On 14 Aug 2012, at 00:44, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 03:56:35PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Aug 2012, at 00:32, Russell Standish wrote:
OK. But the question is: would an agent lost free-will in case no
random oracle is available?
I would have thought so.
OK.
Hi William,
On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote:
Bruno:
From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe
seems rather obvious.
I don't think anything is obvious here.
What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are
dreaming? What is your theo
On 14 Aug 2012, at 06:33, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 10:53 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
The choice of the initial universal system does not matter. Of
course it does matter epistemologically. If you choose a quantum
computing system as initial system, the derivation of th
On 14 Aug 2012, at 07:26, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/13/2012 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Aug 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Roger,
I will interleave some remarks.
On 8/11/2012 7:37 AM, Roger wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
As I understand it, Leibniz's pre-established
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 11:33:48AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >"That which exists" is fundamentally unknowable, and probably not
> >sensible disucssed, hence I prefer to stick with more neutral labels
> >like "syntactic level".
>
> I disagree with this. With comp we know that the fundamenta
On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 11:51:54AM -0400, John Clark wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 1:12 AM, Russell Standish
> wrote> > are you really claiming that roulette wheels
> are conscious?
> >
>
> I can't prove it or the opposite proposition but personally I feel that
> it's unlikely such things are
How can there be a subjective universe ?
This question can be answered by the use of Leibniz's Monadology:
See http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/leibniz.htm
for that. I have no idea why it is on a Marxist website, for it aims to do
away with materialism.
Monads seem
On 14 Aug 2012, at 12:30, Russell Standish wrote:
Assuming the coin is operating inside the agent's body? Why would that
be considered non-free?
In what sense would the choice be mine if it is random? It is like
letting someone else take the decision for you. I really don't see how
rando
Hi Brian Tenneson
IMHO computers cannot be conscious, or have intuition,
since these require the ability to sense and handle qualitative
signals-such as seeing colors as colors, not light frequencies-
I'm not even sure you could call that information,
perhaps recognition would be a better wor
Hi Bruno Marchal
BRUNO: This "musical score", does it require work of some kind to be created
itself?
ROGER: A Turing Machine (tapes with holes in them) would not be able to see
the future,
only intuition and other abilities might do that. So it could not create
itself.
BRUNO: I argue t
Hi Bruno Marchal
I'm way out of touch here. What is comp ?
I don't think you can have a symbolic theory of subjectivity, for theories are
contructed
in symbols, and subjectivity is awareness of the symbols and hopefully what
they mean.
CS Peirce differentiates the triadic connections betwee
I think the "Qualia" is the philosophical term
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia
Steven Pinker at the end of his book "how the mind works" recognizes that
all the brain functional modules explained in the book say nothing about
the qualia. It says that we can not understand this mystery in th
Hi Brian,
IMHO machines can compare things, but only quantitatively.
Thus meaning cannot be handled.
In Peirces' philosophy of categories (which is really an epistemology)
comparison is not just quantitative but qualitative, for
the comparison is triadic, that is, between
a) an object with
Hi Bruno Marchal
I think that your soul is your identity in the form of point of view.
As we grow up we begin to define or find ourselves not out of any great
insight but pragmatically, out of choosing what tribe we belong to.
We define ourselves socially and culturally. We wear their indian
Hi Bruno Marchal
Guitar Cowboy describes my own limited-ability process of composing music.
I decide on what audience and what mood, and the rest - at least
the melody-- just pops into my head. Or not. If it hasn't come
within a few minutes, you can't force things.
Mozart, if you look at his ma
Hi Alberto G. Corona
Yes, qualia are the qualitative aspects of an experience,
meaning as perceived, such as the redness of an apple.
The apple only appears red to us. Dogs or some
other animals cannot see red, so it
would appear perhaps gray to them.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
Hi Evgenii Rudnyi
Intelligent means subjectively determined,
that is, determined all on our own, autonomously,
not by some computer program.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Evgenii Rudnyi
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-12, 09:
Hi Jason Resch
Personally I believe that the physical universe out there is physical,
in the traditional sense of the word, and can be characterized for
example by physical experiment. So science is fine, as far as it goes.
But what we experience of the physical universe is a psychological
or m
No problem, Roger.
