Forgive any typos...
- Original Message -
From: "Jesse Mazer"
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Thu, 26 May 2005 20:05:49 -0400
>
> aet.radal ssg wrote:
>
> > You're assuming that Einstein ca
there but exist in Nash's head can still be considered real in "our universe". That's what I'm talking about. That's a fully formed idea with absolutely no basis in the objective world that was just put out there like it meant something, when in fact it's ridiculous.
aet.radal ssg wrote:
You're assuming that Einstein came up with those ideas through
brainstorming.
To me, "brainstorming" just means any creative attempt to come up with new
tentative speculations about solutions to a problem. Since Einstein's ideas
cannot possibly have been anything but ten
sure.
- Original Message -
From: "Jesse Mazer"
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Thu, 26 May 2005 12:29:13 -0400
>
> aet.radal ssg wrote:
>
> > Clearly, the method and definition of
-- Original Message - From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 26 May 2005 12:29:13 -0400 > > aet.radal ssg wrote: > > > Clearly, the method and definition of b
aet.radal ssg wrote:
Clearly, the method and definition of brainstorming that you're accustomed
to is different than mine. >The "half-formed idea" is what initiates the
brainstorm for me, which is fully formed when the storm is >over, ie. the
ground is parched and in need of rain, the storm co
- Original Message - From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Tue, 24 May 2005 18:36:51 -0400 > > "aet.radal ssg" wrote: > > >> From: "Jes
"aet.radal ssg" wrote:
From: "Jesse Mazer"
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Thu, 12 May 2005 14:48:17 -0400
Generally, unasked-for attempts at armchair psychology to explain
the motivations of another poster
> From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com > Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality > Date: Thu, 12 May 2005 14:48:17 -0400 > > Generally, unasked-for attempts at armchair psychology to explain > th
Dear Saibal:
Could you explain the paradox you've created by saying, "In the film Nash was closelyacquainted to persons that *didn't realy exist*." and "One could argue that the persons that Nash was seeing in fact did exist *(inour universe)*, precisely because Nash's brain was simulating them."
W
Why am I not surprised that I disagree with this response?- Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 12 May 2005 23:25:28 +1000 > > The obvious
Le 14-mai-05, à 07:44, Lee Corbin a écrit :
No, it is not "just erroneous". I know of many thoughtful
people, and include myself as one of them, who believe that
the so-called mind body problem is some sort of verbal or
linguistic problem.
I can agree with that, but then we should solve that li
Lee Corbin writes (replying to Bruno Marchal):
> I agree the abandoning of vitalism is progress. And it is true that
> natural science has explained features like self-reproduction,
> animal motion, energy transformation (sun -> living matter) and so
> on. But it is just erroneous to conclude that
Bruno writes
> [Lee writes]
> > But many here contend that abstract
> > patterns---mathematical stings, really---can do *so* much cross-
> > referencing and quoting of each other that a form of paste obtains
> > that wields them in to something capable of having experiences.
> > But a familiar abs
Le 13-mai-05, à 05:39, Lee Corbin a écrit :
Brent writes
I think that an observer must be physically instantiated - that seems
well
supported empirically. As it is used a "observer moment" seems to
mean a unit
of subjective experience. That there is an "observer", i.e.
something with
conti
ibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "everything"
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Fri, 13 May 2005 03:11:21 +0200
One could say that the brain of some schizophrenic persons simulate other
persons. I don't know if some of you have seen the film 'A Beauti
>-Original Message-
>From: Lee Corbin [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Friday, May 13, 2005 3:40 AM
>To: EverythingList
>Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>
>
>Brent writes
>
>> I think that an observer must be physically instantiat
Brent writes
> I think that an observer must be physically instantiated - that seems well
> supported empirically. As it is used a "observer moment" seems to mean a unit
> of subjective experience. That there is an "observer", i.e. something with
> continuity over many such subjective experience
u" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Aan:
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>CC: <everything-list@eskimo.com>Verzonden:
Thursday, May 12, 2005 03:25 PMOnderwerp: Re: Many worlds theory of
immortality> The obvious and sensible-sounding response to
Jeanne's question
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I doubt that there are many people who have known someone with a mental
illness and would claim that there is anything positive about the
experience. While sometimes the mentally ill themselves claim that they
have a superior insight into reality, that's just because t
is to
deliberately cause lesions in an experimental animal and observe the
resulting effects.
