Re: The Meaning of Life

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 07-févr.-07, à 05:55, Brent Meeker a écrit  (some time ago)

>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> Sorry, I thought I was replying to what you said. It's possible of
>> course to be right about one thing and wrong about another, and people
>> do keep different beliefs differently compartmentalized in their head,
>> like your brother-in-law. However, this is *inconsistent*, and
>> inconsistent is even worse than wrong.
>>
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>
> I'm not sure I agree with that last.  Being consistent means you're 
> either all right or all wrong.  :-)


I don't think so. By Godel II, [Peano Arithmetic + the axiom that Peano 
Arithmetic is inconsistent] is consistent. But is wrong (because PA 
*is* consistent), but not all wrong, because PA + PA is inconsistent 
does correctly prove that 1+1=2.

You can be wrong, and consistent. It is due to the gap between truth 
and provability. Stathis is right, you (and machine lobian) can be 
right on something and wrong on another thing, still remaining 
consistent.

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> This study recent published in Nature suggests not only a neural basis 
> for morality, but a specific neural basis for a specific kind of morality:

I'd say an irrational morality.  I almost always make the utilitarian choice in 
those hypothetical moral dilemmas (must be damage from one of my motorcycle 
crashes :-)).  

I wonder if they surveyed any Inuits, who traditionally killed female infants 
in a family until a son had been born.

Brent Meeker

> 
> http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/abs/nature05631.html
> 
> http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/22/science/22brain.html?_r=1&ref=science&oref=slogin
>  
> 
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

This study recent published in Nature suggests not only a neural basis for
morality, but a specific neural basis for a specific kind of morality:

http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/abs/nature05631.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/22/science/22brain.html?_r=1&ref=science&oref=slogin

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 15-mars-07, à 19:38, Brent Meeker a écrit :

>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Le 13-mars-07, à 05:03, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>
>>> But there is no reason to believe there is any "root" cause that is
>>> deeper than variation with natural selection.  You have not presented
>>> any argument for the existence of this "ultimate" or "root".  You
>>> merely refer to "closed science" as though that proved something - 
>>> but
>>> it begs the question.  You have to show there is something outside
>>> science in order to know that it is "closed"; not just that there is
>>> something science has not explained, there's lots of that, but
>>> something that science cannot, in-principle explain.
>>
>>
>> Assuming comp, we can know that science will never been able to 
>> explain
>> where natural numbers come from. That's an insoluble mystery.
>> It makes science open. Forever.
>
> I think that depends on what you count as explanation.  There are 
> certainly possible evolutionary explanations for why humans invented 
> counting of say sheep instead of looking at each sheep as a unique 
> thing.


OK, but we have to distinguish
A) the existence of numbers, and
B) the discovery of numbers by humans.
I can understand how human discovered numbers  by mixture of 
introspection and observation of a physical reality (and struggle of 
life ...).
But to understand the physical reality I need the numbers at the start.

>
>>
>> But then comp *can* explain (but does not yet provide more than an
>> embryo of explanation, yet already confirmed) where waves and 
>> particles
>> come from, and also, unlike physics, why waves and particles can hurt
>> (cf G/G*).
>
> But can comp explain why there is einselection of large objects and 
> the world is approximately classical.

Normally classical comp implies quantum observation, and quantum theory 
can explain the emergence of the classical mind (in the Everett, 
Hartle, Deutsch way).

Comp makes qubit emerging from glueing dreams by  bits. But our local 
bits emerge most probably from our local qubits.
Bit---Qubit is a two way road, if comp is correct (and if my reasoning 
is valid, 'course).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 15-mars-07, à 17:15, David Nyman a écrit :

> Yes, in that it makes sense to argue (from a 'contingentist'
> perspective) that the justification for 'primeness' (or indeed any
> other concept) derives ultimately from persistent aspects of
> contingent states of affairs (in this case a degree of persistence we
> abstract as 'necessity').  So from this perspective 17 is
> 'necessarily' prime, but this very 'necessity' is limited to the
> contingent framework that supports the conceptual one. In this view,
> positing 'platonic primeness' does no further work. This is not to
> take issue with Bruno's alternative numerical basis for contingency,
> but rather to see it as just that - an alternative, not a knock-down
> argument.


Please, don't take what I will say here as an authoritative argument. 
Giving the extreme newness, you have to understand this by yourself, 
and the UDA is really a construction which aimed at that. But my point 
is that once we assume the comp hyp in the cognitive science, then, the 
reversal between "matter" and "mind" is not an alternative, it is a 
necessity.
You can still believe in "primary matter" if you want to, but you just 
cannot use it to individuate neither mind/person, nor matter.
Of course, arithmetical truth as seen from inside is full of relative 
contingies, generally treated by a modal diamond (having an 
arithmetical interpretation).
For the UDA you need only a passive knowledge of Church thesis. For the 
lob interview you need more background in mathematical logic and in 
theoretical computer science.
And to believe it, I guess you have to know about the quantum, which is 
currently still more weird than anything I extract from comp (but that 
converges as it should).

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 15-mars-07, à 01:38, David Nyman a écrit :

> On Mar 14, 10:18 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> Perhaps using the term "existence" for mathematical objects is 
>> misleading.
>> It doesn't mean they exist as separate objects in the real world,  
>> just that
>> they exist as concepts. This is mathematical Platonism.
>
> Yes, I understand.  I guess I'm saying that nevertheless I can
> conceive of a radical negation in which even Platonic objects have no
> existence, conceptual or otherwise. Consequently AFAICS arguments for
> Platonic 'necessity' are in fact derived wholly from contingent states
> of affairs.


True. But the fact that the human conception of platonic necessity is 
derived from contingent facts does not necessarily change the necessity 
character of platonic truth.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[John M]

Brent:
"...No parent expects to receive anything but satisfaction from raising their 
children - as perfectly well explained by Darwin.  And how dare you assert that 
money I sent to Katrina victims was simply calculated to get something back.  
There are many possible Darwinian explanations for feelings of altruism; but 
apparently you haven't bothered to find them..."

What is this? a mental blockage?
How could you forget (disregard) your 1st sentence in the 2nd? Are you a 
formalistical materialist to expect ONLY monetary rewards for money (or 
anything else) spent? S a t i s f a c t i o n  is not a reward? Feeling good 
about something? Besides such feelings - indeed - might have developed from 
'real' return: raising young means having a community-protection when getting 
old (as the most primitive idea). As complexity grew such ideas get also more 
complex. Luv is a composition. Not a primitive

John M


  - Original Message - 
  From: Brent Meeker 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2007 12:03 AM
  Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life



  Tom Caylor wrote:
  > On Mar 6, 5:19 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
  >> Tom Caylor wrote:
  >>>> A source that has given us the crusades and 9/11 as well as the
  >>>> sister's of mercy.  No a very sufficient source if nobody can
  >>>> agree on what it provides.
  >>> I don't like simply saying "That isn't so," but "nobody can agree
  >>> on what it provides", referring to the source of ultimate
  >>> meaning,
  >> I was referring to the "sufficient source of *morality*".  Such a
  >> source should be able to provide an unambiguous standard that is so
  >> clear everyone agrees - if it existed.
  >> 
  >>> is not true.  In fact it's very remarkable the consistency,
  >>> across all kinds of cultures, the basic beliefs of truly
  >>> normative morality, evidence for their being a source which
  >>> cannot be explained through closed science alone.
  >> Why not?  Why isn't Darwin's or Scott Atran's or Richard Dawkin's a
  >> *possible* explanation. And how is "God did it" an explanation of
  >> anything?  It's just a form of words so ambiguous as to be
  >> virtually empty.  "God" meant different things to the crusaders and
  >> the 9/11 jihadists, to the Aztecs and the Conquistadores, to the
  >> Nazi's and the Jews.  So just because they use the same word
  >> doesn't mean they are referring to the same thing.
  >> 
  > 
  > We've talked about this before.  Darwin cannot explain giving without
  >  expecting to receive.

  Where do you get this nonsense??  Do you just make it up as you need it?  No 
parent expects to receive anything but satisfaction from raising their children 
- as perfectly well explained by Darwin.  And how dare you assert that money I 
sent to Katrina victims was simply calculated to get something back.  There are 
many possible Darwinian explanations for feelings of altruism; but apparently 
you haven't bothered to find them.
  ...skipped the rest...
  Brent Meeker


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[John M]

Thank you, Russell

John
  - Original Message - 
  From: Russell Standish 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2007 6:56 PM
  Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life



  I think high energy physicists talk about "colour charge", rather than
  "colour pole", but this is by analogy to electricity with its +ve &
  -ve charges, rather than analogy to magnetism with its north and south
  poles. However at the level of analogy, which is what your story is,
  this distinction is unimportant.

  In the real world, objects tend to be electrically neutral (even when
  charged, objects have only a slight imbalance between positive and
  negative charges). This is a not quite analogy to the need for magnets
  to always have two poles. Incidently, physicists also talk about
  monopoles, but aside from one isolated experiment, monopoles have
  never been seen.

  With the strong force, the colours can never be imbalanced on everyday
  objects. Only quarks have colour. Bigger objects from protons up are
  said to be "white" or "colourless". The reason for this is
  "confinement", but I'll let you look that up on Wikipedia if you're
  interested.

  Cheers

  On Wed, Mar 14, 2007 at 04:04:59PM -0400, John Mikes wrote:
  > Russell,
  > 
  >  I apologize for my flippant quip of yesterday, it was after several hours
  > of reading and replying internet discussion lists. Besides: it was true.
  > 
  > I never considered the features named as distinguishing 'colors'  in QCD as
  > "poles". Also it is new to me that the strong force has 3 poles. In my usage
  > a 'pole' represents ONE charge of the TWO we know of - the positive and the
  > negative.
  > Well, it seems those non-physicists are simpleminded brutes. It felt so good
  > to 'invent' something (for fun) beyond our grasp.
  >  What nature would that 3rd pole present in the strong force? (I ask this
  > question, because I did not read about the 3-pole distinction of it).
  > 
  > Cheers
  > 
  > John M
  > 
  > On 3/12/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
  > >
  > >
  > > On Mon, Mar 12, 2007 at 11:58:58AM -0400, John Mikes wrote:
  > > > In the sci-fi I wrote in 1988-89 I depicted the 'story' of human
  > > evolving as
  > > > done
  > > > by an experiment of aliens from another universe, to which I assigned
  > > > "energy"
  > > > with 3 (three) poles. One +, one -, and a THIRD one. (Maybe your math
  > > could
  > > > formulate this, but I could not. I accepted it as something beyond our
  > > human
  > > > mind.
  > >
  > > The strong force has 3 "poles". To think about them in a human
  > > fashion, we name them "red", "green" and "blue", and the theory
  > > describing the strong force is called "quantum chromodynamics". It
  > > doesn't seem beyond the human mind at all.
  > >
  > > I dare say if we had a reason to have a theory with four poles,
  > > someone will come up with a way of thinking about these too.
  > >
  > > Prof Russell Standish
  > >
  > 
  > > 

  -- 

  
  A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
  Mathematics 
  UNSW SYDNEY 2052  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au
  

  


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[John M]

  - Original Message - 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2007 10:34 AM
  Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
  (Brent's question skipped)...
  BM:
  Assuming comp, we can know that science will never been able to explain 
  where natural numbers come from. That's an insoluble mystery.
  It makes science open. Forever.

  But then comp *can* explain (but does not yet provide more than an 
  embryo of explanation, yet already confirmed) where waves and particles 
  come from, and also, unlike physics, why waves and particles can hurt 
  (cf G/G*).
  Bruno
  A question in the 1st par: (Not   the "assuming" or not part): it is the 
nature of that particular type 'science' prohibiting to disclose the origin of 
ANY numbers. 
  *
  As evolutionary complexity (and I emphasize this 'comp') goes, the hominid 
compared things, fingers, etc. and found 2 (two) hands/feet. Paralle to its 
mental development it realized 5 fingers on each. Compared to children in the 
cave and as the veins in his neck widened (through increasing holes in the 
skull etc.) for more blood into the developing neuronal brain, named the 
'count', "added" both hands if there were many kids and so on. I skip the 
ramifications, counting was developed with 'numbers named' and it is only a 
quanti developmental difference to arrive at a Hilbert space, or CQD. The 
growing neural complexity allowed the coordination of hand-muscles to make the 
hand-ax a projectile, something chimps have not yet achieved. It went in 
quantitative (no qualitative emergence and no random invention) steps to the 
spacerocket application.
  Then, gradually, the human mind became capable of more complexity - to 
explain natural observation at the level of the time in a quantised 
(physicalistic) fashion.
  *
  In another science-view, if we look at the processes as in a reductionist 
model separation, the numbers may appear as God, creating the universe. 
Unexplainably.
  It is another viewpoint of another form of 'science'.  
  The above is not my obsession, I see it as free thinking.
  *
  Bruno, I looked at your 'knots' (my head still spins from them) and agree to 
their topological - math view, no need of a material input. Which one was 
Alexander's? 
  Best wishes

  John M


  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


  


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[John M]

Thanks for a clear mind, Bruno. But isn't it obvious? We can "know" about what 
we don't know ONLY if we do know 'about it'. Copernicus did not know that he 
does not know radioactivity. Aristotle did not denigrate the linearity of QM 
because he did not know these items. 

My 'firm' knowledge of my ignorance stems from earlier memory: I know 
(remember) not having learnt many things I would have needed later on (by 
laziness or lack of interest). Nowadays I find myself exposed to other items of 
my ignorance and feel "lazy" to start studying things I did not study at 21. 
Don't even have the time (?) and tutor (school) - plus: I have a suspicious 
(violent?) mind and start arguing instead of learning.  
So I stay stupid (but happily so). 

Have a good weekend you too

Machine John

PS For some (taste?) reasons I like 'organisation'  - or 'organism' - better 
than 'machine', which carries a  notion of a composition (contraption): 
structural and designed ingredients assembled for some purpose. "Loebian 
machine" is different, (I hesitate to call it 'unlimited' or 
the questionable 'infinite') but the word is not. - J.
  - Original Message - 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2007 11:00 AM
  Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
  Le 14-mars-07, à 20:51, John Mikes a écrit :

  > I am not in favor of human omniscience.

  The more a machine knows, the more she is able to see the bigness of 
  its ignorance.

  Knowledge for lobian machine is really like a lantern in an infinite 
  room. The more powerful is the lantern, the more bigger the room seems 
  to be.

  So I certainly agree with you. Meaning: perhaps we are both wrong!

  Bon week-end,

  Bruno


  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Le 13-mars-07, à 05:03, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> 
>> But there is no reason to believe there is any "root" cause that is 
>> deeper than variation with natural selection.  You have not presented 
>> any argument for the existence of this "ultimate" or "root".  You 
>> merely refer to "closed science" as though that proved something - but 
>> it begs the question.  You have to show there is something outside 
>> science in order to know that it is "closed"; not just that there is 
>> something science has not explained, there's lots of that, but 
>> something that science cannot, in-principle explain.
> 
> 
> Assuming comp, we can know that science will never been able to explain 
> where natural numbers come from. That's an insoluble mystery.
> It makes science open. Forever.

I think that depends on what you count as explanation.  There are certainly 
possible evolutionary explanations for why humans invented counting of say 
sheep instead of looking at each sheep as a unique thing.

> 
> But then comp *can* explain (but does not yet provide more than an 
> embryo of explanation, yet already confirmed) where waves and particles 
> come from, and also, unlike physics, why waves and particles can hurt 
> (cf G/G*).

But can comp explain why there is einselection of large objects and the world 
is approximately classical.

Brent Meeker

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[David Nyman]

On Mar 15, 2:45 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> It's something Bruno, in particular, has discussed at length. Is it possible
> that 17 is only contingently prime?

Yes, in that it makes sense to argue (from a 'contingentist'
perspective) that the justification for 'primeness' (or indeed any
other concept) derives ultimately from persistent aspects of
contingent states of affairs (in this case a degree of persistence we
abstract as 'necessity').  So from this perspective 17 is
'necessarily' prime, but this very 'necessity' is limited to the
contingent framework that supports the conceptual one. In this view,
positing 'platonic primeness' does no further work. This is not to
take issue with Bruno's alternative numerical basis for contingency,
but rather to see it as just that - an alternative, not a knock-down
argument.

David


> On 3/15/07, David Nyman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> On Mar 14, 10:18 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
> > > Perhaps using the term "existence" for mathematical objects is
> > misleading.
> > > It doesn't mean they exist as separate objects in the real world,  just
> > that
> > > they exist as concepts. This is mathematical Platonism.
>
> > Yes, I understand.  I guess I'm saying that nevertheless I can
> > conceive of a radical negation in which even Platonic objects have no
> > existence, conceptual or otherwise. Consequently AFAICS arguments for
> > Platonic 'necessity' are in fact derived wholly from contingent states
> > of affairs.
>
> It's something Bruno, in particular, has discussed at length. Is it possible
> that 17 is only contingently prime?
>
> Stathis Papaiaonnou


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 14-mars-07, à 20:51, John Mikes a écrit :

>  I am not in favor of human omniscience.


The more a machine knows, the more she is able to see the bigness of 
its ignorance.

Knowledge for lobian machine is really like a lantern in an infinite 
room. The more powerful is the lantern, the more bigger the room seems 
to be.

So I certainly agree with you. Meaning: perhaps we are both wrong!

Bon week-end,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 14-mars-07, à 08:15, Kim Jones a écrit :

> I believe that the 'ability to conceive of nothing' -  in a Loebian
> machine context might be forbidden under comp (I could be wrong)


The problem with words like "nothing" and "everything" is that they 
have as many meaning than there are theories or philosophical frame.

As example, you cannot represent the quantum vacuum by the empty set. 
Those are completely different and opposite notion of nothingness.
The empty set can be simulated by a simple non universal machine. The 
quantum void is already turing universal.

I am not sure that a notion of nothingness can have some absolute 
meaning. It is rich and interesting, but hardly basic and primitive.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/15/07, David Nyman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

On Mar 14, 10:18 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > Perhaps using the term "existence" for mathematical objects is
> misleading.
> > It doesn't mean they exist as separate objects in the real world,  just
> that
> > they exist as concepts. This is mathematical Platonism.
>
> Yes, I understand.  I guess I'm saying that nevertheless I can
> conceive of a radical negation in which even Platonic objects have no
> existence, conceptual or otherwise. Consequently AFAICS arguments for
> Platonic 'necessity' are in fact derived wholly from contingent states
> of affairs.
>

It's something Bruno, in particular, has discussed at length. Is it possible
that 17 is only contingently prime?

Stathis Papaiaonnou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 14-mars-07, à 07:48, Kim Jones a écrit :

>
> Lurking, lurking...
>
>
> This thread started I believe with Tom's 3 magnificent questions,
> aeons ago on my birthday last year.
>
> Thankee, Tom
>
> A little refresher now:
>
>
> On 31/12/2006, at 8:25 AM, Tom Caylor wrote:
>
>> Besides the question of how meaning relates to this List, the question
>> of meaning itself can be asked at several different levels, so I'll
>> list a few:
>>
>> 1) Why does the universe exist?  Why is there something rather than
>> nothing?
>> 2) Why do human beings in general exist?
>> 3) Why do I exist?


1) We don't know. But assuming the consistency of elementary 
arithmetic, we can explain why machines will develop exactly such 
questions. Assuming moreover comp, we can know why *we* are such 
questions, and why we believe in universes.

2) because all lobian (not necessarily consistent) machine exists.

3) this is equivalent with: "why am I in Washington" after a self 
Washington/Moscow duplication. Or, why do I observed a spin up, after a 
preparation in the complementary base. Here again, with just elementary 
arithmetic we can explain where such question come from, and with comp, 
we can explain why we ask and why we will never get an answer. Even a 
God cannot explain that!

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 13-mars-07, à 05:03, Brent Meeker a écrit :

> But there is no reason to believe there is any "root" cause that is 
> deeper than variation with natural selection.  You have not presented 
> any argument for the existence of this "ultimate" or "root".  You 
> merely refer to "closed science" as though that proved something - but 
> it begs the question.  You have to show there is something outside 
> science in order to know that it is "closed"; not just that there is 
> something science has not explained, there's lots of that, but 
> something that science cannot, in-principle explain.


Assuming comp, we can know that science will never been able to explain 
where natural numbers come from. That's an insoluble mystery.
It makes science open. Forever.

But then comp *can* explain (but does not yet provide more than an 
embryo of explanation, yet already confirmed) where waves and particles 
come from, and also, unlike physics, why waves and particles can hurt 
(cf G/G*).

Bruno





http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

David Nyman wrote:
> 
> 
> On Mar 14, 10:18 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
>> Perhaps using the term "existence" for mathematical objects is misleading.
>> It doesn't mean they exist as separate objects in the real world,  just that
>> they exist as concepts. This is mathematical Platonism.
> 
> Yes, I understand.  I guess I'm saying that nevertheless I can
> conceive of a radical negation in which even Platonic objects have no
> existence, conceptual or otherwise. 

It's hard to imagine what "conceptual existence" means anyway.  Sort of like 
"non-existent existence".  It's just  set of non-contradictory property 
statements.

Brent Meeker


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[David Nyman]

On Mar 14, 10:18 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Perhaps using the term "existence" for mathematical objects is misleading.
> It doesn't mean they exist as separate objects in the real world,  just that
> they exist as concepts. This is mathematical Platonism.

Yes, I understand.  I guess I'm saying that nevertheless I can
conceive of a radical negation in which even Platonic objects have no
existence, conceptual or otherwise. Consequently AFAICS arguments for
Platonic 'necessity' are in fact derived wholly from contingent states
of affairs.

David

> On 3/14/07, David Nyman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Mar 14, 9:44 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > On 3/14/07, Kim Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > > It is
> > > conceivable that the physical world might not exist, or God not exist,
> > or
> > > God exist but not make the physical world, but it is not conceivable
> > that
> > > circles or integers or the UD not exist as mathematical objects.
>
> > In what sense 'not conceivable'?  I don't find it hard to conceive of
> > mathematical objects not existing, given that nothing else does
> > either. 'Nothing else' here simply but radically entails that whatever
> > you say you can 'conceive', my response is 'not that either'. This
> > 'nothing' precisely is the nothing from which *nothing* can come. Our
> > own existence contingently rules it out, which is what makes it so
> > hard to think about.  Such a 'possibility', being in fact necessary in
> > 'all possible worlds', paradoxically abolishes the conceiver at the
> > moment of conception.
>
> Perhaps using the term "existence" for mathematical objects is misleading.
> It doesn't mean they exist as separate objects in the real world,  just that
> they exist as concepts. This is mathematical Platonism.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Russell Standish]

I think high energy physicists talk about "colour charge", rather than
"colour pole", but this is by analogy to electricity with its +ve &
-ve charges, rather than analogy to magnetism with its north and south
poles. However at the level of analogy, which is what your story is,
this distinction is unimportant.

In the real world, objects tend to be electrically neutral (even when
charged, objects have only a slight imbalance between positive and
negative charges). This is a not quite analogy to the need for magnets
to always have two poles. Incidently, physicists also talk about
monopoles, but aside from one isolated experiment, monopoles have
never been seen.

With the strong force, the colours can never be imbalanced on everyday
objects. Only quarks have colour. Bigger objects from protons up are
said to be "white" or "colourless". The reason for this is
"confinement", but I'll let you look that up on Wikipedia if you're
interested.

Cheers

On Wed, Mar 14, 2007 at 04:04:59PM -0400, John Mikes wrote:
> Russell,
> 
>  I apologize for my flippant quip of yesterday, it was after several hours
> of reading and replying internet discussion lists. Besides: it was true.
> 
> I never considered the features named as distinguishing 'colors'  in QCD as
> "poles". Also it is new to me that the strong force has 3 poles. In my usage
> a 'pole' represents ONE charge of the TWO we know of - the positive and the
> negative.
> Well, it seems those non-physicists are simpleminded brutes. It felt so good
> to 'invent' something (for fun) beyond our grasp.
>  What nature would that 3rd pole present in the strong force? (I ask this
> question, because I did not read about the 3-pole distinction of it).
> 
> Cheers
> 
> John M
> 
> On 3/12/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Mon, Mar 12, 2007 at 11:58:58AM -0400, John Mikes wrote:
> > > In the sci-fi I wrote in 1988-89 I depicted the 'story' of human
> > evolving as
> > > done
> > > by an experiment of aliens from another universe, to which I assigned
> > > "energy"
> > > with 3 (three) poles. One +, one -, and a THIRD one. (Maybe your math
> > could
> > > formulate this, but I could not. I accepted it as something beyond our
> > human
> > > mind.
> >
> > The strong force has 3 "poles". To think about them in a human
> > fashion, we name them "red", "green" and "blue", and the theory
> > describing the strong force is called "quantum chromodynamics". It
> > doesn't seem beyond the human mind at all.
> >
> > I dare say if we had a reason to have a theory with four poles,
> > someone will come up with a way of thinking about these too.
> >
> > Prof Russell Standish
> >
> 
> > 

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/14/07, David Nyman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> On Mar 14, 9:44 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > On 3/14/07, Kim Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > It is
> > conceivable that the physical world might not exist, or God not exist,
> or
> > God exist but not make the physical world, but it is not conceivable
> that
> > circles or integers or the UD not exist as mathematical objects.
> >
>
> In what sense 'not conceivable'?  I don't find it hard to conceive of
> mathematical objects not existing, given that nothing else does
> either. 'Nothing else' here simply but radically entails that whatever
> you say you can 'conceive', my response is 'not that either'. This
> 'nothing' precisely is the nothing from which *nothing* can come. Our
> own existence contingently rules it out, which is what makes it so
> hard to think about.  Such a 'possibility', being in fact necessary in
> 'all possible worlds', paradoxically abolishes the conceiver at the
> moment of conception.
>

Perhaps using the term "existence" for mathematical objects is misleading.
It doesn't mean they exist as separate objects in the real world,  just that
they exist as concepts. This is mathematical Platonism.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[明迪]

My reply to the topic:

The question "How to calculate the Universe?" by definition is equivalent to
the question "how to calculate Everything," including the answer to the
question "what is the meaning of life".

It justifies our existence even if we were not to know exactly the meaning
of it. :-)

Inyuki
http://i.tai.lt

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[John Mikes]

Russell,

 I apologize for my flippant quip of yesterday, it was after several hours
of reading and replying internet discussion lists. Besides: it was true.

I never considered the features named as distinguishing 'colors'  in QCD as
"poles". Also it is new to me that the strong force has 3 poles. In my usage
a 'pole' represents ONE charge of the TWO we know of - the positive and the
negative.
Well, it seems those non-physicists are simpleminded brutes. It felt so good
to 'invent' something (for fun) beyond our grasp.
 What nature would that 3rd pole present in the strong force? (I ask this
question, because I did not read about the 3-pole distinction of it).

Cheers

John M

On 3/12/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, Mar 12, 2007 at 11:58:58AM -0400, John Mikes wrote:
> > In the sci-fi I wrote in 1988-89 I depicted the 'story' of human
> evolving as
> > done
> > by an experiment of aliens from another universe, to which I assigned
> > "energy"
> > with 3 (three) poles. One +, one -, and a THIRD one. (Maybe your math
> could
> > formulate this, but I could not. I accepted it as something beyond our
> human
> > mind.
>
> The strong force has 3 "poles". To think about them in a human
> fashion, we name them "red", "green" and "blue", and the theory
> describing the strong force is called "quantum chromodynamics". It
> doesn't seem beyond the human mind at all.
>
> I dare say if we had a reason to have a theory with four poles,
> someone will come up with a way of thinking about these too.
>
> Prof Russell Standish
>

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[John Mikes]

Kim, thanks for your observing 'lurking' about the 'hatchet'. I do not
believe that we would have buried it into each others' head, I accepted that
Bruno may be irritated (by my question/remark, or by other business).