You are coherent: you seem to believe in substantial (primitive)
matter, and in non-comp.
Personally I am not sure about that. What I am pretty sure of, still,
is that we can't have both primitive matter and mechanism to be true
together.
Of course, as a logician, I wi
Hi John Clark
1) I can experiencre redness (a qualitative property) while computers cannot,
all they can know are 0s and 1s.
2) One can use methods such as statistics to infer something in a
practical or logical sense, eg if a bottle of wine has a french label
one can infer that it might well b
On 14 Aug 2012, at 13:36, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
BRUNO: This "musical score", does it require work of some kind to
be created itself?
? I did not write this.
ROGER: A Turing Machine (tapes with holes in them) would not be
able to see the future,
only intuition and other abi
Hi Stephen P. King
Leibniz' best possible world is a conjecture
based on L's two worlds of logic:
1) There is logic that is either always true or false, called the logic of
reason or necessity.
One could call this "theory"
2) The logic of contingency, also called the logic of "fact", e
On 14 Aug 2012, at 14:00, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
I'm way out of touch here. What is comp ?
Roughly speaking comp is the idea that we can survive with a computer
for a brain, like we already believe that we can survive with a pump
in place of a heart.
This is the position of the
Bruno:
You've turned things around. The implication is context to information, not
information to context.
And, I suggest you think very long and carefully about my statement
regarding the computational
omniscience of the Turing machine. Yes, you may call it universality but
that word i
On 14 Aug 2012, at 14:42, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
I think that your soul is your identity in the form of point of view.
I agree. I use almost that exact definition.
As we grow up we begin to define or find ourselves not out of any
great
insight but pragmatically, out of choosing
Roger and Bruno:
Peirce’s philosophy is the strong basis for semiotic theory.
wrb
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 5:00 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Peirce on subjectivity
Hi Br
Hi William R. Buckley
Hwere's how I see it:
1. The object is the object of a subject, so is mostly a grammatical term.
2. The subject is the observer or doer and so is grammatical term.
3 The object can be either physical (such as metter) where it has extension in
space
or nonphysical
Hi Roger,
When I used the term universal system, I meant it in the sense of Turing
universality ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_universality
). It is universal in the same sense of the word as a universal remote. A
Turing universal system is one that can be used to define/emulate
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 9:29 AM, Roger wrote:
> Hi John Clark
>
>
> 1) I can experiencre redness (a qualitative property) while computers
> cannot,
> all they can know are 0s and 1s.
>
This statement suggests to me that you are not familiar with the levels of
abstraction that are common in comp
Hi Bruno Marchal
IMHO Intelligence is the ability to make deliberate free choices.
One could lie if one chose to.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-12, 05:24:48
Subject: Re: Positivis
Hi Bruno Marchal
IMHO One way of describing the subconscious might be along Freudian lines. The
context of a conscious thought,
as in peripheral vision, just out of focus.
As in dreams, this context might be in the form of a fuzzy myth, an unclear
story, say as presented
by a fortune-teller.
Hi Bruno Marchal
You say, "a non living computer can supported a living self-developing life
form"
Do you mean support instead of supported ? Or what do you mean ?
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-lis
Hi Bruno Marchal
What is it that Locke and Hume claimed ? That we can think nothing that
did not come through our senses, that is, from experience. But Turing machines
cannot experience life. They can only experience 0s and 1s.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the followi
Hi Bruno Marchal
As I recall, Kant did not use time and space as logical categories of thought
because time and space are intuited before logic. And Leibniz similarly
did not assign monads to them for similar reasons. Thus monadic
space has no where or when. Just what. In some sense it would the
Hi Bruno Marchal
For what it's worth, Leibniz differentiated between ordinary perception
(which would include sentience or awareness) and self-awareness, which he called
apperception.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Hi Bruno Marchal
Penrose's noncomputability argument is based on Godel's theorem,
which along these lines, IMHO also makes rational thinking leaky.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-1
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 6:30 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
> But he[me] agrees and even proposes a compatibilist definition [of free
>> will]
>>
>
> > I'll let him speak to that, but its not the impression I get.
>
All I said was that the only definition of "free will" that is not
gibberish is the
Hi Bruno Marchal
Well, I feel like Daniel must have felt when before the Giant.
