2013/9/30 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 9/30/2013 2:02 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Let me give an example: Free will.
That we can choose between alternative actions (and we can predict the
consequences for the good or evil of ourselves and others) has been ever
considered a fact.
On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 05:25:32AM +, chris peck wrote:
Hi Russell
Not at all. The UDA does not depend on the MWI at all.
And I didn't suggest it did. This is exquisite chaos. Assuming none of us are
correct then we're rebutting rebuttles we misrepresent of arguments that have
been
I forgot to answer the last one:
2013/9/30 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 9/30/2013 2:02 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Let me give an example: Free will.
That we can choose between alternative actions (and we can predict the
consequences for the good or evil of ourselves and others) has
2013/10/1 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 30 Sep 2013, at 15:56, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Not exactly. And that depends on what we call as science. Many called
sciences are pure rubbish, while some other disciplines outside of what is
now called science are much more interesting. I´, in
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a
person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to
On 01 Oct 2013, at 18:41, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 12:01 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Digital teleportation is not necessary, with existing technology
I can make a real experiment, not just a thought experiment, that
incorporates all the philosophical
On 01 Oct 2013, at 18:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 1, 2013 7:13:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:
The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my
view.
On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a
person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to have
qualia,
On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:19, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 5:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
CA are local. The universe cannot be a CA if comp is correct, and
the empirical violation of Bell's inequality confirms this comp
feature.
?? But CA are Turing universal, which means they can compute
On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 7:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
However, on reflection, this is not what one should deduce from the
logic as set out. The logical structure of each subjective moment is
defined as encoding its relative past and anticipated future states
(an
On 01 Oct 2013, at 22:20, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 12:59 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Forget Everett, forget Quantum Mechanics, even in pure Newtonian
physics subjective indeterminacy exists because of lack of
information. If you knew the exact speed
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 3:43 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 7:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
However, on reflection, this is not what one should deduce from the
logic as set out. The logical structure of each subjective moment is
On 02 Oct 2013, at 04:18, LizR wrote:
On 2 October 2013 14:56, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
There is no particular requirement for CAs to be local, although local
CAs are by far easier to study than nonlocal ones, so in practice they
usually are (cue obligatory lamp post
On 02 Oct 2013, at 03:56, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 02:54:51PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 01:30, Russell Standish wrote:
The real universe is likely to be 11 dimensional, nonlocal with
around
10^{122} states, or 2^{10^{122}} possible universes,
On 02 Oct 2013, at 03:51, chris peck wrote:
Hi David
Thanks for the response. It was by far the best response Ive had and
a pleasure to read.
Lets distinguish between conclusions and arguments.
I can entertain many bizarre conclusions. I often wonder about an
'infinite plenitude of
On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote:
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could*
reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they
say.
On 02 Oct 2013, at 10:35, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2013/10/1 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 30 Sep 2013, at 15:56, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Not exactly. And that depends on what we call as science. Many
called sciences are pure rubbish, while some other disciplines
outside of
On 02 Oct 2013, at 11:04, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a
person
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:26:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote:
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then the reasoning shows (at a meta-level, made possible with the
assumption used) how consciousness and
Huh?
-- Forwarded message --
In the place where souls meet, we came together and conspired to create the
forces which separate us all in service of the greater union.
The inevitable lightness of being arises naturally from the requirement
that the essence of conceptual thinking
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
philosophically my low-tech experiment works just as well and is just as
uninformative as your hi-tech version.
Not at all. In your low tech (using a coin), you get an indeterminacy
from coin throwing,
And the coin throw was
On 10/2/2013 2:04 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a
person supported by
On 10/2/2013 1:17 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
All the rest, including theories, must accommodate this fact and not
the other
way around.
The trouble is this fact just refers to a personal feeling and so is
useless for
social policy: Did you feel that you had free
On 10/1/2013 11:49 PM, Pierz wrote:
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 3:15:01 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote:
Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the
qualia can be
different, it does present issues - how much and in what way
2013/10/2 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 10/2/2013 1:17 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
All the rest, including theories, must accommodate this fact and not
the other way around.
The trouble is this fact just refers to a personal feeling and so is
useless for social policy: Did you
On 10/2/2013 6:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be misleading. A
computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by an infinity
of
On 10/2/2013 7:03 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 3:43 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 7:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
However, on reflection, this is not what one should deduce from the
logic as set out. The
On 10/2/2013 9:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I agree with Brent though on this. Your UDA proceeds on the basis that a computer in a
single reality (not an infinite sum of calculations - that comes later) can have a 1p.
Yes. It has 1p, it is not a zombie. But that 1p, for him, is really defined
Brent:
***But no matter how smart I make it, it won't experience lust.*
*
*
1. lust is not the universal criterion that makes us human, it is only
one of our humanly circumscribed paraphernalia we apply in HUMAN thinking
and HUMAN complexity with HUMAN language. Can you apply a similar criterion
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 9:37 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/2/2013 7:03 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 3:43 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 7:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
However, on reflection,
On 10/2/2013 2:06 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Brent:
*//*/But no matter how smart I make it, it won't experience lust./
/
/
1. lust is not the universal criterion that makes us human, it is only one of our
humanly circumscribed paraphernalia we apply in HUMAN thinking and HUMAN complexity with
On 3 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
philosophically my low-tech experiment works just as well and is just
as uninformative as your hi-tech version.
Not at all. In your low tech (using a coin), you
Hi Bruno
[JC] Because step 3 sucks.
[Bruno] Why? You have not yet make a convincing point on this.
His point is convincing me.
regards.
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2013 23:18:07 +0200
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: te...@telmomenezes.com
To:
On 3 October 2013 12:38, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
Hi Bruno
*[JC] Because step 3 sucks.
*
* *
* *
* ** *
*
*
* *
*[Bruno] Why? You have not yet make a convincing point on this. *
His point is convincing me.
Which point is that? JC said:
What question about
On 10/2/2013 4:33 PM, LizR wrote:
On 3 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
philosophically my low-tech experiment works just as well and is
On 1 October 2013 23:31, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the
brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a challenge to
Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It seems to me that Bruno has
On 3 October 2013 13:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Interestingly it appears that most coin tosses may be quantum random,
arXiv:1212.0953v1 [gr-qc]
(snip)
I say most because I know that magicians train themselves to be able to
flip a coin and catch it consistently.
On 2 October 2013 00:46, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce
the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a
challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred
On 10/2/2013 5:15 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 1 October 2013 23:31, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the
brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a challenge to
Chalmer's position has occurred
Hi Liz
Is there something wrong with quantum indeterminacy?
Apart from the fact the MWI removes it? And that that is the point of MWI? And
that probability questions in MWI are notoriously thorny?
This is why I resort to the Quantum Suicide experiment or better still to
Quantum Russian
On 3 October 2013 14:12, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
Hi Liz
*
Is there something wrong with quantum indeterminacy?
*
Apart from the fact the MWI removes it? And that that is the point of MWI?
And that probability questions in MWI are notoriously thorny?
OK, and since the
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 2:59:17 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/1/2013 11:49 PM, Pierz wrote:
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 3:15:01 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote:
Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the
qualia can be
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 8:23:36 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On 2 October 2013 00:46, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be javascript:
wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could*
reproduce
the brain's behaviour.
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