On 07 Nov 2011, at 23:08, John Mikes wrote:
To Qentin: "DEATH" an excellent vaiation for immoprtality. I always
emphasize that ETERNITY is NOT a "time" indicator, can most likely
be timeless ("POOF" it is over).
To Bruno:
we wrote already about your 2c question "WHO ARE WE?" and you
ans
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
We somehow think that if we in the
state of feeling to be a seperate individual cease to exist, we as
conscious
beings cease to exist, which is simply not true.
>>>
>>> I agree with you. I just call "person" the conscious bei
On 08 Nov 2011, at 20:56, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I would rather call this consciousness.
Indeed I agree with Dan that it is quite accurate to say that there
is no
person in the sense that experience is not personal, it doesn't
"belong" to
anyone (but it is very intimate with
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I would rather call this consciousness.
>>
>> Indeed I agree with Dan that it is quite accurate to say that there
>> is no
>> person in the sense that experience is not personal, it doesn't
>> "belong" to
>> anyone (but it is very intimate with itself nontheless).
>
On 07 Nov 2011, at 21:02, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But if you realize that there has never been a person to begin with,
But this contradicts immediately my present consciousness feeling. I
am currently in the state of wanting to drink water, so I am pretty
sure that there exis
meekerdb wrote:
>
> On 11/7/2011 12:02 PM, benjayk wrote:
>> I think we only fear the elimination of personhood because we confuse
>> being
>> conscious as an ego with being conscious. We somehow think that if we in
>> the
>> state of feeling to be a seperate individual cease to exist, we as
>>
meekerdb wrote:
>
> On 11/7/2011 9:50 AM, benjayk wrote:
>> meekerdb wrote:
>>> >
>>> > How great was that?
>> I don't know. Being a fetus might be a peaceful experience, or like
>> sleep.
>> But the point is that it doesn't matter how great the experience was,
>
> So what's your evidence
To Qentin: "DEATH" an excellent vaiation for immoprtality. I always
emphasize that ETERNITY is NOT a "time" indicator, can most likely be
timeless ("POOF" it is over).
To Bruno:
we wrote already about your 2c question "WHO ARE WE?" and you answered
something like "Gods".
That may be a cheap shot,
On 11/7/2011 12:02 PM, benjayk wrote:
I think we only fear the elimination of personhood because we confuse being
conscious as an ego with being conscious. We somehow think that if we in the
state of feeling to be a seperate individual cease to exist, we as conscious
beings cease to exist, which
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> But if you realize that there has never been a person to begin with,
>
> But this contradicts immediately my present consciousness feeling. I
> am currently in the state of wanting to drink water, so I am pretty
> sure that there exist right now at least one person
On 11/7/2011 9:50 AM, benjayk wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
>
> How great was that?
I don't know. Being a fetus might be a peaceful experience, or like sleep.
But the point is that it doesn't matter how great the experience was,
So what's your evidence that there is *any* experience of "being a
meekerdb wrote:
>
>> You picture consciousness as something inherently personal. But you can
>> be
>> conscious without there being any sense of personhood, or any experience
>> related to a particular person (like in meditation). So that assumption
>> doesn't seems to be true.
>>
>> Also you
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
>> >>
>> >> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> > Immortality still means what it means, what you're talking about is
>> not
>> >> > immortality. If nothing is preserved (no memories) then nothing is
>> left
>> >> > and
>> >> > I don't care.
>> >> But is is not true
On 06 Nov 2011, at 12:29, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2011/11/6 Bruno Marchal
Quentin,
On 30 Oct 2011, at 23:51, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
benjayk:
On the other hand, I don't see why we would ignore immortality of
consciousness, considering that the "I" is just a psychosocial
construct/illusion a
2011/11/6 Bruno Marchal
> Quentin,
>
> On 30 Oct 2011, at 23:51, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> benjayk:
>> On the other hand, I don't see why we would ignore immortality of
>> consciousness, considering that the "I" is just a psychosocial
>> construct/illusion anyway. We don't find an actual "I" any
Quentin,
On 30 Oct 2011, at 23:51, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
benjayk:
On the other hand, I don't see why we would ignore immortality of
consciousness, considering that the "I" is just a psychosocial
construct/illusion anyway. We don't find an actual "I" anywhere. It
seems
very relevant to know
Hi Dan,
On 03 Nov 2011, at 03:08, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
Hey there,
I don't often post on this board, but I follow it quite frequently,
and perhaps I might inject a 'fresh voice' to rescue this thread of a
cul-de-sac of its own. It's essentially buddhist in nature rather than
mathematical or
On 11/3/2011 7:07 AM, benjayk wrote:
There is no difference, as there is no your and mine consciousness.
