Re: Holiday Exercise

On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 10:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​> ​ > Answer, or re-answer to question 1. ​John Clark doesn't even remember what question 1 was and doubts it is worth looking up because of a suspicion it involves personal pronouns and rugs for sweeping sloppy

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 14 Aug 2016, at 18:26, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Aug 14, 2016 at 11:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​>> ​​I saw only a apple, my friend saw only a banana, what is THE one and only fruit that BOTH me AND my friend ​saw? Silly question. ​> ​I agree so much with you

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Sun, Aug 14, 2016 at 11:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​>> ​ >> ​I saw only a apple, my friend saw only a banana, what is *THE* one and >> only fruit that *BOTH* me *AND* my friend ​saw? Silly question. > > > ​> ​ > I agree so much with you on this! > ​ ​ > Although the

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 12 Aug 2016, at 18:40, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Aug 12, 2016 at 10:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: "The" first person experience you will live is "the" experience, that both copies witnesses when I interview them both ​I saw only a apple, my friend saw only a banana,

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Fri, Aug 12, 2016 at 10:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: "The" first person experience you will live is "the" experience, that both > copies witnesses when I interview them both ​I saw only a apple, my friend saw only a banana, what is *THE* one and only fruit that *BOTH* me

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 11 Aug 2016, at 20:18, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Aug 11, 2016 at 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​>> ​in general it's not true that they will​ perceiving different things​, if you were the identical copy and in a symmetrical environment and facing your original

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Thu, Aug 11, 2016 at 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​>> ​in general it's not true that they will >> ​ >> perceiving different things >> ​ >> , if you were the identical copy and in a symmetrical environment and >> facing your original the two of you would see identical

Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

On 09 Aug 2016, at 19:32, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 at 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​> ​a nine years old child get the point ​And I might get your point if I had the mentality of a nine year old child, or of something similar like an ancient Greek.

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 09 Aug 2016, at 23:30, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Aug 8, 2016 at 8:51 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: ​> ​I think the default assumption is that consciousness supervenes on the brain, so two different brains will realize two different consciousnesses because they are at

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 09 Aug 2016, at 07:28, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 3:14 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/8/2016 7:03 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 10:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote: I think Russell is just saying

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 09 Aug 2016, at 02:57, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 9 August 2016 at 03:52, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/8/2016 6:18 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Monday, 8 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Mon, Aug 8, 2016 at 8:51 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > ​> ​ > I think the default assumption is that consciousness supervenes on the > brain, so two different brains will realize two different consciousnesses > because they are at different locations and perceiving different

Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 at 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​> ​ > a nine years old child get the point ​And I might get your point if I had the mentality of a nine year old child, or of something similar like an ancient Greek. John K Clark​ -- You received this message

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 09 Aug 2016, at 01:03, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 09:06:20PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 8/08/2016 8:38 pm, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Aug 07, 2016 at 09:24:31AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: However, still no justification has been given for the assumption

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 08 Aug 2016, at 19:52, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/8/2016 6:18 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Monday, 8 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be digitized so

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 09 Aug 2016, at 01:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 9:05 am, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 10:01:49AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 09 Aug 2016, at 01:15, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 12:39 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Aug 2016, at 01:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 8/08/2016 1:30 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: But in step 3, I ma very careful to not use the notion of "consciousness", and instead a simple 3p notion of

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 9/08/2016 4:08 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/8/2016 10:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: You seem to be agreeing that this is, at bottom, an empirical matter. If we do the experiment and duplicate a conscious being, then separate the duplicates, we could ask one whether or not it was still

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/8/2016 10:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: Yes, that makes sense. But the rovers are not conscious. Why not? Suppose they are. If you would say "yes to the doctor" then you must believe that AI is possible. I have no reason to suppose that AI is not possible. But the Mars rovers are

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/8/2016 10:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: You seem to be agreeing that this is, at bottom, an empirical matter. If we do the experiment and duplicate a conscious being, then separate the duplicates, we could ask one whether or not it was still aware of its duplicate. If the answer is "No",

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 9/08/2016 3:14 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/8/2016 7:03 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 10:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote: I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/8/2016 7:03 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 10:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote: I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 9/08/2016 10:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote: I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate consciousnesses at least as soon as they

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 9 August 2016 at 03:52, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 8/8/2016 6:18 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Monday, 8 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> >> >> On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> Not necessarily. A digital computer

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote: I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different perceptions If that is what

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 9/08/2016 9:05 am, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 10:01:49AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 9/08/2016 9:03 am, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 09:06:20PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 8/08/2016 8:38 pm, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Aug 07, 2016 at 09:24:31AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: However, still no justification has been given for the assumption that the

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote: I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different perceptions If that is what you have to do, why not admit it openly?

