Re: [foar] COMP => no cloning?
On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 9:52:25 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > > On 3/25/2014 6:52 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: > > It is trivially a theorem of COMP, since the existence of such a > substitution level is the COMP axiom itself. If COMP is true, then the > substitution level is unknowable (although it can be honed in upon > scientifically). > > > I have trouble with this. How would you know if your consciousness were > different after the substitution? > COMP is a bet that, if you chose the substitution level correctly, that "you", whatever "you" are, will survive the substitution. You can consult friends, introspect, make any measurement or think any thought you could have beforehand. It's like a change of reference frame in relativity. How do you "know" that a boost leaves the laws of physics unchanged? You make any measurement you like, and verify it. You can't know that the boost didn't cause your brain to act in such a way that you "just imagined" that the laws of physics were the same, but this is really just the same as "the laws of physics are the same". > I generally don't know why thought A comes to me instead of thought B. I > can see that after the substitution you could ask your friends if you > seemed different and you could compare your remembered past actions and > feelings to present ones in similar circumstances; but it seems to me it > would be impossible to say with any confidence that you had "survived" as a > stream of consciousness. > I don't know what you mean by "stream of consciousness". How could you ever verify that your "stream of consciousness" is unbroken, even ignoring the COMP duplication? How you you know that this moment right now isn't the only "real" moment you've ever experienced, all the others being false memories? These distinctions are positivistically meaningless. > If your friends said to acted similar to before, maybe a little different, > couldn't it be with quite rather different internal narrative - just as a > good actor could pretend and act like you. > If the actor is good enough, it IS you. This reminds me of something Maudlin brought up in a review of Penrose's second consciousness book. He points out that OF COURSE a computer can be programmed to behave just like Penrose -- i.e. pass a Turing Test as Penrose, answering exactly how Penrose would answer. This is completely uncontroversial, and for me, it "proves" COMP scientifically. If an agent can pass the Turing Test, it is conscious -- this is what we mean when we call other agents conscious. In fact, this is how we verify that we have been conscious in the past -- by Turing Testing our memories of ourselves. > Brent > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [foar] COMP => no cloning?
Thanks Bruno. On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 4:34:43 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote: > > > > > On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 4:48 PM, Quentin Anciaux > > > wrote: > >> >> >> >> 2014-03-25 21:37 GMT+01:00 Richard Ruquist >> >: >> >> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal >>> >>> > wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 24 Mar 2014, at 20:18, Richard Ruquist wrote: >>>> >>>> Bruno, >>>> >>>> How does cloning differ from "asking the doctor". >>>> Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory- >>>> just to indicate that this is an important question. >>>> >>>> >>>> No problem: I love all questions :) >>>> >>>> The non cloning theorem says that you cannot copy exactly a *quantum >>>> state*. Note that you can still teleport it quantum mechanically, but you >>>> have to detsroy "the original". >>>> >>>> But nobody pretends that your mind needs your exact quantum state. It >>>> needs only a substitution level, which is usually estimate to be at a >>>> quite >>>> higher level than the quantum state. >>>> >>>> You cannot clone this or that exemplary of "Alice in Wonderland", but >>>> it is easy to make a copy of its classical information content, which is >>>> way above the quantum level defining the "material" book. >>>> >>> >>> Bruno, My concern is at what level is consciousness. I suspect that if >>> it is below the substitution level, then consciousness will not be >>> transmitted >>> >> >> Consciousness is always *at* the substitution level by definition of what >> is a "substitution level"... the definition of the substitution level is >> the level at which your consciousness is invariant (you don't feel a >> change) if implemented on a "digital brain"/computer... so by definition >> your consciousness is preserved at the substitution level as low it can >> be... (and it exists if computationalism is true...). >> > "Consciousness is Invariant at the Substitution level" > Sounds like a theorem. Can you link me to its proof? > It is trivially a theorem of COMP, since the existence of such a substitution level is the COMP axiom itself. If COMP is true, then the substitution level is unknowable (although it can be honed in upon scientifically). > Richard > >> >> Quentin >> >> >>> >>>> All the same with this present post. Once send it will be multiplied, >>>> without any information loss, to all participant to this forum. >>>> >>> >>> Right, except that I suspect that the post is not conscious. >>> >>> >>>> Now, I should add that the consequence of comp remains correct, even if >>>> our substitution level is sub quantum, and asks for the total quantum >>>> state. WHY? because the consequences depends only on step 7, which does >>>> not >>>> use any duplication of any states, but only their multi-preparation, which >>>> is done automatically by the arithmetical reality, or the Universal >>>> Dovetailer. Only the pedagogical step 1-6 are no more available except ... >>>> as pedagogical steps. But a majority of people believe that the brain, >>>> although plausibly a quantum object, works at a much higher level, so I >>>> don't insist so much on this, given that we get a non-cloning result >>>> directly by comp. >>>> >>>> OK? >>>> >>> >>> Right, and I suspect that consciousness could be duplicated >>> if the consciousness level is at or above the substitution level. >>> Seems we have several levels: >>> the particle and quantum levels, and the consciousness and the >>> substitution level, The conscious level is fixed by nature. >>> The substitution level seems to be fixed by mathematics. >>> They both may be the same: nature and math, that is. >>> Richard >>> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Richard >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal >>>> >>>> > wrot
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 8:23:10 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 07:34:56PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > > > Unless, indeed, or just in part, but he acknowledged my work in some > > draft he sent me, then they disappeared in the public version, > > making him either a coward, or an opportunist or both. (Or under > > influence, as it is easy to defame to me to a physicist by saying I > > am wrong on Gödel, and to a logician that I am mad in physics (like > > "pretending that I "believe" in "parallel world", that's enough). > > > > Which aspect of your work did he acknowledge in the draft? Was it the > FPI result? If it was, he possibly changed it to cite Everett, who > conceivably was the first to come up with that mechanism for deriving > subjective indeteminism from a deterministic theory. That was the > implication in the video clip we watched recently. I wouldn't argue it > either way, historically. > > That still leaves your FPI contribution as original in the > computationalist setting, as Everett is not explicitly > computationalist. Everett is explicitly computationalist. He identifies the observer with an "automaton" whose memory can be identified with some finite amount of information. He just didn't carry the logic nearly as far as Bruno. (He was martyred anyway.) But for Max's purposes, he assumes the Hilbert space > is fundamental, so only needs Everett. > > Cheers > -- > > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.au > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Quick question
So is physics best understood as a computer program with access to a random oracle? (Coming from 1-indeterminacy.) On Mar 31, 2013 8:13 AM, "Bruno Marchal" wrote: > > On 31 Mar 2013, at 01:15, Joseph Knight wrote: > > Sorry for the vagueness of my question; I would not count pi as a physical > constant. I would count the empirically determined circumference:diameter > ratio for a circle in our observed curved spacetime as a physical constant. > > The reason I asked is because Bruno has repeatedly claimed that > COMP=>"noncomputability of physics" but I'm wondering what exactly this > would mean in practice. > > > In practice it would mean that some phenomena are not predictible or > computable. Russell and Brent are right, it comes from the FPI (first > person indeterminacy) which introduces "genuine randomness" in the first > person experience. > In fact that randomness might be so great as leading to the "white > rabbits", and with comp it is astonishing that the world around us seems so > much computable. But the redundancy of the UD, and the constraints of > correct self-reference add much structure, and if comp is true, that should > be enough. The non computable sequence will still have computable > distribution, like with QM, when, for example, we send a sheaf of electron > is the 1/sqrt(2)(up + down) on a up/down Stern-Gerlach analyser. From the > first person perspective, this leads to uncomputable sequence of events > (even incompressible strings of up and down), but statistically, with > Avogadro-like numbers of particles, the electronic sheaf will just split in > symmetrical halves, like the big number statistical laws predict. > > It is an open problem if there are non computable constants in nature, as > it is an open problem if some oracle might play a role in the development > of the appearance of physical laws in the UD (or in arithmetic). That seems > unlikely, but who knows? As Brent says, that would be hard to test, but it > might make some sense from theoretical assumption, both in comp-physics, > and in theoretical physics. Note that it is easy to build a non computable > solution to the SWE (something like Ae^ikHt, with k a non computable > number, but it is impossible to test the non computability of such wave in > case they occur. Machines can prove only the individual incompressibility > of a *finite* number of strings. > > Bruno > > > > On Mar 30, 2013 6:53 PM, "Russell Standish" wrote: > >> On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 04:15:54PM -0700, Joseph Knight wrote: >> > True or False: COMP implies that any fundamental physical constant is >> non >> > computable? >> > >> >> I would say false, unless you can say that pi is _not_ a physical >> constant. Another example that springs to mind is the magnetic moment >> of the neutron which is definitely physical, but maybe not fundamental. >> >> -- >> >> >> >> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) >> Principal, High Performance Coders >> Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au >> University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/53ZNGv7qPpo/unsubscribe?hl=en >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List&quo
Re: Quick question
Sorry for the vagueness of my question; I would not count pi as a physical constant. I would count the empirically determined circumference:diameter ratio for a circle in our observed curved spacetime as a physical constant. The reason I asked is because Bruno has repeatedly claimed that COMP=>"noncomputability of physics" but I'm wondering what exactly this would mean in practice. On Mar 30, 2013 6:53 PM, "Russell Standish" wrote: > On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 04:15:54PM -0700, Joseph Knight wrote: > > True or False: COMP implies that any fundamental physical constant is non > > computable? > > > > I would say false, unless you can say that pi is _not_ a physical > constant. Another example that springs to mind is the magnetic moment > of the neutron which is definitely physical, but maybe not fundamental. > > -- > > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/53ZNGv7qPpo/unsubscribe?hl=en > . > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Quick question
True or False: COMP implies that any fundamental physical constant is non computable? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Re: [FOM] From theorems of infinity to axioms of infinity
It's a good discussion. In fact I've been independently thinking about the matter of Dedekind's original argument as it's discussed in Webb's book "Mechanism, Mentalism, and Metamathematics" (a book Bruno has referred to multiple times on this list). Does anyone know of other attempts to prove the existence of infinite sets, unrelated to Dedekind? It seems like the truth or value of axioms (of infinity or otherwise) should be judged by their fruitfulness in "ordinary" mathematical reasoning. In this sense their truth may be understood "inductively". [Harvey Friedman has spent decades showing that several "natural" and "concrete" mathematical statements are not only independent of ZFC but require certain large cardinal axioms. In short, the existence of (massively!) infinitary objects has consequences for finitary mathematical questions. Friedman predicts that these statements will become a mainstream component of future mathematics, requiring the adoption of the large cardinal axioms.I recommend this YouTube video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NAGQD-bSXok] On Wednesday, March 20, 2013 11:37:58 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > Hi Folks, > > I apologize for crossforwarding a post, but this one is too good to > not... > > > Original Message Subject: Re: [FOM] From theorems of > infinity to axioms of infinity Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2013 22:23:27 -0400 > (EDT) From: Timothy Y. ChowReply-To: > tc...@alum.mit.edu , Foundations of Mathematics >To: f...@cs.nyu.edu > > I've found the responses to Michael Detlefsen's original question very > interesting and educational. Before the thread diverges completely onto a > different track, though, I'd like to comment on one issue that Detlefsen > implicitly raised in his original post. > > Michael Detlefsen wrote: > > Problem: Dedekind's "proof" of the assertion of the > > existence of an infinite collection is flawed, perhaps > > fatally so. > > > > Solution: Make the proposition purportedly proved by > > Dedekind's flawed proof an axiom! > > > > I'm guessing I'm not the only one who finds this a little > > funny, and a little bewildering. > > This seems funny *if* you equate the *desire to provide a proof* for > something with *a worry that it might be proved false*. That is, if you > think that the reason Russell and others felt an urge to provide proofs > for the axiom of infinity was that they *doubted its truth* and therefore > did not want to accept it without proof, then it is certainly bewildering > to observe them accepting the statement as an axiom when the proofs fell > through, rather than treating the statement as an open question. > > But I think that the desire to provide a proof isn't always motivated by > doubt, and the axiom of infinity is just an example of that. For another > example, consider Euclid's parallel postulate. For a long time, many > people struggled to prove it from the other axioms. None of them ever > doubted that it was true. They just had a strong intuition that it should > follow from the other axioms and that postulating it separately was > redundant and inelegant. > > Similarly, Russell never doubted the axiom of infinity, but just had a > strong intuition that it was redundant to postulate it separately. When > this intuition proved to be wrong, it should not be bewildering to find > him effectively shrugging his shoulders and saying, "Oh well, I guess > we'll just have to postulate it separately after all." > > The difference between wanting proof and having doubt can be seen even in > the context of famous conjectures, e.g., P != NP or the Riemann > hypothesis. Although there is not quite enough consensus about these > statements for them to achieve axiomatic status, in practice they are > treated much like axioms, in that people feel free to assume them whenever > they need to. There's still an intense desire to find proofs for them, > even among people who are totally convinced that the statements are true. > > Tim > ___ > FOM mailing listf...@cs.nyu.edu > http://www.cs.nyu.edu/mailman/listinfo/fom > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Born Rule in MWI
On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 10:56 PM, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/21/2013 7:10 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: > > Question: Why is the "derivation"* of the Born Rule in (Everett, 1957) not > considered satisfactory**? > > *Everett shows that the amplitude-squared rule for subjective > probability is the only measure consistent with an agreeable additivity > condition. > > > Gleason's theorem is to the same effect. But both start with the > assumption that the wave-function amplitude determines the probability - > and then they show it must be via the Born rule. > OK, I see, thanks. I suppose then that the decision-theory derivation drops this assumption? > Brent > > > **It is apparently not satisfactory because there have been multiple > later attempts to derive the Born Rule from certain other (e.g., > decision-theoretic) assumptions in an Everett framework (Deutsch, Wallace). > I have not yet studied these later works so cannot yet comment on them (but > would appreciate any remarks/opinions that Everything-listers have to > offer). > > -- > Joseph Knight -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > No virus found in this message. > Checked by AVG - www.avg.com > Version: 2013.0.2899 / Virus Database: 2639/6117 - Release Date: 02/19/13 > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Born Rule in MWI
Question: Why is the "derivation"* of the Born Rule in (Everett, 1957) not considered satisfactory**? *Everett shows that the amplitude-squared rule for subjective probability is the only measure consistent with an agreeable additivity condition. **It is apparently not satisfactory because there have been multiple later attempts to derive the Born Rule from certain other (e.g., decision-theoretic) assumptions in an Everett framework (Deutsch, Wallace). I have not yet studied these later works so cannot yet comment on them (but would appreciate any remarks/opinions that Everything-listers have to offer). -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Autonomy?
