On 22 Sep 2009, at 23:32, m.a. wrote:
>
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "Bruno Marchal"
> To:
> Sent: Tuesday, September 22, 2009 10:36 AM
> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>
>
>
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> On 21 Sep 2009, at 23:48, m.a. wrote:
>>>
*And whe
On 22 Sep 2009, at 20:12, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 21 Sep, 08:58, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 20 Sep 2009, at 02:49, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> So does being "pure thought" mean "without a reference", i.e. a
>>> fiction? As in "Sherlock Holmes" is a pure thought?
>>
>> Consider the Ma
On 22 Sep 2009, at 19:07, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>>> On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>> You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does
>> not
>> invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?
>>
>
On 22 Sep 2009, at 20:15, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 19:08, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> 2009/9/22 Flammarion
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman wrote:
On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion wrote:
>>
> There is no problem attaching consc to PM.
>>
What do you mean by th
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion :
>
>>> So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original
>>> argument?
>> I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go.
>>
>>> You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
>>> cause consciousness. But did you also mean
2009/9/22 Flammarion :
>> So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original
>> argument?
>
> I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go.
>
>>You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
>> cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless
>
On 22 Sep, 19:56, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion :
>
> > since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing
> > to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would
> > be a property.
>
> In what might such attachment consist, in you view, beyond the mere
>
On 22 Sep, 21:53, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Well little problem in gmail sorry.
>
> So I do it again /o\
>
> Sorry I wanted to write "it does *add* nothing".
>
> Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can
> relate physically running a program on a computer, and run
On 13 Sep, 17:51, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/11 Flammarion :
>
> >> I'm not sure I see what distinction you're making. If as you say the
> >> realisation of computation in a physical system doesn't cause
> >> consciousness, that would entail that no physically-realised
> >> computation could
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal"
To:
Sent: Tuesday, September 22, 2009 10:36 AM
Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 21 Sep 2009, at 23:48, m.a. wrote:
>>
>>> *And when pressed as to exactly how the Heisenberg compensators
>>> w
Well little problem in gmail sorry.
So I do it again /o\
Sorry I wanted to write "it does *add* nothing".
Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can
relate physically running a program on a computer, and running it on an
abaccus, with a pen and a sheet of paper, in
Sorry I wanted to write "it does *add* nothing".
Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can
relate physically running a program on a computer, a
2009/9/22 Quentin Anciaux
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 22 Sep, 21:29, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> > 2009/9
2009/9/22 Flammarion
>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 21:29, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > 2009/9/22 Flammarion
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > > 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
> >
> > > > The level "0" has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true
> > > > by a computa
On 22 Sep, 21:29, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
>
> > > The level "0" has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true
> > > by a computational observer (us if CTM is true).
>
> > If a le
On 1 Sep, 18:35, David Nyman wrote:
> What this shows is that CTM and comp are not different, but rather
> that comp is CTM properly understood. Its 'supervention' on
> virtualisation - i.e. a bottomless stack as perceived from inside -
> means that demanding that it further supervene on dist
2009/9/22 Flammarion
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
>
> > The level "0" has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true
> > by a computational observer (us if CTM is true).
>
>
> If a level 0 is part of the standard package of materialism,
> it i
On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
> The level "0" has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true
> by a computational observer (us if CTM is true).
If a level 0 is part of the standard package of materialism,
it is testable because "small world" materia
2009/9/22 Flammarion :
> since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing
> to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would
> be a property.
In what might such attachment consist, in you view, beyond the mere
assertion of its possibility? Since you rule out intr
2009/9/22 Brent Meeker
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
> >
> >> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> >> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
> >
> >
> > You are in a third person way. If you are a
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
>
>> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
>> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>
>
> You are in a third person way. If you are a program relatively to any
> "real wor
On 22 Sep, 19:08, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion
>
>
>
> > On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman wrote:
> > > On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > > > There is no problem attaching consc to PM.
>
> > > What do you mean by this?
>
> > since PM notoriously has no intrinisc proper
On 22 Sep 2009, at 19:22, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 17:16, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 22 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
>>
> He goes on to conclude that I am being generat
On 21 Sep, 08:58, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 20 Sep 2009, at 02:49, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
> > So does being "pure thought" mean "without a reference", i.e. a
> > fiction? As in "Sherlock Holmes" is a pure thought?
>
> Consider the Many world theory of Everett, or the many histories of
> com
2009/9/22 Flammarion
>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman wrote:
> > On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion wrote:
> >
> > > There is no problem attaching consc to PM.
> >
> > What do you mean by this?
>
> since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing
> to stop qualia being attach
On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman wrote:
> On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > There is no problem attaching consc to PM.
>
> What do you mean by this?
since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing
to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would
be a pr
On 22 Sep, 17:16, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> >>> UD. That is not possible if the
> > On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
> You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not
> invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?
