Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 20-janv.-06, à 16:04, John M wrote (in part):


thanks for your approval to my post on 'belief'. To
this one, however, I think you mix up evidence with
assumption. The beautiful sunshine is assumed to
be God's gift for us, it is a 1st person idea if we
like it, or find it burning, to assign it as a gift or
a curse. It is our perception of reality anyway.
I stand with my Popperian example - which you did not
address in my post - about 'proof and falsification'.



I did elsewhere. Also I think we could have perhaps some vocabulary 
problems.
I agree that some believer in God does assume that a beautiful sunshine 
is a God's gift to us. Here I was more alluding to Plato's view of God 
as the Good, and I was talking about someone who makes such a 
personal experience of beauty, in front of that sunshine, that he takes 
it as a, personal or first person for sure, experience of the 
Good/God/whatever (sort of mystical experience if you want).
Of course it is not a proof (as in pure math), nor an evidence in the 
Popper sense of confirmation. Nor can a reconstitution of oneself 
during a teleportation be a proof of comp, nor can quantum suicide 
provides any proof that QM, or Everett, or comp are true. First Person 
Knowledge is just incorrigible and unfalsifiable, and as such 
unscientific. Science is concerned only with third person discourses, 
or, arguably, with first person plural discourses (the one which I 
defined explicitly through duplication of populations of individuals).


Now I don't think it is really important to be so precise in the 
beginning. At some point I will be obliged to say many 
counter-intuitive propositions and explain how in some important cases 
first person truth can indirectly lead to 100% falsifiable third person 
propositions, but it is not easy to explain. Well, I wouldn' t have 
believe myself a large part of what I want to explain if that wouldn't 
have been confirmed by the Lobian interview. Nevertheless, I am 
realizing now  that many rational mystics (including the Neoplatonist 
pagan theologians) are closer to the lobian machine than I would have 
thought before reading Plotinus. I am still searching more confirmation 
because if this is confirmed (I have some criteria) it would put some 
new light on the discussion.


I will try to sum up this in a new thread on Plotinus (and 
neoplatonism, more generally).
At some point I will explain how I am getting (apparently) an 
arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus, and on some part of Plato's 
Parmenides. My work would make Plotinus theory of matter 100% 
experimentally testable.


Of course there is nothing miraculous that honest introspector converge 
toward the lobian discourse, given that this is the discourse of the 
self-referential correct machine.


I don't know if that relation with Plotinus will help me selling my 
stuff, but this is another problem (for a future different thread). 
What some Christian theologians dismissed in Plato, they will dismiss 
it in any TOE.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-19 Thread Bruno Marchal




Le 19-janv.-06, à 02:45, Russell Standish a écrit :


On Mon, Jan 16, 2006 at 04:32:15PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Le 15-janv.-06, ? 19:04, Benjamin Udell a ?crit :


The dovetailer keeps sounding like a powerful idea. I do remember
that it has often been mentioned here, but somehow I failed to pick 
up

a sense of what it was really about.



The Universal Dovetailer is a program which generates and executes all
programs.
Its existence is a non trivial consequence of Church thesis. Please
recall me to explain this in detail in one or two weeks.
The necessity to dovetail (that is to run successiveley on the initial
segement of the execution never waiting any programs stop is due to 
the

fact that the always defined programs cannot be generated mechanically
(this can be done in the case of all programs).
Actually I have already explain this on the list (in 2001) but the
escribe archive seems no more working again, and the new archive seems
not go enough backward in time.
The first published paper where I define it, is Mechanism ans 
Personal

Identity paper:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/MPI_15-MAI-91.pdf
Russell Standish attributes it (wrongly) to Schmidhuber in his book. 
My


To be precise I do not attribute it to Schmidhuber, but I can see why
you came to that conclusion. I will be revising this section to make
this point clear in the final version of my book. The dovetailer 
algorithm is

certainly well known, and not apparently attributable to anyone, and
at the time when I wrote that part of ToN, I was unaware that the
specific application of the dovetailer to computing all possible
programs is your idea.




Yes, the key was to realize that church's thesis allows *universal* 
dovetailing, and forces the dovetailing part: i.e. there is no 
universal machine capable of running all programs without dovetailing. 
For exemple, there are no universal dovetailer for the total computable 
functions. See the diagonalization posts (when available).








My mistake actually is using the qualified name
universal dovetailer to describe a dovetailer generating all
possible strings (Schmidhuber's work), when the universal dovetailer
actually runs the programs too. I do not use the qualified name in
Why Occam's razor.




But a program generating all the strings does not need to dovetail at 
all. The expression dovetailing on all strings is quite confusing. I 
think it would be preferable to keep Schmidhuber terminology when you 
describe his work, which I have already described as interesting 
constructive physics, but not entirely relevant when searching a  
TOE, as the philosophical remarks ending his first everything paper 
illustrated, and as it has been confirmed when he dismissed the 1/3 
distinction.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-19 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 18-janv.-06, à 20:35, danny mayes a écrit :

I doubt the beliefs of fundementalist Christianity will ever be 
absolutely proven or disproven, and as a faith belief I reserve the 
right to discard it at my choosing!



And what if you make the personal experience of God afterlife or 
before, or to take a less hot example, what if you wake up in the 
morning with the belief that you exist, as a first person (with private 
subjective life and all that). In both case you get something that 
science will never been able to prove or disperove. But does it need an 
act of faith?
One problem is that the word faith has already (like theology) big 
social connotations, but many reasonable things, especially in 
science, needs some amount of faith in the sense belief beyond 
proof..
What I mean is that those questions are difficult, and there is no 
clear-cut frontier between many sort of beliefs. I have given reasons 
(often in this list) that the belief in a primitive material 
universe/realm is already a sort of religious belief. Actually the 
belief in any application of a theory is beyond provability. But as I 
said, also the belief in a personal pain, like headache, is beyond 
proof, although we don't need a proof to understand we have headache. 
In any case I am not sure it is a question of choice, although that, 
concerning religious belief, perhaps some form of open-minded education 
could help young people to be less influenced by the their parent's 
beliefs (which are not chosen by the children of course). But then that 
choice question could lead us to the will or free-will question 
which is not simple too.
I am not sure I am clear: to sum up I think we have many beliefs on 
things with no proofs nor disproofs, but I would'n say it is a matter 
of choice.
We always need evidences of some kind, I think, but for some just a 
lovely sunshine could be taken as an evidence for God or Gods, and for 
others just the existence of Nazis will be taken of evidence for Evil, 
Evils, if not devil(s). That leads to the question of what is an 
evidence and how does evidences add up (and here many interesting 
models and theory are developped in Artifical Intelligence (and alike), 
and the evidences add up toward the idea that that stuff is not obvious 
at all.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-18 Thread danny mayes

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


Danny Mayes writes:

I haven't participated in the list in a while, but I try to keep up 
with the discussion here and there as time permits.  I personally was 
raised a fundamentalist Baptist, but lost most of my interest in that 
religion when I was taught at 9 years old that all the little kids in 
Africa that are never told about Jesus Christ go to Hell.  Even at 9, 
I knew that wasn't something I was going to be buying.  Who wants to 
believe in a God that cruel?  Even without the problematic cruel 
creator, I have always been to oriented toward logic and proof to 
just accept stuff on faith.



I sympathise with the conclusions of the young Danny, but there is a 
philosophical non sequitur here. The fact that I would like something 
to be true, or not to be true, has no bearing on whether it is in fact 
true. I don't like what happened in Germany under the Nazis, but that 
doesn't mean I should believe the Nazis did not exist, so why should 
my revulsion at the thought of infidels burning in Hell lead me to 
believe that God and Hell do not exist? It might make me reluctant to 
worship such a God, but that is not the same as believing he does not 
exist.


 Religion means believing something in the absence of sufficient 
evidence.


Stathis Papaioannou

_
Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's 
FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/



My belief is that in matters of faith, you can choose to believe or not 
believe based on whether it suits your personal preferences.  Your 
example of the Nazis  would not apply because there is overwhelming 
evidence that the Nazis existed.  Perhaps it can be argued that there is 
meaningful evidence that the God described in Sunday school class exists 
as well, however I don't think anyone would argue that the evidence for 
that God is nearly as strong as evidence of the Nazis.  As you say, 
religion, by necessity, is based on faith and therefore little to no 
objective evidence.  I guess your point was that if you already have the 
faith in something without evidence, the fact that you are then taught 
as part of the belief system that there are some aspects not very 
appealing should not have any bearing on whether you still have your 
faith?  I would disagree with that in that you can have faith in 
something because the concept is attractive to you, but then lose your 
faith when the concept is shown to be less attractive. (this was not 
really my situation as a child- I was never really presented the 
opportunity to examine the faith until presented with the teachings 
described in the original post).  This is not entirely unrelated to the 
sciences.  Science has pushed into many areas into realms that can only 
tangentially, at best, be proven with objective evidence.  The MWI is a 
good example.  I believe in it, because I think it provides the most 
explanatory power over competing ideas. However, it would be difficult 
to fault someone for demanding more in the way of direct evidence.  In a 
sense, there is an element of faith in such theories.  String theory is 
another example.  I'm not saying these things are not science, just that 
they are theories beyond our reach to prove or disprove at the present 
time.  Many scientists are quoted as endorsing string theory in part due 
to the elegance of the theory.  This goes with what I was saying above 
about accepting something on faith as long as it appears to be the most 
attractive idea, even if it is not supported by much objective evidence.