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/8/2016 4:05 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 10:01:49AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 9/08/2016 12:39 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Aug 2016, at 01:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 8/08/2016 1:30 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: But in step 3, I ma very careful to not use the notion of "consciousness", and instead a simple 3p notion of first person. usually many relates it two

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 10:01:49AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: > I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added > axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate > consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different perceptions. > This is exactly what you would

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 09:06:20PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 8/08/2016 8:38 pm, Russell Standish wrote: > >On Sun, Aug 07, 2016 at 09:24:31AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > >>However, still no justification has been given for the assumption > >>that the duplicated consciousness

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/8/2016 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Aug 2016, at 22:32, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/7/2016 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: So I suggest that instead of starting with the hypothesis that consciousness is a computation, Please, I insist that consciousness is NOT a computation.

Re: Holiday Exercise

I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different perceptions. This is exactly what you would predict from supposing that consciousness is a product of physical

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 08 Aug 2016, at 01:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 8/08/2016 1:30 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: But in step 3, I ma very careful to not use the notion of "consciousness", and instead a simple 3p notion of first person. usually many relates it two consciousness and assumes that when the guy

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 07 Aug 2016, at 23:14, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be digitized so that its registers run synchronously. Otherwise "the state" is ill defined. The finite speed of light means that

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 07 Aug 2016, at 22:32, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/7/2016 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: So I suggest that instead of starting with the hypothesis that consciousness is a computation, Please, I insist that consciousness is NOT a computation. Consciousness is an 1p notion, and you

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Monday, 8 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be digitized >>> so that its registers run synchronously. Otherwise "the state" is ill >>> defined. The finite

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/08/2016 8:38 pm, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Aug 07, 2016 at 09:24:31AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: However, still no justification has been given for the assumption that the duplicated consciousness differentiates on different inputs. And consciousness is what computationalism is

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Sun, Aug 07, 2016 at 09:24:31AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > However, still no justification has been given for the assumption > that the duplicated consciousness differentiates on different > inputs. And consciousness is what computationalism is supposed to be > giving an account of. >

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/08/2016 1:30 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: But in step 3, I ma very careful to not use the notion of "consciousness", and instead a simple 3p notion of first person. usually many relates it two consciousness and assumes that when the guy say "I see Moscow", they are conscious, but that is

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be digitized so that its registers run synchronously. Otherwise "the state" is ill defined. The finite speed of light means that spacially separated regions cannot be synchronous. Even

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/7/2016 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: So I suggest that instead of starting with the hypothesis that consciousness is a computation, Please, I insist that consciousness is NOT a computation. Consciousness is an 1p notion, and you cannot identify it with *any* 3p. But then you must

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 07 Aug 2016, at 15:06, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Friday, 5 August 2016, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2016, at 06:27, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/4/2016 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Sunday, August 7, 2016 at 4:27:56 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 06 Aug 2016, at 20:00, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > C. An UD will realize all possible computation, and hence the totality of > reality. > > > > Brent, please reread the UDA. > Perhaps but perhaps you should reread it.

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 07 Aug 2016, at 01:24, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 7/08/2016 9:00 am, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Aug 04, 2016 at 07:51:22PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote: Methinks you are unnecessarily assuming

Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

On 06 Aug 2016, at 20:35, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Aug 6, 2016 at 9:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​> ​It was the question 2 which does not involve duplication. Question 2: if I am sure at time t that at time q, q > t, I will be uncertain of the outcome of some

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 06 Aug 2016, at 20:00, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/6/2016 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: If we think about engineering an autonomous being it becomes obvious that this is a good architecture. Decision making should be hierarchical with only a few requiring system-wide consideration.