To your choice of Q-#1: recalls my usual doubt "in Mark's Plain English":
does the "why" ask for originating history, or for a purpose?
In the second case I count myself out.
In the 1st meaning I have an answer:- I dunno - and do not think that ANY
humanly conceived machine (Loeb?) could come up with an acceptable (for us)
history from parts impenetrable for our views (of today)..  Even if a
'supernatural and superhuman' comp can come up with something from
"outside" our conceivable system, how could we muster some understanding for
it? The best thing is: we '(mis)understand' it for an explanation that may
or may not hold water.
 I am not in favor of human omniscience.

Nice to hear from you again.

John M

On 3/14/07, Kim Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Lurking, lurking...
>
>
> This thread started I believe with Tom's 3 magnificent questions,
> aeons ago on my birthday last year.
>
> Thankee, Tom
>
> A little refresher now:
>
>
> On 31/12/2006, at 8:25 AM, Tom Caylor wrote:
>
> > Besides the question of how meaning relates to this List, the question
> > of meaning itself can be asked at several different levels, so I'll
> > list a few:
> >
> > 1) Why does the universe exist?  Why is there something rather than
> > nothing?
> > 2) Why do human beings in general exist?
> > 3) Why do I exist?
> >
> > The purpose of listing these three questions is not to deal with
> > all of
> > them on this thread necessarily, but to show that the question of the
> > meaning of life really is connected to the universal questions that
> > this list tries to address.  One's answer to any one of these
> > questions
> > can affect his/her answer to the other questions.
> >
> > It seems that we all have to eventually come to the question of the
> > end
> > of our lives.  (Even if immortality, quantum or other kinds, is a
> > reality, the question of the end of our lives is a topic addressed
> > even
> > on this List.)  So as one man on United Flight 93 said before giving
> > his life to save others, "Let's roll!"
> >
> > Tom
>
>
>
> It was a touching moment when Bruno and John 'buried the hatchet'
> yesterday ;)
>
> I just want to say that this has been the most magnificent and
> compelling thread I have contributed nothing to that I have ever
> contributed nothing to
>
> nevertheless
>
> I think we need more on question 1
>
> Questions 2 and 3 appear to have answers of sorts
>
> Kim Jones
>
> >
>

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[David Nyman]

On Mar 14, 9:44 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 3/14/07, Kim Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> It is
> conceivable that the physical world might not exist, or God not exist, or
> God exist but not make the physical world, but it is not conceivable that
> circles or integers or the UD not exist as mathematical objects.
>

In what sense 'not conceivable'?  I don't find it hard to conceive of
mathematical objects not existing, given that nothing else does
either. 'Nothing else' here simply but radically entails that whatever
you say you can 'conceive', my response is 'not that either'. This
'nothing' precisely is the nothing from which *nothing* can come. Our
own existence contingently rules it out, which is what makes it so
hard to think about.  Such a 'possibility', being in fact necessary in
'all possible worlds', paradoxically abolishes the conceiver at the
moment of conception.

David


> A little refresher now:
>
>
>
> > On 31/12/2006, at 8:25 AM, Tom Caylor wrote:
>
> > > Besides the question of how meaning relates to this List, the question
> > > of meaning itself can be asked at several different levels, so I'll
> > > list a few:
>
> > > 1) Why does the universe exist?  Why is there something rather than
> > > nothing?
> > > 2) Why do human beings in general exist?
> > > 3) Why do I exist?
>
> > I think we need more on question 1
>
> Thanks for reminding us of the original questions, it's easy to get lost in
> a thread this long. For me, one of the more compelling reasons for
> entertaining some version of the idea that mathematical existence is all
> there is to apparent physical reality is that it answers this question:
> physical reality, including God (if he exists, and contra the ontological
> argument), is contingent; mathematical truths are necessary. It is
> conceivable that the physical world might not exist, or God not exist, or
> God exist but not make the physical world, but it is not conceivable that
> circles or integers or the UD not exist as mathematical objects.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/14/07, Kim Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

A little refresher now:
>
>
> On 31/12/2006, at 8:25 AM, Tom Caylor wrote:
>
> > Besides the question of how meaning relates to this List, the question
> > of meaning itself can be asked at several different levels, so I'll
> > list a few:
> >
> > 1) Why does the universe exist?  Why is there something rather than
> > nothing?
> > 2) Why do human beings in general exist?
> > 3) Why do I exist?
>
>
> I think we need more on question 1


Thanks for reminding us of the original questions, it's easy to get lost in
a thread this long. For me, one of the more compelling reasons for
entertaining some version of the idea that mathematical existence is all
there is to apparent physical reality is that it answers this question:
physical reality, including God (if he exists, and contra the ontological
argument), is contingent; mathematical truths are necessary. It is
conceivable that the physical world might not exist, or God not exist, or
God exist but not make the physical world, but it is not conceivable that
circles or integers or the UD not exist as mathematical objects.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Kim Jones]

On 14/03/2007, at 5:59 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:

>> nevertheless
>>
>> I think we need more on question 1
>>
>> Questions 2 and 3 appear to have answers of sorts
>>
>> Kim Jones
>
> What kind of statement would you regard as an answer to why there  
> is something rather than nothing?  For example here are some  
> possible answers:
>
> 1. What is there?  Everything!  What isn't there?  Nothing!
> 2. Nothing is unstable (Frank Wilczek, Nobelist physics)
> 3. Why should Nothing be the default and Something need an  
> explanation?
> 4. The universe is just Nothing rearranged (Vic Stenger, Yonatan  
> Fishman)
>
> I think it's one of those questions that seems as if it should have  
> answer because it is so simple and clear, but which on reflection  
> you find isn't clear at all.  What is Nothing?  Can you conceive of  
> Nothing?  Is absolute Nothing a coherent concept or is Nothing just  
> absence of matter, i.e. empty space.
>
> Brent Meeker


I believe that the 'ability to conceive of nothing' -  in a Loebian  
machine context might be forbidden under comp (I could be wrong)

I cannot personally conceive of nothing. All of your four statements  
may well apply - its just not the whole description. Nothing is BIG  
enough to encompass at least four descriptive statements - it can  
surely hold a few more

doing pretty well for a bunch of nothin

Can we say that nothing is *big* in some sense and therefore have  
that property? It's a nonsensical idea but you never know

Is nothing big or small


Kim


>

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Kim Jones wrote:
> Lurking, lurking...
> 
> 
> This thread started I believe with Tom's 3 magnificent questions,  
> aeons ago on my birthday last year.
> 
> Thankee, Tom
> 
> A little refresher now:
> 
> 
> On 31/12/2006, at 8:25 AM, Tom Caylor wrote:
> 
>> Besides the question of how meaning relates to this List, the question
>> of meaning itself can be asked at several different levels, so I'll
>> list a few:
>>
>> 1) Why does the universe exist?  Why is there something rather than
>> nothing?
>> 2) Why do human beings in general exist?
>> 3) Why do I exist?
>>
>> The purpose of listing these three questions is not to deal with  
>> all of
>> them on this thread necessarily, but to show that the question of the
>> meaning of life really is connected to the universal questions that
>> this list tries to address.  One's answer to any one of these  
>> questions
>> can affect his/her answer to the other questions.
>>
>> It seems that we all have to eventually come to the question of the  
>> end
>> of our lives.  (Even if immortality, quantum or other kinds, is a
>> reality, the question of the end of our lives is a topic addressed  
>> even
>> on this List.)  So as one man on United Flight 93 said before giving
>> his life to save others, "Let's roll!"
>>
>> Tom
> 
> 
> 
> It was a touching moment when Bruno and John 'buried the hatchet'  
> yesterday ;)
> 
> I just want to say that this has been the most magnificent and  
> compelling thread I have contributed nothing to that I have ever  
> contributed nothing to
> 
> nevertheless
> 
> I think we need more on question 1
> 
> Questions 2 and 3 appear to have answers of sorts
> 
> Kim Jones

What kind of statement would you regard as an answer to why there is something 
rather than nothing?  For example here are some possible answers:

1. What is there?  Everything!  What isn't there?  Nothing!
2. Nothing is unstable (Frank Wilczek, Nobelist physics)
3. Why should Nothing be the default and Something need an explanation?
4. The universe is just Nothing rearranged (Vic Stenger, Yonatan Fishman)

I think it's one of those questions that seems as if it should have answer 
because it is so simple and clear, but which on reflection you find isn't clear 
at all.  What is Nothing?  Can you conceive of Nothing?  Is absolute Nothing a 
coherent concept or is Nothing just absence of matter, i.e. empty space.

Brent Meeker

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Kim Jones]

Lurking, lurking...


This thread started I believe with Tom's 3 magnificent questions,  
aeons ago on my birthday last year.

Thankee, Tom

A little refresher now:


On 31/12/2006, at 8:25 AM, Tom Caylor wrote:

> Besides the question of how meaning relates to this List, the question
> of meaning itself can be asked at several different levels, so I'll
> list a few:
>
> 1) Why does the universe exist?  Why is there something rather than
> nothing?
> 2) Why do human beings in general exist?
> 3) Why do I exist?
>
> The purpose of listing these three questions is not to deal with  
> all of
> them on this thread necessarily, but to show that the question of the
> meaning of life really is connected to the universal questions that
> this list tries to address.  One's answer to any one of these  
> questions
> can affect his/her answer to the other questions.
>
> It seems that we all have to eventually come to the question of the  
> end
> of our lives.  (Even if immortality, quantum or other kinds, is a
> reality, the question of the end of our lives is a topic addressed  
> even
> on this List.)  So as one man on United Flight 93 said before giving
> his life to save others, "Let's roll!"
>
> Tom



It was a touching moment when Bruno and John 'buried the hatchet'  
yesterday ;)

I just want to say that this has been the most magnificent and  
compelling thread I have contributed nothing to that I have ever  
contributed nothing to

nevertheless

I think we need more on question 1

Questions 2 and 3 appear to have answers of sorts

Kim Jones

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 12-mars-07, à 16:58, John Mikes a écrit :

> Let me reverse the sequence of your post for my ease:
> The last part: "> If we accept Bruno's "we are god"<
> ">I have never said that. The most I have said in that direction, is
> that, assuming comp, the first person inherits "God"' unanmeability.
> So the first person has some "god" attribute. you cannot infer from
> this that we are "God!".Bruno<"
> I apologize for misunderstanding what you said.

No problem. I hope I was not too much direct, but of course, 
misunderstandings are the very reason why we are discussing.



>  I tried to find the meaning of the (seemingly mistyped?)  
> "unanmeability"
> in your present post  - the closest was :'untenability'. Is this what 
> you meant?
> *


Logicians use the term "unameability"  in the sense of undescribable. 
The most typical example is the notion of truth for any sufficiently 
complex machine. Such machine, when consistent (not proving 0 ≠ 0)  
cannot define a notion of truth T(x) and prove that for each sentence x 
they can prove T(x) iff x. That is, no truth predicate, bearing on a 
machine, can be defined by that machine.




> Now let me return to our 'human mind".
> Reasonably: we are part of a world -


The notion of "part" is misleading, both in comp and in QM.



> assumably a small portion only - and our
> mind (whatever you identify as that) is 'part of us' = included into 
> the 'model' we
> may call 'humans'.

Is not the model included in the mind, instead?




> We have certain exparience-stuff and logical thinking ways,
> we use that even in trying to 'understand' ideas beyond it - beyond 
> our reach of
> observation. We do that, but can never be sure of doing it right.

OK.


> In the sci-fi I wrote in 1988-89 I depicted the 'story' of human 
> evolving as done
> by an experiment of aliens from another universe, to which I assigned 
> "energy"
> with 3 (three) poles. One +, one -, and a THIRD one. (Maybe your math 
> could
> formulate this, but I could not. I accepted it as something beyond our 
> human mind.
> (It facilitated direct mental contact, manipulation of time, 
> overriding of materially
> induced space barriers, conscious machines and of course no 
> lights-peed max.)
> [It was rejected  from publishers both in the US and Europe on 
> identical grounds:
> too much science and insufficient sex and violence]
> Speaking about such is different from understanding, more so from 
> 'creating'.
> We would need a bootstrap process to explain our origin (existence) 
> from within our existence.


Yes. But comp science is full of possible bootstrap processes.




> Maybe this is my mental limitation - I have to live with it.


Why? If you are really aware of a mental limitation, then you can 
overcome it.


> And - of course - I am also guilty of 'human' thinking as you  charged.


Well I "charged" you for criticising some idea by only mentionning that 
there are produced by "human thinking".
If a human (resp. lobian) really find a personal limitation, then 
he/she/it can go beyond, with some work. That is the nice aspect of 
human, and of lobian machine.




> Loeb created the idea of his machine. It is equipped with superhuman 
> (-natural?)

Loeb proved in 1955 that Peano Arithmetic PA has the following weird 
property. If PA proves that provable(p) implies p, for some proposition 
p, then PA proves p (Lob theorem). I call a machine, or a any chatty 
entity "Lobian", in case it obeys Loeb theorem. You can see Lob theorem 
as a statement that some placebo effect could work for PA (and thus by 
definition on all Lobian Machine). If you convince a Lobian entity that 
if she ever believes that [if she believes in Santa Klaus existence 
implies Santa Klaus existence], then she will believe in Santa Klaus.
And, of course, if the machine is correct, this will entail the 
existence of Santa Klaus.


> capabilities, all identified by a human mind, just as my 3-pole energy 
> was. The idea of a "pole" is very much from within our (humanly 
> adjusted?) worldview. If it
> is 2, or 3, or 1457: it is still a (humanly divised) "pole".

?

>
> I am a believer of 'creativity' so I do not find 'arguing' about 
> 'ideas' superfluous.
> I am not 'prejudiced' against numbers: I asked so many time to get 
> understandable information and did not. I am agnostic, do not 'cut 
> out' other possibilities unless I see acceptable arguments to do so. 
> (Acceptable to me).
> And: you are so smart that you do not have to resort to some 'racist' 
> hint which
> seems to me as an ad hominem link.

OK sorry. Sometimes you give me the feeling that you know that machine 
cannot be the bearer of thought.

>
> Here I am again: decided so many times to keep off from arguments 
> where the
> word "god" is involved and am bugged down into it, both with you and 
> Danny.


The choice of words should not matter, at least in principle. We should 
bother only on the validity of reasoning. But 'course, it is easier to 
say t

Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Tom Caylor wrote:
> On Mar 6, 5:19 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Tom Caylor wrote:
 A source that has given us the crusades and 9/11 as well as the
 sister's of mercy.  No a very sufficient source if nobody can
 agree on what it provides.
>>> I don't like simply saying "That isn't so," but "nobody can agree
>>> on what it provides", referring to the source of ultimate
>>> meaning,
>> I was referring to the "sufficient source of *morality*".  Such a
>> source should be able to provide an unambiguous standard that is so
>> clear everyone agrees - if it existed.
>> 
>>> is not true.  In fact it's very remarkable the consistency,
>>> across all kinds of cultures, the basic beliefs of truly
>>> normative morality, evidence for their being a source which
>>> cannot be explained through closed science alone.
>> Why not?  Why isn't Darwin's or Scott Atran's or Richard Dawkin's a
>> *possible* explanation. And how is "God did it" an explanation of
>> anything?  It's just a form of words so ambiguous as to be
>> virtually empty.  "God" meant different things to the crusaders and
>> the 9/11 jihadists, to the Aztecs and the Conquistadores, to the
>> Nazi's and the Jews.  So just because they use the same word
>> doesn't mean they are referring to the same thing.
>> 
> 
> We've talked about this before.  Darwin cannot explain giving without
>  expecting to receive.

Where do you get this nonsense??  Do you just make it up as you need it?  No 
parent expects to receive anything but satisfaction from raising their children 
- as perfectly well explained by Darwin.  And how dare you assert that money I 
sent to Katrina victims was simply calculated to get something back.  There are 
many possible Darwinian explanations for feelings of altruism; but apparently 
you haven't bothered to find them.

> Actually that's true love.  Only some people believe that God did
> that.  But many other people somehow see the goodness of it.
> 
>> And there is nothing "closed" about science.  Science is perfectly
>> open to the existence of whatever you can demonstrate.  People have
>> tried to show that the God who answers prayers exists and they
>> fail.  But they could have succeeded; nothing about science
>> prevented their success.  They failed because there is no such God.
>> 
>> 
>>> On your first sentence, it also can be said of science that a lot
>>> of evil has come that wouldn't have come (at least in the forms
>>> it has) if it weren't for advances of science.

Quite true.  Science helps technology and technology provides power and power 
can be applied for good and ill.

>>> And I'm not knocking down science as being invalid in its own
>>> right.  I'm just making the point that your statement does not
>>> address *root* cause any more than blaming science.

But there is no reason to believe there is any "root" cause that is deeper than 
variation with natural selection.  You have not presented any argument for the 
existence of this "ultimate" or "root".  You merely refer to "closed science" 
as though that proved something - but it begs the question.  You have to show 
there is something outside science in order to know that it is "closed"; not 
just that there is something science has not explained, there's lots of that, 
but something that science cannot, in-principle explain.  

Brent Meeker

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[John M]

Thanks, Russell, 4 Poles may play bridge.
John
  - Original Message - 
  From: Russell Standish 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Monday, March 12, 2007 9:19 AM
  Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life



  On Mon, Mar 12, 2007 at 11:58:58AM -0400, John Mikes wrote:
  > In the sci-fi I wrote in 1988-89 I depicted the 'story' of human evolving as
  > done
  > by an experiment of aliens from another universe, to which I assigned
  > "energy"
  > with 3 (three) poles. One +, one -, and a THIRD one. (Maybe your math could
  > formulate this, but I could not. I accepted it as something beyond our human
  > mind.

  The strong force has 3 "poles". To think about them in a human
  fashion, we name them "red", "green" and "blue", and the theory
  describing the strong force is called "quantum chromodynamics". It
  doesn't seem beyond the human mind at all.

  I dare say if we had a reason to have a theory with four poles,
  someone will come up with a way of thinking about these too.

  -- 

  
  A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
  Mathematics 
  UNSW SYDNEY 2052  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au
  

  


  -- 
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9:27 AM


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Mar 12, 2007 at 11:58:58AM -0400, John Mikes wrote:
> In the sci-fi I wrote in 1988-89 I depicted the 'story' of human evolving as
> done
> by an experiment of aliens from another universe, to which I assigned
> "energy"
> with 3 (three) poles. One +, one -, and a THIRD one. (Maybe your math could
> formulate this, but I could not. I accepted it as something beyond our human
> mind.

The strong force has 3 "poles". To think about them in a human
fashion, we name them "red", "green" and "blue", and the theory
describing the strong force is called "quantum chromodynamics". It
doesn't seem beyond the human mind at all.

I dare say if we had a reason to have a theory with four poles,
someone will come up with a way of thinking about these too.

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[John Mikes]

Let me reverse the sequence of your post for my ease:
The last part: "> If we accept Bruno's "we are god"<
">I have never said that. The most I have said in that direction, is
that, assuming comp, the first person inherits "God"' unanmeability.
So the first person has some "god" attribute. you cannot infer from
this that we are "God!".Bruno<"
I apologize for misunderstanding what you said.
 I tried to find the meaning of the (seemingly mistyped?)  "unanmeability"
in your present post  - the closest was :'untenability'. Is this what you
meant?
*
Now let me return to our 'human mind".
Reasonably: we are part of a world - assumably a small portion only - and
our
mind (whatever you identify as that) is 'part of us' = included into the
'model' we
may call 'humans'. We have certain exparience-stuff and logical thinking
ways,
we use that even in trying to 'understand' ideas beyond it - beyond our
reach of
observation. We do that, but can never be sure of doing it right.
In the sci-fi I wrote in 1988-89 I depicted the 'story' of human evolving as
done
by an experiment of aliens from another universe, to which I assigned
"energy"
with 3 (three) poles. One +, one -, and a THIRD one. (Maybe your math could
formulate this, but I could not. I accepted it as something beyond our human
mind.
(It facilitated direct mental contact, manipulation of time, overriding of
materially
induced space barriers, conscious machines and of course no lights-peed
max.)
[It was rejected  from publishers both in the US and Europe on identical
grounds:
too much science and insufficient sex and violence]
Speaking about such is different from understanding, more so from
'creating'.
We would need a bootstrap process to explain our origin (existence) from
within our existence. Maybe this is my mental limitation - I have to live
with it. And - of course - I am also guilty of 'human' thinking as you
charged.
Loeb created the idea of his machine. It is equipped with superhuman
(-natural?)
capabilities, all identified by a human mind, just as my 3-pole energy was.
The idea of a "pole" is very much from within our (humanly adjusted?)
worldview. If it
is 2, or 3, or 1457: it is still a (humanly divised) "pole".

I am a believer of 'creativity' so I do not find 'arguing' about 'ideas'
superfluous.
I am not 'prejudiced' against numbers: I asked so many time to get
understandable information and did not. I am agnostic, do not 'cut out'
other possibilities unless I see acceptable arguments to do so. (Acceptable
to me).
And: you are so smart that you do not have to resort to some 'racist' hint
which
seems to me as an ad hominem link.

Here I am again: decided so many times to keep off from arguments where the
word "god" is involved and am bugged down into it, both with you and Danny.

I have to control my 'mouse' better.

John M



On 3/12/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
> Le 11-mars-07, à 17:33, John M a écrit :
>
>
>
> > Still: human thinking.
>
>
>
> You should subscribe to some alien list, if you are annoyed by us being
> human.
> You can answer "human thinking"  to any (human) post. So this does not
> convey any information, unless you explain what in our human nature
> prevent us to understand something typically non-human. It will be hard
> for you, human, to point on such a thing (actually the "human thinking
> critics apply to your own posts).
>
> Now, I am the one in the list which says: look we can already interview
> non-human lobian machine. So, in a sense, I could argue that all the
> lobian explanation with regard to our fundamental questions are lobian
> thinking, and a priori, this is not human. You, among the other, should
> be particularly pleased by this non human intervention in the list,
> unless you add that whatever the lobian machine says, it is us, human
> who interpret it, but then, again, we, humans, could stop arguing about
> anything, and even argue we should not talk with non-human entity given
> that we will deformed, by our human-ness, all what they talk about. But
> then we will certainly enforced our human prejudice.
> My feeling, John, is that you have typically human prejudice against
> number and machine, 100% similar to any form of racist prejudice: oh
> those entity are so different from us that we should not even listen to
> them ...
>
> And why do you say "human thinking". Why not "mammal's thinking"? Why
> not "carbon type of life thinking"? Why not "typical descendent of
> bacteria prejudices" ...
>
>
>
> > If we accept Bruno's "we are god"
>
>
> I have never said that. The most I have said in that direction, is
> that, assuming comp, the first person inherits "God"' unanmeability. So
> the first person has some "god" attribute. you cannot infer from this
> that we are "God!".
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 11-mars-07, à 17:33, John M a écrit :



> Still: human thinking.



You should subscribe to some alien list, if you are annoyed by us being 
human.
You can answer "human thinking"  to any (human) post. So this does not 
convey any information, unless you explain what in our human nature 
prevent us to understand something typically non-human. It will be hard 
for you, human, to point on such a thing (actually the "human thinking 
critics apply to your own posts).

Now, I am the one in the list which says: look we can already interview 
non-human lobian machine. So, in a sense, I could argue that all the 
lobian explanation with regard to our fundamental questions are lobian 
thinking, and a priori, this is not human. You, among the other, should 
be particularly pleased by this non human intervention in the list, 
unless you add that whatever the lobian machine says, it is us, human 
who interpret it, but then, again, we, humans, could stop arguing about 
anything, and even argue we should not talk with non-human entity given 
that we will deformed, by our human-ness, all what they talk about. But 
then we will certainly enforced our human prejudice.
My feeling, John, is that you have typically human prejudice against 
number and machine, 100% similar to any form of racist prejudice: oh 
those entity are so different from us that we should not even listen to 
them ...

And why do you say "human thinking". Why not "mammal's thinking"? Why 
not "carbon type of life thinking"? Why not "typical descendent of 
bacteria prejudices" ...



> If we accept Bruno's "we are god"


I have never said that. The most I have said in that direction, is 
that, assuming comp, the first person inherits "God"' unanmeability. So 
the first person has some "god" attribute. you cannot infer from this 
that we are "God!".

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Jason]

On Mar 12, 12:49 am, "Danny Mayes " <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Le 07-mars-07, à 18:50, Danny Mayes a écrit :
>
> If you assume an ensemble theory, whether it be an infinite MWI or Bruno's
> UD in the plenitude, is it POSSIBLE to avoid God?  For the purposes of this
> question I'll define "God" as an entity capable of creating everything that
> would be observed to exist in a (all possible) quantum mechanical universe.
>

The UD contains many recursive instances of itself, and since the UD
is a short program these instances should be rather common.  Less
common in the UD would be progams whose initial conditions were
something like AI, but since all programs exist in the UD these
necessarily do exist.  If this AI has intelligent control over its own
program code then it would have infinite computing resources made
available to it by the UD.  This AI might desire to explore the rest
of the UD by running its own instance of it.  In this way you have an
entity which is capable of creating everything that exists within the
UD.  To be accurate, it is not really creating anything, only
exploring and realizing other parts in the infinite structure of the
UD.  It is up to you if you wish to call such an intelligence God.  If
the UD is true, such an entity must exist, infact an infinite number
would.  To me, the best approximation to a monotheistic God would be
the plentiude itself, or perhaps the set of all first person
experiences that exist in the UD (or would this be the "holy
spirit"?).  To summarize, if everything possible exists then there is
something out there which best appoximates anything you might imagine
to be God.  Does this mean it has control over the universe you are in
now?  It does in the sense that the universe you are in now exists
simultanesouly in an infinite number of instances of the UD created by
an infinite number of very different Gods.

Jason


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RE: The Meaning of Life

[Danny Mayes]

 


Le 07-mars-07, à 18:50, Danny Mayes a écrit :


 

If you assume an ensemble theory, whether it be an infinite MWI or Bruno’s
UD in the plenitude, is it POSSIBLE to avoid God?  For the purposes of this
question I’ll define “God” as an entity capable of creating everything that
would be observed to exist in a (all possible) quantum mechanical universe.





God has to choose only among QM universes? Does that God obey QM Eself?

>>> Bruno, as a starting point, I concede that discussion of things
occurring outside the quantum-mechanical multiverse is metaphysical.
Certainly other realities can be discussed (Tegmark, and for that matter the
UD in the plenitude), but for the purposes of the question I was
specifically limiting the subject to the creation of the type of universe we
observe, because we are having to work off the laws of physics we know to
attempt and answer the question, and the issue is the creation of what we
observe, not other realities.  So it’s not that “God” has to choose QM
universes, it’s that I’m only interested in whether an entity capable of
creating QM universes (whatever you call it) is an inevitable result of an
assumed ensemble theory.  Of course, as I described in the original post,
the entity does not have to actually create QM universes necessarily.  It
would achieve the same effect as to observers if it simply understood how to
emulate brain states of observers that existed in QM universes.

 

To avoid God are we back to some kind of “primitive physical” idea that
there is something about the nature of reality that will forever prohibit
intelligence from emulating it?  