Consciousness can not be owned, and can not be divided into pieces. There is
just consciousness.
It is very easily experientally confirmable: Do you ever experience anything
other than this co
2011/11/3 benjayk
>
>
> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
> >
> > 2011/11/3 benjayk
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
> >> >
> >> >> You picture consciousness as something inherently personal. But you
> >> can
> >> >> be
> >> >> conscious without there being any sense of personhood, or any
> >>
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
> 2011/11/3 benjayk
>
>>
>>
>> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >
>> >> You picture consciousness as something inherently personal. But you
>> can
>> >> be
>> >> conscious without there being any sense of personhood, or any
>> experience
>> >> related to a particular pers
2011/11/3 benjayk
>
>
> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
> >
> >> You picture consciousness as something inherently personal. But you can
> >> be
> >> conscious without there being any sense of personhood, or any experience
> >> related to a particular person (like in meditation). So that assumption
> >>
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
>> You picture consciousness as something inherently personal. But you can
>> be
>> conscious without there being any sense of personhood, or any experience
>> related to a particular person (like in meditation). So that assumption
>> doesn't seems to be true.
>>
>> A
On 11/2/2011 7:08 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
Hey there,
I don't often post on this board, but I follow it quite frequently,
and perhaps I might inject a 'fresh voice' to rescue this thread of a
cul-de-sac of its own. It's essentially buddhist in nature rather than
mathematical or computational
Hey there,
I don't often post on this board, but I follow it quite frequently,
and perhaps I might inject a 'fresh voice' to rescue this thread of a
cul-de-sac of its own. It's essentially buddhist in nature rather than
mathematical or computational, so forgive me if I appear presumptuous,
or off
On 1 November 2011 21:07, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 01, 2011 at 01:07:31PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
> > This is where I am coming from:
> >
> > I accept decoherence as the mechanism for suppressing interference
> > between universes and that this happens very quickly (no time for us
On Oct 27, 12:10 am, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 04:00:56PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
> > QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
>
> > I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
> > differentiation works – especially in relation to QT
On 11/2/2011 11:45 AM, benjayk wrote:
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/11/1 benjayk
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/10/30 benjayk
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/10/30 benjayk
Nick Prince-2 wrote:
This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post
http://groups.google.com/group
2011/11/2 benjayk
>
>
> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
> >
> > 2011/11/1 benjayk
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
> >> >
> >> > 2011/10/30 benjayk
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
> >> >> >
> >> >> > 2011/10/30 benjayk
> >> >> >
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Nick
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
> 2011/11/1 benjayk
>
>>
>>
>> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >
>> > 2011/10/30 benjayk
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> > 2011/10/30 benjayk
>> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Nick Prince-2 wrote:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > This is
On Tue, Nov 1, 2011 at 5:40 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
> 2011/11/1 benjayk
>
>>
>>
>> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >
>> > 2011/10/30 benjayk
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> > 2011/10/30 benjayk
>> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Nick Prince-2 wrote:
>> >> >> >
On 11/1/2011 3:40 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
What do you mean by "consciousness" ? I don't care about "eternal" not me... it's the
*same* thing as death. When talking about dying, what's important is the person who die,
if something is left who doesn't know that it was that person... what does i
On 11/1/2011 2:07 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Nov 01, 2011 at 01:07:31PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
This is where I am coming from:
I accept decoherence as the mechanism for suppressing interference
between universes and that this happens very quickly (no time for us
to notice). So assu
On 11/1/2011 1:07 PM, Nick Prince wrote:
[BM]
I don't think I understand it any better than you do. But ISTM we need a
quantum theory
of consciousness in order to write eqns like (3) above. In the standard theory
it implies
that there is some experience of both system states at the same time.