While I agree about the judicial system, any system worth having should not hinge upon metaphysical conclusions regarding free will. It's bizarre (and somewhat anti-democratic) to say that we can or should argue for/against some political issue on this basis. The underlying assumption seems to be that the judicial system is somehow "just" in the event that we really do have free will, which is hilariously naive. On Mon, Jun 4, 2012 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb wrote: > My friend Vic Stenger has written a blog on free will, mostly in > response to Sam Harris > > > http://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/free-will-is-an-illusion_b_1562533.html?ref=science > (don't bother to read the comments) > > Vic suggests dropping the term 'free will' and using the term 'autonomy' > to refer to the social/legal concept of acting free of coercion. > > And Jerry Coyne has also commented. > > > http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2012/06/04/victor-stenger-and-janna-levin-on-our-lack-of-free-will/ > (do read the comments) > > He is strictly a determinist and denies the implication of compatibilism > that there some 'free will' (or autonomy) worth having. But interestingly > both he and Vic conclude that this implies we need to overhaul our judicial > system, while Harris is not so sure. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: free will and mathematics
On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:52 PM, John Clark wrote: > > On Sun, May 27, 2012 Aleksandr Lokshin wrote: > > > All main mathematical notions ( such as infinity, variable, integer >> number) implicitly >> depend on the notion of free will. > > > Because nobody can explain what the ASCII string "free will" means the > above statement is of no value. > Precisely. The original poster should introduce some sensible definition of free will. Good luck! > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The limit of all computations
On Tue, May 22, 2012 at 11:08 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: > On 5/22/2012 10:56 AM, Joseph Knight wrote: > > > > On Tue, May 22, 2012 at 7:36 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: > >> On 5/21/2012 6:26 PM, Russell Standish wrote: >> >> snip >> >> Hi Russell, >> >> I once thought that consistency, in mathematics, was the indication >> of existence but situations like this make that idea a point of >> contention... CH and AoC <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom_of_choice>are >> two axioms associated with ZF set theory that have lead some people >> (including me) to consider a wider interpretation of mathematics. What if >> all possible consistent mathematical theories must somehow exist? >> > > Joel David Hamkins introduced the "set-theoretic multiverse" idea > (link<http://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223>). > The abstract reads: > > "The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in this > article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each > instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, > in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with > a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every > set-theoretic question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I > argue, explains our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic > possibilities, a phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In > particular, I argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the > multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the > multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner > formerly hoped for." > > > Hi Joseph, > > Thank you for this comment and link! Do you think that there is a > possibility of an "invariance theory", like Special relativity but for > mathematics, at the end of this chain of reasoning? > I am doubtful, simply because, for example, the Continuum Hypothesis and its negation are both consistent with ZF set theory. Ditto for the axiom of choice, of course. I find it fascinating that, at this level of the foundations of mathematics, mathematics becomes almost an intuitive science. Questions are asked such as: *Ought *the axiom of choice be true? Are its consequences in line with how we intuit sets to behave? This is the intersection of minds and mathematics. > My thinking is that any form of consciousness or theory of knowledge has > to assume that there is something meaningful to the idea that knowledge > implies agency <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency_%28philosophy%29> and > intention <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intention/>... > > > > >> >> >> Its one reason why Bruno would like to restrict ontology to machines, >> or at most integers - echoing Kronecker's quotable "God made the >> integers, all else is the work of man". >> >> >> >> >> I understand that, but this choice to restrict makes Bruno's >> Idealism even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are given >> such special status, especially when we cast aside all possibility (within >> our ontology) of the "reality" of the physical world? Without the physical >> world to act as a "selection" mechanism for what is "Real", why the bias >> for integers? This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to >> no avail. >> > > I think Bruno gives such high status to the natural numbers because they > are perhaps the least-doubt-able mathematical entities there are. The very > fact that talks of a "set-theoretic multiverse" exist makes one ask, how > real are sets? Do set theories tell us more about our minds than they do > about the mathematical world? (Obviously, as David Lewis pointed out, you > need something like a set theory in order to do mathematics at all, and as > Russell says, for the average mathematician it really doesn't matter.) > > > My skeptisism centers on the ambiguity of the metric that defines "the > least-doubt-able mathematical entities there are". > I understand. At the end of the day, it may be up to the individual to decide what is doubt-able and what is not. > We operate as if there is a clear domain of meaning to this phrase and yet > are free to range outside it at will without self-contradiction. Set > theory, whether implicit of explicitly acknowledged seems to be a > requirement for communication of the 1st person content. Is it necessary > for consciousness itself? Might consciousness, boiled down to its essence, > be the act of making a dist
Re: The limit of all computations
g like that to > Quentin and was rebuffed... I wrote it incorrectly it appears... > > > Of course in Fortran, it means something entirely different: it > renames a type, much like the typedef statement of C. Sorry, that was > a digression. > > > That's OK. ;-) I suppose that it is a blessing to be able to "think in > code". ;-) > > > > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." > ~ Francis Bacon > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 4, 2012, at 1:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
> 2012/4/4 Bruno Marchal
>
> On 04 Apr 2012, at 18:26, John Clark wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> > You confuse "consciousness of being here and now" with "consciousness
>> > would be here and now".
>>
>> How in the world could anybody be confused by a idea stated as crystal
>> clearly as you just did ?
>
> You can be conscious of being here and now. That expression is traditional,
> and used in many place, and we have already used it to illustrate the fact
> that the cnscious feeling "here and now" is undoubtable, as opposed to the
> idea that being conscious five minutes ago and five minutes from now is
> already doubtable, and you did agree.
>
> I was just saying that consciousness of a localization does not entail the
> localization of consciousness. You argument was confusing those two different
> thing. We agree that consciousness is not something localisable, but this
> does not entail that we cannot have a conscious experience of being localised
> somewhere, like when we say "I visited Bombay last week-end".
>
>
>
>>
>>> >> And the only answer you can receive will come from a trivial
>>> >> application of the anthropic principle, "I will become the Moscow man if
>>> >> events transpire so that I meet the definition of the Moscow man, namely
>>> >> that I see Moscow".
>>
>>
>> > Which avoids again to answer to the question asked.
>>
>> The reason I'm not the Moscow man is that I'm the Washington man and the
>> reason I'm the Washington man is that I saw Washington and the probability
>> the Helsinki man will see Moscow and Washington is 100%. What more is there
>> to say on this rather dull subject?
>
> That you give the probability that the guy will be in W and M from a third
> person point of view, when we ask the probability on his future first person
> point of view. the criteria of confirmation is given, by definition, from the
> result of the self-localization provided by the persons after their
> duplication.
> In that case, it cannot be 100%, because the guy in M does not feel himself
> to be in W, and vice versa.
> You still confuse the 3-view on the 1-views (an outsider can ascribe the
> consciousness of John K Clark to both persons in each city), with the 1-views
> on the 1-views ("Ah, I see I am the one in W" and "Ah, I see I am the one in
> M"). In Helsinki, he could not know in advance which one he can happen to be.
> If you think he could, give me the algorithm.
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> >> I repeat yet again, give me a single concrete example of two things
>> >> being identical by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views themselves" and
>> >> you will have won this argument
>>
>>
>> > I have been duplicated in W and M and I feel myself in W.
>> or
>> I have been duplicated in W and M and i feel myself in M.
>> Those are different in the 1-views (as different as seeing M and seeing W),
>>
>> Right.
>>
>> > But are equal in the 3-view, where I am in both cities.
>>
>> WRONG! From my 3-view I can clearly see that the brain of Bruno Washington
>> is different from the brain of Bruno Moscow, one has memories, that is to
>> say physical changes in the brain, of the sights and sounds of Washington
>> while the other has brain changes signifying the sights and sounds of
>> Moscow; because of the changes in physical structure the two brains operate
>> differently, or to say the same thing with different words, I the third
>> party can see that the mind of Bruno Washington is different from the mind
>> of Bruno Moscow. Provided that Washington is different from Moscow (I've
>> never been to Moscow but I imagine that it is) then the brain of Bruno
>> Washington is physically different from the brain of Bruno Moscow, and I the
>> third party observer can see those physical differences, and if the
>> construction of those two objects are different then the way they operate,
>> the mind, is different too.
>
> But this contradict the fact that you agree both person are the Helsinki guy.
> You are again transforming "I cannot know for sure I will feel myself in W or
> M" with I can be sure that the guy in M will see M and the guy in W will see
> W, which is does not answer the question in asked to him in Helsinki.
>
>
>
>>
>> Try again. Give me a single concrete example of two things being identical
>> by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views themselves" and you will have won
>> this argument.
>>
>> >> Who cares? How is it relevant to the copies if the original is cut or
>> >> not cut as long as he's read?
>>
>> > If the original is cut, the probability to wake up at Helsinki is 0.
>>
>> But the Helsinki man is not a copy, it's irrelevant to the copies in Moscow
>> and Washington what happens to the original.
>
> Of course, but the question is asked before the reading is done. The question
> is aske
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On Fri, Mar 23, 2012 at 5:12 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: > On 3/23/2012 3:44 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: > > > > On Thu, Mar 22, 2012 at 6:40 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: > >> On 3/21/2012 8:16 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tue, Mar 20, 2012 at 10:25 AM, Stephen P. King >> wrote: >> >>> >>> Dear Joseph, >>> >>> How do numbers implement that necessary capacity to define each >>> other and themselves? What kind of relational structure is necessary? From >>> what I can tell, it looks like a "net of Indra" where every jewel, here a >>> number, reflects all others. This is a non-well founded structure. >>> >> >> You'll have to be more explicit than this if I am to make any sense of >> it. >> >> >> Dear Joseph, >> >> I first must say that I appreciate very much this exchange as it >> forces me to better refine my wordings and explanations. In the passage >> above I was trying to get at something that I see in the implied structure >> of numbers, given Bruno's amazing ideas. Remember, I "think in pictures", >> so the relations between numbers - with their Goedelizations and Loeb >> references - is to me a network where any one entity - here an integer - is >> defined by and related to all others. It looks like the structure of an >> infinite Webster Dictionary! What I also see is that the "links" are not >> of a constant length - some connections between numbers are tiny - like the >> link between prime pairs - while others are infinitely long. What I am >> trying to point out is that this structure, is very much* unlike* the >> structure that we think of when we just consider the "number line" where >> such a line is made up only of integers - 0, 1, 2, 3, ... >> > > This is all nice, but I can't understand it unless you give make this > more formal/precise. > > > Do you only think in words? I'm just curious... I will try harder to > sketch the idea in words for you. > I do tend to think more in words or symbols than in pictures, but my intent here is really just to get a precise understanding of what you are saying. I hope you agree that this is necessary! > > Think of how Goedelizations and Goedel numbers work as a visual > picture, perhaps as a poitrait by Matisse or Dali. We have a string of > numbers that "represents" another set of numbers *and* some arithmetic > operation on those numbers. Any such Goedel number is thus the equivalent > to a "handle" on the "space" of numbers (which is, by definition, a one > dimensional manifold <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curve#Topology>, also > see 1 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evenly_spaced_integer_topology> and > 2<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_sets#Topological_spaces>), > therefore if it is possible to have an infinity of goedel numbers in the > integers then the resulting manifold would an infinity of handles (disjoint > manifolds) on it. How many unique paths would exist on such a manifold? > What is the "average" length of a path? (Please recall the fact that a > handle can have any size iff it is simply connected and analytic) There is > no such an average for the only faithful sample of the set of possible > lengths of paths is the set itself (infinite sets are isomorphic to any of > their proper subsets). > Remember that we can also have goedel numbers operating on (mapping > into) dovetailed strings of goedel numbers and goedel numbers can have > arbitrarily long number string lengths.. This makes the dimension of > this manifold to be infinite because of the disjointness of the "handles" > that are induced by the Goedelizing, thus making it (modulo the > requirements of spaces to exist) an infinite space. It is only if the > requirements of a > space<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_%28mathematics%29>not being met that > this would not occur. Given that a geodelization > introduces arithmetic into the set of numbers then is automatically > qualifies a goedelized number line to be the dual of a space (via the Stone > representation > theorem<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stone_representation_theorem> > ). > Thanks for being explicit. But as I have said before, you fail to convince me of the relevance of these mathematical gymnastics. I can see what you are saying, but it does not seem insightful to me. > > QED. > > The visual mode and the symbol mode of languages seem to have a > strange conjugacy > > > > > >> Numbers as Bruno is considering
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