And I can't even find a rock to sling.
Nevertheless, as I see it, computers are imprisoned by language (computer code).
Like our social selves. But like Kierkegaard, I believe that ultimate truth
is subjective (can
On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:09 PM, William R. Buckley
wrote:
> Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient[...]
>
Turing's entire reason for inventing what we now call a Turing Machine was
to prove that computational omniscience is NOT possible. He rigorously
proved that no Turing
Hi Bruno Marchal
Dennet refers to the self as "the center of narrative gravity".
But if I were reading a novel, the protagonist, not my self, would be
"the center of narrative gravity". His pains would be my pains, his
joys, my joys. At least, that's what happens to me when I read a novel,
an
Hi Bruno Marchal
Memory may be physical, but the experience of memory is not physical.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-11, 12:00:54
Subject: Re: Libet's experimental result re-evalu
Hi Evgenii Rudnyi
There is Intelligence (which requires a self to decide things)
and there is AI, which does not use a self. In AI, the
lights are on, but nobody's home.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Evgenii Rudnyi
Receiver: everythin
Hi Evgenii Rudnyi
Unless it is drunk, life must have governance, which means it needs
intelligence as a governor.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Evgenii Rudnyi
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-12, 04:05:20
Subject: Re: Definitio
Hi Evgenii Rudnyi
Anything internally governed must have an intelligence to govern it.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Evgenii Rudnyi
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-12, 02:51:22
Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibl
Hi Jason Resch
You got it right. Descartes never troubled to explain how two completely
different substances--
mind and body-- could interact. And Leibniz was too hard to understand.
And it was also easy to follow Newton, because bodies acted "as if" they
transferred energy or momentum.
In Des
Hi Jason Resch
I realize that animals can think to some extent,
I was just using Leibniz' simplified model.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Jason Resch
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-11, 18:23:30
Subject: Re: Leibniz on the un
Hi Jason Resch
No, the artificial man does not have a conscious self (subjectivity) to
experience (to feel) the world. You could show a movie of happenings
in his mind, but there'd be nobody there to watch it.
Only a monad can do that.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving
Hi John Clark
Good one. Another version is said to have been made by St. Theresa, who said
to God,
regarding His failure to heal her sickness, "No wonder you have so few friends
!"
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: John Clark
Receiver:
Hi Russell Standish
Another definition of life (Aristotle's) is that life is anything that is
self-activated.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Russell Standish
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-12, 05:38:16
Subject: Re: Definitio
Hi Russell Standish
Anything self-activated (life) needs intelligence to decide
what to do next.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Russell Standish
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-12, 01:18:27
Subject: Re: Definitions of intelli
2012/8/14 John Clark
> On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:09 PM, William R. Buckley <
> bill.buck...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient[...]
>>
>
> Turing's entire reason for inventing what we now call a Turing Machine was
> to prove that computational om
Hi meekerdb
Excellent point. My only answer is that the self or agent has to be a monad.
because only monads can perceive (although indirectly).
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: meekerdb
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-11, 18:2
Hi meekerdb
No, except in case anyone's interested, there is a hybrid,
which might have a future, the Rat Brain Robot
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1QPiF4-iu6g
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: meekerdb
Receiver: everything-list
Time:
Hi meekerdb
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: meekerdb
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-11, 18:14:45
Subject: Re: Leibniz on the uncons
Hi meekerdb
You're right, random shapes do not show evidence of intelligence.
But the carbon atom, being highly unlikely, does.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."
- Receiving the following cont
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 1:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hmmm... well the halting problem is that there is no *general* algorithm
> to decide wether or not a given program will stop
Yes.
> it doesn't state that there is no algorithm that can determine if a
> particular program will stop or no
On 8/14/2012 10:22 AM, Roger wrote:
Hi Jason Resch
No, the artificial man does not have a conscious self (subjectivity) to
experience (to feel) the world.
And you know this how?
You could show a movie of happenings
in his mind, but there'd be nobody there to watch it.
I don't think you can
John:
Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus universality, the
Turing machine
can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue of its
construction.
wrb
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of J
Oh. Monads. Well I'm glad we didn't leave the explanation in terms of something poorly
understood like 'agency'.