2011/11/1 benjayk
>
>
> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
> >
> > 2011/10/30 benjayk
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
> >> >
> >> > 2011/10/30 benjayk
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> Nick Prince-2 wrote:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> > This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post
On Tue, Nov 01, 2011 at 01:07:31PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
> This is where I am coming from:
>
> I accept decoherence as the mechanism for suppressing interference
> between universes and that this happens very quickly (no time for us
> to notice). So assuming the everett interpretation, there
[BM]
> I don't think I understand it any better than you do. But ISTM we need a
> quantum theory
> of consciousness in order to write eqns like (3) above. In the standard
> theory it implies
> that there is some experience of both system states at the same time. A
> change of basis
> changes
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
> 2011/10/30 benjayk
>
>>
>>
>> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >
>> > 2011/10/30 benjayk
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Nick Prince-2 wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post
>> >> >
>> >>
>> http://groups.google.com/group/ever
On 31 Oct 2011, at 23:56, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/31/2011 11:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Why? Everett shows convincingly that, being a memory machine, when
we measure a superposition state, we just entangle ourself with the
superposition state, but this differentiate the consciousness/
memor
On 10/31/2011 11:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Why? Everett shows convincingly that, being a memory machine, when we measure a
superposition state, we just entangle ourself with the superposition state, but this
differentiate the consciousness/memory of the machine, and she can feel the split.
On 31 Oct 2011, at 18:13, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/31/2011 6:01 AM, Nick Prince wrote:
On Oct 31, 5:30 am, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/30/2011 5:13 PM, Nick Prince wrote:
On Oct 30, 8:56 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
My point about the unitary evolution was that the clicking of the
Geiger count
On 10/31/2011 6:01 AM, Nick Prince wrote:
On Oct 31, 5:30 am, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/30/2011 5:13 PM, Nick Prince wrote:
On Oct 30, 8:56 pm, Russell Standishwrote:
My point about the unitary evolution was that the clicking of the
Geiger counter is not a unitary process - and until you
On 30 Oct 2011, at 10:34, benjayk wrote:
Nick Prince-2 wrote:
This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/4514b50b8eb469c3/c49c3aa24c265a4b?lnk=gst&q=homomorphic#c49c3aa24c265a4b
where I suggest that very
On 31 Oct 2011, at 06:20, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/30/2011 5:09 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
A common response to the idea of QTI is, Why should I care if I die
and someone else in another world who thinks he is me survives? But
this objection shows a lack of understanding of consciousness w
On Oct 31, 5:30 am, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/30/2011 5:13 PM, Nick Prince wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Oct 30, 8:56 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >> My point about the unitary evolution was that the clicking of the
> >> Geiger counter is not a unitary process - and until you hear it, you
> >> remain i
On 31 Oct 2011, at 06:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/30/2011 5:13 PM, Nick Prince wrote:
On Oct 30, 8:56 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
My point about the unitary evolution was that the clicking of the
Geiger counter is not a unitary process - and until you hear it,
you remain in
superposition.
On 10/30/2011 5:13 PM, Nick Prince wrote:
On Oct 30, 8:56 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
My point about the unitary evolution was that the clicking of the
Geiger counter is not a unitary process - and until you hear it, you remain in
superposition.
- Show quoted text -
I thought that in the e
On 10/30/2011 5:09 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
A common response to the idea of QTI is, Why should I care if I die and someone
else in another world who thinks he is me survives? But this objection shows a
lack of understanding of consciousness works if there are multiple
instantiations.
On Oct 30, 8:56 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
> My point about the unitary evolution was that the clicking of the
> Geiger counter is not a unitary process - and until you hear it, you remain in
> superposition.
>
>
> - Show quoted text -
I thought that in the everett interpretation everything w
On Oct 31, 2011, at 8:15 AM, benjayk wrote:
> OK, I can see that this a possible perspective on that. Indeed most of the
> time immortality is used to refer to personal immortality (especially in the
> west). I agree with materialists there is no good reason to suppose that
> this exists.
