On 02 Mar 2014, at 10:49, LizR wrote:
On 2 March 2014 21:33, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Because "1+1=2" is elementary math, learned in high school.
" "1+1=2" is a fact " is a non trivial philosophical statement,
which involved a non trivial notion like "fact". I have seen people
discussing ad n
On 2 March 2014 21:33, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Because "1+1=2" is elementary math, learned in high school.
>
" "1+1=2" is a fact " is a non trivial philosophical statement, which
> involved a non trivial notion like "fact". I have seen people discussing ad
> nauseam on what is a fact, and some p
On 01 Mar 2014, at 10:15, LizR wrote:
On 1 March 2014 21:03, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Mar 2014, at 02:06, LizR wrote:
On 1 March 2014 03:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote:
Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept "Yes Doctor"
the rest of comp follo
On 1 March 2014 21:03, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Mar 2014, at 02:06, LizR wrote:
>
> On 1 March 2014 03:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote:
>>
>> Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept "Yes Doctor" the
>>> rest of comp follows. Which I realise isn
On 01 Mar 2014, at 02:06, LizR wrote:
On 1 March 2014 03:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote:
Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept "Yes Doctor"
the rest of comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true,
? You might elaborate on this. What is the "re
On 28 Feb 2014, at 19:14, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Feb 28, 2014 at 11:26 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
>>Sorry, I was guessing something along the lines of FPI = first
person interpretation.
> ???
!!!
> You are the one describing the FPI as a crazy discovery.
No, I'm the one who keeps say
On 28 Feb 2014, at 02:10, LizR wrote:
On 28 February 2014 14:03, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/27/2014 4:27 PM, LizR wrote:
On 28 February 2014 05:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And Liz-Washington said "I don't know if I am the one from
Washington I drunk to much whisky and I lost the diary!"
And Liz-Mos
On 28 Feb 2014, at 02:03, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/27/2014 4:27 PM, LizR wrote:
On 28 February 2014 05:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And Liz-Washington said "I don't know if I am the one from
Washington I drunk to much whisky and I lost the diary!"
And Liz-Moscow said "I don't know if I am the one f
On 28 Feb 2014, at 01:27, LizR wrote:
On 28 February 2014 05:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And Liz-Washington said "I don't know if I am the one from
Washington I drunk to much whisky and I lost the diary!"
And Liz-Moscow said "I don't know if I am the one from Moscow, I
drunk too much vodka an
On 1 March 2014 03:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote:
>
> Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept "Yes Doctor" the rest
>> of comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true,
>>
> ? You might elaborate on this. What is the "rest", and why do you think it
On 28 Feb 2014, at 15:28, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 February 2014 17:04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi David,
On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:32, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck
wrote
On Fri, Feb 28, 2014 at 11:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>Sorry, I was guessing something along the lines of FPI = first person
> interpretation.
>
> > ???
>
!!!
> You are the one describing the FPI as a crazy discovery.
>
No, I'm the one who keeps saying that first person indeterminacy (I d
On 26 Feb 2014, at 19:37, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Feb 25, 2014 at 1:21 PM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
>>> provide the algorithm of prediction.
>> Why? What does that have to do with the price of eggs? FPI is
about the feeling of self and prediction has nothing to do with it.
> FPI = first
On 26 February 2014 17:04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi David,
>
> On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:32, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck wrote:
>>
>> *>>This is the same as say
On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote:
On 26 February 2014 15:16, chris peck
wrote:
Hi Liz
>> In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition
of "you" has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split.
Well what definition of 'you' do you suggest we use? What is
On 28 February 2014 14:03, meekerdb wrote:
> On 2/27/2014 4:27 PM, LizR wrote:
>
> On 28 February 2014 05:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> And Liz-Washington said "I don't know if I am the one from Washington I
>> drunk to much whisky and I lost the diary!"
>> And Liz-Moscow said "I don't know if
On 2/27/2014 4:27 PM, LizR wrote:
On 28 February 2014 05:29, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
wrote:
And Liz-Washington said "I don't know if I am the one from Washington I
drunk to
much whisky and I lost the diary!"