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Friday, 5 August 2016, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 05 Aug 2016, at 06:27, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > On 8/4/2016 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 7/08/2016 9:00 am, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Aug 04, 2016 at 07:51:22PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote: Methinks you are unnecessarily assuming transitivity again. No, I was just referring to the

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Thu, Aug 04, 2016 at 07:51:22PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: > >On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote: > >>Methinks you are unnecessarily assuming transitivity again. > > > >No, I was just referring to the continuation of a single >

Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

On Sat, Aug 6, 2016 at 9:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​> ​ > It was the question 2 which does not involve duplication. > *Question 2*: if I am sure at time t that at time q, q > t, I will be > uncertain of the outcome of some experience x, then I am uncertain about > the

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/6/2016 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: If we think about engineering an autonomous being it becomes obvious that this is a good architecture. Decision making should be hierarchical with only a few requiring system-wide consideration. With RF communication this autonomous being could

Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

On 06 Aug 2016, at 03:43, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Aug 5, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​ ​>>>​>Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will see next is not ambiguous as long as "YOU" duplicating machine are not around. ​>​>>​ ​So, you are OK that the guy

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 05 Aug 2016, at 20:20, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/5/2016 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2016, at 06:27, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/4/2016 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/4/2016 2:57 AM,

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 06 Aug 2016, at 07:19, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 6/08/2016 12:58 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2016, at 13:23, Bruce Kellett wrote He writes in the diaries what he sees: it is just a matter of the protocol whether he writes the name of the city in which each diary is

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 05 Aug 2016, at 20:35, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/5/2016 4:23 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: We can associate a mind to a body, but the mind itself (the 1p) can be (and must be) associated with many different bodies, in the physical universe and later in arithmetic. You seem to accept my

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 6/08/2016 2:36 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2016, at 14:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: The difficulty is with your assumption that differentiation into two persons is inevitable. It is not an assumption. With the protocol and the hypothesis, the diaries have differentiated. Diaries are

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 6/08/2016 12:58 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2016, at 13:23, Bruce Kellett wrote He writes in the diaries what he sees: it is just a matter of the protocol whether he writes the name of the city in which each diary is located in that particular diary, or if he writes in both diaries

Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

On Fri, Aug 5, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​ >>> ​>>>​> >>> Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will see next is not ambiguous >>> as long as "YOU" duplicating machine are not around. >> >> >> ​> >>> ​>>​ >>> ​ >>> So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/5/2016 4:23 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: We can associate a mind to a body, but the mind itself (the 1p) can be (and must be) associated with many different bodies, in the physical universe and later in arithmetic. You seem to accept my point -- there is still only one mind even after

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/5/2016 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2016, at 06:27, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/4/2016 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker > wrote: On 8/4/2016 2:57 AM, Stathis Papaioannou

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 05 Aug 2016, at 14:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 9:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2016, at 00:31, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 1:28 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/4/2016 2:51 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm,

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Fri, Aug 5, 2016 at 4:17 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 05 Aug 2016, at 15:01, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On 5/08/2016 10:11 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >>> On 5/08/2016 9:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> Just tell me if you are OK with question 1. The Helsinki guy is

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 05 Aug 2016, at 13:23, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 6:12 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2016, at 04:13, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 3:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Aug 2016, at 04:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 1:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Aug 2016, at

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 05 Aug 2016, at 15:01, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 10:11 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 9:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: Just tell me if you are OK with question 1. The Helsinki guy is told that BOTH copies will have a hot drink after the reconstitutions, in both Moscow and

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 5/08/2016 10:11 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 9:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: Just tell me if you are OK with question 1. The Helsinki guy is told that BOTH copies will have a hot drink after the reconstitutions, in both Moscow and Washington. Do you agree that the Helsinki guy (a

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 5/08/2016 9:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2016, at 00:31, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 1:28 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/4/2016 2:51 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 05 Aug 2016, at 00:31, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 1:28 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/4/2016 2:51 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 04:27:21PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: On

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 5/08/2016 6:12 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2016, at 04:13, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 3:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Aug 2016, at 04:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 1:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: You use the assumption

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 05 Aug 2016, at 06:27, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/4/2016 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/4/2016 2:57 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The problem with (3) is a general problem with multiverses. A single,

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 05 Aug 2016, at 04:13, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 3:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Aug 2016, at 04:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 1:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: You use the assumption that the duplicated consciousnesses

Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

On 04 Aug 2016, at 19:53, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Marchal wrote: ​> ​The question is not about duplication. ​OK.​ ​And that part is still OK. Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will see next is not ambiguous as long as "YOU"

Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

On 04 Aug 2016, at 19:53, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Marchal wrote: ​> ​The question is not about duplication. ​OK.​ ​And that part is still OK. Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will see next is not ambiguous as long as "YOU"

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/4/2016 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker > wrote: On 8/4/2016 2:57 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The problem with (3) is a general problem with multiverses. A single,