ctionalism vs nominalism > vs Platonism in mathematics. > > > > I will! Thank you for this reference. Done. I am awaiting the approval > of the moderator. > > > >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> and there is no such thing as a space or time. >>>> >>> >>> Where? >>> >>> >>> How is the notion of >>> space<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space#Philosophy_of_space>coded in >>> numbers? People argue that we can recover a notion of time from >>> the well order of integers, but what about spaces? How do we get those? >>> >> >> I don't think you are going to derive the subjective experience of time >> from the well-ordering of integers. >> >> >> I agree, but some people do actually argue that they can! >> >> >> >> We agree that we have a many-body problem here, although not the >> ordinary one. It is the problem of how, if you and I are just tiny slivers >> of Platonia experiencing itself, we can still interact with one another in >> the stable, well-behaved physical universe we observe. It's a staggeringly >> beautiful fact that this happens. Whence Time? Whence Space? It would take >> an incredible effort to come close to an answer here. It may or may not be >> worth it. The point here is that COMP ensures that this is true. >> >> >> Maybe the answer is very simple. We are finite slivers of Platonia >> experiencing ourselves and each other, but we do so because for every >> Boolean algebra (representing a world of possible experience) there exists >> a space as its dual. >> > > You refer to Pratt's work. It seems like an interesting metaphor, but I > don't see how it solves the problem. Could you be more explicit? The > "rational mechanics" paper takes, IMO, some odd and unjustified leaps when > it comes to his definitions. (An example: he says that the categories SET > and SET^OP "represent respectively the physical and the mental." How???) > > > Did you read the entire paper? He does explain this on page 4 for > example using functions and antifunctions... The key is to not think of > bodies and minds as "things" but as processes. Pratt is considering a > "process dualism", not a "substance dualism" as he points out that the > notion of substance is the fatal flaw of Descartes' program. I was > originally looking at Leibniz' Monadology in my study of the mind body > problem and found a similar solution, but such required a rehabilitation of > Leibniz' "pre-established harmony" concept. (Basically, we would replace > his idea of a global fiat regime of synchronizations between the monads > with a "ongoing process" idea using concepts from quantum game theory. I > have found similar ideas in the work of Lee Smolin, Stuart > Kaufmann<http://www.amazon.com/At-Home-Universe-Self-Organization-Complexity/dp/0195111303/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1332256837&sr=1-1>and > David Deutsch. But that is not sufficient to make it "true". It is just > a "crazy idea" at this point.) > Yes, I understand what the constructs are, and I see how Pratt is making an interesting analogy, but I don't see the justification for his conclusions about the mind-body problem. But I haven't finished grokking the article. -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 10:11 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: No, my critique is that you seem to not see a problem with the fact > that COMP shows that the physical world is epiphenomena and thus > unnecessary. I see this as denying the mere possibility of observational > falsification. AS I have said before, you seem to reason as if the your > chalkboard (as the one in your picture > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/courses/Saturday_20070602_LNash/t_blackboard_1.png) > does not really exist. If you say that the physical world does exist but > only as a collective hallucination or dream, but if I understand the Bp&p > concept correctly, this is not quite right as it makes the possibility of > relationship between bodies epiphenomena. Ummm, I need to understand the > role of the "Girard-Abramski like theory" with COMP. > Stephen, I am starting to think that you have fundamentally misunderstood the UDA. You have repeatedly voiced this misconception, that COMP implies that the physical world does not exist. It exists, but it is not fundamental. It is still phenomenal. I will respond to your other message shortly, and discuss the issue of communicability and the need for physical instantiation a little more. > > > > > > > which is exactly what we are claiming when we say that "... our > generalized brains ..." are this and that, such as what is implied by > "...the latter is just a restatement of the former." The point is that we > first need to dig a bit deeper and establish by natural mathematical means > that 1) digital substitution is a sound mathematical concept and 2) that it > is possible. > > > 1) Yes, thanks to the notion of level, digital substitution is well > defined, and sound (if the level is correctly chosen). > > > Yes, and this makes it "local" not "global" and thus is not consistent > with a representation in Platonic terms. > > > UDA shows the passage from local to global. Why and how it occurs. You > lost me. > > > Could you be more specific? Are you thinking of UDA3? But is this > global plurality not collapsed in UDA4 and UDA5? Let me be clear about what > I am thinking with regards to the words local and global. By "Global" I > mean pertaining to all of a collection of many from any kind of > partitioning on the collection. By "local" I mean pertaining to a > collection from only one partitioning of the collection. For example, in > physics, an effect is global if it is invariant to shifts from one point of > view to another, the potential of the electromagnetic field is a good > example. In physics, an effect is local if it vanishes when one shifts to a > different point of view. > > > > > 2) That it is (in principle) possible *is* the comp assumption. > > > OK, but you are assuming more. You are assuming that computations have > particular and definite properties merely because they are true, > > > "true" does not apply to computations, but to proposition. > > > This does not change the implication of what I wrote. You are still > thinking that mere existence defines properties. My claim is that this is > ontologically and epistemologically incoherent as it implies that the > difference of the properties that one object X has from the properties that > another object Y has follows merely from the existence of X and Y. How does > the mere existence of X and Y require that X and Y are different at all? > > > > > > you are claiming implicitly that properties supervene on the soundness > of the object having such properties. > > > > "sound" applies to "theories", not to object. > > > OK. So we say that if there is a sound theory of an object then the > object must exist? I am just trying to be sure I understand. > > > > > This is, I claim, equivalent to postulating the existence of a Universal > Observer that can somehow percieve all UTM strings and define by fiat which > are equivalent to which > > > You miss the 1-indeterminacy here. We don't need to know which > computations are equivalent or not, because we live them. > > > No, I was considering how you assume that properties follow from mere > existence. You are thinking of theories as constructions to define the > existence of an object, say a computation, and then forgetting that you > constructed the theory that implied the properties of the object so that > you can claim "look it exists and has properties completely independent of > me". This is just the logical conclusion of thinking that computations are > independent of the necessity of any physical implementation. This is one > piece of your thinking that upsets me, you are taking the universality > concept too far. > > > > > without having to actually implement all of them > > > by step 8. > > > Again, just because a computation does not require a particular > physical implementation does not make it independent of the need for at > least one implementation. To claim the contrary is equivalent to talking > about things that you cannot
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 at 9:42 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: > On 3/19/2012 3:16 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: > > > > On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 at 12:20 AM, Stephen P. King > wrote: > >> On 3/18/2012 11:49 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 10:38 PM, Stephen P. King > > wrote: >> >>> >>> Dear Joseph, >>> >>> Could you elaborate exactly where this is covered in the COMP >>> hypothesis such that it (continuity) is not something that is eliminated in >>> UDA 8? >>> >> >> What do you mean by continuity here -- continuity of observer moments? >> >> ** >> Dear Joseph, >> >> Yes, the continuity of observer moments. What defines the order of an >> arbitrary string of OMs? What topology do these strings have? What about >> situations where we have many strings of observer moments that connect >> laterally with other strings? You are, after all, going to model multiple >> observer and interactions, no? Bruno has repeatedly discussed how COMP >> reduces physics to a computational many bodies problem. How do you propose >> to solve this problem? I have a proposal in mind. ;-) But it only works in >> a non-Platonic setting. >> ** >> > > I agree that this is an important, and fascinating problem. As Bruno says, > COMP is a problem, not a solution. But from what I have seen of your > proposals (and I confess that I do not fully understand it/them), they seem > to ignore the non-physicalist conclusion of the UDA. Well, something is > wrong here. > > > Dear Joseph, > > Bruno argues that COMP proves that the physical world is "just a dream > of numbers", this is ideal monism ala Berkeley. > Could you explain to me what ideal monism is and why COMP leads to it? > I take COMP as a proof that material monism is a false ontological theory, > but this does not take ideal monism off the hook, for it has a serious > problem of its own: It fails to allow for any explanations of the causal > efficacy of matter, the co-called "body problem". > How do you know? On the contrary, if COMP really does lead to ideal monism, then indeed ideal monism *must *allow for explanations of the "causal efficacy of matter". > As a student of philosophy I find that there always is a solution but we > need to press harder and ask better questions. > > > > > > >> >> >> If we admit a digital substitution, it follows that the "data" for our >> generalized brains can be copied and pasted at will. In fact, the latter is >> just a restatement of the former. >> >> ** >> Iff a digital substitution is in principle even possible! >> > > Bingo. We assume it is possible. If it's not, then COMP is false and we > can talk about something else. Your knowledge of mathematics is impressive, > but you have again failed to convince me of its relevance here. I don't > need to know about surgery on manifolds, or the surreal numbers, to know > that digital information can be duplicated. > > > We can duplicate classical digital information, yes indeed, but if > there is any thing at all that is quantum about consciousness then it > cannot be faithfully duplicated. > The UDA does not depend on this. > There are many arguments about how the brain is a classical machine and > those are fine but if you examine them they all seem to be narrowly focused > on some particular aspect of brain physiology. Max Tegmark's paper focused > on ion transport. > Wrong. Tegmark's result is *very *general because it shows that decoherence timescales are *many *orders of magnitude smaller than those of brain functioning (neuron firing, etc.). > Resent research has proven that quantum effects are indeed used by organic > systems to increase their efficiency in energy conversion processes, > Indeed, for biophysical systems whose relevant timescales are comparable to those of decoherence. > and we have barely scratched the surface, so why are we so eager to go all > in with the assumptions about classicality? > I for one am not so eager. I am neutral on whether consciousness is related to quantum phenomena, in spite of the contravening evidence. In fact, I am probably more open to the idea than the average commentator. But it doesn't matter in this context. > Maybe we just want a solution that we can point to and say "aha, there it > is, I don't need to worry any more about that..." > > > > > >> Cutting and pasting at will requires the existence of a structure to be >> acted upon and an action to carry out the c
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 at 12:20 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: > On 3/18/2012 11:49 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: > > > > On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 10:38 PM, Stephen P. King > wrote: > >> >> Dear Joseph, >> >> Could you elaborate exactly where this is covered in the COMP >> hypothesis such that it (continuity) is not something that is eliminated in >> UDA 8? >> > > What do you mean by continuity here -- continuity of observer moments? > > ** > Dear Joseph, > > Yes, the continuity of observer moments. What defines the order of an > arbitrary string of OMs? What topology do these strings have? What about > situations where we have many strings of observer moments that connect > laterally with other strings? You are, after all, going to model multiple > observer and interactions, no? Bruno has repeatedly discussed how COMP > reduces physics to a computational many bodies problem. How do you propose > to solve this problem? I have a proposal in mind. ;-) But it only works in > a non-Platonic setting. > ** > I agree that this is an important, and fascinating problem. As Bruno says, COMP is a problem, not a solution. But from what I have seen of your proposals (and I confess that I do not fully understand it/them), they seem to ignore the non-physicalist conclusion of the UDA. Well, something is wrong here. > > > If we admit a digital substitution, it follows that the "data" for our > generalized brains can be copied and pasted at will. In fact, the latter is > just a restatement of the former. > > ** > Iff a digital substitution is in principle even possible! > Bingo. We assume it is possible. If it's not, then COMP is false and we can talk about something else. Your knowledge of mathematics is impressive, but you have again failed to convince me of its relevance here. I don't need to know about surgery on manifolds, or the surreal numbers, to know that digital information can be duplicated. > Cutting and pasting at will requires the existence of a structure to be > acted upon and an action to carry out the cutting and pasting. What defines > the set or category or topos of the "data"? Did you know that surgery - > which is what cutting and pasting is - violates a basic principle in > topology, the invariance of genus of a continuous manifold? Sure, we can > define computations in terms of functions in surgical quotient spaces, but > where do we get the spaces or the functions to perform these actions? > What is it mereology (whole-part relation of the manifold)? What > axioms does the data obey? What are its organizational principles? You seem > to just assume that such are already defined by some fiat! What will not > do, for you are just avoiding Leibniz' question: "Why this and not some > other?" > This is cheating since we have learned that one thing that Nature is > not is biased about any framing, basis or mereology. Why Integers and not a > large but finite field? Why not the P-adics? Why not the surreals? Why not > some form of non-standard numbers? Each of these sets have different > properties and computational features, we should never be so > anthropocentric to think that "Man is the measure of all things!", which is > exactly what we are claiming when we say that "... our generalized brains > ..." are this and that, such as what is implied by "...the latter is just a > restatement of the former." The point is that we first need to dig a bit > deeper and establish by natural mathematical means that 1) digital > substitution is a sound mathematical concept and 2) that it is possible. > Surprisingly it can be easily argued that the latter is just a restatement > of the former. But is this done in the discussion of COMP so far? I haven't > seen it. So I ask again: Why are we putting our selves through such > convoluted abstractions to talk about the simple idea of moving though > space-time? > COMP is just a formal model of the a form of the relationships between > numbers and the content of observer moments, but it assumes that some > particular set of numbers are ontological primitives and some idealization > of actions that we only know to occur when we run actual calculations on > our computers of work out in long form stuff on chalkboards of by the > actions of the neurons in our brains. > > At least try to understand my point here. I am trying to explain that > there are things that numbers alone cannot do, they cannot count > themselves. They cannot perform any form of activity, they are purely and > perpetually static and fixed. Therefore any talk that involves any kind of > activity or change is nonsense in COMP. > Not from the
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
>> Korean subtitles, etc. >> Don't count on it! >> >> You avoid to answer the question which concerns the futures 1-view on >> the 1-view, by avoiding doing the experience, and defining an abstract >> notion of person distributed in the copies to avoid the simple fact that we >> will just look at the diaries which describe the experiences, and that with >> the movie-multiplication protocol, they almost all describes "white noise". >> The number of "senseful movie grows linearly", the number of white noise >> movie grows exponentially. >> >> I said it precisely in the protocol, you have to bet which movie you >> will describe in the diary after the experience. Obviously after the >> experience they have all view ONE movie. OK, there is one "winner", having >> seen a perfect version of "flying circus", but the vast majority have not. >> In those thought experiments, you have to put yourself coldly at the place >> of some sample of those person. >> >> With the quantum multiplication movie experience, the pixels are in >> quantum superposition which contagiate to the spectator, so that the >> quantum wave describes the spectator seeing all the movies, but again, the >> spectators does not feel the split nor the superposition, and see only >> *one* movie, and most of them will see white noise, for the same reason >> that beam splitters split the intensity into 1/2. >> >> So logically, it is just plausible that the quantum indeterminacy might >> be an instance of the comp first person plural (with duplication of >> populations) indeterminacy. But we are not yet there. >> >> You seem to continue to oscillate between there is no 1-indeterminacy, >> because ... 100% for Moscow, and there is an indeterminacy (but it is >> trivial, nothing new). >> >> Let us assume you accept the 1-indeterminacy (trivial or not might be >> just another topic), might we move to step 4? Hint: revise step 0, 1, 2. >> Step zero is the definition of comp. >> >> Bruno >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On Fri, Mar 2, 2012 at 3:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Let me ask a question to everybody. Consider the WM duplication, starting > from Helsinki, but this time, in W, you are reconstituted in two exemplars, > in exactly the same environment. Is the probability, asked in Helsinki, to > find yourself in W equal to 2/3 or to 1/2. > My current answer, not yet verified with the logics, is that if the two > computations in W are exactly identical forever, then it is 1/2, but if > they diverge soon or later, then the probability is [2/3]. > Why is that? > But I am not sure of this. What do you think? > My intuition is that the probability should be 2/3 in either case. > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test
On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 4:26 PM, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/27/2012 2:15 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: > > > > On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 3:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > >> On Feb 27, 3:15 pm, Joseph Knight wrote: >> > On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 11:26 AM, ronaldheld >> wrote: >> > > What observations or measurements can I perform that would falsify >> > > COMP? >> > >> > The best thing would be to work in the other direction, and see if you >> can >> > derive the "wrong" laws of physics from COMP itself. If you could do >> that, >> > then COMP is false. >> >> Since I can fly sometimes in dreams, that proves that if comp were >> true, it is capable of varying the laws of physics. I have not yet >> heard why comp prefers one set of physical laws outside of my head and >> many spontaneously shifting sets of physical non-laws inside my head. >> > > With COMP it's all "inside your head" so I don't see the problem. > > > That IS the problem. Since they are both "inside your head" why is > dreaming so different from being awake. > I don't see how the answer would be any different from how one would naively respond: That's just the way things *are *when your brain is in those atypical states. > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test
On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 3:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > On Feb 27, 3:15 pm, Joseph Knight wrote: > > On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 11:26 AM, ronaldheld > wrote: > > > What observations or measurements can I perform that would falsify > > > COMP? > > > > The best thing would be to work in the other direction, and see if you > can > > derive the "wrong" laws of physics from COMP itself. If you could do > that, > > then COMP is false. > > Since I can fly sometimes in dreams, that proves that if comp were > true, it is capable of varying the laws of physics. I have not yet > heard why comp prefers one set of physical laws outside of my head and > many spontaneously shifting sets of physical non-laws inside my head. > With COMP it's all "inside your head" so I don't see the problem. > > Craig > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test