I doubt the beliefs of fundementalist Christianity will ever be 
absolutely proven or disproven, and as a faith belief I reserve the 
right to discard it at my choosing!


Danny






Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-18 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, Jan 16, 2006 at 04:32:15PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Le 15-janv.-06, ? 19:04, Benjamin Udell a ?crit :
 
 The dovetailer keeps sounding like a powerful idea. I do remember 
 that it has often been mentioned here, but somehow I failed to pick up 
 a sense of what it was really about.
 
 
 The Universal Dovetailer is a program which generates and executes all 
 programs.
 Its existence is a non trivial consequence of Church thesis. Please 
 recall me to explain this in detail in one or two weeks.
 The necessity to dovetail (that is to run successiveley on the initial 
 segement of the execution never waiting any programs stop is due to the 
 fact that the always defined programs cannot be generated mechanically 
 (this can be done in the case of all programs).
 Actually I have already explain this on the list (in 2001) but the 
 escribe archive seems no more working again, and the new archive seems 
 not go enough backward in time.
 The first published paper where I define it, is Mechanism ans Personal 
 Identity paper:
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/MPI_15-MAI-91.pdf
 Russell Standish attributes it (wrongly) to Schmidhuber in his book. My 

To be precise I do not attribute it to Schmidhuber, but I can see why
you came to that conclusion. I will be revising this section to make
this point clear in the final version of my book. The dovetailer algorithm is
certainly well known, and not apparently attributable to anyone, and
at the time when I wrote that part of ToN, I was unaware that the
specific application of the dovetailer to computing all possible
programs is your idea. My mistake actually is using the qualified name
universal dovetailer to describe a dovetailer generating all
possible strings (Schmidhuber's work), when the universal dovetailer
actually runs the programs too. I do not use the qualified name in
Why Occam's razor.


-- 
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Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-17 Thread Benjamin Udell
Russell, list,

[Ben] The dovetailer keeps sounding like a powerful idea. I do remember 
that it has often been mentioned here, but somehow I failed to pick up a sense 
of what it was really about. Was there a message to the Everything-List in 
which it was explained so that non-experts can understand it? I'm not asking 
you to track that message (or series of messages) down, but if you or somebody 
remembers around which month it was, that should be enough for me to find it. 
Or is there a link to a Webpage with such an exposition?

[Russell] Do a Google search, or a search on the everything list archives eg 
Google everything list dovetailer.

I know that the phrase has been used in very many posts, I thought it might 
take me a long time. Anyway, Bruno has narrowed it down.

[Ben] Level III varies across quantum branchings. Level II varies across 
times and places along a single quantum branch in such a way that its features 
come out the same as Level III's features.

[Russell] This is not my reading. Level II universes vary their fundamental 
physical constants, eg G, alpha and so on.
[Russell] Level I universes merely vary in time and space, but sufficiently 
separated as to be causally independent.

That's exactly what I meant. I think the terminology has gotten me into trouble 
here. G, alpha, etc. vary across Level II, across its various inflationary 
bubbles. Level II's features are the same as Level III's features. Level III 
embodies a variation-across-quantum-branchings of constants, initial 
conditions, etc., variations which Level II has across the various Level I 
universes or Level I multiverses (I did think that my using the word universe 
instead would get me into trouble!) which Level II contains along a single 
quantum branch. Or maybe talking about different Level I multiverses still 
implies that I'm speaking only of Level I variation, not Level II variation. 
Anyway, I mean variation of constants, etc. With regard to quantum branching, 
this kind of variation is quite like the kind of variation exhibited by hits in 
a repeated experiment within a single Level I multiverse, with one big 
difference: the pattern of a sufficiently repeated experiment's hits is s!
 ufficient to tell us the probability distribution for the particle in that 
experiment in that Level I multiverse, but is not an adequate sample of 
variation across a Level II multiverse, since it does not reflect variation of 
fundamental constants, initial conditions insofar as these might affect the 
constants, etc. A pattern of hits representing only Level II variation is 
just the pattern which we can't observe -- it's the pattern made across various 
inflationary bubbles -- they are such hits.  Anyway, given a mathematical 
structure distinguishable topologically or perhaps 
infinite-graph-theoretically, there are still variations of constants, initial 
conditions insofar as these might affect the constants, etc., which are 
reflected in variations of probability distribution for a given experiment's 
result across a Level III multiverse's quantum branchings of the genesis of an 
inflationary bubble and across a Level II multiverse's various inflationary 
bubbles along a sing!
 le quantum branch. Maybe we could approximate some such variat!
 ion by v
arying the experimental conditions, I'm unsure how to think about that. 

Would it be bad for Tegmark if there were no probability distribution for a 
multiverse's having one mathematical structure instead of another? Maybe that's 
where variational or optimizational principles would come in.

[Ben But I haven't noticed anybody here talking about variational principles 
or optimizational equations in any connection, much less in relation to Level 
IV. (While there is an obvious echo of optimization in applying Occam's Razor 
to Level IV's mathematical structures, this doesn't seem to involve any 
application of mathematical extremization, variations, Morse Theory, etc., so 
it seems not really the same thing. It's certainly not the only echo between a 
mode of inference (present instance: surmise, simplest explanation) and a 
mathematical formalism (extremization, shortest paths, etc.).)

[Russell] Extremum principles come up mostly in Roy Frieden's work. No-one has 
managed to integrate Frieden's stuff into the usual framework of this list, so 
little mention has been made of it, but I do mention it in my book. The hope is 
that some connection can be forged.

I'll try looking into him.

Best, Ben Udell




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-17 Thread Benjamin Udell
Russell, list,

Thanks for pointing out Roy Frieden and EPI. 

At first skim, it reminds me vaguely of the argument by C.S. Peirce (there's 
that name again) that space was curved. The idea was that it would take 
infinite precision of measurement to establish that space were perfectly 
Euclidean all the way down, and that, given all the scales and ways in which 
it could be curved, and the single and unique way for it to be Euclidean, it 
was overwhelmingly likely to be curved.

I'm not sure how such an argument holds up in consideration of things like the 
Planck radius, or in Frieden's or EPI's terms, but the general notion is that 
of inferring physical laws or spatial geometries from measurement issues. In 
Peirce's case, the idea seems to have involved considering what would be 
established by research indefinitely prolonged, which ultimate or indefinitely 
far destination Peirce equated with truth, though in most cases Peirce 
considered it to be findable mainly only by actually doing the research.

[Russell] Extremum principles come up mostly in Roy Frieden's work. No-one 
has managed to integrate Frieden's stuff into the usual framework of this list, 
so little mention has been made of it, but I do mention it in my book. The hope 
is that some connection can be forged.

[Ben] I'll try looking into him.

Best, Ben Udell




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 15-janv.-06, à 19:04, Benjamin Udell a écrit :

The dovetailer keeps sounding like a powerful idea. I do remember 
that it has often been mentioned here, but somehow I failed to pick up 
a sense of what it was really about.



The Universal Dovetailer is a program which generates and executes all 
programs.
Its existence is a non trivial consequence of Church thesis. Please 
recall me to explain this in detail in one or two weeks.
The necessity to dovetail (that is to run successiveley on the initial 
segement of the execution never waiting any programs stop is due to the 
fact that the always defined programs cannot be generated mechanically 
(this can be done in the case of all programs).
Actually I have already explain this on the list (in 2001) but the 
escribe archive seems no more working again, and the new archive seems 
not go enough backward in time.
The first published paper where I define it, is Mechanism ans Personal 
Identity paper:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/MPI_15-MAI-91.pdf
Russell Standish attributes it (wrongly) to Schmidhuber in his book. My 
fault, perhaps, because I have (charitably) compare  Schmidhuber great 
programmer with the Universal Dovetailer in some message to James 
Higgo. You can google on universal dovetailer.
I have also introduced the distinction between the first person, plural 
and non plural, and third person view, although this has been done by 
some philosophers of mind in different context before. I introduce it 
in the self-multiplication and UD context. This is explained in most of 
my papers (recent or not).
Schmidhuber never accepted that distinction (or took it as unscientific 
like may scientist, but that is a category error). Actually he leaves 
the list at the time most people acknowledge the idea. Schmidhuber's 
work is more akin to a constructive physics based on Universal 
effective prior than an attempt toward a TOE capable of treating the 
mind-body relation problems. Here too with some imagination we can see 
the shadow of that  1-3 distinction appearing in Tegmark through the 
frog and bird view.
In the Quantum Mechanics setting the 1-3 distinction appears in Everett 
fundamental paper under the term subjective and objective.
The full conceptual power of the UD arises from the 1-3 distinction 
applied to it. This leads easily  to the mind/matter  reversal (except 
for the remaining movie-graph/Occam difficulty).
Of course dovetailing algorithm are well known by computer scientists 
as a way to simulate parallelism on a sequential computer.