And Liz-Moscow said "I don't know if I am the one from Mo
On 28 February 2014 05:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> And Liz-Washington said "I don't know if I am the one from Washington I
> drunk to much whisky and I lost the diary!"
> And Liz-Moscow said "I don't know if I am the one from Moscow, I drunk too
> much vodka and I lost the diary".
>
> GASP! How di
ta
and the non communicable qualia. I think. With their rich mathematics.
Bruno
All the best
Chris
From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:33:21 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2014-02-26 7:31 GMT+01
partial solutions, testable, and up to now tested (thanks
to both Gödel and QM).
Bruno
All the best
Chris.
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100
On 25 Feb 2014, at 07
On 24 Feb 2014, at 23:04, LizR wrote:
On 24 February 2014 07:57, Bruno Marchal wrote:
About [](A -> B) -> ([]A -> []B), let me ask you a more precise
exercise.
Convince yourself that this formula is true in all worlds, of all
Kripke multiverses, with any illumination.
Hint: you might try
On Tue, Feb 25, 2014 at 1:21 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> provide the algorithm of prediction.
>>>
>>
>> >> Why? What does that have to do with the price of eggs? FPI is about
>> the feeling of self and prediction has nothing to do with it.
>>
>
> > FPI = first person indeterminacy
>
Sorry, I wa
Hi David,
On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:32, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck
wrote:
>>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible
futures in the MWI - but
On 26 February 2014 19:31, chris peck wrote:
> Hi Liz
>
> *>> I meant changed from our everyday definition, in which we normally
> assume there is only one you, which is (or is at least associated with)
> your physical structure. Which we generally assume exists in one universe.*
>
> We lose that
if MWI must be in accordance with QM.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#PRPO
All the best
Chris.
From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:28:53 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2014-02-26 7:2
ttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#PRPO
>
> All the best
>
> Chris.
>
> --
> From: allco...@gmail.com
> Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:28:53 +0100
>
> Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
&
s in
which 'we' appear.
All the best
Chris.
From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:28:53 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2014-02-26 7:21 GMT+01:00 chris peck :
Hi Bruno
>> Yes, it is t
y are wrong, but only the interpretation
> of what is probability change in MWI (and duplication settings)... not the
> prediction... if you say it is totally useless, then you're ready to make a
> bet with me (as everything for your has equal probability of happening...)
>
> Qu
useless, then you're ready to make a
bet with me (as everything for your has equal probability of happening...)
Quentin
>
> All the best
>
> Chris.
>
> ----------
> From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> Su
utcome without being committed to the view that either future self sees both.
All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen to divert attention
from the simple error you make here, isn't it?
All the best
Chris.
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject:
On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and
spin down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where,
in discussion of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's
step 3, he argues:
"What ... should
ris.
> From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
> Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 19:21:00 +0100
>
>
> On 25 Feb 2014, at 18:35, John Clark wrote:
>
> >
> >
> > > provide
On 26 February 2014 15:53, chris peck wrote:
> Hi Liz
>
> *>>Assuming comp it appears to be the state(s) that could follow on from
> your current brain state via whatever transitions rules are allowed by - I
> assume - logical necessity. Perhaps Bruno can explain.*
>
> let me ask a more round abo
me 'if the definition of "you" has been
changed to accommodate the fact that you've split'
Changed from which definition?
All the best
Chris.
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 15:31:01 +1300
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
From: lizj..
On 26 February 2014 15:16, chris peck wrote:
> Hi Liz
>
> *>> In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of
> "you" has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. *
>
> Well what definition of 'you' do you suggest we use? What is your
> criterion for identity ove
.@ulb.ac.be
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
> Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 19:21:00 +0100
>
>
> On 25 Feb 2014, at 18:35, John Clark wrote:
>
> >
> >
> > > provide the algorithm of predic
On 25 Feb 2014, at 18:35, John Clark wrote:
> provide the algorithm of prediction.
Why? What does that have to do with the price of eggs? FPI is about
the feeling of self and prediction has nothing to do with it.
FPI = first person indeterminacy of result of experience having two
outco
On 25 Feb 2014, at 10:43, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> David Deutsch does not reject probability...