--Stathis Papaioannou
From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Thu, 12 May 2005 14:48:17 -0400
G
On Thu, May 12, 2005 at 08:47:09AM -0500, aet.radal ssg wrote:
???
Could I please request that people post only plain text emails to the
everything list, or at very least include a plain text translation?
This is a sending option available on all HTML email clients I've come
across. It's a real b
On Thu, May 12, 2005 at 02:48:17PM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> Generally, unasked-for attempts at armchair psychology to explain the
> motivations of another poster on an internet forum, like the comment that
> someone "just wants to hear themself talk", are justly considered flames
> and tend t
ry if I have upset you, and I hope > that if you do have the opportunity to work with the mentally ill > in future you will treat them with compassion.> > --Stathis Papaioannou> > > From: "aet.radal ssg" <[EMAIL PRO
I agree with Stathis' answer to Jeanne. Another one which looks a
little bit incompatible with the one by Stathis would be: if QM is
correct no information can travel from one universe to another. So such
an hallucination can only be such a coincidence or a triviality
(whatever I think, there i
opportunity to work with the mentally ill > in future you will treat them with compassion.> > --Stathis Papaioannou> > > From: "aet.radal ssg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> > To: everything-list@eskimo.com> > Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality> > Da
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:
Sent: Thursday, May 12, 2005 2:25 PM
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
> The obvious and sensible-sounding response to Jeanne's question whether it
>
The obvious and sensible-sounding response to Jeanne's question whether it
may be possible to access other universes through dreams or hallucinations
is that it is not really any more credible than speculation that people can
contact the dead, or have been kidnapped by aliens, or any other of th
I read "Why Occam's Razor" tonight after posting my last response
(despite having a Federal court brief begging for attention). I didn't
have time to wade through the technical parts very thoroughly, but in
general I found it a very good summary of many of the topics we have
been frequently
>Jonathan Colvin writes:
>> That's putting it mildly. I was thinking that it is more
>likely that a
>> universe tunnels out of a black hole that "just randomly" happens to
>> contain your precise brain state at that moment, and for all
>of future
>> eternity. But the majority of these random
On Thu, May 12, 2005 at 12:40:10AM -0400, danny mayes wrote:
> Russell,
>
> When I stated in the original reply that pulling information out of
> other worlds in the MWI context was prohibited by physics, I was
> referring to information about those universes. As I stated, obviously
> you can
Russell,
When I stated in the original reply that pulling information out of
other worlds in the MWI context was prohibited by physics, I was
referring to information about those universes. As I stated, obviously
you can create a superposition to utilize processing power in other
universes,
John Collins had written
> >..You [Hal] are working from the assumption that each person has some sort of
> >transcendental identity that experiences these observer moments, but I would
> >think it more likely that these would be included in the observer moment,
> >with memories being distinguishe
>-Original Message-
>From: John Collins [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2005 10:22 AM
>To: Quentin Anciaux; everything-list@eskimo.com
>Subject: Re: many worlds theory of immortality
>
>
>
>Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>"
>>Le Mard
iately also ends instantaneously.
So heaven or hell may not last at all (ha ha).
Cheers
John Mikes
----- Original Message -
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "danny mayes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "everything list"
Sent: Tuesday, May 10, 2005 7:44 PM
Subject: Re: [Fwd: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality]
I agree with you Stathis. That's why I think MWI, QTI and COMPI lead to
the Relative SSA, and relative immortality.
The SSA you mention is the Absolute SSA which does not make sense, imo.
Bruno
Le 11-mai-05, à 14:04, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno,
Le 10-mai-05, à 12:25, Stathis Papaioannou
Bruno,
Le 10-mai-05, à 12:25, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are
guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment
concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments where
we are young and living w
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
"
>Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 19:13, "Hal Finney" a écrit :
>> And in terms of your question, I would not act as though I expected to
> >be guaranteed a very long life span, because the measure of that universe
> >is so low compared to others where I don't survive.
>>
> >Hal Finne
you do have the
opportunity to work with the mentally ill in future you will treat them with
compassion.
--Stathis Papaioannou
From: "aet.radal ssg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Tue, 10 May 200
The Grover algorithm is a form of accessing information from other
worlds. Of course the worlds need to be prepared in just the right
way, of course...