Was there a message to the Everything-List in which it was explained 
so that non-experts can understand it? I'm not asking you to track 
that message (or series of messages) down, but if you or somebody 
remembers around which month it was, that should be enough for me to 
find it. Or is there a link to a Webpage with such an exposition?



I have a lot in my web pages but the Everything Archive does not 
function properly. I will try to find my own backup, once I have more 
time.


But now, Ben, it could be an opportunity and a pleasure for me to 
explain the UD and  the UDA, again. (Those who have already understand 
are not obliged to reread the explanations but actually not many people 
have acknowledge a complete understanding of it).
After all, the interview with the lobian machine will bear on the UDA. 
The UDA explains why physics is reduce to a measure on computations 
seen from some 1-point-of-view, and the lobian machine will be able 
to extract the logic of probability one. This is enough to make the 
comparison with quantum logic (the logic of probability one in 
physics).


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-16 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Jan 15, 2006 at 01:04:02PM -0500, Benjamin Udell wrote:
 
 The dovetailer keeps sounding like a powerful idea. I do remember that it 
 has often been mentioned here, but somehow I failed to pick up a sense of 
 what it was really about. Was there a message to the Everything-List in which 
 it was explained so that non-experts can understand it? I'm not asking you to 
 track that message (or series of messages) down, but if you or somebody 
 remembers around which month it was, that should be enough for me to find it. 
 Or is there a link to a Webpage with such an exposition?

Do a Google search, or a search on the everything list archives eg
Google everything list dovetailer.

 
 Level III varies across quantum branchings. Level II varies across times and 
 places along a single quantum branch in such a way that its features come out 
 the same as Level III's features.

This is not my reading. Level II universes vary their fundamental
physical constants, eg G, alpha and so on.

Level I universes merely vary in time and space, but sufficiently
separated as to be causally independent.

... 

 
 But I haven't noticed anybody here talking about variational principles or 
 optimizational equations in any connection, much less in relation to Level 
 IV. (While there is an obvious echo of optimization in applying Occam's Razor 
 to Level IV's mathematical structures, this doesn't seem to involve any 
 application of mathematical extremization, variations, Morse Theory, etc., so 
 it seems not really the same thing. It's certainly not the only echo between 
 a mode of inference (present instance: surmise, simplest explanation) and a 
 mathematical formalism (extremization, shortest paths, etc.).)
 

Extremum principles come up mostly in Roy Frieden's work. No-one has
managed to integrate Frieden's stuff into the usual framework of this
list, so little mention has been made of it, but I do mention it in my
book. The hope is that some connection can be forged.


-- 
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 ()
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02



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Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-15 Thread Russell Standish
On Fri, Jan 13, 2006 at 11:12:15AM -0500, Benjamin Udell wrote:
 [Russell] The particular Plenitude I assume (ensemble of all bitstrings) is
 actually a completely uninteresting place to have a view of (it has
 precisely zero informational complexity).
 
 Is this kind of Plenitude (ensemble of all bitstrings) more or less
Tegmark's Level IV of all mathematical structures? (I.e., if it's
different, does the difference involve a restriction to discrete or
finitistic structures or some such? 

It does correspond to Tegmark's level 4, but Tegmark's proposal All
mathematical structures is rather vague. I have interpreted his
proposal as all finite axiomatic systems. This is in fact a subset
of my ensemble (well basically Schmidhuber's ensemble) of all
descriptions (since an FAS is a description), yet one can also
describe the entire ensemble of descriptions by a finite method (the
dovetailer), hence one can find the ensemble of all descriptions
contained within Tegmark's.

Note, however that the relationships going both ways do _not_ imply
equivalence between the two ensembles. This is described in my paper
Why Occam's Razor, as well as talked about on the everything list.

 
 IV. possibility waves (variational principles)
 III. probabilities for various outcomes 
 II. information, news, outcomes, events, interactions, phenomena
 I. evidence of causes/dependencies (dependencies, e.g., emission -- open 
 slit -- hit)

I'm somewhat sceptical of your associations here, but it is possibly
because I don't understand what you're getting at. You may need to
develop this some more.


-- 
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 ()
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
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Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-15 Thread Benjamin Udell
Russell, list,

[Russell] The particular Plenitude I assume (ensemble of all bitstrings) is 
actually a completely uninteresting place to have a view of (it has precisely 
zero informational complexity).
[Ben] Is this kind of Plenitude (ensemble of all bitstrings) more or less 
Tegmark's Level IV of all mathematical structures? (I.e., if it's different, 
does the difference involve a restriction to discrete or finitistic structures 
or some such? 
[Russell] It does correspond to Tegmark's level 4, but Tegmark's proposal All 
mathematical structures is rather vague. I have interpreted his proposal as 
all finite axiomatic systems. This is in fact a subset of my ensemble (well 
basically Schmidhuber's ensemble) of all descriptions (since an FAS is a 
description), yet one can also describe the entire ensemble of descriptions by 
a finite method (the dovetailer), hence one can find the ensemble of all 
descriptions contained within Tegmark's.

The dovetailer keeps sounding like a powerful idea. I do remember that it has 
often been mentioned here, but somehow I failed to pick up a sense of what it 
was really about. Was there a message to the Everything-List in which it was 
explained so that non-experts can understand it? I'm not asking you to track 
that message (or series of messages) down, but if you or somebody remembers 
around which month it was, that should be enough for me to find it. Or is there 
a link to a Webpage with such an exposition?

[Russell] Note, however that the relationships going both ways do _not_ imply 
equivalence between the two ensembles. This is described in my paper Why 
Occam's Razor, as well as talked about on the everything list.

[Ben] 
 IV. possibility waves (variational principles)
 III. probabilities for various outcomes 
 II. information, news, outcomes, events, interactions, phenomena
 I. evidence of causes/dependencies (dependencies, e.g., emission -- open 
 slit -- hit)

[Russell] I'm somewhat sceptical of your associations here, but it is possibly 
because I don't understand what you're getting at. You may need to develop this 
some more.

I think I may have made it sound more like my own idea than what it actually 
seems to me. First, here's the part where I haven't thought that I was going 
out on a limb:

Level III varies across quantum branchings. Level II varies across times and 
places along a single quantum branch in such a way that its features come out 
the same as Level III's features.
Where the experimental setup remains the same, successive particles emitted 
make, collectively, a pattern of hits such that the pattern corresponds to the 
probability distribution for particle hits. The pattern consists of variations 
of hit times and locations along a single quantum branch, such that the pattern 
reflects the variations across quantum branchings. So there you see Level III  
Level II aspects.

At Level I, individual histories are especially important and that which 
happens is partly attributable to idiosyncrasies of one's Level I universe, 
such that one must study its individual history and explain things by 
historical causes. I'm not sure whether I've said enough there, so if the 
following is redundant, I apologize. If there's something arbitrary about a 
Level I universe's constants and initial conditions, then there is variation, 
across Level II, among Level I universes or inflationary bubbles (I'm saying 
Level I universe instead of Level I multiverse because you've said that 
Tegmark's use of the word multiverse isn't standard; but if universe has a 
technical sense here that confuses the issue, then I don't mean it in that 
technical sense). But whether it's an issue of constants and initial conditions 
or of something else if anything at all (Tegmark seems unsure), a variation 
across inflationary bubbles in a Level II universe means that there are aspec!
 ts of our Level I universe which are part of a pattern of variation such that 
our Level I universe is not a representative sample of instances (like the 
pattern of accumulated particle hits) but instead a single instance (a single 
particle hit). To establish what are these arbitrary aspects, we vary the 
experimental setup and seek the constants and infer relationships between 
patterns of outcomes and the variations among initial conditions of various 
experiments. Now we're establishing the significance of variations across 
various evolutions of the possibility waves into which the various experimental 
setups were factored and finding that some relationships (or aspects of 
relationships, the particular quantities involved, etc.) seem arbitrarily to 
impose themselves -- seemiingly arbitrarily set constants of nature etc. 
(Again, if the fundamental constants and initial conditions of our Level I 
universe turn out not to be somewhat arbitrary and turn out not to mark a 
variat!
 ion across Level II, then there would be to seek out other thi!
 ngs whic
h do mark such variation, 

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-15 Thread Benjamin Udell
Russell, list,

When I said:
But I haven't noticed anybody here talking about variational principles or 
optimizational equations in any connection, much less in relation to Level IV.
I meant that as being part of why I feel out on a limb (rather than in the 
sense of some sort of chiding toward people here for not discussing those 
subjects enough.)

