligent
beings, and you are left
with the problem of how to
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 22-août-06, à 15:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
OK, I suppose you could say I'm intelligent but not I + my
environment are intelligent.
That still allows that an inputless program might contain intelligent
beings, and you are left
with the problem of how to
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
You might say that a computer program has a two-way interaction with its
environment while a recording does not, but it is easy to imagine a
situation
where this can be perfectly reproduced by a recording. In run no. 1, you
start up
the computer
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single,
deterministic, non-branching
computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then
contingency in general
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Right!
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2006 10:18:18 +0200
Hi,
Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17
Peter Jones writes:
And such a universe could be emulated
as a running, deterministic process. But
that won't get you into Plato's heaven,
because it is a *running* process -- it is still
dynamic. A recording of the process could
exist in Plato's heaven, but it wouldn't have
all the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
And such a universe could be emulated as a running, deterministic process.
But
that won't get you into Plato's heaven, because it is a *running* process --
it
is still dynamic. A recording of the process could exist in Plato's heaven,
Hi,
Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically
like a recording. Would that count as a program at all,
It would be a trivial case.
Trivial does not mean false.
It
Le 19-août-06, à 15:36, Günther wrote:
The existence of numbers is not like the existence of objects, and I
don't
think that most mathematical Platonists would say that it is.
I agree with them. We have to distinguish many forms of internal or
epistemological existence, build from the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic,
non-branching
computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency
in general
being due to the fact that we don't know the details of how
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically
like a recording. Would that count as a program at all,
It would be a trivial case.
Right!
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2006 10:18:18 +0200
Hi,
Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17, Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic,
non-branching
computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then
contingency in general
being due to the fact that we
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is
independent of the
real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from
Euclid's axioms
*despite* the fact that real space is not Euclidian. The fact
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is
independent of the
real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from
Euclid's axioms
*despite* the fact that real space is not Euclidian. The fact
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
But the fact that a theorem is true relative to some axioms doesn't make it
true
or existent. Some mathematicians I know regard it as a game. Is true that
a
bishop can only move diagonally? It is relative to chess. Does chess
exist?
It does in
Le 19-août-06, à 08:48, Brent Meeker wrote quoting Stathis Papaioannou
What more could we possibly ask of a theorem other than that it be
true relative to some
axioms? That a theorem should describe some aspect of the real world,
or that it should
be discovered by some mathematician, is
Le 18-août-06, à 17:02, 1Z a écrit :
It is for Pythagorenas and Platonists to explain what they mean by
exist.
However, if you are going to claim that we are actually *in* Platonia,
(mathematical monism) there must be some equivalence between the
existence we
have and the existence
Le 18-août-06, à 17:38, 1Z a écrit :
That is an explanation of mind-independence, not of existence.
The anti-Platonist (e.g. the formalist) can claim that
the truth of mathematical statments is mind-independent,
but their existence isn't.
Their existence ? Mathematical statements needs
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 18-août-06, à 17:38, 1Z a écrit :
That is an explanation of mind-independence, not of existence.
The anti-Platonist (e.g. the formalist) can claim that
the truth of mathematical statments is mind-independent,
but their existence isn't.
Their existence ?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 18-août-06, à 17:02, 1Z a écrit :
It is for Pythagorenas and Platonists to explain what they mean by
exist.
However, if you are going to claim that we are actually *in* Platonia,
(mathematical monism) there must be some equivalence between the
existence we
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system
must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to
occur,
I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain
if-then
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic,
non-branching
computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency in
general
being due to the fact that we don't know the details of how the program will
play
out?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Günther writes:
Well, let's see: in Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty fell off a
wall. This is true, isn't it? It is certainly true independent
of our minds. Indeed, it is true in such a way that even when
all humans have died, this universe will have a
Le 18-août-06, à 22:59, complexitystudies a écrit :
As 1Z has so nicely put, existence implies causal interaction.
Numbers cannot causally interact, therefore they do not exist,
save as thoughts in our brains.
Don(t say this to a logician. there are as many notion of causality
than there
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically like a
recording.
Would that count as a program at all,
It would be a trivial case.
Trivial does not mean false.
and could it be a conscious program, given that
computationalism
Peter Jones writes:
Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic,
non-branching
computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency in
general
being due to the fact that we don't know the details of how the program
will play
out?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated
form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the
Hi,
Le vendredi 18 août 2006 11:52, 1Z a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated
form of finitism to
Brent Meeker writes (quoting Peter Jones and SP):
Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical
structures *exist* independently of you,
not just that they are true independently of you.
What's the difference?
Stathis Papaioannou
You could regard the theorems of
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot
support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist.
It can if you can show that the mental does not supervene
on the physical.
I don't see how that is connected,
and I don't want
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
Le vendredi 18 août 2006 11:52, 1Z a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated
form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot
support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist.