On Tue, May 10, 2005 at 01:01:32PM -0400, danny mayes wrote:
> >
> I'm not one to shy away from what others would perceive to be "unbridled
> spe
On Tue, May 10, 2005 at 07:19:01AM -0400, Jeanne Houston wrote:
> I once read an article in, I believe, Time Magazine, about the relatively
> new field of "neurotheology" which investigates what goes on in the brain
> during ecstatic states, etc. One suggestion that intrigued me was that it
> may
se has not died out.
--Stathis Papaioannou
From: "Jeanne Houston" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stathis Papaioannou"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CC: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Tue, 10 May 2005 07:1
On Mon, May 09, 2005 at 08:55:00PM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
>
> But it's not all that unlikely that someone in the world, unbeknownst
> to you, has invented a cure; whereas for a universe with your exact
> mind in it to be created purely de novo is astronomically unlikely.
>
That's the wrong w
Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 20:14, "Hal Finney" a écrit :
>> And what do you think of life insurance? Suppose you have young children
>> whom you love dearly, for whom you are the sole support, and who will
>> suffer greatly if you die without insurance?
Do you agree with this ?
1- whenever there is
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I happen to be a believer in the observer-moment as
fundamental, and the only thing one can be sure of from the first
person perspective. "I think, therefore I am" is taking it too far in
deducing the existence of an observer; "I think, therefore there is a
thought"
Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 20:14, "Hal Finney" a écrit :
> Yet you have already been unconscious forever, before your birth (if we
> pretend/assume that the universe is infinite in both time directions).
It can't be forever... I'm conscious now... so it was not "forever". But I
know you'll say infinity
Quentin Anciaux writes:
> but by definition of what being alive means (or being conscious), which is to
> experience observer moments, even if the difference of the measure where you
> have a long life compared to where you don't survive is enormous, you can
> only experience world where you are
Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 19:13, "Hal Finney" a écrit :
> And in terms of your question, I would not act as though I expected to
> be guaranteed a very long life span, because the measure of that universe
> is so low compared to others where I don't survive.
>
> Hal Finney
Hi,
but by definition of wha
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> Hal,
> >I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are
> >guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment
> >concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments where
> >we are young and living within a normal
aet.radal ssg wrote:
Dear Jeanne:
Message -
From: "Jeanne Houston"
To: "Stathis Papaioannou" ,
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Tue, 10 May 2005 07:19:01 -0400
I didn't read the article but I am aware of
Dear Jeanne:
Message - From: "Jeanne Houston" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Tue, 10 May 2005 07:19:01 -0400
I didn't read the article but I am a
If you do, you really aren't interested in discovering anything new about objective reality. You really just want to "hear" yourself talk, because nothing else worthwhile is coming from it. Chatter. Just my observation.
&g
Le 10-mai-05, à 05:55, Hal Finney a écrit :
I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are
guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment
concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments
where
we are young and living within a normal l
Le 10-mai-05, à 12:25, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are
guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment
concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments
where
we are young and living within
tails of the article,
but I don't have it anymore.
Jeanne
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 11:19 PM
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Hal,
I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are
guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment
concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments where
we are young and living within a normal lifespan than ones where we are
at a very
Norman Samish writes:
> If the multiverse is truly infinite in space-time, then all possible
> universes must eventually appear in it, including an infinite number with
> all 10^80 particles in it identical to those in our universe.
Yes, Tegmark calls this the "Level I" concept of a multiverse.
-
From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 8:55 PM
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin writes:
> That's putting it mildly. I was thinking that it is more likely that a
> universe tunnels out of a black
Jonathan Colvin writes:
> That's putting it mildly. I was thinking that it is more likely that a
> universe tunnels out of a black hole that "just randomly" happens to contain
> your precise brain state at that moment, and for all of future eternity. But
> the majority of these random universes wil
While it is likely that some version of you will end up in a hellishly
random universe as a result of QTI, you probably won't stay there very long,
since if your particular brain pattern arose randomly, it will probably
become disrupted randomly as well. Failing that, you can always kill
yourse
Russell,
To be fair, I should elaborate on my earlier post about amnesics and
psychotics. If I consider the actual cases I have seen, arguably they do
have *some* sense of the passage of time. Taking the first example, people
with severe Korsakoff Syndrome (due to chronic alcohol abuse) appear t
>>The usual approach is that a system which is algorithmically
>>compressible is defined as random. A rule-based universe has a short
>>program that determines its evolution, or creates its state.