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 8/4/2016 2:57 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > The problem with (3) is a general problem with multiverses. A single, > infinite universe is an example of a multiverse theory, since there will be > infinite copies of

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 5/08/2016 3:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Aug 2016, at 04:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 1:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: You use the assumption that the duplicated consciousnesses automatically differentiate when receiving different

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 5/08/2016 1:28 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/4/2016 2:51 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 04:27:21PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 3/08/2016 12:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote: However,

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/4/2016 2:57 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 4 August 2016 at 11:16, Brent Meeker > wrote: On 8/3/2016 5:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3 August 2016 at 16:02, Brent Meeker

Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Marchal wrote: > > ​> ​ >> The question is not about duplication. > > > ​OK.​ > > > ​And that part is still OK. Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will see next is not ambiguous as long as "YOU" duplicating machine are not around. ​> ​ >

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 04 Aug 2016, at 04:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 1:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 3/08/2016 2:55 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Aug 2016, at 14:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 2/08/2016 3:07 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Aug 2016, at

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 04 Aug 2016, at 03:16, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/3/2016 5:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3 August 2016 at 16:02, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/2/2016 10:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 5:15 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 03 Aug 2016, at 21:01, Brent Meeker wrote: > > >> >> On 8/3/2016 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> >>> On 02 Aug 2016, at 20:52, Brent Meeker wrote: >>> >>> On 8/2/2016 6:15 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

On 03 Aug 2016, at 19:20, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 2:56 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​> ​The question is not about duplication. ​OK.​ ​> ​Do you agree that if today, someone is "sure" that tomorrow (or any precise time later) he will be uncertain of an

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/4/2016 2:51 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 04:27:21PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 3/08/2016 12:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote: However, we are being asked to consider two

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 03 Aug 2016, at 21:01, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/3/2016 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Aug 2016, at 20:52, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/2/2016 6:15 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: It's not that it can't, but rather that it doesn't, and if it does then that would require some extra

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 4 August 2016 at 11:16, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 8/3/2016 5:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On 3 August 2016 at 16:02, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> >> >> On 8/2/2016 10:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, 3 August

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 04:27:21PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 3/08/2016 12:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote: However, we are being asked to consider two conscious states where the conscious state differs

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 04:27:21PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 3/08/2016 12:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote: However, we are being asked to consider two conscious states where the conscious state differs by at least one bit - the W/M bit.

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 04:27:21PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 3/08/2016 12:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote: > > > >However, we are being asked to consider two conscious states where the > >conscious state differs by at least one bit - the W/M bit. Clearly, by the YD > >assumption, both states

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 4/08/2016 1:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 3/08/2016 2:55 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Aug 2016, at 14:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 2/08/2016 3:07 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Aug 2016, at 09:04, Bruce Kellett wrote: Consider ordinary

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/3/2016 5:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3 August 2016 at 16:02, Brent Meeker > wrote: On 8/2/2016 10:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote:

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 3 August 2016 at 16:02, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 8/2/2016 10:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> >> >> On 8/2/2016 3:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, 3

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Wed, Aug 3, 2016 at 3:01 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > ​> ​ > I've given up following your exchanges with Clark. They seem to be about > semantics. ​I certainly hope so, semantics is the branch of ​ logic concerned with meaning ​.​ ​ John K Clark​ -- You received

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/3/2016 7:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Aug 2016, at 22:41, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/2/2016 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But the argument seems somewhat circular since you assume that the different physical processes associated with location make the thoughts different.

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/3/2016 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Aug 2016, at 20:52, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/2/2016 6:15 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: It's not that it can't, but rather that it doesn't, and if it does then that would require some extra physical explanation, a radio link between brains

Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 2:56 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​> ​ > The question is not about duplication. ​OK.​ ​> ​ > Do you agree that if today, someone is "sure" that tomorrow (or any > precise time later) he will be uncertain of an outcome of a certain > experience, then he

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Wed, Aug 3, 2016 at 4:40 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 02 Aug 2016, at 22:39, Brent Meeker wrote: > > >> >> On 8/2/2016 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> Not at all. The existence of the computations is an elementary >>> metatheorem about Robinson Arithmetic, and

Re: R: Re: Holiday Exercise

On 03 Aug 2016, at 08:50, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 3/08/2016 4:37 pm, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote: The suggestion that the one consciousness could inhabit more than one physical body does not predict telepathy -- it could merely indicate that consciousness is not localized to a

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:28, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 3/08/2016 3:19 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/2/2016 3:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote:

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