On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 11:26 AM, ronaldheld wrote: > What observations or measurements can I perform that would falsify > COMP? > The best thing would be to work in the other direction, and see if you can derive the "wrong" laws of physics from COMP itself. If you could do that, then COMP is false. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test
On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 1:02 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: > On 2/27/2012 12:26 PM, ronaldheld wrote: > >> What observations or measurements can I perform that would falsify >> COMP? >> >> Hi, > >Any measurement of a physical process that cannot be simulated by a > Turing Machine equivalent computation. IOW, any non-computational physical > process. > As Bruno has explained, COMP implies that the universe/laws of physics are *not *Turing emulable (because physics is given by statistics on an infinite number of computations going through your state). > > Onward! > > Stephen > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ > **googlegroups.com . > For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** > group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
On Tue, Feb 14, 2012 at 1:31 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: > On 2/14/2012 10:25 AM, Joseph Knight wrote: > > [SPK] >> >> The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence >> of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts >> that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world >> does not exist. >> > > How many times do we have to tell you that's not true? > > > Hi Joseph, > > Please be specific. What is "not true" about the sentence I wrote > above? In SANE04, pg. 10-11, I read: > > " 8) Yes, but what if we don’t grant a concrete robust physical > universe? Up to this > stage, w*e can still escape the conclusion of the seven preceding > reasoning steps, by > postulating that a ‘‘physical universe’’ really ‘‘exists’’ and is too > little in the sense of not being > able to generate the entire UD*, nor any reasonable portions of it, so > that our usual physical > predictions would be safe from any interference with its UD-generated > ‘‘little’’ computational > histories. Such a move can be considered as being ad hoc and > disgraceful. *It can also be > quite weakened by some acceptation of some conceptual version of > Ockham’s Razor, and > obviously that move is without purpose for those who are willing to accept > comp+ (in which > case the UDA just show the necessity of the detour in psychology, > and the general shape of > physics as averages on consistent 1-histories). But logically, > there is still a place for both > physicalism and comp, once we made that move. Actually the 8th present > step will explain > that such a move is nevertheless without purpose.* This will make the > notion of concrete and > existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power.* * It > will follow that a much > weaker and usual form of Ockham’s razor can be used to conclude that not > only physics has > been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that > ‘‘matter’’ has been > ontologically reduced to ‘‘mind’’ where mind is defined as the > object study of fundamental > machine psychology. *All that by assuming comp, I insist. The reason is > that comp forbids to > associate inner experiences with the physical processing related > to the computations > corresponding (with comp) to those experiences. The physical > ‘‘supervenience thesis’’ of the > materialist philosophers of mind cannot be maintained, and inner > experiences can only be > associated with type of computation. > Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine > state] at space-time > (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time > (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of > computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which > is accepted as existing > independently of our selves with arithmetical realism)." > > If this is not a statement that "the physical world does not exist" > and, instead, that all that exists is "abstract machine", I will eat my > hat. > > I have repeatedly tried to see if the reasoning of Bruno et al allows > for us to decouple the existence of an entity from its properties but I > have been repeatedly rebuffed for such a thought, therefore the elimination > of the properties of the physical world demands the elimination of the > "existence" of the physical world. My claim is that we can recover > appearances by decoupling existence from property definiteness, but that > idea is either not being understood or is being rejected out of hand. > > What Quentin said. If* *anyone actually denied the existence of a physical reality in any sense, that would indeed be grounds not just for correcting them, but for ignoring them entirely. Is your post some kind of meta-level commentary on the need for precise language?? > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
> This does not work, unless you define the physical reality by > arithmetic, but this would be confusing. It seems clearer and cleare that > your "existence" axiom is the postulate that there is a physical primary > reality. But then comp is wrong. > > > What I see as wrong about COMP is how you are interpreting it. You are > taking its implied meaning too far. I claim that there is a limit on its > soundness as a theory or explanation of ontological nature, a soundness > that vanishes when it is taken to imply that its communicability becomes > impossible - a situation which inevitably occurs when one interprets COMP > as a claim that the physical world does not exist. > > > At least Craig is coherent on this. he want some primitive matter, and > he abandons comp. His theory is still unclear, but the overall shape make > sense, despite it explains nothing (given that he assume also a primitive > sense, and a primitive symmetry). > > Bruno > > > I do not want primitive matter, as this would put us into the > situation that the material monist are in, with the epiphenomenal nature of > consciousness. I just want abstract representations and physical object on > the same level. I think that we can agree that the physical world cannot be > primitive in the ontological sense, but can you not see that > representations cannot be primitive either if only becuase to claim that, > for instance, that only numbers are primitive eliminates the possibility > that one number has a particular set of properties that makes it somehow > different from another number. > > Also, you have been using the word "neutral" to mean "indifferent" in > a way that is similar to "I am indifferent to whether cows prefer chocolate > ice cream over vanilla ice cream". I mean neutral to mean "not having any > bias for some set of properties over any other". These two meaning are very > similar but the latter is more general than the former because the latter > is not considering the entity that might have a particular set of > properties (which implies a choice of properties and thus my comments about > the axiom of choice) while the former is taking the case of indifference > about some particular state of affairs given from a particular point of > view. It is a 1p versus a 3p difference. No? > At issue is the question of how does the definiteness of the > properties of an object, be it abstract - like the concept of a number - or > concrete - like the keyboard that I am typing on, come to be what it is. > You seem to claim that properties are defined by the mere existence of an > object. I am not understanding how you think that such is possible. We can > make claims that A exists and that A is A, but what is A independent of any > claims we might make of it? > > > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP, MGA and Time
On Mon, Feb 13, 2012 at 11:47 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: > On 2/13/2012 12:11 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: > > I think you should probably read Maudlin's > paper<http://www.finney.org/%7Ehal/maudlin.pdf>for specifics. I don't think > thermodynamics will have much to do with the > conclusions, whatever they may be (and I don't think it's obvious what > *exactly > *Maudlin showed). > > > Hi Joseph, > > Thank you for the new link to Maudlin''s paper. I was having a hard > time finding my copy... As to your comment: Would you consider exactly what > a "computational structure" means in a universe that allows for perpetual > motion <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perpetual_motion>? > You should be aware that our universe allows for perpetual motion. > > (We are going to run a reductio argument<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductio_ad_absurdum> > ...) > > One thing that I see is that in such a universe we would have a huge > White Rabbit problem because all brains in it would only be those of the > Boltzmann > type <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boltzmann_brain>. There could not be > any invariant form of sequencing that we could run a UD on. How so? Becasue > in a universe without thermodynamics > A Big universe "with thermodynamics" will still admit perpetual motion machines (in fact, our Universe is such a universe). Are you aware that, in the 19th century, classical thermodynamics was transformed into a statistical theory? You made a huge (and incorrect) leap from "admits a perpetual motion machine" to "no thermodynamics". If you can have Boltzmann Brains you can have Universal Dovetailers run for arbitrary (even infinite) amounts of time. At any rate, the notion of a "sufficiently robust universe" is a provisional premise that is dropped later in the UDA, so it's not important. > there is no such a thing as a sequence of events that is invariant with > respect to transitions from one observer to another, i.e. there would be no > such thing as time definable in a 'dimensional' sense. All sequences would > be at best Markov <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markov_property>. With > such a restriction to Markov processes, how to you define a UD? Without a > UD, how do we get COMP to work? > > > > Onward! > > Stephen > > > > > On Mon, Feb 13, 2012 at 7:21 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: > >> Hi Folks, >> >> I have been mulling over my conversations with Bruno, Joseph and ACW >> in the EVERYTHING list and have a question. In SANE04 we read the following: >> >> "For any given precise running computation associated to some inner >> experience, you >> can modify the device in such a way that the amount of >> physical activity involved is >> arbitrarily low, and even null for dreaming experience which has no >> inputs and no outputs. >> Now, having suppressed that physical activity present in the >> running computation, the >> machine will only be accidentally correct. It will be correct only for >> that precise computation, >> with unchanged environment. If it is changed a little bit, it will >> make the machine running >> computation no more relatively correct. But then, Maudlin >> ingenuously showed that >> counterfactual correctness can be recovered, by adding non active >> devices which will be >> triggered only if some (counterfactual) change would appear in the >> environment. Now this >> shows that any inner experience can be associated with an arbitrary low >> (even null) physical >> activity, and this in keeping counterfactual correctness. And >> that is absurd with the >> conjunction of both comp and materialism." >> >> Setting aside the problem of concurrency for now, how is it that we >> are jumping over the difference between infinitely slow or even " >> adiabatic <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adiabatic_process>" physical >> process and "null" physical process? >> >> I may be not even wrong here, but in math isn't it true that there is a >> big difference between a quantity being arbitrarily small and a quantity >> being zero? I suspect that the folks in FOAR List that have been discussing >> information and entropy might have a thought on this. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On Mon, Feb 13, 2012 at 9:24 AM, David Nyman wrote: > On 13 February 2012 01:18, Joseph Knight wrote: > > > Yes it is, with the Movie Graph Argument. The MGA shows that assuming > COMP, > > consciousness cannot be explained by appealing to any physical system. > Not > > even a little. > > Whereas I would concur with this conclusion, I realise on reflection > that I'm not sure exactly where it leaves us vis-a-vis the Movie-graph > setup itself, or Maudlin's contraption, once the reversal of > physics-mechanism is actually accepted. Clearly, we now have to > regard these devices in their physical manifestation as aspects of a > deeper computational reality with which our conscious state is > currently related. But what are we now to make of the original > proposal that they instantiate some computation that encapsulates an > actual conscious state? After all, we don't regard them as > "primitively physical" objects any longer, so we can't now apply the > reductio arguments in quite the same way, can we? They're part of the > general computational state of affairs, like everything else. Is it > that they instantiate the "wrong" sort of computation for > consciousness, because their physical behaviour is the result of > "accidentally" contrived relations? IOW, they're not really UM's in > any relevant sense. But then wouldn't the same argument for > contrivance hold in the original case, and undermine the reductio? > > I'm puzzled. > That makes two of us. You may recall the lengthy post I made a couple of months ago questioning the validity of the MGA. I now accept its validity but still find myself pondering how *weird *it is. I'm going to think about your post a little more before I respond completely. > > David > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP, MGA and Time
I think you should probably read Maudlin's paper<http://www.finney.org/~hal/maudlin.pdf>for specifics. I don't think thermodynamics will have much to do with the conclusions, whatever they may be (and I don't think it's obvious what *exactly *Maudlin showed). On Mon, Feb 13, 2012 at 7:21 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: > Hi Folks, > > I have been mulling over my conversations with Bruno, Joseph and ACW > in the EVERYTHING list and have a question. In SANE04 we read the following: > > "For any given precise running computation associated to some inner > experience, you > can modify the device in such a way that the amount of > physical activity involved is > arbitrarily low, and even null for dreaming experience which has no > inputs and no outputs. > Now, having suppressed that physical activity present in the > running computation, the > machine will only be accidentally correct. It will be correct only for > that precise computation, > with unchanged environment. If it is changed a little bit, it will > make the machine running > computation no more relatively correct. But then, Maudlin > ingenuously showed that > counterfactual correctness can be recovered, by adding non active > devices which will be > triggered only if some (counterfactual) change would appear in the > environment. Now this > shows that any inner experience can be associated with an arbitrary low > (even null) physical > activity, and this in keeping counterfactual correctness. And > that is absurd with the > conjunction of both comp and materialism." > > Setting aside the problem of concurrency for now, how is it that we > are jumping over the difference between infinitely slow or even > "adiabatic<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adiabatic_process>" > physical process and "null" physical process? > > I may be not even wrong here, but in math isn't it true that there is a > big difference between a quantity being arbitrarily small and a quantity > being zero? I suspect that the folks in FOAR List that have been discussing > information and entropy might have a thought on this. > > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 1:07 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 11 Feb 2012, at 23:09, Joseph Knight wrote: > > > > On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 11:41 AM, Stephen P. King > wrote: > >> >> >> >> The diagram is strictly 3p. It would be helpful if you wrote up an >> informal article on the octolism. It is very difficult to comprehend it >> from just your discussion of the hypostases. >> > > I agree, this would be very helpful. I wouldn't mind if it got a little > technical, either. > > > Have you read the part 2 of sane04? (which starts at the page 12). It is a > concise version of AUDA. > I read it, and will review it further, but I feel like I don't have a good understanding of what's going on toward the very end of the paper (last 3-4 pages particularly). But take that with a grain of salt, since I haven't read most of the other papers on your website, which also discuss the matter. > > When I reread it now, I am frightened by my own style, and spelling. I > also see little mistakes here and there. But it explains the main thing. > > To interview a universal machine about itself (at some level) makes > necessary to describe the universal machine in its language (there is no > miracle). That part is usually long and tedious, but for someone capable > of programming in some universal language (be it fortran or lisp, or > whatever) the principle are not different from programming an interpreter > or a compiler. It is the writing of the code of an interpreter in the > language of that intepreter. I often skip that part, but refer to the basic > literature (Gödel 1931, ...). > > The more the universal system is simple, the more the translation is long > and tedious. In case the universal system is extremely simple (like a > universal degree 4 diophantine polynomial) the proof of universality is > very complex (it is the Putnam-Davis-Robinson-Matiyasevitch-Jones story). > > If you can write an interpreter lisp in the language lisp, an easy task, > you can better conceive that it is possible (and has been done) to write an > "interpreter of arithmetic" in arithmetic. > > That is mainly the one I call "B" for Gödel's beweisbar predicate, which > define Peano Arithmetic (say) in (Peano, Robinson) Arithmetic. > Beweisbar(x) is the arithmetical predicate for "x is provable", with x > coding arithmetically a proposition. Arithmetical means that it is defined > only with "E", f, ->, s, 0, and parenthesis). > > What is your familiarity with Gödel 1931? Gödel's original paper use > Principia Mathematica (a formal version of a Russell typed set theory). Do > you see the relation between Gödel numbering/beweisbar and > programming/universal-interpreter. Both RA and PA are sigma_1 complete, so > you can use them as programming language, and "B" refer to Turing universal > arithmetical predicate. But as a provability predicate, its range is > personal and different for RA, PA, ZF, you, me, etc. > > Hmm... I might have to insist that computability is