>A random
>>universe has no program much smaller than itself which can encode its
>>informatio
>The usual approach is that a system which is algorithmically
>compressible is defined as random. A rule-based universe has
>a short program that determines its evolution, or creates its
>state. A random universe has no program much smaller than
>itself which can encode its information.
>
>Ha
Did you mean to say a system *not* algorithmically compressible is defined
as random?
--Stathis Papaioannou
Jonathan Colvin writes:
> Pondering on this, it raises an interesting question. Can we
differentiate
> between worlds that are (or appear to be) rule-based, and those that are
> purely ran
annou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 2:02 PM
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
> Dear aet.radal ssg,
>
> I think you missed my point about the amnesic and psychotic patients,
which
> is not that they are cle
I don't know why you think QTI experienced worlds will be random. They
will still be law abiding, but the laws will gradually get more
complex, with more "exceptions to the rule" as time goes on.
Cheers
On Mon, May 09, 2005 at 04:09:26PM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
> I think you meant "algorith
On Mon, May 09, 2005 at 11:02:18PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Dear aet.radal ssg,
>
> I think you missed my point about the amnesic and psychotic patients, which
> is not that they are clear thinkers, but that they are conscious despite a
> disability which impairs their perception of t
applicable to ANY entity, not just humans. I am happy with the
possibility of being wrong.
Stephen
- Original Message -
From:
John M
To: Stephen Paul King ; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 5:29 PM
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of
immortality
I think you meant "algorithmically *in*compressible".
The relevance was, I was thinking that those universes where we become
immortal under MWI are not the conventional rule-based universes such as we
appear to live in, but a different class of stochastic random ones (which
require very unlikely s
-image. ("Our" reality? as seen from this
universe?)
Cheers
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <everything-list@eskimo.com>
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 10:51 AM
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of
Jonathan Colvin writes:
> Pondering on this, it raises an interesting question. Can we differentiate
> between worlds that are (or appear to be) rule-based, and those that are
> purely random?
The usual approach is that a system which is algorithmically compressible
is defined as random. A rule-
ROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 9:02 AM
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Dear aet.radal ssg,
I think you missed my point about the amnesic and psychotic patients,
which
is not that they are clear thinkers, but that they are conscious desp
Sincerely,
Chris Collins.
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 2:02 PM
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
> Dear aet.radal ssg,
>
> I think you missed my point abou
IL PROTECTED]>
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Sat, 07 May 2005 10:44:25 -0500
_
REALESTATE: biggest buy/rent/share listings
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--- Begin Message ---
Picking up a thread from a little while ago:
>>Jonathan Colvin: That's a good question. I can think of a chess position
that is
>>a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex it is far
>>from obvious what is allowed and what is forbidden.
>
>Jesse Mazer: So what if some chess positi
- Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Wed, 04 May 2005 22:40:46 +1000 > snip<> I don't see how you could get anywhere if you disregard the > relationshi
On 4 May 2005 George Levy wrote:
I believe that according to some or most participants in this list,
transitions between observer moments is representing "Time." I have also
been talking about observer moments in the past but I have always skirted
around the issue of defining them.
The concept
I believe that according to some or most participants in this list,
transitions between observer moments is representing "Time." I have also
been talking about observer moments in the past but I have always
skirted around the issue of defining them.
The concept of observer moment is not clear.
On Wed, May 04, 2005 at 10:40:46PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> I don't see how you could get anywhere if you disregard the relationship
> between observer moments. It is this relationship which allows grouping of
> different observer moments to give the effect of a continuous stream of
I would add another point with regard to observer-moments and continuity:
probably there is no unique "next" or "previous" relationship among
observer-moments.
The case of non-unique "next" observer-moments is uncontroversial, as it
relates to the universe splitting predicted by the MWI or the ana
On 4 May 2005 Russell Standish wrote:
On this list, we seem to have two fairly clear camps: those who
identify observer moments as the fundamental concept, and those who
regard relationships between observer moments with equal ontological
status.