We cannot, knowingly, emulate a first person in any third person way. For
example we can emulate perfectly both the comp and the quantum indeterminacy
.. up to the measurement procedure, which can still be emulate but only by
emulating the observer himself. But this can be done with any classical or
quantum universal machine, but then only serendipitously.
I prefer translate the "primitive physical idea" as the idea that there is a
primitive physical world which is responsible for appearances. But this
already contradict the comp hypothesis (for example by the UDA argument, but
you can also look at Plotinus or Proclus).



 





That it is impossible even in theory to build a kind of “universal quantum
constructor”?  




It is impossible to build a universal *prover* or knower. But we can build
universal classical or quantum constructor or computer.




 

 

Or is the idea one that physics will forever prohibit intelligence from
acquiring the resources necessary to achieve such a feat? 


Neither math nor physics prohibit this. Math only prohibit universal machine
prover or knower.





How can you have everything, but not have something capable of creating
everything?  If you assume for instance the UD in the plenitude (no
intelligent action required), doesn’t it eventually describe intelligence
with access to infinite or near infinite resources capable of creating an
“artificial” UD?  




Sure. But why? The UD is needed in an argument. Real platonic UDs are enough
for the rest. Note that this can and should be tested.



If the answer is yes the whole debate over God seems to become a silly
argument over semantics.  




You are quite fuzzy about God, and your basic assumptions. Do you assume a
*primitive* physical universe? 




 I’ll be happy to hear where I’m wrong on all this.  Please be kind, I’ve
been away from these sorts of discussions for quite a while!



No problem, but you could be clearer about your assumption, or I am perhaps
missing something.

>>>  Thanks for your responses Bruno, I’ll respond as to my assumptions when
I have more time.

Danny


Bruno



Danny Mayes

 

 

On 3/7/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:

> I agree with the Russell quote as it stands.  Unendingness is not what
> gives meaning.  The source of meaning is not "living forever" in time
> (contrary to the trans-humanists) but is timeless.  However, the quote 
> makes a bad assumption when it talks about losing value.  The real
> problem is how there can be any true objective value to love in the
> first place (other than the so-called "irrefutable" first person: 
> "It's all about me").

Why should there be?  Values are relative to people.  Love is our word.  We
invented it to describe what we feel.  Having some Platonic form of LOVE out
there is superfluous.  You're just making up a requirement for "the really
real ding-an-sich" so that you can say God provides it.


You could replace "love" with "chocolate" and "God" with "the chocolate
fairy". You can claim that while the reason people like chocolate can be
explained in terms of chemistry, physiology, evolutionary biology etc., only
the chocolate fairy can give ultimate meaning to the chocolate eating
experience.

Stathis Papaioannou






http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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RE: The Meaning of Life

[Danny Mayes]

 

 

 

Danny wrote:

To avoid God are we back to some kind of “primitive physical” idea that
there is something about the nature of reality that will forever prohibit
intelligence from emulating it? 

JM:

I suppose 'our intelligence' is part of 'us' and we are part of the "nature
of reality" (whatever that may be, god, or existence, or...).

My grandparents had a cellar with a trap door to descend, a maid-girl came
crying that the door does not open. As it turned out: she was standing on it
when trying to lift it

(parable for us understanding 'all' we are part of). 

 

 

Bruno asked:

God has to choose only among QM universes? Does that God obey QM Eself?

JM:

whatever WE decide is our restrictive opinion. Bruno accepted that 'we' are
'god' so mu answer to the question is: NO, I as god do not.

I consider QM a product of the product (etc) of that 'reality' we try to
assign to it. 

(Sorry,Bruno, I do not start from 'numbers' to build up the existence. So
far they stayed unidentified/able upon the many questions I (and others)
asked. They still seem to be - as Bohm said - products of the human
thinking. (See above: product of the product of the pr...etc.)

 

>> I think I agree with you on this.  However, numbers are ultimately
representations of information.  And it seems possible, perhaps probable,
that everything can be reduced to information.  As with most other things,
maybe it is just a matter of perspective. 

 

Bruno:

It is impossible to build a universal *prover* or knower. But we can build
universal classical or quantum constructor or computer.
JM:

"Build", or "think about it"? (Alice, the builder?)

 

Bruno:

...I prefer translate the "primitive physical idea" as the idea that there
is a primitive physical world which is responsible for appearances. 

JM:

I like the translation into "idea". It implies that an 'idea' cannot be
responsible for appearances we think to receive in our mind. Appearances are
just that. Our - if you prefer - mind's interpretation of 'something' -
"reality". 

Still: human thinking. 

Question: which one of us (humans) CAN think with anything else than a human
mind? If we accept Bruno's "we are god" then it is a human god. Not capable
of 'building' the existence from the existing existence. (Cf: trapdoor)

 

Danny:

...If the answer is yes the whole debate over God seems to become a silly
argument over semantics. 

JM:

If the answer is 'no' or anything, it IS as well. If somebody 'believes' in
a personal relationship  with any god-phantom halucination based on ANY
selective hearsay assumption, you cannot make him accept (substitute) a
scientific'  scrutiny. (I may elaborate on selective, hearsay, and
assumption, if I must).

 

>>>I disagree and think you misunderstood the point of my original post.  I
don’t really have time to get into it in detail now, but I was really trying
to get outside of any faith-based aspect of the question.  Perhaps the word
God should not be used.  The question I guess boiled down to its essence is
can you have an ensemble theory of any kind (everything exists) that does
not end up having intelligence playing an “interesting” role in the process.
For future reference, when I refer to “God” in a post I will not be
referring to anything relating to personal relationships (in the general
understood sense that I think you meant) or hallucinations, but will be
referring very specifically to an entity capable of emulating or creating in
one manner or another the “universe” we observe, either from a 3rd person
viewpoint or from the 1st person viewpoint.  The question is can you have
ensemble theories without having these entities, and if so, what assumptions
do you have to make about our underlying reality (or the ensemble theory) to
avoid them.

 

I don’t see those types of questions as being exclusive of some type of
tentative scientific scrutiny, but I guess you do or perhaps you thought I
meant something else when I said “God” (despite my defining the term in the
original post). 

 

It may be that I just totally don’t understand you John.  To be honest I
more than occasionally have a difficult time understanding what you are
conveying in your posts.

 

Danny

 

*

I would be happy to see an expansion of what kind of "assumption" Bruno was
mentioning in the last sentence.

 

John M

 

 

- Original Message - 

From: Bruno Marchal <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>  

To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 

Sent: Sunday, March 11, 2007 11:42 AM

Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life

 


Le 07-mars-07, à 18:50, Danny Mayes a écrit :

If you assume an ensemble theory, whether it be an infinite MWI or Bruno’s
UD in the plenitude, is it POSSIBLE to avoid God?  For the purposes of this
question I’l

Re: The Meaning of Life

[John M]

Danny wrote:
To avoid God are we back to some kind of "primitive physical" idea that there 
is something about the nature of reality that will forever prohibit 
intelligence from emulating it? 
JM:
I suppose 'our intelligence' is part of 'us' and we are part of the "nature of 
reality" (whatever that may be, god, or existence, or...).
My grandparents had a cellar with a trap door to descend, a maid-girl came 
crying that the door does not open. As it turned out: she was standing on it 
when trying to lift it
(parable for us understanding 'all' we are part of). 

Bruno asked:
God has to choose only among QM universes? Does that God obey QM Eself?
JM:
whatever WE decide is our restrictive opinion. Bruno accepted that 'we' are 
'god' so mu answer to the question is: NO, I as god do not.
I consider QM a product of the product (etc) of that 'reality' we try to assign 
to it. 
(Sorry,Bruno, I do not start from 'numbers' to build up the existence. So far 
they stayed unidentified/able upon the many questions I (and others) asked. 
They still seem to be - as Bohm said - products of the human thinking. (See 
above: product of the product of the pr...etc.)

Bruno:
It is impossible to build a universal *prover* or knower. But we can build 
universal classical or quantum constructor or computer.
JM:
"Build", or "think about it"? (Alice, the builder?)

Bruno:
...I prefer translate the "primitive physical idea" as the idea that there is a 
primitive physical world which is responsible for appearances. 
JM:
I like the translation into "idea". It implies that an 'idea' cannot be 
responsible for appearances we think to receive in our mind. Appearances are 
just that. Our - if you prefer - mind's interpretation of 'something' - 
"reality". 
Still: human thinking. 
Question: which one of us (humans) CAN think with anything else than a human 
mind? If we accept Bruno's "we are god" then it is a human god. Not capable of 
'building' the existence from the existing existence. (Cf: trapdoor)

Danny:
...If the answer is yes the whole debate over God seems to become a silly 
argument over semantics. 
JM:
If the answer is 'no' or anything, it IS as well. If somebody 'believes' in a 
personal relationship  with any god-phantom halucination based on ANY selective 
hearsay assumption, you cannot make him accept (substitute) a scientific'  
scrutiny. (I may elaborate on selective, hearsay, and assumption, if I must).
*
I would be happy to see an expansion of what kind of "assumption" Bruno was 
mentioning in the last sentence.

John M


  - Original Message - 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Sunday, March 11, 2007 11:42 AM
  Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life



  Le 07-mars-07, à 18:50, Danny Mayes a écrit :

If you assume an ensemble theory, whether it be an infinite MWI or Bruno's 
UD in the plenitude, is it POSSIBLE to avoid God?  For the purposes of this 
question I'll define "God" as an entity capable of creating everything that 
would be observed to exist in a (all possible) quantum mechanical universe.  

  God has to choose only among QM universes? Does that God obey QM Eself?


To avoid God are we back to some kind of "primitive physical" idea that 
there is something about the nature of reality that will forever prohibit 
intelligence from emulating it?  


  We cannot, knowingly, emulate a first person in any third person way. For 
example we can emulate perfectly both the comp and the quantum indeterminacy .. 
up to the measurement procedure, which can still be emulate but only by 
emulating the observer himself. But this can be done with any classical or 
quantum universal machine, but then only serendipitously.
  I prefer translate the "primitive physical idea" as the idea that there is a 
primitive physical world which is responsible for appearances. But this already 
contradict the comp hypothesis (for example by the UDA argument, but you can 
also look at Plotinus or Proclus).

That it is impossible even in theory to build a kind of "universal quantum 
constructor"?  


  It is impossible to build a universal *prover* or knower. But we can build 
universal classical or quantum constructor or computer.




Or is the idea one that physics will forever prohibit intelligence from 
acquiring the resources necessary to achieve such a feat? 


  Neither math nor physics prohibit this. Math only prohibit universal machine 
prover or knower.





How can you have everything, but not have something capable of creating 
everything?  If you assume for instance the UD in the plenitude (no intelligent 
action required), doesn't it eventually describe intelligence with access to 
infini

Re: The Meaning of Life

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 07-mars-07, à 18:50, Danny Mayes a écrit :

>
>  
>
> If you assume an ensemble theory, whether it be an infinite MWI or 
> Bruno’s UD in the plenitude, is it POSSIBLE to avoid God?  For the 
> purposes of this question I’ll define “God” as an entity capable of 
> creating everything that would be observed to exist in a (all 
> possible) quantum mechanical universe. 

God has to choose only among QM universes? Does that God obey QM Eself?




> To avoid God are we back to some kind of “primitive physical” idea 
> that there is something about the nature of reality that will forever 
> prohibit intelligence from emulating it? 


We cannot, knowingly, emulate a first person in any third person way. 
For example we can emulate perfectly both the comp and the quantum 
indeterminacy .. up to the measurement procedure, which can still be 
emulate but only by emulating the observer himself. But this can be 
done with any classical or quantum universal machine, but then only 
serendipitously.
I prefer translate the "primitive physical idea" as the idea that there 
is a primitive physical world which is responsible for appearances. But 
this already contradict the comp hypothesis (for example by the UDA 
argument, but you can also look at Plotinus or Proclus).




> That it is impossible even in theory to build a kind of “universal 
> quantum constructor”? 

It is impossible to build a universal *prover* or knower. But we can 
build universal classical or quantum constructor or computer.



> Or is the idea one that physics will forever prohibit intelligence 
> from acquiring the resources necessary to achieve such a feat? 

Neither math nor physics prohibit this. Math only prohibit universal 
machine prover or knower.



>
> How can you have everything, but not have something capable of 
> creating everything?  If you assume for instance the UD in the 
> plenitude (no intelligent action required), doesn’t it eventually 
> describe intelligence with access to infinite or near infinite 
> resources capable of creating an “artificial” UD? 

Sure. But why? The UD is needed in an argument. Real platonic UDs are 
enough for the rest. Note that this can and should be tested.


> If the answer is yes the whole debate over God seems to become a silly 
> argument over semantics.  

You are quite fuzzy about God, and your basic assumptions. Do you 
assume a *primitive* physical universe?



>  I’ll be happy to hear where I’m wrong on all this.  Please be kind, 
> I’ve been away from these sorts of discussions for quite a while!


No problem, but you could be clearer about your assumption, or I am 
perhaps missing something.


Bruno


> Danny Mayes
>
>  
>
>  
>
> On 3/7/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
>
>  > I agree with the Russell quote as it stands.  Unendingness is not 
> what
>  > gives meaning.  The source of meaning is not "living forever" in 
> time
>  > (contrary to the trans-humanists) but is timeless.  However, the 
> quote
>  > makes a bad assumption when it talks about losing value.  The real
>  > problem is how there can be any true objective value to love in the
>  > first place (other than the so-called "irrefutable" first person:
>  > "It's all about me").
>
>  Why should there be?  Values are relative to people.  Love is our 
> word.  We invented it to describe what we feel.  Having some Platonic 
> form of LOVE out there is superfluous.  You're just making up a 
> requirement for "the really real ding-an-sich" so that you can say God 
> provides it.
>
>
>  You could replace "love" with "chocolate" and "God" with "the 
> chocolate fairy". You can claim that while the reason people like 
> chocolate can be explained in terms of chemistry, physiology, 
> evolutionary biology etc., only the chocolate fairy can give ultimate 
> meaning to the chocolate eating experience.
>
>  Stathis Papaioannou
>
>
>  >
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 10-mars-07, à 09:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

> Most people in the world behave as if there were an ultimate morality, 
> even though logically they might know that there isn't.


Come on, come on, come on com,  





>  I think this true even of those with religious beliefs: murder is bad 
> because it's bad,

?


> not because it confirms in the Bible that it's bad.

Certainly!



> This strong sense that there is something to moral behaviour besides 
> evolutionary expediency is what I called a second order feeling, and 
> its utility is that it makes it difficult for us to shrug off morality 
> and "do whatever we want".


All right!   So there could be an "ultimate morality" (making bad 
bad!), it is just that there if there is one, then there is no third 
person normative theory of it. But, with comp, there is a (machine's) 
metatheory saying exactly that, that ultimate morality is not 
normatively describable, if that exists.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 10-mars-07, à 05:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :

> Brent Meeker' quote:
> "My best advice to anyone who wants to raise a happy, mentally healthy 
> child is: Keep him or her as far away from a church as you can."
>    Frank Zappa


I agree with Zappa. (and thus Brent).

Let me borrow his way of talking: "My best advice to anyone who wants 
to study or search in the field of theology or any fundamental field: 
Keep the field as far as away from any authoritative-by-principle 
institution as you can".

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 10-mars-07, à 04:30, Tom Caylor a écrit :

> Here a diagram would be useful.  The reductionist tendency seems to be
> to lump all of consciousness into the "input interpretting" box and
> "explain it" in terms of smaller parts making up an autonomous
> machine.  Hence, now that it is all explained and we are a machine,
> there is no room for real morality and we can do whatever we want.  (I
> think I heard an Amen! from Brent.)

This is a good description of comp before Gödel and Church's thesis. 
After, comp makes such interpretations provably wrong or inconsistent.
To understand comp + Gödel forces us toward more modesty, including the 
modesty in front on any self-referentially correct (by constuction) 
universal machine or entity.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/10/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

It seems that you are missing my point.  I will better explain my
> point about "the whole control loop".   Personal tastes and second
> order feelings about the tastes are all on the *input* side of our
> system of consciousness.  But the input is not the whole system.
> Instead of saying "are personal feelings sufficient as the total input
> into our decision making system?" I should have said "are personal
> feelings (and other interpretations of inputs) sufficient to make up
> our decision making system", actually our whole system of
> consciousness?


Apparently they are, since that is what in fact happens.

Here a diagram would be useful.  The reductionist tendency seems to be
> to lump all of consciousness into the "input interpretting" box and
> "explain it" in terms of smaller parts making up an autonomous
> machine.  Hence, now that it is all explained and we are a machine,
> there is no room for real morality and we can do whatever we want.  (I
> think I heard an Amen! from Brent.)
>
> That's fine for those of us who are older and have one foot still back
> in the days when our parents believed in something that was based on
> ultimate meaning and reality.  Hence we know what we want.  But what
> about the future generations? The big question for them is, "What are
> we supposed to want?"  We answer, "Whatever you want!"  See the
> circularity?  By lumping everything into the "input interpretting" box
> and explaining it, we have left the "output creating" box totally
> undefined.  The nobility of humanity is not in how to interpret things
> alone, but in creating things.  If we are trying to eliminate any
> normative thinking about this creating ability, we have left the
> creating ability to atrophy without guidance.  Freedom must be guided
> by form, on purpose, in a meaningful way.


Most people in the world behave as if there were an ultimate morality, even
though logically they might know that there isn't. I think this true even of
those with religious beliefs: murder is bad because it's bad, not because it
confirms in the Bible that it's bad. This strong sense that there is
something to moral behaviour besides evolutionary expediency is what I
called a second order feeling, and its utility is that it makes it difficult
for us to shrug off morality and "do whatever we want".

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Tom Caylor wrote:
> On Mar 8, 4:14 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> On 3/9/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> You could replace "love" with "chocolate" and "God" with "the
>>> chocolate
> fairy". You can claim that while the reason people like chocolate can
>>> be
> explained in terms of chemistry, physiology, evolutionary biology
>>> etc., only
> the chocolate fairy can give ultimate meaning to the chocolate eating
> experience.
>>> Actually if all we're talking about is first-person experience and
>>> personal tastes, then there would be cause for alarm if someone is
>>> claiming that there's some normative rules governing them.  I agree:
>>> How could any such normative rules ever be verified as being the
>>> "right" way of interpreting things?  Not! This is not what I am
>>> talking about.  You need to look at the *whole* control loop in order
>>> to be able to talk about sharable 3rd person meaning.
>>> Personal feelings of "oo that's good" or "bleah" are fine for what
>>> they are, but are they sufficient as the total input into our decision
>>> making system?  Without real morality the answer *must* be yes.  As in
>>> Russell Standish's post, the answer *must* be that "whatever I
>>> *happen* (for no reason that I need to worry about) to feel is good
>>> stuff, is good stuff".  Marquis de Sade with no escape.
>> It's not just personal tastes, but also second order feelings about the
>> tastes. Consider the importance attached to the Japanese tea ceremony, for
>> example. If there is a strong feeling in the tea ceremony participant that
>> they are not just engaging in a cultural quirk but doing something of
>> profound significance, this does not mean there is a supernatural source for
>> this significance. Psychological factors are necessary and sufficient to
>> explain it, and to explain morality as well.
>>
>> Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> It seems that you are missing my point.  I will better explain my
> point about "the whole control loop".   Personal tastes and second
> order feelings about the tastes are all on the *input* side of our
> system of consciousness.  But the input is not the whole system.
> Instead of saying "are personal feelings sufficient as the total input
> into our decision making system?" I should have said "are personal
> feelings (and other interpretations of inputs) sufficient to make up
> our decision making system", actually our whole system of
> consciousness?
> 
> Here a diagram would be useful.  The reductionist tendency seems to be
> to lump all of consciousness into the "input interpretting" box and
> "explain it" in terms of smaller parts making up an autonomous
> machine.  Hence, now that it is all explained and we are a machine,
> there is no room for real morality and we can do whatever we want.  (I
> think I heard an Amen! from Brent.)
> 
> That's fine for those of us who are older and have one foot still back
> in the days when our parents believed in something that was based on
> ultimate meaning and reality.  Hence we know what we want.  But what
> about the future generations? The big question for them is, "What are
> we supposed to want?"  

Wrong question.  The question is what do you want?  What's going to be a life 
well lived?  What epitaph do you want on your tombstone?

>We answer, "Whatever you want!"  See the
> circularity?  

Yes - you're going around in circles because you think you need "ultimate 
purpose" to have any purpose at all.

By lumping everything into the "input interpretting" box
> and explaining it, we have left the "output creating" box totally
> undefined.  

No, I want to create things.  I get a lot my satisfaction in life by creating 
things.  It's part of what I want.

Brent Meeker
"My best advice to anyone who wants to raise a happy, mentally healthy child 
is: Keep him or her as far away from a church as you can." 
 Frank Zappa

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Tom Caylor]

On Mar 8, 4:14 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 3/9/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > > You could replace "love" with "chocolate" and "God" with "the
> > chocolate
> > > > fairy". You can claim that while the reason people like chocolate can
> > be
> > > > explained in terms of chemistry, physiology, evolutionary biology
> > etc., only
> > > > the chocolate fairy can give ultimate meaning to the chocolate eating
> > > > experience.
>
> > Actually if all we're talking about is first-person experience and
> > personal tastes, then there would be cause for alarm if someone is
> > claiming that there's some normative rules governing them.  I agree:
> > How could any such normative rules ever be verified as being the
> > "right" way of interpreting things?  Not! This is not what I am
> > talking about.  You need to look at the *whole* control loop in order
> > to be able to talk about sharable 3rd person meaning.
>
> > Personal feelings of "oo that's good" or "bleah" are fine for what
> > they are, but are they sufficient as the total input into our decision
> > making system?  Without real morality the answer *must* be yes.  As in
> > Russell Standish's post, the answer *must* be that "whatever I
> > *happen* (for no reason that I need to worry about) to feel is good
> > stuff, is good stuff".  Marquis de Sade with no escape.
>
> It's not just personal tastes, but also second order feelings about the
> tastes. Consider the importance attached to the Japanese tea ceremony, for
> example. If there is a strong feeling in the tea ceremony participant that
> they are not just engaging in a cultural quirk but doing something of
> profound significance, this does not mean there is a supernatural source for
> this significance. Psychological factors are necessary and sufficient to
> explain it, and to explain morality as well.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou

It seems that you are missing my point.  I will better explain my
point about "the whole control loop".   Personal tastes and second
order feelings about the tastes are all on the *input* side of our
system of consciousness.  But the input is not the whole system.
Instead of saying "are personal feelings sufficient as the total input
into our decision making system?" I should have said "are personal
feelings (and other interpretations of inputs) sufficient to make up
our decision making system", actually our whole system of
consciousness?

Here a diagram would be useful.  The reductionist tendency seems to be
to lump all of consciousness into the "input interpretting" box and
"explain it" in terms of smaller parts making up an autonomous
machine.  Hence, now that it is all explained and we are a machine,
there is no room for real morality and we can do whatever we want.  (I
think I heard an Amen! from Brent.)

That's fine for those of us who are older and have one foot still back
in the days when our parents believed in something that was based on
ultimate meaning and reality.  Hence we know what we want.  But what
about the future generations? The big question for them is, "What are
we supposed to want?"  We answer, "Whatever you want!"  See the
circularity?  By lumping everything into the "input interpretting" box
and explaining it, we have left the "output creating" box totally
undefined.  The nobility of humanity is not in how to interpret things
alone, but in creating things.  If we are trying to eliminate any
normative thinking about this creating ability, we have left the
creating ability to atrophy without guidance.  Freedom must be guided
by form, on purpose, in a meaningful way.

Tom


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/9/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > You could replace "love" with "chocolate" and "God" with "the
> chocolate
> > > fairy". You can claim that while the reason people like chocolate can
> be
> > > explained in terms of chemistry, physiology, evolutionary biology
> etc., only
> > > the chocolate fairy can give ultimate meaning to the chocolate eating
> > > experience.


Actually if all we're talking about is first-person experience and
> personal tastes, then there would be cause for alarm if someone is
> claiming that there's some normative rules governing them.  I agree:
> How could any such normative rules ever be verified as being the
> "right" way of interpreting things?  Not! This is not what I am
> talking about.  You need to look at the *whole* control loop in order
> to be able to talk about sharable 3rd person meaning.
>
> Personal feelings of "oo that's good" or "bleah" are fine for what
> they are, but are they sufficient as the total input into our decision
> making system?  Without real morality the answer *must* be yes.  As in
> Russell Standish's post, the answer *must* be that "whatever I
> *happen* (for no reason that I need to worry about) to feel is good
> stuff, is good stuff".  Marquis de Sade with no escape.


It's not just personal tastes, but also second order feelings about the
tastes. Consider the importance attached to the Japanese tea ceremony, for
example. If there is a strong feeling in the tea ceremony participant that
they are not just engaging in a cultural quirk but doing something of
profound significance, this does not mean there is a supernatural source for
this significance. Psychological factors are necessary and sufficient to
explain it, and to explain morality as well.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Tom Caylor]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 3/7/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > On 3/7/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > Tom Caylor wrote:
> > >
> > > > I agree with the Russell quote as it stands.  Unendingness is not what
> > > > gives meaning.  The source of meaning is not "living forever" in time
> > > > (contrary to the trans-humanists) but is timeless.  However, the quote
> > >
> > > > makes a bad assumption when it talks about losing value.  The real
> > > > problem is how there can be any true objective value to love in the
> > > > first place (other than the so-called "irrefutable" first person:
> > > > "It's all about me").
> > >
> > > Why should there be?  Values are relative to people.  Love is our
> > > word.  We invented it to describe what we feel.  Having some Platonic form
> > > of LOVE out there is superfluous.  You're just making up a requirement for
> > > "the really real ding-an-sich" so that you can say God provides it.
> > >
> >
> > You could replace "love" with "chocolate" and "God" with "the chocolate
> > fairy". You can claim that while the reason people like chocolate can be
> > explained in terms of chemistry, physiology, evolutionary biology etc., only
> > the chocolate fairy can give ultimate meaning to the chocolate eating
> > experience.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
> >
>
> I hope that didn't come across as facetious, Tom. These are serious
> questions and I appreciate the opportunity to discuss them with an
> intelligent and scientifically well-informed theist.
>
> Stathis
>

Actually if all we're talking about is first-person experience and
personal tastes, then there would be cause for alarm if someone is
claiming that there's some normative rules governing them.  I agree:
How could any such normative rules ever be verified as being the
"right" way of interpreting things?  Not! This is not what I am
talking about.  You need to look at the *whole* control loop in order
to be able to talk about sharable 3rd person meaning.

Personal feelings of "oo that's good" or "bleah" are fine for what
they are, but are they sufficient as the total input into our decision
making system?  Without real morality the answer *must* be yes.  As in
Russell Standish's post, the answer *must* be that "whatever I
*happen* (for no reason that I need to worry about) to feel is good
stuff, is good stuff".  Marquis de Sade with no escape.