Brent
On 8/14/2012 10:34 AM, Roger wrote:
Hi meekerdb
Excellent point. My only answer is that the self or agent has to be a monad.
because only monads can perceive (although indire
On 8/14/2012 10:38 AM, Roger wrote:
Hi meekerdb
No,
Why not?
except in case anyone's interested, there is a hybrid,
which might have a future, the Rat Brain Robot
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1QPiF4-iu6g
So the neurons of a rat's brain can constitute a mind, but computer chips with the sa
On 8/14/2012 10:42 AM, Roger wrote:
Hi meekerdb
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could
function."
And I'd say why can't everything just function by itself? If "God" is just a placeholder
word for "whatever it is that makes things work" it doesn't a
Dear Roger,
It was not Bruno that wrote what you are attributing to him below.
It was me. I think that he might appreciate that you make attributions
correctly. Let me fix the attributions.
On 8/14/2012 7:36 AM, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Stephen P. King: This "musical score", does
On 8/14/2012 10:45 AM, Roger wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
Leibniz' best possible world is a conjecture
based on L's two worlds of logic:
1) There is logic that is either always true or false, called the
logic of reason or necessity.
One could call this "theory"
2) The logic of contingency, also ca
I think the limitation is better expressed as,
Halting problem - no one arbitrary algorithm can decide whether or not
another arbitrary algorithm will halt.
There are some cases, typically one to one, or one to some small and well
defined set, where decidability is
satisfied. There is no
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 11:16:47AM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote:
> John:
>
>
>
> Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus universality, the
> Turing machine
>
> can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue of its
> construction.
>
>
>
> wrb
John
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 2:07 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
> On 8/14/2012 10:45 AM, Roger wrote:
>
> Hi Stephen P. King
>
> Leibniz' best possible world is a conjecture
> based on L's two worlds of logic:
>
> 1) There is logic that is either always true or false, called the logic of
> reason or nece
On Saturday, August 11, 2012 3:01:41 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
> Roger,
>
> You say computers are quantitative instruments which cannot have a self or
> feelings, but might you be attributing things at the wrong level? For
> example, a computer can simulate some particle interactions, a suffici
On Tuesday, August 14, 2012 2:25:31 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
>
> So the neurons of a rat's brain can constitute a mind, but computer chips
> with the same functionality can't?
>
> Brent
>
It's begging the question to say the computer chips have 'the same
functionality' as a rat's brain and t
Dear Russell:
When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not
its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice.
wrb
> -Original Message-
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
> l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish
> Sen
On 8/14/2012 7:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 2:07 PM, Stephen P. King
mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:
On 8/14/2012 10:45 AM, Roger wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
Leibniz' best possible world is a conjecture
based on L's two worlds of logic:
1) There
On 8/14/2012 6:24 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, August 14, 2012 2:25:31 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
So the neurons of a rat's brain can constitute a mind, but computer chips
with the
same functionality can't?
Brent
It's begging the question to say the computer chips have 't
On 8/14/2012 7:22 PM, William R. Buckley wrote:
Dear Russell:
When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not
its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice.
Every machine that built itself was not built by Russell.
Brent
--
You received this message because yo
John Russell and Katharine Russell might not agree.
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 8:23 PM, meekerdb wrote:
> On 8/14/2012 7:22 PM, William R. Buckley wrote:
>
> Dear Russell:
>
> When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not
> its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your a
I have done exactly as I challenged Russell.
wrb
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Brian Tenneson
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 8:26 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible
John Russell and Ka
On 8/14/2012 8:35 PM, William R. Buckley wrote:
I have done exactly as I challenged Russell.
That you built a machine that built itself would imply that you built yourself. Which
implies you arose from nothing, otherwise there would have been a prior part of you which
you didn't build.
Bre
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 8:13 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, August 11, 2012 3:01:41 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>>
>> Roger,
>>
>> You say computers are quantitative instruments which cannot have a self
>> or feelings, but might you be attributing things at the wrong level? For
>> exampl
Ah, someone sharp enough to see the crux of the biscuit.
The machine has the interesting property that it can begin its behavior
with very much less than one half of itself still not constructed, and yet
it can with this small portion construct the remainder of its configuration.
Furthe
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