Sure he does, he swaps out the Born rule for rational decision
theory (+ amendments to make it compatible with MWI). There isn't
probability, but we should act 'as if' there was. Its what he's
On 25 Feb 2014, at 01:05, chris peck wrote:
The point is that how probability fits into MWI's determinist
framework, or any TofE really, is still an open question.
Of course, and my point is that comp aggravates that problem, as only
extends the indterminacy from a wave to arithmetic.
But
On Sun, Feb 23, 2014 at 1:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Did the Helsinki Man see Washington and Moscow? Yes.
>>>
>>> >>> In the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view.
>>>
>>
>>
> >> In who's "1-1 view"? You'll probably say in "The Helsinki Man's"
>>
>
> > No. The W-man and the M-m
>
But that
tstochastic processes occur. For instance if asked whether they occur he
> will certainly reply ‘no’, because the non-probabilistic axioms of quantum
> theory require the stateto evolve in a continuous and deterministic way.)"*
>
> Now if you want to make the case that Deutsch '
7;no
probabilistic axiom is required in quantum theory' be my guest. Im always up
for a laugh.
All the best
Chris.
From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 10:43:33 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2014-02
r measure
will follow the predicted distribution... so what's your point ?
> if you disagree you need display the same generosity and explain to me
> what you think they are arguing and how that is different.
>
See upper
Quentin
> Waving your hands in the air demanding more and mo
moniously and uncritically ditch is no-ones idea of fun.
All the best
Chris.
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 20:26:52 +1300
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the de
In the MWI you *do* see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of "you"
has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. Or to put it
another way, you (now) will become you (who sees spin up) and you (who sees
spin down), which by then will be two different people.
--
You received t
ility to measure spin up was one.*
>
> See above.
>
Well what I see does not seem to make sense.
Regards,
Quentin
>
> All the best
>
> Chris.
>
> --
> From: da...@davidnyman.com
> Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 16:32:01 +
>
> Subject: Re: 3-
On 25 February 2014 16:54, chris peck wrote:
> Hi Liz
>
> *>> I can't see why the MWI's existing explanation of probability needs to
> have anything added.*
>
> I can't see that MWI has an explanation of probability.
>
>
>
>
> *>>Probability in the MWI is deduced from the results of measurements
assign a probability to seeing either result I
assign 1 to both.
Theirs is a method of calculating frequencies of me seeing ups and downs but
not probabilities of seeing up or down.
All the best
Chris.
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 13:30:48 +1300
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chines
On 25 February 2014 13:05, chris peck wrote:
> Since Everett there have been numerous attempts to smuggle an account of
> probability back into the theory, and more recent attempts: Deutsch,
> Wallace, Greaves etc., do that by abandoning the concept of subjective
> uncertainty altogether and repl
a...@davidnyman.com
Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 16:32:01 +0000
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck
On 24 February 2014 07:57, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> About [](A -> B) -> ([]A -> []B), let me ask you a more precise exercise.
>
>
>> Convince yourself that this formula is true in all worlds, of all Kripke
>> multiverses, with any illumination.
>> Hint: you might try a reductio ad absurdum. try to
On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck wrote:
>
> *>>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures
>> in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the versio
On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck
wrote:
>>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible
futures in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course,
the version of me in each branch will be different, and it always
1.
from the stand point of the person duplicated. Certainly for me he
doesn't manage that.
What is wrong with above?
Bruno
All the best
Chris.
> From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
>
in good company.
>
> See here:
>
> http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136
>
> All the best
>
> Chris.
>
> --
> From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than th
On 24 February 2014 14:04, chris peck wrote:
> Hi Liz
>
> *>> Let's also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be sent
> to, and that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send you to A or
> B with equal probability based on some "quantum coin flip". But by accident
> it dup
On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck wrote:
*>>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures
> in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of
> me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me,
> retrospectively, as though I only
ust recognition that
each duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show that 3p
and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the
person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.
All the best
Chris.
> From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
to show that 3p
and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the
person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.
All the best
Chris.