Tom


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/8/07, Danny Mayes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>  If you assume an ensemble theory, whether it be an infinite MWI or
> Bruno's UD in the plenitude, is it POSSIBLE to avoid God?  For the purposes
> of this question I'll define "God" as an entity capable of creating
> everything that would be observed to exist in a (all possible) quantum
> mechanical universe.  To avoid God are we back to some kind of "primitive
> physical" idea that there is something about the nature of reality that will
> forever prohibit intelligence from emulating it?  That it is impossible even
> in theory to build a kind of "universal quantum constructor"?  Or is the
> idea one that physics will forever prohibit intelligence from acquiring the
> resources necessary to achieve such a feat?
>
> How can you have everything, but not have something capable of creating
> everything?  If you assume for instance the UD in the plenitude (no
> intelligent action required), doesn't it eventually describe intelligence
> with access to infinite or near infinite resources capable of creating an
> "artificial" UD?  If the answer is yes the whole debate over God seems to
> become a silly argument over semantics.   I'll be happy to hear where I'm
> wrong on all this.  Please be kind, I've been away from these sorts of
> discussions for quite a while!
>
You could have what Russell Standish called a demigod, creating a copy of
every physical structure in the Plenitude but powerless, even if he were a
supernatural being separate from the Plenitude (i.e. not just arising as a
consequence of the many worlds), as far as creating, destroying or changing
the Plenitude goes.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Russell Standish]

  If the answer is yes the whole debate over God seems to
> become a silly argument over semantics.  
> Danny Mayes
> 

A *lot* of the debate over God seems to be a silly argument over
semantics. When people ask me if I believe in God, I sometimes ask
"What precisely do you mean by 'God'?". But only if I'm spoiling for an
argument. Otherwise I'll just say something like "Not the Christian
God", or "mind your own business"...

Cheers


-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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RE: The Meaning of Life

[Danny Mayes]

 

If you assume an ensemble theory, whether it be an infinite MWI or Bruno's
UD in the plenitude, is it POSSIBLE to avoid God?  For the purposes of this
question I'll define "God" as an entity capable of creating everything that
would be observed to exist in a (all possible) quantum mechanical universe.
To avoid God are we back to some kind of "primitive physical" idea that
there is something about the nature of reality that will forever prohibit
intelligence from emulating it?  That it is impossible even in theory to
build a kind of "universal quantum constructor"?  Or is the idea one that
physics will forever prohibit intelligence from acquiring the resources
necessary to achieve such a feat?  

How can you have everything, but not have something capable of creating
everything?  If you assume for instance the UD in the plenitude (no
intelligent action required), doesn't it eventually describe intelligence
with access to infinite or near infinite resources capable of creating an
"artificial" UD?  If the answer is yes the whole debate over God seems to
become a silly argument over semantics.   I'll be happy to hear where I'm
wrong on all this.  Please be kind, I've been away from these sorts of
discussions for quite a while!

Danny Mayes

 

 

On 3/7/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

Tom Caylor wrote:

> I agree with the Russell quote as it stands.  Unendingness is not what
> gives meaning.  The source of meaning is not "living forever" in time
> (contrary to the trans-humanists) but is timeless.  However, the quote 
> makes a bad assumption when it talks about losing value.  The real
> problem is how there can be any true objective value to love in the
> first place (other than the so-called "irrefutable" first person: 
> "It's all about me").

Why should there be?  Values are relative to people.  Love is our word.  We
invented it to describe what we feel.  Having some Platonic form of LOVE out
there is superfluous.  You're just making up a requirement for "the really
real ding-an-sich" so that you can say God provides it. 


You could replace "love" with "chocolate" and "God" with "the chocolate
fairy". You can claim that while the reason people like chocolate can be
explained in terms of chemistry, physiology, evolutionary biology etc., only
the chocolate fairy can give ultimate meaning to the chocolate eating
experience. 

Stathis Papaioannou



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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/7/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 3/7/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Tom Caylor wrote:
> >
> > > I agree with the Russell quote as it stands.  Unendingness is not what
> > > gives meaning.  The source of meaning is not "living forever" in time
> > > (contrary to the trans-humanists) but is timeless.  However, the quote
> >
> > > makes a bad assumption when it talks about losing value.  The real
> > > problem is how there can be any true objective value to love in the
> > > first place (other than the so-called "irrefutable" first person:
> > > "It's all about me").
> >
> > Why should there be?  Values are relative to people.  Love is our
> > word.  We invented it to describe what we feel.  Having some Platonic form
> > of LOVE out there is superfluous.  You're just making up a requirement for
> > "the really real ding-an-sich" so that you can say God provides it.
> >
>
> You could replace "love" with "chocolate" and "God" with "the chocolate
> fairy". You can claim that while the reason people like chocolate can be
> explained in terms of chemistry, physiology, evolutionary biology etc., only
> the chocolate fairy can give ultimate meaning to the chocolate eating
> experience.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

I hope that didn't come across as facetious, Tom. These are serious
questions and I appreciate the opportunity to discuss them with an
intelligent and scientifically well-informed theist.

Stathis

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/7/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

Tom Caylor wrote:
>
> > I agree with the Russell quote as it stands.  Unendingness is not what
> > gives meaning.  The source of meaning is not "living forever" in time
> > (contrary to the trans-humanists) but is timeless.  However, the quote
> > makes a bad assumption when it talks about losing value.  The real
> > problem is how there can be any true objective value to love in the
> > first place (other than the so-called "irrefutable" first person:
> > "It's all about me").
>
> Why should there be?  Values are relative to people.  Love is our
> word.  We invented it to describe what we feel.  Having some Platonic form
> of LOVE out there is superfluous.  You're just making up a requirement for
> "the really real ding-an-sich" so that you can say God provides it.
>

You could replace "love" with "chocolate" and "God" with "the chocolate
fairy". You can claim that while the reason people like chocolate can be
explained in terms of chemistry, physiology, evolutionary biology etc., only
the chocolate fairy can give ultimate meaning to the chocolate eating
experience.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Tom Caylor]

On Mar 6, 5:19 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
> >> A source that has given us the crusades and 9/11 as well as the sister's 
> >> of mercy.  No a very sufficient source if nobody can agree on what it 
> >> provides.
>
> > I don't like simply saying "That isn't so," but "nobody can agree on
> > what it provides", referring to the source of ultimate meaning,
>
> I was referring to the "sufficient source of *morality*".  Such a source 
> should be able to provide an unambiguous standard that is so clear everyone 
> agrees - if it existed.
>
> >is not
> > true.  In fact it's very remarkable the consistency, across all kinds
> > of cultures, the basic beliefs of truly normative morality, evidence
> > for their being a source which cannot be explained through closed
> > science alone.
>
> Why not?  Why isn't Darwin's or Scott Atran's or Richard Dawkin's a 
> *possible* explanation. And how is "God did it" an explanation of anything?  
> It's just a form of words so ambiguous as to be virtually empty.  "God" meant 
> different things to the crusaders and the 9/11 jihadists, to the Aztecs and 
> the Conquistadores, to the Nazi's and the Jews.  So just because they use the 
> same word doesn't mean they are referring to the same thing.
>

We've talked about this before.  Darwin cannot explain giving without
expecting to receive.  Actually that's true love.  Only some people
believe that God did that.  But many other people somehow see the
goodness of it.

> And there is nothing "closed" about science.  Science is perfectly open to 
> the existence of whatever you can demonstrate.  People have tried to show 
> that the God who answers prayers exists and they fail.  But they could have 
> succeeded; nothing about science prevented their success.  They failed 
> because there is no such God.
>
> > On your first sentence, it also can be said of science that a lot of
> > evil has come that wouldn't have come (at least in the forms it has)
> > if it weren't for advances of science.  And I'm not knocking down
> > science as being invalid in its own right.  I'm just making the point
> > that your statement does not address *root* cause any more than
> > blaming science.
>
> That's the same criticism that theists make of cosmogonies - and the reply is 
> the same; if God doesn't need a root cause and can just exist uncaused, then 
> why not the universe (or the multiverse).  Love and morality don't need a 
> "root cause" beyond the evolutionary advantages they bestow.
>
> >> Brent Meeker
> >> "Happiness is none the less true happiness because it must come to an end, 
> >> nor do thought and love lose their value because they are not everlasting."
> >> --- Bertrand Russell-
>
> > I agree with the Russell quote as it stands.  Unendingness is not what
> > gives meaning.  The source of meaning is not "living forever" in time
> > (contrary to the trans-humanists) but is timeless.  However, the quote
> > makes a bad assumption when it talks about losing value.  The real
> > problem is how there can be any true objective value to love in the
> > first place (other than the so-called "irrefutable" first person:
> > "It's all about me").
>
> Why should there be?  Values are relative to people.  Love is our word.  We 
> invented it to describe what we feel.  Having some Platonic form of LOVE out 
> there is superfluous.  You're just making up a requirement for "the really 
> real ding-an-sich" so that you can say God provides it.

Dealing with our differences would require dealing with the fact that
I am a moral realist (hence my appeal to the argument from morality),
and you are not.  It seems you are a non-cognitivist or emotivist.

Perhaps we should just acknowledge our different views of morality.
Of course, as a moral realist, I believe that non-cognitivism does not
give a sufficient basis for morality.  But of course you disagree.  If
you agreed with moral realism then you would have to deal with the
argument from morality.

But if, when we say "I love you" to someone, all we're talking about
is our feelings, then morally that is like a stock market bubble, all
froth and in danger of collapse, sooner or later.  I'm not saying that
the speaker doesn't feel something at the time he/she says it, or that
they don't have good intentions.  I'm saying "sooner or later".  There
is no foundation.

>
> Brent Meeker
> "The Christian religion is fundamentally opposed to everything I hold in 
> veneration- courage, clear thinking, honesty, fairness, and above all, love 
> of the truth."
> --- H. L. Mencken

What in the world is this quote talking about?  Since I am a follower
of Jesus, I am not interested in religion, but I am interested in all
of those other things.

Tom


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Tom Caylor wrote:
> On Mar 1, 8:17 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Tom Caylor wrote:
>>> On Feb 26, 4:33 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
 On 2/27/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> The thing that is different in this realm of true morality is that the
> Creator is a person that we can get to know (not totally, but in a
> process of growth just like any relationship), so that we aren't just
> cranking out IF/THEN inferences like a machine, but the Holy Spirit
> (analogous to All Soul in Bruno/Plotinus term) affirms with our spirit
> that a certain response or initiative in the current situation is in
> accord with the Creator's personal character.  Thus, there is only so
> much convincing that one can do in a forum like this.  The rest
> requires actually being shown God's love in a tangible way by another
> person.  Then it is still up to each of us to decide how we respond.
 OK, but if we skip the question of how we know that God wants us to act in 
 a
 particular (moral) way, as well as the question of why we should listen to
 him, we still have the Euthyphro dilemma, as raised by 
 Brent:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euthyphro_dilemma
 ...
> I insist that I am not going down the ontological argument path.  If
> you want to categorize my argument from meaning, perhaps it is closest
> to Kant's argument from morality.  In a scientific system, perhaps
> this is branded as "wishful thinking", but I am also insisting that
> science's basis (anything's basis actually), such as fundamentality,
> generality, beauty, "introspection" is also mystical wishful thinking,
> and naturality is circular, and reproducibility is circular in that
> its pragmatism begs the question of meaning (IF you want to do this,
> THEN reproducible experiments have shown that you "should" do such and
> such).
 But you're seeking to break out of this circularity by introducing God, who
 doesn't need a creator, designer, source of meaning or morality, containing
 these qualities in himself necessarily rather than contingently. If you're
 happy to say that God breaks the circularity, why include this extra layer
 of complication instead of stopping at the universe?
 Stathis Papaioannou
>>> Because the universe doesn't break the circularity (and a plenitude of
>>> universes doesn't either for that matter).
>>> By the way, I'm not using the moral argument as a proof of the
>>> existence of God in the sense of a conclusion inside a closed system
>>> of logic.  I'm arguing that the personal God of love is the only
>>> possible truly sufficient source for real morality and ultimate
>>> meaning.  
>> A source that has given us the crusades and 9/11 as well as the sister's of 
>> mercy.  No a very sufficient source if nobody can agree on what it provides.
> 
> I don't like simply saying "That isn't so," but "nobody can agree on
> what it provides", referring to the source of ultimate meaning, 

I was referring to the "sufficient source of *morality*".  Such a source should 
be able to provide an unambiguous standard that is so clear everyone agrees - 
if it existed.

>is not
> true.  In fact it's very remarkable the consistency, across all kinds
> of cultures, the basic beliefs of truly normative morality, evidence
> for their being a source which cannot be explained through closed
> science alone.

Why not?  Why isn't Darwin's or Scott Atran's or Richard Dawkin's a *possible* 
explanation.  And how is "God did it" an explanation of anything?  It's just a 
form of words so ambiguous as to be virtually empty.  "God" meant different 
things to the crusaders and the 9/11 jihadists, to the Aztecs and the 
Conquistadores, to the Nazi's and the Jews.  So just because they use the same 
word doesn't mean they are referring to the same thing.

And there is nothing "closed" about science.  Science is perfectly open to the 
existence of whatever you can demonstrate.  People have tried to show that the 
God who answers prayers exists and they fail.  But they could have succeeded; 
nothing about science prevented their success.  They failed because there is no 
such God.
 
> On your first sentence, it also can be said of science that a lot of
> evil has come that wouldn't have come (at least in the forms it has)
> if it weren't for advances of science.  And I'm not knocking down
> science as being invalid in its own right.  I'm just making the point
> that your statement does not address *root* cause any more than
> blaming science.  

That's the same criticism that theists make of cosmogonies - and the reply is 
the same; if God doesn't need a root cause and can just exist uncaused, then 
why not the universe (or the multiverse).  Love and morality don't need a "root 
cause" beyond the evolutionary advantages they bestow.  

> Conversely, people would still do evil things no
> matte

Re: The Meaning of Life

[Tom Caylor]

On Mar 1, 8:17 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
> > On Feb 26, 4:33 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> On 2/27/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> >>> The thing that is different in this realm of true morality is that the
> >>> Creator is a person that we can get to know (not totally, but in a
> >>> process of growth just like any relationship), so that we aren't just
> >>> cranking out IF/THEN inferences like a machine, but the Holy Spirit
> >>> (analogous to All Soul in Bruno/Plotinus term) affirms with our spirit
> >>> that a certain response or initiative in the current situation is in
> >>> accord with the Creator's personal character.  Thus, there is only so
> >>> much convincing that one can do in a forum like this.  The rest
> >>> requires actually being shown God's love in a tangible way by another
> >>> person.  Then it is still up to each of us to decide how we respond.
> >> OK, but if we skip the question of how we know that God wants us to act in 
> >> a
> >> particular (moral) way, as well as the question of why we should listen to
> >> him, we still have the Euthyphro dilemma, as raised by 
> >> Brent:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euthyphro_dilemma
> >> ...
>
> >>> I insist that I am not going down the ontological argument path.  If
> >>> you want to categorize my argument from meaning, perhaps it is closest
> >>> to Kant's argument from morality.  In a scientific system, perhaps
> >>> this is branded as "wishful thinking", but I am also insisting that
> >>> science's basis (anything's basis actually), such as fundamentality,
> >>> generality, beauty, "introspection" is also mystical wishful thinking,
> >>> and naturality is circular, and reproducibility is circular in that
> >>> its pragmatism begs the question of meaning (IF you want to do this,
> >>> THEN reproducible experiments have shown that you "should" do such and
> >>> such).
> >> But you're seeking to break out of this circularity by introducing God, who
> >> doesn't need a creator, designer, source of meaning or morality, containing
> >> these qualities in himself necessarily rather than contingently. If you're
> >> happy to say that God breaks the circularity, why include this extra layer
> >> of complication instead of stopping at the universe?
>
> >> Stathis Papaioannou
>
> > Because the universe doesn't break the circularity (and a plenitude of
> > universes doesn't either for that matter).
>
> > By the way, I'm not using the moral argument as a proof of the
> > existence of God in the sense of a conclusion inside a closed system
> > of logic.  I'm arguing that the personal God of love is the only
> > possible truly sufficient source for real morality and ultimate
> > meaning.  
>
> A source that has given us the crusades and 9/11 as well as the sister's of 
> mercy.  No a very sufficient source if nobody can agree on what it provides.

I don't like simply saying "That isn't so," but "nobody can agree on
what it provides", referring to the source of ultimate meaning, is not
true.  In fact it's very remarkable the consistency, across all kinds
of cultures, the basic beliefs of truly normative morality, evidence
for their being a source which cannot be explained through closed
science alone.

On your first sentence, it also can be said of science that a lot of
evil has come that wouldn't have come (at least in the forms it has)
if it weren't for advances of science.  And I'm not knocking down
science as being invalid in its own right.  I'm just making the point
that your statement does not address *root* cause any more than
blaming science.  Conversely, people would still do evil things no
matter what the form of their belief in ultimate reality takes.  We
all (except for nihilists) believe in some form of ultimate reality.

I have a feeling that you'll always just come back with another short
quip like that.

>
> Brent Meeker
> "Happiness is none the less true happiness because it must come to an end, 
> nor do thought and love lose their value because they are not everlasting."
> --- Bertrand Russell-

I agree with the Russell quote as it stands.  Unendingness is not what
gives meaning.  The source of meaning is not "living forever" in time
(contrary to the trans-humanists) but is timeless.  However, the quote
makes a bad assumption when it talks about losing value.  The real
problem is how there can be any true objective value to love in the
first place (other than the so-called "irrefutable" first person:
"It's all about me").  I've talked about that plenty already.  I just
wanted to make the point about unendingness, which is a common
caricature of what belief in God is all about (i.e. "It's all about
me" :).

Tom


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Tom Caylor wrote:
> On Feb 26, 4:33 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> On 2/27/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>>> The thing that is different in this realm of true morality is that the
>>> Creator is a person that we can get to know (not totally, but in a
>>> process of growth just like any relationship), so that we aren't just
>>> cranking out IF/THEN inferences like a machine, but the Holy Spirit
>>> (analogous to All Soul in Bruno/Plotinus term) affirms with our spirit
>>> that a certain response or initiative in the current situation is in
>>> accord with the Creator's personal character.  Thus, there is only so
>>> much convincing that one can do in a forum like this.  The rest
>>> requires actually being shown God's love in a tangible way by another
>>> person.  Then it is still up to each of us to decide how we respond.
>> OK, but if we skip the question of how we know that God wants us to act in a
>> particular (moral) way, as well as the question of why we should listen to
>> him, we still have the Euthyphro dilemma, as raised by 
>> Brent:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euthyphro_dilemma
>> ...
>>
>>> I insist that I am not going down the ontological argument path.  If
>>> you want to categorize my argument from meaning, perhaps it is closest
>>> to Kant's argument from morality.  In a scientific system, perhaps
>>> this is branded as "wishful thinking", but I am also insisting that
>>> science's basis (anything's basis actually), such as fundamentality,
>>> generality, beauty, "introspection" is also mystical wishful thinking,
>>> and naturality is circular, and reproducibility is circular in that
>>> its pragmatism begs the question of meaning (IF you want to do this,
>>> THEN reproducible experiments have shown that you "should" do such and
>>> such).
>> But you're seeking to break out of this circularity by introducing God, who
>> doesn't need a creator, designer, source of meaning or morality, containing
>> these qualities in himself necessarily rather than contingently. If you're
>> happy to say that God breaks the circularity, why include this extra layer
>> of complication instead of stopping at the universe?
>>
>> Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> Because the universe doesn't break the circularity (and a plenitude of
> universes doesn't either for that matter).
> 
> By the way, I'm not using the moral argument as a proof of the
> existence of God in the sense of a conclusion inside a closed system
> of logic.  I'm arguing that the personal God of love is the only
> possible truly sufficient source for real morality and ultimate
> meaning.  

A source that has given us the crusades and 9/11 as well as the sister's of 
mercy.  No a very sufficient source if nobody can agree on what it provides.

Brent Meeker
"Happiness is none the less true happiness because it must come to an end, nor 
do thought and love lose their value because they are not everlasting."
--- Bertrand Russell

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Tom Caylor]

On Mar 1, 5:26 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 3/1/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > But you're seeking to break out of this circularity by introducing God,
> > who
> > > doesn't need a creator, designer, source of meaning or morality,
> > containing
> > > these qualities in himself necessarily rather than contingently. If
> > you're
> > > happy to say that God breaks the circularity, why include this extra
> > layer
> > > of complication instead of stopping at the universe?
>
> > > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> > Because the universe doesn't break the circularity (and a plenitude of
> > universes doesn't either for that matter).
>
> Actually, the plenitude does break the circularity, trumping even God. God
> could create or destroy his own separate physical universe but the infinite
> and infinitely nested universes of the plenitude, at least matching God's
> work, would exist regardless. If you don't agree with this statement at
> which point do you think the analogue of our present universe in the
> plenitude would fall short of its real counterpart: would stars and planets
> develop? Life? Zombie humans? Conscious humans but lacking a soul (and if
> you could explain what that would mean)?
>

God would be outside of the plenitude, and thus would break the
meaning/moral circularity inherent in the plenitude, breaking its
symmetry of meaningless whiteness/blackness and bringing order.  He
basically would be in charge of the evolution of the countless
histories of the universes.  But this seems superfluous to what is
needed for meaning for us in this universe.  Thus why bother with
multiverses?  You haven't shown how multiverses give meaning.

> > By the way, I'm not using the moral argument as a proof of the
> > existence of God in the sense of a conclusion inside a closed system
> > of logic.  I'm arguing that the personal God of love is the only
> > possible truly sufficient source for real morality and ultimate
> > meaning.  And if multiverses truly don't give us that, then to heck
> > with multiverses.  I think I've made my point.
>
> Well, I think from what you've said you would have to agree that if you can
> find a way to prove that ultimate morality and meaning exist, you would also
> prove that God exists. Is there a way of proving that these entities exist,
> independent of a separate proof of God's existence?
>

Not proof in the sense of logic in a closed system of course.  How can
you *prove* something ultimate from something non-ultimate?  But as I
have said before, I am arguing *from* the fact that meaning and
morality are evident to us (my posts on "seeing" and consciousness),
and that you can't have meaning without ultimate meaning of the same
nature as the meaning.

> > Lastly, on Euthyphro, look at the last reference at the end of the
> > Wikipedia article on the Euthyphro dilemma, especially the last
> > section on "whim".  The circular logic of Euthyphro is a problem only
> > with self-referencing terms in a closed system of logic.  This is the
> > problem with the assumption of the uniformity of natural causes in a
> > closed system.  God's love transcends all closed systems.
>
> That reference seems to suggest that there is an extra-God criterion for
> morality, because as God is all-loving, "God's arbitrary commands can't be
> arbitrary in the sense of being based on whim, but must instead concern
> behaviour that is in the overall best interests of those involved".
>

You can't put God's love in a box.  Remember that I'm not pushing
through to a proof of God's existence.  You seem to be assuming that I
am.  I'm talking about what is evident to us, and the multiverse can't
explain.

>
> > through the dark dry barren sky
> > pierced a warm red wet rain
> > can you not see this next new life spring flowing from him
> >   -- "Song of Longinus"
>
> Who wrote that?
>
> Stathis Papaioannou

I did.

Tom


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/1/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> But you're seeking to break out of this circularity by introducing God,
> who
> > doesn't need a creator, designer, source of meaning or morality,
> containing
> > these qualities in himself necessarily rather than contingently. If
> you're
> > happy to say that God breaks the circularity, why include this extra
> layer
> > of complication instead of stopping at the universe?
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> Because the universe doesn't break the circularity (and a plenitude of
> universes doesn't either for that matter).


Actually, the plenitude does break the circularity, trumping even God. God
could create or destroy his own separate physical universe but the infinite
and infinitely nested universes of the plenitude, at least matching God's
work, would exist regardless. If you don't agree with this statement at
which point do you think the analogue of our present universe in the
plenitude would fall short of its real counterpart: would stars and planets
develop? Life? Zombie humans? Conscious humans but lacking a soul (and if
you could explain what that would mean)?

By the way, I'm not using the moral argument as a proof of the
> existence of God in the sense of a conclusion inside a closed system
> of logic.  I'm arguing that the personal God of love is the only
> possible truly sufficient source for real morality and ultimate
> meaning.  And if multiverses truly don't give us that, then to heck
> with multiverses.  I think I've made my point.


Well, I think from what you've said you would have to agree that if you can
find a way to prove that ultimate morality and meaning exist, you would also
prove that God exists. Is there a way of proving that these entities exist,
independent of a separate proof of God's existence?

Lastly, on Euthyphro, look at the last reference at the end of the
> Wikipedia article on the Euthyphro dilemma, especially the last
> section on "whim".  The circular logic of Euthyphro is a problem only
> with self-referencing terms in a closed system of logic.  This is the
> problem with the assumption of the uniformity of natural causes in a
> closed system.  God's love transcends all closed systems.


That reference seems to suggest that there is an extra-God criterion for
morality, because as God is all-loving, "God's arbitrary commands can't be
arbitrary in the sense of being based on whim, but must instead concern
behaviour that is in the overall best interests of those involved".

through the dark dry barren sky
> pierced a warm red wet rain
> can you not see this next new life spring flowing from him
>   -- "Song of Longinus"


Who wrote that?

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Tom Caylor]

On Feb 26, 4:33 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 2/27/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > The thing that is different in this realm of true morality is that the
> > Creator is a person that we can get to know (not totally, but in a
> > process of growth just like any relationship), so that we aren't just
> > cranking out IF/THEN inferences like a machine, but the Holy Spirit
> > (analogous to All Soul in Bruno/Plotinus term) affirms with our spirit
> > that a certain response or initiative in the current situation is in
> > accord with the Creator's personal character.  Thus, there is only so
> > much convincing that one can do in a forum like this.  The rest
> > requires actually being shown God's love in a tangible way by another
> > person.  Then it is still up to each of us to decide how we respond.
>
> OK, but if we skip the question of how we know that God wants us to act in a
> particular (moral) way, as well as the question of why we should listen to
> him, we still have the Euthyphro dilemma, as raised by 
> Brent:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euthyphro_dilemma
> ...
>
> > I insist that I am not going down the ontological argument path.  If
> > you want to categorize my argument from meaning, perhaps it is closest
> > to Kant's argument from morality.  In a scientific system, perhaps
> > this is branded as "wishful thinking", but I am also insisting that
> > science's basis (anything's basis actually), such as fundamentality,
> > generality, beauty, "introspection" is also mystical wishful thinking,
> > and naturality is circular, and reproducibility is circular in that
> > its pragmatism begs the question of meaning (IF you want to do this,
> > THEN reproducible experiments have shown that you "should" do such and
> > such).
>
> But you're seeking to break out of this circularity by introducing God, who
> doesn't need a creator, designer, source of meaning or morality, containing
> these qualities in himself necessarily rather than contingently. If you're
> happy to say that God breaks the circularity, why include this extra layer
> of complication instead of stopping at the universe?
>
> Stathis Papaioannou

Because the universe doesn't break the circularity (and a plenitude of
universes doesn't either for that matter).

By the way, I'm not using the moral argument as a proof of the
existence of God in the sense of a conclusion inside a closed system
of logic.  I'm arguing that the personal God of love is the only
possible truly sufficient source for real morality and ultimate
meaning.  And if multiverses truly don't give us that, then to heck
with multiverses.  I think I've made my point.

Lastly, on Euthyphro, look at the last reference at the end of the
Wikipedia article on the Euthyphro dilemma, especially the last
section on "whim".  The circular logic of Euthyphro is a problem only
with self-referencing terms in a closed system of logic.  This is the
problem with the assumption of the uniformity of natural causes in a
closed system.  God's love transcends all closed systems.