With my TIME postulate, I say that a conscious obser
Reading your responses here, I don't think we have much to disagree
on. Like you, I don't need a concrete universe, with concrete time
etc. It was largely your thesis that convinced me of that. Perhaps you
confuse me with Schmidhuber too much !
I wouldn't say that time is illusionary. Illusionary
Le 04-mai-05, à 01:53, Russell Standish a écrit :
On this list, we seem to have two fairly clear camps: those who
identify observer moments as the fundamental concept, and those who
regard relationships between observer moments with equal ontological
status.
OK. As you know I take the relationship
On this list, we seem to have two fairly clear camps: those who
identify observer moments as the fundamental concept, and those who
regard relationships between observer moments with equal ontological
status.
With my TIME postulate, I say that a conscious observer necessarily
experiences a sequenc
2 weeks ago Saibal Mitra wrote:
I don't think that the MW immortality is correct at all! In a certain
sense
we are
immortal, because the enseble of all possible worlds is a fixed static
entity. So,
you ''always'' find yourselve alive in one state or another. However, you
won't
experience youse
Saibal,
Does
your conclusion about conditional probability also apply to complex-valued
probabilities a la Youssef?
http://physics.bu.edu/~youssef/quantum/quantum_refs.html
http://www.goertzel.org/papers/ChaoQM.htm
-- Ben
Goertzel
-Original Message-From: Bruno Marchal
Le 16-avr.-05, à 02:45, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
Both the suicide and copying thought experiments have convinced me that the
notion of a conditional probability is fundamentally flawed. It can be
defined under ''normal'' circumstances but it will break down precisely when
considering copying or sui
Dear Lee,
Interleaving.
- Original Message -
From: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2005 11:00 PM
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality: May only be the Anthropic
Principle
Stephen writes
you seem to b
Hi Stephen,
You wrote:
>
>can be faithfully represented by Turing algorithms.) ...>
I take the opportunity of that statement to insist on a key point which
is admittedly not obvious.
The fact is that I am also totally allergic to the idea that 1st person
aspects can be represented. Comma
Jesse,
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Now, look at p(n) again. This time, let's say it is not k, but a random
real number greater than zero, smaller than 1, with k being the mean of
the distribution. At first glance, it may appear that not much has
changed, since the probabilities will "on average"
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Now, look at p(n) again. This time, let's say it is not k, but a random
real number greater than zero, smaller than 1, with k being the mean of the
distribution. At first glance, it may appear that not much has changed,
since the probabilities will "on average" be the
Jesse,
I've deleted everything, it was getting too messy. I hope this
(semi-)mathematical formulation captures your argument correctly:
Suppose you start with one individual, your friend, on a computer network
which has infinite resources and will grow exponentially forever. This
individual wil
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
[Quoting Stathis:]
However, let us agree that the scenario you describe occurs in a
non-negligible proportion of MW branches in which sentient life survives
into the indefinite future, and return to Nick Prince's original question
which spawned this
Jesse Mazer wrote:
[Quoting Stathis:]
However, let us agree that the scenario you describe occurs in a
non-negligible proportion of MW branches in which sentient life survives
into the indefinite future, and return to Nick Prince's original question
which spawned this thread. How will you ensure
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
[Stathis]
There are two separate probabilities to consider here. One is the
probability (3/4, as you show) that civilization will never break down
if implemented on a computer with behaviour as specified above. The
other is the probability that the
Jesse Mazer writes:
[Stathis]
There are two separate probabilities to consider here. One is the
probability (3/4, as you show) that civilization will never break down
if implemented on a computer with behaviour as specified above. The
other is the probability that the actual hardware will work a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
[Stathis]
There are two separate probabilities to consider here. One is the
probability (3/4, as you show) that civilization will never break down if
implemented on a computer with behaviour as specified above. The other is
the probability that the
nou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Tuesday, April 19, 2005 12:33 AM
Subject: Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Brent Meeker wrote:
[Stathis]
>Your body slowly disintegrates and is (approximately) reconstructed atom
by
>atom, so you don't notice a discontinuity, and it doesn't hurt. If the
>timing and order of the process were changed, so that your body is
destroyed
>in one operation and a copy reconstruc
Jesse Mazer writes:
[Stathis]
There are two separate probabilities to consider here. One is the
probability (3/4, as you show) that civilization will never break down if
implemented on a computer with behaviour as specified above. The other is
the probability that the actual hardware will work a
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