> From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Bette
On Sunday, February 23, 2014 10:48:57 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 23 February 2014 00:18, Craig Weinberg
> > wrote:
>
> The body's recognition of foreign protein markers is a lower level
>> manifestation of the mismatch of higher level zoological history. It is a
>> sign that on this l
On 23 February 2014 12:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 12:53:00 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, February 23, 2014, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 2:05:47 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, February 22,
On 23 February 2014 00:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
The body's recognition of foreign protein markers is a lower level
> manifestation of the mismatch of higher level zoological history. It is a
> sign that on this level of description, tissue is not naively exchangeable.
One would have to concede
On Sunday, February 23, 2014 12:53:00 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, February 23, 2014, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 2:05:47 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, February
On 19 February 2014 23:00, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Liz, Others,
>
> I was waiting for you to answer the last questions to proceed. Any problem?
>
> I give the correction of the last exercise.
>
>
> On 14 Feb 2014, at 19:18, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On 13 Feb 2014, at 22:23, LizR wrote:
>
>
On 22 Feb 2014, at 21:09, LizR wrote to Clark (with the "above pap" =
the FPI of step 3):
The "above pap" is only a small step in an argument (and it only
reproduces a result obtained in the MWI, anyway).
OK, but the MWI is a "big" thing, relying on another big thing: QM.
The FPI assume
On 22 Feb 2014, at 19:45, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 1:39 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
>> Did the Helsinki Man see Washington and Moscow? Yes.
> In the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view.
In who's "1-1 view"? You'll probably say in "The Helsinki Man's",
No. The W-man and the M
On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 7:45 PM, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 1:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >> Did the Helsinki Man see Washington and Moscow? Yes.
>>>
>>
>> > In the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view.
>>
>
> In who's "1-1 view"? You'll probably say in "The Helsinki Man's", but
On Sunday, February 23, 2014, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 2:05:47 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014, Craig Weinberg
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 12:29:04 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
On 20 Februar
On Saturday, February 22, 2014 2:05:47 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 12:29:04 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>> On 20 February 2014 09:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> >>> You're assumin
The "above pap" is only a small step in an argument (and it only reproduces
a result obtained in the MWI, anyway).
--
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On Saturday, February 22, 2014, Craig Weinberg
wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 12:29:04 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On 20 February 2014 09:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> >>> You're assuming that precise molecular assembly will necessarily
>> yield a
>> >>> coherent dynamic proce
On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 1:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Did the Helsinki Man see Washington and Moscow? Yes.
>>
>
> > In the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view.
>
In who's "1-1 view"? You'll probably say in "The Helsinki Man's", but his
view is just of Helsinki. Perhaps you mean the future "1 view"
On Saturday, February 22, 2014 12:29:04 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 20 February 2014 09:24, Craig Weinberg >
> wrote:
>
> >>> You're assuming that precise molecular assembly will necessarily yield
> a
> >>> coherent dynamic process, but that may not be the case at all. If you
> put
> >
On 22 Feb 2014, at 07:19, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/21/2014 9:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
What could that mean? The diary of the M-guy and of the W-guy do
> differentiate, and are different from the memory and records of
the observer
> which does not enter in the telebox.
> I am not sure w
On 22 Feb 2014, at 06:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 20 February 2014 20:43, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Feb 2014, at 22:50, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thursday, February 20, 2014, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 19 Feb 2014, at 17:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18/02/2014, David
On 21 Feb 2014, at 23:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thursday, February 20, 2014, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
Hi Liz,
On 20 Feb 2014, at 08:49, LizR wrote:
On 19 February 2014 23:00, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Liz, Others,
I was waiting for you to answer the last questions to proceed. Any
pr
What is it like to be Daniel Dennett?
On 22 February 2014 19:19, meekerdb wrote:
> On 2/21/2014 9:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> What could that mean? The diary of the M-guy and of the W-guy do>
> differentiate, and are different from the memory and records of the observer>
> which
On 21 Feb 2014, at 19:07, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 Bruno Marchal wrote:
> if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is
simple: we have to interview all the copies.