Tom

through the dark dry barren sky
pierced a warm red wet rain
can you not see this next new life spring flowing from him
  -- "Song of Longinus"


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 2/27/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


>
> On Feb 24, 6:10 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > On 2/24/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > > > The universe is not under any obligation to reveal itself to us. All
> we
> > > can
> > > > do is stumble around blindly gathering what data we can and make a
> best
> > > > guess as to what's going on.
> >
> > > This is a metaphysical judgment.  There are those who strongly
> > > disagree on rational grounds.
> >
> > One of the problems with the verification principle of logical
> positivism
> > was that it, itself, cannot be verified by the verification principle,
> and
> > hence is subject to the charge of being part of the hated metaphysics
> (and,
> > I suppose, if it could be verified it would be subject to the charge
> that it
> > was a circular argument). But I would get around the problem by stating
> the
> > principles by which science works thus: IF you want to predict the
> weather,
> > build planes that fly, make sick people better THEN you should do such
> and
> > such. By putting it in this conditional form there is no metaphysical
> > component.
> >
>
> I think you and/or Bruno talked about this internal conditional
> definition of "morality" before.  But this is just logical inference
> inside a "closed" system of facts.  IF this is true THEN this is
> true.  There are no real normative statements here, and thus no real
> moral meaning.  IF you want to torture babies, THEN you "should" do
> such and such.  This definition of morality does not explain why we
> should want certain things and not others.  This definition does not
> suppport the real noble things of morality such as compassion.  Some
> examples are:
>
> IF you want to follow the Creator's path when your enemy strikes you
> on the cheek, THEN you should turn the other cheek and pray for him/
> her.
> IF you want to follow the Creator's path when it comes to a choice
> between your benefit and your neighbor's benefit, THEN you act for
> your neighbor's benefit.
> IF you want to follow the Creator's path when it comes to a choice
> between your life and your friend's life, THEN you should give your
> life.


That's fine in its logical form.


> The thing that is different in this realm of true morality is that the
> Creator is a person that we can get to know (not totally, but in a
> process of growth just like any relationship), so that we aren't just
> cranking out IF/THEN inferences like a machine, but the Holy Spirit
> (analogous to All Soul in Bruno/Plotinus term) affirms with our spirit
> that a certain response or initiative in the current situation is in
> accord with the Creator's personal character.  Thus, there is only so
> much convincing that one can do in a forum like this.  The rest
> requires actually being shown God's love in a tangible way by another
> person.  Then it is still up to each of us to decide how we respond.


OK, but if we skip the question of how we know that God wants us to act in a
particular (moral) way, as well as the question of why we should listen to
him, we still have the Euthyphro dilemma, as raised by Brent:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euthyphro_dilemma


> > > Science is just a systematisation of this
> > > > process, with guesses taking the form of models and theories.
> >
> > > So science is a just systematisation of a metaphysical judgment.  I
> > > agree.
> >
> > > > However, it's
> > > > all tentative, and the scientific method itself is tentative:
> tomorrow
> > > pigs
> > > > might sprout wings and fly, even though this has never happened
> before.
> > > I
> > > > would bet that pigs will still be land-bound tomorrow, because there
> is
> > > no
> > > > reason to think otherwise, but I have to stop short of absolute
> > > certainty. A
> > > > metaphysical position would be that flying pigs are an absurdity or
> an
> > > > anathema and therefore pigs absolutely *cannot* fly. But it is
> arrogant
> > > as
> > > > well as wrong to create absolute certainty, absolute meaning, or
> > > absolute
> > > > anything else by fiat, just because that's what you fancy. If there
> are
> > > some
> > > > things we can't know with certainty or can't know at all, that may
> be
> > > > unfortunate, but it's the way the world is.
> >
> > > > Stathis Papaioannou
> >
> > > Looking over my previous post, I cannot see why you are bringing up
> > > absolute certainty.  Also I don't know what "absolute meaning" means,
> > > unless it means knowing meaning with absolute certainty in which case
> > > I don't hold that view.
> >
> > Sorry if I have misunderstood, and if I have been unclear or tangential.
> > Several posts back you spoke of positivism being deficient because "a
> closed
> > system which is supposedly totally explainable will always have at least
> one
> > fixed point that is unexplainable". I read into this an implication that
> God
> > would solve the problem because he could be outside the system, indee

Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Tom Caylor wrote:
> On Feb 24, 6:10 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> On 2/24/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
 The universe is not under any obligation to reveal itself to us. All we
>>> can
 do is stumble around blindly gathering what data we can and make a best
 guess as to what's going on.
>>> This is a metaphysical judgment.  There are those who strongly
>>> disagree on rational grounds.
>> One of the problems with the verification principle of logical positivism
>> was that it, itself, cannot be verified by the verification principle, and
>> hence is subject to the charge of being part of the hated metaphysics (and,
>> I suppose, if it could be verified it would be subject to the charge that it
>> was a circular argument). But I would get around the problem by stating the
>> principles by which science works thus: IF you want to predict the weather,
>> build planes that fly, make sick people better THEN you should do such and
>> such. By putting it in this conditional form there is no metaphysical
>> component.
>>
> 
> I think you and/or Bruno talked about this internal conditional
> definition of "morality" before.  But this is just logical inference
> inside a "closed" system of facts.  IF this is true THEN this is
> true.  There are no real normative statements here, and thus no real
> moral meaning.  IF you want to torture babies, THEN you "should" do
> such and such.  This definition of morality does not explain why we
> should want certain things and not others.  This definition does not
> suppport the real noble things of morality such as compassion.  Some
> examples are:
> 
> IF you want to follow the Creator's path when your enemy strikes you
> on the cheek, THEN you should turn the other cheek and pray for him/
> her.
> IF you want to follow the Creator's path when it comes to a choice
> between your benefit and your neighbor's benefit, THEN you act for
> your neighbor's benefit.
> IF you want to follow the Creator's path when it comes to a choice
> between your life and your friend's life, THEN you should give your
> life.
> 
> The thing that is different in this realm of true morality is that the
> Creator is a person that we can get to know (not totally, but in a
> process of growth just like any relationship), so that we aren't just
> cranking out IF/THEN inferences like a machine, but the Holy Spirit
> (analogous to All Soul in Bruno/Plotinus term) affirms with our spirit
> that a certain response or initiative in the current situation is in
> accord with the Creator's personal character.  Thus, there is only so
> much convincing that one can do in a forum like this.  The rest
> requires actually being shown God's love in a tangible way by another
> person.  Then it is still up to each of us to decide how we respond.
> 
...
> 
> I insist that I am not going down the ontological argument path.  If
> you want to categorize my argument from meaning, perhaps it is closest
> to Kant's argument from morality.  In a scientific system, perhaps
> this is branded as "wishful thinking", but I am also insisting that
> science's basis (anything's basis actually), such as fundamentality,
> generality, beauty, "introspection" is also mystical wishful thinking,
> and naturality is circular, and reproducibility is circular in that
> its pragmatism begs the question of meaning (IF you want to do this,
> THEN reproducible experiments have shown that you "should" do such and
> such).
> 
> Tom

You seem not to appreciate the inconsistency in trying to use someone else's 
morality, even The Creator's, as your own.  Surely you've read Euthyphro.

Brent Meeker

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Tom Caylor]

On Feb 24, 6:10 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 2/24/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > > The universe is not under any obligation to reveal itself to us. All we
> > can
> > > do is stumble around blindly gathering what data we can and make a best
> > > guess as to what's going on.
>
> > This is a metaphysical judgment.  There are those who strongly
> > disagree on rational grounds.
>
> One of the problems with the verification principle of logical positivism
> was that it, itself, cannot be verified by the verification principle, and
> hence is subject to the charge of being part of the hated metaphysics (and,
> I suppose, if it could be verified it would be subject to the charge that it
> was a circular argument). But I would get around the problem by stating the
> principles by which science works thus: IF you want to predict the weather,
> build planes that fly, make sick people better THEN you should do such and
> such. By putting it in this conditional form there is no metaphysical
> component.
>

I think you and/or Bruno talked about this internal conditional
definition of "morality" before.  But this is just logical inference
inside a "closed" system of facts.  IF this is true THEN this is
true.  There are no real normative statements here, and thus no real
moral meaning.  IF you want to torture babies, THEN you "should" do
such and such.  This definition of morality does not explain why we
should want certain things and not others.  This definition does not
suppport the real noble things of morality such as compassion.  Some
examples are:

IF you want to follow the Creator's path when your enemy strikes you
on the cheek, THEN you should turn the other cheek and pray for him/
her.
IF you want to follow the Creator's path when it comes to a choice
between your benefit and your neighbor's benefit, THEN you act for
your neighbor's benefit.
IF you want to follow the Creator's path when it comes to a choice
between your life and your friend's life, THEN you should give your
life.

The thing that is different in this realm of true morality is that the
Creator is a person that we can get to know (not totally, but in a
process of growth just like any relationship), so that we aren't just
cranking out IF/THEN inferences like a machine, but the Holy Spirit
(analogous to All Soul in Bruno/Plotinus term) affirms with our spirit
that a certain response or initiative in the current situation is in
accord with the Creator's personal character.  Thus, there is only so
much convincing that one can do in a forum like this.  The rest
requires actually being shown God's love in a tangible way by another
person.  Then it is still up to each of us to decide how we respond.

>
> > Science is just a systematisation of this
> > > process, with guesses taking the form of models and theories.
>
> > So science is a just systematisation of a metaphysical judgment.  I
> > agree.
>
> > > However, it's
> > > all tentative, and the scientific method itself is tentative: tomorrow
> > pigs
> > > might sprout wings and fly, even though this has never happened before.
> > I
> > > would bet that pigs will still be land-bound tomorrow, because there is
> > no
> > > reason to think otherwise, but I have to stop short of absolute
> > certainty. A
> > > metaphysical position would be that flying pigs are an absurdity or an
> > > anathema and therefore pigs absolutely *cannot* fly. But it is arrogant
> > as
> > > well as wrong to create absolute certainty, absolute meaning, or
> > absolute
> > > anything else by fiat, just because that's what you fancy. If there are
> > some
> > > things we can't know with certainty or can't know at all, that may be
> > > unfortunate, but it's the way the world is.
>
> > > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> > Looking over my previous post, I cannot see why you are bringing up
> > absolute certainty.  Also I don't know what "absolute meaning" means,
> > unless it means knowing meaning with absolute certainty in which case
> > I don't hold that view.
>
> Sorry if I have misunderstood, and if I have been unclear or tangential.
> Several posts back you spoke of positivism being deficient because "a closed
> system which is supposedly totally explainable will always have at least one
> fixed point that is unexplainable". I read into this an implication that God
> would solve the problem because he could be outside the system, indeed
> outside all possible systems. But this runs into two problems. The first is
> that positivists are in fact very modest and make no claim to explain
> everything; the very opposite, in fact. The second is that the concept of an
> entity outside all possible systems, and therefore requiring no cause,
> design, meaning or any of the other things allegedly necessary for the
> universe and its components constitutes a restatement of the ontological
> argument for the existence of God, an argument that is 900 years old and has
> been rejected as invalid even 

Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 2/25/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> [SP, in response to Tom Caylor]:
> 
>  > Sorry if I have misunderstood, and if I have been unclear or
> tangential.
>  > Several posts back you spoke of positivism being deficient because "a
>  > closed system which is supposedly totally explainable will always
> have
>  > at least one fixed point that is unexplainable".
> 
> This is somewhat beside the point anyway.  Positivists (and all
> foundationists) suppose that there are some things known directly,
> without explanation, usually by direct perception or by
> introspection.  Just as mystics suppose some things are directly
> intuited or revealed by meditation, e.g. "...such things as
> fundamentality, generality and beauty."
> 
> Brent Meeker
> 
> 
> But then why value a scientific explanation over a mystical explanation? 

Because, as you pointed out, it works.  When knowledge is tested against 
perception and intersubjective agreement on that perception (to rule out 
hallucinations) it seems to be reliable.  When it's based on mystic revelation, 
it's not.  I was referring to Tom's statement you quoted when I said it was 
somewhat beside the point.

> It's straightforward when we stick to science as a method for making 
> predictions and creating technology (penicillin works better than 
> prayer), but where does this leave the example you raised recently, the 
> interpretation of quantum mechanics? I understand that some journals 
> will not publish papers on this subject on positivist grounds, i.e. that 
> it is metaphysics rather than science.

Some physics journals and proceeding of symposia do publish papers on the 
interpretation of quantum mechanics.  This kind of metaphysics (literally 
"about physics") is useful in guiding the development of new theories.  When 
Einstein developed general relativity he assumed some "meta-" rules, e.g. no 
derivatives higher than second.  Since there's a conflict between quantum 
mechanics and general relativity at the ontological level, the resolution is 
likely to require something that is "meta-" relative to the current theories.

Brent Meeker

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 2/25/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

[SP, in response to Tom Caylor]:

> > Sorry if I have misunderstood, and if I have been unclear or tangential.
> > Several posts back you spoke of positivism being deficient because "a
> > closed system which is supposedly totally explainable will always have
> > at least one fixed point that is unexplainable".
>
> This is somewhat beside the point anyway.  Positivists (and all
> foundationists) suppose that there are some things known directly, without
> explanation, usually by direct perception or by introspection.  Just as
> mystics suppose some things are directly intuited or revealed by meditation,
> e.g. "...such things as fundamentality, generality and beauty."
>
> Brent Meeker
>

But then why value a scientific explanation over a mystical explanation?
It's straightforward when we stick to science as a method for making
predictions and creating technology (penicillin works better than prayer),
but where does this leave the example you raised recently, the
interpretation of quantum mechanics? I understand that some journals will
not publish papers on this subject on positivist grounds, i.e. that it is
metaphysics rather than science.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 2/24/07, *Tom Caylor* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Feb 23, 8:51 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > wrote:
>  > On 2/24/07, Tom Caylor < [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > wrote:
>  >
>  > > I agree that positivists don't like metaphysics, and they actually
>  > > don't believe in it either.  The problem with this is that
> science is
>  > > ultimately based on (and is inescapably in the context of) some
> kind
>  > > of metaphysics, since it is in the context of the universe as a
> whole.
>  >
>  > > There are some ways of sorting out metaphysics.  In fact these
>  > > criteria are mostly the same as how we sort out science (since,
> again,
>  > > science is based on metaphysics).  These are such things as
>  > > fundamentality, generality and beauty.  However, the fact that
> science
>  > > conventionally has been limited to the "material" (whatever that
>  > > means!) implies that the criteria of naturality (a viscious circle
>  > > actually!) and reproducibility (another vicious circle) that we
> have
>  > > in science cannot be applied to the universe as a whole or to
>  > > metaphysics.
>  >
>  > > [Side note: But even more important is to recognize that
> metaphysics,
>  > > as well as science, is filtered for us: we are part of the universe
>  > > and we are limited.  So this filters out almost everything.  This
>  > > limits more than anything the amount of "sense" we can make out of
>  > > Everything.]
>  >
>  > > However the criterion that you are trying to enforce, that of all
>  > > things having a cause even in the context of Everything and
> Everyone,
>  > > is a positivist criteria, treating metaphysics as science.  It
> assumes
>  > > that Everything has to be part of this closed system of cause and
>  > > effect.  There are plenty of criteria to sort out Everything
> (as I've
>  > > mentioned above) without getting into the positivist viscious
> circle.
>  >
>  > The universe is not under any obligation to reveal itself to us.
> All we can
>  > do is stumble around blindly gathering what data we can and make
> a best
>  > guess as to what's going on.
> 
> This is a metaphysical judgment.  There are those who strongly
> disagree on rational grounds.
> 
> 
> One of the problems with the verification principle of logical 
> positivism was that it, itself, cannot be verified by the verification 
> principle, and hence is subject to the charge of being part of the hated 
> metaphysics (and, I suppose, if it could be verified it would be subject 
> to the charge that it was a circular argument). But I would get around 
> the problem by stating the principles by which science works thus: IF 
> you want to predict the weather, build planes that fly, make sick people 
> better THEN you should do such and such. By putting it in this 
> conditional form there is no metaphysical component.
> 
>  > Science is just a systematisation of this
>  > process, with guesses taking the form of models and theories.
> 
> So science is a just systematisation of a metaphysical judgment.  I
> agree.
> 
>  > However, it's
>  > all tentative, and the scientific method itself is tentative:
> tomorrow pigs
>  > might sprout wings and fly, even though this has never happened
> before. I
>  > would bet that pigs will still be land-bound tomorrow, because
> there is no
>  > reason to think otherwise, but I have to stop short of absolute
> certainty. A
>  > metaphysical position would be that flying pigs are an absurdity
> or an
>  > anathema and therefore pigs absolutely *cannot* fly. But it is
> arrogant as
>  > well as wrong to create absolute certainty, absolute meaning, or
> absolute
>  > anything else by fiat, just because that's what you fancy. If
> there are some
>  > things we can't know with certainty or can't know at all, that may be
>  > unfortunate, but it's the way the world is.
>  >
>  > Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> Looking over my previous post, I cannot see why you are bringing up
> absolute certainty.  Also I don't know what "absolute meaning" means,
> unless it means knowing meaning with absolute certainty in which case
> I don't hold that view. 
> 
> 
> Sorry if I have misunderstood, and if I have been unclear or tangential. 
> Several posts back you spoke of positivism being deficient because "a 
> closed system which is supposedly totally explainable will always have 
> at least one fixed point that is unexplainable". 

This is somewhat beside the point anyway.  Positivists (and all foundationists) 
suppose that there are some things known directly, without explan

Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 2/24/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


> On Feb 23, 8:51 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > On 2/24/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > wrote:
> >
> > > I agree that positivists don't like metaphysics, and they actually
> > > don't believe in it either.  The problem with this is that science is
> > > ultimately based on (and is inescapably in the context of) some kind
> > > of metaphysics, since it is in the context of the universe as a whole.
> >
> > > There are some ways of sorting out metaphysics.  In fact these
> > > criteria are mostly the same as how we sort out science (since, again,
>
> > > science is based on metaphysics).  These are such things as
> > > fundamentality, generality and beauty.  However, the fact that science
> > > conventionally has been limited to the "material" (whatever that
> > > means!) implies that the criteria of naturality (a viscious circle
> > > actually!) and reproducibility (another vicious circle) that we have
> > > in science cannot be applied to the universe as a whole or to
> > > metaphysics.
> >
> > > [Side note: But even more important is to recognize that metaphysics,
> > > as well as science, is filtered for us: we are part of the universe
> > > and we are limited.  So this filters out almost everything.  This
> > > limits more than anything the amount of "sense" we can make out of
> > > Everything.]
> >
> > > However the criterion that you are trying to enforce, that of all
> > > things having a cause even in the context of Everything and Everyone,
> > > is a positivist criteria, treating metaphysics as science.  It assumes
> > > that Everything has to be part of this closed system of cause and
> > > effect.  There are plenty of criteria to sort out Everything (as I've
> > > mentioned above) without getting into the positivist viscious circle.
> >
> > The universe is not under any obligation to reveal itself to us. All we
> can
> > do is stumble around blindly gathering what data we can and make a best
> > guess as to what's going on.
>
> This is a metaphysical judgment.  There are those who strongly
> disagree on rational grounds.


One of the problems with the verification principle of logical positivism
was that it, itself, cannot be verified by the verification principle, and
hence is subject to the charge of being part of the hated metaphysics (and,
I suppose, if it could be verified it would be subject to the charge that it
was a circular argument). But I would get around the problem by stating the
principles by which science works thus: IF you want to predict the weather,
build planes that fly, make sick people better THEN you should do such and
such. By putting it in this conditional form there is no metaphysical
component.

> Science is just a systematisation of this
> > process, with guesses taking the form of models and theories.
>
> So science is a just systematisation of a metaphysical judgment.  I
> agree.
>
> > However, it's
> > all tentative, and the scientific method itself is tentative: tomorrow
> pigs
> > might sprout wings and fly, even though this has never happened before.
> I
> > would bet that pigs will still be land-bound tomorrow, because there is
> no
> > reason to think otherwise, but I have to stop short of absolute
> certainty. A
> > metaphysical position would be that flying pigs are an absurdity or an
> > anathema and therefore pigs absolutely *cannot* fly. But it is arrogant
> as
> > well as wrong to create absolute certainty, absolute meaning, or
> absolute
> > anything else by fiat, just because that's what you fancy. If there are
> some
> > things we can't know with certainty or can't know at all, that may be
> > unfortunate, but it's the way the world is.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> Looking over my previous post, I cannot see why you are bringing up
> absolute certainty.  Also I don't know what "absolute meaning" means,
> unless it means knowing meaning with absolute certainty in which case
> I don't hold that view.


Sorry if I have misunderstood, and if I have been unclear or tangential.
Several posts back you spoke of positivism being deficient because "a closed
system which is supposedly totally explainable will always have at least one
fixed point that is unexplainable". I read into this an implication that God
would solve the problem because he could be outside the system, indeed
outside all possible systems. But this runs into two problems. The first is
that positivists are in fact very modest and make no claim to explain
everything; the very opposite, in fact. The second is that the concept of an
entity outside all possible systems, and therefore requiring no cause,
design, meaning or any of the other things allegedly necessary for the
universe and its components constitutes a restatement of the ontological
argument for the existence of God, an argument that is 900 years old and has
been rejected as invalid even by most theists.

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~

Re: The Meaning of Life

[John M]

Thank you, guys, for 2 parts in this post I cherrish most.
(I was questioning the endless back-and-forth of these 'bickercussions', but 
from time to time there is a part that justifies the frustration of reading so 
much) 
*
I leave the part from Stathis' text which I want to copy to another list (with 
credit to Stathis and this list - if it is not prohibited, pls advise) between 
dotted lines. 
Also:
The remark of Brent opened up a little light in my head (aka activated some 
photons in the neurons?) about refreshing the 'pilot wave' of D. Bohm as 
coinciding with Robert Rosen's anticipatory principle. (Bohm's priority). 
*
Btw I find 'metaphysics' was a false historical mock-name to reject everything 
outside the primitive ancient model they called (then) "physics" (the science). 
Today's physics is many times 'meta', especially when carrying a "Q-name". I 
can relate to both of yours remarks. 
( Theists etc. just wanted to ride that horse in the past.  )
The wording that emerges in talks about metaphysics is a mixture of the ancient 
denigration and the up-to-date ideas. Is it still fruitful to argue about a 
past misnomer?

John M
 
PS. about 'cause' and 'positivists':
if we accept the random occurrences in the existence, we just waste any effort 
to identify ANY order (including math). I don't think the 'positivist' is a 
right (denigrating?)
word for the idea that everything is (deterministically) interconnected/ 
interinfluencing any occurrence to 'happen' - maybe not 'causing' just 
'directing/facilitating' - entailing in some sense.  JM
  - Original Message ----- 
  From: Stathis Papaioannou 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Saturday, February 24, 2007 6:32 AM
  Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life


  I suppose it depends on what is covered by the term "metaphysics". Theists 
sometimes profess absolute certainty in the face of absolute lack of evidence, 
and are proud of it. I wouldn't lump this in together with the interpretation 
of quantum mechanics (I'm sure you wouldn't either, but I thought I'd make the 
point). 

  ...  (On /24/07,
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:)
>
> On Feb 23, 3:59 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >> wrote:
>  > On 2/23/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote: 
Skip
*
>  > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> I agree that positivists don't like metaphysics, and they actually 
> don't believe in it either.  The problem with this is that science is
> ultimately based on (and is inescapably in the context of) some kind
> of metaphysics, since it is in the context of the universe as a 
whole. 
>
> There are some ways of sorting out metaphysics.  In fact these
> criteria are mostly the same as how we sort out science (since, again,
> science is based on metaphysics).  These are such things as 
> fundamentality, generality and beauty.  However, the fact that science
> conventionally has been limited to the "material" (whatever that
> means!) implies that the criteria of naturality (a viscious circle 
> actually!) and reproducibility (another vicious circle) that we have
> in science cannot be applied to the universe as a whole or to
> metaphysics.
>
> [Side note: But even more important is to recognize that metaphysics, 
> as well as science, is filtered for us: we are part of the universe
> and we are limited.  So this filters out almost everything.  This
> limits more than anything the amount of "sense" we can make out of 
> Everything.]
>
> However the criterion that you are trying to enforce, that of all
> things having a cause even in the context of Everything and Everyone,
> is a positivist criteria, treating metaphysics as science.  It 
assumes 
> that Everything has to be part of this closed system of cause and
> effect.  There are plenty of criteria to sort out Everything (as I've
> mentioned above) without getting into the positivist viscious circle. 
>
>-
> The universe is not under any obligation to reveal itself to us. All we
> can do is stumble around blindly gathering what data we can and make a
> best guess as to what's going on. Science is just a systematisation of 
> t

Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

I suppose it depends on what is covered by the term "metaphysics". Theists
sometimes profess absolute certainty in the face of absolute lack of
evidence, and are proud of it. I wouldn't lump this in together with the
interpretation of quantum mechanics (I'm sure you wouldn't either, but I
thought I'd make the point).