an absolute notion > (with CT), but provability is always relative to a machine/number. > Provability becomes universal (with respect to the computable) when it is > Sigma_1 complete (like RA and PA). Sigma_1 complete provability is Turing > universal, and this ease the talk on computer science, and beyond, with the > machine. > > The (meta) theories (G, G*, S4Grz, ...) applies on all sound recursively > enumerable extensions of Peano Arithmetic. With comp it applies to us as > far as we are self-referentially correct, which is hard to know, especially > when betting on a personal digital substitution level. > It's all very exciting. I have a lot of learning to do. Right now I'm doing a lot of self study on logic, categories, toposes, sets, and so forth. Slow but rewarding work. > > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 11:14 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: > On 2/11/2012 5:09 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: > > > > On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 11:41 AM, Stephen P. King > wrote: > >> On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote: >> >> Hi ACW, >> >> Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!! >> >> On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: >> >> Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion), >> that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However, let's try >> and see why that is and why someone would take COMP as an assumption: >> >> - The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, a digital >> substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you were to implement/run >> such a Turing-emulable program, it would be conscious and you would have a >> continuation in it. Isn't that a strong theological assumption? >> >> [SPK] >> Yes, but it is the "substitution" of one configuration of "stuff" >> with another such that the functionality (that allows for the >> implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turing equivalence!)) >> program to remain invariant. One thing interesting to point out about this >> is that this substitution can be the replacement of completely different >> kinds of stuff, like carbon based stuff with silicon based stuff and does >> not require a continuous physical process of transformation in the sense of >> smoothly morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at some primitive >> level. B/c of this it may seem to bypass the usual restrictions of physical >> laws, but does it really? >> What exactly is this "physical stuff" anyway? If we take a hint from >> the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the "stuff" of the >> material world is more about properties that remain invariant under sets of >> symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like "primitive" >> substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered to be a >> wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me that to >> test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be >> derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I am >> trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that COMP >> is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the appearance of >> space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant and >> not primitive. >> >> >> So you miss the UDA point. The UDA point is that if COMP is true, it >> has to be complete as a theory, independently of the fact that the shorter >> time to derive physics might be 10^1000 millenia. Comp explains, by the >> UDA, that whatever you add to comp, or to RA, or to the UD, cannot play any >> role in consciousness, including the feeling that the worlds obeys some >> role. So if comp is correct the las of physics have to be derived from >> arithmetic alone. Then AUDA makes a non trivial part of the derivation. We >> have already the symmetry of the core bottom physics, the quantum >> indeterminacy, non locality, non cloning. But this is just for illustrating >> the consistency: the UDA conclusion is that no matter what, the appearance >> of matter cannot use any supplementary assumption to comp and/or >> arithmetic. You can sum up the UD by "comp is not completable". It is the >> Bell-von Neuman answer to Einstein, in your analogy below. Arithmetic is >> made conceptually complete. Whatever you add to it will prevent the comp >> solution of the mind-body problem, a bit like evruthing you add to the SWE >> will reintroduce the measurement problem in quantum physics. Comp and >> arithmetic are conceptually complete, but of epistemologically highly >> incomplete and uncompletable. >> >> Also, once you agree that stuff is not primitive, you have to define it >> from your primitive terms, which I don't see possible given that your >> primitive is the word "existence" which is not defined, nor even a theory. >> >> >> Hi Bruno, >> >> You are still not addressing my questions and what I see as a >> problem. The speed issue and completeness is not just addressing from an >> internal perspective since we have to have invariance over many different >> internal perspectives and these can vary over speed and complexity. This is >> illustrated by the discussion of how "stuff"
Re: COMP theology (was: Ontological Problems of COMP)
e following finite rules. It's a > hypothesis/assumption because in the general form it's not provable because > it's too general, but we can prove any individual case we care to try, > there's also many strong intuitions for why it has to be true. I don't > think there are many computer scientists who don't believe in it, but > usually those that don't just try to define CTT in wider scope than it is > (such as hypercomputation, which it obviously doesn't include), such issues > are a matter of definition and shouldn't be considered to be included in > this assumption. > > > I have no problem at all with CTT, i just have a serious problem with > the idea that CTT is completely divorced from the physical. > > > - Consistency of arithmetic (existence of the standard model of > arithmetic), existence of truth value of arithmetical sentences. > > > The existence of truth values does not, in itself, define them. > Additional structure is required to define not only what domain the truth > value lies in but how it is mapped to our propositions and sentences. > > The consistency belief is both intuitive as well as one about a certain > Turing Machine never halting (which can be made in stronger theories, but > cannot be believed any more than you can believe that arithmetic is > consistent). A belief in a sentence being either true or false independent > of anything is not much different from the belief that a machine either > halts or doesn't halt (and no other choice exists). > This is again a matter of theology - of the provably unprovable stuff. > Although, again, it's a strong "no magic" assumption, that given a finite > self-contained set of rules (addition, multiplication) applied on finite > self-contained objects (numbers), it will always yield the same result and > nothing whatsoever can change that. > > > I agree that "given a finite self-contained set of rules (addition, > multiplication) applied on finite self-contained objects (numbers), it will > always yield the same result" but this does not address my problem. Unless > there is something physical that is somehow different but equal in > ontological level to show results side by side, there is no proof of > equivalence, all there is is modulo isomorphism and barely even that. > > > - A hidden assumption: we have minds/are conscious/experience qualia. This > is a bit magical, but it's hidden in the first assumption that I listed. > > > It is not magical, it is quite ordinary. It is the most ordinary of > facts that I am conscious of what my hands are doing at this moment, for > example... But what is this "my"? If it is just an illusion generated by > some kind of feedback loop, how does the delay that allows the loop come to > be? It is interesting that there is a mapping in category theory that shows > this exact kind of mapping: the Idempotent Endomap > > [image: Idempotent Endomap] > > It is interesting to note the properties of this mapping. See, for > example: ls.poly.edu/~jbain/Cat/lectures/13.MoreCats.pdf > > The thing is - the only thing we can be certain of, but cannot communicate > is having a mind. From our observations we can infer the existence of the > external world and that our bodies are part of it, we can also observe that > the states of our brain correlate very well with our conscious experience. > A different computationalist theory (eliminative materialism) takes this > hidden assumption and posts its negation as an axiom. The problem with that > is that the external world is only inferred by using observation, thus it > cannot really be accepted by most conscious observers (who are delusional > in such a theory), however such a theory is not inconsistent if > consciousness is ignored. If you ignore the mind assumption, you can > completely ignore almost all of COMP's strange conclusions because none of > them would matter, but the existence of primitive matter would be saved in > such a theory. > > > I agree. I just do not require matter nor mind to be primitive, I > argue that both are aspects of a single neutral primitive. > > > All of these are assumptions which are not uncommon for most > secular-minded people: the first is widely considered by the "no magic" > camp, it also is required if you don't want consciousness to be utterly > strange and magic current evidence, the second is widely considered true by > anyone who studied computability/math/comp sci, the third is usually > considered true, if it's false, pretty much all math we know is false, and > there are many intuitions why it's likely true. Given these assumptions, >
Re: COMP theology
e at least the comparison between a pair of arithmetic > truths and for this to be possible there has to be a relatively stable > substrate. There is no escape from this necessity. > How do you know this? > > > > > My tentative explanation is that at our level a form of dualism holds. A > dualism quite unlike that of Descartes, since instead of "separate > substances", it is proposed that the logical and the physical are two > distinct aspect of reality that follow on equal yet anti-parallel tracks. > As Vaughan Pratt explains in his papers, the logical processes and the > physical processes have dynamics that have arrows that point in opposite > directions. Schematically and crudely we can show a quasi-category theory > diagram of this duality: > > > X -> Y -> > | | > <- A <--B <- > > > I am OK with this. This is already derivable from the many dualisms > contained in the octalist machines points of view, notably between > "intelligible" (Bp) and (matter intelligible Bp & Dt). It does reverse the > arrow in a way akin to Pratt. It is not a parallelism, or anti-parallelism, > though, for the 1p and 3p are not symmetrical. Then the qualia, and the > first person plural quanta, are given by the machine's semantics for the > logic obeyed by Bp & Dt & p. > > > The diagram is strictly 3p. It would be helpful if you wrote up an > informal article on the octolism. It is very difficult to comprehend it > from just your discussion of the hypostases. > I agree, this would be very helpful. I wouldn't mind if it got a little technical, either. > > > I have no idea what your neutral monism refer too, except a sort of > vague God-like notion of Existence, but that's not a (scientific) theory, > yet. And, by UDA, whatever it adds to comp and arithmetic has to refute > the comp physics, or comp itself. Craig is, at least, coherent on this: he > abandon comp, to save an unintelligible notion of matter and mind (alas). > > > Read the discussion of neutral monism by Bertrand Russell and others. > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/ is a good overview > (even though the pluralism of neutral entities assumption is problematic as > Spinoza understood). It would be helpful to you and the rest of us if you > spent some time refreshing your understanding of what theology is by > comparing the many theologies that already exist or by learning from the > wisdom of those that have done such studies. I hope that Bertrand Russell > is someone that you can respect as I respect your skills and understanding > of modal logics. > > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Mind-reading-device-could-become-reality
One step closer to scanning and uploading :) On Tue, Jan 31, 2012 at 11:24 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: > Hi, > > http://www.telegraph.co.uk/**science/science-news/9051909/** > Mind-reading-device-could-**become-reality.html<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/science-news/9051909/Mind-reading-device-could-become-reality.html> > >Are not computers wonderful tools? :-) > >Any comments? > > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ > **googlegroups.com . > For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** > group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Superfluous Qualia Challenge For Comp
On Tue, Jan 31, 2012 at 2:41 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > On Jan 31, 2:33 pm, Joseph Knight wrote: > > On Tue, Jan 31, 2012 at 1:12 PM, Craig Weinberg >wrote: > > > > > On Jan 31, 1:18 pm, Joseph Knight wrote: > > > > > > I agree with your point about thinking outside the box, but barring > some > > > > astronomically improbable stroke of luck, it would be necessary for > Craig > > > > to *understand what he is criticizing *before he could actually make > > > useful > > > > progress away from it. Surely this is not an unreasonable demand? > > > > > What is it that you think I don't understand about COMP? > > > > Let's start with the basics. I know that you don't understand what a > > computer is, since you claim a bit later that it is a "humming box". In > an > > earlier post you said 'computers are arrays of semiconductor materials > > arranged to conduct electrical current in a dynamic and orderly fashion'. > > Wrong. When I directed you to an article explaining why you are wrong, > you > > replied "you're pointing me to references to Boolean algebra". Boolean > > algebra was not mentioned even once on the page! You didn't read it! > > Laziness. > > Not laziness. I'm just not in the business of doing errands for > strangers on the internet. When someone tells you you are wrong, you are not interested in seeing if they are correct? Laziness, or worse, trolling. Convince me otherwise. > I'm not your student. I understand that the > term computer *can* apply to anything that can be used to perform > computation (I use the abacus as an example too, steam powered > machines, whatever). Obviously from my wording I am talking about > contemporary electronic computers. In that context, and indeed essentially all contexts on this list, the precise definition was the one being employed. > This kind of semantic nitpicking is > the lowest form of argumentative desperation. > No, we need to know exactly what each other means when they use a word if we are to make any progress. So there's a problem when you use one word to refer to two quite different things. > > > > > > The problem > > > is that I know for a fact that you don't understand my view > > > > I don't think anyone on this list understands your view, except perhaps > > yourself. Who is to blame? > > You can blame me if you want, but it makes no difference. You can > either try to understand what I mean or not, I certainly have tried, and failed, repeatedly. I haven't personally inquired about it because others have, and you have been less than helpful for them. You invent dozens of new terms, abuse the meanings of dozens of commonly used terms from science and philosophyI don't see any concrete predictions about the result of an experiment, any falsifiability, or any concern for precision. > that's fine, but you > aren't telling me anything I don't already know so I'm not curious > about your views. > > > > > > , and there > > > is nothing anyone has said here which surprises me in any way about > > > comp. It's all old hat to me, even if it seems exciting and fresh to > > > you, I have been thinking about neurological simulations using > > > computation for probably 35 years. I have drawings of multi-sensory > > > Walkman designs from when I was 12. > > > > Cool. > > > > > > > > > What is the big amazing thing about comp? Arithmetic truth? UDA? > > > Substitution level? Self-reference and Turing Machines? > > > > Among other things. > > > > > I understand > > > that you think it makes sense because computers can seem to simulate > > > so many things, > > > > They certainly can simulate many things. However, I have seen you > conflate > > simulations run by scientists working with simplified models of > something, > > I'm doing that intentionally to strip away the confusion and think > about it in a clearer, more truthful way. > Hold on -- you are purposefully causing confusion in order to strip away confusion? > > > with the kind of simulation that matters when we talk about the > > computational theory of mind. > > > > > including computers, but that doesn't impress me > > > because I understand that computers are only computers because users > > > are using them that way. > > > > Ludicrous, and this only reinforces my suspicion that you have no idea > what > > a "computer", c
Re: Superfluous Qualia Challenge For Comp
On Tue, Jan 31, 2012 at 1:12 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > On Jan 31, 1:18 pm, Joseph Knight wrote: > > > I agree with your point about thinking outside the box, but barring some > > astronomically improbable stroke of luck, it would be necessary for Craig > > to *understand what he is criticizing *before he could actually make > useful > > progress away from it. Surely this is not an unreasonable demand? > > What is it that you think I don't understand about COMP? Let's start with the basics. I know that you don't understand what a computer is, since you claim a bit later that it is a "humming box". In an earlier post you said 'computers are arrays of semiconductor materials arranged to conduct electrical current in a dynamic and orderly fashion'. Wrong. When I directed you to an article explaining why you are wrong, you replied "you're pointing me to references to Boolean algebra". Boolean algebra was not mentioned even once on the page! You didn't read it! Laziness. > The problem > is that I know for a fact that you don't understand my view I don't think anyone on this list understands your view, except perhaps yourself. Who is to blame? > , and there > is nothing anyone has said here which surprises me in any way about > comp. It's all old hat to me, even if it seems exciting and fresh to > you, I have been thinking about neurological simulations using > computation for probably 35 years. I have drawings of multi-sensory > Walkman designs from when I was 12. Cool. > > What is the big amazing thing about comp? Arithmetic truth? UDA? > Substitution level? Self-reference and Turing Machines? Among other things. > I understand > that you think it makes sense because computers can seem to simulate > so many things, They certainly can simulate many things. However, I have seen you conflate simulations run by scientists working with simplified models of something, with the kind of simulation that matters when we talk about the computational theory of mind. > including computers, but that doesn't impress me > because I understand that computers are only computers because users > are using them that way. Ludicrous, and this only reinforces my suspicion that you have no idea what a "computer", conceived mathematically, actually is. > Otherwise they are just humming boxes. > See above. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Superfluous Qualia Challenge For Comp