Then don't just talk to the Moscow Man and say that is enough to
disprove the prediction th
On 2/21/2014 9:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
What could that mean? The diary of the M-guy and of the W-guy do
>differentiate, and are different from the memory and records of the observer
>which does not enter in the telebox.
>I am not sure what sense to give to your statement.
>Likewise, the
On 20 February 2014 20:43, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 19 Feb 2014, at 22:50, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, February 20, 2014, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 19 Feb 2014, at 17:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 18/02/2014, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> >> I think if I
On 20 February 2014 09:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>> You're assuming that precise molecular assembly will necessarily yield a
>>> coherent dynamic process, but that may not be the case at all. If you put
>>> random people in the proper places in a baseball diamond, and give the one
>>> in the mid
On 21 February 2014 14:48, chris peck wrote:
> Hi Liz
>
>
>>>Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you to
>>> another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life.
>>> Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be
>>> "transported"
On Thursday, February 20, 2014, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Liz,
>
> On 20 Feb 2014, at 08:49, LizR wrote:
>
> On 19 February 2014 23:00, Bruno Marchal
>
> > wrote:
>
>> Liz, Others,
>>
>> I was waiting for you to answer the last questions to proceed. Any
>> problem?
>>
>
> Well, nothing apart fr
2014-02-21 19:07 GMT+01:00 John Clark :
> On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we
>> have to interview all the copies.
>>
>
> Then don't just talk to the Moscow Man and say that is enough to disprove
> the predictio
On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 Bruno Marchal wrote:
> if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we
> have to interview all the copies.
>
Then don't just talk to the Moscow Man and say that is enough to disprove
the prediction that the Helsinki Man will see Moscow AND Washingto
On 21 February 2014 16:48, chris peck wrote:
> Hi Liz
>
>
>
> *>>Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you
> to another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life.
> Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be
> "transported"
t probabilities, however small, get rounded up
> to 1 in MWI scenarios.
>
> All the best
>
> Chris.
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Tha
On 21 Feb 2014, at 00:30, LizR wrote:
On 21 February 2014 00:06, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Thanks for telling me, so that I avoid any paranoia, like "did I say
something impolite or what ...".
Never that!
OK, thanks. Best,
Bruno
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All the best
Chris.
From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 03:48:43 +
Hi Liz
>>Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends
you to another solar syste
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 16:19:47 +1100
> From: li...@hpcoders.com.au
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
>
> On Fri, Feb 21, 2014 at 03:48:43AM +, chris peck wrote:
> >
> > My probabilities get
On Fri, Feb 21, 2014 at 03:48:43AM +, chris peck wrote:
>
> My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar
> system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I
> don't know about the possibility of accidents. But,
> If I know that there is a
will in fact
only experience one or the other, I will demand my money back or at least half
of it.
All the best
Chris.
From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 03:48:43 +00
I'm sure its an unpopular
view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up to 1 in MWI
scenarios.
All the best
Chris.
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 20
On 21 February 2014 00:06, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Thanks for telling me, so that I avoid any paranoia, like "did I say
> something impolite or what ...".
>
> Never that!
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"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from th
On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
> I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of
last week.
But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who
could say exactly the same thing, so more
On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last week.
>
But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could
say exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed.
> >> and neither is experien
Hi Liz,
On 20 Feb 2014, at 08:49, LizR wrote:
On 19 February 2014 23:00, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Liz, Others,
I was waiting for you to answer the last questions to proceed. Any
problem?
Well, nothing apart from going on a mini holiday with an old friend
for the last 4 days. Sadly she hasn'
an inability to conduct simple
probability sums to convince you that individuals only have a single
pov?
I do the contrary. By definition of the 1p, it is just obvious that
individuals only have a single pov, and this is used to lead to the
probabilities.
But I don't think that is al
On 19 Feb 2014, at 22:50, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thursday, February 20, 2014, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 19 Feb 2014, at 17:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18/02/2014, David Nyman wrote:
>> I think if I say consciousness is an epiphenomenon of
biochemistry I
>> should also
On 19 Feb 2014, at 20:53, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark :
On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux
wrote:
> Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding
the argument that you can't meet your doppelganger,
So you want me to
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