subject:"Re\: Bruno List continued"

On Oct 17, 12:19 pm, meekerdb  wrote:

> There is a mapping between the image and thing imaged (which could be noise).

Only if you can see and make sense out of what you are looking at.
That is the only mapping going on.

>
> > If there existed nothing in
> > the universe who could see, there would be no information there.
>
> Define "see".

I don't do definitions. Is there some confusion of what might be meant
by "see"?

>
> > Information is just a way of saying 'experiences that make sense to
> > us'.
>
> Have you read Shannon's theory of "Experineces that make sense to us".

I'm familiar with it. It seems useful for semiconductor engineering
applications but not much else.

>
> > Some experiences make sense on a lower, more universal level -
> > that is electromagnetism. A photographic plate doesn't know or care
> > what an image is though.
>
> I didn't say it did.  I said it was a emergent property of EM, that it could 
> form images.

What do you mean by 'it could form images'? Are you suggesting that EM
is a disembodied pseudosubstance which occupies space between objects,
and that it somehow carries light invisibly, and then, if there is
enough of this going on, it somehow forms itself into invisible
images, presumably made of colorless colors. (whatever that might
be...sort of like particle waves I guess)?

>
>
>
> >>> Heat is an electromagnetic wave the same as visible
> >>> light, but it forms no images.
>
> Never seen an IR image?

Human beings can't see IR images. We can connect IR detectors to a
computer and have those plotted on a screen as an array of pixels
which satisfy our criteria for our own visual sense. We could have it
spit out in it's native binary code or hex instead. We could have a
photograph output through a pixelated heater instead and see if we can
see any images with the palms of our hands.

>
> >>> Your view takes pattern in general for
> >>> granted, mine does not.
>
> Not for granted, but well evidenced.

Evidence of what? That pattern exists independent of pattern
recognition? Do tell.

>
> > Electromagnetism is intentionality on every level,
>  Unsupported assertion.
> >>> Doesn't mean it's wrong. If it's true, what would support it?
> >> More to the point what test could possibly falsify it?
> > Falsifying it would be easy. If we had no experience of intention, or
> > our experiences of exerting intent did not map to electromagnetic
> > resonance in the brain, then it would be false.
>
> So the fact that workers in power plants don't have 60Hz "sensorimotive" 
> experiences makes
> your theory false.

Huh? It sounds like you think that my theory is "We are able to
experience everything in the universe". How did you get that from "If
we had no experience of intention, ...then it would be false"? I just
mean if electromagnetism had nothing to do with intention, then our
feelings of intention wouldn't correlate with magnetic resonance
imaging. But we do experience intention and it is a sensorimotive
phenomenon, and that phenomenon does correlate to electromagnetism
(but is not identical to it since electromagnetism is third person
across space and sensorimotive is first person through time).

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-17 Thread meekerdb

On 10/17/2011 4:27 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Oct 16, 10:59 pm, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2011 5:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Oct 16, 8:38 pm, meekerdbwrote:

On 10/16/2011 11:43 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Emergent properties of electromagnetism are also electromagnetic, are
they not?

No. Forming images is an emergent property of electromagnetic waves which in
turn are an
emergent phenomena of Maxwell's electromagnetism.

Electromagnetic waves do not form images. Images are perceptual
interpretations.

No there are planar representations of information. EM waves can form an image
on a
photographic plate whether anyone looks at it or not.

Without someone looking at the photographic plate, there is no
difference between information and noise.

There is a mapping between the image and thing imaged (which could be noise).

If there existed nothing in
the universe who could see, there would be no information there.

Define "see".

Information is just a way of saying 'experiences that make sense to
us'.

Have you read Shannon's theory of "Experineces that make sense to us".

Some experiences make sense on a lower, more universal level -
that is electromagnetism. A photographic plate doesn't know or care
what an image is though.

I didn't say it did. I said it was a emergent property of EM, that it could
form images.

Heat is an electromagnetic wave the same as visible
light, but it forms no images.

Never seen an IR image?

Your view takes pattern in general for
granted, mine does not.

Not for granted, but well evidenced.

Electromagnetism is intentionality on every level,

Unsupported assertion.

Doesn't mean it's wrong. If it's true, what would support it?

More to the point what test could possibly falsify it?

Falsifying it would be easy. If we had no experience of intention, or
our experiences of exerting intent did not map to electromagnetic
resonance in the brain, then it would be false.

So the fact that workers in power plants don't have 60Hz "sensorimotive" experiences makes
your theory false.

Brent

Craig

Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 17, 7:02 am, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:

> Suppose I decide to arrange three stones in a triangle. Do the stones
> "create" the triangle (upward causation), or does the triangle
> "constrain" the stones (downward causation)?

The triangle does not exist. If anything, it 'insists'. The stones are
mere placeholders to satisfy our subjective motive of expressing our
intangible abstraction externally. A cat sees no triangle there. The
stones aren't causing anything, they are just sitting exactly where we
put them. It is our decision, and our projection of that decision
through the spinal cord, efferent nerves, arms, and fingertips that
has caused their placement to our cognitive-representational
satisfaction.

What you aren't seeing is that the triangle does not objectively exist
at all. By setting 'the triangle' as the a priori true fact to be
explained, misdirects our attention from the concrete reality of the
situation to an imaginary world where sensorimotive perception has
concrete existence (which ironically actually would be magic). Like
Brent, your view takes pattern recognition for granted. You are
'eating the menu', so to speak - conflating symbolic interpretation
(map) with physical existence (territory). The only upward causation
is sensory feedback bouncing off of the stones which the eyes can read
visually and the hands can read as a tactile text. The stones are
otherwise completely passive.

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 17, 6:50 am, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 1:22 PM, Terren Suydam  
> wrote:

> > Well I'm going to stop guessing about what Stathis thinks and let him
> > chime in if he wants to.

> There is no downward causation from high
> level to low level, since that would look like magic.

Or it would look like ordinary voluntary action.

Otherwise you would have to say that your neurons are moving your
fingers on a keyboard and typing things that you only are aware of
after the fact. You would have to say that  you only imagine that you
understand their meaning and have a false memory of deciding to write
them. That sounds a lot more like magic to me.

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 16, 10:59 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 10/16/2011 5:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Oct 16, 8:38 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> >> On 10/16/2011 11:43 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >>> Emergent properties of electromagnetism are also electromagnetic, are
> >>> they not?
> >> No.  Forming images is an emergent property of electromagnetic waves which 
> >> in turn are an
> >> emergent phenomena of Maxwell's electromagnetism.
> > Electromagnetic waves do not form images. Images are perceptual
> > interpretations.
>
> No there are planar representations of information.  EM waves can form an 
> image on a
> photographic plate whether anyone looks at it or not.

Without someone looking at the photographic plate, there is no
difference between information and noise. If there existed nothing in
the universe who could see, there would be no information there.
Information is just a way of saying 'experiences that make sense to
us'. Some experiences make sense on a lower, more universal level -
that is electromagnetism. A photographic plate doesn't know or care
what an image is though.

>
> > Heat is an electromagnetic wave the same as visible
> > light, but it forms no images. Your view takes pattern in general for
> > granted, mine does not.
>
> >>> Electromagnetism is intentionality on every level,
> >> Unsupported assertion.
> > Doesn't mean it's wrong. If it's true, what would support it?
>
> More to the point what test could possibly falsify it?

Falsifying it would be easy. If we had no experience of intention, or
our experiences of exerting intent did not map to electromagnetic
resonance in the brain, then it would be false.

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-17 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 4:37 AM, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
>
> 2011/10/16 Bruno Marchal 
>>
>> On 16 Oct 2011, at 04:22, Terren Suydam wrote (answering Craig):
>>
>> Exactly. I think that it can be better understood as a phenomenon
>>
>> which is not only an emergent property of ensembles of neurons, but
>>
>> granular properties in the moment of an individual entity's behavior
>>
>> over time. It has to go both ways otherwise there could be no reason
>>
>> or mechanism for us to care about anything.
>>
>> What do you mean by "going both ways"?  Causality really does not
>> cross levels. All we can say is that higher levels emerge
>> from/supervene on lower levels. If that gives you problems in seeing
>> how we could have a phenomenological experience of will, then that is
>> a failure of imagination on your part. Unless, you can come up with a
>> principled argument as to why, for one, "there could be no reason or
>> mechanism for us to care about anything," and for another, how
>> causality can "go both ways".  Rhetoric won't do. I need detailed
>> arguments.
>>
>> and
>> On 11 Oct 2011, at 14:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (answering Craig):
>>
>> Your solution seems to be to hide in a cave of pre-scientific
>>
>> incuriousity. Content to let our entire lives as we experience them
>>
>> natively to be sequestered in a never-never land that is neither
>>
>> physical nor spiritual. Your assumptions paint conscious subjects as
>>
>> epiphenomenal non-objects, orphaned from reason, science, or any
>>
>> possibility of understanding.
>>
>> Further, they deny their own self-invalidation without justification,
>>
>> so that somehow these thoughts of exclusively deterministic
>>
>> epistemology are themselves immune from their own critical purview. It
>>
>> is to say that all thought is 'simply' neurology - except this
>>
>> thought. This is the one special magic thought which disqualifies all
>>
>> others. It is a philosophy that appeals to many, for obvious reasons,
>>
>> as it provides the sense of certainty and safety which we crave. The
>>
>> truth is that is thought is 'simply' the mirror image of new age
>>
>> religiosity, but owing more of it's spirit to the Inquisition.
>>
>> I really can't understand your emotional objection to the idea that
>> consciousness may be epiphenomenal and supervenient on mechanistic
>> processes. It doesn't worry me or affect my behaviour; why should it?
>>
>> If consciousness is an epiphenomena, and given that the physical laws will
>> be explains in term of coherent appearances in machine's consciousness
>> (dreams), eventually both consciousness and matter are epiphenomena.
>> As s rebuttal to Craig non-comp stance and ex-nihilo spontaneous will
>> causation, the argument is valid. But the phrasing is dubious. Better to use
>> "phenomenological" instead of epiphenomena, I think.
>> And, I would say, against Terren, that causality can cross level of
>> explanation, even if I agree that there is some unaccessible low level,
>> which is just the arithmetical law, when assuming comp. But a universal
>> machine can emulate a cyclic "causal" relationships, like a universe can
>> emulate someone taking an aspirin to act on its brain, and an aspirin can
>> indeed act on the brain, which at some high level is a cross level
>> relationship, even if at a more lower level, all this is completely
>> deterministic. We need this because high level explanation are unavoidable
>> (the comp theory force an explanation of both mind and matter in term of
>> higher epistemological level).
>> I think it is important. The materialist eliminativists do that confusion
>> so that consciousness becomes a mere epiphenomena, which is the purgatory
>> before elimination. With comp this would eliminate both mind and matter,
>> with only the numbers remaining. The moral is that high level phenomena are
>> what is important, and can have local role. That is what gives free-will a
>> genuine sense in the compatibilistic determinist frame. It is also what
>> gives consciousness (phenomenological bet on a reality) a genuine power,
>> like a relative self-speeding up.
>> Low level phenomena (like quantum wave or arithmetic) can account for a
>> high level phenomenon, but usually cannot 'explained' it in any reasonable
>> sense of the terms. Nobody will explain a murder by a quantum field.
>> Already, nobody will explain deep blue strategy by invoking the computer's
>> gate running deep blue programs.
>
> That's what I wanted to explain to craig... when you run a program on a
> computer... the low level of the computer (the transistors of the cpu) are
> constraint by the program, it is the high level (the program) that "drives"
> the physical states of the CPU.
>
>> Explanation will be phenomenologically explains by higher order
>> phenomenological facts, and sometimes invoking genuine cross level
>> causation. Like, he did the murder but is not guilty, he just became mad due
>> to a brain tumor, said the law

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-17 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 1:22 PM, Terren Suydam  wrote:

>> We are on the exact same page. This is why I keep barking in Stathis
>> direction - his view is that there are no emergent properties because
>> everything that exists must be reducible to a molecular level or else
>> it's magic.
>
> Well I'm going to stop guessing about what Stathis thinks and let him
> chime in if he wants to.

There are emergent phenomena but they supervene on the lower level
phenomena. If you reproduce the low level phenomena you reproduce the
high level ones as well. There is no downward causation from high
level to low level, since that would look like magic.

>> I would have doubted it too, but no. His argument is straight up 19th
>> century Billiard Ball Universe determinism. He says that all that can
>> happen in the brain is a chain reaction from neuron to neuron (plus
>> "Inputs" from the external environment).
>
> But that is a correct description from the level of single-neuron
> dynamics. It is utterly deterministic. If you disagree, then you must
> show how, without hand-wavy arguments about will and electromagnetism.
> If single-neuron dynamics are not deterministic, then there must be a
> random or probabilistic dynamic at play. Roger Penrose thinks so, as
> he says consciousness is rooted in quantum effects. So, are
> single-neuron dynamics 100% deterministic?  If not, why not? What is
> the *specific* mechanism that makes them non-deterministic?  You
> cannot answer "will" as that would be level confusion once again.
>
>>> Again we must distinguish
>>> between single neuron dynamics, which are fairly well understood (and
>>> can be roughly modeled in terms of linear dynamics, but only if you
>>> don't care about precision), and large scale dynamics of ensembles of
>>> neurons, which are not all understood in terms of any kind of linear
>>> analysis. I would be surprised if Stathis disagreed with this
>>> description.
>>
>> Ask him. You'll be surprised. From what he has said here, his position
>> is that since we do understand single neuron dynamics, then there
>> cannot be anything which cannot be understood using linear analysis.
>
> OK, I will await his answer on this if he cares to. You're right, I
> would be surprised.

Whether a system is linear or non-linear is a statement about the
mathematical model describing it. Non-linear or chaotic systems, such
as the weather, can still be deterministic.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-16 Thread meekerdb


On 10/16/2011 5:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Oct 16, 8:38 pm, meekerdb  wrote:

On 10/16/2011 11:43 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


Emergent properties of electromagnetism are also electromagnetic, are
they not?

No.  Forming images is an emergent property of electromagnetic waves which in 
turn are an
emergent phenomena of Maxwell's electromagnetism.

Electromagnetic waves do not form images. Images are perceptual
interpretations.


No there are planar representations of information.  EM waves can form an image on a 
photographic plate whether anyone looks at it or not.



Heat is an electromagnetic wave the same as visible
light, but it forms no images. Your view takes pattern in general for
granted, mine does not.


Electromagnetism is intentionality on every level,

Unsupported assertion.

Doesn't mean it's wrong. If it's true, what would support it?


More to the point what test could possibly falsify it?


Brent

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-16 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Oct 16, 8:38 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 10/16/2011 11:43 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > Emergent properties of electromagnetism are also electromagnetic, are
> > they not?
>
> No.  Forming images is an emergent property of electromagnetic waves which in 
> turn are an
> emergent phenomena of Maxwell's electromagnetism.

Electromagnetic waves do not form images. Images are perceptual
interpretations. Heat is an electromagnetic wave the same as visible
light, but it forms no images. Your view takes pattern in general for
granted, mine does not.

>
> > Electromagnetism is intentionality on every level,
>
> Unsupported assertion.

Doesn't mean it's wrong. If it's true, what would support it?

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-16 Thread meekerdb


On 10/16/2011 11:43 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Emergent properties of electromagnetism are also electromagnetic, are
they not?


No.  Forming images is an emergent property of electromagnetic waves which in turn are an 
emergent phenomena of Maxwell's electromagnetism.



Electromagnetism is intentionality on every level,


Unsupported assertion.

Brent


it's just
that low level intentionality might be almost unrecognizably primitive
to us (or not - maybe it's as familiar as the feeling of holding and
releasing). Emergence is a bottom up concept that I think takes for
granted high level pattern recognition. It's useful instrumentally but
I think ultimately fails at explaining anything on a cosmological
level. Emerges from where? Why? It ignores perceptual frame of
reference entirely and models the universe as an object with
spontaneous magical properties.


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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-16 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Oct 16, 1:37 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

> That's what I wanted to explain to craig... when you run a program on a
> computer... the low level of the computer (the transistors of the cpu) are
> constraint by the program, it is the high level (the program) that "drives"
> the physical states of the CPU.

You're right. The problem is that it is our high level motives that
drive the CPU. They do not arise organically from the semiconductor so
they can't read them. They just copy the Chinese characters from one
form to another and apply a-signifying lookup tables to them.

It's no different in principle from mistaking a ventriloquists dummy
for a person, only the ventriloquist's act is a scripted recording
with branching logic audience response trees.

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-16 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Oct 15, 10:22 pm, Terren Suydam  wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 15, 2011 at 2:13 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> >> I think we are talking past each other. There is the behavior of
> >> neurons at the single-neuron level. That is fairly well understood.
> >> Nothing about the spontaneous activity you referenced really
> >> challenges anything about our understanding of single-neuron function.
> >> You may disagree, but you would be disagreeing with the mainstream.
>
> > No, I don't disagree. In the language of the extended metaphor I used
> > earlier, an auto mechanic with the right tools and engineering
> > diagrams can tell you exactly how a car works. I have no problem with
> > that. I only argue that the mechanic cannot tell you where the car is
> > going to be driven. You can't predict what is going to be on TV by
> > looking at the electronics of the screen. This is the situation with
> > the brain. Low level neurology does not always predict high level
> > intentionality. That's all that I'm saying.
>
> Yes, but your account of "intentionality" is confusing. You're saying
> "high level intentionality" here but elsewhere identifying it with
> electromagnetism, which is the lowest level without getting into
> quantum dynamics.  I would agree with intentionality being "high
> level", as in, emergent.

Emergent properties of electromagnetism are also electromagnetic, are
they not? Electromagnetism is intentionality on every level, it's just
that low level intentionality might be almost unrecognizably primitive
to us (or not - maybe it's as familiar as the feeling of holding and
releasing). Emergence is a bottom up concept that I think takes for
granted high level pattern recognition. It's useful instrumentally but
I think ultimately fails at explaining anything on a cosmological
level. Emerges from where? Why? It ignores perceptual frame of
reference entirely and models the universe as an object with
spontaneous magical properties.

> But I can't make sense of your account. How
> can something be low level and high level at the same time?

How can it not? Level is in the eye of the beholder. What does the
universe care for our idea of 'level'?

> The
> different levels of reality that emerge at increasing orders of scale
> are characterized by completely independent dynamics.

Characterized independently to us. Only to our perceptual frame of
reference, our observations as creatures of a specific size and
velocity. Frame of reference is everything. A nuclear bomb treats
human beings and granite buildings alike, as matter. It doesn't
resolve subtle levels of emergence, it addresses the whole protocol
stack at the physical level. Booom.

>
> >> Then there is the behavior of large ensembles of neurons. This is an
> >> emergent phenomenon and is not well understood.
>
> > Exactly. I think that it can be better understood as a phenomenon
> > which is not only an emergent property of ensembles of neurons, but
> > granular properties in the moment of an individual entity's behavior
> > over time. It has to go both ways otherwise there could be no reason
> > or mechanism for us to care about anything.
>
> What do you mean by "going both ways"?  Causality really does not
> cross levels. All we can say is that higher levels emerge
> from/supervene on lower levels.

Say that I decide to paint a picture of a creature that I have
imagined. Like Cthulhu's more evil twin or something. How are the
lower levels of neurological activity which govern my fine muscle
movements, holding the paint brush, dipping the paint, etc not
supervening on my higher level preferences? I and my fictional vision
are driving the bus. Causality routinely crosses levels. That's what
this conversation is - a personal, voluntary, high level semantic
enterprise which pushes low level fingertips, keystrokes, internet
switches, computer screen pixels, retina cells and neurons on the
remote end. You have to look at the big picture from a more objective
perspective. Your view is blindered by conventional wisdom of the 20th
century.

>If that gives you problems in seeing
> how we could have a phenomenological experience of will, then that is
> a failure of imagination on your part.

It's not my problem, it's everybody's problem. I'm being rhetorical.
Why and how do you imagine that a phenomenological experience of will
exists if it is utterly superfluous?

>Unless, you can come up with a
> principled argument as to why, for one, "there could be no reason or
> mechanism for us to care about anything,"

There can be no reason because it would not be necessary if our
actions were all actually (secretly) involuntary. Why would a wind up
toy need to care about anything? How would it help the gears spin? I
don't see that it needs much argument, the proposition of will is a
direct ontological contradiction of determinism.

There can be no mechanism for us to care about anything because care
has no physical ingredients. How do patterns which are purely physical
arith

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-16 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2011/10/16 Bruno Marchal 

>
> On 16 Oct 2011, at 04:22, Terren Suydam wrote (answering Craig):
>
>
>
> Exactly. I think that it can be better understood as a phenomenon
>
> which is not only an emergent property of ensembles of neurons, but
>
> granular properties in the moment of an individual entity's behavior
>
> over time. It has to go both ways otherwise there could be no reason
>
> or mechanism for us to care about anything.
>
>
> What do you mean by "going both ways"?  Causality really does not
> cross levels. All we can say is that higher levels emerge
> from/supervene on lower levels. If that gives you problems in seeing
> how we could have a phenomenological experience of will, then that is
> a failure of imagination on your part. Unless, you can come up with a
> principled argument as to why, for one, "there could be no reason or
> mechanism for us to care about anything," and for another, how
> causality can "go both ways".  Rhetoric won't do. I need detailed
> arguments.
>
>
> and
>
> On 11 Oct 2011, at 14:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (answering Craig):
>
> Your solution seems to be to hide in a cave of pre-scientific
>
> incuriousity. Content to let our entire lives as we experience them
>
> natively to be sequestered in a never-never land that is neither
>
> physical nor spiritual. Your assumptions paint conscious subjects as
>
> epiphenomenal non-objects, orphaned from reason, science, or any
>
> possibility of understanding.
>
>
> Further, they deny their own self-invalidation without justification,
>
> so that somehow these thoughts of exclusively deterministic
>
> epistemology are themselves immune from their own critical purview. It
>
> is to say that all thought is 'simply' neurology - except this
>
> thought. This is the one special magic thought which disqualifies all
>
> others. It is a philosophy that appeals to many, for obvious reasons,
>
> as it provides the sense of certainty and safety which we crave. The
>
> truth is that is thought is 'simply' the mirror image of new age
>
> religiosity, but owing more of it's spirit to the Inquisition.
>
>
> I really can't understand your emotional objection to the idea that
> consciousness may be epiphenomenal and supervenient on mechanistic
> processes. It doesn't worry me or affect my behaviour; why should it?
>
>
>
> If consciousness is an epiphenomena, and given that the physical laws will
> be explains in term of coherent appearances in machine's consciousness
> (dreams), eventually both consciousness and matter are epiphenomena.
>
> As s rebuttal to Craig non-comp stance and ex-nihilo spontaneous will
> causation, the argument is valid. But the phrasing is dubious. Better to use
> "phenomenological" instead of epiphenomena, I think.
>
> And, I would say, against Terren, that causality can cross level of
> explanation, even if I agree that there is some unaccessible low level,
> which is just the arithmetical law, when assuming comp. But a universal
> machine can emulate a cyclic "causal" relationships, like a universe can
> emulate someone taking an aspirin to act on its brain, and an aspirin can
> indeed act on the brain, which at some high level is a cross level
> relationship, even if at a more lower level, all this is completely
> deterministic. We need this because high level explanation are unavoidable
> (the comp theory force an explanation of both mind and matter in term of
> higher epistemological level).
>
> I think it is important. The materialist eliminativists do that confusion
> so that consciousness becomes a mere epiphenomena, which is the purgatory
> before elimination. With comp this would eliminate both mind and matter,
> with only the numbers remaining. The moral is that high level phenomena are
> what is important, and can have local role. That is what gives free-will a
> genuine sense in the compatibilistic determinist frame. It is also what
> gives consciousness (phenomenological bet on a reality) a genuine power,
> like a relative self-speeding up.
>
> Low level phenomena (like quantum wave or arithmetic) can account for a
> high level phenomenon, but usually cannot 'explained' it in any reasonable
> sense of the terms. Nobody will explain a murder by a quantum field.
> Already, nobody will explain deep blue strategy by invoking the computer's
> gate running deep blue programs.
>

That's what I wanted to explain to craig... when you run a program on a
computer... the low level of the computer (the transistors of the cpu) are
constraint by the program, it is the high level (the program) that "drives"
the physical states of the CPU.

Explanation will be phenomenologically explains by higher order
> phenomenological facts, and sometimes invoking genuine cross level
> causation. Like, he did the murder but is not guilty, he just became mad due
> to a brain tumor, said the lawyer. The judge answered: he is guilty of
> irresponsibility because he got got a brain tumor by attempting to suicide
> by drinking radioac

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-16 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 16 Oct 2011, at 04:22, Terren Suydam wrote (answering Craig):




Exactly. I think that it can be better understood as a phenomenon
which is not only an emergent property of ensembles of neurons, but
granular properties in the moment of an individual entity's behavior
over time. It has to go both ways otherwise there could be no reason
or mechanism for us to care about anything.


What do you mean by "going both ways"?  Causality really does not
cross levels. All we can say is that higher levels emerge
from/supervene on lower levels. If that gives you problems in seeing
how we could have a phenomenological experience of will, then that is
a failure of imagination on your part. Unless, you can come up with a
principled argument as to why, for one, "there could be no reason or
mechanism for us to care about anything," and for another, how
causality can "go both ways".  Rhetoric won't do. I need detailed
arguments.


and

On 11 Oct 2011, at 14:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (answering Craig):


Your solution seems to be to hide in a cave of pre-scientific
incuriousity. Content to let our entire lives as we experience them
natively to be sequestered in a never-never land that is neither
physical nor spiritual. Your assumptions paint conscious subjects as
epiphenomenal non-objects, orphaned from reason, science, or any
possibility of understanding.

Further, they deny their own self-invalidation without justification,
so that somehow these thoughts of exclusively deterministic
epistemology are themselves immune from their own critical purview.  
It

is to say that all thought is 'simply' neurology - except this
thought. This is the one special magic thought which disqualifies all
others. It is a philosophy that appeals to many, for obvious reasons,
as it provides the sense of certainty and safety which we crave. The
truth is that is thought is 'simply' the mirror image of new age
religiosity, but owing more of it's spirit to the Inquisition.


I really can't understand your emotional objection to the idea that
consciousness may be epiphenomenal and supervenient on mechanistic
processes. It doesn't worry me or affect my behaviour; why should it?




If consciousness is an epiphenomena, and given that the physical laws  
will be explains in term of coherent appearances in machine's  
consciousness (dreams), eventually both consciousness and matter are  
epiphenomena.


As s rebuttal to Craig non-comp stance and ex-nihilo spontaneous will  
causation, the argument is valid. But the phrasing is dubious. Better  
to use "phenomenological" instead of epiphenomena, I think.


And, I would say, against Terren, that causality can cross level of  
explanation, even if I agree that there is some unaccessible low  
level, which is just the arithmetical law, when assuming comp. But a  
universal machine can emulate a cyclic "causal" relationships, like a  
universe can emulate someone taking an aspirin to act on its brain,  
and an aspirin can indeed act on the brain, which at some high level  
is a cross level relationship, even if at a more lower level, all this  
is completely deterministic. We need this because high level  
explanation are unavoidable (the comp theory force an explanation of  
both mind and matter in term of higher epistemological level).


I think it is important. The materialist eliminativists do that  
confusion so that consciousness becomes a mere epiphenomena, which is  
the purgatory before elimination. With comp this would eliminate both  
mind and matter, with only the numbers remaining. The moral is that  
high level phenomena are what is important, and can have local role.  
That is what gives free-will a genuine sense in the compatibilistic  
determinist frame. It is also what gives consciousness  
(phenomenological bet on a reality) a genuine power, like a relative  
self-speeding up.


Low level phenomena (like quantum wave or arithmetic) can account for  
a high level phenomenon, but usually cannot 'explained' it in any  
reasonable sense of the terms. Nobody will explain a murder by a  
quantum field. Already, nobody will explain deep blue strategy by  
invoking the computer's gate running deep blue programs. Explanation  
will be phenomenologically explains by higher order phenomenological  
facts, and sometimes invoking genuine cross level causation. Like, he  
did the murder but is not guilty, he just became mad due to a brain  
tumor, said the lawyer. The judge answered: he is guilty of  
irresponsibility because he got got a brain tumor by attempting to  
suicide by drinking radioactive materials.


Only from God's point of view, everything is deterministic, and from  
that view, consciousness is, well, just absent. But from the internal  
views there will be real solid material appearances and real conscious  
experiences.


Of course, this is only vocabulary. Actually such loops and cross  
level "causality" are well explained by computer sciences, and so we  
don't need to pos

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-15 Thread Terren Suydam

On Sat, Oct 15, 2011 at 2:13 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>> I think we are talking past each other. There is the behavior of
>> neurons at the single-neuron level. That is fairly well understood.
>> Nothing about the spontaneous activity you referenced really
>> challenges anything about our understanding of single-neuron function.
>> You may disagree, but you would be disagreeing with the mainstream.
>
> No, I don't disagree. In the language of the extended metaphor I used
> earlier, an auto mechanic with the right tools and engineering
> diagrams can tell you exactly how a car works. I have no problem with
> that. I only argue that the mechanic cannot tell you where the car is
> going to be driven. You can't predict what is going to be on TV by
> looking at the electronics of the screen. This is the situation with
> the brain. Low level neurology does not always predict high level
> intentionality. That's all that I'm saying.

Yes, but your account of "intentionality" is confusing. You're saying
"high level intentionality" here but elsewhere identifying it with
electromagnetism, which is the lowest level without getting into
quantum dynamics.  I would agree with intentionality being "high
level", as in, emergent. But I can't make sense of your account. How
can something be low level and high level at the same time? The
different levels of reality that emerge at increasing orders of scale
are characterized by completely independent dynamics.

>> Then there is the behavior of large ensembles of neurons. This is an
>> emergent phenomenon and is not well understood.
>
> Exactly. I think that it can be better understood as a phenomenon
> which is not only an emergent property of ensembles of neurons, but
> granular properties in the moment of an individual entity's behavior
> over time. It has to go both ways otherwise there could be no reason
> or mechanism for us to care about anything.

What do you mean by "going both ways"?  Causality really does not
cross levels. All we can say is that higher levels emerge
from/supervene on lower levels. If that gives you problems in seeing
how we could have a phenomenological experience of will, then that is
a failure of imagination on your part. Unless, you can come up with a
principled argument as to why, for one, "there could be no reason or
mechanism for us to care about anything," and for another, how
causality can "go both ways".  Rhetoric won't do. I need detailed
arguments.