> Quant
2011/10/30 benjayk
>
>
> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
> >
> > 2011/10/30 benjayk
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> Nick Prince-2 wrote:
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post
> >> >
> >>
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/4514b50b8eb469c3
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
> 2011/10/30 benjayk
>
>>
>>
>> Nick Prince-2 wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post
>> >
>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/4514b50b8eb469c3/c49c3aa24c265a4b?lnk=gst&q=homomorphic#c49c3aa
On Sun, Oct 30, 2011 at 05:10:34AM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
> Well suppose the "device" triggers the flask smashing part of the
> detector apparatus depending on whether the electron is moving up and
> spinning up or vice versa as in my analysis. Also say it does this on
> recieiving a click from
On 29 Oct 2011, at 20:07, Nick Prince wrote:
On Oct 29, 6:44 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Oct 30, 2011, at 3:17 AM, Nick Prince
wrote:
Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type
multiverses
here, in which case I agree. What I was doing in my analysis was
thin
>
> [RS]
The question is - when did the cat become aware of which way the
> electron was spinning as it left the Stern-Gerlach apparatus? I would
> say it was when it discovered the vial didn't smash, and it was still alive.
>
> The other question, from the DD perspective, is when did the sphere
2011/10/30 benjayk
>
>
> Nick Prince-2 wrote:
> >
> >
> > This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post
> >
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/4514b50b8eb469c3/c49c3aa24c265a4b?lnk=gst&q=homomorphic#c49c3aa24c265a4b
> > where I suggest that very o
Nick Prince-2 wrote:
>
>
> This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/4514b50b8eb469c3/c49c3aa24c265a4b?lnk=gst&q=homomorphic#c49c3aa24c265a4b
> where I suggest that very old or dying brains might
> deterora
On Sat, Oct 29, 2011 at 03:44:46PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
>
> [NP]
> > > Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type multiverses
> > > here, in which case I agree. What I was doing in my analysis was
> > > thinking about QM type 3 multiverses only. Let's pretend that these
> > >
[NP]
> > Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type multiverses
> > here, in which case I agree. What I was doing in my analysis was
> > thinking about QM type 3 multiverses only. Let's pretend that these
> > are the only variety for the moment, then my analysis does indicate
> > t
>[SPK]
From what I can tell, cul de sac's would have 3p consequences that
> would have an effect on the distribution of branches. Maybe we should
> consider what effect the 'rest of the universe' has on the 1p of the cat.
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
[NP]
Had a think but still not sure what you m
On Oct 27, 11:52 am, benjayk wrote:
> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>
> > On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 6:00 PM, Nick Prince
> > wrote:
>
> >> QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
>
> >> I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
> >> di
On Sat, Oct 29, 2011 at 09:17:17AM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
> Hi Stathis
>
> Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type multiverses
> here, in which case I agree. What I was doing in my analysis was
> thinking about QM type 3 multiverses only. Let's pretend that these
> are the on
On Oct 29, 6:44 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Oct 30, 2011, at 3:17 AM, Nick Prince
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type multiverses
> > here, in which case I agree. What I was doing in my analysis was
> > thinking about QM type 3 multiverses
On Oct 29, 6:44 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Oct 30, 2011, at 3:17 AM, Nick Prince
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type multiverses
> > here, in which case I agree. What I was doing in my analysis was
> > thinking about QM type 3 multiverses
On Oct 30, 2011, at 3:17 AM, Nick Prince wrote:
> Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type multiverses
> here, in which case I agree. What I was doing in my analysis was
> thinking about QM type 3 multiverses only. Let's pretend that these
> are the only variety for the moment
On Oct 29, 1:53 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Oct 26, 2011, at 10:00 AM, Nick Prince
> wrote:
>
> > QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
>
> > I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
> > differentiation works – especially in relatio
On Oct 26, 2011, at 10:00 AM, Nick Prince wrote:
> QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
>
> I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
> differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI. With a
> standard treatment it looks as if there might be cul de sacs
Thanks Bruno for being so patient with me and taking the time to
carefully answer my queries.
Nick
On Oct 28, 3:42 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 28 Oct 2011, at 01:56, Nick Prince wrote:
>
>
>
> > [BM]
> > The QTI, or the more general comp immortality, or arithmetical
> > immortality is a comple
On 28 Oct 2011, at 01:56, Nick Prince wrote:
[BM]
The QTI, or the more general comp immortality, or arithmetical
immortality is a complex subject, if only because it depends on
what
you mean by "you".
[NP]
Can you be more specific on this?
Well, we have discuss this a lot on this list. O
[SPK]
> > It seems to me that we have to take the environment of the system
> >> into account, so we have to have a {environment> in the equation, no?