It can if you can show that the mental does not supervene
on the physical.
I don't see how that is
Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 14:21, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
Le vendredi 18 août 2006 11:52, 1Z a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a
bold assumption, but
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
What's the difference?
Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't.
What could it possibly mean for numbers to exist in the sense you claim
they do not? Could I be mugged by a burly number 6 in a dark alley?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot
support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist.
It can if you can show that the mental does not supervene
on the
Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 17:02, 1Z a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
What's the difference?
Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't.
What could it possibly mean for numbers to exist in the sense you claim
they do not? Could
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 17:02, 1Z a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
What's the difference?
Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't.
What could it possibly mean for numbers to exist in the sense
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 14:21, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
Le vendredi 18 août 2006 11:52, 1Z a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes (quoting Peter Jones and SP):
Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical
structures *exist* independently of you,
not just that they are true independently of you.
What's the difference?
Stathis Papaioannou
You could regard the
1Z wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system
must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur,
I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain
if-then statements.
other than
Brent Meeker wrote:
But the fact that a theorem is true relative to some axioms doesn't make it
true
or existent.
It doesn't make it *false* relative to those axioms. It has
to be estbalished that a mathematical statement needs to or
can aspire to further kinds of truth,
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system
must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur,
I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain
if-then
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
...
If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically
identical.
I don't think I understand this either.
Either that, or counterfactuallity is asupernatural phenomenon.
Computer programs contain if-then
statements which branch
I think it has been said several times :
The existence of a number/arithmetical proposition is the fact that its
existence/truth does not depend on the fact that you exist/that it exists
conscious beings capable of thinking of it.
So the truth value of a proposition is independant of
1Z wrote:
Not even remotely. I fact, what I have said can be written as two valid
syllogisms.
Existence is availability for causal interaction
Numbers are not available for causal interaction
Numbers do not exist
Platonism is the claim that numbers exist
Numbers do not exist
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
...
If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically
identical.
I don't think I understand this either.
Either that, or counterfactuallity is asupernatural phenomenon.
Computer programs contain
Hi,
Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 22:17, complexitystudies a écrit :
I think it has been said several times :
The existence of a number/arithmetical proposition is the fact that its
existence/truth does not depend on the fact that you exist/that it exists
conscious beings capable of
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 17-août-06, à 00:14, complexitystudies a écrit :
I recall it is just the belief that the
propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Do you
sincerley belief that 37 could be a non prime number? Or that the
square root of 2 can equal to a ratio
complexitystudies wrote:
...
Not exactly. Animals and babies can distinguish up to 2-3 objects
(innate arithmetic, subitizing). The experiments with which this has
been ascertained are both fascinating and entertaining (google is your
friend ;-)
This ability has an evolutionary
complexitystudies wrote:
I think it has been said several times :
The existence of a number/arithmetical proposition is the fact that its
existence/truth does not depend on the fact that you exist/that it exists
conscious beings capable of thinking of it.
So the truth value of a proposition
1Z wrote:
Not even remotely. I fact, what I have said can be written as two valid
syllogisms.
Existence is availability for causal interaction
Numbers are not available for causal interaction
Numbers do not exist
Platonism is the claim that numbers exist
Numbers do not exist
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system
must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur,
I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain
if-then statements.
other than that
Brent Meeker writes:
Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is
independent of the
real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from
Euclid's axioms
*despite* the fact that real space is not Euclidian. The fact that real
space is
Brent Meeker writes:
1Z wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system
must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur,
I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain
Günther writes:
Well, let's see: in Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty fell off a
wall. This is true, isn't it? It is certainly true independent
of our minds. Indeed, it is true in such a way that even when
all humans have died, this universe will have a contained a life-form
which
Le 17-août-06, à 00:14, complexitystudies a écrit :
Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just
assume).
A bold assumption, if I may say so.
Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 17-août-06, à 00:14, complexitystudies a écrit :
Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just
assume).
A bold assumption, if I may say so.
Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
assumption, but number
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 17-août-06, à 16:41, 1Z a écrit :
Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical
structures *exist* independently of you,
not just that they are true independently of you.
What is the difference between the proposition it exists a prime
number is true
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated
form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the
propositions of elementary arithmetic
Peter Jones writes:
A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot
support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist.
It can if you can show that the mental does not supervene
on the physical. This is far from a generally accepted fact,
but there but I am not yet aware of
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated
form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the
propositions
Hi Bruno,
Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just assume).
A bold assumption, if I may say so.
To be clear on that hypothesis, I do indeed find plausible that the
number six is perfect, even in the case the branes would not have
collide, no big bang, no physical
complexitystudies wrote:
Hi Bruno,
Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just assume).
A bold assumption, if I may say so.
To be clear on that hypothesis, I do indeed find plausible that the
number six is perfect, even in the case the branes would not have
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