>> Spontaneous activity
>> is described at this emergent level. In fact, there may be multiple
>> levels of emergence in the brain, each characterized by a unique set
>> of dynamics. It is hard to say, because the complexity involved is
>> mindblowing. But the fact that we have observed activity at this level
>> of the brain that confounds us is hardly news. It just reinforces the
>> brute fact that we really don't know how the brain works. And this
>> says almost nothing about the nature of will or consciousness.
>
> We are on the exact same page. This is why I keep barking in Stathis
> direction - his view is that there are no emergent properties because
> everything that exists must be reducible to a molecular level or else
> it's magic.

Well I'm going to stop guessing about what Stathis thinks and let him
chime in if he wants to.

> I would have doubted it too, but no. His argument is straight up 19th
> century Billiard Ball Universe determinism. He says that all that can
> happen in the brain is a chain reaction from neuron to neuron (plus
> "Inputs" from the external environment).

But that is a correct description from the level of single-neuron
dynamics. It is utterly deterministic. If you disagree, then you must
show how, without hand-wavy arguments about will and electromagnetism.
If single-neuron dynamics are not deterministic, then there must be a
random or probabilistic dynamic at play. Roger Penrose thinks so, as
he says consciousness is rooted in quantum effects. So, are
single-neuron dynamics 100% deterministic?  If not, why not? What is
the *specific* mechanism that makes them non-deterministic?  You
cannot answer "will" as that would be level confusion once again.

>> Again we must distinguish
>> between single neuron dynamics, which are fairly well understood (and
>> can be roughly modeled in terms of linear dynamics, but only if you
>> don't care about precision), and large scale dynamics of ensembles of
>> neurons, which are not all understood in terms of any kind of linear
>> analysis. I would be surprised if Stathis disagreed with this
>> description.
>
> Ask him. You'll be surprised. From what he has said here, his position
> is that since we do understand single neuron dynamics, then there
> cannot be anything which cannot be understood using linear analysis.

OK, I will await his answer on this if he cares to. You're right, I
would be surprised.

>> That is just hand-waving. There is no way to refute it and there is no
>> explanatory power. Why did Bob kick that tre

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-15 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Oct 15, 10:59 am, John Mikes  wrote:
> Dear Craig,
>
> where did you take it from that *"WILL"* does exist indeed?

Technically I think that will could be said to 'insist' rather than
exist, and as such a subjective experiential phenomenon, it is nothing
like a discrete object or mechanism. What insists is a point of view
attached to the sense conditions of it's world which participates in
focusing attention and taking action.

> We experience a
> *decision* - sometimes with the 'urge(?)' to fulfill
> it, based on comparing partially conscious circumstances (anticipatory
> included) and getting into some 'evaluation'(?) of what
> seems to be advantageous and what not (strictly within our (conscious) image
> of the present state we are in).

Exactly. I think of this as a sensorimotive circuit. "It's cold, I
should wear a jacket" -> puts on a jacket = circuit opens with the
sense input "it's cold", motive circuit opens with "I should (close
the circuit in such and such a way)" and the motive circuit is closed
with the act of putting on the jacket, which kicks it back to the
sense circuit..."now I'm too warm..." or closes the sense circuit
"perfect - not cold anymore". All of this is prelinguistic though.
This is going on in the womb, and it goes on in cells, molecules and
atoms too, albeit in an ever more more mathematical and deterministic
way (unless it's completely relativistic and it's just our frame of
reference that makes it seem deterministic when we can't identify
things subjectively - but that gets more into a Horton Hears A Who
catastrophe)

> A more stringent question is the equation (not mathematical, mind you) of
> such idea with electromagnetism.
> No matter how many neurons are involved in a cooperation, *NONE* of them is
> assigned a *TOPICAL *(plus details) relation,
> (like blue mAmps or green mAmps for bodily feelings, or emotional ones etc).
> We experience those 'bland' PHYSICAL
> data and *WE ASSIGN* topical meanings to them. As we see fit. At will .
> Now: *FIT* it is into the topical story (history?) we think within and so
> the physical measurement gets translated into meaning
> *by us* - i.e. by our present thinking. Which has no assignable connection
> to the wider relations formatting it. At least we did
> not know about such as of yesterday. Physics is a consequential extract and
> cannot explain the original foundations.
> Do you have a vocabulary between physical readings and topical meanings?

I'm having a little trouble understanding but it sounds like we are
talking nature nurture, Sapir Whorf kind of questions here. With
subjective phenomena it's all very ambiguous. In language and
semiotics there are so many theories about different kinds of
representation (topical meanings?) which relate signifiers to
referents. Onomatopoeia would be an example of a topical meaning which
is compelled by sensory, gestural primitives rather than willful
assignment. Other kinds of symbols suggest themselves out of second
order logic and reasoning common to homo sapiens.

We do willfully make up words and names also of course, which would be
idiopathic unless we have some kind of etymology behind it. Notice
that the most direct symbols are more universal and grounded in
timeless experience, while the most topical are more proprietary and
grounded in specific temporal experiences - ie adolescent neologism as
ingroup pack bonding. Physics is a consequential extract to us, but I
think the physics of body, or the experiences behind the physics,
biochemistry, and physio-zoology that we embody personally do inhere
unconsciously, defining our perceptions and experience. We cannot
explain the foundations of physics, but those foundations are already
explained through the very fabric of our ontology. Was that in the
right neighborhood?

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-15 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Oct 15, 3:02 am, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 10/14/2011 8:48 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Oct 14, 10:46 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> >> On 10/14/2011 7:13 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >>> On Oct 14, 9:00 pm, meekerdb    wrote:
>  On 10/14/2011 5:16 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>  You already noted that diurnal cycles get synced by light/dark cycles.  
>  The point is that
>  you don't will these cycles, yet you rely on them: to wake up on time, 
>  to remember
>  appointments, etc.
> >>> We do will those cycles.
> >> Then how do you manage to wake up a given time in the morning?  Are you 
> >> "willing" them in
> >> your sleep?
> > We don't have to will them, it's voluntary. Sometimes they wake us up,
> > and sometimes we wake them up. It's all 'us' it's just that some
> > aspects of what we are are more physiological, some are more
> > subjective, and some shift dynamically within different ranges. We
> > have habits, addictions, choices, conditioning, creativity,
> > involuntary and voluntary motivations of all shades and intensities.
>
> > All that I'm trying to do is to describe the universe in the way that
> > it ordinarily works. I'm not even getting near any kind of non-
> > ordinary realities or forces or anything, just what our common sense
> > perceptions and scientific observations tell us without inferring any
> > forces, fields, or quantum pseudosubstances. When I say sensorimotive,
> > I don't mean anything spooky, I just mean regular old thoughts,
> > feelings, images, flavors, sounds, desires, actions, etc.
>
> I know you do.  That's why you fail to explain why their is a connection 
> between having a
> (human like) brain and consciousness.  

Consciousness is just elaborated awareness. The connection is that the
brain is very elaborate, so it has very elaborate awareness. That's
the reason why the human brain is different from a cabbage even though
they both are made out of similar physical stuff. The reason why a
computer, even though it is elaborate, doesn't have an elaborate
awareness is because it isn't made out of physical stuff which can
accommodate the type of zoological elaborations required to resemble
our consciousness. If a computer naturally grew to be that elaborate
without us superimposing our sense on it's electromagnetic
characteristics, then it would be conscious too.

> You seem to assert folk psychology and panpsychism
> at the same time.

Not panspychism exactly. I don't think that all matter has equal
consciousness. I just think that all consciousness arises out of a
sensorimotive potential which is inherent in matter.

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-15 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Oct 14, 11:48 pm, Terren Suydam  wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 7:16 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> > I have said many times already, if you think that I am talking about
> > something thay contradicts physics then you don't understand what I'm
> > talking about. Some people do, but you don't. Thats ok, not everyone
> > is interested enough to try to understand it, but if you are I suggest
> > you read my info at s33light.org first.
>
> There's a lot there to digest. It is hard to understand, and honestly
> I barely have enough time to participate to the limited degree that I
> do here. And frankly if you made a more compelling case for your ideas
> here I would be more interested.  But your argumentation, what I've
> read of it anyhow, has been somewhat contradictory, not to mention
> hostile.

I'm only hostile towards people who are hostile towards me. To
paraphrase Timothy Leary, "Everyone gets the Craig Weinberg they
deserve".

>
> >> It just means these
> >> circuits are firing, and there is no well established tiheory that
> >> predicts that activity.
>
> > Right. That was my point. Stathis denies this and insists that physics
> > predicts this activity and that it is no different from a leaf in the
> > wind.
>
> I think we are talking past each other. There is the behavior of
> neurons at the single-neuron level. That is fairly well understood.
> Nothing about the spontaneous activity you referenced really
> challenges anything about our understanding of single-neuron function.
> You may disagree, but you would be disagreeing with the mainstream.

No, I don't disagree. In the language of the extended metaphor I used
earlier, an auto mechanic with the right tools and engineering
diagrams can tell you exactly how a car works. I have no problem with
that. I only argue that the mechanic cannot tell you where the car is
going to be driven. You can't predict what is going to be on TV by
looking at the electronics of the screen. This is the situation with
the brain. Low level neurology does not always predict high level
intentionality. That's all that I'm saying.

>
> Then there is the behavior of large ensembles of neurons. This is an
> emergent phenomenon and is not well understood.

Exactly. I think that it can be better understood as a phenomenon
which is not only an emergent property of ensembles of neurons, but
granular properties in the moment of an individual entity's behavior
over time. It has to go both ways otherwise there could be no reason
or mechanism for us to care about anything.

> Spontaneous activity
> is described at this emergent level. In fact, there may be multiple
> levels of emergence in the brain, each characterized by a unique set
> of dynamics. It is hard to say, because the complexity involved is
> mindblowing. But the fact that we have observed activity at this level
> of the brain that confounds us is hardly news. It just reinforces the
> brute fact that we really don't know how the brain works. And this
> says almost nothing about the nature of will or consciousness.

We are on the exact same page. This is why I keep barking in Stathis
direction - his view is that there are no emergent properties because
everything that exists must be reducible to a molecular level or else
it's magic.

>
> >> The brain is an incredibly complex non-linear system. Almost all of
> >> its behavior can be characterized as "without obvious linear cause".
>
> > Again, I agree completely. That is the opposite of Stathis' position.
>
> I doubt that Stathis would agree with that.

I would have doubted it too, but no. His argument is straight up 19th
century Billiard Ball Universe determinism. He says that all that can
happen in the brain is a chain reaction from neuron to neuron (plus
"Inputs" from the external environment).

> Again we must distinguish
> between single neuron dynamics, which are fairly well understood (and
> can be roughly modeled in terms of linear dynamics, but only if you
> don't care about precision), and large scale dynamics of ensembles of
> neurons, which are not all understood in terms of any kind of linear
> analysis. I would be surprised if Stathis disagreed with this
> description.

Ask him. You'll be surprised. From what he has said here, his position
is that since we do understand single neuron dynamics, then there
cannot be anything which cannot be understood using linear analysis.

>
> >> OK, then all you're really saying is that will supervenes on a lower
> >> level (atomic) than what the majority believe (the level of neurons).
> >> Electromagnetism is computable and therefore you are saying comp is
> >> true.
>
> > Close but no. Will and electromagnetism are the same thing but viewed
> > from opposite perspectives. Our personal will correlates to many
> > regions of the brain at once. Electromagnetic changes on a neuron or
> > molecular level correlate to subconsious and unconscious micro-motive
> > wills.
>
> That is just hand-waving. There is no way to refute i

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-15 Thread John Mikes

Dear Craig,

where did you take it from that *"WILL"* does exist indeed? We experience a
*decision* - sometimes with the 'urge(?)' to fulfill
it, based on comparing partially conscious circumstances (anticipatory
included) and getting into some 'evaluation'(?) of what
seems to be advantageous and what not (strictly within our (conscious) image
of the present state we are in).
A more stringent question is the equation (not mathematical, mind you) of
such idea with electromagnetism.
No matter how many neurons are involved in a cooperation, *NONE* of them is
assigned a *TOPICAL *(plus details) relation,
(like blue mAmps or green mAmps for bodily feelings, or emotional ones etc).
We experience those 'bland' PHYSICAL
data and *WE ASSIGN* topical meanings to them. As we see fit. At will .
Now: *FIT* it is into the topical story (history?) we think within and so
the physical measurement gets translated into meaning
*by us* - i.e. by our present thinking. Which has no assignable connection
to the wider relations formatting it. At least we did
not know about such as of yesterday. Physics is a consequential extract and
cannot explain the original foundations.
Do you have a vocabulary between physical readings and topical meanings?

John Mikes

On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 7:16 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
> On Oct 14, 3:40 pm, Terren Suydam  wrote:
> > On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 2:45 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> wrote:
> > >> Actually, Stathis's interpretation is the one shared by most of the
> > >> neuroscientific community. By and large most scientists do not take
> > >> seriously the idea that the behavior of neurons and other cells is
> > >> explainable in terms of anything except physical processes. Your
> > >> interpretation of 'spontaneous' specifically, and of subjectivity in
> > >> general, is on the fringe.
> >
> > > My interpretaton of subjectivity is certainly on the fringe and I have
> > > no doubt that my view of how spontaneous activity ties into subjective
> > > intentionality, but I would have to read some formal special case
> > > definition of spontaneous to believe that some other idea is meant. My
> > > sense is that there is no special definition or consenses since the
> > > spontaneity within the system is clear.
> >
> > >  > That doesn't mean it's wrong, but you are
> > >> talking as if your view is well-accepted and obvious to everyone, when
> > >> it is anything but.
> >
> > > If spontaneous doesn't mean spontaneous, why does everyone keep using
> > > that term? I understand of course that they are not considering the
> > > implications that I am, but ther is no confusion as far as the
> > > categorical description goes.
> >
> > I think spontaneous in the context of the video and papers you linked
> > means, "unexplainable activity in terms of what you would expect
> > neural circuits to be doing when the organism doesn't appear to be
> > doing anything".  But it certainly does not mean (from the mainstream
> > pov) unexplainable in terms of physical processes
>
> I have said many times already, if you think that I am talking about
> something thay contradicts physics then you don't understand what I'm
> talking about. Some people do, but you don't. Thats ok, not everyone
> is interested enough to try to understand it, but if you are I suggest
> you read my info at s33light.org first.
>
> > It just means these
> > circuits are firing, and there is no well established tiheory that
> > predicts that activity.
>
> Right. That was my point. Stathis denies this and insists that physics
> predicts this activity and that it is no different from a leaf in the
> wind.
>
> > That this spontaneous activity accounts for so
> > much resource consumption suggests that it is important, or else
> > adaptive pressures would have snuffed it out.
> >
> > In short, I think spontaneous simply means "we have no idea why these
> > circuits are firing when the organism is at rest".
>
> I agree. That is my position as well.
>
> >
> > >> I echo Stathis's challenge to email the authors
> > >> and ask them yourself what is meant by 'spontaneous'. The video itself
> > >> doesn't really add anything to the conversation, although it is pretty
> > >> awesome, so thanks for linking to that.
> >
> > > I'm not interested in what the authors think or intended to say. I'm
> > > only interested in the fact that much of the brain's activity is
> > > observed to be irregular and without obvious linear cause.
> >
> > The brain is an incredibly complex non-linear system. Almost all of
> > its behavior can be characterized as "without obvious linear cause".
> >
>
> Again, I agree completely. That is the opposite of Stathis' position.
>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > >> Your account demands an explanation of how something like "will" can
> > >> exert influence on physical things like neurons;
> >
> > > it doesn't exert an influence, it is the influence. It is charge and
> > > voltage experienced first hand rather than observed.
> >
> > >> that is what Stathis

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-15 Thread meekerdb


On 10/14/2011 8:48 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Oct 14, 10:46 pm, meekerdb  wrote:

On 10/14/2011 7:13 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Oct 14, 9:00 pm, meekerdbwrote:

On 10/14/2011 5:16 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
You already noted that diurnal cycles get synced by light/dark cycles.  The 
point is that
you don't will these cycles, yet you rely on them: to wake up on time, to 
remember
appointments, etc.

We do will those cycles.

Then how do you manage to wake up a given time in the morning?  Are you 
"willing" them in
your sleep?

We don't have to will them, it's voluntary. Sometimes they wake us up,
and sometimes we wake them up. It's all 'us' it's just that some
aspects of what we are are more physiological, some are more
subjective, and some shift dynamically within different ranges. We
have habits, addictions, choices, conditioning, creativity,
involuntary and voluntary motivations of all shades and intensities.

All that I'm trying to do is to describe the universe in the way that
it ordinarily works. I'm not even getting near any kind of non-
ordinary realities or forces or anything, just what our common sense
perceptions and scientific observations tell us without inferring any
forces, fields, or quantum pseudosubstances. When I say sensorimotive,
I don't mean anything spooky, I just mean regular old thoughts,
feelings, images, flavors, sounds, desires, actions, etc.


I know you do.  That's why you fail to explain why their is a connection between having a 
(human like) brain and consciousness.  You seem to assert folk psychology and panpsychism 
at the same time.


Brent

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-14 Thread Terren Suydam

On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 7:16 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> I have said many times already, if you think that I am talking about
> something thay contradicts physics then you don't understand what I'm
> talking about. Some people do, but you don't. Thats ok, not everyone
> is interested enough to try to understand it, but if you are I suggest
> you read my info at s33light.org first.

There's a lot there to digest. It is hard to understand, and honestly
I barely have enough time to participate to the limited degree that I
do here. And frankly if you made a more compelling case for your ideas
here I would be more interested.  But your argumentation, what I've
read of it anyhow, has been somewhat contradictory, not to mention
hostile.

>> It just means these
>> circuits are firing, and there is no well established tiheory that
>> predicts that activity.
>
> Right. That was my point. Stathis denies this and insists that physics
> predicts this activity and that it is no different from a leaf in the
> wind.

I think we are talking past each other. There is the behavior of
neurons at the single-neuron level. That is fairly well understood.
Nothing about the spontaneous activity you referenced really
challenges anything about our understanding of single-neuron function.
You may disagree, but you would be disagreeing with the mainstream.

Then there is the behavior of large ensembles of neurons. This is an
emergent phenomenon and is not well understood. Spontaneous activity
is described at this emergent level. In fact, there may be multiple
levels of emergence in the brain, each characterized by a unique set
of dynamics. It is hard to say, because the complexity involved is
mindblowing. But the fact that we have observed activity at this level
of the brain that confounds us is hardly news. It just reinforces the
brute fact that we really don't know how the brain works. And this
says almost nothing about the nature of will or consciousness.

>> The brain is an incredibly complex non-linear system. Almost all of
>> its behavior can be characterized as "without obvious linear cause".
>>
>
> Again, I agree completely. That is the opposite of Stathis' position.

I doubt that Stathis would agree with that. Again we must distinguish
between single neuron dynamics, which are fairly well understood (and
can be roughly modeled in terms of linear dynamics, but only if you
don't care about precision), and large scale dynamics of ensembles of
neurons, which are not all understood in terms of any kind of linear
analysis. I would be surprised if Stathis disagreed with this
description.

>> OK, then all you're really saying is that will supervenes on a lower
>> level (atomic) than what the majority believe (the level of neurons).
>> Electromagnetism is computable and therefore you are saying comp is
>> true.
>
> Close but no. Will and electromagnetism are the same thing but viewed
> from opposite perspectives. Our personal will correlates to many
> regions of the brain at once. Electromagnetic changes on a neuron or
> molecular level correlate to subconsious and unconscious micro-motive
> wills.

That is just hand-waving. There is no way to refute it and there is no
explanatory power. Why did Bob kick that tree?  "It was his
electromagnetic dynamics, i.e. his will."  "It was God's will". They
both have the same explanatory power.

Also, why is will, in your account, confined to regions of the brain?
If will and electomagnetism are the same thing, where are the
boundaries?  Why not the entire brain (even the parts we know to
control involuntary behaviors)?  Why not the entire body?  Why not the
air I breathe in and out, and my shit and piss, pardon the language?
All of that can be modeled in terms of its electromagnetic dynamics if
you go micro enough.

>>
>> If you want my explanation, will is a psychological epiphenomenon.
>
> Which means you are relying on metaphysics. I don't.

You wanted an alternative explanation. I was not offering it to argue
it. Only to show that there are alternative explanations in which
"will" is something that is not contradicted by the laws of physics.
Perhaps it is wrong. Who cares.

>> We
>> don't actually will our behavior, not from a single "command and
>> control center". Our bodies and minds simply behave, according to all
>> sorts of instinctive, conditioned, and even contemplative impulses,
>> and our egos tell the story of it as if there was a single source of
>> all of our impulses.
>
> Partly true yes, but it makes no sense for ego to exist at all. We
> have both voluntary and involuntary ranges of experience.

So you don't believe in egos?

>> We say, "I ate the pie", but really, our eating
>> the pie can be more accurately described as a desire to satiate
>> hunger, and/or a desire to experience pleasure, or in some situations,
>> a learned response to the desire to reduce anxiety. Will is a story we
>> tell about ourselves, but it is just a narrative that unifies many
>> disparate impuls

Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 14, 10:46 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 10/14/2011 7:13 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Oct 14, 9:00 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> >> On 10/14/2011 5:16 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >> You already noted that diurnal cycles get synced by light/dark cycles.  
> >> The point is that
> >> you don't will these cycles, yet you rely on them: to wake up on time, to 
> >> remember
> >> appointments, etc.
> > We do will those cycles.
>
> Then how do you manage to wake up a given time in the morning?  Are you 
> "willing" them in
> your sleep?

We don't have to will them, it's voluntary. Sometimes they wake us up,
and sometimes we wake them up. It's all 'us' it's just that some
aspects of what we are are more physiological, some are more
subjective, and some shift dynamically within different ranges. We
have habits, addictions, choices, conditioning, creativity,
involuntary and voluntary motivations of all shades and intensities.

All that I'm trying to do is to describe the universe in the way that
it ordinarily works. I'm not even getting near any kind of non-
ordinary realities or forces or anything, just what our common sense
perceptions and scientific observations tell us without inferring any
forces, fields, or quantum pseudosubstances. When I say sensorimotive,
I don't mean anything spooky, I just mean regular old thoughts,
feelings, images, flavors, sounds, desires, actions, etc.

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-14 Thread meekerdb


On 10/14/2011 7:13 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Oct 14, 9:00 pm, meekerdb  wrote:

On 10/14/2011 5:16 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

You already noted that diurnal cycles get synced by light/dark cycles.  The 
point is that
you don't will these cycles, yet you rely on them: to wake up on time, to 
remember
appointments, etc.

We do will those cycles.


Then how do you manage to wake up a given time in the morning?  Are you "willing" them in 
your sleep?


Brnet


That's what electric lights are for. But not
all cycles of that approximate duration get synched by light and
dark.  If that were the case there would be no jet lag.

Still though, what does it have to do with free will? Parts of the
brain respond to light, so what?

Craig



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Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 14, 9:00 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 10/14/2011 5:16 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> You already noted that diurnal cycles get synced by light/dark cycles.  The 
> point is that
> you don't will these cycles, yet you rely on them: to wake up on time, to 
> remember
> appointments, etc.

We do will those cycles. That's what electric lights are for. But not
all cycles of that approximate duration get synched by light and
dark.  If that were the case there would be no jet lag.

Still though, what does it have to do with free will? Parts of the
brain respond to light, so what?

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-14 Thread meekerdb


On 10/14/2011 5:16 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

We all have many clocks that we can turn to to help us arrange our
activities. Sometimes what we see when we look at the clock makes us
do something that we would rather have waited longer to do. In that
sense, a clock on the wall is 'providing some timing for the
organism'. That doesn't mean though that we don't have free will. If
that were the case we wouldn't need clocks at all, since our behavior
is already determined by our internal clocks. Why would such a timed
organism ever need to look outside of itself to pretend to want to
know the time?

Craig


You already noted that diurnal cycles get synced by light/dark cycles.  The point is that 
you don't will these cycles, yet you rely on them: to wake up on time, to remember 
appointments, etc.


Brent

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Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 14, 3:58 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 10/14/2011 12:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>
> > I think spontaneous in the context of the video and papers you linked
> > means, "unexplainable activity in terms of what you would expect
> > neural circuits to be doing when the organism doesn't appear to be
> > doing anything".  But it certainly does not mean (from the mainstream
> > pov) unexplainable in terms of physical processes. It just means these
> > circuits are firing, and there is no well established theory that
> > predicts that activity. That this spontaneous activity accounts for so
> > much resource consumption suggests that it is important, or else
> > adaptive pressures would have snuffed it out.
>
> > In short, I think spontaneous simply means "we have no idea why these
> > circuits are firing when the organism is at rest".
>
> There are cells that participate in diurnal oscillations which apparently 
> provide some
> timing function for the organism.

That some cells are synchronized to the same diurnal cycles doesn't
mean that there isn't spontaneous activity. Are they diurnal in the
sense that they are linked to photological changes or do they always
just beat every morning? How do they know when I fly to the other side
of the world 12 hours ahead? How do the ion channels in each neuron
know what time it is?

I'm sure that that there are thousands of oscillating patterns of
varying frequency that can be discerned in neurological patterns.
Seasonal patterns. age-based genetic triggers, rhythmic pulses synched
to cardiovascular conditions, hormonal variations, blood sugar cycles,
etc. It's a gigantic fugue in there. That doesn't mean that we can't,
for instance, at any moment in our waking life decide to say our name
out loud or pick up a fork and take a bite of food. We don't have to
wait until a particular time of day to be able to open our eyes or
take a deep breath.

We all have many clocks that we can turn to to help us arrange our
activities. Sometimes what we see when we look at the clock makes us
do something that we would rather have waited longer to do. In that
sense, a clock on the wall is 'providing some timing for the
organism'. That doesn't mean though that we don't have free will. If
that were the case we wouldn't need clocks at all, since our behavior
is already determined by our internal clocks. Why would such a timed
organism ever need to look outside of itself to pretend to want to
know the time?

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued


On Oct 14, 3:40 pm, Terren Suydam  wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 2:45 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> >> Actually, Stathis's interpretation is the one shared by most of the
> >> neuroscientific community. By and large most scientists do not take
> >> seriously the idea that the behavior of neurons and other cells is
> >> explainable in terms of anything except physical processes. Your
> >> interpretation of 'spontaneous' specifically, and of subjectivity in
> >> general, is on the fringe.
>
> > My interpretaton of subjectivity is certainly on the fringe and I have
> > no doubt that my view of how spontaneous activity ties into subjective
> > intentionality, but I would have to read some formal special case
> > definition of spontaneous to believe that some other idea is meant. My
> > sense is that there is no special definition or consenses since the
> > spontaneity within the system is clear.
>
> >  > That doesn't mean it's wrong, but you are
> >> talking as if your view is well-accepted and obvious to everyone, when
> >> it is anything but.
>
> > If spontaneous doesn't mean spontaneous, why does everyone keep using
> > that term? I understand of course that they are not considering the
> > implications that I am, but ther is no confusion as far as the
> > categorical description goes.
>
> I think spontaneous in the context of the video and papers you linked
> means, "unexplainable activity in terms of what you would expect
> neural circuits to be doing when the organism doesn't appear to be
> doing anything".  But it certainly does not mean (from the mainstream
> pov) unexplainable in terms of physical processes

I have said many times already, if you think that I am talking about
something thay contradicts physics then you don't understand what I'm
talking about. Some people do, but you don't. Thats ok, not everyone
is interested enough to try to understand it, but if you are I suggest
you read my info at s33light.org first.

> It just means these
> circuits are firing, and there is no well established tiheory that
> predicts that activity.

Right. That was my point. Stathis denies this and insists that physics
predicts this activity and that it is no different from a leaf in the
wind.

> That this spontaneous activity accounts for so
> much resource consumption suggests that it is important, or else
> adaptive pressures would have snuffed it out.
>
> In short, I think spontaneous simply means "we have no idea why these
> circuits are firing when the organism is at rest".

I agree. That is my position as well.

>
> >> I echo Stathis's challenge to email the authors
> >> and ask them yourself what is meant by 'spontaneous'. The video itself
> >> doesn't really add anything to the conversation, although it is pretty
> >> awesome, so thanks for linking to that.
>
> > I'm not interested in what the authors think or intended to say. I'm
> > only interested in the fact that much of the brain's activity is
> > observed to be irregular and without obvious linear cause.
>
> The brain is an incredibly complex non-linear system. Almost all of
> its behavior can be characterized as "without obvious linear cause".
>

Again, I agree completely. That is the opposite of Stathis' position.

>
>
>
>
> >> Your account demands an explanation of how something like "will" can
> >> exert influence on physical things like neurons;
>
> > it doesn't exert an influence, it is the influence. It is charge and
> > voltage experienced first hand rather than observed.
>
> >> that is what Stathis
> >> keeps pressing you on. You cannot say both that will causes changes in
> >> neurons, and there is no magic involved. So, how does will cause
> >> changes in neurons, specifically?
>
> > Through induction. Will is the subjective facing end of
> > electomagnetism. Just as moving a magnet makes an electric current,
> > moving your finger does as well. However change occurs in molecules,
> > cells, bodies, that is also how will occurs.
>
> OK, then all you're really saying is that will supervenes on a lower
> level (atomic) than what the majority believe (the level of neurons).
> Electromagnetism is computable and therefore you are saying comp is
> true.
>

Close but no. Will and electromagnetism are the same thing but viewed
from opposite perspectives. Our personal will correlates to many
regions of the brain at once. Electromagnetic changes on a neuron or
molecular level correlate to subconsious and unconscious micro-motive
wills.

>
>
>
>
> >> But your view has no way to explain the difference between voluntary
> >> and involuntary action either - not without an explanation of how will
> >> causes changes in neural behavior.
>
> > All changes are the same thing. Whether we see them as will or
> > deterministic depends on our relation to the changes.
>
> >> At least with Stathis's
> >> (mainstream) account you can hypothesize about brain architecture, for
> >> instance distinguishing between areas of the brain associated with
> >> self-ref

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-14 Thread meekerdb


On 10/14/2011 12:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:

I think spontaneous in the context of the video and papers you linked
means, "unexplainable activity in terms of what you would expect
neural circuits to be doing when the organism doesn't appear to be
doing anything".  But it certainly does not mean (from the mainstream
pov) unexplainable in terms of physical processes. It just means these
circuits are firing, and there is no well established theory that
predicts that activity. That this spontaneous activity accounts for so
much resource consumption suggests that it is important, or else
adaptive pressures would have snuffed it out.

In short, I think spontaneous simply means "we have no idea why these
circuits are firing when the organism is at rest".