Best, Ben Udell
 
- Original Message - 
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: EverythingList everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, January 15, 2006 1:04 PM
Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 13-janv.-06, à 18:51, Brent Meeker a écrit :


Bruno Marchal wrote:

Le 13-janv.-06, à 04:56, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
I sympathise with the conclusions of the young Danny, but there is a 
philosophical non sequitur here. The fact that I would like 
something to be true, or not to be true, has no bearing on whether 
it is in fact true. I don't like what happened in Germany under the 
Nazis, but that doesn't mean I should believe the Nazis did not 
exist, so why should my revulsion at the thought of infidels burning 
in Hell lead me to believe that God and Hell do not exist? It might 
make me reluctant to worship such a God, but that is not the same as 
believing he does not exist.

Totally agree.
But if it's scientific, it's not religion, is it? Religion means 
believing something in the absence of sufficient evidence.
But here the word evidence is too large. Imagine two seconds that 
Christian religion is true and you face God after your earthly 
existence. In that case you would have evidence for the existence of 
God. Would it be a reason to stop believing in religion?
At the same time, operationally I do somehow agree with you, but then 
you should accept the idea that many scientist are religious in the 
sense that many scientist believe in the existence of a stuffy or 
substancial primitive physical reality, but obviously there are no 
evidence at all for this.


Surely you don't mean there's no evidence for tables, chairs, atoms, 
etc...? Are you using primitive in some special philosophical sense?



You are right. we have evidence for chairs, galaxies, bosons and 
fermions and even anyons, and all that. But we have no evidence that 
this is eventually made up of substances capable of closing the 
physical worlds. Like Plato guessed it could be the shadow or the 
border of something bigger. Like the sharable and unsharable part of 
the machine ignorance as I hope to show we get into, once we take 
some comp hyp. or weaker seriously enough.







No physicists does even postulate it in scientific paper.


Sure they do - the most commonly postulated primitive stuff is a 
quantum field.


This is a wonderful mathematical construct, but I don't think wise to 
believe no one really knows how to interpret it really, despite Everett 
MWI which I think is a key progress, but not necessarily towards 
physical primitivity (giving that Everett postulated a mechanical 
observer trigging the UDA paradoxe).





(People confuse often the belief in a reality and a belief in a 
physical reality).


What's your definition of reality?


It is whatever it is.
It should be the roots of our knowledge and beliefs. It is what makes 
us bet on the physical realities, on the psychological realities, on 
the arithmetical realities and many other related realities, ...


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith

2006-01-14 Thread Benjamin Udell
Bruno, list,

Thank your for clarifying with regard to semantics and truth-preservation, 
enough for me to do a little homework.

I searched around the Internet and see that you're quite right, I've wandered 
into semantic-vs.-syntactic issues with my talk of truth preservation in 
inference.

How did I get into this? For what it's worth, here's how:  

Here and elsewhere I've started mentioning truth preservation and falsity 
preservation because it has seemed a concise and striking way to sum up (in 
terms of formal implicational relations between premisses and conclusion) a 
four-way distinction among kinds of inference. So in a sense it was my choices 
in rhetoric that got me into this. My argument is with some who see three basic 
kinds of inference -- deductive, inductive, and abductive, and not so much 
with people who count two, since they'll probably grant at the very least some 
importance, albeit smaller, to a further subdivision. 

Basically, I've wanted to moot, by resolving in a simple and systematic way, 
the excessively chewed-over issue of _formal_ reducibility of certain kinds of 
inferences to others, and to do so while pointing out that such definitions 
don't at all completely capture what's interesting or valuable about the 
thereby defined kinds of inference, not in _only some_ cases (surmise and 
inductive generalization, regarding which the objections may be anticipated) 
but instead in _all_ cases (i.e., also strict aka reversible deduction and 
equipollential aka reversible deduction (which includes the mathematical 
induction step in its usual application, i.e., to a set whose well-orderedness 
has already been granted)).

This sort of thing, taken further, would lead to why I joined the 
Everything-List -- correlations between families of research and the four 
Levels.

Best, Ben Udell

- Original Message - 
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Everything-List List everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, January 14, 2006 8:43 AM
Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith



Le 13-janv.-06, à 19:13, Benjamin Udell wrote in part:

 I'm wondering whether we mean the same thing by truth preservation. 
 I mean the validity of such arguments as exemplified (in trivial 
 forms) by p, ergo p and pq, ergo p or whatever argument such that 
 the conclusion is contained in the premisses. Or maybe I've been 
 using the word deductive in too broad a sense?

Actually it is the contrary. What you describe is classical truth 
preservation, which occurs with the classical deductive rules (so that 
they are sound and complete). In general truth preservation is a 
semantics dependant concept, where semantics can sometimes be given by 
some mathematical structures. I don't want to be too technical at this 
point.
(Mathematically a semantics is a subspaces' classifier)

 How did you guess that I currently have patience and time on my hands? 
 :-)

Thanks for witnessing the interest. I wish only I would have more time 
for now. I have the patience I think :-)

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith

2006-01-14 Thread Benjamin Udell
Sorry, had to make a few corrections.

1. [correction]  ...my definitions don't at all completely capture...
[instead of vague]  ...such definitions don't at all completely capture... 

2. [correction]  ...'strict' aka 'non-reversible' deduction...
[instead of mistake]  ...'strict' aka 'reversible' deduction... 

This is an after-second-cup-of-coffee post and should be more reliable. The 
corrections are incorporated below. Again, sorry.

- Best Ben Udell.

- Original Message [corrected] - 
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything-List List everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, January 14, 2006 12:26 PM
Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith


Bruno, list,

Thank your for clarifying with regard to semantics and truth-preservation, 
enough for me to do a little homework.

I searched around the Internet and see that you're quite right, I've wandered 
into semantic-vs.-syntactic issues with my talk of truth preservation in 
inference.

How did I get into this? For what it's worth, here's how:  

Here and elsewhere I've started mentioning truth preservation and falsity 
preservation because it has seemed a concise and striking way to sum up (in 
terms of formal implicational relations between premisses and conclusion) a 
four-way distinction among kinds of inference. So in a sense it was my choices 
in rhetoric that got me into this. My argument is with some who see three basic 
kinds of inference -- deductive, inductive, and abductive, and not so much 
with people who count two, since they'll probably grant at the very least some 
importance, albeit smaller, to a further subdivision. 

Basically, I've wanted to moot, by resolving in a simple and systematic way, 
the excessively chewed-over issue of _formal_ reducibility of certain kinds of 
inferences to others, and to do so while pointing out that my definitions don't 
at all completely capture what's interesting or valuable about the thereby 
defined kinds of inference, not in _only some_ cases (surmise and inductive 
generalization, regarding which the objections may be anticipated) but instead 
in _all_ cases (i.e., also strict aka non-reversible deduction and 
equipollential aka reversible deduction (which includes the mathematical 
induction step in its usual application, i.e., to a set whose well-orderedness 
has already been granted)).

This sort of thing, taken further, would lead to why I joined the 
Everything-List -- correlations between families of research and the four 
Levels.

Best, Ben Udell

- Original Message - 
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Everything-List List everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, January 14, 2006 8:43 AM
Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith



Le 13-janv.-06, à 19:13, Benjamin Udell wrote in part:

 I'm wondering whether we mean the same thing by truth preservation. 
 I mean the validity of such arguments as exemplified (in trivial 
 forms) by p, ergo p and pq, ergo p or whatever argument such that 
 the conclusion is contained in the premisses. Or maybe I've been 
 using the word deductive in too broad a sense?

Actually it is the contrary. What you describe is classical truth 
preservation, which occurs with the classical deductive rules (so that 
they are sound and complete). In general truth preservation is a 
semantics dependant concept, where semantics can sometimes be given by 
some mathematical structures. I don't want to be too technical at this 
point.
(Mathematically a semantics is a subspaces' classifier)

 How did you guess that I currently have patience and time on my hands? 
 :-)

Thanks for witnessing the interest. I wish only I would have more time 
for now. I have the patience I think :-)

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/







Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-13 Thread Bruno Marchal
Thanks. The expression rational theology is quite nice and I have been  
tempted to use it but it is already used by Mormons in a too much a  
priori christian frame.

http://www.lds-mormon.com/widtsoe.shtml

But if a adjective should be added to theology I think I would use  
lobian perhaps. But not in a title. Machine theology is better,  
although superficially (pregodelian) contradictory.