> >> From what I can tell, cul de sac's would have 3p consequences that
> >> would have an effect on the distribution of branches. Maybe we s
On 10/27/2011 4:56 PM, Nick Prince wrote:
With comp, and I think with QM,
there is no escapes from being conscious, in a way or another. I
don't
like that, but then it is a consequence of those theories.
Have you never been unconscious? Concussion? Anesthesia?
Brent
--
You received this mes
[BM]
The QTI, or the more general comp immortality, or arithmetical
immortality is a complex subject, if only because it depends on
what
you mean by "you".
[NP]
Can you be more specific on this?
[BM]
Do you know Kripke semantic? A Kripke frame is just a set (of
elements
called worlds) with an
On 10/27/2011 3:26 PM, Nick Prince wrote:
[SPK]
Are we sure that this ordering, at the level of the state vectors,
really matters? We are, after all, only considering observables that
mutually commute and thus ordering should be irrelevant.
[NP]
Hi Stephen. I stressed the order because it
[SPK]
Are we sure that this ordering, at the level of the state vectors,
> really matters? We are, after all, only considering observables that
> mutually commute and thus ordering should be irrelevant.
>
[NP]
Hi Stephen. I stressed the order because it is how the cat perceives
events and there
[JR]
I think such cul de sacs exist only from third person perspectives.
E.g.,
the experimenter's view of what happens to the cat. When considering
the
perspective from the first person (cat) perspective, there are no cul
de
sacs for a much simpler reason: The cat might be mistaken, dreaming,
or e
[CW]
I can't help with that unfortunately. My own TOE explains why QM may
be a misinterpretation to begin with (even though the observations and
predictions of QM are of course valid).
[NP]
Ok thanks for your comments Craig. I would be interested in your
TOE. If you have explained it on this
On 26 Oct 2011, at 01:00, Nick Prince wrote:
QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI. With a
standard treatment it looks as if there might be cul de sacs for a
dying cat. However
On 10/25/2011 7:00 PM, Nick Prince wrote:
QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI. With a
standard treatment it looks as if there might be cul de sacs for a
dying cat. However I
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>
> On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 6:00 PM, Nick Prince
> wrote:
>
>> QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
>>
>> I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
>> differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI. With a
On Wed, Oct 26, 2011 at 08:02:02PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
> I don't think it is possible to define personal discontinuation (death) in
> terms of a local event or configuration that is setup in some corner of a
> universe.
>
> For instance, if the universe is infinitely big, one could recur inf
On 10/26/2011 5:10 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 04:00:56PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI. With a
standard treatment it
On Wed, Oct 26, 2011 at 7:14 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 26, 2011 at 06:58:15PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
> >
> > Nick,
> >
> > I think such cul de sacs exist only from third person perspectives.
> E.g.,
> > the experimenter's view of what happens to the cat. When considering the
>
On Wed, Oct 26, 2011 at 06:58:15PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> Nick,
>
> I think such cul de sacs exist only from third person perspectives. E.g.,
> the experimenter's view of what happens to the cat. When considering the
> perspective from the first person (cat) perspective, there are no cul
On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 04:00:56PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
> QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
>
> I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
> differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI. With a
> standard treatment it looks as if there might be
On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 6:00 PM, Nick Prince
wrote:
> QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
>
> I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
> differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI. With a
> standard treatment it looks as if there might be cul de sacs
On Oct 26, 11:29 am, Nick Prince
wrote:
> [NP]
> QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
> By the end of the first evolution due to Msg, the infinite
> bundle of universes has partitioned into two bundles i.e. one bundle
> of universes that have a Z spin up electron moving upwards w
[NP]
QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
By the end of the first evolution due to Msg, the infinite
bundle of universes has partitioned into two bundles i.e. one bundle
of universes that have a Z spin up electron moving upwards with a
neutral detector reading and an alive cat, and another bundle
On Oct 25, 7:00 pm, Nick Prince wrote:
> QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
> By the end of the first evolution due to Msg, the infinite
> bundle of universes has partitioned into two bundles i.e. one bundle
> of universes that have a Z spin up electron moving upwards with a
> n
QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI. With a
standard treatment it looks as if there might be cul de sacs for a
dying cat. However I think I can see why this conclusion could be
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