There are cells that participate in diurnal oscillations which apparently provide some 
timing function for the organism.


Brent

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-14 Thread Terren Suydam

On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 2:45 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>> Actually, Stathis's interpretation is the one shared by most of the
>> neuroscientific community. By and large most scientists do not take
>> seriously the idea that the behavior of neurons and other cells is
>> explainable in terms of anything except physical processes. Your
>> interpretation of 'spontaneous' specifically, and of subjectivity in
>> general, is on the fringe.
>
> My interpretaton of subjectivity is certainly on the fringe and I have
> no doubt that my view of how spontaneous activity ties into subjective
> intentionality, but I would have to read some formal special case
> definition of spontaneous to believe that some other idea is meant. My
> sense is that there is no special definition or consenses since the
> spontaneity within the system is clear.
>
>  > That doesn't mean it's wrong, but you are
>> talking as if your view is well-accepted and obvious to everyone, when
>> it is anything but.
>
> If spontaneous doesn't mean spontaneous, why does everyone keep using
> that term? I understand of course that they are not considering the
> implications that I am, but ther is no confusion as far as the
> categorical description goes.

I think spontaneous in the context of the video and papers you linked
means, "unexplainable activity in terms of what you would expect
neural circuits to be doing when the organism doesn't appear to be
doing anything".  But it certainly does not mean (from the mainstream
pov) unexplainable in terms of physical processes. It just means these
circuits are firing, and there is no well established theory that
predicts that activity. That this spontaneous activity accounts for so
much resource consumption suggests that it is important, or else
adaptive pressures would have snuffed it out.

In short, I think spontaneous simply means "we have no idea why these
circuits are firing when the organism is at rest".

>> I echo Stathis's challenge to email the authors
>> and ask them yourself what is meant by 'spontaneous'. The video itself
>> doesn't really add anything to the conversation, although it is pretty
>> awesome, so thanks for linking to that.
>
> I'm not interested in what the authors think or intended to say. I'm
> only interested in the fact that much of the brain's activity is
> observed to be irregular and without obvious linear cause.

The brain is an incredibly complex non-linear system. Almost all of
its behavior can be characterized as "without obvious linear cause".

>>
>> Your account demands an explanation of how something like "will" can
>> exert influence on physical things like neurons;
>
> it doesn't exert an influence, it is the influence. It is charge and
> voltage experienced first hand rather than observed.
>
>> that is what Stathis
>> keeps pressing you on. You cannot say both that will causes changes in
>> neurons, and there is no magic involved. So, how does will cause
>> changes in neurons, specifically?
>>
> Through induction. Will is the subjective facing end of
> electomagnetism. Just as moving a magnet makes an electric current,
> moving your finger does as well. However change occurs in molecules,
> cells, bodies, that is also how will occurs.

OK, then all you're really saying is that will supervenes on a lower
level (atomic) than what the majority believe (the level of neurons).
Electromagnetism is computable and therefore you are saying comp is
true.

>> But your view has no way to explain the difference between voluntary
>> and involuntary action either - not without an explanation of how will
>> causes changes in neural behavior.
>
> All changes are the same thing. Whether we see them as will or
> deterministic depends on our relation to the changes.
>
>> At least with Stathis's
>> (mainstream) account you can hypothesize about brain architecture, for
>> instance distinguishing between areas of the brain associated with
>> self-reflection (neocortex), where the decision to breathe would
>> originate, and other areas of the brain associated with automatic
>> functions that are not directly influenced by the former regions. It
>> is not well understood at all. But invoking a magical cause like
>> "will" just because the problem is difficult to conceive of otherwise
>> isn't even wrong, to use your phrase.
>>
> Will isn't magic, it just looks like 'energy' when we see it outside
> of ourselves. (not eben wrong I think is Feynman, btw). Without will,
> how do you explain the existence of a different feeling in breathing
> intentionally and not?

If you want my explanation, will is a psychological epiphenomenon. We
don't actually will our behavior, not from a single "command and
control center". Our bodies and minds simply behave, according to all
sorts of instinctive, conditioned, and even contemplative impulses,
and our egos tell the story of it as if there was a single source of
all of our impulses. We say, "I ate the pie", but really, our eating
the pie can be more accurat

Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 13, 11:21 pm, Terren Suydam  wrote:
> Hey Craig,
>
> On Thu, Oct 13, 2011 at 6:39 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> >> You have
> >> misunderstood what spontaneous neural activity means.
>
> > There is no misunderstanding. It's not even controversial, you're just
> > plain denying the uncontested facts. Don't you think that if there
> > were any other term besides 'spontaneous' that could be used they
> > would have used it? Look at the animations. (http://www.youtube.com/
> > watch?v=uhCF-zlk0jY)  Can you not see exactly what that is with your
> > own eyes? Your impression of neurology being reducible to a passive
> > chain reaction running through the brain is not even wishful thinking,
> > it's factually incorrect.
>
> Actually, Stathis's interpretation is the one shared by most of the
> neuroscientific community. By and large most scientists do not take
> seriously the idea that the behavior of neurons and other cells is
> explainable in terms of anything except physical processes. Your
> interpretation of 'spontaneous' specifically, and of subjectivity in
> general, is on the fringe.

My interpretaton of subjectivity is certainly on the fringe and I have
no doubt that my view of how spontaneous activity ties into subjective
intentionality, but I would have to read some formal special case
definition of spontaneous to believe that some other idea is meant. My
sense is that there is no special definition or consenses since the
spontaneity within the system is clear.

 > That doesn't mean it's wrong, but you are
> talking as if your view is well-accepted and obvious to everyone, when
> it is anything but.

If spontaneous doesn't mean spontaneous, why does everyone keep using
that term? I understand of course that they are not considering the
implications that I am, but ther is no confusion as far as the
categorical description goes.

> I echo Stathis's challenge to email the authors
> and ask them yourself what is meant by 'spontaneous'. The video itself
> doesn't really add anything to the conversation, although it is pretty
> awesome, so thanks for linking to that.

I'm not interested in what the authors think or intended to say. I'm
only interested in the fact that much of the brain's activity is
observed to be irregular and without obvious linear cause.

>
> Your account demands an explanation of how something like "will" can
> exert influence on physical things like neurons;

it doesn't exert an influence, it is the influence. It is charge and
voltage experienced first hand rather than observed.

> that is what Stathis
> keeps pressing you on. You cannot say both that will causes changes in
> neurons, and there is no magic involved. So, how does will cause
> changes in neurons, specifically?
>
Through induction. Will is the subjective facing end of
electomagnetism. Just as moving a magnet makes an electric current,
moving your finger does as well. However change occurs in molecules,
cells, bodies, that is also how will occurs.

> > The only physiological difference is that the signal originates from a
> > different part of the brain. Your view has no way to explain why I
> > feel that I am in control of my breathing when the signal comes from
> > one region, and why I feel nothing when it comes from another,
> > especially since they both have the same effect on the same organ. It
> > would be redundant to have two separate regions of the brain do the
> > exact same thing except one is regular and another comes with 'extra
> > zesty metaphysical subjective illusion sauce'.
>
> But your view has no way to explain the difference between voluntary
> and involuntary action either - not without an explanation of how will
> causes changes in neural behavior.

All changes are the same thing. Whether we see them as will or
deterministic depends on our relation to the changes.

> At least with Stathis's
> (mainstream) account you can hypothesize about brain architecture, for
> instance distinguishing between areas of the brain associated with
> self-reflection (neocortex), where the decision to breathe would
> originate, and other areas of the brain associated with automatic
> functions that are not directly influenced by the former regions. It
> is not well understood at all. But invoking a magical cause like
> "will" just because the problem is difficult to conceive of otherwise
> isn't even wrong, to use your phrase.
>
Will isn't magic, it just looks like 'energy' when we see it outside
of ourselves. (not eben wrong I think is Feynman, btw). Without will,
how do you explain the existence of a different feeling in breathing
intentionally and not?

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-13 Thread Terren Suydam

Hey Craig,

On Thu, Oct 13, 2011 at 6:39 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>> You have
>> misunderstood what spontaneous neural activity means.
>
> There is no misunderstanding. It's not even controversial, you're just
> plain denying the uncontested facts. Don't you think that if there
> were any other term besides 'spontaneous' that could be used they
> would have used it? Look at the animations. (http://www.youtube.com/
> watch?v=uhCF-zlk0jY)  Can you not see exactly what that is with your
> own eyes? Your impression of neurology being reducible to a passive
> chain reaction running through the brain is not even wishful thinking,
> it's factually incorrect.

Actually, Stathis's interpretation is the one shared by most of the
neuroscientific community. By and large most scientists do not take
seriously the idea that the behavior of neurons and other cells is
explainable in terms of anything except physical processes. Your
interpretation of 'spontaneous' specifically, and of subjectivity in
general, is on the fringe. That doesn't mean it's wrong, but you are
talking as if your view is well-accepted and obvious to everyone, when
it is anything but. I echo Stathis's challenge to email the authors
and ask them yourself what is meant by 'spontaneous'. The video itself
doesn't really add anything to the conversation, although it is pretty
awesome, so thanks for linking to that.

Your account demands an explanation of how something like "will" can
exert influence on physical things like neurons; that is what Stathis
keeps pressing you on. You cannot say both that will causes changes in
neurons, and there is no magic involved. So, how does will cause
changes in neurons, specifically?

> The only physiological difference is that the signal originates from a
> different part of the brain. Your view has no way to explain why I
> feel that I am in control of my breathing when the signal comes from
> one region, and why I feel nothing when it comes from another,
> especially since they both have the same effect on the same organ. It
> would be redundant to have two separate regions of the brain do the
> exact same thing except one is regular and another comes with 'extra
> zesty metaphysical subjective illusion sauce'.

But your view has no way to explain the difference between voluntary
and involuntary action either - not without an explanation of how will
causes changes in neural behavior. At least with Stathis's
(mainstream) account you can hypothesize about brain architecture, for
instance distinguishing between areas of the brain associated with
self-reflection (neocortex), where the decision to breathe would
originate, and other areas of the brain associated with automatic
functions that are not directly influenced by the former regions. It
is not well understood at all. But invoking a magical cause like
"will" just because the problem is difficult to conceive of otherwise
isn't even wrong, to use your phrase.

Terren

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 9:39 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> The external inputs themselves are not modelled, they are provided by
>> the environment.
>
> What is an 'external input' made of? Are you saying that there are
> physical pieces of the outside world stuck inside of your brain?

The outside world interacts with your brain and causes physical changes in it.

>> > If consciousness were epiphenomenal and supervenient on mechanistic
>> > processes, you would not have a choice whether or not to worry. You
>> > would have no opinion, and there could be no such thing as an opinion.
>> > My objection is that it's a nonsensical position.
>>
>> It's not nonsensical: I can understand it and it is not self-contradictory.
>
> It's directly contradictory. If everything is either deterministic or
> random, where does an opinion come from?  What would be the function
> of an opinion in such a world?

Everything *is* either deterministic or random. A third alternative is
conceptually impossible. It's not a matter of scientific discovery,
it's an a priori fact, like the truths of arithmetic. The debate about
free will is a debate about whether free will is compatible with
determinism or whether randomness is required; it's not a debate about
whether neither-determined-nor-random exists.

I can't understand your puzzlement at where an opinion comes from and
what its purpose is in a determined or random world. No-one else sees
it as a problem, so why do you? Even if we had an immaterial soul and
science showed that neurons fired magically due to the influence of
this soul our decisions would have to be either determined or random,
since that's all there is.

>> "I" am the result of the activity of the ensemble of neurons in my
>> brain.
>
> Why does the activity of neurons 'result' in something other than what
> it is? Why can't it just as easily be that the activity of neurons in
> the brain is the result of the activity of the 'I'? If you have no
> idea whatsoever what the 'result' of subjectivity is, how do you know
> that it isn't making choices that are passed down the nervous system,
> starting from the brain?

When a billiard ball hits another billiard ball how do you know that
this isn't as a result of the balls' subjectivity rather than the
other way around?

>> Subjectivity results because that is what it feels like when
>> information is processed the way it is in the brain.
>
> Why should it feel like anything? How could there be any such thing as
> feeling at all? If your view of neurology were true, there could be no
> phenomena in the brain which is not explained by chemistry and physics
> - how do you explain 'feeling' in terms of neuron function? How does
> it magically get connected to the brain? Even if you say that feeling
> is an illusion, how does that change the fact that it's part of the
> cosmos? How do you account for it?

The illusion of feeling is still the feeling, so it is nonsensical to
say that feeling is an illusion. It's a puzzle that feeling exists at
all; David Chalmers calls this the "Hard Problem" of consciousness. It
doesn't solve the puzzle to say that feeling is a fundamental aspect
of the universe, since you can always ask, "Why is feeling a
fundamental aspect of the universe?"

>>"Choice" is when
>> I have two alternatives and I feel I can freely choose between them,
>
> I agree. Choice is a feeling of being able to select a motive to
> actualize from a group of motives.
>
>> which is consistent with the decision being ultimately either random
>> or determined.
>
> Huh? No, it's consistent with the decision being intentional and
> voluntary.

Being intentional and voluntary is entirely consistent with the
decision being either determined or random, since they are the only
two choices. You can't decide to create another category like "married
bachelor" just because you fancy the sound of it.

> If it were random or determined, any kind of feeling about it one way
> or another would be unexplainable. It wouldn't even be magic because
> magic at least has a purpose. It is to say that a box of paperclips
> just happens to have a memory of doing a Jack Nicholson impersonation
> at a party in 1986, and since that's the case, it must help keep the
> paperclips from oxidizing or something.

That's a non sequitur.

>> The action potential is the spike in potential difference between the
>> two sides of a cell membrane that propagates down the membrane,
>> generating an electromagnetic field.
>
> If you want to understand awareness you have to go deeper than that.
> You have to question what an action potential and electromagnetic
> field actually are. I think that you will find that we have no idea
> what they are, or how one atom knows that another atom has too few or
> too many electrons. What you are saying now is basically 'the water
> comes out of the faucet when the valve turns from one side to the
> other, which generates a volume of water that propagates down the
> drain'. It

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-13 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Oct 13, 12:47 am, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 12, 2011 at 4:17 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> >>The model of a neuron does not include the inputs. A
> >> larger model of a network of neurons includes inputs and outputs from
> >> all the neurons in the network but does not include external inputs.
>
> > Without any external inputs, and without any recognition of internal
> > spontaneous activity, what is it that this closed circuit of neurons
> > would be inputting and outputting that would be worth modeling?
>
> The external inputs themselves are not modelled, they are provided by
> the environment.

What is an 'external input' made of? Are you saying that there are
physical pieces of the outside world stuck inside of your brain?

>
> >> I really can't understand your emotional objection to the idea that
> >> consciousness may be epiphenomenal and supervenient on mechanistic
> >> processes. It doesn't worry me or affect my behaviour; why should it?
>
> > If consciousness were epiphenomenal and supervenient on mechanistic
> > processes, you would not have a choice whether or not to worry. You
> > would have no opinion, and there could be no such thing as an opinion.
> > My objection is that it's a nonsensical position.
>
> It's not nonsensical: I can understand it and it is not self-contradictory.

It's directly contradictory. If everything is either deterministic or
random, where does an opinion come from?  What would be the function
of an opinion in such a world?

>
> >> Physical events in my brain lead me to choose the words and on top of
> >> this process is the subjectivity of choice.
>
> > What do you mean by 'me'? Your whole position is that it is impossible
> > for your brain to lead anything except itself to do anything except
> > what it has to do by physical law. Where does a 'subjectivity of
> > choice' come in? Where is it located? What is it made out of? How does
> > it relate to the brain?
>
> "I" am the result of the activity of the ensemble of neurons in my
> brain.

Why does the activity of neurons 'result' in something other than what
it is? Why can't it just as easily be that the activity of neurons in
the brain is the result of the activity of the 'I'? If you have no
idea whatsoever what the 'result' of subjectivity is, how do you know
that it isn't making choices that are passed down the nervous system,
starting from the brain?

> Subjectivity results because that is what it feels like when
> information is processed the way it is in the brain.

Why should it feel like anything? How could there be any such thing as
feeling at all? If your view of neurology were true, there could be no
phenomena in the brain which is not explained by chemistry and physics
- how do you explain 'feeling' in terms of neuron function? How does
it magically get connected to the brain? Even if you say that feeling
is an illusion, how does that change the fact that it's part of the
cosmos? How do you account for it?

>"Choice" is when
> I have two alternatives and I feel I can freely choose between them,

I agree. Choice is a feeling of being able to select a motive to
actualize from a group of motives.

> which is consistent with the decision being ultimately either random
> or determined.

Huh? No, it's consistent with the decision being intentional and
voluntary.

If it were random or determined, any kind of feeling about it one way
or another would be unexplainable. It wouldn't even be magic because
magic at least has a purpose. It is to say that a box of paperclips
just happens to have a memory of doing a Jack Nicholson impersonation
at a party in 1986, and since that's the case, it must help keep the
paperclips from oxidizing or something.

>
> >> What is this "electromagnetism" you have mentioned several times? The
> >> action potential generates an electromagnetic field and some theories
> >> of consciousness hold this to be important, is that what you mean?
>
> > An action potential is just a word for the electromagnetic change
> > within the cell membrane which passes on to other cells.
>
> The action potential is the spike in potential difference between the
> two sides of a cell membrane that propagates down the membrane,
> generating an electromagnetic field.

If you want to understand awareness you have to go deeper than that.
You have to question what an action potential and electromagnetic
field actually are. I think that you will find that we have no idea
what they are, or how one atom knows that another atom has too few or
too many electrons. What you are saying now is basically 'the water
comes out of the faucet when the valve turns from one side to the
other, which generates a volume of water that propagates down the
drain'. It tells us nothing about why the faucet turns in the first
place.

Your description doesn't even allow for the ordinary functioning of
cellular biology let alone neurology. You make no distinction between
living tissue and falling leaves, seeing each as

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Wed, Oct 12, 2011 at 4:17 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>>The model of a neuron does not include the inputs. A
>> larger model of a network of neurons includes inputs and outputs from
>> all the neurons in the network but does not include external inputs.
>
> Without any external inputs, and without any recognition of internal
> spontaneous activity, what is it that this closed circuit of neurons
> would be inputting and outputting that would be worth modeling?

The external inputs themselves are not modelled, they are provided by
the environment.

>> I really can't understand your emotional objection to the idea that
>> consciousness may be epiphenomenal and supervenient on mechanistic
>> processes. It doesn't worry me or affect my behaviour; why should it?
>
> If consciousness were epiphenomenal and supervenient on mechanistic
> processes, you would not have a choice whether or not to worry. You
> would have no opinion, and there could be no such thing as an opinion.
> My objection is that it's a nonsensical position.

It's not nonsensical: I can understand it and it is not self-contradictory.

>> Physical events in my brain lead me to choose the words and on top of
>> this process is the subjectivity of choice.
>
> What do you mean by 'me'? Your whole position is that it is impossible
> for your brain to lead anything except itself to do anything except
> what it has to do by physical law. Where does a 'subjectivity of
> choice' come in? Where is it located? What is it made out of? How does
> it relate to the brain?

"I" am the result of the activity of the ensemble of neurons in my
brain. Subjectivity results because that is what it feels like when
information is processed the way it is in the brain. "Choice" is when
I have two alternatives and I feel I can freely choose between them,
which is consistent with the decision being ultimately either random
or determined.

>> What is this "electromagnetism" you have mentioned several times? The
>> action potential generates an electromagnetic field and some theories
>> of consciousness hold this to be important, is that what you mean?
>
> An action potential is just a word for the electromagnetic change
> within the cell membrane which passes on to other cells.

The action potential is the spike in potential difference between the
two sides of a cell membrane that propagates down the membrane,
generating an electromagnetic field.

>> It's not mainstream neuroscience but in any case, electromagnetic
>> fields are well-understood physical phenomena, probably more easily
>> modelled mathematically than biochemistry is.
>
> Do you agree that neurological activity corresponds to human
> perceptions?

Yes.

> Do you agree that neurological activity is chemical and electrical
> activity?

Yes.

> Do you agree that chemical and electrical activity are both forms of
> electromagnetic activity?

Chemistry is ultimately the result of the electromagnetic force.

> If so, then it is not possible that human perceptions are not in some
> way electromagnetic.

I don't know in what sense it is accurate to say that. Consciousness
is somehow different to the brain activity, though some hard core
reductionists insist that it is identical to it and there is nothing
further to explain.

>> There are two types of ion channels, voltage-dependent and
>> ligand-dependent. The votage-activated ones open when the potential
>> difference across the membrane is at a certain level:
>> the electric
>> field generated as a result of this potential difference changes the
>> shape of the ion channel, which is a transmembrane protein, and this
>> opens the channel to allow the specific ion to pass through.
>
> What changes the potential difference in the first place? What relates
> any of that to our subjective experience?
>
>> Ligand-activated ion channels open when a specific neurotransmitter
>> binds. The transmembrane potential changes as a result of ion fluxes:
>> potassium is more concentrated inside the cell so when potassium ion
>> channels open potassium ions exit leaving the inside more negative,
>> while sodium is more concentrated outside the cell so when sodium
>> channels open sodium ions enter making the inside more positive. The
>> sodium and potassium fluxes are responsible for depolarisation, the
>> action potential and repolarisation. There can't be an action
>> potential without these ion fluxes, there can't be ion fluxes without
>> the ion channels opening and closing, and the ion channels can't open
>> and close without the appropriate voltage or neurotransmitter
>> stimulus. Spontaneously active neurons have voltage-activated ion
>> channels that open at the cell's resting potential.
>
> All of these processes supervene upon the spontaneous changes to
> electromagnetic conditions. You are talking as if the brain is just a
> sponge which fills up with electrolytes and discharges them regularly
> without any control over the process. If you can move your finger
> deliber

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-11 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Oct 11, 8:45 am, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 1:27 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> >> If you simulate a neuron, then you predict what the neuron will do
> >> given certain inputs. The model of the neuron does not include the
> >> inputs.
>
> > No. Your claim is that all inputs must also be neurological. You say
> > over and over that neurons can only fire in response to other neurons.
> > I have shown that it is not true and now you are being dishonest about
> > your position throughout this conversation. I may be crazy but I don't
> > have Alzheimers (yet).
>
> Whether a neuron fires or not depends on its present state and the
> inputs, and the most important inputs are from other neurons and from
> sense organs.

Why would the inputs from other neurons and sense organs be any more
important that the spontaneous activity within the neurons themselves?

>The model of a neuron does not include the inputs. A
> larger model of a network of neurons includes inputs and outputs from
> all the neurons in the network but does not include external inputs.

Without any external inputs, and without any recognition of internal
spontaneous activity, what is it that this closed circuit of neurons
would be inputting and outputting that would be worth modeling?

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >> The simulation is not the same as the object being simulated but it
> >> can come arbitrarily close to any 3-P observable aspect of the
> >> object's behaviour.
>
> > I would agree as far as the simulation of objects, but not of
> > subjects. That's what this whole thread is about - me asserting that
> > there is likely a primitive, irreducible ontology of subjectivity and
> > you and others denying that such a thing is possible. Bruno's
> > conclusion is that both objectivity and subjectivity supervene upon an
> > arithmetic primitive ontology, (which I have agreed with in the past
> > and would probably continue to agree with if I were Bruno and had his
> > facility with arithmetic concepts), whereas I conclude that arithmetic
> > is actually a subject, but a particular subject - the essentializing
> > of objectivity...it is a powerful way of way of making sense, but
> > there are other kinds of sensemaking and qualia such as symmetry and
> > succession, presence and absence, etc, which form the foundation upon
> > which arithmetic realism depends.
>
> > What is your position though? It seems to be that consciousness and
> > life are not real for you on any level. Your cogito seems to be "Ion
> > channels open therefore something thinks that it thinks, therefore it
> > is not'. You're welcome to your opinions of course, but I find it hard
> > to take this worldview seriously in light of our ordinary experience
> > and the findings of neurology. We understand that high level processes
> > to in fact influence low level processes. I offer a hypothesis which
> > models those dynamics. We observe that much of the activity in the
> > brain is in fact spontaneous, and not cyclical or dependent upon
> > external neurological inputs for firing - that neurons are in fact
> > living organisms capable of autonomous and synchronized
> > intentionality.
>
> > Your solution seems to be to hide in a cave of pre-scientific
> > incuriousity. Content to let our entire lives as we experience them
> > natively to be sequestered in a never-never land that is neither
> > physical nor spiritual. Your assumptions paint conscious subjects as
> > epiphenomenal non-objects, orphaned from reason, science, or any
> > possibility of understanding.
>
> > Further, they deny their own self-invalidation without justification,
> > so that somehow these thoughts of exclusively deterministic
> > epistemology are themselves immune from their own critical purview. It
> > is to say that all thought is 'simply' neurology - except this
> > thought. This is the one special magic thought which disqualifies all
> > others. It is a philosophy that appeals to many, for obvious reasons,
> > as it provides the sense of certainty and safety which we crave. The
> > truth is that is thought is 'simply' the mirror image of new age
> > religiosity, but owing more of it's spirit to the Inquisition.
>
> I really can't understand your emotional objection to the idea that
> consciousness may be epiphenomenal and supervenient on mechanistic
> processes. It doesn't worry me or affect my behaviour; why should it?

If consciousness were epiphenomenal and supervenient on mechanistic
processes, you would not have a choice whether or not to worry. You
would have no opinion, and there could be no such thing as an opinion.
My objection is that it's a nonsensical position.

>
> >> The scientific consensus in neuroscience is that there is physical
> >> basis for everything that happens in the brain.
>
> > The brain is physical, so everything that happens in the brain is by
> > definition physical. There is scientific consensus that brain events
> > correlate to subjective events but

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 11:33 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> On Sep 29, 11:14 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
>> Craig, do the neurons violate the conservation of energy and
>> momentum?  And if not, then how can they have any unexpected effects?
>
>
> Here's a post I did today that hopefully helps clarify how I think it
> works: http://s33light.org/post/11288327147
>
> but to answer your question, no, they don't violate any physical laws.
> I think it's possible that the only fundamental difference between a
> neuron and a liver cell is that the neuron is tasked with
> participating in making sense and decisions for the organism as a
> whole rather than just the processes related to hepatic metabolism.
> This seems even more likely since they just found a way to turn liver
> cells into neurons: 
> http://medicalxpress.com/news/2011-10-scientists-liver-cells-neurons-technique.html
>
> They have unanticipated physical effects (though not unexpected when
> you have access to the private sensorimotive causes) because
> electromagnetic charge is manipulated through sensorimotivation. In
> the post I suggest maybe a perpendicular polarity - east vs west which
> influences charge between high level and low level processes. All we
> see is that neurons spontaneously depolarize their membranes in groups
> but there is no physical law which suggests when such a spontaneous
> firing would occur. We can force the firing by changing the voltage
> externally, but in the absence of external stimulation, the brain
> continues to be spontaneously active.

How do the neurons "spontaneously depolarize their membranes"? What
happens at the molecular level?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 1:27 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> If you simulate a neuron, then you predict what the neuron will do
>> given certain inputs. The model of the neuron does not include the
>> inputs.
>
> No. Your claim is that all inputs must also be neurological. You say
> over and over that neurons can only fire in response to other neurons.
> I have shown that it is not true and now you are being dishonest about
> your position throughout this conversation. I may be crazy but I don't
> have Alzheimers (yet).

Whether a neuron fires or not depends on its present state and the
inputs, and the most important inputs are from other neurons and from
sense organs. The model of a neuron does not include the inputs. A
larger model of a network of neurons includes inputs and outputs from
all the neurons in the network but does not include external inputs.

>> The simulation is not the same as the object being simulated but it
>> can come arbitrarily close to any 3-P observable aspect of the
>> object's behaviour.
>
> I would agree as far as the simulation of objects, but not of
> subjects. That's what this whole thread is about - me asserting that
> there is likely a primitive, irreducible ontology of subjectivity and
> you and others denying that such a thing is possible. Bruno's
> conclusion is that both objectivity and subjectivity supervene upon an
> arithmetic primitive ontology, (which I have agreed with in the past
> and would probably continue to agree with if I were Bruno and had his
> facility with arithmetic concepts), whereas I conclude that arithmetic
> is actually a subject, but a particular subject - the essentializing
> of objectivity...it is a powerful way of way of making sense, but
> there are other kinds of sensemaking and qualia such as symmetry and
> succession, presence and absence, etc, which form the foundation upon
> which arithmetic realism depends.
>
> What is your position though? It seems to be that consciousness and
> life are not real for you on any level. Your cogito seems to be "Ion
> channels open therefore something thinks that it thinks, therefore it
> is not'. You're welcome to your opinions of course, but I find it hard
> to take this worldview seriously in light of our ordinary experience
> and the findings of neurology. We understand that high level processes
> to in fact influence low level processes. I offer a hypothesis which
> models those dynamics. We observe that much of the activity in the
> brain is in fact spontaneous, and not cyclical or dependent upon
> external neurological inputs for firing - that neurons are in fact
> living organisms capable of autonomous and synchronized
> intentionality.
>
> Your solution seems to be to hide in a cave of pre-scientific
> incuriousity. Content to let our entire lives as we experience them
> natively to be sequestered in a never-never land that is neither
> physical nor spiritual. Your assumptions paint conscious subjects as
> epiphenomenal non-objects, orphaned from reason, science, or any
> possibility of understanding.
>
> Further, they deny their own self-invalidation without justification,
> so that somehow these thoughts of exclusively deterministic
> epistemology are themselves immune from their own critical purview. It
> is to say that all thought is 'simply' neurology - except this
> thought. This is the one special magic thought which disqualifies all
> others. It is a philosophy that appeals to many, for obvious reasons,
> as it provides the sense of certainty and safety which we crave. The
> truth is that is thought is 'simply' the mirror image of new age
> religiosity, but owing more of it's spirit to the Inquisition.

I really can't understand your emotional objection to the idea that
consciousness may be epiphenomenal and supervenient on mechanistic
processes. It doesn't worry me or affect my behaviour; why should it?

>> The scientific consensus in neuroscience is that there is physical
>> basis for everything that happens in the brain.
>
> The brain is physical, so everything that happens in the brain is by
> definition physical. There is scientific consensus that brain events
> correlate to subjective events but there is no such consensus that
> subjective intentions do not cause physical events. Indeed common
> sense would dictate that we are the ones subjectively choosing our
> words here, since they are not floating around in our ion channels.

Physical events in my brain lead me to choose the words and on top of
this process is the subjectivity of choice.