Bruno



Le 12-janv.-06, à 20:22, Benjamin Udell a écrit :


Bruno, list,

It occurred to me that I ought not merely to wing it on the meaning  
of theology as a word. There are various places online to look it  
up, but this is an interesting one and, anyway, some may find this to  
be an introduction to a good resource.



From the Century Dictionary http://www.global-language.com/century/
(About the really rather useful Century Dictionary:  
http://www.leoyan.com/century-dictionary.com/why.php )


(Requires installing software) Century Dictionary, Vol. VIII, Page  
6274, Theologus to Theorbo (DjVu)
http://www.leoyan.com/century-dictionary.com/08/index08.djvu? 
djvuoptspage=66 ,

(DjVu Highlighted), (Java) (JPEG)

theology (the¯-ol' o¯-ji), n. [ ME. theologie,  OF. theologie, F.  
théologie = Pr. teologia = Sp. teología = Pg. theologia = It. teologia  
= D. G. theologie = Sw. Dan. teologi,  LL. theologia,  Gr.  
theología, a speaking concerning God,  theológos, speaking of God  
(see theologue),  theós, god, + légein, speak.] The science concerned  
with ascertaining, classifying, and systematizing all attainable truth  
concerning God and his relation to the universe; the science of  
religion; religious truth scientifically stated.
The ancient Greeks used the word to designate the history of their  
gods; early Christian writers applied it to the doctrine of the nature  
of God; Peter Abelard, ill the twelfth century, first began to employ  
it to denote scientific instruction concerning God and the divine  
life. Theology differs from religion as the science of any subject  
differs from the subject matter itself. Religion in the broadest sense  
is a life of right affections and right conduct toward God; theology  
is a scientific knowledge of God and of the life which reverence and  
allegiance toward him require. Theology is divided, in reference to  
the sources whence the knowledge is derived, into natural theology,  
which treats of God and divine things in so far as their nature is  
disclosed through human consciousness, through the material creation,  
and through the moral order discernible in the course of history apart  
from specific revelation, and revealed theology, which treats of the  
same subject-matter as mad!
 e known in the scriptures of the 0ld and the New Testament. The  
former is theistic merely; the latter is Christian, and includes the  
doctrine of salvation by Christ, and of future rewards and  
punishments. In reference to the ends sought and the methods of  
treatment, theology is again divided into theoretical theology, which  
treats of the doctrines and principles of the divine life for the  
purpose of scientific and philosophical accuracy, and practical  
theology, which treats of the duties of the divine life for immediate  
practical ends. Theology is further divided, according to  
subject-matter and methods, into various branches, of which the  
principal are given below.

  Ac Theologie hath tened me ten score tymes,
 The more I muse there-inne the mistier it seemeth.
 Piers Plowman (B), x. 180.
  Theology, what is it but the science of things divine?
 Hooker, Eccles. Polity, iii. 8.
  Theology, properly and directly, deals with notional apprehension;  
religion with imaginative.

 J. H. Newman, Gram. of Assent, p. 115.
--Ascetical theology. See ascetical.
--Biblical theology, that branch of theology which has for its object  
to set forth the knowledge of God and the divine life as gathered from  
a large study of the Bible, as opposed to a merely minute study of  
particular texts on the one hand, and to a mere use of philosophical  
methods on the other.
--Dogmatic theology, that department of theology which has for its  
object a connected and scientific statement of theology as a complete  
and harmonious science as authoritatively held and taught by the  
church.

--Exegetical theology. See exegetical.
--Federal theology, a system of theology based upon the idea of two  
covenants between God and man--the covenant of nature, or of works,  
before the fall, by which eternal life was promised to man on  
condition of his perfect obedience to the moral law, and the covenant  
of grace, after the fall, by which salvation and eternal life are  
promised to man by the free grace of God. Kloppenburg, professor of  
theology at Franeker in the Netherlands (died 1652), originated the  
system, and it was perfected (1648) by John Koch (Cocceius), successor  
of Kloppenburg in the same chair. See Cocceian.
--Fundamental theology, that 

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith

2006-01-13 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 12-janv.-06, à 16:54, Benjamin Udell a écrit :


Bruno, list,

If I understand you correctly, then you mean, more generally:

G* \ G will correspond to any true conclusion that the machine can 
draw by other than deductive (= truth-preservative)inference.


Yes. Except that if deduction are generally thought indeed as truth 
preservative, truth preservation is far more general than deduction.
I f I get the time and the patience of the lister, I could one day 
introduce you to some typical lobian entity which are NOT machine for 
illustrating more concretely such phenomena.
The  incompleteness phenomena itself illustrates that truth 
preservation is much more general than deduction.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-13 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 13-janv.-06, à 04:56, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

I sympathise with the conclusions of the young Danny, but there is a 
philosophical non sequitur here. The fact that I would like something 
to be true, or not to be true, has no bearing on whether it is in fact 
true. I don't like what happened in Germany under the Nazis, but that 
doesn't mean I should believe the Nazis did not exist, so why should 
my revulsion at the thought of infidels burning in Hell lead me to 
believe that God and Hell do not exist? It might make me reluctant to 
worship such a God, but that is not the same as believing he does not 
exist.


Totally agree.

But if it's scientific, it's not religion, is it? Religion means 
believing something in the absence of sufficient evidence.


But here the word evidence is too large. Imagine two seconds that 
Christian religion is true and you face God after your earthly 
existence. In that case you would have evidence for the existence of 
God. Would it be a reason to stop believing in religion?
At the same time, operationally I do somehow agree with you, but then 
you should accept the idea that many scientist are religious in the 
sense that many scientist believe in the existence of a stuffy or 
substancial primitive physical reality, but obviously there are no 
evidence at all for this. No physicists does even postulate it in 
scientific paper.
(People confuse often the belief in a reality and a belief in a 
physical reality).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-13 Thread Benjamin Udell
 at least mental notice of it, 
especially in a scientific manner. Seeing and noting. Consciousness itself is 
also in a sense an experience, insofar as it involves a cognitive/affective 
subjectedness to things beyond one's entire control. In some way, with the talk 
of observers, I was thinking of experiencers. Perhaps you're taking 
experience in the sense of the experience sharable among members of a 
community, such that my personal, unsharable experience doesn't count as 
empirical. I sometimes trip over differences in meaning across traditions.

Anyway, how would I know of (or believe in) my quantum immortality except by 
inference from abstractions? What sort of personal, non-sharable knowledge 
would one have of quantum immortality such that the knowledge of it is 
comparable with the knowledge of consciousness? Is it a subjective sense that 
it's somehow possible for oneself not to exist? -- i.e., not a consciousness of 
immortality, but a consciousness of an underlying impossibility of mortality? 
Something like that?

[Ben] Nevertheless, I've liked the idea of distinguishing an inclusive 
1st--2nd person we, both addressor and addressee, from an exclusive 1st 
person addressor-only, so I'm glad to see it pop up in this context.
[Russell] I think we can credit Bruno with this distinction :)

I'll count that credit as established.

Best, Ben Udell


- Original Message - 
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Friday, January 13, 2006 12:13 AM
Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

On Thu, Jan 12, 2006 at 11:12:13PM -0500, Benjamin Udell wrote:
 Russell, list,
 
  Tegmark's 4 level Multiverse (actually the Multiverse is only one of the 
  levels) does not really have viewpoints at each level.
  In my book, which largely follows the tradition of this list, there is 3 
  viewpoints identified: 1st person, 1st person plural and 3rd person.
  The 3rd person corresponds to the bird viewpoint of the Multiverse, or 
  Tegmark Level 3 'verse. Calling it a viewpoint is a stretch of the language 
  since necessarily observers must be embedded in the Multiverse.
 
 Where does Tegmark say that the Multiverse is only one of the levels? Which 
 one?

Multiverse was coined by David Deutsch to refer to the many worlds
of MWI. This corresponds to Tegmark's level 3 parallel universe. I
follow this terminology, as do many others on this list. We also tend
to use the terms Plenitude or Platonia to refer to his Level 4
parallel universe. The other levels have not been christened so to speak.

Tegmark uses multiverse to refer to any type of parallel universe -
which I think contradicts usual usage.