On Tue, Jan 31, 2012 at 12:11 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: > On 1/31/2012 12:48 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: > > > > On Tue, Jan 31, 2012 at 11:03 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> >> >> 2012/1/31 Craig Weinberg >> >>> On Jan 31, 11:46 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> > 2012/1/31 Craig Weinberg >>> > >>> > > When we close our eyes, we still see visual noise, even in total >>> > > darkness. If qualia were based on computation, we should expect that >>> > > no sensory input should equate to total blackness, since there is no >>> > > information to report. >>> > >>> > ?? >>> > >>> > WTF ? >>> >>> Visual silence is easily represented. Why the superfluous light show? >>> >> >> Nothing is easily represented... why something ? Have you more stupid >> though to discuss in your pocket ? >> > > I am debating with myself the matter of whether or not Craig is a troll. > > He commits the cardinal sin of not being willing to learn the basic > ideas of a realm of discourse, before trying to demonstrate important > results in that realm. I tried talking to him a couple of times but he > refused to meet me halfway by understanding the real meaning of rigorous > terms like computation. He has surely spent enough time on this list to > have at least some grasp of, say, what COMP actually says, but he shows no > evidence of it. I can only chalk this up to laziness. Worse, much of his > writing reads like one of these generative postmodernist > essays<http://www.elsewhere.org/pomo/>. > I am tempted to give him the Baez treatment, but I don't want to fan the > flames. > > >> >> > Hi, > > In Craig's defense I would like to point out that however trolling or > postmodernist you might see his ideas, he is trying hard to think outside > of the box that you guys are gyrating in like the ball in a game of Pong. > How does science advance unless people are willing to contemplate > alternative ideas? > First of all, I do not think Craig *intends *to come off as a troll or a postmodernist. I agree with your point about thinking outside the box, but barring some astronomically improbable stroke of luck, it would be necessary for Craig to *understand what he is criticizing *before he could actually make useful progress away from it. Surely this is not an unreasonable demand? > > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Superfluous Qualia Challenge For Comp
On Tue, Jan 31, 2012 at 11:03 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > 2012/1/31 Craig Weinberg > >> On Jan 31, 11:46 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> > 2012/1/31 Craig Weinberg >> > >> > > When we close our eyes, we still see visual noise, even in total >> > > darkness. If qualia were based on computation, we should expect that >> > > no sensory input should equate to total blackness, since there is no >> > > information to report. >> > >> > ?? >> > >> > WTF ? >> >> Visual silence is easily represented. Why the superfluous light show? >> > > Nothing is easily represented... why something ? Have you more stupid > though to discuss in your pocket ? > I am debating with myself the matter of whether or not Craig is a troll. He commits the cardinal sin of not being willing to learn the basic ideas of a realm of discourse, before trying to demonstrate important results in that realm. I tried talking to him a couple of times but he refused to meet me halfway by understanding the real meaning of rigorous terms like computation. He has surely spent enough time on this list to have at least some grasp of, say, what COMP actually says, but he shows no evidence of it. I can only chalk this up to laziness. Worse, much of his writing reads like one of these generative postmodernist essays<http://www.elsewhere.org/pomo/>. I am tempted to give him the Baez treatment, but I don't want to fan the flames. > > >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Computing Spacetime
On Fri, Jan 20, 2012 at 2:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 20 Jan 2012, at 07:17, Joseph Knight wrote: > > > > On Wed, Jan 18, 2012 at 1:33 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Stephen, Ronald, >> >> The paper is very interesting, on physics, but succumbs directly from the >> argument that any digital physics is bound to be unsuccessful on the >> mind-body problem by being still physicalist. The body problem is a problem >> of computer science, that is arithmetic, once we bet that observer are >> Turing emulable, as they should if the physics is digital. >> >> If the universe is a computation, then comp is true. But comp implies >> that the universe cannot be a computation (by UDA). > > > Could you explain this a little bit? I didn't get that from my reading of > the UDA > > > I suppose you grasped well the sixth first steps. > > Consider yourself in front of a running UD, and the "protocol" is that it > will never stop. Suppose you drop a pen. To predict what you will feel is > determined by *all* computations in the UD's work going through your > states. So to predict exactly what you will feel, you cannot use one > computation, but an infinity of them. This is a priori non computable. > Even if it is computable (like if ONE computation multiplies so much that > it get a measure near one), we know that there are other computations, so, > this can only be 1 - epsilon, and the exact decimal will still need an > infinite computation, even if much shorter computation provides excellent > approximations. But in principle, your exact future, even the "physical" > first person sharable, is not given by one computation, but, below your > substitution level, all of them. You can't compute that. And he phyical > laws are just describing your normal histories, and the nomality can only > come on the "winning computations" in the limit. Phycics might remain > arithmetical, but certainly well above Sigma_1 (the computable). > Tell me if this helps. > Yes - thanks! > > Bruno > > > > > > > >> So the universe is a computation implies that the universe is not a >> computation. So the universe is not a computation, whatever it can be. This >> defeat Finkelstein, Schmidhuber, Fredkin, and all attempts to conceive the >> physical universe as a computation, or output of a computation. > > >> This does not mean that the paper does not have interesting ideas on the >> unification of known forces in physics, and that "quantum graphity" might >> be a good idea, but if correct, such idea have to be recovered from the >> (more ambitious) attempt to get a unification of both qualia and quanta >> (consciousness and matter). The authors have still not integrate the >> mind-body problem. We are still much in advance on this list :) >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> On 18 Jan 2012, at 14:53, ronaldheld wrote: >> >> I found this at arXiv:1201.3398v1 [gr-qc] 17 Jan 2012. Any comments? >>> I have just started to read it., >>>Ronald >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to >>> everything-list@googlegroups.**com >>> . >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>> . >>> >>> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.**com >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com >> . >> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >> . >> >> > > > -- > Joseph Knight > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsu
Re: The Computing Spacetime
On Wed, Jan 18, 2012 at 1:33 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Stephen, Ronald, > > The paper is very interesting, on physics, but succumbs directly from the > argument that any digital physics is bound to be unsuccessful on the > mind-body problem by being still physicalist. The body problem is a problem > of computer science, that is arithmetic, once we bet that observer are > Turing emulable, as they should if the physics is digital. > > If the universe is a computation, then comp is true. But comp implies that > the universe cannot be a computation (by UDA). Could you explain this a little bit? I didn't get that from my reading of the UDA > So the universe is a computation implies that the universe is not a > computation. So the universe is not a computation, whatever it can be. This > defeat Finkelstein, Schmidhuber, Fredkin, and all attempts to conceive the > physical universe as a computation, or output of a computation. > This does not mean that the paper does not have interesting ideas on the > unification of known forces in physics, and that "quantum graphity" might > be a good idea, but if correct, such idea have to be recovered from the > (more ambitious) attempt to get a unification of both qualia and quanta > (consciousness and matter). The authors have still not integrate the > mind-body problem. We are still much in advance on this list :) > > Bruno > > > > > On 18 Jan 2012, at 14:53, ronaldheld wrote: > > I found this at arXiv:1201.3398v1 [gr-qc] 17 Jan 2012. Any comments? >> I have just started to read it., >>Ronald >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.**com >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com >> . >> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >> . >> >> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ > **googlegroups.com . > For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** > group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation
> making the projection conscious seems magical and unrelated to the original > computation. > > > > >> >> >> >> >> I am trying to think of an analogy to another system which would make my >> argument clearer (and in the process learning how tricky the concept of >> supervenience can be). >> >> >> >> Actually, I do the same. I search a system where I can make it clearer >> why the idiosyncrasies of the movie-graph are simpler to evacuate. >> But in the present case, it seems rather obvious to me that the absurdity >> is already there, before replacing the glass+smoke by a usual screen. There >> is already no more computations, we can already use the stroboscopic >> argument to make that absurd. >> > > I am not familiar with the stroboscopic argument. > > > It is an argument used to show (if that was necessary) that a movie of a > computation is not a computation, nor even a well defined physical reality. > Instead of moving the film behind a lamp, we move the (stroboscopic) lamps > and the observer along the film. Then the existence of a movie is shown to > be relative to an observer, making the idea that a consciousness supervene > on the movie non sensical. I think this should work also with the situation > where the broken nodes are not removed. > Such an argument avoid some special tailored critics based on that type of > thought experiment, like the heap sand critics (which by itself leads to > the absurd notion of partial zombie, which some materialist accepts, but > just as way to avoid the consequence of comp). Anyway, the stroboscopic > argument shows that a projection of a movie is not even a well defined > physical events, as needed for a primitive supervenience thesis. > > Bruno > > > > > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > > > -- > Joseph Knight > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 26 Dec 2011, at 05:47, Joseph Knight wrote: > > > > On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> On 23 Dec 2011, at 20:16, Joseph Knight wrote: >> >> >>> >>> The same problem arises in *Part 2*. Bruno claims that we are forced to >>> accept that Alice’s consciousness supervenes on the film. >>> >>> No. On the projection of the pellicle on the Boolean graph, and then on >>> the Boolean graph missing part. The idea is that we built again the right >>> physical activity, with the projection of the film playing the role of the >>> cosmic rays. >>> >> >> What is a pellicle? (Sorry) I understand this part, however. My >> objections arise later. >> >> >> A film. (But in french "film" is for cinema (movie?)). >> > > OK, there was no confusion. > > > OK. > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> but (film + optical graph) is certainly changed, and Alice’s dream turns >>> out differently (if it occurs at all). >>> >>> With comp + sup-phys, it can't. >>> >> >> Why? If we assume sup+phys, then some changes in the physical system on >> which the dream supervenes certainly will lead to changes in the dream. >> >> >> I don't think so. Remember that we suppose comp (and sup-phys). So we >> already agree that we can change the physical implementation if it runs the >> computation at the correct level. So, we can change the physical >> implementation as we wish, below the substitution level without changing >> the first person private consciousness. >> > > I think I wasn't clear here. I didn't mean changes in the particular > physical system consciousness is supervening on -- of course by comp that > doesn't matter. I meant that, assuming sup-phys on physical system X, there > must exist some changes in X which lead to changes in consciousness. > > > OK. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> Bruno isolates the film and thus reaches his apparent contradictions. >>> But this is not a permissible move. >>> >>> I think that the term "film" could have different meaning in french and >>> english. But the film here means the projection of the pellicle on the >>> glass/crystal medium. This one is never broken. It is a process which takes >>> time, and occur in some place. >>> >>> >>> >>> Not only is the definition of supervenience violated, but his principle >>> of irrelevant subparts is violated as well – for the optical graph is * >>> not *irrelevant for the execution of Alice’s consciousness. >>> >>> >>> Of course, but once we put away the nodes, the physical activity >>> corresponding to the computation are not changed. The optical graph becomes >>> irrelevant for the physical activity on which Alice's consciousness is >>> supposed to supervene, by comp+sup-phys. >>> >> >> This is where my problem lies. Of course the physical activity of the >> system is changed when you (invalidly) remove the optical graph from the >> system. It is far from irrelevant. For example, what mechanism causes the >> light to triggers the lasers? There must be some "internal" mechanisms at >> work as well. The nodes aren't "connected" to one another, but it matters >> whether or not the recording is being projected on an optical graph, vs. a >> concrete wall, vs. movie screen >> >> >> Why? The relevant physical activity is the same. >> > Obviously I agree with you (the projection of the film does not >> instantiate consciousness). The point is that if comp and sup-phys are >> maintained, and if 323 is correct, then there is nothing different from >> projecting the film on the glass crystal with the boolean laser graph >> removed and a wall. >> > > I have no problem with 323. My argument is that consciousness never > supervenes on the film/movie/recording. > > > I agree with that. If only because there are no more any computation done > "in time and space" (the original abstract computation does not disappear, > of course, so with comp, we will have to attach consciousness to it, and > not to its particular "concrete implementation". > > > > > So there *is *something different between projecting the film on the > glas
Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 11:18 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 04:27:28PM -0600, Joseph Knight wrote: > > > > > > Regarding Maudlin’s argument: Russell has recently stated that Maudlin’s > > argument doesn’t work in a multiverse, and that consciousness is thus a > > multiverse phenomenon. I disagree for the same reason that Bruno > disagrees: > > the region of the multiverse on which consciousness supervenes can just > be > > Turing emulated in a huge water/trough/block computer, and Maudlin’s > > argument can be reapplied. I realize that this could lead to an infinite > > regress…hmm… > > > > You reminding us all of what supervenience really means is very > timely. > > In the case of dovetailing a region of the Multiverse, it is not the > case that consciousness can supervene on a universal dovetailer. If > the conscious content differs in some way, the universal dovetailer > does not - as it is a static, quite singular object. > Surely it is only static in the sense that any program is static (in a Platonic sense)? For now, I am referring to a concrete UD. A concrete UD can be in different states at different times, so I don't see a problem. > > Consiousness does still supervene on the simulated physics, though - > assuming it supervened on the original multiversal physics. > > Please could someone explain how to apply Maudlin's argument to a > dovetailed multiverse. People keep asserting it is just the same as > the orignal argument, when it is clearly not. There are no Klaras, for > instance, no counterfactuals, and no supervenience, as your posting > has made clear. > I don't see the need to apply Maudlin's argument to the whole UD, just the branches that are relevant. There are surely counterfactuals between these branches? > > I wouldn't fuss too much about the infinite regress - there's a lot of > those as soon as dovetailers are involved. > Cheers > > -- > > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation
On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 22 Dec 2011, at 23:27, Joseph Knight wrote: > > Hello everyone and everything, > > > I have pompously made my own thread for this, even though we have another > MGA thread going, because the other one (sigh, I created that one too) > seems to have split into at least two different discussions, both of which > are largely different from what I have to say, so I want to avoid confusion. > > > Here, I will explain why I believe the Movie Graph Argument (MGA) is > invalid. I will start with an exegesis of my understanding of the MGA, so > that Bruno or others can point out if I have failed to understand some > important aspect of the argument. Then I will explain what is wrong. I > believe confusion regarding the concept of supervenience has been > responsible for some invalid reasoning. (At the end I will also explain why > I find Maudlin’s thought experiment to be inconclusive.) > > > As it is explained > here<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/201ce36c784b2795/aa1e30fe5b731a40> > , > here<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/18539e96f75bb740/b748e386a6795f3c>, > and > here<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/a0e1758bf03bc080/6f9f14d6fb505261>, > the MGA consists of three parts. Throughout the argument we are assuming > comp and materialism to be true. > > > *The MGA* > > * > * > > In *Part 1*, Bruno asks us to consider Alice. Alice is a conscious being. > Alice already has an artificial brain, to make the reasoning easier. We are > assuming here (with no loss of generality) that, under normal > circumstances, Alice’s consciousness supervenes on this artificial brain. > Alice is taking a math exam, when at a certain moment one of the logic > gates A fails to signal logic gate B. At this precise moment, however, a > particle arrives from some far-away cosmic explosion and triggers gate B > anyway. Assuming comp we (pretty safely) conclude that Alice’s > consciousness is unaffected by this change in causation – after all, the > computation has been performed.Moreover, we can assume any number – > thousands, say – of such failures in Alice’s brain, with lucky cosmic rays > arriving to save the day. Indeed, *all *of Alice’s neurons could be > disabled, with cosmic rays triggering each one in just the right way so as > to maintain her consciousness. Bruno (wisely, in my opinion) likes to end > the steps of his argument with questions. At the end of MGA 1, he asks, is > Alice a zombie during the exam? We are really forced to say that she isn’t, > because of our comp assumption. So Alice is just as conscious as she was > before her brain started short-circuiting. > > > In *Part 2*,* *we build on the ideas of part 1 but without cosmic rays. > Bruno assumes for the sake of argument, again with no loss of generality, > that Alice is dreaming and that her brain has no inputs or outputs. Now, > Alice’s (artificial) brain is a 3D Boolean graph (network being the more > common term), which, with a few wiring changes, can be deformed into a 2D > Boolean graph and thus laid out on a plane. Next Bruno asks us to imagine > us instantiating Alice’s 2D graph-brain as a system of laser beams > connecting nodes (instead of wires, and with destructive interference > helping out with NOR, etc.), all in some special material. The graph is > placed between two glass plates, and a special crystalline material is > sandwiched between the plates which has the property that if a beam of > light connects two nodes, the “right” laser is triggered to signal the > right node at that location. (Unlikely, but conceivable and valid, which is > all we intrepid philosophers need anyway!) > > > So Alice is dreaming (conscious), with her dream supervening on the 2D > optical graph, and with no malfunctions. Suppose we film these computations > with a video camera. Now suppose Alice begins to dream the same dream again > but after a while, Alice’s 2D graph begins making mistakes, i.e. not > sending signals where signals should be sent. But if we, in all our > humanitarian goodwill, project the (perfectly aligned) film onto the > optical material/graph, we can preserve Alice’s consciousness completely. > If it worked with the cosmic rays from part 1, it works here too, by comp. > Alice remains conscious. > > > Finally, in *Part 3*, we reach some apparent contradictions. Bruno > introduces a (safe) principle at the beginning, namely that if some part of > a system is not used for the functioning of that system in some given task, > then it can be removed and still complete that task. If Alice doesn’t use >
Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 11:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 11:45 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: > I am truly agnostic. I really have no earthly idea. But assuming >> computationalism, as in the MGA, I have to say yes. With this assumption, >> the particular physical implementation of a program, however bizarre, is >> not relevant -- only the execution of the algorithm matters. >> > > I agree that only the algorithm matters, but my contention is that in this > case, the isolated neurons operating on input from the star do not > implement the same algorithm. A bunch of logic gates from a CPU, > physically separated (without any intercommunication) has no causal > interdependence, the bits they contain have no relation to each other. > > >> As Bruno has emphasized again and again, if you reject this, then you >> reject comp as well. >> > > I accept comp, but I reject the MGA (as I currently understand it). It > may be that I do not understand the MGA. My objection is that I find it > less than clear whether Alice remains conscious when her neurons are > processing shallow input. > I guess its an open question. I certainly can't solve this issue. Maybe I'll think about it and come up with something. However my argument in the OP is independent of this criticism. > > >> >> What you say is interesting though, because I think it bears on the issue >> of the unity of >> consciousness<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-unity/>. >> Perhaps such a completely disconnected brain would be incapable of >> experiencing what we humans call the" unity of consciousness". >> >> >> > > If the neurons in this scenario really do implement the same algorithm, > then they would necessarily experience the same unity of consciousness. > > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 10:34 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 11:21 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: > >> >> >> On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 6:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >>> Joseph, >>> >>> I found your post very interesting. While I agree with your conclusion, >>> how I get there is a little different. >>> >>> I think that at the time all of Alice's neuronal firings are triggered >>> by random particles she is a zombie. It is less clear in the case of a >>> single malfunctioning neuron. This is because of the modularity of our >>> brains: Different sections of the brain perform specific functions. Some >>> neurons may serve only as communication links between different regions in >>> the brain, while others may be involved in processing. I think that the >>> malfunction and correction of a "communication neuron" might not alter >>> Alice's experience, in the same way we could correct a faulty signal in her >>> optic nerve and not expect her experience to be affected. I am less sure, >>> however, that a neuron involved in processing could have its function >>> replaced by a randomly received particle, as this changes the definition of >>> the machine. >>> >>> Think of a register containing a bit '1'. If the bit is '1' because two >>> inputs were received and the logical AND operation is applied, this is an >>> entirely different computation from two bits being ANDed, the result placed >>> in that register, then (regardless of the result) the bit '1' is set in >>> that register. This erases any effect of the two input bits, and redefines >>> the computation altogether. This 'set 1' instruction is much like the >>> received particles from the super nova causing neurons to fire. It is a >>> very shallow computation, and in my opinion, not likely to lead to any >>> consciousness. >>> >> >> I see what you are saying here, but I don't think this counterargument >> works because the wiring (i.e. logical rules) of Alice's neural network >> have not themselves been changed by her malfunctioning -- only the >> individual inputs themselves. The way those inputs are processed has not >> changed. >> >> > > If every neuron is processing only inputs generated by the exploded star > then the neurons might as well be completely isolated > If the logical rules are processing these star-generated inputs > (equivalent to input generated by a "set 1" instruction) then there would > be no deep computations, no recursion, etc. Would you argue that Alice's > neurons firing in complete physical isolation from each other could create > conscious? > Assume each neuron fires at the same times it would if it were still in > Alice's functioning mind. > > I am truly agnostic. I really have no earthly idea. But assuming computationalism, as in the MGA, I have to say yes. With this assumption, the particular physical implementation of a program, however bizarre, is not relevant -- only the execution of the algorithm matters. As Bruno has emphasized again and again, if you reject this, then you reject comp as well. What you say is interesting though, because I think it bears on the issue of the unity of consciousness<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-unity/>. Perhaps such a completely disconnected brain would be incapable of experiencing what we humans call the" unity of consciousness". > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation
Craig, no one would ever claim that the brain is a perfectly discrete system (at the neuronal level at least) such as the sort represented in Boolean models. But continuous neural networks can still be modeled (with varying degrees of error) by discrete ones, without much loss of insight. (Researchers study both continuous and discrete networks all the time!) Moreover, continuous functions can be represented in computers just like discrete ones can, without even using rational approximations. For example, sqrt(2) can be represented and manipulated as the number 2 with the square root operation next to it, and not just as 1.414 (say). You will soon learn not to take on faith everything you read in university press releases, which are not different in kind from fast food advertisements on TV :) Also, modularity in this context does not refer to the discreteness of neuron states, or synapse firing, etc., it rather refers to the (not total, obviously) relative isolation of certain subsystems in performing certain tasks. On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 9:00 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > On Dec 22, 7:13 pm, Jason Resch wrote: > > > This is because of the modularity of our brains: > > Different sections of the brain perform specific functions. Some neurons > > may serve only as communication links between different regions in the > > brain, while others may be involved in processing. I think that the > > malfunction and correction of a "communication neuron" might not alter > > Alice's experience, in the same way we could correct a faulty signal in > her > > optic nerve and not expect her experience to be affected. I am less > sure, > > however, that a neuron involved in processing could have its function > > replaced by a randomly received particle, as this changes the definition > of > > the machine. > > > > Think of a register containing a bit '1'. If the bit is '1' because two > > inputs were received and the logical AND operation is applied, this is an > > entirely different computation from two bits being ANDed, the result > placed > > in that register, then (regardless of the result) the bit '1' is set in > > that register. This erases any effect of the two input bits, and > redefines > > the computation altogether. This 'set 1' instruction is much like the > > received particles from the super nova causing neurons to fire. It is a > > very shallow computation, and in my opinion, not likely to lead to any > > consciousness. > > This study suggests that the mind should not be modeled in that way: > http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/June05/new.mind.model.ssl.html > > "For decades, the cognitive and neural sciences have treated mental > processes as though they involved passing discrete packets of > information in a strictly feed-forward fashion from one cognitive > module to the next or in a string of individuated binary symbols -- > like a digital computer," said Spivey. "More recently, however, a > growing number of studies, such as ours, support dynamical-systems > approaches to the mind. In this model, perception and cognition are > mathematically described as a continuous trajectory through a high- > dimensional mental space; the neural activation patterns flow back and > forth to produce nonlinear, self-organized, emergent properties -- > like a biological organism." > > Their findings support my view that consciousness is biological > awareness, not modular computation. > > Craig > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 6:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > Joseph, > > I found your post very interesting. While I agree with your conclusion, > how I get there is a little different. > > I think that at the time all of Alice's neuronal firings are triggered by > random particles she is a zombie. It is less clear in the case of a single > malfunctioning neuron. This is because of the modularity of our brains: > Different sections of the brain perform specific functions. Some neurons > may serve only as communication links between different regions in the > brain, while others may be involved in processing. I think that the > malfunction and correction of a "communication neuron" might not alter > Alice's experience, in the same way we could correct a faulty signal in her > optic nerve and not expect her experience to be affected. I am less sure, > however, that a neuron involved in processing could have its function > replaced by a randomly received particle, as this changes the definition of > the machine. > > Think of a register containing a bit '1'. If the bit is '1' because two > inputs were received and the logical AND operation is applied, this is an > entirely different computation from two bits being ANDed, the result placed > in that register, then (regardless of the result) the bit '1' is set in > that register. This erases any effect of the two input bits, and redefines > the computation altogether. This 'set 1' instruction is much like the > received particles from the super nova causing neurons to fire. It is a > very shallow computation, and in my opinion, not likely to lead to any > consciousness. > I see what you are saying here, but I don't think this counterargument works because the wiring (i.e. logical rules) of Alice's neural network have not themselves been changed by her malfunctioning -- only the individual inputs themselves. The way those inputs are processed has not changed. > > Jason > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation
and expect Alice to pass her exam – in both cases, we are left merely with an interesting light show. In conclusion, we are *not *forced to conclude that Alice’s consciousness supervenes on a vacuum, or on an inert film reel. Please discuss, and tell me if I myself have made any errors. Regarding Maudlin’s argument: Russell has recently stated that Maudlin’s argument doesn’t work in a multiverse, and that consciousness is thus a multiverse phenomenon. I disagree for the same reason that Bruno disagrees: the region of the multiverse on which consciousness supervenes can just be Turing emulated in a huge water/trough/block computer, and Maudlin’s argument can be reapplied. I realize that this could lead to an infinite regress…hmm… The real reason I don’t find Tim Maudlin’s argument convincing is largely due to recent comments made by Brent. It is not patently absurd that a constant program/algorithm cannot be conscious – it is for intelligence, however. For all I know, this has not been decided either way. Maybe in the future a “consciousness theorem” will decide the matter one way or another, but until then I don’t think that Maudlin has demonstrated a contradiction, just an irritating fact. (It seems to me, and is worth noting, that if the principle of irrelevant subparts is true, then we are forced to conclude that a constant program/algorithm can be conscious, rendering Maudlin’s paradox, well, not a paradox.) Intelligence is tricky, as it has the notion of counterfactual bound up within its definition. But there is no *a priori *reason to assume this to be the case for consciousness. -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Movie Graph Argument
> > If Maudlin’s argument is a foundation of the UDA, then it seems to me > the UDA is on shaky ground, though I have yet to investigate the MGA > in depth. People talk about the Movie Graph Argument, but the links > provided refer to Alice and a distant supernova with lucky rays that > substitute for functional neurons. I don’t see a connection to the > idea of a recording or a filmed graph. Can someone enlighten me? > You must be looking at the first thread (there are three). Here are the other two. http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/18539e96f75bb740/b748e386a6795f3c http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/a0e1758bf03bc080/6f9f14d6fb505261 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Movie Graph Argument
On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 7:11 PM, meekerdb wrote: > On 12/14/2011 2:09 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: > > > > On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 1:51 PM, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 12/14/2011 10:40 AM, Joseph Knight wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 13, 2011 at 11:32 PM, Kim Jones wrote: >> >>> Any chance someone might précis for me/us dummies out here in maybe 3 >>> sentences what Tim Maudlin's argument is? Nothing too heavy - just a quick >>> refresher. >>> >>> I'll try, but with a few more than 3 sentences. Suppose the >> consciousness of a machine can be said to supervene on the running of some >> program X. We can have a machine run the program but only running a >> constant program Y that gives the same output as X for one given input. In >> other words, it cannot "handle" counterfactual inputs because it is just a >> constant program that does the same thing no matter what. Surely such a >> machine is not conscious. It would be like, if I decided "I will answer A B >> D B D D C A C..." in response to the Chemistry test I am about to run off >> and take, and happened to get them all correct, I wouldn't really know >> Chemistry, right? >> >> >> But I think Russell has reasonably questioned this. You say X wouldn't >> know chemistry. But that's a matter of intelligence, not necessarily >> consciousness. We already know that computers can be intelligent, and >> there's nothing mysterious about intelligence "supervening" on machines. >> Intelligence includes returning appropriate outputs for many different >> inputs. But does consciousness? >> > > I was really just using my Chemistry test as an imperfect analogy to the > machine running Y being conscious (or not), so it doesn't affect the rest > of the argument. But I see your point. Would you argue that a constant > program (giving the same output no matter the input) can be conscious in > principle? > > > I don't think something can be conscious in the human sense unless it is > intelligent. The question is can something be intelligent without being > conscious. > I have always assumed so. Maybe it is unjustified, but I see no compelling reason why intelligence implies consciousness. There are strong reasons to believe the two are correlated though, because I agree that consciousness probably implies high intelligence. > I incline to not, but I'm not sure. I think the interesting point is that > there tends to be a unjustified slip from consciousness to intelligence in > some arguments. > Agreed; I have encountered this many times in discussions like this. I prefer to leave intelligence out of it entirely, because I don't think there is any real controversy over whether intelligent entities can be built with 1s and 0s. In fact, they already have. > In particular the "323" argument implicitly assumes that > not-intelligent=>not-conscious. > I am still unsure of the 323 argument, could you or someone explain? > > Brent > > Maudlin assumes that such a program cannot be conscious, in his words, > "it would make a mockery of the computational theory of mind." I am > agnostic. In my opinion the Filmed Graph argument is more convincing than > Maudlin, because with Maudlin one can still fall back to the position > "consciousness can in principle supervene on a constant program". > > (For those interested, here is the article > itself<http://www.finney.org/%7Ehal/maudlin.pdf> > ) > > >> >> Brent >> >> >> >> So consciousness doesn't supervene on Y. But Maudlin (basically) shows >> that you can just add some additional parts to the machine that handle the >> counterfactuals as needed. These extra parts don't actually do anything, >> but their "presence" means the machine now could exactly emulate program X, >> i.e., is conscious. So a computationalist is forced to assert that the >> machine's consciousness supervenes on the presence of these extra parts, >> which in fact perform no computations at all. >> >> I think what Russell said about this earlier, i.e., in a multiverse the >> extra parts are doing things, so consciousness then appears at the scale of >> the multiverse -- is fascinating. But I am out of time. Hope this helped. I >> would recommend reading the original paper for the details. >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >
Re: Movie Graph Argument
On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 1:51 PM, meekerdb wrote: > On 12/14/2011 10:40 AM, Joseph Knight wrote: > > > > On Tue, Dec 13, 2011 at 11:32 PM, Kim Jones wrote: > >> Any chance someone might précis for me/us dummies out here in maybe 3 >> sentences what Tim Maudlin's argument is? Nothing too heavy - just a quick >> refresher. >> >> I'll try, but with a few more than 3 sentences. Suppose the > consciousness of a machine can be said to supervene on the running of some > program X. We can have a machine run the program but only running a > constant program Y that gives the same output as X for one given input. In > other words, it cannot "handle" counterfactual inputs because it is just a > constant program that does the same thing no matter what. Surely such a > machine is not conscious. It would be like, if I decided "I will answer A B > D B D D C A C..." in response to the Chemistry test I am about to run off > and take, and happened to get them all correct, I wouldn't really know > Chemistry, right? > > > But I think Russell has reasonably questioned this. You say X wouldn't > know chemistry. But that's a matter of intelligence, not necessarily > consciousness. We already know that computers can be intelligent, and > there's nothing mysterious about intelligence "supervening" on machines. > Intelligence includes returning appropriate outputs for many different > inputs. But does consciousness? > I was really just using my Chemistry test as an imperfect analogy to the machine running Y being conscious (or not), so it doesn't affect the rest of the argument. But I see your point. Would you argue that a constant program (giving the same output no matter the input) can be conscious in principle? Maudlin assumes that such a program cannot be conscious, in his words, "it would make a mockery of the computational theory of mind." I am agnostic. In my opinion the Filmed Graph argument is more convincing than Maudlin, because with Maudlin one can still fall back to the position "consciousness can in principle supervene on a constant program". (For those interested, here is the article itself<http://www.finney.org/~hal/maudlin.pdf> ) > > Brent > > > > So consciousness doesn't supervene on Y. But Maudlin (basically) shows > that you can just add some additional parts to the machine that handle the > counterfactuals as needed. These extra parts don't actually do anything, > but their "presence" means the machine now could exactly emulate program X, > i.e., is conscious. So a computationalist is forced to assert that the > machine's consciousness supervenes on the presence of these extra parts, > which in fact perform no computations at all. > > I think what Russell said about this earlier, i.e., in a multiverse the > extra parts are doing things, so consciousness then appears at the scale of > the multiverse -- is fascinating. But I am out of time. Hope this helped. I > would recommend reading the original paper for the details. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Movie Graph Argument
On Tue, Dec 13, 2011 at 11:32 PM, Kim Jones wrote: > Any chance someone might précis for me/us dummies out here in maybe 3 > sentences what Tim Maudlin's argument is? Nothing too heavy - just a quick > refresher. > > I'll try, but with a few more than 3 sentences. Suppose the consciousness of a machine can be said to supervene on the running of some program X. We can have a machine run the program but only running a constant program Y that gives the same output as X for one given input. In other words, it cannot "handle" counterfactual inputs because it is just a constant program that does the same thing no matter what. Surely such a machine is not conscious. It would be like, if I decided "I will answer A B D B D D C A C..." in response to the Chemistry test I am about to run off and take, and happened to get them all correct, I wouldn't really know Chemistry, right? So consciousness doesn't supervene on Y. But Maudlin (basically) shows that you can just add some additional parts to the machine that handle the counterfactuals as needed. These extra parts don't actually do anything, but their "presence" means the machine now could exactly emulate program X, i.e., is conscious. So a computationalist is forced to assert that the machine's consciousness supervenes on the presence of these extra parts, which in fact perform no computations at all. I think what Russell said about this earlier, i.e., in a multiverse the extra parts are doing things, so consciousness then appears at the scale of the multiverse -- is fascinating. But I am out of time. Hope this helped. I would recommend reading the original paper for the details. > Jolly kind of you, > > Kim Jones > > > > On 12/12/2011, at 10:05 AM, Russell Standish wrote: > > Maudlin's argument relies on the absurdity the the presence or absence > of inert parts bears on whether something is consious. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Movie Graph Argument
teral folk ontology, the > notion of automatism as the authoritative essence of identity has ugly > consequences. Wal Mart. Wall Street. The triumph of quanitative > analysis over qualitative aesthetics is emptying our culture of all > significance, leaving only a digital residue - the essence of generic > interchangeability - like money itself, a universal placeholder for > the power of nothingness to impersonate anything and everything. I can buy that. > Just > as alchemists and mystics once gazed into mere matter and coincidence > looking for higher wisdom of a spiritual nature, physics and > mathematics now gazes into consciousness looking for a foregone > conclusion of objective certainty. It's a fools errand. I'm glad we have you to tell us these things! Your position is legitimate, in that it is perfectly fine to deny computationalism. But you have no argument, so there is no reason to take you seriously. -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Movie Graph Argument
On Sat, Dec 10, 2011 at 6:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 09 Dec 2011, at 19:47, Joseph Knight wrote: > > On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> On 09 Dec 2011, at 06:30, Joseph Knight wrote: >> >> Hi Bruno >> >> I was cruising the web when I stumbled upon a couple of PDFs by Jean-Paul >> Delahaye criticizing your work. (PDF >> 1<http://www2.lifl.fr/~delahaye/dnalor/UDA2010.pdf>, >> PDF 2 <http://www2.lifl.fr/~delahaye/dnalor/RefGraFil.pdf>). I don't >> speak French, but google translate was able to help me up to a point. The >> main point of PDF 1, in relation to the UDA, seems to be that there is not >> necessarily a notion of probability defined for truly indeterministic >> events. (Is this accurate? Are there any results in this area? I couldn't >> find much.) >> >> >> Jean-Paul Delahaye was the director of my thesis, and in 2004, when I >> asked him why I did not get the gift (money, publication of the thesis, and >> promotion of it) of the price I got in Paris for my thesis, he told me that >> he has refuted it (!). I had to wait for more than six year to see that >> "refutation" which appears to be only a pack of crap. >> > > So you never got the money, publication, or promotion? > > > I get only defamation. > > > > Most objection are either rhetorical tricks, or contains elementary >> logical errors. I will, or not, answer to those fake objections. I have no >> clue why Delahaye acts like that. I think that if he had a real objection >> he would have told me this in private first, and not under my back. He >> showed a lacking of elementary scientific deontology. He might have some >> pressure from Paris, who witnessed some pressure from Brussels to hide a >> belgo-french academical scandal, but of course he denies this. >> > >> So Delahaye is that unique "scientist", that i have mentionned in some >> post, who pretend to refute my thesis. My director thesis! >> >> >> >> The translation of PDF 2, with regards to the Movie Graph argument, was >> much harder for me to understand. Could you help me out with what Delayahe >> is saying here, and what your response is? I am just curious about these >> things :) I noticed some discussion of removing stones from heaps, and >> comparing that to the removal of subparts of the filmed graph, which to me >> seemed to be an illegitimate analogy, but I would like to hear your take... >> >> >> The heap argument was already done when I was working on the thesis, and >> I answered it by the stroboscopic argument, which he did understand without >> problem at that time. Such an argument is also answered by Chalmers fading >> qualia paper, and would introduce zombie in the mechanist picture. We can >> go through all of this if you are interested, but it would be simpler to >> study the MGA argument first, for example here: >> >> http://old.nabble.com/MGA-1-td20566948.html >> >> There are many other errors in Delahaye's PDF, like saying that there is >> no uniform measure on N (but there are just non sigma-additive measures), >> and also that remark is without purpose because the measure bears on >> infinite histories, like the iterated self-duplication experience, which is >> part of the UD's work, already illustrates. >> >> All along its critics, he confuses truth and validity, practical and in >> principle, deduction and speculation, science and continental philosophy. >> He also adds assumptions, and talk like if I was defending the truth of >> comp, which I never did (that mistake is not unfrequent, and is made by >> people who does not take the time to read the argument, usually). >> >> I proposed him, in 2004, to make a public talk at Lille, so that he can >> make his objection publicly, but he did not answer. I have to insist to get >> those PDF. I did not expect him to make them public before I answered them, >> though, and the tone used does not invite me to answer them with serenity. >> He has not convinced me, nor anyone else, that he takes himself his >> argument seriously. >> >> The only remark which can perhaps be taken seriously about MGA is the >> same as the one by Jacques Mallah on this list: the idea that a physically >> inactive material piece of machine could have a physical activity relevant >> for a particular computation, that is the idea that comp does not entail >> what I call "the 323 principle". But as Stathis Papaioannou said, this does >> introduce a magic
Re: Movie Graph Argument
On Sat, Dec 10, 2011 at 12:23 AM, Russell Standish wrote: > On Fri, Dec 09, 2011 at 12:47:32PM -0600, Joseph Knight wrote (to Bruno): > > > > Could you elaborate on the 323 principle? It sounds like a qualm that I > > also have had, to an extent, with the MGA and also with Tim Maudlin's > > argument against supervenience -- the notion of "inertness" or "physical > > inactivity" seems to be fairly vague. > > > > I discuss this on page 76 of my book. > > AFAICT, Maudlin's argument only works in a single universe > setting. What is inert in one universe, is alive and kicking in other > universes for which the counterfactuals are true. > > So it seems that COMP and single world, deterministic, materialism are > incompatible, but COMP and many worlds materialism is not (ie > supervenience across parallel worlds whose histories are compatible > with our present). > > But then the UDA shows that parallel realities must occur, and > consciousness must supervene across all consistent histories, and that > the subjective future is indeterminate. > Thanks, that makes a lot of sense. (Actually, I have read your book, but I read it before I really understood the issues at hand so I missed a lot. It's a good book, especially considering the breadth of topics it covers!) So you are saying that consciousness supervenes on the goings-on of other regions of the multiverse? -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Movie Graph Argument
On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 09 Dec 2011, at 06:30, Joseph Knight wrote: > > Hi Bruno > > I was cruising the web when I stumbled upon a couple of PDFs by Jean-Paul > Delahaye criticizing your work. (PDF > 1<http://www2.lifl.fr/~delahaye/dnalor/UDA2010.pdf>, > PDF 2 <http://www2.lifl.fr/~delahaye/dnalor/RefGraFil.pdf>). I don't > speak French, but google translate was able to help me up to a point. The > main point of PDF 1, in relation to the UDA, seems to be that there is not > necessarily a notion of probability defined for truly indeterministic > events. (Is this accurate? Are there any results in this area? I couldn't > find much.) > > > Jean-Paul Delahaye was the director of my thesis, and in 2004, when I > asked him why I did not get the gift (money, publication of the thesis, and > promotion of it) of the price I got in Paris for my thesis, he told me that > he has refuted it (!). I had to wait for more than six year to see that > "refutation" which appears to be only a pack of crap. > So you never got the money, publication, or promotion? Most objection are either rhetorical tricks, or contains elementary logical > errors. I will, or not, answer to those fake objections. I have no clue why > Delahaye acts like that. I think that if he had a real objection he would > have told me this in private first, and not under my back. He showed a > lacking of elementary scientific deontology. He might have some pressure > from Paris, who witnessed some pressure from Brussels to hide a > belgo-french academical scandal, but of course he denies this. > > So Delahaye is that unique "scientist", that i have mentionned in some > post, who pretend to refute my thesis. My director thesis! > > > > The translation of PDF 2, with regards to the Movie Graph argument, was > much harder for me to understand. Could you help me out with what Delayahe > is saying here, and what your response is? I am just curious about these > things :) I noticed some discussion of removing stones from heaps, and > comparing that to the removal of subparts of the filmed graph, which to me > seemed to be an illegitimate analogy, but I would like to hear your take... > > > The heap argument was already done when I was working on the thesis, and I > answered it by the stroboscopic argument, which he did understand without > problem at that time. Such an argument is also answered by Chalmers fading > qualia paper, and would introduce zombie in the mechanist picture. We can > go through all of this if you are interested, but it would be simpler to > study the MGA argument first, for example here: > > http://old.nabble.com/MGA-1-td20566948.html > > There are many other errors in Delahaye's PDF, like saying that there is > no uniform measure on N (but there are just non sigma-additive measures), > and also that remark is without purpose because the measure bears on > infinite histories, like the iterated self-duplication experience, which is > part of the UD's work, already illustrates. > > All along its critics, he confuses truth and validity, practical and in > principle, deduction and speculation, science and continental philosophy. > He also adds assumptions, and talk like if I was defending the truth of > comp, which I never did (that mistake is not unfrequent, and is made by > people who does not take the time to read the argument, usually). > > I proposed him, in 2004, to make a public talk at Lille, so that he can > make his objection publicly, but he did not answer. I have to insist to get > those PDF. I did not expect him to make them public before I answered them, > though, and the tone used does not invite me to answer them with serenity. > He has not convinced me, nor anyone else, that he takes himself his > argument seriously. > > The only remark which can perhaps be taken seriously about MGA is the same > as the one by Jacques Mallah on this list: the idea that a physically > inactive material piece of machine could have a physical activity relevant > for a particular computation, that is the idea that comp does not entail > what I call "the 323 principle". But as Stathis Papaioannou said, this does > introduce a magic (non Turing emulable) role for matter in the computation, > and that's against the comp hypothesis. No one seems to take the idea that > comp does not entail 323 seriously in this list, but I am willing to > clarify this. > Could you elaborate on the 323 principle? It sounds like a qualm that I also have had, to an extent, with the MGA and also with Tim Maudlin's argument against supervenience -- the notion of "inertness" or "physical inactivity" seems t
Movie Graph Argument
Hi Bruno I was cruising the web when I stumbled upon a couple of PDFs by Jean-Paul Delahaye criticizing your work. (PDF 1<http://www2.lifl.fr/~delahaye/dnalor/UDA2010.pdf>, PDF 2 <http://www2.lifl.fr/~delahaye/dnalor/RefGraFil.pdf>). I don't speak French, but google translate was able to help me up to a point. The main point of PDF 1, in relation to the UDA, seems to be that there is not necessarily a notion of probability defined for truly indeterministic events. (Is this accurate? Are there any results in this area? I couldn't find much.) The translation of PDF 2, with regards to the Movie Graph argument, was much harder for me to understand. Could you help me out with what Delayahe is saying here, and what your response is? I am just curious about these things :) I noticed some discussion of removing stones from heaps, and comparing that to the removal of subparts of the filmed graph, which to me seemed to be an illegitimate analogy, but I would like to hear your take... Thanks -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Hello Everything List
Hello Everything List, My name is Joseph Knight. This is my first post. Like most of you, I am interested in math, philosophy, science I've been lurking on this list for around 6 months now, absorbing what the people here have to say about life, the universe, and everything. My view of things has been challenged and mutated significantly in these months. In particular I have been focusing on the UDA and related topics, which seems to easily be the most-discussed issue in this group. I just wanted to say hi because I plan to add my two cents from time to time! Looking forward to the discussions -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