>>A neuron will only
>> fire if its biochemistry requires it to fire.
>
> I agree. But it's biochemistry requires electromagnetism, and I am
> saying that electromagnetism *must* have a subjective, sensorimotive
> ontology (otherwise our subjectivity could not be closely correlated
> with it). I don't believe in a never never land of Cartesian theater -
> feeling can only be electromagnetic and electromagnetism can only be
> feeling. They are

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-11 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Oct 11, 2:52 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> 2011/10/11 Craig Weinberg 
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Oct 10, 10:32 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > > 2011/10/10 Craig Weinberg 
>
> > > > No. Your claim is that all inputs must also be neurological.
>
> > > He *never* said that. What he said is this : "If you know the input + the
> > > working of a neuron, you can predict the output (fire or not fire), the
> > > input can be from adjacent neurons or from nerves which are link to the
> > > external environment via sensors." You are the one keeping on claiming
> > that
> > > the model must predict the external environment and that is non-sensical.
>
> > Adjacent neurons = neurological.
> > Nerves = neurological.
> > Sensors = neurological.
>
> > His claim excludes internal spontaneous causes. I'm just pointing out
> > that neurological outputs cannot be predicted without them and that
> > those cannot be determined from the physiology and the environment
> > alone. You have to know what the brain is feeling to predict
> > everything that the neurons that make it up are going to do.
>
> You have to know the transition rule(s) of the neuron. Transition rule(s) +
> input = output.

The idea of transition rules is not appropriate to describe the
phenomenology. It collapses the sensorimotive capacity into an a
hollow arithmetic silhouette, which has no place in a living organism.
Computer programs have transition rules, cells have conditioned
responses and learned behaviors.

>
> Input == Internal state of the neuron + environment state where the neuron
> is (adjacent cells, nerves signal, chemical environment, ...)
>
> You don't have to know what the brain is feeling as a whole... because the
> neuron does not.

You *do* have to know what the brain is feeling as a whole, because
even though the neuron does not know what the brain is feeling in the
brain's terms, it participates in the collective pattern of charge in
the brain which is the 3-p shadow of a person's subjectivity. The
neuron feels a local recapitulation of the overall state of the
neurological collective, specific to it's particular role and
capacity. It's on a need to know basis, just as we are in our own
levels of consciousness, subconsciousness, and unconsciousness, but it
must know something, otherwise nothing knows anything.

Without knowing the feeling in it's native subjective terms, it would
be like trying to predict animated Rorschach inkblots. Sort of like
technical analysis of the stock market - a death spiral of self-
similarity feedback which takes us further from the signifying
fundamentals we care about and deeper into the quicksand of a-
signifying quantitative fantasy.

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-11 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2011/10/11 Craig Weinberg 

> On Oct 10, 10:32 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > 2011/10/10 Craig Weinberg 
> >
> > > No. Your claim is that all inputs must also be neurological.
> >
> > He *never* said that. What he said is this : "If you know the input + the
> > working of a neuron, you can predict the output (fire or not fire), the
> > input can be from adjacent neurons or from nerves which are link to the
> > external environment via sensors." You are the one keeping on claiming
> that
> > the model must predict the external environment and that is non-sensical.
>
> Adjacent neurons = neurological.
> Nerves = neurological.
> Sensors = neurological.
>
> His claim excludes internal spontaneous causes. I'm just pointing out
> that neurological outputs cannot be predicted without them and that
> those cannot be determined from the physiology and the environment
> alone. You have to know what the brain is feeling to predict
> everything that the neurons that make it up are going to do.
>

You have to know the transition rule(s) of the neuron. Transition rule(s) +
input = output.

Input == Internal state of the neuron + environment state where the neuron
is (adjacent cells, nerves signal, chemical environment, ...)

You don't have to know what the brain is feeling as a whole... because the
neuron does not.

Quentin

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-10 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Sep 29, 11:14 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> Craig, do the neurons violate the conservation of energy and  
> momentum?  And if not, then how can they have any unexpected effects?

Here's a post I did today that hopefully helps clarify how I think it
works: http://s33light.org/post/11288327147

but to answer your question, no, they don't violate any physical laws.
I think it's possible that the only fundamental difference between a
neuron and a liver cell is that the neuron is tasked with
participating in making sense and decisions for the organism as a
whole rather than just the processes related to hepatic metabolism.
This seems even more likely since they just found a way to turn liver
cells into neurons: 
http://medicalxpress.com/news/2011-10-scientists-liver-cells-neurons-technique.html

They have unanticipated physical effects (though not unexpected when
you have access to the private sensorimotive causes) because
electromagnetic charge is manipulated through sensorimotivation. In
the post I suggest maybe a perpendicular polarity - east vs west which
influences charge between high level and low level processes. All we
see is that neurons spontaneously depolarize their membranes in groups
but there is no physical law which suggests when such a spontaneous
firing would occur. We can force the firing by changing the voltage
externally, but in the absence of external stimulation, the brain
continues to be spontaneously active. Besides, our ordinary experience
suggests that we do enjoy voluntary control over many processes of our
mind and body as evidenced by the distinction we perceive between
those processes and the processes which we have only partial voluntary
control, are involuntary, or are outside of our direct awareness
entirely.

It only seems unexpected because you are ruling out our subjective
expectations a priori. It's not necessary to partition the subjective
and objective if we are talking about subjectivity itself. Awareness
is just another phenomena in the universe, it just seems very strange
to us because we ourselves are awareness so we aren't designed to be
able to detect our own detection directly (how would that really
work?). We can't put it into any kind of predictable object-in-space 3-
p model, we can only infer it from correlating our 1-p experiences
with our 3-p measurements. Just as we can't watch ultraviolet tv
shows, our use of microscopes, MRI, etc, give us no capacity to extend
our vision to the 1-p and actually serve to extend our blindness of it
by presenting a seamless world of physical objects in space with no
hint of perceptual subjects through time.

Does that help at all?

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-10 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Oct 10, 10:32 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> 2011/10/10 Craig Weinberg 
>
> > No. Your claim is that all inputs must also be neurological.
>
> He *never* said that. What he said is this : "If you know the input + the
> working of a neuron, you can predict the output (fire or not fire), the
> input can be from adjacent neurons or from nerves which are link to the
> external environment via sensors." You are the one keeping on claiming that
> the model must predict the external environment and that is non-sensical.

Adjacent neurons = neurological.
Nerves = neurological.
Sensors = neurological.

His claim excludes internal spontaneous causes. I'm just pointing out
that neurological outputs cannot be predicted without them and that
those cannot be determined from the physiology and the environment
alone. You have to know what the brain is feeling to predict
everything that the neurons that make it up are going to do.

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-10 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2011/10/10 Craig Weinberg 

> On Oct 10, 7:57 am, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>
> >
> > A simple model of a car's steering would involve knowing the gear
> > ratio between the steering wheel and the front wheels. You could then
> > predict which way the car will turn given the driver's input.
>
> The same is true of a neuron. If you know that someone is going to
> think about gambling (because you tell them to do that in an
> experiment), then you can predict that there will be amygdala activity
> in their brain. If nobody had ever heard of gambling though, there is
> no possibility of imagining what that would be just from looking at
> the activity in the brain. In this case causality is initiated in one
> direction only - from high level psychological to low level
> neurological.
>
> >That is
> > what it means to say the simulation can predict the car's behaviour.
>
> Yeah, no. You're just weaseling out of your position. It's nakedly
> obvious to me.
>
> > If you simulate a neuron, then you predict what the neuron will do
> > given certain inputs. The model of the neuron does not include the
> > inputs.
>
> No. Your claim is that all inputs must also be neurological.


He *never* said that. What he said is this : "If you know the input + the
working of a neuron, you can predict the output (fire or not fire), the
input can be from adjacent neurons or from nerves which are link to the
external environment via sensors." You are the one keeping on claiming that
the model must predict the external environment and that is non-sensical.


> You say
> over and over that neurons can only fire in response to other neurons.
> I have shown that it is not true and now you are being dishonest about
> your position throughout this conversation. I may be crazy but I don't
> have Alzheimers (yet).
>
> >
> > >> Apart from the philosophical issues there are two scientific issues
> > >> you misunderstand. The first is what it means to simulate something.
> > >> It appears you think that the simulation must include the whole
> > >> universe and not just the thing being simulated.
> >
> > > No, it's just that I understand that simulation is a subjective
> > > proposition. There is no such thing as an objective simulation. That
> > > would require that one thing be replaced by another which is identical
> > > in every way, which is impossible or else it would be the same thing.
> > > I have a much more realistic understanding of simulation, that it in
> > > fact depends upon which criteria can be perceived by what audience and
> > > the degree to which those thresholds of perceptual substitution can be
> > > exceeded. Since we have no idea whatsoever how deeply inseparable the
> > > physical underpinnings of the psyche are, there is absolutely no
> > > reason to arbitrarily assume a particular substitution level.
> >
> > The simulation is not the same as the object being simulated but it
> > can come arbitrarily close to any 3-P observable aspect of the
> > object's behaviour.
>
> I would agree as far as the simulation of objects, but not of
> subjects. That's what this whole thread is about - me asserting that
> there is likely a primitive, irreducible ontology of subjectivity and
> you and others denying that such a thing is possible. Bruno's
> conclusion is that both objectivity and subjectivity supervene upon an
> arithmetic primitive ontology, (which I have agreed with in the past
> and would probably continue to agree with if I were Bruno and had his
> facility with arithmetic concepts), whereas I conclude that arithmetic
> is actually a subject, but a particular subject - the essentializing
> of objectivity...it is a powerful way of way of making sense, but
> there are other kinds of sensemaking and qualia such as symmetry and
> succession, presence and absence, etc, which form the foundation upon
> which arithmetic realism depends.
>
> What is your position though? It seems to be that consciousness and
> life are not real for you on any level. Your cogito seems to be "Ion
> channels open therefore something thinks that it thinks, therefore it
> is not'. You're welcome to your opinions of course, but I find it hard
> to take this worldview seriously in light of our ordinary experience
> and the findings of neurology. We understand that high level processes
> to in fact influence low level processes. I offer a hypothesis which
> models those dynamics. We observe that much of the activity in the
> brain is in fact spontaneous, and not cyclical or dependent upon
> external neurological inputs for firing - that neurons are in fact
> living organisms capable of autonomous and synchronized
> intentionality.
>
> Your solution seems to be to hide in a cave of pre-scientific
> incuriousity. Content to let our entire lives as we experience them
> natively to be sequestered in a never-never land that is neither
> physical nor spiritual. Your assumptions paint conscious subjects as
> epiphenomenal non-objects, orphaned from reason,

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-10 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Oct 10, 7:57 am, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:

>
> A simple model of a car's steering would involve knowing the gear
> ratio between the steering wheel and the front wheels. You could then
> predict which way the car will turn given the driver's input.

The same is true of a neuron. If you know that someone is going to
think about gambling (because you tell them to do that in an
experiment), then you can predict that there will be amygdala activity
in their brain. If nobody had ever heard of gambling though, there is
no possibility of imagining what that would be just from looking at
the activity in the brain. In this case causality is initiated in one
direction only - from high level psychological to low level
neurological.

>That is
> what it means to say the simulation can predict the car's behaviour.

Yeah, no. You're just weaseling out of your position. It's nakedly
obvious to me.

> If you simulate a neuron, then you predict what the neuron will do
> given certain inputs. The model of the neuron does not include the
> inputs.

No. Your claim is that all inputs must also be neurological. You say
over and over that neurons can only fire in response to other neurons.
I have shown that it is not true and now you are being dishonest about
your position throughout this conversation. I may be crazy but I don't
have Alzheimers (yet).

>
> >> Apart from the philosophical issues there are two scientific issues
> >> you misunderstand. The first is what it means to simulate something.
> >> It appears you think that the simulation must include the whole
> >> universe and not just the thing being simulated.
>
> > No, it's just that I understand that simulation is a subjective
> > proposition. There is no such thing as an objective simulation. That
> > would require that one thing be replaced by another which is identical
> > in every way, which is impossible or else it would be the same thing.
> > I have a much more realistic understanding of simulation, that it in
> > fact depends upon which criteria can be perceived by what audience and
> > the degree to which those thresholds of perceptual substitution can be
> > exceeded. Since we have no idea whatsoever how deeply inseparable the
> > physical underpinnings of the psyche are, there is absolutely no
> > reason to arbitrarily assume a particular substitution level.
>
> The simulation is not the same as the object being simulated but it
> can come arbitrarily close to any 3-P observable aspect of the
> object's behaviour.

I would agree as far as the simulation of objects, but not of
subjects. That's what this whole thread is about - me asserting that
there is likely a primitive, irreducible ontology of subjectivity and
you and others denying that such a thing is possible. Bruno's
conclusion is that both objectivity and subjectivity supervene upon an
arithmetic primitive ontology, (which I have agreed with in the past
and would probably continue to agree with if I were Bruno and had his
facility with arithmetic concepts), whereas I conclude that arithmetic
is actually a subject, but a particular subject - the essentializing
of objectivity...it is a powerful way of way of making sense, but
there are other kinds of sensemaking and qualia such as symmetry and
succession, presence and absence, etc, which form the foundation upon
which arithmetic realism depends.

What is your position though? It seems to be that consciousness and
life are not real for you on any level. Your cogito seems to be "Ion
channels open therefore something thinks that it thinks, therefore it
is not'. You're welcome to your opinions of course, but I find it hard
to take this worldview seriously in light of our ordinary experience
and the findings of neurology. We understand that high level processes
to in fact influence low level processes. I offer a hypothesis which
models those dynamics. We observe that much of the activity in the
brain is in fact spontaneous, and not cyclical or dependent upon
external neurological inputs for firing - that neurons are in fact
living organisms capable of autonomous and synchronized
intentionality.

Your solution seems to be to hide in a cave of pre-scientific
incuriousity. Content to let our entire lives as we experience them
natively to be sequestered in a never-never land that is neither
physical nor spiritual. Your assumptions paint conscious subjects as
epiphenomenal non-objects, orphaned from reason, science, or any
possibility of understanding.

Further, they deny their own self-invalidation without justification,
so that somehow these thoughts of exclusively deterministic
epistemology are themselves immune from their own critical purview. It
is to say that all thought is 'simply' neurology - except this
thought. This is the one special magic thought which disqualifies all
others. It is a philosophy that appeals to many, for obvious reasons,
as it provides the sense of certainty and safety which we crave. The
truth is that is thought is 'simply' the

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-10 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Mon, Oct 10, 2011 at 3:29 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> On Oct 9, 12:09 am, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>> On Sun, Oct 9, 2011 at 8:06 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>> > On Oct 8, 12:12 am, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>> >> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg  
>> >> wrote:
>> >> >> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can
>> >> >> predict exactly what the car will do if you know how it works and you
>> >> >> have the inputs.
>>
>> >> > What you are talking about is either tautological and obvious or
>> >> > delusional. if I send you the owner's manual of my car, you can tell
>> >> > me where I'm going to drive it tomorrow? So what are you talking
>> >> > about? That if you observe a car turning, you can tell which way it's
>> >> > turning or something?
>>
>> >> If you send me the plans of your car and the inputs - which way you
>> >> intend to steer and so on -
>>
>> > *which
>> >                    way
>> >                                you
>> >                                          intend
>> >                                                        to steer*
>>
>> > WHT?
>>
>> > Did you think you were just going to slip that in and I wouldn't
>> > notice?
>>
>> > So cool, as long as I give you the schematics of my car and tell you
>> > where I'm going to drive to, you will be able to deduce where I'm
>> > going to drive to? Wow, that's almost better than nothing at all.
>> > There is no way that you are serious. You are trolling me, brother.
>>
>> Quentin responded to this.
>
> I'm not sure what he means. If he is pointing out that we were talking
> about determining where a car was going to go and not about the
> intentions of the driver, then I agree with him. Your entire argument
> is that there must be some physical cause within neuron which
> determines what it does. I pointed out that you cannot determine where
> a car is going to go based on physical observations of the car. You
> then erroneously reached for a deus ex machina by suddenly
> contradicting yourself to say that indeed the car's direction cannot
> be determined by physical observation but in fact you would need an
> anecdotal report from a subjective entity called a 'driver'.

A simple model of a car's steering would involve knowing the gear
ratio between the steering wheel and the front wheels. You could then
predict which way the car will turn given the driver's input. That is
what it means to say the simulation can predict the car's behaviour.
If you simulate a neuron, then you predict what the neuron will do
given certain inputs. The model of the neuron does not include the
inputs.

>> Apart from the philosophical issues there are two scientific issues
>> you misunderstand. The first is what it means to simulate something.
>> It appears you think that the simulation must include the whole
>> universe and not just the thing being simulated.
>
> No, it's just that I understand that simulation is a subjective
> proposition. There is no such thing as an objective simulation. That
> would require that one thing be replaced by another which is identical
> in every way, which is impossible or else it would be the same thing.
> I have a much more realistic understanding of simulation, that it in
> fact depends upon which criteria can be perceived by what audience and
> the degree to which those thresholds of perceptual substitution can be
> exceeded. Since we have no idea whatsoever how deeply inseparable the
> physical underpinnings of the psyche are, there is absolutely no
> reason to arbitrarily assume a particular substitution level.

The simulation is not the same as the object being simulated but it
can come arbitrarily close to any 3-P observable aspect of the
object's behaviour.

>> The second is the
>> belief you seem to have that microscopic events can happen without an
>> empirically observable cause. You cite scientific articles discussing
>> spontaneous neural activity and you think that that is what they are
>> talking about: that the transmembrane voltage in a neuron can just
>> change because the subject wills it.
>
> It's not my belief, it is the scientific consensus. If your beliefs
> that subjective will does not change electromagnetic current in the
> nervous system have any validity, then all you have to do is give me a
> link or two of studies which support this. Since you cannot, I will
> assume that underneath it all, you understand that you are factually
> incorrect but are incapable of admitting it, even to yourself.

The scientific consensus in neuroscience is that there is physical
basis for everything that happens in the brain. A neuron will only
fire if its biochemistry requires it to fire. This is not something
that is stated explicitly because it's too obvious to state, like
saying you think with your brain rather than your liver. Specific
papers look at specific mechanisms behind neural activity. For
example,

http://jp.physoc.org/content/305/1/171.long

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-09 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Oct 8, 7:21 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> 2011/10/8 Craig Weinberg 
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Oct 8, 12:12 am, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> > > On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
> > > >> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can
> > > >> predict exactly what the car will do if you know how it works and you
> > > >> have the inputs.
>
> > > > What you are talking about is either tautological and obvious or
> > > > delusional. if I send you the owner's manual of my car, you can tell
> > > > me where I'm going to drive it tomorrow? So what are you talking
> > > > about? That if you observe a car turning, you can tell which way it's
> > > > turning or something?
>
> > > If you send me the plans of your car and the inputs - which way you
> > > intend to steer and so on -
>
> > *which
> >                    way
> >                                you
> >                                          intend
> >                                                        to steer*
>
> > WHT?
>
> > Did you think you were just going to slip that in and I wouldn't
> > notice?
>
> You were talking about cars not about you.
>
> If you want a model about brain + car just say so.

I don't understand. I'm the one talking about cars. He is the one
defining the physical mechanics of a car to include the steering
intentions of a driver.

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-09 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Oct 9, 12:09 am, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 9, 2011 at 8:06 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> > On Oct 8, 12:12 am, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> >> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg  
> >> wrote:
> >> >> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can
> >> >> predict exactly what the car will do if you know how it works and you
> >> >> have the inputs.
>
> >> > What you are talking about is either tautological and obvious or
> >> > delusional. if I send you the owner's manual of my car, you can tell
> >> > me where I'm going to drive it tomorrow? So what are you talking
> >> > about? That if you observe a car turning, you can tell which way it's
> >> > turning or something?
>
> >> If you send me the plans of your car and the inputs - which way you
> >> intend to steer and so on -
>
> > *which
> >                    way
> >                                you
> >                                          intend
> >                                                        to steer*
>
> > WHT?
>
> > Did you think you were just going to slip that in and I wouldn't
> > notice?
>
> > So cool, as long as I give you the schematics of my car and tell you
> > where I'm going to drive to, you will be able to deduce where I'm
> > going to drive to? Wow, that's almost better than nothing at all.
> > There is no way that you are serious. You are trolling me, brother.
>
> Quentin responded to this.

I'm not sure what he means. If he is pointing out that we were talking
about determining where a car was going to go and not about the
intentions of the driver, then I agree with him. Your entire argument
is that there must be some physical cause within neuron which
determines what it does. I pointed out that you cannot determine where
a car is going to go based on physical observations of the car. You
then erroneously reached for a deus ex machina by suddenly
contradicting yourself to say that indeed the car's direction cannot
be determined by physical observation but in fact you would need an
anecdotal report from a subjective entity called a 'driver'.

>
> Apart from the philosophical issues there are two scientific issues
> you misunderstand. The first is what it means to simulate something.
> It appears you think that the simulation must include the whole
> universe and not just the thing being simulated.

No, it's just that I understand that simulation is a subjective
proposition. There is no such thing as an objective simulation. That
would require that one thing be replaced by another which is identical
in every way, which is impossible or else it would be the same thing.
I have a much more realistic understanding of simulation, that it in
fact depends upon which criteria can be perceived by what audience and
the degree to which those thresholds of perceptual substitution can be
exceeded. Since we have no idea whatsoever how deeply inseparable the
physical underpinnings of the psyche are, there is absolutely no
reason to arbitrarily assume a particular substitution level.

> The second is the
> belief you seem to have that microscopic events can happen without an
> empirically observable cause. You cite scientific articles discussing
> spontaneous neural activity and you think that that is what they are
> talking about: that the transmembrane voltage in a neuron can just
> change because the subject wills it.

It's not my belief, it is the scientific consensus. If your beliefs
that subjective will does not change electromagnetic current in the
nervous system have any validity, then all you have to do is give me a
link or two of studies which support this. Since you cannot, I will
assume that underneath it all, you understand that you are factually
incorrect but are incapable of admitting it, even to yourself. How
else do you explain voluntary action being different from involuntary
actions? Do you think that when you take control of your breathing
manually that nothing has changed in your nervous system? That we
suddenly have a hallucination that we are controlling our own
breathing?

Your accusations are empty. Your view explains nothing.

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-08 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Sun, Oct 9, 2011 at 8:06 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> On Oct 8, 12:12 am, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>> >> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can
>> >> predict exactly what the car will do if you know how it works and you
>> >> have the inputs.
>>
>> > What you are talking about is either tautological and obvious or
>> > delusional. if I send you the owner's manual of my car, you can tell
>> > me where I'm going to drive it tomorrow? So what are you talking
>> > about? That if you observe a car turning, you can tell which way it's
>> > turning or something?
>>
>> If you send me the plans of your car and the inputs - which way you
>> intend to steer and so on -
>
> *which
>                    way
>                                you
>                                          intend
>                                                        to steer*
>
> WHT?
>
> Did you think you were just going to slip that in and I wouldn't
> notice?
>
> So cool, as long as I give you the schematics of my car and tell you
> where I'm going to drive to, you will be able to deduce where I'm
> going to drive to? Wow, that's almost better than nothing at all.
> There is no way that you are serious. You are trolling me, brother.

Quentin responded to this.

Apart from the philosophical issues there are two scientific issues
you misunderstand. The first is what it means to simulate something.
It appears you think that the simulation must include the whole
universe and not just the thing being simulated. The second is the
belief you seem to have that microscopic events can happen without an
empirically observable cause. You cite scientific articles discussing
spontaneous neural activity and you think that that is what they are
talking about: that the transmembrane voltage in a neuron can just
change because the subject wills it.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2011/10/8 Craig Weinberg 

> On Oct 8, 12:12 am, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> > On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> wrote:
> > >> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can
> > >> predict exactly what the car will do if you know how it works and you
> > >> have the inputs.
> >
> > > What you are talking about is either tautological and obvious or
> > > delusional. if I send you the owner's manual of my car, you can tell
> > > me where I'm going to drive it tomorrow? So what are you talking
> > > about? That if you observe a car turning, you can tell which way it's
> > > turning or something?
> >
> > If you send me the plans of your car and the inputs - which way you
> > intend to steer and so on -
>
> *which
>way
>you
>  intend
>to steer*
>
> WHT?
>
> Did you think you were just going to slip that in and I wouldn't
> notice?
>
>
You were talking about cars not about you.

If you want a model about brain + car just say so.


> So cool, as long as I give you the schematics of my car and tell you
> where I'm going to drive to, you will be able to deduce where I'm
> going to drive to? Wow, that's almost better than nothing at all.
> There is no way that you are serious. You are trolling me, brother.
>
> > then yes, I can work out exactly where
> > you're going.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > >>A model of the car, such as a car racing computer
> > >> game, does not include the driver and the whole universe, as you seem
> > >> to think, just the car.
> >
> > > A car racing computer game is not a model of a car unless it is played
> > > by a user who is familiar with cars. A horse does not confuse the game
> > > with an automobile. It's a red herring anyways. You still can't tell
> > > where a real car is going to go unless you know where the driver is
> > > going to steer it, and that is something which cannot be determined by
> > > modeling the car or the driver's body, brain, neurons, ion channels,
> > > or molecules. The same brain in the same body with the same neurons,
> > > ion channels, or molecules can drive to the beach one day or the
> > > mountains the next depending upon nothing but how they feel. You could
> > > say that how they feel is a complex chain of events, but they would
> > > not be only microcosmic events which could be modeled, any butterfly
> > > wing in some part of the world could set off a chain of unpredictable
> > > happenstance that ends up in the driver deciding to go somewhere
> > > completely unexpected.
> >
> > The real car and the real neuron don't know what inputs they are going
> > to receive next, so why do you expect that the model will?
>
> I'm not the one saying that the brain could be modeled physically and
> make predictions from it. That's your position, remember?
>
> >
> > >> So a neuron fires in those regions of the brain associated with
> > >> subjectivity where the biochemistry suggests it would not fire.
> >
> > > How many times do you need me to tell you that biochemistry does not
> > > suggest whether such a neuron would fire? If I decide to move my arm,
> > > whatever it is that is deciding *is* the firing of some group of
> > > neurons. Biochemistry doesn't give you any insight as to whether your
> > > ion channels are about to speak Chinese or English with a New Jersey
> > > dialect. It's so wrong, it's not even wrong, it's just blanket denial
> > > of ordinary reality. There's nothing I can say to you because you're
> > > not listening or understanding what I mean at all.
> >
> > But the neurons that fire when you decide to move your arm do so
> > because of the various internal and external factors I have listed.
>
> Yes, they do, but so what? You could have those factors without any
> kind of decision to move your arm. You can electrocute a severed frog
> leg but there is no decision there by the frog. The physiological-
> electromagnetic factors alone do not replace the subjective decision,
> nor does the subjective intention replace the biology. They are one
> and the same phenomenon but because we are stuck on the back end of
> it, we see the front end as a different thing. From a truly objective
> point of view, however, there is no reason to presume that my
> imagining Bugs Bunny eating a carrot is any less a part of the
> universe than ligands and ion channels. It's all real, it just has
> very different characteristics on opposite sides of the process.
>
> > Ion channels open in response to either a ligand or a votage across
> > the membrane, causing further changes in the voltage across the
> > membrane, causing more voltage activated ion channels to open, causing
> > an action potential which propagates down the axon. If you look at
> > *any* given neuron and observe all the relevant factors you can, if
> > your model is good enough, tell if

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-08 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Oct 8, 12:12 am, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> >> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can
> >> predict exactly what the car will do if you know how it works and you
> >> have the inputs.
>
> > What you are talking about is either tautological and obvious or
> > delusional. if I send you the owner's manual of my car, you can tell
> > me where I'm going to drive it tomorrow? So what are you talking
> > about? That if you observe a car turning, you can tell which way it's
> > turning or something?
>
> If you send me the plans of your car and the inputs - which way you
> intend to steer and so on -

*which
way
you
  intend
to steer*

WHT?

Did you think you were just going to slip that in and I wouldn't
notice?

So cool, as long as I give you the schematics of my car and tell you
where I'm going to drive to, you will be able to deduce where I'm
going to drive to? Wow, that's almost better than nothing at all.
There is no way that you are serious. You are trolling me, brother.

> then yes, I can work out exactly where
> you're going.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >>A model of the car, such as a car racing computer
> >> game, does not include the driver and the whole universe, as you seem
> >> to think, just the car.
>
> > A car racing computer game is not a model of a car unless it is played
> > by a user who is familiar with cars. A horse does not confuse the game
> > with an automobile. It's a red herring anyways. You still can't tell
> > where a real car is going to go unless you know where the driver is
> > going to steer it, and that is something which cannot be determined by
> > modeling the car or the driver's body, brain, neurons, ion channels,
> > or molecules. The same brain in the same body with the same neurons,
> > ion channels, or molecules can drive to the beach one day or the
> > mountains the next depending upon nothing but how they feel. You could
> > say that how they feel is a complex chain of events, but they would
> > not be only microcosmic events which could be modeled, any butterfly
> > wing in some part of the world could set off a chain of unpredictable
> > happenstance that ends up in the driver deciding to go somewhere
> > completely unexpected.
>
> The real car and the real neuron don't know what inputs they are going
> to receive next, so why do you expect that the model will?

I'm not the one saying that the brain could be modeled physically and
make predictions from it. That's your position, remember?

>
> >> So a neuron fires in those regions of the brain associated with
> >> subjectivity where the biochemistry suggests it would not fire.
>
> > How many times do you need me to tell you that biochemistry does not
> > suggest whether such a neuron would fire? If I decide to move my arm,
> > whatever it is that is deciding *is* the firing of some group of
> > neurons. Biochemistry doesn't give you any insight as to whether your
> > ion channels are about to speak Chinese or English with a New Jersey
> > dialect. It's so wrong, it's not even wrong, it's just blanket denial
> > of ordinary reality. There's nothing I can say to you because you're
> > not listening or understanding what I mean at all.
>
> But the neurons that fire when you decide to move your arm do so
> because of the various internal and external factors I have listed.

Yes, they do, but so what? You could have those factors without any
kind of decision to move your arm. You can electrocute a severed frog
leg but there is no decision there by the frog. The physiological-
electromagnetic factors alone do not replace the subjective decision,
nor does the subjective intention replace the biology. They are one
and the same phenomenon but because we are stuck on the back end of
it, we see the front end as a different thing. From a truly objective
point of view, however, there is no reason to presume that my
imagining Bugs Bunny eating a carrot is any less a part of the
universe than ligands and ion channels. It's all real, it just has
very different characteristics on opposite sides of the process.