 What is meant by viewpoint? Tegmark's elementary description of the four 
 levels sounds like the outline of four viewpoints, with frog and bird 
 marking the extremes of a four-step set of gradations. Level IV is associated 
 with pure maths. Level III is associated with alternatives among cases, 
 which marks it as associated with maths of logic, information, probability, 
 etc., despite what Tegmark says about logic's being the most general and 
 underlying thing in maths. Level III is more abstract than Level II and 
 actualizes alternate outcomes across quantum branchings, while Level II 
 actualizes alternate outcomes in various times and places along a single 
 branch, so that the two levels come out the same in their features. Level II 
 seems associable with statistical theory, some areas of information theory, 
 and some other fields deal in a general way with gathering data from various 
 actual places and times and drawing ampliatively-inductive conclusions from 
 parts, sampl!
 es, etc., to totalities. Level I, with its possibly idiosyncratic constants, 
initial conditions, historical dependencies, seems associable with physical, 
chemical, life sciences and human  social studies. So those seem four 
viewpoints with distinctive content and associations, though not the kind of 
content which the idea of viewpoint seems to have received on the everything 
list, which is decidedly not to say that there's anything wrong with the kind 
of content given on the everything list to the idea of viewpoint.
 
 Is it Tegmark's view, that the bird's eye view is associated particularly 
 with Level III, or does it depend on ideas as developed on the everything 
 list? Why wouldn't a view be associated with Level IV as well? (I thought 
 that, at least in Tegmark's view, the bird's eye view _was_ Level IV).

The term bird/frog viewpoint is Tegmark's, which he used in his 1998
paper. I can well imagine applying to his 2003 multilevel scheme.

The association of 3rd person viewpoint (not bird viewpoint) with the
Multiverse is mine, and is justified on the basis that all observers
must be embedded in quantum mechanical many worlds structure. This
result is derived by assuming a level 4 plenitude, and is given in my
2004 paper Why Occams Razor

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith

2006-01-13 Thread Benjamin Udell
Bruno, list,

[Ben]  Bruno, list,
 If I understand you correctly, then you mean, more generally:
 G* \ G will correspond to any true conclusion that the machine can draw by 
 other than deductive (= truth-preservative)inference.

[Bruno]  Yes. Except that if deduction are generally thought indeed as truth 
preservative, truth preservation is far more general than deduction. If I get 
the time and the patience of the lister, I could one day introduce you to some 
typical lobian entity which are NOT machine for illustrating more concretely 
such phenomena. The  incompleteness phenomena itself illustrates that truth 
preservation is much more general than deduction.

I'm wondering whether we mean the same thing by truth preservation. I mean 
the validity of such arguments as exemplified (in trivial forms) by p, ergo p 
and pq, ergo p or whatever argument such that the conclusion is contained 
in the premisses. Or maybe I've been using the word deductive in too broad a 
sense? I tend to think, for instance, of the reductio ad absurdum as 
deductive in a broad sense, because I'm trying to differentiate simply in 
terms of truth-(non)preservativeness and falsity-(non)preservativeness of the 
overall reasoning process in which such a piece of reasoning takes place.

How did you guess that I currently have patience and time on my hands? :-)

Best, Ben Udell




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith

2006-01-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 09-janv.-06, à 18:30, Benjamin Udell a écrit :


By ampliative induction I mean, not mathematical induction.


Nice!  I hope you will be patient enough to see that this is a good 
description of G* \ G.
G characterises the self-referential discourse of the lobian machine, 
which is fundamentally a machine capable of using mathematical 
induction(+).
G* \ G will correspond to anything true that the machine can guess 
without using mathematical induction.


Bruno

(+) IF a property is such that 1) it is true for 0, and 2) if true for 
n it is true for n+1; THEN it will be true for all numbers.
More compactly:   {P(0)  [for all n:  P(n) - P(n+1)]} - for all n 
P(n).



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 11-janv.-06, à 17:57, Benjamin Udell a écrit :



Bruno, list,

Well, on the basis of that which you say below (much of which I 
unfortunately only vaguely understand), where you don't focus it all 
decidedly on the particular issues of faith and belief, it actually 
does now sound more like some sort of theology. It has various 
elements of theology in the broader or more comprehensive sense.




Thanks for telling. Note that it is all normal you only vaguely 
understand my last post, because it is a very concise summary.






The thing that it seems to be missing is gods or God. Considered as 
theology, it seems like a wheel sorely missing its hub.



The neoplatonician use often the term God for ultimate explanation, 
and also use often (but it is an idiosyncrasies) the names of the greek 
Gods for concept (EROS = love, THANATOS = death, etc.). Strictly 
speaking, it has nothing to do with the judeo-christian notion of God.
Still, I like to define axiomatically God by something so big that it 
escapes any attempt to define it, except perhaps in some negative way. 
In that sense I could argue that the God of comp theology can be 
identified either with either the ultimate explanation, the root of 
everything or even with the unnameable SELF which caracterizes the 
comp first person.
Perhaps the chapter of God will be a necessary blank page in comp 
treatise.
Now, I think that GOD as a term has much more heavy connotation than 
theology, but I am probably underestimating the stealing of rational 
theology by the political power (this happened sometimes after 
Plotinus death).





At this point, in terms of descriptive accuracy, this hublessness 
seems the hub of the matter. So it sounds like a kind of 
psycho-cosmology, or -- well, not a psychophysics, but, in order to 
suggest your computationalist primacy of the soul -- a physiopsychics 
(in English, if the adjective is physicopsychical, it's a little 
less suggestive of paranormalism, which is strongly associated 
nowadays with the adjective psychic.)


(C.S. Peirce held that matter is congealed mind. Though he thought 
that space would turn out to be curved, he was pre-Einstein and saw 
matter as a kind of spentness and barrenness rather than as a tight 
lockup of energy.)


Your theory may be empirically refutable but, if it survives such 
tests, what is there to support its affirmation?



The UDA+MOVIEgraph argument. I will simply say UDA. (Universal 
Dovetailer Argument).






 Is derivability of physical laws from laws of mind really enough?



Would be nice, but the UDA shows there is no choice. Please understand 
that the UDA argument explains only but completely that if the comp 
hyp. is true then necessarily matter emerges from mind. Because this 
sounds so weird I have begin a derivation, at first just in order to 
illustrate what that could mean.




An information theorist, John Collier, said at the peirce email forum 
peirce-l that he had managed to derive each two among logic, 
information theory, and probability theory, from the third remaining, 
though I don't know whether he ever published these derivations.



Could be interesting.



Have you shown that your laws of mind cannot be derived from physics 
in a way that shows that the nonderivability is not merely a result of 
our insufficent knowledge of physical law? You may also encounter some 
flak on your conception of mind.



The problem is that physics does never really address the mind-body 
problem, with some exception like Mario Bunge, but he dismisses it and 
explain it away in a manner similar to Dennett. Many people have try 
and generally the honest one (like Dennett) admit their failure. It 
*is* a tricky problem. my original goal of my research (and thesis) was 
*just* to explain that the mind body problem was not yet solved. That 
is how and why I eventually translate it into a measure (on 
computational histories) problem, quite in line with discussion on this 
list.






For what it's worth, for my part, I would hold that a key factor in 
intelligence, at least, which learns and grows, is an evolvability 
factor, a kind of sufficient un-boundness to its codes and its 
methods and systems of interpretation, in order to be able to test 
those codes, methods, systems and to do so not only by trial and error 
but more sophisticated kinds of learning and testing, such that memory 
and active recollection take on particular importance.



I do agree with you here.




Do your laws of mind take evolvability into account? Maybe they don't 
need to, though, depending on what you mean by mind. I tend to think 
that the mind must involve the retention and evolvability factor in 
some radical way, but it's quite vague to me how that would work. 
Maybe there are things which could fairly be called mind though I 
would never have thought of them that way.



As far as you don't (re)introduce substances, there is a possibility of 
staying coherent with comp. Now you 

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith

2006-01-12 Thread Benjamin Udell
Bruno, list,

If I understand you correctly, then you mean, more generally:

G* \ G will correspond to any true conclusion that the machine can draw by 
other than deductive (= truth-preservative)inference.

Best, Ben Udell

- Original Message - 
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Everything-List List everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, January 12, 2006 10:03 AM
Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith

Le 09-janv.-06, à 18:30, Benjamin Udell a écrit :

 By ampliative induction I mean, not mathematical induction.

Nice!  I hope you will be patient enough to see that this is a good 
description of G* \ G.
G characterises the self-referential discourse of the lobian machine, 
which is fundamentally a machine capable of using mathematical 
induction(+).
G* \ G will correspond to anything true that the machine can guess 
without using mathematical induction.