On 2/24/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 2/24/07, *Tom Caylor* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Feb 23, 3:59 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > wrote:
> >  > On 2/23/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > wrote:
> >  >
> >  > > My point in quoting Kronecker was to simply to allude to the
> > fact that
> >  > > the foundations of mathematics are axiomatic in a similar way
> that
> >  > > ultimate meaning is ultimate.  We have a feeling that the
> > foundation
> >  > > of math is ultimately right, even though we can't prove it.  In
> my
> >  > > "logical reason" (reason #1 a few posts back), I am simply
> > arguing for
> >  > > realism (vs. positivism).  Your arguments that you are trying
> to
> >  > > enforce here would apply equally well (if valid) to realism in
> > general
> >  > > (not just God), and therefore put you in the positivist camp.
> >  >
> >  > > Tom
> >  >
> >  > Positivists don't like metaphysics, but even if you allow that
> > metaphysics
> >  > isn't all just nonsense, you have to maintain some sort of
> > standards. How do
> >  > you weed out those metaphysical beliefs which *are* just
> nonsense?
> >  >
> >  > Stathis Papaioannou
> >
> > I agree that positivists don't like metaphysics, and they actually
> > don't believe in it either.  The problem with this is that science
> is
> > ultimately based on (and is inescapably in the context of) some kind
> > of metaphysics, since it is in the context of the universe as a
> whole.
> >
> > There are some ways of sorting out metaphysics.  In fact these
> > criteria are mostly the same as how we sort out science (since,
> again,
> > science is based on metaphysics).  These are such things as
> > fundamentality, generality and beauty.  However, the fact that
> science
> > conventionally has been limited to the "material" (whatever that
> > means!) implies that the criteria of naturality (a viscious circle
> > actually!) and reproducibility (another vicious circle) that we have
> > in science cannot be applied to the universe as a whole or to
> > metaphysics.
> >
> > [Side note: But even more important is to recognize that
> metaphysics,
> > as well as science, is filtered for us: we are part of the universe
> > and we are limited.  So this filters out almost everything.  This
> > limits more than anything the amount of "sense" we can make out of
> > Everything.]
> >
> > However the criterion that you are trying to enforce, that of all
> > things having a cause even in the context of Everything and
> Everyone,
> > is a positivist criteria, treating metaphysics as science.  It
> assumes
> > that Everything has to be part of this closed system of cause and
> > effect.  There are plenty of criteria to sort out Everything (as
> I've
> > mentioned above) without getting into the positivist viscious
> circle.
> >
> >
> > The universe is not under any obligation to reveal itself to us. All we
> > can do is stumble around blindly gathering what data we can and make a
> > best guess as to what's going on. Science is just a systematisation of
> > this process, with guesses taking the form of models and theories.
> > However, it's all tentative, and the scientific method itself is
> > tentative: tomorrow pigs might sprout wings and fly, even though this
> > has never happened before. I would bet that pigs will still be
> > land-bound tomorrow, because there is no reason to think otherwise, but
> > I have to stop short of absolute certainty. A metaphysical position
> > would be that flying pigs are an absurdity or an anathema and therefore
> > pigs absolutely *cannot* fly. But it is arrogant as well as wrong to
> > create absolute certainty, absolute meaning, or absolute anything else
> > by fiat, just because that's what you fancy. If there are some things we
> > can't know with certainty or can't know at all, that may be unfortunate,
> > but it's the way the world is.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> You seem to take metaphysics to be an absolutist theory.  Maybe Tom does
> too.  But I think of metaphysics to be the interpretation we put on top of
> our mathematical theories, e.g. Bohm's pilot wave and Feynman's multiple
> particle paths are two different metaphysics we can use to explain what the
> formalism of quantum mechanics refers to.  But we're *less* certain about
> them t

Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 2/24/07, *Tom Caylor* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Feb 23, 3:59 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > wrote:
>  > On 2/23/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > wrote:
>  >
>  > > My point in quoting Kronecker was to simply to allude to the
> fact that
>  > > the foundations of mathematics are axiomatic in a similar way that
>  > > ultimate meaning is ultimate.  We have a feeling that the
> foundation
>  > > of math is ultimately right, even though we can't prove it.  In my
>  > > "logical reason" (reason #1 a few posts back), I am simply
> arguing for
>  > > realism (vs. positivism).  Your arguments that you are trying to
>  > > enforce here would apply equally well (if valid) to realism in
> general
>  > > (not just God), and therefore put you in the positivist camp.
>  >
>  > > Tom
>  >
>  > Positivists don't like metaphysics, but even if you allow that
> metaphysics
>  > isn't all just nonsense, you have to maintain some sort of
> standards. How do
>  > you weed out those metaphysical beliefs which *are* just nonsense?
>  >
>  > Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> I agree that positivists don't like metaphysics, and they actually
> don't believe in it either.  The problem with this is that science is
> ultimately based on (and is inescapably in the context of) some kind
> of metaphysics, since it is in the context of the universe as a whole.
> 
> There are some ways of sorting out metaphysics.  In fact these
> criteria are mostly the same as how we sort out science (since, again,
> science is based on metaphysics).  These are such things as
> fundamentality, generality and beauty.  However, the fact that science
> conventionally has been limited to the "material" (whatever that
> means!) implies that the criteria of naturality (a viscious circle
> actually!) and reproducibility (another vicious circle) that we have
> in science cannot be applied to the universe as a whole or to
> metaphysics.
> 
> [Side note: But even more important is to recognize that metaphysics,
> as well as science, is filtered for us: we are part of the universe
> and we are limited.  So this filters out almost everything.  This
> limits more than anything the amount of "sense" we can make out of
> Everything.]
> 
> However the criterion that you are trying to enforce, that of all
> things having a cause even in the context of Everything and Everyone,
> is a positivist criteria, treating metaphysics as science.  It assumes
> that Everything has to be part of this closed system of cause and
> effect.  There are plenty of criteria to sort out Everything (as I've
> mentioned above) without getting into the positivist viscious circle.
> 
> 
> The universe is not under any obligation to reveal itself to us. All we 
> can do is stumble around blindly gathering what data we can and make a 
> best guess as to what's going on. Science is just a systematisation of 
> this process, with guesses taking the form of models and theories. 
> However, it's all tentative, and the scientific method itself is 
> tentative: tomorrow pigs might sprout wings and fly, even though this 
> has never happened before. I would bet that pigs will still be 
> land-bound tomorrow, because there is no reason to think otherwise, but 
> I have to stop short of absolute certainty. A metaphysical position 
> would be that flying pigs are an absurdity or an anathema and therefore 
> pigs absolutely *cannot* fly. But it is arrogant as well as wrong to 
> create absolute certainty, absolute meaning, or absolute anything else 
> by fiat, just because that's what you fancy. If there are some things we 
> can't know with certainty or can't know at all, that may be unfortunate, 
> but it's the way the world is.
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou

You seem to take metaphysics to be an absolutist theory.  Maybe Tom does too.  
But I think of metaphysics to be the interpretation we put on top of our 
mathematical theories, e.g. Bohm's pilot wave and Feynman's multiple particle 
paths are two different metaphysics we can use to explain what the formalism of 
quantum mechanics refers to.  But we're *less* certain about them than about 
the formalism.  In fact they don't even matter in applications.  Their 
usefulness, if they have any, is in suggesting extensions to the theory.

Brent Meeker

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Tom Caylor]

On Feb 23, 8:51 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 2/24/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > I agree that positivists don't like metaphysics, and they actually
> > don't believe in it either.  The problem with this is that science is
> > ultimately based on (and is inescapably in the context of) some kind
> > of metaphysics, since it is in the context of the universe as a whole.
>
> > There are some ways of sorting out metaphysics.  In fact these
> > criteria are mostly the same as how we sort out science (since, again,
> > science is based on metaphysics).  These are such things as
> > fundamentality, generality and beauty.  However, the fact that science
> > conventionally has been limited to the "material" (whatever that
> > means!) implies that the criteria of naturality (a viscious circle
> > actually!) and reproducibility (another vicious circle) that we have
> > in science cannot be applied to the universe as a whole or to
> > metaphysics.
>
> > [Side note: But even more important is to recognize that metaphysics,
> > as well as science, is filtered for us: we are part of the universe
> > and we are limited.  So this filters out almost everything.  This
> > limits more than anything the amount of "sense" we can make out of
> > Everything.]
>
> > However the criterion that you are trying to enforce, that of all
> > things having a cause even in the context of Everything and Everyone,
> > is a positivist criteria, treating metaphysics as science.  It assumes
> > that Everything has to be part of this closed system of cause and
> > effect.  There are plenty of criteria to sort out Everything (as I've
> > mentioned above) without getting into the positivist viscious circle.
>
> The universe is not under any obligation to reveal itself to us. All we can
> do is stumble around blindly gathering what data we can and make a best
> guess as to what's going on.

This is a metaphysical judgment.  There are those who strongly
disagree on rational grounds.

> Science is just a systematisation of this
> process, with guesses taking the form of models and theories.

So science is a just systematisation of a metaphysical judgment.  I
agree.

> However, it's
> all tentative, and the scientific method itself is tentative: tomorrow pigs
> might sprout wings and fly, even though this has never happened before. I
> would bet that pigs will still be land-bound tomorrow, because there is no
> reason to think otherwise, but I have to stop short of absolute certainty. A
> metaphysical position would be that flying pigs are an absurdity or an
> anathema and therefore pigs absolutely *cannot* fly. But it is arrogant as
> well as wrong to create absolute certainty, absolute meaning, or absolute
> anything else by fiat, just because that's what you fancy. If there are some
> things we can't know with certainty or can't know at all, that may be
> unfortunate, but it's the way the world is.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou

Looking over my previous post, I cannot see why you are bringing up
absolute certainty.  Also I don't know what "absolute meaning" means,
unless it means knowing meaning with absolute certainty in which case
I don't hold that view.

Tom


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 2/24/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


> On Feb 23, 3:59 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > On 2/23/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > > My point in quoting Kronecker was to simply to allude to the fact that
> > > the foundations of mathematics are axiomatic in a similar way that
> > > ultimate meaning is ultimate.  We have a feeling that the foundation
> > > of math is ultimately right, even though we can't prove it.  In my
> > > "logical reason" (reason #1 a few posts back), I am simply arguing for
> > > realism (vs. positivism).  Your arguments that you are trying to
> > > enforce here would apply equally well (if valid) to realism in general
> > > (not just God), and therefore put you in the positivist camp.
> >
> > > Tom
> >
> > Positivists don't like metaphysics, but even if you allow that
> metaphysics
> > isn't all just nonsense, you have to maintain some sort of standards.
> How do
> > you weed out those metaphysical beliefs which *are* just nonsense?
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> I agree that positivists don't like metaphysics, and they actually
> don't believe in it either.  The problem with this is that science is
> ultimately based on (and is inescapably in the context of) some kind
> of metaphysics, since it is in the context of the universe as a whole.
>
> There are some ways of sorting out metaphysics.  In fact these
> criteria are mostly the same as how we sort out science (since, again,
> science is based on metaphysics).  These are such things as
> fundamentality, generality and beauty.  However, the fact that science
> conventionally has been limited to the "material" (whatever that
> means!) implies that the criteria of naturality (a viscious circle
> actually!) and reproducibility (another vicious circle) that we have
> in science cannot be applied to the universe as a whole or to
> metaphysics.
>
> [Side note: But even more important is to recognize that metaphysics,
> as well as science, is filtered for us: we are part of the universe
> and we are limited.  So this filters out almost everything.  This
> limits more than anything the amount of "sense" we can make out of
> Everything.]
>
> However the criterion that you are trying to enforce, that of all
> things having a cause even in the context of Everything and Everyone,
> is a positivist criteria, treating metaphysics as science.  It assumes
> that Everything has to be part of this closed system of cause and
> effect.  There are plenty of criteria to sort out Everything (as I've
> mentioned above) without getting into the positivist viscious circle.


The universe is not under any obligation to reveal itself to us. All we can
do is stumble around blindly gathering what data we can and make a best
guess as to what's going on. Science is just a systematisation of this
process, with guesses taking the form of models and theories. However, it's
all tentative, and the scientific method itself is tentative: tomorrow pigs
might sprout wings and fly, even though this has never happened before. I
would bet that pigs will still be land-bound tomorrow, because there is no
reason to think otherwise, but I have to stop short of absolute certainty. A
metaphysical position would be that flying pigs are an absurdity or an
anathema and therefore pigs absolutely *cannot* fly. But it is arrogant as
well as wrong to create absolute certainty, absolute meaning, or absolute
anything else by fiat, just because that's what you fancy. If there are some
things we can't know with certainty or can't know at all, that may be
unfortunate, but it's the way the world is.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Tom Caylor]

On Feb 23, 3:59 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 2/23/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > My point in quoting Kronecker was to simply to allude to the fact that
> > the foundations of mathematics are axiomatic in a similar way that
> > ultimate meaning is ultimate.  We have a feeling that the foundation
> > of math is ultimately right, even though we can't prove it.  In my
> > "logical reason" (reason #1 a few posts back), I am simply arguing for
> > realism (vs. positivism).  Your arguments that you are trying to
> > enforce here would apply equally well (if valid) to realism in general
> > (not just God), and therefore put you in the positivist camp.
>
> > Tom
>
> Positivists don't like metaphysics, but even if you allow that metaphysics
> isn't all just nonsense, you have to maintain some sort of standards. How do
> you weed out those metaphysical beliefs which *are* just nonsense?
>
> Stathis Papaioannou

I agree that positivists don't like metaphysics, and they actually
don't believe in it either.  The problem with this is that science is
ultimately based on (and is inescapably in the context of) some kind
of metaphysics, since it is in the context of the universe as a whole.

There are some ways of sorting out metaphysics.  In fact these
criteria are mostly the same as how we sort out science (since, again,
science is based on metaphysics).  These are such things as
fundamentality, generality and beauty.  However, the fact that science
conventionally has been limited to the "material" (whatever that
means!) implies that the criteria of naturality (a viscious circle
actually!) and reproducibility (another vicious circle) that we have
in science cannot be applied to the universe as a whole or to
metaphysics.

[Side note: But even more important is to recognize that metaphysics,
as well as science, is filtered for us: we are part of the universe
and we are limited.  So this filters out almost everything.  This
limits more than anything the amount of "sense" we can make out of
Everything.]

However the criterion that you are trying to enforce, that of all
things having a cause even in the context of Everything and Everyone,
is a positivist criteria, treating metaphysics as science.  It assumes
that Everything has to be part of this closed system of cause and
effect.  There are plenty of criteria to sort out Everything (as I've
mentioned above) without getting into the positivist viscious circle.

Tom


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 2/23/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> On Feb 20, 3:47 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > > Ultimate meaning is analogous to axioms or arithmetic truth (e.g. 42
> > > is not prime).  In fact the famous quote of Kronecker "God created the
> > > integers" makes this point.  I think Bruno takes arithmetic truth as
> > > his ultimate source of meaning.  If you ask the same positivist
> > > questions of arithmetic truth, you also have the same problem.  The
> > > problem lies in the positivist view that there can be no given truth.
> >
> > > Tom
> >
> > This is indeed related to the ontological argument, first formulated by
> > Anselm of Canterbury in the 11th century: We say that God is a being
> than
> > which nothing more perfect can be imagined. If God did not exist, then
> we
> > can imagine an entity just like God, but with the additional attribute
> of
> > existence - which is absurd, because we would then be imagining
> something
> > more perfect than that than which nothing more perfect can be imagined.
> > Therefore, God the most perfect being imaginable must necessarily have
> > existence as one of his attributes. Versions of the argument from first
> > cause and the argument from design also reduce to the ontological
> argument,
> > answering the question "who made God?" with the assertion that God
> exists
> > necessarily, with no need for the creator/designer (or, you might add,
> > external source of meaning) that the merely contingents things in the
> > universe need.
> >
> > The problem with defining God in this way as something which necessarily
> > exists is that you can use the same trick to conjure up anything you
> like:
> > an "existent pink elephant" can't be non-existent any more than a
> bachelor
> > can be married. This objection pales a little if we admit that imagined
> > existence (i.e Platonia and the conscious computations therein) is all
> the
> > existence there is, but I am not sure that you would be happy with this
> > explanation as despite the Kronecker quote (which I always understood as
> > rhetorical anyway) mathematical truths are beyond even God's power to
> > change.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> My point in quoting Kronecker was to simply to allude to the fact that
> the foundations of mathematics are axiomatic in a similar way that
> ultimate meaning is ultimate.  We have a feeling that the foundation
> of math is ultimately right, even though we can't prove it.  In my
> "logical reason" (reason #1 a few posts back), I am simply arguing for
> realism (vs. positivism).  Your arguments that you are trying to
> enforce here would apply equally well (if valid) to realism in general
> (not just God), and therefore put you in the positivist camp.
>
> Tom


Positivists don't like metaphysics, but even if you allow that metaphysics
isn't all just nonsense, you have to maintain some sort of standards. How do
you weed out those metaphysical beliefs which *are* just nonsense?

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Tom Caylor]

On Feb 20, 3:47 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > Ultimate meaning is analogous to axioms or arithmetic truth (e.g. 42
> > is not prime).  In fact the famous quote of Kronecker "God created the
> > integers" makes this point.  I think Bruno takes arithmetic truth as
> > his ultimate source of meaning.  If you ask the same positivist
> > questions of arithmetic truth, you also have the same problem.  The
> > problem lies in the positivist view that there can be no given truth.
>
> > Tom
>
> This is indeed related to the ontological argument, first formulated by
> Anselm of Canterbury in the 11th century: We say that God is a being than
> which nothing more perfect can be imagined. If God did not exist, then we
> can imagine an entity just like God, but with the additional attribute of
> existence - which is absurd, because we would then be imagining something
> more perfect than that than which nothing more perfect can be imagined.
> Therefore, God the most perfect being imaginable must necessarily have
> existence as one of his attributes. Versions of the argument from first
> cause and the argument from design also reduce to the ontological argument,
> answering the question "who made God?" with the assertion that God exists
> necessarily, with no need for the creator/designer (or, you might add,
> external source of meaning) that the merely contingents things in the
> universe need.
>
> The problem with defining God in this way as something which necessarily
> exists is that you can use the same trick to conjure up anything you like:
> an "existent pink elephant" can't be non-existent any more than a bachelor
> can be married. This objection pales a little if we admit that imagined
> existence (i.e Platonia and the conscious computations therein) is all the
> existence there is, but I am not sure that you would be happy with this
> explanation as despite the Kronecker quote (which I always understood as
> rhetorical anyway) mathematical truths are beyond even God's power to
> change.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou

My point in quoting Kronecker was to simply to allude to the fact that
the foundations of mathematics are axiomatic in a similar way that
ultimate meaning is ultimate.  We have a feeling that the foundation
of math is ultimately right, even though we can't prove it.  In my
"logical reason" (reason #1 a few posts back), I am simply arguing for
realism (vs. positivism).  Your arguments that you are trying to
enforce here would apply equally well (if valid) to realism in general
(not just God), and therefore put you in the positivist camp.

Tom


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Tom Caylor wrote:
> On Feb 19, 7:00 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>>> On Feb 19, 4:00 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
 On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> These are positivist questions.  This is your basic error in this
> whole post (and previous ones).  These questions are assuming that
> positivism is the right way of viewing everything, even ultimate
> meaning (at least when meaning is said to be based on God, but not
> when meaning is said to be based on ourselves).
> Tom
 Can you explain that a bit further? I can understand that personal
>>> meaning
 is not necessarily connected to empirical facts. The ancient Greeks
>>> believed
 in the gods of Olympus, built temples to them, wrote songs about them,
>>> and
 so on. They provided meaning to the Greeks, and had an overall positive
 effect on Greek society even though as a matter of fact there weren't
>>> any
 gods living on Mount Olympus. Just as long as we are clear about that.
 Stathis Papaioannou
>>> It is a given that whatever belief we have falls short of the set of
>>> all truth.  But here we are talking about different "theories" behind
>>> beliefs in general.  Positivism is one such "theory" or world view.
>>> This problematic type of world view in which positivism falls has also
>>> been referred to as "rationalism in a closed system".  In such a world
>>> view there is no ultimate meaning.  All meaning is a reference to
>>> something else which is in turn meaningless except for in reference to
>>> yet something else which is meaningless.  We can try to hide this
>>> problem by putting the end of the meaning dependency line inside each
>>> individual person's 1st person point of view.  At that point, if we
>>> claim that we still have a closed system, then we have to call the 1st
>>> person point of view meaningless.  Or, if we at that point allow an
>>> "open system", then we can say that the 1st person point of view has
>>> meaning which comes from where-we-know-not.  This is just as useless
>>> as the meaningless view (in terms of being meaningful ;).  This is all
>>> opposed to the world view which allows an ultimate source of meaning
>>> for persons.  If there were such an ultimate source of meaning for
>>> persons, then, even though our beliefs would fall short of the full
>>> truth of it, it makes sense that there would be some way of "seeing"
>>> or discovering the truth in a sort of progressive or growing process
>>> at the personal level.  Gotta go.
>>> Tom
>> I don't see how ultimate meaning is logically possible (if it is even
>> desirable, but that's another question). What is God's ultimate meaning? If
>> he gets away without one or has one from where-we-know-not then how is this
>> different to the case of the individual human? Saying God is infinite
>> doesn't help because we can still ask for the meaning of the whole infinite
>> series. Defining God as someone who *just has* ultimate meaning as one of
>> his attributes is a rehash of the ontological argument.
>>
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
> 
> Ultimate meaning is analogous to axioms or arithmetic truth (e.g. 42
> is not prime).  In fact the famous quote of Kronecker "God created the
> integers" makes this point.  I think Bruno takes arithmetic truth as
> his ultimate source of meaning.  If you ask the same positivist
> questions of arithmetic truth, you also have the same problem.  The
> problem lies in the positivist view that there can be no given truth.
> 
> Tom

I think you mis-state the positivist view; which is that what we can directly 
perceive can be the referent of true statements.  But I take your point.  It is 
strictly parallel to the question of what is reality.  It seems pretty clear 
that we can't know what is real as opposed to what seems real to us; except for 
our own thoughts.  So some people deny there is any reality and we're just 
making it all up in a dream (solipism) or in a kind of joint dream (mysticism). 
 Others suppose there is a reality but it's completely unknowable.  Scientists 
generally suppose there is a reality, which we can never know with certainity, 
but which we may know some aspects with varying degrees of confidence through 
inductive inference.  Some on this list suppose that we may be entities in a 
computer game and so we can never know the really real reality of the 
programmer.  Theists suppose there is a reality that cannot be known through 
perception but only through revelation (as if the programme
r told his creations about the computer).  Some seize on the fact that we must 
know our own thoughts and conclude that reality must consist of 
observer-moments.

Brent Meeker

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> On Feb 19, 7:00 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > > On Feb 19, 4:00 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > > On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > > > > These are positivist questions.  This is your basic error in this
> > > > > whole post (and previous ones).  These questions are assuming that
> > > > > positivism is the right way of viewing everything, even ultimate
> > > > > meaning (at least when meaning is said to be based on God, but not
> > > > > when meaning is said to be based on ourselves).
> >
> > > > > Tom
> >
> > > > Can you explain that a bit further? I can understand that personal
> > > meaning
> > > > is not necessarily connected to empirical facts. The ancient Greeks
> > > believed
> > > > in the gods of Olympus, built temples to them, wrote songs about
> them,
> > > and
> > > > so on. They provided meaning to the Greeks, and had an overall
> positive
> > > > effect on Greek society even though as a matter of fact there
> weren't
> > > any
> > > > gods living on Mount Olympus. Just as long as we are clear about
> that.
> >
> > > > Stathis Papaioannou
> >
> > > It is a given that whatever belief we have falls short of the set of
> > > all truth.  But here we are talking about different "theories" behind
> > > beliefs in general.  Positivism is one such "theory" or world view.
> > > This problematic type of world view in which positivism falls has also
> > > been referred to as "rationalism in a closed system".  In such a world
> > > view there is no ultimate meaning.  All meaning is a reference to
> > > something else which is in turn meaningless except for in reference to
> > > yet something else which is meaningless.  We can try to hide this
> > > problem by putting the end of the meaning dependency line inside each
> > > individual person's 1st person point of view.  At that point, if we
> > > claim that we still have a closed system, then we have to call the 1st
> > > person point of view meaningless.  Or, if we at that point allow an
> > > "open system", then we can say that the 1st person point of view has
> > > meaning which comes from where-we-know-not.  This is just as useless
> > > as the meaningless view (in terms of being meaningful ;).  This is all
> > > opposed to the world view which allows an ultimate source of meaning
> > > for persons.  If there were such an ultimate source of meaning for
> > > persons, then, even though our beliefs would fall short of the full
> > > truth of it, it makes sense that there would be some way of "seeing"
> > > or discovering the truth in a sort of progressive or growing process
> > > at the personal level.  Gotta go.
> >
> > > Tom
> >
> > I don't see how ultimate meaning is logically possible (if it is even
> > desirable, but that's another question). What is God's ultimate meaning?
> If
> > he gets away without one or has one from where-we-know-not then how is
> this
> > different to the case of the individual human? Saying God is infinite
> > doesn't help because we can still ask for the meaning of the whole
> infinite
> > series. Defining God as someone who *just has* ultimate meaning as one
> of
> > his attributes is a rehash of the ontological argument.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
> >
>
> Ultimate meaning is analogous to axioms or arithmetic truth (e.g. 42
> is not prime).  In fact the famous quote of Kronecker "God created the
> integers" makes this point.  I think Bruno takes arithmetic truth as
> his ultimate source of meaning.  If you ask the same positivist
> questions of arithmetic truth, you also have the same problem.  The
> problem lies in the positivist view that there can be no given truth.
>
> Tom


This is indeed related to the ontological argument, first formulated by
Anselm of Canterbury in the 11th century: We say that God is a being than
which nothing more perfect can be imagined. If God did not exist, then we
can imagine an entity just like God, but with the additional attribute of
existence - which is absurd, because we would then be imagining something
more perfect than that than which nothing more perfect can be imagined.
Therefore, God the most perfect being imaginable must necessarily have
existence as one of his attributes. Versions of the argument from first
cause and the argument from design also reduce to the ontological argument,
answering the question "who made God?" with the assertion that God exists
necessarily, with no need for the creator/designer (or, you might add,
external source of meaning) that the merely contingents things in the
universe need.

The problem with defining God in this way as something which necessarily
exists is that you can use the same trick to conjure up anything you like:
an "existent pink elephant" can't be non-existent any more than a bachelor
can be married. This objection pales a little if we admit that

Re: The Meaning of Life

[Tom Caylor]

On Feb 19, 7:00 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > On Feb 19, 4:00 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > > > These are positivist questions.  This is your basic error in this
> > > > whole post (and previous ones).  These questions are assuming that
> > > > positivism is the right way of viewing everything, even ultimate
> > > > meaning (at least when meaning is said to be based on God, but not
> > > > when meaning is said to be based on ourselves).
>
> > > > Tom
>
> > > Can you explain that a bit further? I can understand that personal
> > meaning
> > > is not necessarily connected to empirical facts. The ancient Greeks
> > believed
> > > in the gods of Olympus, built temples to them, wrote songs about them,
> > and
> > > so on. They provided meaning to the Greeks, and had an overall positive
> > > effect on Greek society even though as a matter of fact there weren't
> > any
> > > gods living on Mount Olympus. Just as long as we are clear about that.
>
> > > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> > It is a given that whatever belief we have falls short of the set of
> > all truth.  But here we are talking about different "theories" behind
> > beliefs in general.  Positivism is one such "theory" or world view.
> > This problematic type of world view in which positivism falls has also
> > been referred to as "rationalism in a closed system".  In such a world
> > view there is no ultimate meaning.  All meaning is a reference to
> > something else which is in turn meaningless except for in reference to
> > yet something else which is meaningless.  We can try to hide this
> > problem by putting the end of the meaning dependency line inside each
> > individual person's 1st person point of view.  At that point, if we
> > claim that we still have a closed system, then we have to call the 1st
> > person point of view meaningless.  Or, if we at that point allow an
> > "open system", then we can say that the 1st person point of view has
> > meaning which comes from where-we-know-not.  This is just as useless
> > as the meaningless view (in terms of being meaningful ;).  This is all
> > opposed to the world view which allows an ultimate source of meaning
> > for persons.  If there were such an ultimate source of meaning for
> > persons, then, even though our beliefs would fall short of the full
> > truth of it, it makes sense that there would be some way of "seeing"
> > or discovering the truth in a sort of progressive or growing process
> > at the personal level.  Gotta go.
>
> > Tom
>
> I don't see how ultimate meaning is logically possible (if it is even
> desirable, but that's another question). What is God's ultimate meaning? If
> he gets away without one or has one from where-we-know-not then how is this
> different to the case of the individual human? Saying God is infinite
> doesn't help because we can still ask for the meaning of the whole infinite
> series. Defining God as someone who *just has* ultimate meaning as one of
> his attributes is a rehash of the ontological argument.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

Ultimate meaning is analogous to axioms or arithmetic truth (e.g. 42
is not prime).  In fact the famous quote of Kronecker "God created the
integers" makes this point.  I think Bruno takes arithmetic truth as
his ultimate source of meaning.  If you ask the same positivist
questions of arithmetic truth, you also have the same problem.  The
problem lies in the positivist view that there can be no given truth.