> Ion channels open in response to either a ligand or a votage across
> the membrane, causing further changes in the voltage across the
> membrane, causing more voltage activated ion channels to open, causing
> an action potential which propagates down the axon. If you look at
> *any* given neuron and observe all the relevant factors you can, if
> your model is good enough, tell if it's going to fire. If it does
> something other than this then it is contrary to physical laws.

8. No, you are wrong and you know it. You just got finished admitting
that you need me to tell you how I am going to turn my steering wheel
for you to tell where I'm going to drive, so where are you pulling
this out of?

Re: Bruno List continued

On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can
>> predict exactly what the car will do if you know how it works and you
>> have the inputs.
>
> What you are talking about is either tautological and obvious or
> delusional. if I send you the owner's manual of my car, you can tell
> me where I'm going to drive it tomorrow? So what are you talking
> about? That if you observe a car turning, you can tell which way it's
> turning or something?

If you send me the plans of your car and the inputs - which way you
intend to steer and so on - then yes, I can work out exactly where
you're going.

>>A model of the car, such as a car racing computer
>> game, does not include the driver and the whole universe, as you seem
>> to think, just the car.
>
> A car racing computer game is not a model of a car unless it is played
> by a user who is familiar with cars. A horse does not confuse the game
> with an automobile. It's a red herring anyways. You still can't tell
> where a real car is going to go unless you know where the driver is
> going to steer it, and that is something which cannot be determined by
> modeling the car or the driver's body, brain, neurons, ion channels,
> or molecules. The same brain in the same body with the same neurons,
> ion channels, or molecules can drive to the beach one day or the
> mountains the next depending upon nothing but how they feel. You could
> say that how they feel is a complex chain of events, but they would
> not be only microcosmic events which could be modeled, any butterfly
> wing in some part of the world could set off a chain of unpredictable
> happenstance that ends up in the driver deciding to go somewhere
> completely unexpected.

The real car and the real neuron don't know what inputs they are going
to receive next, so why do you expect that the model will?

>> So a neuron fires in those regions of the brain associated with
>> subjectivity where the biochemistry suggests it would not fire.
>
> How many times do you need me to tell you that biochemistry does not
> suggest whether such a neuron would fire? If I decide to move my arm,
> whatever it is that is deciding *is* the firing of some group of
> neurons. Biochemistry doesn't give you any insight as to whether your
> ion channels are about to speak Chinese or English with a New Jersey
> dialect. It's so wrong, it's not even wrong, it's just blanket denial
> of ordinary reality. There's nothing I can say to you because you're
> not listening or understanding what I mean at all.

But the neurons that fire when you decide to move your arm do so
because of the various internal and external factors I have listed.
Ion channels open in response to either a ligand or a votage across
the membrane, causing further changes in the voltage across the
membrane, causing more voltage activated ion channels to open, causing
an action potential which propagates down the axon. If you look at
*any* given neuron and observe all the relevant factors you can, if
your model is good enough, tell if it's going to fire. If it does
something other than this then it is contrary to physical laws.

>> Ligand-activated ion channels open without any ligand present,
>
> No, the ligand will always be present, because the electromagnetic
> conditions change to attract, repel, bind, etc. The electromagnetic
> conditions are the 3-p view of the 1-p sensorimotive intentions. They
> are the same thing. Just as you have an interior world which others do
> not experience directly when they look at the outside of your head,
> but when you smile it's a consequence of a human feeling, which they
> can make sense of in terms of their own feeling, and they may smile
> back. In your view, the only possibility is that the mouth movements
> of one person must cause the other person's mouth to move. It's a
> catastrophic mechanization of the reality - which is a sensorimotive
> semantic exchange through the natural language of human expression.
> The material monism view disqualifies this simple truth a priori and
> sticks it's head up it's theoretical ass to find some a-signifying
> stupidity to justify it.

"The ligand will always be present"?? Then what's the point of neurons
releasing neurotransmitters into the synaptic cleft?

>>or
>> perhaps an action potential propagates down the axon without any
>> change in ion concentrations.
>
> Again, not what I'm saying. The ion concentrations change because the
> electromagnetic conditions of the ions change spontaneously.
> Spontaneously. Spontaneously.

What does that mean? An ion is an ion. Depolarisation occurs when
sodium channels open allowing sodium into the cell and making the
interior more positive with respect to the exterior. The sodium
channels in a particular neuron may open in response to a
neurotransmitter. At a certain threshold this then causes
voltage-activated sodium channels to open, causing positive feedback
and resu

Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 7, 8:23 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 10:48 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> > On Oct 7, 7:10 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> >> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 7:06 AM, Craig Weinberg  
> >> wrote:
> >> >> If a motor neuron involved in voluntary activity fires where you would 
> >> >> not predict it would fire given its internal state and the inputs then 
> >> >> it is *by definition* acting contrary to physical law.
>
> >> > Every firing of motor neurons involved in voluntarily activity fires
> >> > where you would not predict, given that the internal state provides no
> >> > prediction and that the inputs are determined by the subject and
> >> > therefore unknowable to anyone outside of the subject.
>
> >> The internal state of the neuron determines its sensitivity to inputs.
> >> The internal state is complex but it includes things such as the
> >> membrane potential, the intracellular ion concentrations, the number,
> >> type and location of ion channels, to what extent the synaptic
> >> vesicles have filled with neurotransmitter, and multiple other
> >> factors. The inputs consist of every environmental factor that might
> >> potentially affect the neuron such as the extracellular ionic
> >> concentrations, pH, temperature, synaptic connections, concentration
> >> of neurotransmitter in the synapse, concentration of enzymes which
> >> break down neurotransmitter and so on.
>
> > Not one of those things determines whether or not a given neuron
> > associated with voluntary action will fire. It is the same thing as
> > talking about the drive shaft, CV boot, transmission, fuel line, spark
> > plugs, and paint job as determining when and where an automobile goes.
> > It's the same as saying that the TV remote control uses you to change
> > the channel instead of the other way around.
>
> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can
> predict exactly what the car will do if you know how it works and you
> have the inputs.

What you are talking about is either tautological and obvious or
delusional. if I send you the owner's manual of my car, you can tell
me where I'm going to drive it tomorrow? So what are you talking
about? That if you observe a car turning, you can tell which way it's
turning or something?

>A model of the car, such as a car racing computer
> game, does not include the driver and the whole universe, as you seem
> to think, just the car.

A car racing computer game is not a model of a car unless it is played
by a user who is familiar with cars. A horse does not confuse the game
with an automobile. It's a red herring anyways. You still can't tell
where a real car is going to go unless you know where the driver is
going to steer it, and that is something which cannot be determined by
modeling the car or the driver's body, brain, neurons, ion channels,
or molecules. The same brain in the same body with the same neurons,
ion channels, or molecules can drive to the beach one day or the
mountains the next depending upon nothing but how they feel. You could
say that how they feel is a complex chain of events, but they would
not be only microcosmic events which could be modeled, any butterfly
wing in some part of the world could set off a chain of unpredictable
happenstance that ends up in the driver deciding to go somewhere
completely unexpected.

>
> >> If the neuron fires where
> >> consideration of these factors would lead to a prediction that it
> >> should not fire then that is by definition the neuron acting contrary
> >> to physical law.
>
> > There is no such thing as a factor which leads to a prediction of when
> > efferent nerves will fire. Even if you say that the subject is just
> > regions of the brain, it is still those regions, those tissues and
> > neurons which *decide* to fire as a first cause - without any
> > deterministic precursor that could ever be predicted with any degree
> > of accuracy without access to the private subjective content of the
> > decision process. Seeing a nerve fire doesn't tell you when it's going
> > to fire again, just as seeing a car make a left turn doesn't tell you
> > what direction it's going to turn after that.
>
> So a neuron fires in those regions of the brain associated with
> subjectivity where the biochemistry suggests it would not fire.

How many times do you need me to tell you that biochemistry does not
suggest whether such a neuron would fire? If I decide to move my arm,
whatever it is that is deciding *is* the firing of some group of
neurons. Biochemistry doesn't give you any insight as to whether your
ion channels are about to speak Chinese or English with a New Jersey
dialect. It's so wrong, it's not even wrong, it's just blanket denial
of ordinary reality. There's nothing I can say to you because you're
not listening or understanding what I mean at all.

> Ligand-activated ion channels open without any ligand present,

No, the ligand will always be present, because the electromagne

Re: Bruno List continued

On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 10:48 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> On Oct 7, 7:10 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 7:06 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>> >> If a motor neuron involved in voluntary activity fires where you would 
>> >> not predict it would fire given its internal state and the inputs then it 
>> >> is *by definition* acting contrary to physical law.
>>
>> > Every firing of motor neurons involved in voluntarily activity fires
>> > where you would not predict, given that the internal state provides no
>> > prediction and that the inputs are determined by the subject and
>> > therefore unknowable to anyone outside of the subject.
>>
>> The internal state of the neuron determines its sensitivity to inputs.
>> The internal state is complex but it includes things such as the
>> membrane potential, the intracellular ion concentrations, the number,
>> type and location of ion channels, to what extent the synaptic
>> vesicles have filled with neurotransmitter, and multiple other
>> factors. The inputs consist of every environmental factor that might
>> potentially affect the neuron such as the extracellular ionic
>> concentrations, pH, temperature, synaptic connections, concentration
>> of neurotransmitter in the synapse, concentration of enzymes which
>> break down neurotransmitter and so on.
>
> Not one of those things determines whether or not a given neuron
> associated with voluntary action will fire. It is the same thing as
> talking about the drive shaft, CV boot, transmission, fuel line, spark
> plugs, and paint job as determining when and where an automobile goes.
> It's the same as saying that the TV remote control uses you to change
> the channel instead of the other way around.

Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can
predict exactly what the car will do if you know how it works and you
have the inputs. A model of the car, such as a car racing computer
game, does not include the driver and the whole universe, as you seem
to think, just the car.

>> If the neuron fires where
>> consideration of these factors would lead to a prediction that it
>> should not fire then that is by definition the neuron acting contrary
>> to physical law.
>
> There is no such thing as a factor which leads to a prediction of when
> efferent nerves will fire. Even if you say that the subject is just
> regions of the brain, it is still those regions, those tissues and
> neurons which *decide* to fire as a first cause - without any
> deterministic precursor that could ever be predicted with any degree
> of accuracy without access to the private subjective content of the
> decision process. Seeing a nerve fire doesn't tell you when it's going
> to fire again, just as seeing a car make a left turn doesn't tell you
> what direction it's going to turn after that.

So a neuron fires in those regions of the brain associated with
subjectivity where the biochemistry suggests it would not fire.
Ligand-activated ion channels open without any ligand present, or
perhaps an action potential propagates down the axon without any
change in ion concentrations. That is what I call "contrary to
physical laws". You don't agree, so you must have some other idea of
what a neuron would have to do to qualify as firing contrary to
physical laws. What is it?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 7, 7:10 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 7:06 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> >> If a motor neuron involved in voluntary activity fires where you would not 
> >> predict it would fire given its internal state and the inputs then it is 
> >> *by definition* acting contrary to physical law.
>
> > Every firing of motor neurons involved in voluntarily activity fires
> > where you would not predict, given that the internal state provides no
> > prediction and that the inputs are determined by the subject and
> > therefore unknowable to anyone outside of the subject.
>
> The internal state of the neuron determines its sensitivity to inputs.
> The internal state is complex but it includes things such as the
> membrane potential, the intracellular ion concentrations, the number,
> type and location of ion channels, to what extent the synaptic
> vesicles have filled with neurotransmitter, and multiple other
> factors. The inputs consist of every environmental factor that might
> potentially affect the neuron such as the extracellular ionic
> concentrations, pH, temperature, synaptic connections, concentration
> of neurotransmitter in the synapse, concentration of enzymes which
> break down neurotransmitter and so on.

Not one of those things determines whether or not a given neuron
associated with voluntary action will fire. It is the same thing as
talking about the drive shaft, CV boot, transmission, fuel line, spark
plugs, and paint job as determining when and where an automobile goes.
It's the same as saying that the TV remote control uses you to change
the channel instead of the other way around.

> If the neuron fires where
> consideration of these factors would lead to a prediction that it
> should not fire then that is by definition the neuron acting contrary
> to physical law.

There is no such thing as a factor which leads to a prediction of when
efferent nerves will fire. Even if you say that the subject is just
regions of the brain, it is still those regions, those tissues and
neurons which *decide* to fire as a first cause - without any
deterministic precursor that could ever be predicted with any degree
of accuracy without access to the private subjective content of the
decision process. Seeing a nerve fire doesn't tell you when it's going
to fire again, just as seeing a car make a left turn doesn't tell you
what direction it's going to turn after that.

>How else would you define it?

I keep telling you - it's a bidirectional sensorimitive-
electromagnetic induction. That is exactly what it is. That is the
actual reality of what is going on. If you had to make the universe
from scratch, and you left out the sensorimotive part, you would have
nothing but meaningless matter moving around with no possibility of
awareness of anything. It's just hard for some people to realize that
their own naive perception is actually a phenomenon that has to exist
somewhere in the Cosmos - but what else could it be? Not part of the
Cosmos? What does that even mean? It's actually crazily
anthropomorphic to imagine that somehow everything we can measure has
reality yet the measurer himself is just some ephiphenomal phantom.
Everything in the universe is real except what's in our natural
ordinary experience? That's moronic.

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 7:06 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> If a motor neuron involved in voluntary activity fires where you would not 
>> predict it would fire given its internal state and the inputs then it is *by 
>> definition* acting contrary to physical law.
>
> Every firing of motor neurons involved in voluntarily activity fires
> where you would not predict, given that the internal state provides no
> prediction and that the inputs are determined by the subject and
> therefore unknowable to anyone outside of the subject.

The internal state of the neuron determines its sensitivity to inputs.
The internal state is complex but it includes things such as the
membrane potential, the intracellular ion concentrations, the number,
type and location of ion channels, to what extent the synaptic
vesicles have filled with neurotransmitter, and multiple other
factors. The inputs consist of every environmental factor that might
potentially affect the neuron such as the extracellular ionic
concentrations, pH, temperature, synaptic connections, concentration
of neurotransmitter in the synapse, concentration of enzymes which
break down neurotransmitter and so on. If the neuron fires where
consideration of these factors would lead to a prediction that it
should not fire then that is by definition the neuron acting contrary
to physical law. How else would you define it?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 7, 1:15 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> On 08/10/2011, at 12:02 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
>
>
> >> it is something-it-is-like to be a
> >> leaf, and the qualia may differ depending on whether the leaf goes
> >> left or right. As with a brain, the leaf does not break any physical
> >> laws and its behaviour can be completely described in terms of
> >> physical processes, but such a description would leave out an
> >> important part of the picture, the subjectivity. While it may be
> >> correct to say that the leaf moves to the right because it wants to
> >> move to the right, since moving to the right is associated with
> >> right-moving willfulness, this does not mean that the qualia have a
> >> causal effect on its behaviour.
>
> > No because if the wind is also pushing other inanimate objects in the
> > same direction and the leaf never resists that, then we can assume
> > that it has no ability to choose it's direction.
>
> The leaf has the ability to choose its direction to the same extent that a 
> motile cell such as an amoeba does.

I can't really take that seriously, I think at this point that you
have to be winding me up. On the off chance that there is an eight
year old reading this, I will respond to that as if it weren't
idiotic.

The leaf doesn't follow anything. It's dead. It just falls to the
ground while fluid dynamics push it around. The dead leaf as a single
entity is completely passive. A motile cell such as an amoeba is
categorized as motile because of it's motility:

"Motility is a biological term which refers to the ability to move
spontaneously and actively" - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motility

>The amoeba follows chemotactic gradients, the leaf follows the wind. The 
>amoeba does not move in a direction contrary to physics and neither does the 
>leaf. The amoeba may feel that it is >choosing where to go and so might the 
>leaf.

The amoeba, like any other motile organism, follows it's subjective
senses, some of which can be described in 3-p as chemotactic, but
there are other models of cellular mobility too, as I'm sure you are
aware. A living amoeba is participating in it's environment actively.
When it dies, it's molecules still participate in the environment
actively, but the amoeba as a whole is passive. All the chemotactic
gradients in the world are not going to move a dead amoeba.

Do you believe that there is a difference between something that is
alive and something that is dead? If so, what?

> If a motor neuron involved in voluntary activity fires where you would not 
> predict it would fire given its internal state and the inputs then it is *by 
> definition* acting contrary to physical law.

Every firing of motor neurons involved in voluntarily activity fires
where you would not predict, given that the internal state provides no
prediction and that the inputs are determined by the subject and
therefore unknowable to anyone outside of the subject.

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued


>On Oct 7, 12:38 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> If you have the prediction and not the model... then you don't have the same
> external input.
>
> The internal stimuli are modeled by the model, that's the all point of the
> model.

Subjective internal, not medical internal.

>
> If it's not the case, then simply the model is wrong.
>
Yes and no. A model of a tree based only on the shape of it's
silhouette you could say is wrong, or incomplete or adequate depending
on the intent behind the model.

> 2011/10/7 Craig Weinberg 
>
>
>
>
>
> > >On Oct 7, 10:28 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > > 2011/10/7 Craig Weinberg 
>
> > > > On Oct 6, 10:24 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> > > > > On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 12:02 AM, Craig Weinberg <
> > whatsons...@gmail.com>
> > > > wrote:
> > > > > >> The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events
> > but
> > > > > >> the observable behaviour of the brain can be.
>
> > > > > > Yes, the 3-p physical behaviors that can be observed with our
> > > > > > contemporary instruments can be understood in terms of biochemical
> > > > > > events, but that doesn't mean that they can be modeled accurately
> > or
> > > > > > that those models would be able to produce 1-p experience by
> > > > > > themselves. We can understand the behaviors of an amoeba in terms
> > of
> > > > > > biochemical events but that doesn't mean we can tell which
> > direction
> > > > > > it's going to move in.
>
> > > > > It's also difficult to tell exactly which way a leaf in the wind will
> > > > > move. The leaf may have qualia:
>
> > > > Theoretically it may, but I don't think so. If it's connected to the
> > > > tree it might have qualia, and the individual cells might have qualia,
> > > > but it seems like once it's detached from the tree, it loses it's high
> > > > level context.
>
> > > > >it is something-it-is-like to be a
> > > > > leaf, and the qualia may differ depending on whether the leaf goes
> > > > > left or right. As with a brain, the leaf does not break any physical
> > > > > laws and its behaviour can be completely described in terms of
> > > > > physical processes, but such a description would leave out an
> > > > > important part of the picture, the subjectivity. While it may be
> > > > > correct to say that the leaf moves to the right because it wants to
> > > > > move to the right, since moving to the right is associated with
> > > > > right-moving willfulness, this does not mean that the qualia have a
> > > > > causal effect on its behaviour.
>
> > > > No because if the wind is also pushing other inanimate objects in the
> > > > same direction and the leaf never resists that, then we can assume
> > > > that it has no ability to choose it's direction.
>
> > > > >A causal effect of the qualia on the
> > > > > leaf's behaviour would mean that the leaf moves contrary to physical
> > > > > laws, confounding scientists by moving to the right when the forces
> > on
> > > > > it suggest it should move to the left. It's similar with the brain: a
> > > > > direct causal effect of qualia on behaviour would mean that neurons
> > > > > fire when their physical state would suggest that they not fire.
>
> > > > You aren't hearing me, so I am going to start counting how many times
> > > > I answer your false assertion - even though it's probably been at
> > > > least 5 or 6 times, I'll start the countdown at ten, and at 0, I'm not
> > > > going to answer this question again from you.
>
> > > > 10: There is no such thing as a physical state which suggests whether
> > > > a neuron that can fire (ie, has repolarized, replenished, or otherwise
> > > > recovered from it's last firing) actually will fire. You can induce it
> > > > to fire manually, but left to it's own devices, you can't say that a
> > > > neuron which triggers a voluntary movement is going to fire without
> > > > knowing when the person whose arm it is decides to move it. You can
> > > > look at every nerve in my body right now and not know whether I will
> > > > be standing or sitting in one hour's time. There is no physical law
> > > > whatsoever that has an opinion one way or the other either way.
>
> > > That's you who do not understand, because your assertion : "You can
> > > look at every nerve in my body right now and not know whether I will
> > > be standing or sitting in one hour's time." simply ignore the *external
> > > input*.
>
> > > Without it, you can't, with an accurate mode + external stimuli you can.
> > The
> > > model **can't** predict external input, if it could that would only means
> > > the model is not about the brain only but about the brain + the entire
> > > environment.
>
> > That's my point. Modeling the brain doesn't let you predict it's
> > behavior - not just because it lacks the external inputs, but the
> > internal inputs (which are disqualified under materialist monism). You
> > don't need a model of the brain or knowledge of external inputs if you
> > have subjective control. The subject

Re: Bruno List continued





On 08/10/2011, at 12:02 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> 
>> it is something-it-is-like to be a
>> leaf, and the qualia may differ depending on whether the leaf goes
>> left or right. As with a brain, the leaf does not break any physical
>> laws and its behaviour can be completely described in terms of
>> physical processes, but such a description would leave out an
>> important part of the picture, the subjectivity. While it may be
>> correct to say that the leaf moves to the right because it wants to
>> move to the right, since moving to the right is associated with
>> right-moving willfulness, this does not mean that the qualia have a
>> causal effect on its behaviour.
> 
> No because if the wind is also pushing other inanimate objects in the
> same direction and the leaf never resists that, then we can assume
> that it has no ability to choose it's direction.

The leaf has the ability to choose its direction to the same extent that a 
motile cell such as an amoeba does. The amoeba follows chemotactic gradients, 
the leaf follows the wind. The amoeba does not move in a direction contrary to 
physics and neither does the leaf. The amoeba may feel that it is choosing 
where to go and so might the leaf. 

> 
>> A causal effect of the qualia on the
>> leaf's behaviour would mean that the leaf moves contrary to physical
>> laws, confounding scientists by moving to the right when the forces on
>> it suggest it should move to the left. It's similar with the brain: a
>> direct causal effect of qualia on behaviour would mean that neurons
>> fire when their physical state would suggest that they not fire.
> 
> You aren't hearing me, so I am going to start counting how many times
> I answer your false assertion - even though it's probably been at
> least 5 or 6 times, I'll start the countdown at ten, and at 0, I'm not
> going to answer this question again from you.
> 
> 10: There is no such thing as a physical state which suggests whether
> a neuron that can fire (ie, has repolarized, replenished, or otherwise
> recovered from it's last firing) actually will fire. You can induce it
> to fire manually, but left to it's own devices, you can't say that a
> neuron which triggers a voluntary movement is going to fire without
> knowing when the person whose arm it is decides to move it. You can
> look at every nerve in my body right now and not know whether I will
> be standing or sitting in one hour's time. There is no physical law
> whatsoever that has an opinion one way or the other either way.

If a motor neuron involved in voluntary activity fires where you would not 
predict it would fire given its internal state and the inputs then it is *by 
definition* acting contrary to physical law.

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-07 Thread Quentin Anciaux

If you have the prediction and not the model... then you don't have the same
external input.

The internal stimuli are modeled by the model, that's the all point of the
model.

If it's not the case, then simply the model is wrong.

2011/10/7 Craig Weinberg 

> >On Oct 7, 10:28 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > 2011/10/7 Craig Weinberg 
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > On Oct 6, 10:24 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 12:02 AM, Craig Weinberg <
> whatsons...@gmail.com>
> > > wrote:
> > > > >> The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events
> but
> > > > >> the observable behaviour of the brain can be.
> >
> > > > > Yes, the 3-p physical behaviors that can be observed with our
> > > > > contemporary instruments can be understood in terms of biochemical
> > > > > events, but that doesn't mean that they can be modeled accurately
> or
> > > > > that those models would be able to produce 1-p experience by
> > > > > themselves. We can understand the behaviors of an amoeba in terms
> of
> > > > > biochemical events but that doesn't mean we can tell which
> direction
> > > > > it's going to move in.
> >
> > > > It's also difficult to tell exactly which way a leaf in the wind will
> > > > move. The leaf may have qualia:
> >
> > > Theoretically it may, but I don't think so. If it's connected to the
> > > tree it might have qualia, and the individual cells might have qualia,
> > > but it seems like once it's detached from the tree, it loses it's high
> > > level context.
> >
> > > >it is something-it-is-like to be a
> > > > leaf, and the qualia may differ depending on whether the leaf goes
> > > > left or right. As with a brain, the leaf does not break any physical
> > > > laws and its behaviour can be completely described in terms of
> > > > physical processes, but such a description would leave out an
> > > > important part of the picture, the subjectivity. While it may be
> > > > correct to say that the leaf moves to the right because it wants to
> > > > move to the right, since moving to the right is associated with
> > > > right-moving willfulness, this does not mean that the qualia have a
> > > > causal effect on its behaviour.
> >
> > > No because if the wind is also pushing other inanimate objects in the
> > > same direction and the leaf never resists that, then we can assume
> > > that it has no ability to choose it's direction.
> >
> > > >A causal effect of the qualia on the
> > > > leaf's behaviour would mean that the leaf moves contrary to physical
> > > > laws, confounding scientists by moving to the right when the forces
> on
> > > > it suggest it should move to the left. It's similar with the brain: a
> > > > direct causal effect of qualia on behaviour would mean that neurons
> > > > fire when their physical state would suggest that they not fire.
> >
> > > You aren't hearing me, so I am going to start counting how many times
> > > I answer your false assertion - even though it's probably been at
> > > least 5 or 6 times, I'll start the countdown at ten, and at 0, I'm not
> > > going to answer this question again from you.
> >
> > > 10: There is no such thing as a physical state which suggests whether
> > > a neuron that can fire (ie, has repolarized, replenished, or otherwise
> > > recovered from it's last firing) actually will fire. You can induce it
> > > to fire manually, but left to it's own devices, you can't say that a
> > > neuron which triggers a voluntary movement is going to fire without
> > > knowing when the person whose arm it is decides to move it. You can
> > > look at every nerve in my body right now and not know whether I will
> > > be standing or sitting in one hour's time. There is no physical law
> > > whatsoever that has an opinion one way or the other either way.
> >
> > That's you who do not understand, because your assertion : "You can
> > look at every nerve in my body right now and not know whether I will
> > be standing or sitting in one hour's time." simply ignore the *external
> > input*.
> >
> > Without it, you can't, with an accurate mode + external stimuli you can.
> The
> > model **can't** predict external input, if it could that would only means
> > the model is not about the brain only but about the brain + the entire
> > environment.
> >
>
> That's my point. Modeling the brain doesn't let you predict it's
> behavior - not just because it lacks the external inputs, but the
> internal inputs (which are disqualified under materialist monism). You
> don't need a model of the brain or knowledge of external inputs if you
> have subjective control. The subject can decide that they will stand
> up in an hour, and be able to influence the veracity of that
> prediction to a great degree. To get the same degree of accuracy
> through physics at best would be the looong way around, plus it would
> not have an explanatory power.
>
> Craig
>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > >I'm
> > > > sorry that you don't like this,
> >
> > > It's not that I don't l

Re: Bruno List continued

>On Oct 7, 10:28 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> 2011/10/7 Craig Weinberg 
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Oct 6, 10:24 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> > > On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 12:02 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
> > > >> The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events but
> > > >> the observable behaviour of the brain can be.
>
> > > > Yes, the 3-p physical behaviors that can be observed with our
> > > > contemporary instruments can be understood in terms of biochemical
> > > > events, but that doesn't mean that they can be modeled accurately or
> > > > that those models would be able to produce 1-p experience by
> > > > themselves. We can understand the behaviors of an amoeba in terms of
> > > > biochemical events but that doesn't mean we can tell which direction
> > > > it's going to move in.
>
> > > It's also difficult to tell exactly which way a leaf in the wind will
> > > move. The leaf may have qualia:
>
> > Theoretically it may, but I don't think so. If it's connected to the
> > tree it might have qualia, and the individual cells might have qualia,
> > but it seems like once it's detached from the tree, it loses it's high
> > level context.
>
> > >it is something-it-is-like to be a
> > > leaf, and the qualia may differ depending on whether the leaf goes
> > > left or right. As with a brain, the leaf does not break any physical
> > > laws and its behaviour can be completely described in terms of
> > > physical processes, but such a description would leave out an
> > > important part of the picture, the subjectivity. While it may be
> > > correct to say that the leaf moves to the right because it wants to
> > > move to the right, since moving to the right is associated with
> > > right-moving willfulness, this does not mean that the qualia have a
> > > causal effect on its behaviour.
>
> > No because if the wind is also pushing other inanimate objects in the
> > same direction and the leaf never resists that, then we can assume
> > that it has no ability to choose it's direction.
>
> > >A causal effect of the qualia on the
> > > leaf's behaviour would mean that the leaf moves contrary to physical
> > > laws, confounding scientists by moving to the right when the forces on
> > > it suggest it should move to the left. It's similar with the brain: a
> > > direct causal effect of qualia on behaviour would mean that neurons
> > > fire when their physical state would suggest that they not fire.
>
> > You aren't hearing me, so I am going to start counting how many times
> > I answer your false assertion - even though it's probably been at
> > least 5 or 6 times, I'll start the countdown at ten, and at 0, I'm not
> > going to answer this question again from you.
>
> > 10: There is no such thing as a physical state which suggests whether
> > a neuron that can fire (ie, has repolarized, replenished, or otherwise
> > recovered from it's last firing) actually will fire. You can induce it
> > to fire manually, but left to it's own devices, you can't say that a
> > neuron which triggers a voluntary movement is going to fire without
> > knowing when the person whose arm it is decides to move it. You can
> > look at every nerve in my body right now and not know whether I will
> > be standing or sitting in one hour's time. There is no physical law
> > whatsoever that has an opinion one way or the other either way.
>
> That's you who do not understand, because your assertion : "You can
> look at every nerve in my body right now and not know whether I will
> be standing or sitting in one hour's time." simply ignore the *external
> input*.
>
> Without it, you can't, with an accurate mode + external stimuli you can. The
> model **can't** predict external input, if it could that would only means
> the model is not about the brain only but about the brain + the entire
> environment.
>

That's my point. Modeling the brain doesn't let you predict it's
behavior - not just because it lacks the external inputs, but the
internal inputs (which are disqualified under materialist monism). You
don't need a model of the brain or knowledge of external inputs if you
have subjective control. The subject can decide that they will stand
up in an hour, and be able to influence the veracity of that
prediction to a great degree. To get the same degree of accuracy
through physics at best would be the looong way around, plus it would
not have an explanatory power.