Bruno

(+) IF a property is such that 1) it is true for 0, and 2) if true for 
n it is true for n+1; THEN it will be true for all numbers.
More compactly:   {P(0)  [for all n:  P(n) - P(n+1)]} - for all n 
P(n).

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-12 Thread Benjamin Udell
Bruno, list,

It occurred to me that I ought not merely to wing it on the meaning of 
theology as a word. There are various places online to look it up, but this 
is an interesting one and, anyway, some may find this to be an introduction to 
a good resource.

From the Century Dictionary http://www.global-language.com/century/ 
(About the really rather useful Century Dictionary: 
http://www.leoyan.com/century-dictionary.com/why.php )

(Requires installing software) Century Dictionary, Vol. VIII, Page 6274, 
Theologus to Theorbo (DjVu)
http://www.leoyan.com/century-dictionary.com/08/index08.djvu?djvuoptspage=66 ,
(DjVu Highlighted), (Java) (JPEG)

theology (the¯-ol' o¯-ji), n. [ ME. theologie,  OF. theologie, F. théologie = 
Pr. teologia = Sp. teología = Pg. theologia = It. teologia = D. G. theologie = 
Sw. Dan. teologi,  LL. theologia,  Gr. theología, a speaking concerning God, 
 theológos, speaking of God (see theologue),  theós, god, + légein, speak.] 
The science concerned with ascertaining, classifying, and systematizing all 
attainable truth concerning God and his relation to the universe; the science 
of religion; religious truth scientifically stated. 
The ancient Greeks used the word to designate the history of their gods; early 
Christian writers applied it to the doctrine of the nature of God; Peter 
Abelard, ill the twelfth century, first began to employ it to denote scientific 
instruction concerning God and the divine life. Theology differs from religion 
as the science of any subject differs from the subject matter itself. Religion 
in the broadest sense is a life of right affections and right conduct toward 
God; theology is a scientific knowledge of God and of the life which reverence 
and allegiance toward him require. Theology is divided, in reference to the 
sources whence the knowledge is derived, into natural theology, which treats of 
God and divine things in so far as their nature is disclosed through human 
consciousness, through the material creation, and through the moral order 
discernible in the course of history apart from specific revelation, and 
revealed theology, which treats of the same subject-matter as mad!
 e known in the scriptures of the 0ld and the New Testament. The former is 
theistic merely; the latter is Christian, and includes the doctrine of 
salvation by Christ, and of future rewards and punishments. In reference to the 
ends sought and the methods of treatment, theology is again divided into 
theoretical theology, which treats of the doctrines and principles of the 
divine life for the purpose of scientific and philosophical accuracy, and 
practical theology, which treats of the duties of the divine life for immediate 
practical ends. Theology is further divided, according to subject-matter and 
methods, into various branches, of which the principal are given below.
  Ac Theologie hath tened me ten score tymes, 
 The more I muse there-inne the mistier it seemeth. 
 Piers Plowman (B), x. 180. 
  Theology, what is it but the science of things divine? 
 Hooker, Eccles. Polity, iii. 8. 
  Theology, properly and directly, deals with notional apprehension; religion 
with imaginative. 
 J. H. Newman, Gram. of Assent, p. 115. 
--Ascetical theology. See ascetical.
--Biblical theology, that branch of theology which has for its object to set 
forth the knowledge of God and the divine life as gathered from a large study 
of the Bible, as opposed to a merely minute study of particular texts on the 
one hand, and to a mere use of philosophical methods on the other.
--Dogmatic theology, that department of theology which has for its object a 
connected and scientific statement of theology as a complete and harmonious 
science as authoritatively held and taught by the church.
--Exegetical theology. See exegetical.
--Federal theology, a system of theology based upon the idea of two covenants 
between God and man--the covenant of nature, or of works, before the fall, by 
which eternal life was promised to man on condition of his perfect obedience to 
the moral law, and the covenant of grace, after the fall, by which salvation 
and eternal life are promised to man by the free grace of God. Kloppenburg, 
professor of theology at Franeker in the Netherlands (died 1652), originated 
the system, and it was perfected (1648) by John Koch (Cocceius), successor of 
Kloppenburg in the same chair. See Cocceian. 
--Fundamental theology, that branch of systematic theology which vindicates 
man's knowledge of God by the investigation of its grounds and sources in 
general, and of the trustworthiness of the Christian revelation in particular, 
and which therefore includes both natural theology and the evidences of 
Christianity.
--Genevan theology. See Genevan.
--Historical theology, the science of the history and growth of Christian 
doctrines.
--Homiletic theology. Same as homiletics.
--Liberal theology. See liberal Christianity, under liberal.

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-12 Thread Benjamin Udell
 theology. On the other hand, 
if you have a certain appetite for trouble, then maybe theology is the way to 
go, assuming that you don't simply thereby drive away your desired audience. 
Also, some kinds of fame are always unexpected and often regretted. You don't 
want to win the wrong kind of lottery. Some popular columnist or pundit happens 
upon your theory, vituperates semi-literately against it for thousands or 
millions to read, and suddenly you're a Bad Guy to thousands or millions who 
know nothing about you. In more general form, it's one of the !
 oldest and most common stories: You'll be on unfamiliar turf and your habits 
and instincts on unfamiliar turf may end up mis-serving you. Anyway, the 
bad-celebrity problem can happen even within academe.

[Bruno] the UDA argument explains only but completely that if the comp 
hyp. is true then necessarily matter emerges from mind. Because this 
sounds so weird I have begin a derivation, at first just in order to 
illustrate what that could mean.

It would be interesting to see such a clarification of the Universal Dovetailer 
Argument.

[Bruno] The problem is that physics does never really address the mind-body 
problem 

Yes, but I was referring to the fact that, even aside from that issue, it seems 
fairly presumable that physical science is incomplete. Can you show that the 
UDA shows that the physical arises from the mental, no matter how incomplete 
our knowledge of physical principles and laws? Or can you at least show that 
the UDA shows that the physical arises from the mental under, let's say, most 
families of physical theories which we may come to hold?

[Bruno] Well I already distinguish the mind from the soul. The mind is a very 
general notion comprehending all imaterial notion from the number PI to 
the game of bridge and anything not reasonnablu described by pieces of 
Stuff (even nations and person belongs to mind). 

Well, that clarifies. I've read Rucker's book _Mind Tools: The Five Levels of 
Mathematical Reality_, though not his book Infinity and the Mind which you 
mention further on. But I get the idea. 

A question arises for me here and elsewhere. To what extent do you hold with 
Tegmark's Four-Level Multiverse view and to what extent is your theory 
logically linked to it? I ask this because, for instance, in such a Four-Level 
world, I'd expect not just two salient views (bird's eye  frog's eye, 
3rd-person  1st-person, etc.), but four. I'd expect not just mind-matter 
dichotomies but 4-chotomies. And so on. In some cases, one may argue that one 
distinction across the 4-chotomy is more important than the other, say in the 
case of inference, where arguably the truth-perservative versus 
truth-nonpreservative is a more important distinction, more like a chasm, than 
is the distinction between falsity-preservative and falsity-nonpreservative, 
but I'd still want to know about that the four-way distinction because its 
relevance should not be presumptively precluded, especially in a Tegmarkian 
four-level Multiverse. For me there it's partly a matter of some non-maximal 
degree of sur!
 eness on my part, and partly a matter of my motivation; I take an interest in 
patterns of four-way logical distinctions, though I do wander from that 
interest in an interesting place like this.

Best, Ben Udell

- Original Message - 
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, January 12, 2006 10:52 AM
Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue



Le 11-janv.-06, à 17:57, Benjamin Udell a écrit :


 Bruno, list,

 Well, on the basis of that which you say below (much of which I 
 unfortunately only vaguely understand), where you don't focus it all 
 decidedly on the particular issues of faith and belief, it actually 
 does now sound more like some sort of theology. It has various 
 elements of theology in the broader or more comprehensive sense.

Thanks for telling. Note that it is all normal you only vaguely 
understand my last post, because it is a very concise summary.

 The thing that it seems to be missing is gods or God. Considered as 
 theology, it seems like a wheel sorely missing its hub.

The neoplatonician use often the term God for ultimate explanation, 
and also use often (but it is an idiosyncrasies) the names of the greek 
Gods for concept (EROS = love, THANATOS = death, etc.). Strictly 
speaking, it has nothing to do with the judeo-christian notion of God.
Still, I like to define axiomatically God by something so big that it 
escapes any attempt to define it, except perhaps in some negative way. 
In that sense I could argue that the God of comp theology can be 
identified either with either the ultimate explanation, the root of 
everything or even with the unnameable SELF which caracterizes the 
comp first person.
Perhaps the chapter of God will be a necessary blank page in comp 
treatise.
Now, I think that GOD as a term has much more

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-12 Thread Russell Standish
Tegmark's 4 level Multiverse (actually the Multiverse is only one of
the levels) does not really have viewpoints at each level.