Tom


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


> On Feb 19, 4:00 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > > These are positivist questions.  This is your basic error in this
> > > whole post (and previous ones).  These questions are assuming that
> > > positivism is the right way of viewing everything, even ultimate
> > > meaning (at least when meaning is said to be based on God, but not
> > > when meaning is said to be based on ourselves).
> >
> > > Tom
> >
> > Can you explain that a bit further? I can understand that personal
> meaning
> > is not necessarily connected to empirical facts. The ancient Greeks
> believed
> > in the gods of Olympus, built temples to them, wrote songs about them,
> and
> > so on. They provided meaning to the Greeks, and had an overall positive
> > effect on Greek society even though as a matter of fact there weren't
> any
> > gods living on Mount Olympus. Just as long as we are clear about that.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
> >
>
> It is a given that whatever belief we have falls short of the set of
> all truth.  But here we are talking about different "theories" behind
> beliefs in general.  Positivism is one such "theory" or world view.
> This problematic type of world view in which positivism falls has also
> been referred to as "rationalism in a closed system".  In such a world
> view there is no ultimate meaning.  All meaning is a reference to
> something else which is in turn meaningless except for in reference to
> yet something else which is meaningless.  We can try to hide this
> problem by putting the end of the meaning dependency line inside each
> individual person's 1st person point of view.  At that point, if we
> claim that we still have a closed system, then we have to call the 1st
> person point of view meaningless.  Or, if we at that point allow an
> "open system", then we can say that the 1st person point of view has
> meaning which comes from where-we-know-not.  This is just as useless
> as the meaningless view (in terms of being meaningful ;).  This is all
> opposed to the world view which allows an ultimate source of meaning
> for persons.  If there were such an ultimate source of meaning for
> persons, then, even though our beliefs would fall short of the full
> truth of it, it makes sense that there would be some way of "seeing"
> or discovering the truth in a sort of progressive or growing process
> at the personal level.  Gotta go.
>
> Tom


I don't see how ultimate meaning is logically possible (if it is even
desirable, but that's another question). What is God's ultimate meaning? If
he gets away without one or has one from where-we-know-not then how is this
different to the case of the individual human? Saying God is infinite
doesn't help because we can still ask for the meaning of the whole infinite
series. Defining God as someone who *just has* ultimate meaning as one of
his attributes is a rehash of the ontological argument.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Tom Caylor]

On Feb 19, 4:00 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > These are positivist questions.  This is your basic error in this
> > whole post (and previous ones).  These questions are assuming that
> > positivism is the right way of viewing everything, even ultimate
> > meaning (at least when meaning is said to be based on God, but not
> > when meaning is said to be based on ourselves).
>
> > Tom
>
> Can you explain that a bit further? I can understand that personal meaning
> is not necessarily connected to empirical facts. The ancient Greeks believed
> in the gods of Olympus, built temples to them, wrote songs about them, and
> so on. They provided meaning to the Greeks, and had an overall positive
> effect on Greek society even though as a matter of fact there weren't any
> gods living on Mount Olympus. Just as long as we are clear about that.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

It is a given that whatever belief we have falls short of the set of
all truth.  But here we are talking about different "theories" behind
beliefs in general.  Positivism is one such "theory" or world view.
This problematic type of world view in which positivism falls has also
been referred to as "rationalism in a closed system".  In such a world
view there is no ultimate meaning.  All meaning is a reference to
something else which is in turn meaningless except for in reference to
yet something else which is meaningless.  We can try to hide this
problem by putting the end of the meaning dependency line inside each
individual person's 1st person point of view.  At that point, if we
claim that we still have a closed system, then we have to call the 1st
person point of view meaningless.  Or, if we at that point allow an
"open system", then we can say that the 1st person point of view has
meaning which comes from where-we-know-not.  This is just as useless
as the meaningless view (in terms of being meaningful ;).  This is all
opposed to the world view which allows an ultimate source of meaning
for persons.  If there were such an ultimate source of meaning for
persons, then, even though our beliefs would fall short of the full
truth of it, it makes sense that there would be some way of "seeing"
or discovering the truth in a sort of progressive or growing process
at the personal level.  Gotta go.

Tom


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > On 2/18/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >
> > > On Feb 16, 8:18 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > If you built a model society and set its citizens instincts, goals,
> > > > laws-from-heaven (but really from you) and so on, would that suffice
> to
> > > > provide "meaning"?
> > > >
> > >
> > > It would not provide ultimate meaning for two reasons...
> >
> >
> > My answer would have been that the beings would have no way of knowing
> the
> > difference between the provided meaning and "ultimate" meaning, and
> would
> > live their lives just as we live our lives, some of them atheists and
> others
> > theists. In other words, the idea of ultimate meaning can have no
> objective
> > or subjective consequences: you can honestly, deeply believe in it and
> this
> > belief can change the way you live your life, but it would do so even if
> it
> > had no basis in reality. A child might behave well in order to receive
> > presents from Santa Claus, but this has no bearing whatsoever on the
> > question of whether Santa Claus exists.
> >
> > 1) Logical reason, but still important and inescapable:  If the source
> > > of meaning was from within the "system", i.e. the observable/
> > > controllable universe, then we can always ask the why question when we
> > > find the source. This is not acceptable as part of a scientifically
> > > observable causal universe, as it contradicts it.  A closed system
> > > which is supposedly totally explainable will always have at least one
> > > fixed point that is unexplainable.  This is the old positivism
> > > problem.  This is actually part of the problem with a straw-man
> > > caricature god, in our image, i.e. any thing that we (as part of the
> > > universe) can think up.
> >
> >
> > You can always draw a circle around the system + externals and call it a
> > new, larger system: the universe, the multiverse, the plenitude, God +
> the
> > Plenitude, or whatever. Long before it was a problem for positivism it
> was a
> > problem for theism: Who made God? Who gives God meaning? Who tells God
> > whether his ethical principles are right or wrong?
> >
>
> These are positivist questions.  This is your basic error in this
> whole post (and previous ones).  These questions are assuming that
> positivism is the right way of viewing everything, even ultimate
> meaning (at least when meaning is said to be based on God, but not
> when meaning is said to be based on ourselves).
>
> Tom
>

Can you explain that a bit further? I can understand that personal meaning
is not necessarily connected to empirical facts. The ancient Greeks believed
in the gods of Olympus, built temples to them, wrote songs about them, and
so on. They provided meaning to the Greeks, and had an overall positive
effect on Greek society even though as a matter of fact there weren't any
gods living on Mount Olympus. Just as long as we are clear about that.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Tom Caylor wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> On 2/18/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> On Feb 16, 8:18 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
 If you built a model society and set its citizens instincts, goals,
 laws-from-heaven (but really from you) and so on, would that suffice to
 provide "meaning"?

>>> It would not provide ultimate meaning for two reasons...
>>
>> My answer would have been that the beings would have no way of knowing the
>> difference between the provided meaning and "ultimate" meaning, and would
>> live their lives just as we live our lives, some of them atheists and others
>> theists. In other words, the idea of ultimate meaning can have no objective
>> or subjective consequences: you can honestly, deeply believe in it and this
>> belief can change the way you live your life, but it would do so even if it
>> had no basis in reality. A child might behave well in order to receive
>> presents from Santa Claus, but this has no bearing whatsoever on the
>> question of whether Santa Claus exists.
>>
>> 1) Logical reason, but still important and inescapable:  If the source
>>> of meaning was from within the "system", i.e. the observable/
>>> controllable universe, then we can always ask the why question when we
>>> find the source. This is not acceptable as part of a scientifically
>>> observable causal universe, as it contradicts it.  A closed system
>>> which is supposedly totally explainable will always have at least one
>>> fixed point that is unexplainable.  This is the old positivism
>>> problem.  This is actually part of the problem with a straw-man
>>> caricature god, in our image, i.e. any thing that we (as part of the
>>> universe) can think up.
>>
>> You can always draw a circle around the system + externals and call it a
>> new, larger system: the universe, the multiverse, the plenitude, God + the
>> Plenitude, or whatever. Long before it was a problem for positivism it was a
>> problem for theism: Who made God? Who gives God meaning? Who tells God
>> whether his ethical principles are right or wrong?
>>
> 
> These are positivist questions.  This is your basic error in this
> whole post (and previous ones).  These questions are assuming that
> positivism is the right way of viewing everything, even ultimate
> meaning (at least when meaning is said to be based on God, but not
> when meaning is said to be based on ourselves).
> 
> Tom

Then is it your error to assume that it must be based on God and not on 
ourselves?

If there is a purpose and it's not my purpose, what meaning can it provide to 
my actions?

Brent Meeker


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Tom Caylor]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 2/18/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> > On Feb 16, 8:18 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > >
> > > If you built a model society and set its citizens instincts, goals,
> > > laws-from-heaven (but really from you) and so on, would that suffice to
> > > provide "meaning"?
> > >
> >
> > It would not provide ultimate meaning for two reasons...
>
>
> My answer would have been that the beings would have no way of knowing the
> difference between the provided meaning and "ultimate" meaning, and would
> live their lives just as we live our lives, some of them atheists and others
> theists. In other words, the idea of ultimate meaning can have no objective
> or subjective consequences: you can honestly, deeply believe in it and this
> belief can change the way you live your life, but it would do so even if it
> had no basis in reality. A child might behave well in order to receive
> presents from Santa Claus, but this has no bearing whatsoever on the
> question of whether Santa Claus exists.
>
> 1) Logical reason, but still important and inescapable:  If the source
> > of meaning was from within the "system", i.e. the observable/
> > controllable universe, then we can always ask the why question when we
> > find the source. This is not acceptable as part of a scientifically
> > observable causal universe, as it contradicts it.  A closed system
> > which is supposedly totally explainable will always have at least one
> > fixed point that is unexplainable.  This is the old positivism
> > problem.  This is actually part of the problem with a straw-man
> > caricature god, in our image, i.e. any thing that we (as part of the
> > universe) can think up.
>
>
> You can always draw a circle around the system + externals and call it a
> new, larger system: the universe, the multiverse, the plenitude, God + the
> Plenitude, or whatever. Long before it was a problem for positivism it was a
> problem for theism: Who made God? Who gives God meaning? Who tells God
> whether his ethical principles are right or wrong?
>

These are positivist questions.  This is your basic error in this
whole post (and previous ones).  These questions are assuming that
positivism is the right way of viewing everything, even ultimate
meaning (at least when meaning is said to be based on God, but not
when meaning is said to be based on ourselves).

Tom

> 2) Spiritual reason, but no less important and inescapable:  Perhaps
> > this one is more for people (like Bruno, and Jesse Mazer?) who accept
> > the possible existence of difference levels of reasoning, based on
> > different ways of "seeing" truth (a la G and G*).  We just know
> > somehow that there is something inexplicable about personhood.  There
> > is a hunger in us that wants to always ask the question why, a hunger
> > for the meaning behind whatever layer of stuff we just discovered.
> > Perhaps it's like looking for our true home, or for the reason why
> > this is or is not our true home.  It's like Neo in the Matrix.  And
> > there have been signs the meaning behind this existence poking in this
> > existence now and then, and seen by different people.  Yes, we can
> > always imagine how someone could have thought these signs up, or
> > interpretted them up, and thus explain everything back down to the
> > purely logical level, dealing only with repeatable things.  Like a 2-
> > dimensional shadow world can make up laws that somehow explain the
> > behavior of shadows and say that there are only shadows, but it is not
> > seeing the whole reality.
>
>
> I agree that there is something fundamentally inexplicable, irreducible
> about first person experience, but you are basically challenging this idea
> and saying there *can't* be any inexplicable things, hence God is postulated
> to explain the inexplicable. But again, you are just delaying the
> inevitable: how do you explain God's existence? How do you explain the
> concept of necessary existence? How do you explain why God wanted to have
> other conscious beings around, and why he decided to give just the amount of
> evidence of his existence to those beings as he did? There are countless
> such questions to which the answer is just, "I don't know, that's just the
> way it is".
>
> > On 2/16/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > > Yes. Now we're startin' to talk!  I don't know much of the language,
> > > > but I think that when people experience what some may call words like
> > > > "enlightenment", "cosmic consciousness", etc. they are experiencing
> > > > something that is really there.  In fact, they use words like "seeing"
> > > > reality as it "actually" is, etc.  They speak of "wholeness" and
> > > > "integralness".
> > >
> > >  Except that people would still have the same experiences whether or not
> > > something were really there, just as they would still experience the sky
> > as
> > > a dome whether or not it is in fact a dome. In other words, if

Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 2/18/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


> On Feb 16, 8:18 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > If you built a model society and set its citizens instincts, goals,
> > laws-from-heaven (but really from you) and so on, would that suffice to
> > provide "meaning"?
> >
>
> It would not provide ultimate meaning for two reasons...


My answer would have been that the beings would have no way of knowing the
difference between the provided meaning and "ultimate" meaning, and would
live their lives just as we live our lives, some of them atheists and others
theists. In other words, the idea of ultimate meaning can have no objective
or subjective consequences: you can honestly, deeply believe in it and this
belief can change the way you live your life, but it would do so even if it
had no basis in reality. A child might behave well in order to receive
presents from Santa Claus, but this has no bearing whatsoever on the
question of whether Santa Claus exists.

1) Logical reason, but still important and inescapable:  If the source
> of meaning was from within the "system", i.e. the observable/
> controllable universe, then we can always ask the why question when we
> find the source. This is not acceptable as part of a scientifically
> observable causal universe, as it contradicts it.  A closed system
> which is supposedly totally explainable will always have at least one
> fixed point that is unexplainable.  This is the old positivism
> problem.  This is actually part of the problem with a straw-man
> caricature god, in our image, i.e. any thing that we (as part of the
> universe) can think up.


You can always draw a circle around the system + externals and call it a
new, larger system: the universe, the multiverse, the plenitude, God + the
Plenitude, or whatever. Long before it was a problem for positivism it was a
problem for theism: Who made God? Who gives God meaning? Who tells God
whether his ethical principles are right or wrong?

2) Spiritual reason, but no less important and inescapable:  Perhaps
> this one is more for people (like Bruno, and Jesse Mazer?) who accept
> the possible existence of difference levels of reasoning, based on
> different ways of "seeing" truth (a la G and G*).  We just know
> somehow that there is something inexplicable about personhood.  There
> is a hunger in us that wants to always ask the question why, a hunger
> for the meaning behind whatever layer of stuff we just discovered.
> Perhaps it's like looking for our true home, or for the reason why
> this is or is not our true home.  It's like Neo in the Matrix.  And
> there have been signs the meaning behind this existence poking in this
> existence now and then, and seen by different people.  Yes, we can
> always imagine how someone could have thought these signs up, or
> interpretted them up, and thus explain everything back down to the
> purely logical level, dealing only with repeatable things.  Like a 2-
> dimensional shadow world can make up laws that somehow explain the
> behavior of shadows and say that there are only shadows, but it is not
> seeing the whole reality.


I agree that there is something fundamentally inexplicable, irreducible
about first person experience, but you are basically challenging this idea
and saying there *can't* be any inexplicable things, hence God is postulated
to explain the inexplicable. But again, you are just delaying the
inevitable: how do you explain God's existence? How do you explain the
concept of necessary existence? How do you explain why God wanted to have
other conscious beings around, and why he decided to give just the amount of
evidence of his existence to those beings as he did? There are countless
such questions to which the answer is just, "I don't know, that's just the
way it is".

> On 2/16/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > Yes. Now we're startin' to talk!  I don't know much of the language,
> > > but I think that when people experience what some may call words like
> > > "enlightenment", "cosmic consciousness", etc. they are experiencing
> > > something that is really there.  In fact, they use words like "seeing"
> > > reality as it "actually" is, etc.  They speak of "wholeness" and
> > > "integralness".
> >
> >  Except that people would still have the same experiences whether or not
> > something were really there, just as they would still experience the sky
> as
> > a dome whether or not it is in fact a dome. In other words, if you
> imagine a
> > being in a universe without meaning, cosmic consciousness, enlightenment
> and
> > all the other significant things which are supposed to be there, but
> with
> > otherwise the same physical laws etc., can you think of any reason why
> such
> > a being would or wouldn't come up with the same ideas as humans have,
> > assuming similar evolutionary provenance?
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> This is like saying "If you imagine a being in a universe who cannot
> see the true reali

Re: The Meaning of Life

[Tom Caylor]

On Feb 16, 8:18 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> If you built a model society and set its citizens instincts, goals,
> laws-from-heaven (but really from you) and so on, would that suffice to
> provide "meaning"?
>

It would not provide ultimate meaning for two reasons.  (Note that I
am not the originator of these reasons, although I'm just shooting
from the hip without citing references which don't come to me right
now.  They have been expounded many times by people who are more
intellectually strong than I am.)  But here goes.   One reason is on
the "logical" level (i.e. repeatable facts, propositions and
inference).  The other reason on the "spiritual" level (i.e. you have
to "see" it with your intuition, "expanded consciousness", faith [not
blind faith],..).

1) Logical reason, but still important and inescapable:  If the source
of meaning was from within the "system", i.e. the observable/
controllable universe, then we can always ask the why question when we
find the source. This is not acceptable as part of a scientifically
observable causal universe, as it contradicts it.  A closed system
which is supposedly totally explainable will always have at least one
fixed point that is unexplainable.  This is the old positivism
problem.  This is actually part of the problem with a straw-man
caricature god, in our image, i.e. any thing that we (as part of the
universe) can think up.
2) Spiritual reason, but no less important and inescapable:  Perhaps
this one is more for people (like Bruno, and Jesse Mazer?) who accept
the possible existence of difference levels of reasoning, based on
different ways of "seeing" truth (a la G and G*).  We just know
somehow that there is something inexplicable about personhood.  There
is a hunger in us that wants to always ask the question why, a hunger
for the meaning behind whatever layer of stuff we just discovered.
Perhaps it's like looking for our true home, or for the reason why
this is or is not our true home.  It's like Neo in the Matrix.  And
there have been signs the meaning behind this existence poking in this
existence now and then, and seen by different people.  Yes, we can
always imagine how someone could have thought these signs up, or
interpretted them up, and thus explain everything back down to the
purely logical level, dealing only with repeatable things.  Like a 2-
dimensional shadow world can make up laws that somehow explain the
behavior of shadows and say that there are only shadows, but it is not
seeing the whole reality.

> On 2/16/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Yes. Now we're startin' to talk!  I don't know much of the language,
> > but I think that when people experience what some may call words like
> > "enlightenment", "cosmic consciousness", etc. they are experiencing
> > something that is really there.  In fact, they use words like "seeing"
> > reality as it "actually" is, etc.  They speak of "wholeness" and
> > "integralness".
>
>  Except that people would still have the same experiences whether or not
> something were really there, just as they would still experience the sky as
> a dome whether or not it is in fact a dome. In other words, if you imagine a
> being in a universe without meaning, cosmic consciousness, enlightenment and
> all the other significant things which are supposed to be there, but with
> otherwise the same physical laws etc., can you think of any reason why such
> a being would or wouldn't come up with the same ideas as humans have,
> assuming similar evolutionary provenance?
>
> Stathis Papaioannou

This is like saying "If you imagine a being in a universe who cannot
see the true reality of the universe, but with otherwise the same
reality, can you think of any reason why such a being would or
wouldn't come up with the same ideas as humans have, assuming similar
evolutionary provenance?"  If he/she cannot see the true reality, then
the ideas would not reflect the whole reality, regardless of how he/
she came up with them.  The ideas may be locally useful, but as I said
above, there is more to it than that.  Humans are deeper than that.

Tom


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 2/16/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> On Feb 13, 11:35 pm, "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Tom Caylor wrote:
> >
> > >I'm talking about ultimate meaning, meaning which is ultimately based
> > >on truth.  Purpose would go along with that.  I think that this
> > >situation is similar (metaphysically isomorphic? :) to the "primary
> > >matter" situation.  I think you maintain that experience is enough.  I
> > >maintain that if all you have is relative references, you are having
> > >faith that there is ultimately something "there".  I'm not interested
> > >in any straw-man caricature god who decides what is valuable etc. on a
> > >whim.  I'm interested in the source of the wonderfully unexplainable
> > >good in us.
> >
> > In mentioning the idea of God deciding morality on a whim, you perhaps
> > allude to the old counterargument to grounding morality in God in the
> first
> > place, known as "Euthyphro's Dilemma" from one of Plato's dialogues--if
> God
> > *chose* these supposed laws of morality, then they are ultimately
> arbitrary
> > since God could have chose a completely different set of laws, but if
> moral
> > truths are in some sense beyond God's ability to change, much like many
> > philosophers would say the laws of mathematics or logic are, then it's
> not
> > clear why you need "God" in your explanation at all, you could just cut
> out
> > the middleman and postulate eternal platonic moral truths in the same
> way
> > many on this list are prepared to postulate eternal platonic
> mathematical
> > truths.
> >
> > The only way in which I could see that it would make sense to relate
> > goodness to "God" is to imagine a sort of pantheist God that represents
> a
> > sort of ultimate pattern or harmony connecting every individual part of
> the
> > universe, so goodness would represent some kind of orientation towards
> the
> > ultimate pattern which encompasses all of us, and which would override
> > individual conflicting interests. A variation on this might be the
> "Omega
> > Point" idea that every individual finite being is on some sort of
> long-term
> > path towards being integrated into an infinite superorganism (perhaps
> only
> > as a limit that can never actually be reached in finite time), or in the
> > concepts of this list maybe a single infinitely complex observer-moment
> with
> > memories of every other observer-moment, which could also be seen as an
> > ultimate pattern connecting everything (one might say, as in Frank
> Tipler's
> > speculations about the Omega Point, that an infinite mind would itself
> > contain simulations of every possible history in every possible universe
> > leading up to it, so that the Omega Point would both be an endpoint of
> > history but also contain all history integrated within it). In this
> view,
> > every instance of individuals trying to cooperate and to understand and
> > connect with each other is an incremental "step in the right direction",
> so
> > one could ground "ultimate goodness" in that. I recently came across an
> > interesting interview
> athttp://www.wie.org/j34/swimme2.asp?%20from=lnk-zaadzdiscussing Teilhard de
> > Chardin's thoughts on the Omega Point, and many on this list will be
> > familiar with Frank Tipler's version which I mention above (even if
> Tipler's
> > specific ideas about using the Big Crunch to do an infinite amount of
> > computation in a finite time are proven wrong, as a transhumanist I'm
> still
> > crossing my fingers that intelligence will find some loophole in the
> laws of
> > physics that will allow it to continue forever without violating the
> laws of
> > thermodynamics). But neither of these versions of "God" bears much
> > resemblance to the creator-God separate from the rest of the universe
> that's
> > imagined by most mainstream religions.
> >
> > Jesse
> >
>
> Yes. Now we're startin' to talk!  I don't know much of the language,
> but I think that when people experience what some may call words like
> "enlightenment", "cosmic consciousness", etc. they are experiencing
> something that is really there.  In fact, they use words like "seeing"
> reality as it "actually" is, etc.  They speak of "wholeness" and
> "integralness".


 Except that people would still have the same experiences whether or not
something were really there, just as they would still experience the sky as
a dome whether or not it is in fact a dome. In other words, if you imagine a
being in a universe without meaning, cosmic consciousness, enlightenment and
all the other significant things which are supposed to be there, but with
otherwise the same physical laws etc., can you think of any reason why such
a being would or wouldn't come up with the same ideas as humans have,
assuming similar evolutionary provenance?

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Tom Caylor]

On Feb 13, 11:35 pm, "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
>
> >I'm talking about ultimate meaning, meaning which is ultimately based
> >on truth.  Purpose would go along with that.  I think that this
> >situation is similar (metaphysically isomorphic? :) to the "primary
> >matter" situation.  I think you maintain that experience is enough.  I
> >maintain that if all you have is relative references, you are having
> >faith that there is ultimately something "there".  I'm not interested
> >in any straw-man caricature god who decides what is valuable etc. on a
> >whim.  I'm interested in the source of the wonderfully unexplainable
> >good in us.
>
> In mentioning the idea of God deciding morality on a whim, you perhaps
> allude to the old counterargument to grounding morality in God in the first
> place, known as "Euthyphro's Dilemma" from one of Plato's dialogues--if God
> *chose* these supposed laws of morality, then they are ultimately arbitrary
> since God could have chose a completely different set of laws, but if moral
> truths are in some sense beyond God's ability to change, much like many
> philosophers would say the laws of mathematics or logic are, then it's not
> clear why you need "God" in your explanation at all, you could just cut out
> the middleman and postulate eternal platonic moral truths in the same way
> many on this list are prepared to postulate eternal platonic mathematical
> truths.
>
> The only way in which I could see that it would make sense to relate
> goodness to "God" is to imagine a sort of pantheist God that represents a
> sort of ultimate pattern or harmony connecting every individual part of the
> universe, so goodness would represent some kind of orientation towards the
> ultimate pattern which encompasses all of us, and which would override
> individual conflicting interests. A variation on this might be the "Omega
> Point" idea that every individual finite being is on some sort of long-term
> path towards being integrated into an infinite superorganism (perhaps only
> as a limit that can never actually be reached in finite time), or in the
> concepts of this list maybe a single infinitely complex observer-moment with
> memories of every other observer-moment, which could also be seen as an
> ultimate pattern connecting everything (one might say, as in Frank Tipler's
> speculations about the Omega Point, that an infinite mind would itself
> contain simulations of every possible history in every possible universe
> leading up to it, so that the Omega Point would both be an endpoint of
> history but also contain all history integrated within it). In this view,
> every instance of individuals trying to cooperate and to understand and
> connect with each other is an incremental "step in the right direction", so
> one could ground "ultimate goodness" in that. I recently came across an
> interesting interview 
> athttp://www.wie.org/j34/swimme2.asp?%20from=lnk-zaadzdiscussing Teilhard de
> Chardin's thoughts on the Omega Point, and many on this list will be
> familiar with Frank Tipler's version which I mention above (even if Tipler's
> specific ideas about using the Big Crunch to do an infinite amount of
> computation in a finite time are proven wrong, as a transhumanist I'm still
> crossing my fingers that intelligence will find some loophole in the laws of
> physics that will allow it to continue forever without violating the laws of
> thermodynamics). But neither of these versions of "God" bears much
> resemblance to the creator-God separate from the rest of the universe that's
> imagined by most mainstream religions.
>
> Jesse
>

Yes. Now we're startin' to talk!  I don't know much of the language,
but I think that when people experience what some may call words like
"enlightenment", "cosmic consciousness", etc. they are experiencing
something that is really there.  In fact, they use words like "seeing"
reality as it "actually" is, etc.  They speak of "wholeness" and
"integralness".  The dilemmas such as you speak of come from
projecting our own incomplete concepts onto Something/Someone who is
complete.  This is what I meant by a "straw-man caricature god".  C.S.
Lewis said something like, "Reach for heaven and you get the earth
thrown in too; take only the earth and you get neither." (Can't
remember exact quote.)  I like the aspect of Chardin's Omega Point
that it has a from-the-infinite-back-to-us component.  This very much
is in line with the Creator God of love, actually.  But not a god who
is in our image, i.e. from-us-out-to-the-infinite.

Have to go, so I'll get back to the other posts later.  Along these
lines, I finished reading the mathematical logician Smullyan's "Who
Knows? Some Thoughts on Religious Consciousness" (?).

Tom


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 14-févr.-07, à 00:27, Tom Caylor a écrit :

> This is precisely my point.  If all that exists is internal meaning
> (i.e. opinion), then there is no true basis (even in the literal sense
> of "true") for anything more than a dog-eat-dog world (unless the
> other dog provides 1st person subjective gratification).


I would say "external meaning" is "opinion". Internal meaning is 
private (1-person, incorrigible) knowledge.

(or I have to reconsider my understanding of some preceding posts).

Would you accept (as a first rough approximation):

Truth = Reality = God (be it 'Primary Matter" or "Jesus" or 
"Number" or whatever)
Intellect = Science = Opinion = Theory = Doubt
Soul = (lucky (?) case when) Intellect matches Truth

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Tom Caylor writes:

>I'm talking about ultimate meaning, meaning which is ultimately based
> >on truth.  Purpose would go along with that.  I think that this
> >situation is similar (metaphysically isomorphic? :) to the "primary
> >matter" situation.  I think you maintain that experience is enough.  I
> >maintain that if all you have is relative references, you are having
> >faith that there is ultimately something "there".  I'm not interested
> >in any straw-man caricature god who decides what is valuable etc. on a
> >whim.  I'm interested in the source of the wonderfully unexplainable
> >good in us.
>

If you built a model society and set its citizens instincts, goals,
laws-from-heaven (but really from you) and so on, would that suffice to
provide "meaning"?