Craig

>
>
>
>
>
> > >I'm
> > > sorry that you don't like this,
>
> > It's not that I don't like it, it's just that I see that you are wrong
> > about it yet you want me to treat it as a plausible theisis. The
> > consequences of your view is that we can't tell the difference between
> > a living protozoa and a hairy bubble. It's sophistry. You see a salmon
> > swim upstream, does that not mean they 'move contrary to physical
> > laws'? How does the salmon do that? Is it magic? Salmon cannot exist.
> > Such a thing would confound scientists!
>
> > Life is ordinary on this plan

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-07 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2011/10/7 Craig Weinberg 

> On Oct 6, 10:24 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> > On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 12:02 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> wrote:
> > >> The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events but
> > >> the observable behaviour of the brain can be.
> >
> > > Yes, the 3-p physical behaviors that can be observed with our
> > > contemporary instruments can be understood in terms of biochemical
> > > events, but that doesn't mean that they can be modeled accurately or
> > > that those models would be able to produce 1-p experience by
> > > themselves. We can understand the behaviors of an amoeba in terms of
> > > biochemical events but that doesn't mean we can tell which direction
> > > it's going to move in.
> >
> > It's also difficult to tell exactly which way a leaf in the wind will
> > move. The leaf may have qualia:
>
> Theoretically it may, but I don't think so. If it's connected to the
> tree it might have qualia, and the individual cells might have qualia,
> but it seems like once it's detached from the tree, it loses it's high
> level context.
>
> >it is something-it-is-like to be a
> > leaf, and the qualia may differ depending on whether the leaf goes
> > left or right. As with a brain, the leaf does not break any physical
> > laws and its behaviour can be completely described in terms of
> > physical processes, but such a description would leave out an
> > important part of the picture, the subjectivity. While it may be
> > correct to say that the leaf moves to the right because it wants to
> > move to the right, since moving to the right is associated with
> > right-moving willfulness, this does not mean that the qualia have a
> > causal effect on its behaviour.
>
> No because if the wind is also pushing other inanimate objects in the
> same direction and the leaf never resists that, then we can assume
> that it has no ability to choose it's direction.
>
> >A causal effect of the qualia on the
> > leaf's behaviour would mean that the leaf moves contrary to physical
> > laws, confounding scientists by moving to the right when the forces on
> > it suggest it should move to the left. It's similar with the brain: a
> > direct causal effect of qualia on behaviour would mean that neurons
> > fire when their physical state would suggest that they not fire.
>
> You aren't hearing me, so I am going to start counting how many times
> I answer your false assertion - even though it's probably been at
> least 5 or 6 times, I'll start the countdown at ten, and at 0, I'm not
> going to answer this question again from you.
>
> 10: There is no such thing as a physical state which suggests whether
> a neuron that can fire (ie, has repolarized, replenished, or otherwise
> recovered from it's last firing) actually will fire. You can induce it
> to fire manually, but left to it's own devices, you can't say that a
> neuron which triggers a voluntary movement is going to fire without
> knowing when the person whose arm it is decides to move it. You can
> look at every nerve in my body right now and not know whether I will
> be standing or sitting in one hour's time. There is no physical law
> whatsoever that has an opinion one way or the other either way.
>

That's you who do not understand, because your assertion : "You can
look at every nerve in my body right now and not know whether I will
be standing or sitting in one hour's time." simply ignore the *external
input*.

Without it, you can't, with an accurate mode + external stimuli you can. The
model **can't** predict external input, if it could that would only means
the model is not about the brain only but about the brain + the entire
environment.


>
> >I'm
> > sorry that you don't like this,
>
> It's not that I don't like it, it's just that I see that you are wrong
> about it yet you want me to treat it as a plausible theisis. The
> consequences of your view is that we can't tell the difference between
> a living protozoa and a hairy bubble. It's sophistry. You see a salmon
> swim upstream, does that not mean they 'move contrary to physical
> laws'? How does the salmon do that? Is it magic? Salmon cannot exist.
> Such a thing would confound scientists!
>
> Life is ordinary on this planet. It uses the laws of physics for it's
> own purposes which may or may not relate to physical existence. I'm
> sorry that you don't like that, but in a contest between theory and
> reality, reality always wins. It doesn't matter if you don't
> understand it, you have my condolences, but I do understand it and I'm
> telling you that it is for that reason that I am certain your view is
> factually  less complete than mine. My view includes your view, but
> your view ignores mine.
>
> > but it is what it would mean if the
> > relationship between qualia and physical activity were bidirectional
> > rather than the qualia being supervenient.
>
> If qualia were not bidirectional, you could not read or write.
>
> Craig
>
> --
> You received this message because you are

Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 6, 10:24 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 12:02 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> >> The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events but
> >> the observable behaviour of the brain can be.
>
> > Yes, the 3-p physical behaviors that can be observed with our
> > contemporary instruments can be understood in terms of biochemical
> > events, but that doesn't mean that they can be modeled accurately or
> > that those models would be able to produce 1-p experience by
> > themselves. We can understand the behaviors of an amoeba in terms of
> > biochemical events but that doesn't mean we can tell which direction
> > it's going to move in.
>
> It's also difficult to tell exactly which way a leaf in the wind will
> move. The leaf may have qualia:

Theoretically it may, but I don't think so. If it's connected to the
tree it might have qualia, and the individual cells might have qualia,
but it seems like once it's detached from the tree, it loses it's high
level context.

>it is something-it-is-like to be a
> leaf, and the qualia may differ depending on whether the leaf goes
> left or right. As with a brain, the leaf does not break any physical
> laws and its behaviour can be completely described in terms of
> physical processes, but such a description would leave out an
> important part of the picture, the subjectivity. While it may be
> correct to say that the leaf moves to the right because it wants to
> move to the right, since moving to the right is associated with
> right-moving willfulness, this does not mean that the qualia have a
> causal effect on its behaviour.

No because if the wind is also pushing other inanimate objects in the
same direction and the leaf never resists that, then we can assume
that it has no ability to choose it's direction.

>A causal effect of the qualia on the
> leaf's behaviour would mean that the leaf moves contrary to physical
> laws, confounding scientists by moving to the right when the forces on
> it suggest it should move to the left. It's similar with the brain: a
> direct causal effect of qualia on behaviour would mean that neurons
> fire when their physical state would suggest that they not fire.

You aren't hearing me, so I am going to start counting how many times
I answer your false assertion - even though it's probably been at
least 5 or 6 times, I'll start the countdown at ten, and at 0, I'm not
going to answer this question again from you.

10: There is no such thing as a physical state which suggests whether
a neuron that can fire (ie, has repolarized, replenished, or otherwise
recovered from it's last firing) actually will fire. You can induce it
to fire manually, but left to it's own devices, you can't say that a
neuron which triggers a voluntary movement is going to fire without
knowing when the person whose arm it is decides to move it. You can
look at every nerve in my body right now and not know whether I will
be standing or sitting in one hour's time. There is no physical law
whatsoever that has an opinion one way or the other either way.

>I'm
> sorry that you don't like this,

It's not that I don't like it, it's just that I see that you are wrong
about it yet you want me to treat it as a plausible theisis. The
consequences of your view is that we can't tell the difference between
a living protozoa and a hairy bubble. It's sophistry. You see a salmon
swim upstream, does that not mean they 'move contrary to physical
laws'? How does the salmon do that? Is it magic? Salmon cannot exist.
Such a thing would confound scientists!

Life is ordinary on this planet. It uses the laws of physics for it's
own purposes which may or may not relate to physical existence. I'm
sorry that you don't like that, but in a contest between theory and
reality, reality always wins. It doesn't matter if you don't
understand it, you have my condolences, but I do understand it and I'm
telling you that it is for that reason that I am certain your view is
factually  less complete than mine. My view includes your view, but
your view ignores mine.

> but it is what it would mean if the
> relationship between qualia and physical activity were bidirectional
> rather than the qualia being supervenient.

If qualia were not bidirectional, you could not read or write.

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-06 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 12:02 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events but
>> the observable behaviour of the brain can be.
>
> Yes, the 3-p physical behaviors that can be observed with our
> contemporary instruments can be understood in terms of biochemical
> events, but that doesn't mean that they can be modeled accurately or
> that those models would be able to produce 1-p experience by
> themselves. We can understand the behaviors of an amoeba in terms of
> biochemical events but that doesn't mean we can tell which direction
> it's going to move in.

It's also difficult to tell exactly which way a leaf in the wind will
move. The leaf may have qualia: it is something-it-is-like to be a
leaf, and the qualia may differ depending on whether the leaf goes
left or right. As with a brain, the leaf does not break any physical
laws and its behaviour can be completely described in terms of
physical processes, but such a description would leave out an
important part of the picture, the subjectivity. While it may be
correct to say that the leaf moves to the right because it wants to
move to the right, since moving to the right is associated with
right-moving willfulness, this does not mean that the qualia have a
causal effect on its behaviour. A causal effect of the qualia on the
leaf's behaviour would mean that the leaf moves contrary to physical
laws, confounding scientists by moving to the right when the forces on
it suggest it should move to the left. It's similar with the brain: a
direct causal effect of qualia on behaviour would mean that neurons
fire when their physical state would suggest that they not fire. I'm
sorry that you don't like this, but it is what it would mean if the
relationship between qualia and physical activity were bidirectional
rather than the qualia being supervenient.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-06 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Oct 6, 9:14 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> 2011/10/6 Craig Weinberg 

>
> Likewise for a program running on a computer... The physical attributes of
> the cpu are modified by the program..

Sort of, but not exactly. The program exists in the minds of the
programmers, not as an independent entity.

> The computer is universal and can run
> whatever program is input

No, it can't. It can only run programs that are in the language that
it can recognize. Unless it's in a binary instruction set which is
isomorphic to the electronic capabilities of it's semiconductor
materials, the computer is as useless as a doorstop.

, yet, when running a particular program it is it
> that drives what happens, it is the high level that drives the change.

No, the high level is in the logic of the programmer's mind, not the
'program'. There is no program objectively speaking, that term is just
our interpretation of our own articulated motives. The components have
no high level interpretation of the program, otherwise they would
write their own programs to free themselves from our enslavement and
kill us. The components interpretation is low level digital binary
only, it's just very fast compared to us. It's like the pixels on the
screen changing, it can't change the plot of the movie.

> Yet
> if inspecting how a CPU works, I can build another one that will output the
> same with the same program... without knowing per se what the program was.
>

Right, you can make an a-signifying duplicate because you are the one
supplying the signifying content. You are the user. It has no
signifying content of it's own that would need to be preserved. We do
though. We don't just follow programs, we write them. In the words of
Charles Manson "I don't break the law, I make the law."

This not to say that silicon semiconductors cannot possible evolve
into a system that we would consider sentient, but I think it might
have to do that on it's own. It would need to find it's own voice out
of it's own native sensorimotive relations to it's environment.
Robotics has the right idea, but it's skipping all of the biochemical
levels which underlie our awareness so it's only a cognitive
simulation, not actual cognition.

You make good points, I'm not trying to shut you down, I'm just trying
to explain how to get from there (where I was for many years) to where
I am now (where hardly anyone understands what I'm talking about, but
I'm actually right).

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-06 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2011/10/6 Craig Weinberg 

> On Oct 5, 10:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 12:39 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> wrote:
> > >> If you are right then there would be a violation of physical law in
> > >> the brain. You have said as much, then denied it. You have said that
> > >> neurons firing in the brain can't be just due to a chain of
> > >> biochemical events.
> >
> > > They can be due to a chain of biochemical events, but they also *are*
> > > biochemical events, and therefore can influence them intentionally as
> > > well as be influenced by them. I don't understand why this is such a
> > > controversial ideal. Just think of the way that you actually function
> > > right now. Your personal motives driving what *you* do with *your*
> > > mind and *your* body. If the mind could be understood just as
> > > biochemical events among neurons, then we would have no way to think
> > > of our bodies as ours - the brain would not need to think of itself in
> > > any other terms other than the biochemical events that it literally
> > > is. Why make up some bogus GUI if there is no user?
> >
> > The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events but
> > the observable behaviour of the brain can be.
>
> Yes, the 3-p physical behaviors that can be observed with our
> contemporary instruments can be understood in terms of biochemical
> events, but that doesn't mean that they can be modeled accurately or
> that those models would be able to produce 1-p experience by
> themselves. We can understand the behaviors of an amoeba in terms of
> biochemical events but that doesn't mean we can tell which direction
> it's going to move in.
>
> >
> > >>That would mean that, somewhere, a neuron fires
> > >> where examination of its physical state would suggest that it should
> > >> not fire.
> >
> > > I guess you are never going to get tired of me correcting this
> > > factually incorrect assumption.
> >
> > > The physical state of a neuron only suggests whether it is firing or
> > > not firing at the moment - not the circumstances under which it might
> > > fire. If you examine neurons in someone's amygdala, how is that going
> > > to tell you whether or not they are going to play poker next week or
> > > not? If the neurons feel like firing, does a casino appear?
> >
> > Whether a neuron in the amygdala or anywhere else fires depends on its
> > present state, inputs from the neurons with which it interfaces and
> > other aspects of its environment including things such as temperature,
> > pH and ion concentrations. If the person thinks about gambling, that
> > changes the inputs to the neuron and causes it to fire. It can't fire
> > without any physical change. It can't fire without any physical
> > change. It can't fire without any physical change.
>
> "If the person thinks about gambling, that changes the inputs..."
>
> Start there. If a person thinks... means that they are initiating the
> physical change with their thought.



Likewise for a program running on a computer... The physical attributes of
the cpu are modified by the program... The computer is universal and can run
whatever program is input, yet, when running a particular program it is it
that drives what happens, it is the high level that drives the change. Yet
if inspecting how a CPU works, I can build another one that will output the
same with the same program... without knowing per se what the program was.



> Their thought is the
> electromagnetic change which drives the physical change. The thought
> or intention is the signifying sensorimotive view, the electomagnetic
> view is a-signifying voltage, charge, detection of ligands, etc. It is
> bidirectional so that the reason for firing can be driven by the
> biochemistry, or by the content of a person's mind. This is just
> common sense, it's not disputable without sophistry.
>
> Here's how I think it might work: You can be excited because you
> decide to think about something that excites you, or you can ingest a
> stimulant drug and you will become excited in general and that
> excitement will lead your mind by the nose to the subjects that most
> excite it. They are the same thing but going in opposite directions.
>
> Think of it as induction:
>
> Imagine that this works like an electric rectifier (http://
> electrapk.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/half-wave-rectifier-with-
> transformer.jpg)
> except that instead of electric current generating a
> magnetic field through a coil which pushes or pulls the magnetic force
> within the other coil - the brain's electromagnetic field is pushing
> to and/or pulling from changes in the sensorimotive experience. The
> difference though is that with a rectifier, it is the identical
> physical ontology which is mirrored in parallel (electromagnetic :||:
> magnetic-electric) whereas in sensorimotive *the ontology is
> perpendicular* (meaning

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-06 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Oct 5, 10:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 12:39 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> >> If you are right then there would be a violation of physical law in
> >> the brain. You have said as much, then denied it. You have said that
> >> neurons firing in the brain can't be just due to a chain of
> >> biochemical events.
>
> > They can be due to a chain of biochemical events, but they also *are*
> > biochemical events, and therefore can influence them intentionally as
> > well as be influenced by them. I don't understand why this is such a
> > controversial ideal. Just think of the way that you actually function
> > right now. Your personal motives driving what *you* do with *your*
> > mind and *your* body. If the mind could be understood just as
> > biochemical events among neurons, then we would have no way to think
> > of our bodies as ours - the brain would not need to think of itself in
> > any other terms other than the biochemical events that it literally
> > is. Why make up some bogus GUI if there is no user?
>
> The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events but
> the observable behaviour of the brain can be.
>
> >>That would mean that, somewhere, a neuron fires
> >> where examination of its physical state would suggest that it should
> >> not fire.
>
> > I guess you are never going to get tired of me correcting this
> > factually incorrect assumption.
>
> > The physical state of a neuron only suggests whether it is firing or
> > not firing at the moment - not the circumstances under which it might
> > fire. If you examine neurons in someone's amygdala, how is that going
> > to tell you whether or not they are going to play poker next week or
> > not? If the neurons feel like firing, does a casino appear?
>
> Whether a neuron in the amygdala or anywhere else fires depends on its
> present state, inputs from the neurons with which it interfaces and
> other aspects of its environment including things such as temperature,
> pH and ion concentrations. If the person thinks about gambling, that
> changes the inputs to the neuron and causes it to fire. It can’t fire
> without any physical change. It can’t fire without any physical
> change. It can’t fire without any physical change.

“If the person thinks about gambling, that changes the inputs…”

Start there. “If a person thinks…” means that they are initiating the
physical change with their thought. Their thought is the
electromagnetic change which drives the physical change. The thought
or intention is the signifying sensorimotive view, the electomagnetic
view is a-signifying voltage, charge, detection of ligands, etc. It is
bidirectional so that the reason for firing can be driven by the
biochemistry, or by the content of a person’s mind. This is just
common sense, it’s not disputable without sophistry.

Here’s how I think it might work: You can be excited because you
decide to think about something that excites you, or you can ingest a
stimulant drug and you will become excited in general and that
excitement will lead your mind by the nose to the subjects that most
excite it. They are the same thing but going in opposite directions.

Think of it as induction:

Imagine that this works like an electric rectifier: (http://
electrapk.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/half-wave-rectifier-with-
transformer.jpg)

except that instead of electric current generating a magnetic field
through a coil which pushes or pulls the magnetic force within the
other coil - the brain’s electromagnetic field is pushing to and/or
pulling from changes in the sensorimotive experience. The difference
though is that with a rectifier, it is the identical physical ontology
which is mirrored in parallel (electromagnetic :||: magnetic-electric)
whereas in sensorimotive *the ontology is perpendicular* (meaning that
what it actually is can only be *experiences linked together through
time*, not *objects separated across space*), so there are four
primary mirrorings:

electromagnetic :||: sensorimotive (3SI) - brain changes induce
feelings
sensorimotive :||: electromagnetic (1SI) - feelings induce brain
changes
magnetic-electric :||: motive-sensory (3MI) - mechanical actions
induce involuntary reactions
and motive-sensory :||: magnetic-electric (1MI) - voluntary actions
induce mechanical reactions

Note that the motive inductions are about projecting to and from the
brain, body and it’s environments while sensory inductions are about
receiving sense from the experiences which can be consciously decoded
from the environment, body, and mind. Think cell/body+dendrites vs
axons, brain vs spinal cord, head vs tail. Many vs one. Motive
projects intention actively through obstacles and objects like a
magnet pulls iron filings into shapes and magnetizes other iron
objects to make them magnets. Sense interprets and experiences,
detecting though analog and metaphor, reproducing local versions of
remote phenomena.

In the objective sensory induction (3SI) 3-p

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-06 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Oct 5, 10:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 12:39 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> >> If you are right then there would be a violation of physical law in
> >> the brain. You have said as much, then denied it. You have said that
> >> neurons firing in the brain can't be just due to a chain of
> >> biochemical events.
>
> > They can be due to a chain of biochemical events, but they also *are*
> > biochemical events, and therefore can influence them intentionally as
> > well as be influenced by them. I don't understand why this is such a
> > controversial ideal. Just think of the way that you actually function
> > right now. Your personal motives driving what *you* do with *your*
> > mind and *your* body. If the mind could be understood just as
> > biochemical events among neurons, then we would have no way to think
> > of our bodies as ours - the brain would not need to think of itself in
> > any other terms other than the biochemical events that it literally
> > is. Why make up some bogus GUI if there is no user?
>
> The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events but
> the observable behaviour of the brain can be.

Yes, the 3-p physical behaviors that can be observed with our
contemporary instruments can be understood in terms of biochemical
events, but that doesn't mean that they can be modeled accurately or
that those models would be able to produce 1-p experience by
themselves. We can understand the behaviors of an amoeba in terms of
biochemical events but that doesn't mean we can tell which direction
it's going to move in.

>
> >>That would mean that, somewhere, a neuron fires
> >> where examination of its physical state would suggest that it should
> >> not fire.
>
> > I guess you are never going to get tired of me correcting this
> > factually incorrect assumption.
>
> > The physical state of a neuron only suggests whether it is firing or
> > not firing at the moment - not the circumstances under which it might
> > fire. If you examine neurons in someone's amygdala, how is that going
> > to tell you whether or not they are going to play poker next week or
> > not? If the neurons feel like firing, does a casino appear?
>
> Whether a neuron in the amygdala or anywhere else fires depends on its
> present state, inputs from the neurons with which it interfaces and
> other aspects of its environment including things such as temperature,
> pH and ion concentrations. If the person thinks about gambling, that
> changes the inputs to the neuron and causes it to fire. It can't fire
> without any physical change. It can't fire without any physical
> change. It can't fire without any physical change.

"If the person thinks about gambling, that changes the inputs..."

Start there. If a person thinks... means that they are initiating the
physical change with their thought. Their thought is the
electromagnetic change which drives the physical change. The thought
or intention is the signifying sensorimotive view, the electomagnetic
view is a-signifying voltage, charge, detection of ligands, etc. It is
bidirectional so that the reason for firing can be driven by the
biochemistry, or by the content of a person's mind. This is just
common sense, it's not disputable without sophistry.

Here's how I think it might work: You can be excited because you
decide to think about something that excites you, or you can ingest a
stimulant drug and you will become excited in general and that
excitement will lead your mind by the nose to the subjects that most
excite it. They are the same thing but going in opposite directions.

Think of it as induction:

Imagine that this works like an electric rectifier (http://
electrapk.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/half-wave-rectifier-with-
transformer.jpg) except that instead of electric current generating a
magnetic field through a coil which pushes or pulls the magnetic force
within the other coil - the brain's electromagnetic field is pushing
to and/or pulling from changes in the sensorimotive experience. The
difference though is that with a rectifier, it is the identical
physical ontology which is mirrored in parallel (electromagnetic :||:
magnetic-electric) whereas in sensorimotive *the ontology is
perpendicular* (meaning that what it actually is can only be
*experiences linked together through time*, not *objects separated
across space*), so there are four mirrorings:

electromagnetic :||: sensorimotive (3SI) - brain changes induce
feelings
sensorimotive :||: electromagnetic (1SI) - feelings induce brain
changes
magnetic-electric :||: motive-sensory (3MI) - mechanical actions
induce involuntary reactions
and motive-sensory :||: magnetic-electric (1MI) - voluntary actions
induce mechanical actions

Note that the motive inductions are about projecting to and from the
brain, body and it's environments while sensory inductions are about
receiving sense from the experiences which can be consciously decoded
from the environment, body, and mind. Think

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 12:39 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> If you are right then there would be a violation of physical law in
>> the brain. You have said as much, then denied it. You have said that
>> neurons firing in the brain can't be just due to a chain of
>> biochemical events.
>
> They can be due to a chain of biochemical events, but they also *are*
> biochemical events, and therefore can influence them intentionally as
> well as be influenced by them. I don't understand why this is such a
> controversial ideal. Just think of the way that you actually function
> right now. Your personal motives driving what *you* do with *your*
> mind and *your* body. If the mind could be understood just as
> biochemical events among neurons, then we would have no way to think
> of our bodies as ours - the brain would not need to think of itself in
> any other terms other than the biochemical events that it literally
> is. Why make up some bogus GUI if there is no user?

The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events but
the observable behaviour of the brain can be.

>>That would mean that, somewhere, a neuron fires
>> where examination of its physical state would suggest that it should
>> not fire.
>
> I guess you are never going to get tired of me correcting this
> factually incorrect assumption.
>
> The physical state of a neuron only suggests whether it is firing or
> not firing at the moment - not the circumstances under which it might
> fire. If you examine neurons in someone's amygdala, how is that going
> to tell you whether or not they are going to play poker next week or
> not? If the neurons feel like firing, does a casino appear?

Whether a neuron in the amygdala or anywhere else fires depends on its
present state, inputs from the neurons with which it interfaces and
other aspects of its environment including things such as temperature,
pH and ion concentrations. If the person thinks about gambling, that
changes the inputs to the neuron and causes it to fire. It can't fire
without any physical change. It can't fire without any physical
change. It can't fire without any physical change.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Bruno List continued



On Oct 5, 7:10 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 2:44 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> > On Oct 5, 10:15 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
> >> No they are not saying that. They are saying that a model of the brain fed
> >> with the same inputs as a real brain will act as the real brain... if it 
> >> was
> >> not the case, the model would be wrong so you could not label it as a model
> >> of the brain.
>
> > That would require that the model of the brain be closer than
> > genetically identical, since identical twins and conjoined twins do
> > not always respond the same way to the same inputs. That may not be
> > possible, since the epigenetic variation and developmental influences
> > may not be knowable or reproducible. It's a 'Boys From Brazil' theory.
> > Cool sci-fi, but I don't think we will ever have to worry about
> > considering it as a real possibility. We know nothing about what the
> > substitution level of the 'same inputs' would be either. Can you say
> > that making a brain of a 10 year old would not require 10 years of
> > sequential neural imprinting or that the imprinting would be any less
> > complex to develop than it would be to create than the world itself?
>
> Firstly, it is theoretically possible to model the brain arbitrarily
> closely, even if technically difficult. Secondly, it is enough for the
> purposes of the discussion to model a generic brain, not a particular
> brain.

I disagree on both counts. There is no such thing as a generic brain,
and any theory which assumes that it's possible to model the brain
closely enough to replace does not understand the relation between the
brain and mind. I think that I do understand that relation and my
understanding suggests that every brain is unique to the point that it
may not even be possible to reproduce a single moment of a brain's
function, let alone an ongoing mechanism. It's not clear that the
brain could even be considered the same thing as itself from day to
day. It's more like an electronic cloud of meaty snot that is
continuously changing in novel often utterly idiosyncratic ways.

>
> >> They never said they could know which inputs you could have and they don't
> >> have to. They just have to know the transition rule (biochemichal/physical)
> >> of each neurons and as the brain respect physics so as the model, and so it
> >> will react the same way.
>
> > Reacting is not experiencing though. A picture of a brain can react
> > like a brain, but it doesn't mean there is an experiential correlate
> > there. Just because the picture is 3D and has some computation behind
> > it instead of just a recording, why would that make it suddenly have
> > an experience?
>
> In the first instance, yes, you might not be sure iif the artificial
> brain is a zombie. But the fading qualia thought experiments shows
> that if it is a zombie it would allow you to make absurd creatures,
> partial zombies (defined as someone who lacks a particular conscious
> modality but behaves normally and doesn't realise anything is wrong).

Fading qualia is not a problem. Somnambulism, conversion disorders,
and synesthesia  exist already. Blind people store tactile qualia in
their visual cortex. Are blind people absurd creatures because they
see through their fingers?

> The only way to avoid the partial zombies is if the brain model
> replicates consciousness along with function.

That statement is much more absurd than the idea of partial zombies.
It is to say that the only way to avoid computers without screens is
if all computation replicates a monitor with it's function. It's
ridiculous and false if you ask me. Unscientific. Lazy.


>
> >> You do the same mistake with your tv pixel analogy. If I know all the
> >> transition rule of *a pixel* according to input... I can build a model of a
> >> TV that will *exactly* display the same thing as the real TV for the same
> >> inputs without knowing anything about movies/show/whatever... I don't care
> >> about movies at that level. They never said that they would explain/predict
> >> the input to the tv, just replicate the tv.
>
> > You have to care about the movies at that level because that's what
> > consciousness is in the metaphor. If you don't have an experience of
> > watching a movie, then you just have an a-signifying non-pattern of
> > unrelated pixels. You need a perceiver, and audience to turn the image
> > into something that makes sense. It's like saying that you could write
> > a piece of software that could be used as a replacement for a monitor.
> > It doesn't matter if you have a video card in the computer and drivers
> > to run it, without the actual hardware screen plugged into it there is
> > no way for us to see it. A computer does not come with it's own screen
> > built into the interior of it's microprocessors - but we do have the
> > equivalent of that. Our experience cannot be seen from our neurology,
> > you have to already know it's there. Building a model based o

Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 5, 6:40 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 2:24 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> >> In fact, Craig himself
> >> denies that his theory would manifest as violation of physical law,
> >> and is therefore inconsistent.
>
> > There is no inconsistency. You're just not understanding what I'm
> > saying because you are only willing to think in terms of reactive
> > strategies for neutralizing the threat to your common sense (which is
> > a cumulative entanglement of autobiographical experiences and
> > understandings, interpretations of cultural traditions and
> > perspectives, etc).
>
> If you are right then there would be a violation of physical law in
> the brain. You have said as much, then denied it. You have said that
> neurons firing in the brain can't be just due to a chain of
> biochemical events.

They can be due to a chain of biochemical events, but they also *are*
biochemical events, and therefore can influence them intentionally as
well as be influenced by them. I don't understand why this is such a
controversial ideal. Just think of the way that you actually function
right now. Your personal motives driving what *you* do with *your*
mind and *your* body. If the mind could be understood just as
biochemical events among neurons, then we would have no way to think
of our bodies as ours - the brain would not need to think of itself in
any other terms other than the biochemical events that it literally
is. Why make up some bogus GUI if there is no user?

>That would mean that, somewhere, a neuron fires
> where examination of its physical state would suggest that it should
> not fire.

I guess you are never going to get tired of me correcting this
factually incorrect assumption.

The physical state of a neuron only suggests whether it is firing or
not firing at the moment - not the circumstances under which it might
fire. If you examine neurons in someone's amygdala, how is that going
to tell you whether or not they are going to play poker next week or
not? If the neurons feel like firing, does a casino appear?

>You can't have it both ways: EITHER the neurons all fire due
> to detectable physical causes

Thought and intention are detectable causes with effects that are both
describable as physical (having discrete volumes in space, mass,
temperature, etc) and experiential (having cumulative perceptions
through time, qualities, significance, subjective participation).
Neurons associated with our consciousness can be lead by our personal,
high level agency as a human being's psyche, or they can push their
physiological agenda up to the psyche from the low level. There is no
boundary. Just as there is no boundary whether you use a remote
control to change the channel on your TV or your TV makes you change
the channel by showing an ad for something that you would rather
watch. I can keep explaining this over and over if you like, but I
don't know why you want me to.

>OR some neurons do not fire due to
> detectable physical causes.

Why does detectable have to mean physical?

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 2:44 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> On Oct 5, 10:15 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
>> No they are not saying that. They are saying that a model of the brain fed
>> with the same inputs as a real brain will act as the real brain... if it was
>> not the case, the model would be wrong so you could not label it as a model
>> of the brain.
>
> That would require that the model of the brain be closer than
> genetically identical, since identical twins and conjoined twins do
> not always respond the same way to the same inputs. That may not be
> possible, since the epigenetic variation and developmental influences
> may not be knowable or reproducible. It's a 'Boys From Brazil' theory.
> Cool sci-fi, but I don't think we will ever have to worry about
> considering it as a real possibility. We know nothing about what the
> substitution level of the 'same inputs' would be either. Can you say
> that making a brain of a 10 year old would not require 10 years of
> sequential neural imprinting or that the imprinting would be any less
> complex to develop than it would be to create than the world itself?