>
> >>> "Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to
On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion wrote:
> There is no problem attaching consc to PM.
What do you mean by this?
David
> On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > > He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> > > UD. Th
On 22 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
>>> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>>
>> You are in a
On 22 Sep 2009, at 17:18, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>>
You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not
invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?
>>
>>> "Instead of linking
On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> > UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>
> You are in a third person way.
That is still not possible if there
On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
You are in a third person way. If you are a program relatively to any
"real world", you are 'executed' infinitely of
On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >> You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not
> >> invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?
>
> > "Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a
> > machine
On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>> You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not
>> invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?
>
> "Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a
> machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to assoc
On 22 Sep 2009, at 08:37, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 21 Sep 2009, at 23:48, m.a. wrote:
>>
>>> *And when pressed as to exactly how the Heisenberg compensators
>>> worked, the spokesman replied, "Very well, thank you."*
>>
>> :)
>>
>> That's the problem. Star strek tele
On 22 Sep, 15:10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 10:50, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as
> > well as CTM.
>
> CTM needs Church thesis (to define the C of CTM). This requires
> Arithmetical Realism, that is the belief that classical logi
On 22 Sep 2009, at 10:57, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 18 Sep, 08:33, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I start from pure cognitive science. Saying "yes" to the doctor is
>> not
>> pure math.
>
> Saying yes to the doctor does not show
> that i am being run on an immateial UD.
That is why I use a ma
On 22 Sep 2009, at 10:50, Flammarion wrote:
> No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as
> well as CTM.
CTM needs Church thesis (to define the C of CTM). This requires
Arithmetical Realism, that is the belief that classical logic can be
applied in the number realm. (and there
On 22 Sep, 14:37, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion :
>
> >> But surely what is 'literally' the case depends critically on one's
> >> starting assumptions. If one starts with a theoretical commitment to
> >> the primacy of the physical, then the status of mathematics is
> >> obviously
2009/9/22 Flammarion :
>> But surely what is 'literally' the case depends critically on one's
>> starting assumptions. If one starts with a theoretical commitment to
>> the primacy of the physical, then the status of mathematics is
>> obviously rendered formal or metaphorical with respect to thi
On 22 Sep, 13:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Is mathematic dependant on human being from your point of view ?
>
> That's what I understand.
Yes, exactly.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything L
Is mathematic dependant on human being from your point of view ?
That's what I understand.
2009/9/22 Flammarion
>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 12:59, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > 2009/9/22 Flammarion
> >
> >
> >
> > > On 22 Sep, 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > > It does show that you're nothing more t
On 22 Sep, 12:59, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion
>
>
>
> > On 22 Sep, 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > It does show that you're nothing more than a program... which exists
> > > (mathematically) independantly of any of it's instantiation.
>
> > Such existence is blatant Plat
2009/9/22 Flammarion
>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > It does show that you're nothing more than a program... which exists
> > (mathematically) independantly of any of it's instantiation.
>
> Such existence is blatant Platonism.
>
No it's what a program is... Would you be di
Mirek,
I found Outlook Express, but there are no FOR-MIREK files there.
marty a.
- Original Message -
From: "Miroslav Dobsicek"
To:
Sent: Monday, Sept
On 22 Sep, 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> It does show that you're nothing more than a program... which exists
> (mathematically) independantly of any of it's instantiation.
Such existence is blatant Platonism.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message be
It does show that you're nothing more than a program... which exists
(mathematically) independantly of any of it's instantiation.
Regards,
Quentin
2009/9/22 Flammarion
>
>
>
> On 18 Sep, 08:33, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > I start from pure cognitive science. Saying "yes" to the doctor is not
>
Great. Thank you!
mirek
Wei Dai wrote:
> I've placed a compressed mbox file at
> http://www.ibiblio.org/weidai/everything-archive/. Add everything.bz2 to
> this path for the full URL. (I'm trying not to post the full URL directly so
> the email addresses inside won't get harvested by web robo
On 18 Sep, 08:33, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I start from pure cognitive science. Saying "yes" to the doctor is not
> pure math.
Saying yes to the doctor does not show
that i am being run on an immateial UD.
The existence of an immaterial UD needs
to be argued separately.
--~--~-~--~--
On 18 Sep, 00:31, David Nyman wrote:
> On Sep 17, 11:17 pm, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > > Has it? I thought we were discussing whether CTM made any meaningful
> > > commitments as a physical theory, not whether physics can or can't
> > > include consciousness per se. Now you raise the question,
On 18 Sep, 00:26, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/17 Flammarion :
>
> > Yep, and if the conclusion is ontological, the process that reaches it
> > is ontological.
>
> > Bruno thinks he can reach an ontological assumption starting with pure
> > maths.
> > But he can't. "mathematical existence" means
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