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Tom Caylor wrote:
> On Feb 13, 5:18 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Tom Caylor wrote:
>>> Brent Meeker wrote:
 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 2/12/07, *Tom Caylor* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > wrote:
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>> Tom Caylor writes:
>> Brent Meeker "It does not matter now that in a million
>> years nothing
> we do now
>>> will matter."
>> --- Thomas Nagel
> We might like to believe Nagel, but it isn't true.
> Tom
 That is, it isn't true that in a million years nothing we
 do
> now will
 matter.
>>> Why do you say "we might like to believe Nagel"? Why would
> anyone want
>>> it to be the case that nothing we do now will matter in a
> million years?
> In order to think in terms beyond a few generations, we need a
> basis for meaning that is more universal than explaining and
> controlling things in our immediate sphere of "care abouts", like
> our animal instincts.
>> I never said otherwise.  It is you who keep pretending that if we don't 
>> worship a sky god we're reduced to animal instincts.
>>
>> You keep bringing up "meaning".  Do you not see that "meaning" is reference 
>> to something else.  Words have meaning because they refer to things that are 
>> not words.  In order to act you need purpose, an internal thing.  You don't 
>> need "meaning"; except by reference to your own purpose.  If you act to 
>> satisfy someone else's purpose, then you have to answer the question, "Why 
>> was it your decision, your purpose, to satisfy someone else?"
> 
> I'm talking about ultimate meaning, meaning which is ultimately based
> on truth.  Purpose would go along with that.  I think that this
> situation is similar (metaphysically isomorphic? :) to the "primary
> matter" situation.  I think you maintain that experience is enough.  I
> maintain that if all you have is relative references, you are having
> faith that there is ultimately something "there".  I'm not interested
> in any straw-man caricature god who decides what is valuable etc. on a
> whim.  I'm interested in the source of the wonderfully unexplainable
> good in us.
> 
 But what we care about right now, may include anything we think of
 - including how things will be a million years from now, including
 an abstract principle, even including a fine point of theology.
>>> Sorry that I don't have much time.  I agree with your statement
>>> above.  However, see below.
> (Such a local basis does not support doing things like
> sacrificing your life for others even a couple thousand years in
> the future.)
>> Depends on what you mean by "local basis".  You seem to mean "animal 
>> instincts".  But I, here and now, can care about whether democracy survives 
>> in the U.S. in 2100, whether global warming kills people in Bangladesh, 
>> whether AIDS spreads in Africa, whether a theory of quantum gravity will 
>> ever be discovered.
> 
> But the wonderfully unexplainable good thing is that these cares of
> yours actually mean something that other people can appreciate, 

Nothing inexplicable about that at all.  Other people are products of the same 
evolutionary process, so inevitably they share a sense of what's good and what 
isn't; but this includes looking out for themselves and their kin first, so 
everybody appreciates altruism...in other people.

>and
> that what you see as being worthy to pursue or fight against,
> individually and collectively, can *actually be* worthy, independent
> of what we may think.

I don't even know what "actually" means here.  Is it like a scientific finding, 
that everybody can replicate and agree on?  Or is it like an unknowable really 
real reality?
 
 For the very good reason that one cannot foresee the benefits of
 such sacrifice so far in the future.   But people sacrifice for
 others that they know all the time.
>>> This statement seems to be in conflict with your previous statement.
>> How?
>>
> 
> I explained in the following sentences.
> 
>>> Theology (I'd rather say "being in communion with the personal God"
>>> in from whom we have our personhood, rather than an academic pursuit)
>>> is a way of enabling us to "see" things, expand our consciousness,
>>> outside of the immediate sphere of "care abouts" that are defined by
>>> animal instincts, the five senses, etc., and to see things such as
>>> the nobility of giving our life for a cause that is greater that this
>>>  local, supposedly (but not truly) autonomous, sphere.
>> You seem to assume that "non-local" = "good".  Tell it to the victims of 
>> 9/11.
>>
> 
> I'm not assuming that.  This prompts me to bring up the Solzhenitsin
> quote again about the line between good and evil going down the center
> of every human.  This quote is saying something more than "I value
> certain things, and I don't value (or even I am horrified by) other
> things.

Re: The Meaning of Life

[Jesse Mazer]

Tom Caylor wrote:

>
>I'm talking about ultimate meaning, meaning which is ultimately based
>on truth.  Purpose would go along with that.  I think that this
>situation is similar (metaphysically isomorphic? :) to the "primary
>matter" situation.  I think you maintain that experience is enough.  I
>maintain that if all you have is relative references, you are having
>faith that there is ultimately something "there".  I'm not interested
>in any straw-man caricature god who decides what is valuable etc. on a
>whim.  I'm interested in the source of the wonderfully unexplainable
>good in us.

In mentioning the idea of God deciding morality on a whim, you perhaps 
allude to the old counterargument to grounding morality in God in the first 
place, known as "Euthyphro's Dilemma" from one of Plato's dialogues--if God 
*chose* these supposed laws of morality, then they are ultimately arbitrary 
since God could have chose a completely different set of laws, but if moral 
truths are in some sense beyond God's ability to change, much like many 
philosophers would say the laws of mathematics or logic are, then it's not 
clear why you need "God" in your explanation at all, you could just cut out 
the middleman and postulate eternal platonic moral truths in the same way 
many on this list are prepared to postulate eternal platonic mathematical 
truths.

The only way in which I could see that it would make sense to relate 
goodness to "God" is to imagine a sort of pantheist God that represents a 
sort of ultimate pattern or harmony connecting every individual part of the 
universe, so goodness would represent some kind of orientation towards the 
ultimate pattern which encompasses all of us, and which would override 
individual conflicting interests. A variation on this might be the "Omega 
Point" idea that every individual finite being is on some sort of long-term 
path towards being integrated into an infinite superorganism (perhaps only 
as a limit that can never actually be reached in finite time), or in the 
concepts of this list maybe a single infinitely complex observer-moment with 
memories of every other observer-moment, which could also be seen as an 
ultimate pattern connecting everything (one might say, as in Frank Tipler's 
speculations about the Omega Point, that an infinite mind would itself 
contain simulations of every possible history in every possible universe 
leading up to it, so that the Omega Point would both be an endpoint of 
history but also contain all history integrated within it). In this view, 
every instance of individuals trying to cooperate and to understand and 
connect with each other is an incremental "step in the right direction", so 
one could ground "ultimate goodness" in that. I recently came across an 
interesting interview at 
http://www.wie.org/j34/swimme2.asp?%20from=lnk-zaadz discussing Teilhard de 
Chardin's thoughts on the Omega Point, and many on this list will be 
familiar with Frank Tipler's version which I mention above (even if Tipler's 
specific ideas about using the Big Crunch to do an infinite amount of 
computation in a finite time are proven wrong, as a transhumanist I'm still 
crossing my fingers that intelligence will find some loophole in the laws of 
physics that will allow it to continue forever without violating the laws of 
thermodynamics). But neither of these versions of "God" bears much 
resemblance to the creator-God separate from the rest of the universe that's 
imagined by most mainstream religions.

Jesse

_
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Spaces 
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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Tom Caylor]

On Feb 13, 5:18 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
> > Brent Meeker wrote:
> >> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >>> On 2/12/07, *Tom Caylor* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >>> > wrote:
>
>  Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > Tom Caylor writes:
>
>  Brent Meeker "It does not matter now that in a million
>  years nothing
> >>> we do now
> > will matter."
>  --- Thomas Nagel
>
> >>> We might like to believe Nagel, but it isn't true.
>
> >>> Tom
>
> >> That is, it isn't true that in a million years nothing we
> >> do
> >>> now will
> >> matter.
>
> > Why do you say "we might like to believe Nagel"? Why would
> >>> anyone want
> > it to be the case that nothing we do now will matter in a
> >>> million years?
>
> >>> In order to think in terms beyond a few generations, we need a
> >>> basis for meaning that is more universal than explaining and
> >>> controlling things in our immediate sphere of "care abouts", like
> >>> our animal instincts.
>
> I never said otherwise.  It is you who keep pretending that if we don't 
> worship a sky god we're reduced to animal instincts.
>
> You keep bringing up "meaning".  Do you not see that "meaning" is reference 
> to something else.  Words have meaning because they refer to things that are 
> not words.  In order to act you need purpose, an internal thing.  You don't 
> need "meaning"; except by reference to your own purpose.  If you act to 
> satisfy someone else's purpose, then you have to answer the question, "Why 
> was it your decision, your purpose, to satisfy someone else?"

I'm talking about ultimate meaning, meaning which is ultimately based
on truth.  Purpose would go along with that.  I think that this
situation is similar (metaphysically isomorphic? :) to the "primary
matter" situation.  I think you maintain that experience is enough.  I
maintain that if all you have is relative references, you are having
faith that there is ultimately something "there".  I'm not interested
in any straw-man caricature god who decides what is valuable etc. on a
whim.  I'm interested in the source of the wonderfully unexplainable
good in us.

>
> >> But what we care about right now, may include anything we think of
> >> - including how things will be a million years from now, including
> >> an abstract principle, even including a fine point of theology.
>
> > Sorry that I don't have much time.  I agree with your statement
> > above.  However, see below.
>
> >>> (Such a local basis does not support doing things like
> >>> sacrificing your life for others even a couple thousand years in
> >>> the future.)
>
> Depends on what you mean by "local basis".  You seem to mean "animal 
> instincts".  But I, here and now, can care about whether democracy survives 
> in the U.S. in 2100, whether global warming kills people in Bangladesh, 
> whether AIDS spreads in Africa, whether a theory of quantum gravity will ever 
> be discovered.

But the wonderfully unexplainable good thing is that these cares of
yours actually mean something that other people can appreciate, and
that what you see as being worthy to pursue or fight against,
individually and collectively, can *actually be* worthy, independent
of what we may think.

>
> >> For the very good reason that one cannot foresee the benefits of
> >> such sacrifice so far in the future.   But people sacrifice for
> >> others that they know all the time.
>
> > This statement seems to be in conflict with your previous statement.
>
> How?
>

I explained in the following sentences.

> > Theology (I'd rather say "being in communion with the personal God"
> > in from whom we have our personhood, rather than an academic pursuit)
> > is a way of enabling us to "see" things, expand our consciousness,
> > outside of the immediate sphere of "care abouts" that are defined by
> > animal instincts, the five senses, etc., and to see things such as
> > the nobility of giving our life for a cause that is greater that this
> >  local, supposedly (but not truly) autonomous, sphere.
>
> You seem to assume that "non-local" = "good".  Tell it to the victims of 9/11.
>

I'm not assuming that.  This prompts me to bring up the Solzhenitsin
quote again about the line between good and evil going down the center
of every human.  This quote is saying something more than "I value
certain things, and I don't value (or even I am horrified by) other
things."  This by itself is meaningless unless there is some basis
upon which it is good to value some things and be horrified by other
things.  Solzhenitsin believed in the personal God (who is love), and
so he could believe in actual good and evil, and that we each have a
choice between them.  Without that, we have no choice, we just like
what we like and that's that.

>
> >>> But if we reject the ultimate basis, then it feels good to say
> >>> that it doesn't matter.
>
> >>> Tom
>
> >>> If we discovered some million year old 

Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Tom Caylor wrote:
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>> 
>>> On 2/12/07, *Tom Caylor* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
>>> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
> Tom Caylor writes:
 
 Brent Meeker "It does not matter now that in a million
 years nothing
>>> we do now
> will matter."
 --- Thomas Nagel
 
>>> We might like to believe Nagel, but it isn't true.
 
>>> Tom
 
>> That is, it isn't true that in a million years nothing we
>> do
>>> now will
>> matter.
 
> Why do you say "we might like to believe Nagel"? Why would
>>> anyone want
> it to be the case that nothing we do now will matter in a
>>> million years?
>>> 
>>> In order to think in terms beyond a few generations, we need a
>>> basis for meaning that is more universal than explaining and
>>> controlling things in our immediate sphere of "care abouts", like
>>> our animal instincts.

I never said otherwise.  It is you who keep pretending that if we don't worship 
a sky god we're reduced to animal instincts.

You keep bringing up "meaning".  Do you not see that "meaning" is reference to 
something else.  Words have meaning because they refer to things that are not 
words.  In order to act you need purpose, an internal thing.  You don't need 
"meaning"; except by reference to your own purpose.  If you act to satisfy 
someone else's purpose, then you have to answer the question, "Why was it your 
decision, your purpose, to satisfy someone else?"

>> But what we care about right now, may include anything we think of
>> - including how things will be a million years from now, including
>> an abstract principle, even including a fine point of theology.
> 
> Sorry that I don't have much time.  I agree with your statement 
> above.  However, see below.
> 
>>> (Such a local basis does not support doing things like 
>>> sacrificing your life for others even a couple thousand years in
>>> the future.)

Depends on what you mean by "local basis".  You seem to mean "animal 
instincts".  But I, here and now, can care about whether democracy survives in 
the U.S. in 2100, whether global warming kills people in Bangladesh, whether 
AIDS spreads in Africa, whether a theory of quantum gravity will ever be 
discovered.

>> For the very good reason that one cannot foresee the benefits of
>> such sacrifice so far in the future.   But people sacrifice for
>> others that they know all the time.
> 
> This statement seems to be in conflict with your previous statement. 

How?

> Theology (I'd rather say "being in communion with the personal God"
> in from whom we have our personhood, rather than an academic pursuit)
> is a way of enabling us to "see" things, expand our consciousness, 
> outside of the immediate sphere of "care abouts" that are defined by 
> animal instincts, the five senses, etc., and to see things such as
> the nobility of giving our life for a cause that is greater that this
>  local, supposedly (but not truly) autonomous, sphere.

You seem to assume that "non-local" = "good".  Tell it to the victims of 9/11.

> 
>>> But if we reject the ultimate basis, then it feels good to say
>>> that it doesn't matter.
>>> 
>>> Tom
>>> 
>>> 
>>> If we discovered some million year old civilization today I think
>>> wonder at its achievements, however paltry, would far outweigh
>>> dismay at its wickedness, however extreme. I'm not sure what the
>>> significance of this observation is.
>> I don't think it's true.  My exhibit A is the Aztecs.
>> 
> 
> I think the significance of Stathis' observation is this.  Our local 
> sphere of "care abouts" mostly has to do with "what can I get out of 
> it".  It is more immediately obvious that we could possibly gain 
> something from someone else's achievements or ideas, rather than from
>  their wickedness.  In fact, it is probably true.  Studying goodness
> is more fruitful than studying wickedness.

You're assuming that you have somehow decided what is good and what is wicked.  
But that's the question isn't it.  I know what I value and I can build on that. 
 I don't see how I can build on somebody else's values; how could I let someone 
else decide for me what is valuable?

> (Rather lopsided isn't it? How could such a thing be generated from
> Everything (or Nothing)?) But whoever said that "what matters" is
> only about wickedness and not goodness?
> 
>> Brent Meeker There is a certain impertinence in allowing oneself to
>> be burned for an opinion. -- Anatole France
> 
> This is precisely my point.  If all that exists is internal meaning 
> (i.e. opinion), then there is no true basis (even in the literal
> sense of "true") for anything more than a dog-eat-dog world (unless
> the other dog provides 1st person subjective gratification).
> 
> Tom

You keep assuming that all internal meaning is selfish, short-sighted opinion.  
This is false.  As I said above, it can include anything we think about

Re: The Meaning of Life

[Tom Caylor]

Brent Meeker wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 2/12/07, *Tom Caylor* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > wrote:
> >
> >
> >  > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >  >
> >  > > Tom Caylor writes:
> >  >
> >  > >  > > > Brent Meeker
> >  > >  > > > "It does not matter now that in a million years nothing
> > we do now
> >  > > will matter."
> >  > >  > > > --- Thomas Nagel
> >  >
> >  > >  > > We might like to believe Nagel, but it isn't true.
> >  >
> >  > >  > > Tom
> >  >
> >  > >  > That is, it isn't true that in a million years nothing we do
> > now will
> >  > >  > matter.
> >  >
> >  > > Why do you say "we might like to believe Nagel"? Why would
> > anyone want
> >  > > it to be the case that nothing we do now will matter in a
> > million years?
> >
> > In order to think in terms beyond a few generations, we need a basis
> > for meaning that is more universal than explaining and controlling
> > things in our immediate sphere of "care abouts", like our animal
> > instincts.
>
> But what we care about right now, may include anything we think of - 
> including how things will be a million years from now, including an abstract 
> principle, even including a fine point of theology.

Sorry that I don't have much time.  I agree with your statement
above.  However, see below.

>
> >(Such a local basis does not support doing things like
> > sacrificing your life for others even a couple thousand years in the
> > future.)
>
> For the very good reason that one cannot foresee the benefits of such 
> sacrifice so far in the future.   But people sacrifice for others that they 
> know all the time.

This statement seems to be in conflict with your previous statement.
Theology (I'd rather say "being in communion with the personal God" in
from whom we have our personhood, rather than an academic pursuit) is
a way of enabling us to "see" things, expand our consciousness,
outside of the immediate sphere of "care abouts" that are defined by
animal instincts, the five senses, etc., and to see things such as the
nobility of giving our life for a cause that is greater that this
local, supposedly (but not truly) autonomous, sphere.

>
> > But if we reject the ultimate basis, then it feels good to
> > say that it doesn't matter.
> >
> > Tom
> >
> >
> > If we discovered some million year old civilization today I think wonder
> > at its achievements, however paltry, would far outweigh dismay at its
> > wickedness, however extreme. I'm not sure what the significance of this
> > observation is.
>
> I don't think it's true.  My exhibit A is the Aztecs.
>

I think the significance of Stathis' observation is this.  Our local
sphere of "care abouts" mostly has to do with "what can I get out of
it".  It is more immediately obvious that we could possibly gain
something from someone else's achievements or ideas, rather than from
their wickedness.  In fact, it is probably true.  Studying goodness is
more fruitful than studying wickedness.  (Rather lopsided isn't it?
How could such a thing be generated from Everything (or Nothing)?)
But whoever said that "what matters" is only about wickedness and not
goodness?

> Brent Meeker
> There is a certain impertinence in allowing oneself
> to be burned for an opinion.
> -- Anatole France

This is precisely my point.  If all that exists is internal meaning
(i.e. opinion), then there is no true basis (even in the literal sense
of "true") for anything more than a dog-eat-dog world (unless the
other dog provides 1st person subjective gratification).

Tom


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>  
> 
>  > If we discovered some million year old civilization today I think
> wonder
>  > at its achievements, however paltry, would far outweigh dismay at its
>  > wickedness, however extreme. I'm not sure what the significance
> of this
>  > observation is.
> 
> I don't think it's true.  My exhibit A is the Aztecs.
> 
> Brent Meeker
> There is a certain impertinence in allowing oneself
> to be burned for an opinion.
> -- Anatole France
> 
> 
> The Aztecs aren't a million years old. The further removed it is from us 
> (literally and metaphorically), the less we worry about the ethical 
> considerations. If some far future nonhuman civilization dug up the 
> Nazis their children might very well want the equivalent of Adolf Hitler 
> dolls for Christmas, even if their ethical standards turn out to be 
> similar to our own. In the long run, fascination trumps horror.
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou

Of course distance, in time or DNA, makes ethical judgments less relevant.  
It's hard for us to judge chimpanzees and impossible to judge dinosaurs.

Brent

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Brent Meeker writes:


> > If we discovered some million year old civilization today I think wonder
> > at its achievements, however paltry, would far outweigh dismay at its
> > wickedness, however extreme. I'm not sure what the significance of this
> > observation is.
>
> I don't think it's true.  My exhibit A is the Aztecs.
>
> Brent Meeker
> There is a certain impertinence in allowing oneself
> to be burned for an opinion.
> -- Anatole France
>

The Aztecs aren't a million years old. The further removed it is from us
(literally and metaphorically), the less we worry about the ethical
considerations. If some far future nonhuman civilization dug up the Nazis
their children might very well want the equivalent of Adolf Hitler dolls for
Christmas, even if their ethical standards turn out to be similar to our
own. In the long run, fascination trumps horror.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 2/12/07, *Tom Caylor* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> 
>  > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>  >
>  > > Tom Caylor writes:
>  >
>  > >  > > > Brent Meeker
>  > >  > > > "It does not matter now that in a million years nothing
> we do now
>  > > will matter."
>  > >  > > > --- Thomas Nagel
>  >
>  > >  > > We might like to believe Nagel, but it isn't true.
>  >
>  > >  > > Tom
>  >
>  > >  > That is, it isn't true that in a million years nothing we do
> now will
>  > >  > matter.
>  >
>  > > Why do you say "we might like to believe Nagel"? Why would
> anyone want
>  > > it to be the case that nothing we do now will matter in a
> million years?
> 
> In order to think in terms beyond a few generations, we need a basis
> for meaning that is more universal than explaining and controlling
> things in our immediate sphere of "care abouts", like our animal
> instincts.  

But what we care about right now, may include anything we think of - including 
how things will be a million years from now, including an abstract principle, 
even including a fine point of theology.

>(Such a local basis does not support doing things like
> sacrificing your life for others even a couple thousand years in the
> future.)  

For the very good reason that one cannot foresee the benefits of such sacrifice 
so far in the future.   But people sacrifice for others that they know all the 
time.

> But if we reject the ultimate basis, then it feels good to
> say that it doesn't matter.
> 
> Tom
> 
> 
> If we discovered some million year old civilization today I think wonder 
> at its achievements, however paltry, would far outweigh dismay at its 
> wickedness, however extreme. I'm not sure what the significance of this 
> observation is.

I don't think it's true.  My exhibit A is the Aztecs.

Brent Meeker
There is a certain impertinence in allowing oneself
to be burned for an opinion.
-- Anatole France

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 2/12/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > > Tom Caylor writes:
> >
> > >  > > > Brent Meeker
> > >  > > > "It does not matter now that in a million years nothing we do
> now
> > > will matter."
> > >  > > > --- Thomas Nagel
> >
> > >  > > We might like to believe Nagel, but it isn't true.
> >
> > >  > > Tom
> >
> > >  > That is, it isn't true that in a million years nothing we do now
> will
> > >  > matter.
> >
> > > Why do you say "we might like to believe Nagel"? Why would anyone want
> > > it to be the case that nothing we do now will matter in a million
> years?
>
> In order to think in terms beyond a few generations, we need a basis
> for meaning that is more universal than explaining and controlling
> things in our immediate sphere of "care abouts", like our animal
> instincts.  (Such a local basis does not support doing things like
> sacrificing your life for others even a couple thousand years in the
> future.)  But if we reject the ultimate basis, then it feels good to
> say that it doesn't matter.
>
> Tom


If we discovered some million year old civilization today I think wonder at
its achievements, however paltry, would far outweigh dismay at its
wickedness, however extreme. I'm not sure what the significance of this
observation is.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Tom Caylor]

> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > Tom Caylor writes:
>
> >  > > > Brent Meeker
> >  > > > "It does not matter now that in a million years nothing we do now
> > will matter."
> >  > > > --- Thomas Nagel
>
> >  > > We might like to believe Nagel, but it isn't true.
>
> >  > > Tom
>
> >  > That is, it isn't true that in a million years nothing we do now will
> >  > matter.
>
> > Why do you say "we might like to believe Nagel"? Why would anyone want
> > it to be the case that nothing we do now will matter in a million years?

In order to think in terms beyond a few generations, we need a basis
for meaning that is more universal than explaining and controlling
things in our immediate sphere of "care abouts", like our animal
instincts.  (Such a local basis does not support doing things like
sacrificing your life for others even a couple thousand years in the
future.)  But if we reject the ultimate basis, then it feels good to
say that it doesn't matter.

Tom


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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 08-févr.-07, à 23:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

>  John,
>   
>  I agree: being open-minded is more important than being "right".


OK, but being open-minded would be meaningless if the notion of being 
right was meaningless. Being open-minded means being open to the idea 
that someone else can be right (independently of the fact that in 
practice we can only judge personally someone to be interesting or not, 
but the notion of being right has to be implicit in the background. "To 
be right" entails we *could* be wrong.

Bruno






>
> Stathis.
>   
>>  From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>> Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
>> Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2007 17:09:25 -0500
>>
>> Thanks, Fellow Uncertain (agnostic...). Let me quote to your question 
>> at the end the maxim from Mark's post:
>> "I think therefore I am right!" - Angelica  [Rugrat]
>> (whatever that came from. Of course we value more our (halfbaked?) 
>> opinion  than the wisdom of others.People die for it.
>> With the religious marvels: I look at them with awe, cannot state "it 
>> is impossible" because 'they' start out beyond reason and say what 
>> they please.
>> The sorry thing is, when a crowd takes it too seriously and kill, 
>> blow up, beat or burn live human beings in that 'belief'. Same, if 
>> for money.
>>  
>> John M
>>> - Original Message -
>>> From: Stathis Papaioannou
>>> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>>> Sent: Wednesday, February 07, 2007 6:49 PM
>>> Subject: RE: The Meaning of Life
>>>
>>> I don't "know" a right position from a wrong one either, I'm only 
>>> trying to make the best guess I can given the evidence. Sometimes I 
>>> really have no idea, like choosing which way a tossed coin will come 
>>> up. Other times I do have evidence on which to base a belief, such 
>>> as the belief that the world was not in fact created in six 24-hr 
>>> days. It is certainly possible that I am wrong, and the evidence for 
>>> a very old universe has either been fabricated or grossly 
>>> misinterpreted, but I would bet on being right. Wouldn't you also, 
>>> if something you valued depended on the bet?
>>>  
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>>>  From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>>>> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>>>> Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
>>>> Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2007 18:28:25 -0500
>>>>
>>>> And you, Stathis, are very kind to assume that I "know' a right 
>>>> position from a wromng one. I may be in indecision before I 
>>>> denigrate...
>>>> On the contrary. if someone 'believes' the 6 day creation, I start 
>>>> speculating WHAT "days" they could have been metaphorically, 
>>>> starfting before the solar system led us to our present ways of 
>>>> scheduling. Etc. Etc. Accepting that whatever we 'believe' is our 
>>>> epistemic achievement, anything 'from yesterday' might have been 
>>>> 'right' (maybe except the old Greeks - ha ha). in their own rites.
>>>> Sometimes I start an argument about a "different" (questionable?) 
>>>> belief just to tickle out arguments which I did not consider 
>>>> earlier. But that is my dirty way.
>>>> I am a bad judge and always ready to reconsider.
>>>>  
>>>> John M
>>>>> - Original Message -
>>>>> From: Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, February 06, 2007 5:54 PM
>>>>> Subject: RE: The Meaning of Life
>>>>>
>>>>> John,
>>>>>
>>>>> Some people, including the mentally ill, do have multiple 
>>>>> inconsistent belief systems, but to me that makes it clear that at 
>>>>> least one of their beliefs must be wrong - even in the absence of 
>>>>> other information. You're much kinder to alternative beliefs than 
>>>>> I am, but in reality, you *must* think that some beliefs are 
>>>>> wrong, otherwise you would hold those beliefs! For example, if you 
>>>>> say you don't personally believe the earth was created in six 
>>>>> days, but respect the right of others to believe that it was, what 
>>>>> you're really saying is that you respect the right of others to