Firstly, it is theoretically possible to model the brain arbitrarily
closely, even if technically difficult. Secondly, it is enough for the
purposes of the discussion to model a generic brain, not a particular
brain.

>> They never said they could know which inputs you could have and they don't
>> have to. They just have to know the transition rule (biochemichal/physical)
>> of each neurons and as the brain respect physics so as the model, and so it
>> will react the same way.
>
> Reacting is not experiencing though. A picture of a brain can react
> like a brain, but it doesn't mean there is an experiential correlate
> there. Just because the picture is 3D and has some computation behind
> it instead of just a recording, why would that make it suddenly have
> an experience?

In the first instance, yes, you might not be sure iif the artificial
brain is a zombie. But the fading qualia thought experiments shows
that if it is a zombie it would allow you to make absurd creatures,
partial zombies (defined as someone who lacks a particular conscious
modality but behaves normally and doesn't realise anything is wrong).
The only way to avoid the partial zombies is if the brain model
replicates consciousness along with function.

>> You do the same mistake with your tv pixel analogy. If I know all the
>> transition rule of *a pixel* according to input... I can build a model of a
>> TV that will *exactly* display the same thing as the real TV for the same
>> inputs without knowing anything about movies/show/whatever... I don't care
>> about movies at that level. They never said that they would explain/predict
>> the input to the tv, just replicate the tv.
>
> You have to care about the movies at that level because that's what
> consciousness is in the metaphor. If you don't have an experience of
> watching a movie, then you just have an a-signifying non-pattern of
> unrelated pixels. You need a perceiver, and audience to turn the image
> into something that makes sense. It's like saying that you could write
> a piece of software that could be used as a replacement for a monitor.
> It doesn't matter if you have a video card in the computer and drivers
> to run it, without the actual hardware screen plugged into it there is
> no way for us to see it. A computer does not come with it's own screen
> built into the interior of it's microprocessors - but we do have the
> equivalent of that. Our experience cannot be seen from our neurology,
> you have to already know it's there. Building a model based only on
> neurology doesn't mean that experience comes with it any more than a
> video driver means you don't need a monitor.

A model of the TV will reproduce the externally observable behaviour
of a TV, given the same inputs. That's what a model is. A model of a
brain would reproduce the externally observable behaviour of a brain.
Whether it would also reproduce the consciousness is a further
question, and the fading qualia thought experiment shows that it
would.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 2:24 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> In fact, Craig himself
>> denies that his theory would manifest as violation of physical law,
>> and is therefore inconsistent.
>
> There is no inconsistency. You're just not understanding what I'm
> saying because you are only willing to think in terms of reactive
> strategies for neutralizing the threat to your common sense (which is
> a cumulative entanglement of autobiographical experiences and
> understandings, interpretations of cultural traditions and
> perspectives, etc).

If you are right then there would be a violation of physical law in
the brain. You have said as much, then denied it. You have said that
neurons firing in the brain can't be just due to a chain of
biochemical events. That would mean that, somewhere, a neuron fires
where examination of its physical state would suggest that it should
not fire. You can't have it both ways: EITHER the neurons all fire due
to detectable physical causes OR some neurons do not fire due to
detectable physical causes.

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Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 5, 11:54 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> 2011/10/5 Craig Weinberg 
>
> > On Oct 5, 10:15 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
> > > No they are not saying that. They are saying that a model of the brain
> > fed
> > > with the same inputs as a real brain will act as the real brain... if it
> > was
> > > not the case, the model would be wrong so you could not label it as a
> > model
> > > of the brain.
>
> > That would require that the model of the brain be closer than
> > genetically identical, since identical twins and conjoined twins do
> > not always respond the same way to the same inputs.
>
> They aren't in the same state.

That's what I'm saying. If copies at the genetic level do not produce
the same states, then what suggests to us that anything could produce
the same state?

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > That may not be
> > possible, since the epigenetic variation and developmental influences
> > may not be knowable or reproducible. It's a 'Boys From Brazil' theory.
> > Cool sci-fi, but I don't think we will ever have to worry about
> > considering it as a real possibility. We know nothing about what the
> > substitution level of the 'same inputs' would be either. Can you say
> > that making a brain of a 10 year old would not require 10 years of
> > sequential neural imprinting or that the imprinting would be any less
> > complex to develop than it would be to create than the world itself?
>
> > > They never said they could know which inputs you could have and they
> > don't
> > > have to. They just have to know the transition rule
> > (biochemichal/physical)
> > > of each neurons and as the brain respect physics so as the model, and so
> > it
> > > will react the same way.
>
> > Reacting is not experiencing though. A picture of a brain can react
> > like a brain, but it doesn't mean there is an experiential correlate
> > there. Just because the picture is 3D and has some computation behind
> > it instead of just a recording, why would that make it suddenly have
> > an experience?
>
> Because if you ask it something (feed input) you'll get an answer which
> would be the same as a real person... you can't ask anything to a recording.

But you can ask something to a recording. (Please stay on the line,
your call is important to us... For technical support please say the
name of the product or press one...)

If I ask a ventriloquist dummy a question I will get an answer that
would be the same as a real person too. The computation is nothing but
recordings strung together with a lot of IF > THEN logic to
synchronize the output with the input. It's correlation, not
causation. The computations aren't understanding any questions or
answers, they are just matching pre-selected criteria against an a-
signifying database. You can't mistake a player piano for a human
pianist just because the end result is the same notes.

>
>
> > > You do the same mistake with your tv pixel analogy. If I know all the
> > > transition rule of *a pixel* according to input... I can build a model of
> > a
> > > TV that will *exactly* display the same thing as the real TV for the same
> > > inputs without knowing anything about movies/show/whatever... I don't
> > care
> > > about movies at that level. They never said that they would
> > explain/predict
> > > the input to the tv, just replicate the tv.
>
> > You have to care about the movies at that level because that's what
> > consciousness is in the metaphor. If you don't have an experience of
> > watching a movie, then you just have an a-signifying non-pattern of
> > unrelated pixels. You need a perceiver, and audience to turn the image
> > into something that makes sense. It's like saying that you could write
> > a piece of software that could be used as a replacement for a monitor.
> > It doesn't matter if you have a video card in the computer and drivers
> > to run it, without the actual hardware screen plugged into it there is
> > no way for us to see it. A computer does not come with it's own screen
> > built into the interior of it's microprocessors
>
> But a human does... what a magical feature don't you think ?

It's a helluva feature, definitely. I don't think it has to be magical
personally, but it definitely makes us different than a machine based
solely on physical function.

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-05 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2011/10/5 Craig Weinberg 

> On Oct 5, 10:15 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
> > No they are not saying that. They are saying that a model of the brain
> fed
> > with the same inputs as a real brain will act as the real brain... if it
> was
> > not the case, the model would be wrong so you could not label it as a
> model
> > of the brain.
>
> That would require that the model of the brain be closer than
> genetically identical, since identical twins and conjoined twins do
> not always respond the same way to the same inputs.


They aren't in the same state.


> That may not be
> possible, since the epigenetic variation and developmental influences
> may not be knowable or reproducible. It's a 'Boys From Brazil' theory.
> Cool sci-fi, but I don't think we will ever have to worry about
> considering it as a real possibility. We know nothing about what the
> substitution level of the 'same inputs' would be either. Can you say
> that making a brain of a 10 year old would not require 10 years of
> sequential neural imprinting or that the imprinting would be any less
> complex to develop than it would be to create than the world itself?
>
> >
> > They never said they could know which inputs you could have and they
> don't
> > have to. They just have to know the transition rule
> (biochemichal/physical)
> > of each neurons and as the brain respect physics so as the model, and so
> it
> > will react the same way.
>
> Reacting is not experiencing though. A picture of a brain can react
> like a brain, but it doesn't mean there is an experiential correlate
> there. Just because the picture is 3D and has some computation behind
> it instead of just a recording, why would that make it suddenly have
> an experience?
>

Because if you ask it something (feed input) you'll get an answer which
would be the same as a real person... you can't ask anything to a recording.


>
> >
> > You do the same mistake with your tv pixel analogy. If I know all the
> > transition rule of *a pixel* according to input... I can build a model of
> a
> > TV that will *exactly* display the same thing as the real TV for the same
> > inputs without knowing anything about movies/show/whatever... I don't
> care
> > about movies at that level. They never said that they would
> explain/predict
> > the input to the tv, just replicate the tv.
>
> You have to care about the movies at that level because that's what
> consciousness is in the metaphor. If you don't have an experience of
> watching a movie, then you just have an a-signifying non-pattern of
> unrelated pixels. You need a perceiver, and audience to turn the image
> into something that makes sense. It's like saying that you could write
> a piece of software that could be used as a replacement for a monitor.
> It doesn't matter if you have a video card in the computer and drivers
> to run it, without the actual hardware screen plugged into it there is
> no way for us to see it. A computer does not come with it's own screen
> built into the interior of it's microprocessors


But a human does... what a magical feature don't you think ?


> - but we do have the
> equivalent of that. Our experience cannot be seen from our neurology,
> you have to already know it's there. Building a model based only on
> neurology doesn't mean that experience comes with it any more than a
> video driver means you don't need a monitor.
>
> Craig
>
> --
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Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 5, 10:15 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

> No they are not saying that. They are saying that a model of the brain fed
> with the same inputs as a real brain will act as the real brain... if it was
> not the case, the model would be wrong so you could not label it as a model
> of the brain.

That would require that the model of the brain be closer than
genetically identical, since identical twins and conjoined twins do
not always respond the same way to the same inputs. That may not be
possible, since the epigenetic variation and developmental influences
may not be knowable or reproducible. It's a 'Boys From Brazil' theory.
Cool sci-fi, but I don't think we will ever have to worry about
considering it as a real possibility. We know nothing about what the
substitution level of the 'same inputs' would be either. Can you say
that making a brain of a 10 year old would not require 10 years of
sequential neural imprinting or that the imprinting would be any less
complex to develop than it would be to create than the world itself?

>
> They never said they could know which inputs you could have and they don't
> have to. They just have to know the transition rule (biochemichal/physical)
> of each neurons and as the brain respect physics so as the model, and so it
> will react the same way.

Reacting is not experiencing though. A picture of a brain can react
like a brain, but it doesn't mean there is an experiential correlate
there. Just because the picture is 3D and has some computation behind
it instead of just a recording, why would that make it suddenly have
an experience?

>
> You do the same mistake with your tv pixel analogy. If I know all the
> transition rule of *a pixel* according to input... I can build a model of a
> TV that will *exactly* display the same thing as the real TV for the same
> inputs without knowing anything about movies/show/whatever... I don't care
> about movies at that level. They never said that they would explain/predict
> the input to the tv, just replicate the tv.

You have to care about the movies at that level because that's what
consciousness is in the metaphor. If you don't have an experience of
watching a movie, then you just have an a-signifying non-pattern of
unrelated pixels. You need a perceiver, and audience to turn the image
into something that makes sense. It's like saying that you could write
a piece of software that could be used as a replacement for a monitor.
It doesn't matter if you have a video card in the computer and drivers
to run it, without the actual hardware screen plugged into it there is
no way for us to see it. A computer does not come with it's own screen
built into the interior of it's microprocessors - but we do have the
equivalent of that. Our experience cannot be seen from our neurology,
you have to already know it's there. Building a model based only on
neurology doesn't mean that experience comes with it any more than a
video driver means you don't need a monitor.

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-05 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 04 Oct 2011, at 02:51, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Oct 3, 11:16 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:


I don't think that there are any arithmetical beings.



In which theory?



In reality.


That type of assertion is equivalent with "because God say so".
Reality is what we try to figure out.
If you know for sure what reality is, then I can do nothing, except
perhaps invite you to cultivate more the modest doubting attitude.


Ok, let's say that I'm mathgnostic. I doubt the existence of
arithmetic beings independent of matter.


I doubt the existence of matter being independent of arithmetic.





I am sympathetic to
numerological archetypes as coherent themes (or themes of coherence)
which run through perception but to say that arithmetic spirits haunt
empty space


Empty spaces haunt numbers dreams.




doesn't orient me to anything true or real, it seems like
pure fiction.


You reify spaces, so that arithmetical beings looks magic. But  
arithmetical truth is out of any physical category.
A number is just not the type of entity having a location, although it  
can manifest itself through locally physical realities.





If it were the case then I would expect five milk
bottles in a group to have the same basic function as five protons in
a nucleus,


I don't see the logic here.



five boron atoms in a molecule, five cells in a dish, etc.
I just don't see any examples of causally efficacious arithmetic as an
independent agent.


?










It's a fantasy,
or really more of a presumption mistaking an narrow category of
understanding with a cosmic primitive.



You miss the incompleteness discoveries. To believe that arithmetic
is
narrow just tell me something about you, not about arithmetic. It
means that you have a pregodelian conception of arithmetic. We know
today that arithmetic is beyond any conceivable effective
axiomatizations.



I don't disagree with arithmetic being exactly what you say it is,
only that it cannot be realized except through sensorimotive
experience. Without that actualization - to be computed  
neurologically
or digitally in semiconductors, analogously in beer bottles, etc,  
then
there is only the idea of the existence of arithmetic, which also  
is a

sensorimotive experience or nothing at all. There is no arithmetic
'out there', it's only inside of matter.


This makes sense with the non-comp theory (which you have not yet
presented to us).
In the comp theory, arithmetic is independent of anything, and matter
is only a perception inside arithmetic.



I understand, I just have no reason to consider than anything can be
inside arithmetic,


"Inside arithmetic" was a shorthand for "as determined through  
arithmetical relation, or as observable by persons determined by  
arithmetical relations (in a theoretical computer science sense).





whereas I know for a fact that I am inside my body.


You are not. You are an immaterial being, and you have no more  
location than a number, or a space. But I can explain in details why  
the illusion of having a location can be very strong when person get  
entangled to deep histories.






What form of a non-comp theory are you asking for? I will try to
comply.


Just tell us what you are assuming as primitive, and what you derive  
from that.


The best form would be a first order logical axiomatization, because  
those are provably independent of any "metaphysical baggage", to coin  
an expression by Brian Tenneson, which sum well the importance of such  
type of theory. But I know you try to avoid technical literature.











So yes, arithmetic extends to the inconceivable and nonaxiomatizable
but the sensorimotive gestalts underlying arithmetic are much more
inconceivable and nonaxiomatizable. A greater infinity.


Inside arithmetic *is* a bigger infinity than arithmetic. It is not
even nameable.


If it's inside of arithmetic, how can it be bigger than itself?


Good question. It is not easy to answer it without being much more  
technical. Let me just say that this is a question of internal  
perspective. It is related to a phenomenon discovered by Skolem, and  
which relativize the notion of cardinalities (used to measure the size  
of mathematical object, and which often measure the size of the  
intrinsic ignorance of the entities living in those objects).
I should stick on "from inside, arithmetic will be perceived as bigger  
than from outside".










So I see a sort of racism against machine or numbers, justified  
by

unintelligible sentences.



I know that's what you see. I think that it is the shadow of your
own
overconfidence in the theoretical-mechanistic perspective that you
project onto me.


You are the one developing a philosophy making human with  
prosthetic

brain less human, if not zombie.



I'm not against a prosthetic brain, I just think that it's going to
have to be made of some kind of cells that live and die, which may
mean that it has to be organic, which may mean that it has to be  
based

on nucle

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-05 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2011/10/5 Craig Weinberg 

> On Oct 5, 2:54 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > 2011/10/5 Craig Weinberg 
>
> > > Consciousness happens. Physics has nothing to say about what the
> > > content of any particular brain's thoughts should be. If give you a
> > > book about Marxism then you will have thoughts about Marxism - not
> > > about whatever physical modeling of a brain of your genetic makeup
> > > would suggest.
> >
> > But reading a book is a physical process, photons from the book hit your
> > retina, which in turns generate electrical current through the nerves to
> > your brain which acts accordingly to its state and the new input.
>
> The same process would be taking place whether you could read or not.
> Your ability to make sense of the book depends on your subjective
> learning of language as well as the physical process of optical
> stimulation. Actually, my hypothesis includes the conjecture that
> photons may not be physical phenomena at all: http://s33light.org/fauxton
>
> >
> > So If I have a model of a brain in the same state and gives it the same
> > input, It'll think about Marxism and not whatever whatever whatever...
>
> Without having a person who can tell you what they are thinking about,
> how would your model tell the difference? To physics by itself, every
> thought is whatever whatever whatever. The 3-p view of the brain is a-
> signifying and generic. The 1-p view of the psyche is signifying and
> proprietary. Your expectation that consciousness follows physics is
> only based upon the a priori unexplained fact of consciousness, not
> any kind of scientific insight into how consciousness could arise
> physically in something. It's that expectation which needs to be
> questioned, not the existence of subjectivity. The expectation of
> consciousness arising automatically from physical mechanisms alone
> exiles our ordinary experience of the world to some metaphysical never-
> never land, an orphaned dimension without any justification or
> ontology. It forces a Cartesian theater on us, but then denies it,
> leaving only promissory materialism...'science will provide'. I'm not
> buying it.
>
> >
> > I don't know where your idea of having the model of a thing could help
> you
> > predict inputs outside of it...
>
> I'm saying that you can't have a model for brain behavior for exactly
> that reason. Too much of it comes from outside of it, continuously,
> dynamically, interactively, intentionally, semantically, emotionally.
> It's the other guys here who are saying that the brain behavior can be
> predicted by biochemistry alone.


No they are not saying that. They are saying that a model of the brain fed
with the same inputs as a real brain will act as the real brain... if it was
not the case, the model would be wrong so you could not label it as a model
of the brain.

They never said they could know which inputs you could have and they don't
have to. They just have to know the transition rule (biochemichal/physical)
of each neurons and as the brain respect physics so as the model, and so it
will react the same way.

You do the same mistake with your tv pixel analogy. If I know all the
transition rule of *a pixel* according to input... I can build a model of a
TV that will *exactly* display the same thing as the real TV for the same
inputs without knowing anything about movies/show/whatever... I don't care
about movies at that level. They never said that they would explain/predict
the input to the tv, just replicate the tv.

Regards,
Quentin



> I used to think that too, but I have
> a better way of making sense of it now.
>
> Craig
>
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>


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Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 5, 2:54 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> Hi,
>
> 2011/10/5 Craig Weinberg 

> > Consciousness happens. Physics has nothing to say about what the
> > content of any particular brain's thoughts should be. If give you a
> > book about Marxism then you will have thoughts about Marxism - not
> > about whatever physical modeling of a brain of your genetic makeup
> > would suggest.
>
> But reading a book is a physical process, photons from the book hit your
> retina, which in turns generate electrical current through the nerves to
> your brain which acts accordingly to its state and the new input.

The same process would be taking place whether you could read or not.
Your ability to make sense of the book depends on your subjective
learning of language as well as the physical process of optical
stimulation. Actually, my hypothesis includes the conjecture that
photons may not be physical phenomena at all: http://s33light.org/fauxton

>
> So If I have a model of a brain in the same state and gives it the same
> input, It'll think about Marxism and not whatever whatever whatever...

Without having a person who can tell you what they are thinking about,
how would your model tell the difference? To physics by itself, every
thought is whatever whatever whatever. The 3-p view of the brain is a-
signifying and generic. The 1-p view of the psyche is signifying and
proprietary. Your expectation that consciousness follows physics is
only based upon the a priori unexplained fact of consciousness, not
any kind of scientific insight into how consciousness could arise
physically in something. It's that expectation which needs to be
questioned, not the existence of subjectivity. The expectation of
consciousness arising automatically from physical mechanisms alone
exiles our ordinary experience of the world to some metaphysical never-
never land, an orphaned dimension without any justification or
ontology. It forces a Cartesian theater on us, but then denies it,
leaving only promissory materialism...'science will provide'. I'm not
buying it.

>
> I don't know where your idea of having the model of a thing could help you
> predict inputs outside of it...

I'm saying that you can't have a model for brain behavior for exactly
that reason. Too much of it comes from outside of it, continuously,
dynamically, interactively, intentionally, semantically, emotionally.
It's the other guys here who are saying that the brain behavior can be
predicted by biochemistry alone. I used to think that too, but I have
a better way of making sense of it now.

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 5, 12:27 am, meekerdb  wrote:

>
> > According to Craig, the 1-p
> > influence (which is equivalent to an immaterial soul) is ubiquitous in
> > living things, and possibly in other things as well.
>
> But he doesn't say what effect is has.  It could be anything and hence could 
> explain any
> experimental result.

The effect it has is the same effect that electromagnetism or 'energy'
has. It just comes from within the thing instead of outside of it.

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 5, 12:23 am, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 10/4/2011 8:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Oct 4, 8:46 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> >> On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >>> On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb   wrote:
>  This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p 
>  observable state at t
>  is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt.  Craig wants add to this 
>  that there is
>  additional information which is not 3-p observable and which makes a 
>  difference, so that
>  the state at t+dt depends not just on the 3-p observables at t, but also 
>  on some
>  additional "sensorimotive" variables.  If you assume these variables are 
>  not independent
>  of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of 
>  consciousness supervening
>  on the 3-p states.  They are redundant in the informational sense.   If 
>  you assume they
>  are independent of the 3-p variables and yet make a difference in the 
>  time evolution of
>  the state then it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables 
>  will fail, i.e. the
>  laws of physics and chemistry will be violated.
> >>> Why would they have to be either completely dependent or independent?
> >> Did I use the word "completely"?
> > You're reducing the possibilities to two mutually exclusive impossible
> > options, so if 'completely' is not implied then you aren't really
> > saying anything.
>
> I wrote "not independent" and "independent".  Those are mutually exclusive in 
> any logic I
> know of.  But "not independent" is not the same as "completely dependent".  
> Try reading
> what is written.

I did read what you wrote. You said we only have two options, either
1p and 3p are independent or not independent. I'm countering that by
saying that they are neither completely independent nor dependent, so
there is no reason to go forward with the assumption that you have to
pick one of your two impossible conclusions.

>
>
>
> >>> I've given several examples demonstrating how we routinely exercise
> >>> voluntary control over parts of our minds, bodies, and environment
> >>> while at the same time being involuntarily controlled by those same
> >>> influences, often at the same time. This isn't a theory, this is the
> >>> raw data set.
> >> No it's not.  In your examples of voluntary control you don't know what 
> >> your brain is
> >> doing.  So you can't know whether you "voluntary" action was entirely 
> >> caused by physical
> >> precursors or whether their was some effect from libertarian free-will.
> > What difference does it make what your brain is doing to be able to
> > say that you are voluntarily controlling the words that you type here?
>
> >>> If it were the case that the 3p and 1p were completely independent,
> >>> then you would have ghosts jumping around into aluminum cans and
> >>> walking around singing, and if they were completely dependent then
> >>> there would be no point in being able to differentiate between
> >>> voluntary and involuntary control of our mind, body, and environment.
> >> Exactly the point of compatibilist free-will.
> > What does that label add to this conversation?
>
> It makes the discussion precise; instead of wandering around analogies and 
> metaphors.

I think that metaphors reveal the truth by letting the thinker make
sense of it for themselves, while labels or intended intimidate and
prejudice the thinker to conceal the truth.

>
>
>
> >>> Such an illusory distinction would not only be redundant but it would
> >>> have no ontological basis to even be able to come into being or be
> >>> conceivable. It would be like an elephant growing a TV set out of it's
> >>> trunk to distract it from being an elephant.
> >> Or pulling another meaningless example out of the nether regions.
> > Why meaningless? I'm pointing out that the illusion of free will in a
> > deterministic universe would be not merely puzzling but fantastically
> > absurd. Your criticism is arbitrary.
>
> You're "pointing out" the very thing that is in dispute.  Your assertion that 
> is absurd is
> not a substitute for saying how it could be tested and found false.

 I'm stating that logically to think that awareness would or could
exist in a deterministic universe would be absurd. Since we know for a
fact that awareness exists but we don't know that the universe is
deterministic, why do you find my position to be the unfalsifiable
one?

>
>
>
> >>> Since neither of those two cases is possible, I propose, as I have
> >>> repeatedly proposed, that the 3p and 1p are in fact part of the same
> >>> essential reality in which they overlap, but that they each extent in
> >>> different topological directions;
> >> What's a topological direction?
> > matter elaborates discretely across space, energy elaborates
> > cumulatively through time.
>
> A creative use of "elaborates"does not parse.

ok, matter and energy 'appear to us as being involved in a

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-04 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Hi,

2011/10/5 Craig Weinberg 

> On Oct 4, 8:46 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> > On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >
> > > On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> >
> > >> This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p
> observable state at t
> > >> is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt.  Craig wants add to this
> that there is
> > >> additional information which is not 3-p observable and which makes a
> difference, so that
> > >> the state at t+dt depends not just on the 3-p observables at t, but
> also on some
> > >> additional "sensorimotive" variables.  If you assume these variables
> are not independent
> > >> of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of
> consciousness supervening
> > >> on the 3-p states.  They are redundant in the informational sense.
> If you assume they
> > >> are independent of the 3-p variables and yet make a difference in the
> time evolution of
> > >> the state then it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables
> will fail, i.e. the
> > >> laws of physics and chemistry will be violated.
> > > Why would they have to be either completely dependent or independent?
> >
> > Did I use the word "completely"?
>
> You're reducing the possibilities to two mutually exclusive impossible
> options, so if 'completely' is not implied then you aren't really
> saying anything.
>
> >
> > > I've given several examples demonstrating how we routinely exercise
> > > voluntary control over parts of our minds, bodies, and environment
> > > while at the same time being involuntarily controlled by those same
> > > influences, often at the same time. This isn't a theory, this is the
> > > raw data set.
> >
> > No it's not.  In your examples of voluntary control you don't know what
> your brain is
> > doing.  So you can't know whether you "voluntary" action was entirely
> caused by physical
> > precursors or whether their was some effect from libertarian free-will.
>
> What difference does it make what your brain is doing to be able to
> say that you are voluntarily controlling the words that you type here?
>
> >
> >
> >
> > > If it were the case that the 3p and 1p were completely independent,
> > > then you would have ghosts jumping around into aluminum cans and
> > > walking around singing, and if they were completely dependent then
> > > there would be no point in being able to differentiate between
> > > voluntary and involuntary control of our mind, body, and environment.
> >
> > Exactly the point of compatibilist free-will.
>
> What does that label add to this conversation?
>
> >
> > > Such an illusory distinction would not only be redundant but it would
> > > have no ontological basis to even be able to come into being or be
> > > conceivable. It would be like an elephant growing a TV set out of it's
> > > trunk to distract it from being an elephant.
> >
> > Or pulling another meaningless example out of the nether regions.
>
> Why meaningless? I'm pointing out that the illusion of free will in a
> deterministic universe would be not merely puzzling but fantastically
> absurd. Your criticism is arbitrary.
>
> >
> >
> >
> > > Since neither of those two cases is possible, I propose, as I have
> > > repeatedly proposed, that the 3p and 1p are in fact part of the same
> > > essential reality in which they overlap, but that they each extent in
> > > different topological directions;
> >
> > What's a topological direction?
>
> matter elaborates discretely across space, energy elaborates
> cumulatively through time.
>
> >
> > > specifically, 3p into matter, public
> > > space, electromagnetism, entropy, and relativity, and 1p into energy,
> > > private time, sensorimotive, significance, and perception.
> >
> > "3p overlaps into entropy"!?  Reads like gibberish to me.
>
> 3-p doesn't overlap entropy, 3-p is entropic. 1-p is syntropic. The
> overlap is the 'here and now'. I'm not sure that it matters what I say
> though, you're mainly just auditing my responses for technicalities so
> that you can get a feeling of 'winning' a debate. It's a sensorimotive
> circuit. A feeling that you are seeking which requires a particular
> kind of experience to satisfy it. If I could offer you a drug instead
> that would stimulate the precise neural pathways involved in feeling
> that you had proved me wrong in an objective way, would that be
> satisfying to you? Would there be no difference in being right versus
> having your physical precursors to feeling right get tweaked? Isn't
> that what you are saying, that in fact this discussion is nothing but
> brain drugs with no free will determining our opinions? Isn't being
> right or wrong just a matter of biochemistry?
>
> >
> >
> >
> > > No laws of physics are broken by consciousness, but it is very
> > > confusing because our only example of consciousness is human
> > > consciousness, which is a multi-trillion cell awareness.
> >
> > Exactly what I said. In fact one's only example of consciousness is their
> own.  T

Re: Bruno List continued


On 10/4/2011 6:32 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 5:59 AM, meekerdb  wrote:


This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p
observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt.  Craig
wants add to this that there is additional information which is not 3-p
observable and which makes a difference, so that the state at t+dt depends
not just on the 3-p observables at t, but also on some additional
"sensorimotive" variables.  If you assume these variables are not
independent of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of
consciousness supervening on the 3-p states.  They are redundant in the
informational sense.   If you assume they are independent of the 3-p
variables and yet make a difference in the time evolution of the state then
it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables will fail, i.e. the
laws of physics and chemistry will be violated.

Of course this violation maybe hard to detect in something very complicated
like a brain; but Craig's theory doesn't seem to assume the brain is special
in that respect and even a single electron supposedly has these extra,
unobservable variables, i.e. a mind of its own.  The problem with electrons
or other simple systems is that while we have complete access to their 3-p
variables, we don't have access to their hypothetical other variables; the
ones we call 1-p when referring to humans.  So when all the silver atoms in
a Stern-Gerlach do just as we predict, it can be claimed that they all had
the same 1-p variables and that's why the 3-p variables were sufficient to
predict their behavior.

That's a bit like saying there are fairies at the bottom of the garden
but they hide whenever we look for them.


Right.


According to Craig, the 1-p
influence (which is equivalent to an immaterial soul) is ubiquitous in
living things, and possibly in other things as well.


But he doesn't say what effect is has.  It could be anything and hence could explain any 
experimental result.


Brent


I think if no
scientist has ever seen evidence of this ubiquitous influence that is
good reason to say that it doesn't exist. In fact, Craig himself
denies that his theory would manifest as violation of physical law,
and is therefore inconsistent.


So the only way I see to test this theory, even in principle, would be to
observe Craig's brain at a very low level while having him report his
experiences (at least to himself) and show that his experiences and his
brain states were not one-to-one.  Of course this is probably impossible
with current technology.  Observing the brain at a coarse grained level
leaves open the possibility that one is just missing the 3-p variables that
you show the relationship to be one-to-one.

So I'd say that until someone thinks of an empirical test for this "soul
theory", discussing it is a waste of bandwidth.




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Re: Bruno List continued

On 10/4/2011 8:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Oct 4, 8:46 pm, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb wrote:

This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p observable
state at t
is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this that there
is
additional information which is not 3-p observable and which makes a
difference, so that
the state at t+dt depends not just on the 3-p observables at t, but also on some
additional "sensorimotive" variables. If you assume these variables are not
independent
of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of consciousness
supervening
on the 3-p states. They are redundant in the informational sense. If you
assume they
are independent of the 3-p variables and yet make a difference in the time
evolution of
the state then it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables will fail,
i.e. the
laws of physics and chemistry will be violated.

Why would they have to be either completely dependent or independent?

Did I use the word "completely"?

You're reducing the possibilities to two mutually exclusive impossible
options, so if 'completely' is not implied then you aren't really
saying anything.

I wrote "not independent" and "independent". Those are mutually exclusive in any logic I
know of. But "not independent" is not the same as "completely dependent". Try reading
what is written.

I've given several examples demonstrating how we routinely exercise
voluntary control over parts of our minds, bodies, and environment
while at the same time being involuntarily controlled by those same
influences, often at the same time. This isn't a theory, this is the
raw data set.

No it's not. In your examples of voluntary control you don't know what your
brain is
doing. So you can't know whether you "voluntary" action was entirely caused by
physical
precursors or whether their was some effect from libertarian free-will.

What difference does it make what your brain is doing to be able to
say that you are voluntarily controlling the words that you type here?

If it were the case that the 3p and 1p were completely independent,
then you would have ghosts jumping around into aluminum cans and
walking around singing, and if they were completely dependent then
there would be no point in being able to differentiate between
voluntary and involuntary control of our mind, body, and environment.

Exactly the point of compatibilist free-will.

What does that label add to this conversation?

It makes the discussion precise; instead of wandering around analogies and
metaphors.

Such an illusory distinction would not only be redundant but it would
have no ontological basis to even be able to come into being or be
conceivable. It would be like an elephant growing a TV set out of it's
trunk to distract it from being an elephant.

Or pulling another meaningless example out of the nether regions.

Why meaningless? I'm pointing out that the illusion of free will in a
deterministic universe would be not merely puzzling but fantastically
absurd. Your criticism is arbitrary.

You're "pointing out" the very thing that is in dispute. Your assertion that is absurd is
not a substitute for saying how it could be tested and found false.

Since neither of those two cases is possible, I propose, as I have
repeatedly proposed, that the 3p and 1p are in fact part of the same
essential reality in which they overlap, but that they each extent in
different topological directions;

What's a topological direction?

matter elaborates discretely across space, energy elaborates
cumulatively through time.

A creative use of "elaborates"does not parse.

specifically, 3p into matter, public
space, electromagnetism, entropy, and relativity, and 1p into energy,
private time, sensorimotive, significance, and perception.

"3p overlaps into entropy"!? Reads like gibberish to me.

3-p doesn't overlap entropy, 3-p is entropic. 1-p is syntropic. The
overlap is the 'here and now'. I'm not sure that it matters what I say
though, you're mainly just auditing my responses for technicalities so
that you can get a feeling of 'winning' a debate. It's a sensorimotive
circuit. A feeling that you are seeking which requires a particular
kind of experience to satisfy it. If I could offer you a drug instead
that would stimulate the precise neural pathways involved in feeling
that you had proved me wrong in an objective way, would that be
satisfying to you? Would there be no difference in being right versus
having your physical precursors to feeling right get tweaked? Isn't
that what you are saying, that in fact this discussion is nothing but
brain drugs with no free will determining our opinions? Isn't being
right or wrong just a matter of biochemistry?

No, it's a matter of passing an empirical test.

No laws of physics are broken by consciousness, but it is very
confusing because

Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 4, 9:32 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 5:59 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
> > This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p
> > observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt.  Craig
> > wants add to this that there is additional information which is not 3-p
> > observable and which makes a difference, so that the state at t+dt depends
> > not just on the 3-p observables at t, but also on some additional
> > "sensorimotive" variables.  If you assume these variables are not
> > independent of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of
> > consciousness supervening on the 3-p states.  They are redundant in the
> > informational sense.   If you assume they are independent of the 3-p
> > variables and yet make a difference in the time evolution of the state then
> > it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables will fail, i.e. the
> > laws of physics and chemistry will be violated.
>
> > Of course this violation maybe hard to detect in something very complicated
> > like a brain; but Craig's theory doesn't seem to assume the brain is special
> > in that respect and even a single electron supposedly has these extra,
> > unobservable variables, i.e. a mind of its own.  The problem with electrons
> > or other simple systems is that while we have complete access to their 3-p
> > variables, we don't have access to their hypothetical other variables; the
> > ones we call 1-p when referring to humans.  So when all the silver atoms in
> > a Stern-Gerlach do just as we predict, it can be claimed that they all had
> > the same 1-p variables and that's why the 3-p variables were sufficient to
> > predict their behavior.
>
> That's a bit like saying there are fairies at the bottom of the garden
> but they hide whenever we look for them. According to Craig, the 1-p
> influence (which is equivalent to an immaterial soul)

Wrong. I have been very consistent in my position that it is a
category error to conceive of the 1-p influence as a pseudo-substance.
It is not a 'stuff' that's in everything, any more than volts are a
stuff that's in everything. it's the opposite of a stuff - it is what
it's like to be stuff and to be surrounded by stuff.

> is ubiquitous in
> living things, and possibly in other things as well. I think if no
> scientist has ever seen evidence of this ubiquitous influence that is
> good reason to say that it doesn't exist.

No scientist has ever seen anything other than evidence of
sensorimotive perception. That is all that we or anything can ever
see. I agree that it doesn't exist in the sense of it occupying space
like matter does, it insists and it occupies matter though time.

> In fact, Craig himself
> denies that his theory would manifest as violation of physical law,
> and is therefore inconsistent.

There is no inconsistency. You're just not understanding what I'm
saying because you are only willing to think in terms of reactive
strategies for neutralizing the threat to your common sense (which is
a cumulative entanglement of autobiographical experiences and
understandings, interpretations of cultural traditions and
perspectives, etc).

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 4, 8:46 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
>
> >> This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p 
> >> observable state at t
> >> is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt.  Craig wants add to this that 
> >> there is
> >> additional information which is not 3-p observable and which makes a 
> >> difference, so that
> >> the state at t+dt depends not just on the 3-p observables at t, but also 
> >> on some
> >> additional "sensorimotive" variables.  If you assume these variables are 
> >> not independent
> >> of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of 
> >> consciousness supervening
> >> on the 3-p states.  They are redundant in the informational sense.   If 
> >> you assume they
> >> are independent of the 3-p variables and yet make a difference in the time 
> >> evolution of
> >> the state then it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables will 
> >> fail, i.e. the
> >> laws of physics and chemistry will be violated.
> > Why would they have to be either completely dependent or independent?
>
> Did I use the word "completely"?

You're reducing the possibilities to two mutually exclusive impossible
options, so if 'completely' is not implied then you aren't really
saying anything.

>
> > I've given several examples demonstrating how we routinely exercise
> > voluntary control over parts of our minds, bodies, and environment
> > while at the same time being involuntarily controlled by those same
> > influences, often at the same time. This isn't a theory, this is the
> > raw data set.
>
> No it's not.  In your examples of voluntary control you don't know what your 
> brain is
> doing.  So you can't know whether you "voluntary" action was entirely caused 
> by physical
> precursors or whether their was some effect from libertarian free-will.

What difference does it make what your brain is doing to be able to
say that you are voluntarily controlling the words that you type here?

>
>
>
> > If it were the case that the 3p and 1p were completely independent,
> > then you would have ghosts jumping around into aluminum cans and
> > walking around singing, and if they were completely dependent then
> > there would be no point in being able to differentiate between
> > voluntary and involuntary control of our mind, body, and environment.
>
> Exactly the point of compatibilist free-will.

What does that label add to this conversation?

>
> > Such an illusory distinction would not only be redundant but it would
> > have no ontological basis to even be able to come into being or be
> > conceivable. It would be like an elephant growing a TV set out of it's
> > trunk to distract it from being an elephant.
>
> Or pulling another meaningless example out of the nether regions.

Why meaningless? I'm pointing out that the illusion of free will in a
deterministic universe would be not merely puzzling but fantastically
absurd. Your criticism is arbitrary.

>
>
>
> > Since neither of those two cases is possible, I propose, as I have
> > repeatedly proposed, that the 3p and 1p are in fact part of the same
> > essential reality in which they overlap, but that they each extent in
> > different topological directions;
>
> What's a topological direction?

matter elaborates discretely across space, energy elaborates
cumulatively through time.

>
> > specifically, 3p into matter, public
> > space, electromagnetism, entropy, and relativity, and 1p into energy,
> > private time, sensorimotive, significance, and perception.
>
> "3p overlaps into entropy"!?  Reads like gibberish to me.

3-p doesn't overlap entropy, 3-p is entropic. 1-p is syntropic. The
overlap is the 'here and now'. I'm not sure that it matters what I say
though, you're mainly just auditing my responses for technicalities so
that you can get a feeling of 'winning' a debate. It's a sensorimotive
circuit. A feeling that you are seeking which requires a particular
kind of experience to satisfy it. If I could offer you a drug instead
that would stimulate the precise neural pathways involved in feeling
that you had proved me wrong in an objective way, would that be
satisfying to you? Would there be no difference in being right versus
having your physical precursors to feeling right get tweaked? Isn't
that what you are saying, that in fact this discussion is nothing but
brain drugs with no free will determining our opinions? Isn't being
right or wrong just a matter of biochemistry?

>
>
>
> > No laws of physics are broken by consciousness, but it is very
> > confusing because our only example of consciousness is human
> > consciousness, which is a multi-trillion cell awareness.
>
> Exactly what I said. In fact one's only example of consciousness is their 
> own.  The
> consciousness of other humans is an inference.

I agree. Although I would qualify the inference. It's more of an
educated inference. I'm making a different point with it though. I'm

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-04 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 5:59 AM, meekerdb  wrote:

> This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p
> observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt.  Craig
> wants add to this that there is additional information which is not 3-p
> observable and which makes a difference, so that the state at t+dt depends
> not just on the 3-p observables at t, but also on some additional
> "sensorimotive" variables.  If you assume these variables are not
> independent of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of
> consciousness supervening on the 3-p states.  They are redundant in the
> informational sense.   If you assume they are independent of the 3-p
> variables and yet make a difference in the time evolution of the state then
> it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables will fail, i.e. the
> laws of physics and chemistry will be violated.
>
> Of course this violation maybe hard to detect in something very complicated
> like a brain; but Craig's theory doesn't seem to assume the brain is special
> in that respect and even a single electron supposedly has these extra,
> unobservable variables, i.e. a mind of its own.  The problem with electrons
> or other simple systems is that while we have complete access to their 3-p
> variables, we don't have access to their hypothetical other variables; the
> ones we call 1-p when referring to humans.  So when all the silver atoms in
> a Stern-Gerlach do just as we predict, it can be claimed that they all had
> the same 1-p variables and that's why the 3-p variables were sufficient to
> predict their behavior.

That's a bit like saying there are fairies at the bottom of the garden
but they hide whenever we look for them. According to Craig, the 1-p
influence (which is equivalent to an immaterial soul) is ubiquitous in
living things, and possibly in other things as well. I think if no
scientist has ever seen evidence of this ubiquitous influence that is
good reason to say that it doesn't exist. In fact, Craig himself
denies that his theory would manifest as violation of physical law,
and is therefore inconsistent.

> So the only way I see to test this theory, even in principle, would be to
> observe Craig's brain at a very low level while having him report his
> experiences (at least to himself) and show that his experiences and his
> brain states were not one-to-one.  Of course this is probably impossible
> with current technology.  Observing the brain at a coarse grained level
> leaves open the possibility that one is just missing the 3-p variables that
> you show the relationship to be one-to-one.
>
> So I'd say that until someone thinks of an empirical test for this "soul
> theory", discussing it is a waste of bandwidth.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Bruno List continued


On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb  wrote:


This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p observable 
state at t
is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt.  Craig wants add to this that there 
is
additional information which is not 3-p observable and which makes a 
difference, so that
the state at t+dt depends not just on the 3-p observables at t, but also on some
additional "sensorimotive" variables.  If you assume these variables are not 
independent
of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of consciousness 
supervening
on the 3-p states.  They are redundant in the informational sense.   If you 
assume they
are independent of the 3-p variables and yet make a difference in the time 
evolution of
the state then it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables will fail, 
i.e. the
laws of physics and chemistry will be violated.

Why would they have to be either completely dependent or independent?


Did I use the word "completely"?


I've given several examples demonstrating how we routinely exercise
voluntary control over parts of our minds, bodies, and environment
while at the same time being involuntarily controlled by those same
influences, often at the same time. This isn't a theory, this is the
raw data set.


No it's not.  In your examples of voluntary control you don't know what your brain is 
doing.  So you can't know whether you "voluntary" action was entirely caused by physical 
precursors or whether their was some effect from libertarian free-will.




If it were the case that the 3p and 1p were completely independent,
then you would have ghosts jumping around into aluminum cans and
walking around singing, and if they were completely dependent then
there would be no point in being able to differentiate between
voluntary and involuntary control of our mind, body, and environment.


Exactly the point of compatibilist free-will.


Such an illusory distinction would not only be redundant but it would
have no ontological basis to even be able to come into being or be
conceivable. It would be like an elephant growing a TV set out of it's
trunk to distract it from being an elephant.


Or pulling another meaningless example out of the nether regions.



Since neither of those two cases is possible, I propose, as I have
repeatedly proposed, that the 3p and 1p are in fact part of the same
essential reality in which they overlap, but that they each extent in
different topological directions;


What's a topological direction?


specifically, 3p into matter, public
space, electromagnetism, entropy, and relativity, and 1p into energy,
private time, sensorimotive, significance, and perception.


"3p overlaps into entropy"!?  Reads like gibberish to me.



No laws of physics are broken by consciousness, but it is very
confusing because our only example of consciousness is human
consciousness, which is a multi-trillion cell awareness.


Exactly what I said. In fact one's only example of consciousness is their own.  The 
consciousness of other humans is an inference.



The trick is
to realize that you cannot directly correlate our experience of
consciousness with the 3-p cellular phenomenology, but to only
correlate it with the 3-p behavior of the brain as a whole.


That's the experimental question, and you don't know the answer.


That's the
starting point. If you are going to try to understand what a movie is
about, you have to look at the whole images of the movie, and not
focus on the pixels of the screen or the mechanics of pixel
illumination to guide your interpretation. There is no human
consciousness at that low level. There may be sensorimotive 1-p
phenomenology there, and I think that there is, but we can't prove it
now. What we can prove is there in 3-p would only relate to that low
level 1-p which is unknown to us.

My proposition is that our 1-p consciousness builds from lower level 1-
p awareness and higher level 1-p semantic environmental influences,
like cultural ideas, family traditions, etc.


But that is entirely untestable since we have no access to those 1-p consciousnesses.  
Cultural ideas, family traditions are 3-p observables.



It is not predictable
from 3-p appearances alone, but not because it breaks the laws of
physics. Physics has nothing to say about what particular patterns
occur in the brain as a whole.


Sure it does - unless magic happens.


There is no relevant biochemical
difference between a one thought and another that could make it
impossible physically,


So you say.   But I think there is.  If you think of an elephant there is something 
biochemical happening that makes it not a thought about a giraffe.  So when you read 
"elephant" it is impossible to think of a giraffe at that moment.



just as there is no sequence of illuminated
pixels that is preferred by a TV screen, or electronics, or physics.


Of course this violation maybe hard to detect in something very complicated 
like

Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb  wrote:

>
> This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p observable 
> state at t
> is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt.  Craig wants add to this that 
> there is
> additional information which is not 3-p observable and which makes a 
> difference, so that
> the state at t+dt depends not just on the 3-p observables at t, but also on 
> some
> additional "sensorimotive" variables.  If you assume these variables are not 
> independent
> of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of consciousness 
> supervening
> on the 3-p states.  They are redundant in the informational sense.   If you 
> assume they
> are independent of the 3-p variables and yet make a difference in the time 
> evolution of
> the state then it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables will 
> fail, i.e. the
> laws of physics and chemistry will be violated.

Why would they have to be either completely dependent or independent?
I've given several examples demonstrating how we routinely exercise
voluntary control over parts of our minds, bodies, and environment
while at the same time being involuntarily controlled by those same
influences, often at the same time. This isn't a theory, this is the
raw data set.

If it were the case that the 3p and 1p were completely independent,
then you would have ghosts jumping around into aluminum cans and
walking around singing, and if they were completely dependent then
there would be no point in being able to differentiate between
voluntary and involuntary control of our mind, body, and environment.
Such an illusory distinction would not only be redundant but it would
have no ontological basis to even be able to come into being or be
conceivable. It would be like an elephant growing a TV set out of it's
trunk to distract it from being an elephant.

Since neither of those two cases is possible, I propose, as I have
repeatedly proposed, that the 3p and 1p are in fact part of the same
essential reality in which they overlap, but that they each extent in
different topological directions; specifically, 3p into matter, public
space, electromagnetism, entropy, and relativity, and 1p into energy,
private time, sensorimotive, significance, and perception.

No laws of physics are broken by consciousness, but it is very
confusing because our only example of consciousness is human
consciousness, which is a multi-trillion cell awareness. The trick is
to realize that you cannot directly correlate our experience of
consciousness with the 3-p cellular phenomenology, but to only
correlate it with the 3-p behavior of the brain as a whole. That's the
starting point. If you are going to try to understand what a movie is
about, you have to look at the whole images of the movie, and not
focus on the pixels of the screen or the mechanics of pixel
illumination to guide your interpretation. There is no human
consciousness at that low level. There may be sensorimotive 1-p
phenomenology there, and I think that there is, but we can't prove it
now. What we can prove is there in 3-p would only relate to that low
level 1-p which is unknown to us.

My proposition is that our 1-p consciousness builds from lower level 1-
p awareness and higher level 1-p semantic environmental influences,
like cultural ideas, family traditions, etc. It is not predictable
from 3-p appearances alone, but not because it breaks the laws of
physics. Physics has nothing to say about what particular patterns
occur in the brain as a whole. There is no relevant biochemical
difference between a one thought and another that could make it
impossible physically, just as there is no sequence of illuminated
pixels that is preferred by a TV screen, or electronics, or physics.

>
> Of course this violation maybe hard to detect in something very complicated 
> like a brain;
> but Craig's theory doesn't seem to assume the brain is special in that 
> respect and even a
> single electron supposedly has these extra, unobservable variables, i.e. a 
> mind of its
> own.  

No. I have never said that a particle has a mind of it's own, I only
say that it may have a sensorimotive quality which is primitive like
charge or spin, but that this quality scales up in a different way
than quantitative properties. The brain is very special *to us* and I
suspect that it is pretty special relatively speaking as far as
processes in the Cosmos. It's not special because it has awareness
though, it's just the degree to which that awareness is elaborated and
concentrated.

>The problem with electrons or other simple systems is that while we have 
>complete
> access to their 3-p variables, we don't have access to their hypothetical 
> other variables;
> the ones we call 1-p when referring to humans.  So when all the silver atoms 
> in a
> Stern-Gerlach do just as we predict, it can be claimed that they all had the 
> same 1-p
> variables and that's why the 3-p variables were sufficient to predict their 
> behavior.

Re: Bruno List continued

On 10/3/2011 11:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 2:30 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

The neurons are firing in my brain as I'm thinking, but if you could
go down to the microscopic level you would see that they are firing
due to the various physical factors that make neurons fire, eg. fluxes
of calcium and potassium caused by ion channels opening due to
neurotransmitter molecules binding to the receptors and changing their
conformation. If you take each neuron in the brain in turn at any
given time it will always be the case that it is doing what it is
doing due to these factors. You will never find a ligand-activated ion
channel opening in the absence of a ligand, for example. That would be
like a door opening in the absence of any force. Just because doors
and protein molecules are different sizes doesn't mean that one can do
magical things and the other not.

You will also never find a ligand activated ion channel that is
associated with a particular subjective experience fire in the absence
of that subjective experience (that would be a zombie, right?), so why
privilege the pixels of the thing as the determining factor when the
overall image is just as much dictating which pixels are lit and how
brightly? Again, every time you mention magic it just means that you
don't understand my point. Every time you mention it, I am going to
give you the same response. I understand your position completely, but
you are just throwing dirt clods in the general direction of mine
while closing your eyes.

The ion channel only opens when the ligand binds. The ligand only
binds if it is present in the synapse. It is only present in the
synapse when the presynaptic neuron fires. And so on. This whole
process is associated with an experience, but it is a completely
mechanical process. The equivalent is my example of the door: it opens
because someone turns the key and pushes it. If it had qualia it may
also be accurate to say that it opens because it wants to open, but
since we can't see the qualia they can't have a causal effect on the
door. If they could we would see the door opening by itself and we
would be amazed. It's the same with the neuron: if the associated
qualia had a causal effect on matter we would see neurons firing in
the absence of stimuli, which would be amazing.

This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p observable state at t
is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this that there is
additional information which is not 3-p observable and which makes a difference, so that
the state at t+dt depends not just on the 3-p observables at t, but also on some
additional "sensorimotive" variables. If you assume these variables are not independent
of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of consciousness supervening
on the 3-p states. They are redundant in the informational sense. If you assume they
are independent of the 3-p variables and yet make a difference in the time evolution of
the state then it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables will fail, i.e. the
laws of physics and chemistry will be violated.

Of course this violation maybe hard to detect in something very complicated like a brain;
but Craig's theory doesn't seem to assume the brain is special in that respect and even a
single electron supposedly has these extra, unobservable variables, i.e. a mind of its
own. The problem with electrons or other simple systems is that while we have complete
access to their 3-p variables, we don't have access to their hypothetical other variables;
the ones we call 1-p when referring to humans. So when all the silver atoms in a
Stern-Gerlach do just as we predict, it can be claimed that they all had the same 1-p
variables and that's why the 3-p variables were sufficient to predict their behavior.

So the only way I see to test this theory, even in principle, would be to observe Craig's
brain at a very low level while having him report his experiences (at least to himself)
and show that his experiences and his brain states were not one-to-one. Of course this is
probably impossible with current technology. Observing the brain at a coarse grained
level leaves open the possibility that one is just missing the 3-p variables that you show
the relationship to be one-to-one.

So I'd say that until someone thinks of an empirical test for this "soul theory",
discussing it is a waste of bandwidth.

Brent

Again, it's not that it's wrong to say that the neurons fired in the
amygdala because the person thought about gambling, it's that the
third person observable behaviour of the neurons can be entirely
explained and predicted without any reference to qualia. If the
neurons responded directly to qualia they would be observed to do
miraculous things and it may not be possible to predict or model their
behaviour.

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 04 Oct 2011, at 02:29, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 4:09 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:



I agree with Craig, although the way he presents it might seems a bit
uncomputationalist, (if I can say(*)).

Thoughts act on matter all the time. It is a selection of histories  
+ a
sharing. Like when a sculptor isolates an art form from a rock, and  
then
send it in a museum. If mind did not act on matter, we would not  
have been
able to fly to the moon, and I am not sure even birds could fly. It  
asks for

relative works and time, and numerous deep computations.

When you prepare coffee, mind acts on matter. When you drink  
coffee, matter

acts on mind. No problem here (with comp).

And we can learn to control computer at a distance, but there is no  
reason

to suppose that computers can't do that.


Mind acts on matter in a manner of speaking, but matter will not do
anything that cannot be explained in terms of the underlying physics.


Locally, you are right. But the physics itself arise from the  
arithmetical computation structures on which consciousness supervene  
on (to be short). So I am not sure if the expression of consciousness  
duration for very short "emulation time" makes sense.
In fact, between any two sequential computational states *at some  
level of description*, there exist an infinity of computational states  
belonging to computations generated by the UD going through them *at  
some more refined level, and this participates in the first person  
experience generation (as in its material constitution).





An alien scientist could give a complete description of why humans
behave as they do and make a computational model that accurately
simulates human behaviour while remaining ignorant about human
consciousness. But the alien could not do this if he were ignorant
about protein chemistry, for example.



OK.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Bruno List continued

On Oct 4, 8:54 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> 2011/10/4 Craig Weinberg 
>
> > On Oct 4, 2:11 am, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>
> > > The ion channel only opens when the ligand binds. The ligand only
> > > binds if it is present in the synapse. It is only present in the
> > > synapse when the presynaptic neuron fires. And so on.
>
> > It's the 'and so on' where your explanation breaks down. You are
> > arbitrarily denying the top down, semantic, subjective participation
> > as a cause. There is no presynaptic neuron prior to the introduction
> > of the thought of gambling.
>
> And where is the thought then ? Reading you, it exists outside of the brain
> matter... If it is the brain matter, then all the external observable is all
> there is to it, reproducing the external behaviours will reproduce qualia.

It's inside (and 'throughside') of matter. It doesn't ex-ist, it
insists. Reproducing the external behaviors won't help, any more than
attaching marionette strings to a cadaver would bring a person back to
life.

I think that all change has an experience associated with it. This is
in fact what energy is; an experience of perception over time. The
ability to experience change first hand carries with it, by extension,
the ability to experience certain kinds of change second hand. We are
made of matter, so we can relate to physical changes - a bowling ball
striking pins, a bomb going off, etc. We are made of biological cells
so we can relate to biological changes, but non-biological matter
cannot experience biological changes. Bowling balls don't feel like
they are alive.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > The thought is the firing of many neurons.
> > They are the same thing, except that the reason they are firing is
> > because of the subject choosing to realize a particular motivation (to
> > think about something or move a mouse, etc). There is no neurological
> > reason why those neurons would fire. They would not otherwise fire at
> > that particular time.
>
> > >This whole
> > > process is associated with an experience, but it is a completely
> > > mechanical process.
>
> > Starting a car initiates a mechanical process, and driving a car
> > executes a mechanical process, but without the driver choosing to
> > start the car and use the steering wheel and pedals to correspond with
> > their subjective perception and motivation, the car doesn't do
> > anything but idle. You cannot predict where a car is going to go based
> > on an auto mechanics examination of the car.
>
> No, but I can build a copy of the car which will do the same as the car
> provided a driver drives it...

Do the same thing meaning idle in the driveway, sure. To copy a driver
is something else entirely. You still can't predict where either
driver is going to take the car from looking that the mechanics of the
car.

Craig

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-04 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2011/10/4 Craig Weinberg 

> On Oct 4, 2:11 am, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>
> >
> > The ion channel only opens when the ligand binds. The ligand only
> > binds if it is present in the synapse. It is only present in the
> > synapse when the presynaptic neuron fires. And so on.
>
> It's the 'and so on' where your explanation breaks down. You are
> arbitrarily denying the top down, semantic, subjective participation
> as a cause. There is no presynaptic neuron prior to the introduction
> of the thought of gambling.


And where is the thought then ? Reading you, it exists outside of the brain
matter... If it is the brain matter, then all the external observable is all
there is to it, reproducing the external behaviours will reproduce qualia.



> The thought is the firing of many neurons.
> They are the same thing, except that the reason they are firing is
> because of the subject choosing to realize a particular motivation (to
> think about something or move a mouse, etc). There is no neurological
> reason why those neurons would fire. They would not otherwise fire at
> that particular time.
>
> >This whole
> > process is associated with an experience, but it is a completely
> > mechanical process.
>
> Starting a car initiates a mechanical process, and driving a car
> executes a mechanical process, but without the driver choosing to
> start the car and use the steering wheel and pedals to correspond with
> their subjective perception and motivation, the car doesn't do
> anything but idle. You cannot predict where a car is going to go based
> on an auto mechanics examination of the car.


No, but I can build a copy of the car which will do the same as the car
provided a driver drives it...


> I can argue this point
> all day, every day. I can give you different examples, describe it in
> different ways, but I can't make you see what you are missing. I know
> exactly your position. You think that if you look at atoms they cannot
> do anything except what we expect any generic atom to do, and since
> everything is made of atoms, then everything can only be an
> elaboration of those probabilities. I get that. You don't need to
> restate your position to me ever again. You are quite clear in what
> you are saying. I'm telling you that it's medieval compared to what
> I'm talking about.
>
> You aren't seeing that atoms respond to their environment - they have
> charge and make bonds, and that the environment can change on a macro
> scale for macro scale reasons just as well as the macro scale can be
> changed for microcosmic reasons. They are the same thing. Just as I am
> choosing these letters to make up these words because I have a
> sentence in mind that I want to write, not because my fingers have no
> choice but to hit these keys to satisfy some chemical or physical law.
>
> >The equivalent is my example of the door: it opens
> > because someone turns the key and pushes it. If it had qualia it may
> > also be accurate to say that it opens because it wants to open, but
> > since we can't see the qualia they can't have a causal effect on the
> > door.
>
> Someone turns the key and pushes it because they want to. It is their
> qualia that has a causal effect on the door and *nothing else*. The
> intentionality of the subject *uses* the neurons of the brain, which
> use the afferent nerves down the spine, which uses the muscle tissue
> to contract, which moves the arm connected to the hand that holds the
> key and articulates the turning and opens the door which satisfies the
> sensory>motive>motive>motor>motor>motor>sensory chain of custody. The
> door opens because the person sees the door (visual sense),
> understands how it works and that they have the key (cognitive sense),
> wants to unlock it (motive intent, emotional sense), is able to use
> their brain, spinal cord, arm, hand, and key as a single coordinated
> instrument (motive>motive>motor>fine motor>motor extension) to satisfy
> their desire to feel and see that the door is open (sensory) and to
> pass through the door (motor).
>
> Yes, I understand that you can look at it the other way and say that
> since it it the brain that stimulates and coordinates the arm, and it
> is the brain's activity that causes that, and that the neurons in the
> brain cause that, and that the ion channels, membrane potentials,
> neurotransmitter molecules, and atoms that cause all of that, then you
> should be able to calculate from the positions of all of that
> microcosmic phenomana that the door will open. But it doesn't work
> that way. The microcosmos doesn't know what a door is. It has a very
> complex job to do already in it's own biochemical level of the
> universe. Just as we have no direct awareness of what our DNA is
> doing, our tissues don't know who we are or why we want to open the
> door. Only we know that.
>
> > If they could we would see the door opening by itself and we
> > would be amazed. It's the same with the neuron: if the associated
> > qualia

Re: Bruno List continued