In my book, which largely follows the tradition of this list, there is
3 viewpoints identified: 1st person, 1st person plural and 3rd person.

The 3rd person corresponds to the bird viewpoint of the Multiverse, or
Tegmark Level 3 'verse. Calling it a viewpoint is a stretch of the
language since necessarily observers must be embedded in the Multiverse.

Both of the 1st person viewpoints correspond to the frog viewpoint,
the difference being the 1st person plural is an objective viewpoint -
all things in the 1pp vpt will be agreed upon by 2 or more observers,
whereas the 1p vpt is subjective, containing items such as quantum
immortality that are _necessarily_ subjective.

I have tried to identify 1pp with G and 1p with G*, but I'm really
unsure that the analogy is sound.

Cheers

On Thu, Jan 12, 2006 at 01:18:21PM -0500, Benjamin Udell wrote:
 A question arises for me here and elsewhere. To what extent do you hold with 
 Tegmark's Four-Level Multiverse view and to what extent is your theory 
 logically linked to it? I ask this because, for instance, in such a 
 Four-Level world, I'd expect not just two salient views (bird's eye  frog's 
 eye, 3rd-person  1st-person, etc.), but four. I'd expect not just 
 mind-matter dichotomies but 4-chotomies. And so on. In some cases, one may 
 argue that one distinction across the 4-chotomy is more important than the 
 other, say in the case of inference, where arguably the truth-perservative 
 versus truth-nonpreservative is a more important distinction, more like a 
 chasm, than is the distinction between falsity-preservative and 
 falsity-nonpreservative, but I'd still want to know about that the four-way 
 distinction because its relevance should not be presumptively precluded, 
 especially in a Tegmarkian four-level Multiverse. For me there it's partly a 
 matter of some non-maximal degree of sur!
  eness on my part, and partly a matter of my motivation; I take an interest 
 in patterns of four-way logical distinctions, though I do wander from that 
 interest in an interesting place like this.
 
 Best, Ben Udell
 

-- 
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 ()
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02



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Description: PGP signature


Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-12 Thread Benjamin Udell
Russell, list,

 Tegmark's 4 level Multiverse (actually the Multiverse is only one of the 
 levels) does not really have viewpoints at each level.
 In my book, which largely follows the tradition of this list, there is 3 
 viewpoints identified: 1st person, 1st person plural and 3rd person.
 The 3rd person corresponds to the bird viewpoint of the Multiverse, or 
 Tegmark Level 3 'verse. Calling it a viewpoint is a stretch of the language 
 since necessarily observers must be embedded in the Multiverse.

Where does Tegmark say that the Multiverse is only one of the levels? Which one?

What is meant by viewpoint? Tegmark's elementary description of the four 
levels sounds like the outline of four viewpoints, with frog and bird 
marking the extremes of a four-step set of gradations. Level IV is associated 
with pure maths. Level III is associated with alternatives among cases, which 
marks it as associated with maths of logic, information, probability, etc., 
despite what Tegmark says about logic's being the most general and underlying 
thing in maths. Level III is more abstract than Level II and actualizes 
alternate outcomes across quantum branchings, while Level II actualizes 
alternate outcomes in various times and places along a single branch, so that 
the two levels come out the same in their features. Level II seems associable 
with statistical theory, some areas of information theory, and some other 
fields deal in a general way with gathering data from various actual places and 
times and drawing ampliatively-inductive conclusions from parts, samples!
 , etc., to totalities. Level I, with its possibly idiosyncratic constants, 
initial conditions, historical dependencies, seems associable with physical, 
chemical, life sciences and human  social studies. So those seem four 
viewpoints with distinctive content and associations, though not the kind of 
content which the idea of viewpoint seems to have received on the everything 
list, which is decidedly not to say that there's anything wrong with the kind 
of content given on the everything list to the idea of viewpoint.

Is it Tegmark's view, that the bird's eye view is associated particularly with 
Level III, or does it depend on ideas as developed on the everything list? Why 
wouldn't a view be associated with Level IV as well? (I thought that, at least 
in Tegmark's view, the bird's eye view _was_ Level IV).

 Both of the 1st person viewpoints correspond to the frog viewpoint, the 
 difference being the 1st person plural is an objective viewpoint - all things 
 in the 1pp vpt will be agreed upon by 2 or more observers, whereas the 1p vpt 
 is subjective, containing items such as quantum immortality that are 
 _necessarily_ subjective.

The idea of quantum immortality doesn't seem like something that you could call 
an experience. If you found yourself alive even after what seemed an unlikely 
long period of time, after a series of periodic extraordinary escapes, any 
other observers would agree that you're still alive -- in other words, you'd 
still be alive from the 1pp vpt. Only in the case where _no records_ remain of 
your much earlier existence, nothing but your personal memory of it, would 
quantum immortality seem possibly like an experience, an especially 
subjective one. The quantum immortality idea seems like, not an experience, but 
an idea requiring one's intellectually adopting some sort of 3rd-person view.

Nevertheless, I've liked the idea of distinguishing an inclusive 1st--2nd 
person we, both addressor and addressee, from an exclusive 1st person 
addressor-only, so I'm glad to see it pop up in this context.

Best, Ben Udell

 I have tried to identify 1pp with G and 1p with G*, but I'm really unsure 
 that the analogy is sound.
 Cheers

On Thu, Jan 12, 2006 at 01:18:21PM -0500, Benjamin Udell wrote:
 A question arises for me here and elsewhere. To what extent do you hold with 
 Tegmark's Four-Level Multiverse view and to what extent is your theory 
 logically linked to it? I ask this because, for instance, in such a 
 Four-Level world, I'd expect not just two salient views (bird's eye  frog's 
 eye, 3rd-person  1st-person, etc.), but four. I'd expect not just 
 mind-matter dichotomies but 4-chotomies. And so on. In some cases, one may 
 argue that one distinction across the 4-chotomy is more important than the 
 other, say in the case of inference, where arguably the truth-perservative 
 versus truth-nonpreservative is a more important distinction, more like a 
 chasm, than is the distinction between falsity-preservative and 
 falsity-nonpreservative, but I'd still want to know about that the four-way 
 distinction because its relevance should not be presumptively precluded, 
 especially in a Tegmarkian four-level Multiverse. For me there it's partly a 
 matter of some non-maximal degree of s!
 ur!
  eness on my part, and partly a matter of my motivation; I take an interest 
 in patterns of four-way logical distinctions, though I 

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

Danny Mayes writes:

I haven't participated in the list in a while, but I try to keep up with 
the discussion here and there as time permits.  I personally was raised a 
fundamentalist Baptist, but lost most of my interest in that religion when 
I was taught at 9 years old that all the little kids in Africa that are 
never told about Jesus Christ go to Hell.  Even at 9, I knew that wasn't 
something I was going to be buying.  Who wants to believe in a God that 
cruel?  Even without the problematic cruel creator, I have always been to 
oriented toward logic and proof to just accept stuff on faith.


I sympathise with the conclusions of the young Danny, but there is a 
philosophical non sequitur here. The fact that I would like something to be 
true, or not to be true, has no bearing on whether it is in fact true. I 
don't like what happened in Germany under the Nazis, but that doesn't mean I 
should believe the Nazis did not exist, so why should my revulsion at the 
thought of infidels burning in Hell lead me to believe that God and Hell do 
not exist? It might make me reluctant to worship such a God, but that is not 
the same as believing he does not exist.


I started redeveloping religious belief, ironically, when I picked up a 
book on quantum physics 6 or so years ago.  I was at a legal seminar and 
needed something to read during the boring  sessions, and the author ran 
through a number of experiments of QM and concluded that the MWI was the 
most logical interpretation of these experiments.  I had read all the Sci 
Fi strories of alternate realities and whatnot, but this was my first 
exposure to the concept that reality is created in such a way to allow all 
things to exist (that also actually appeared to be supported by some real 
science).  I still remember my excitement in  contemplating this 
explanation, in that it seems to explain so many questions.


I guess I could go into a long explanation as to why I now believe 
intelligence plays a key role in understanding the nature of our reality 
and how it came to be, but I probably wouldn't be able to say much that 
almost anyone on this board has not already heard.  For me it boils down to 
this: I see absolutely no reason to believe our experiences are not 
emulable.  I strongly suspect it is possible to create a quantum computer.  
I strongly suspect technology will continue to evolve and computer 
processing will get more and more powerful.  Finally, even if we are 
somehow precluded from creating new universes in the future (i.e. universes 
implented on the same level of reality as our universe, virtual universes 
are obviously possible), the one we are in will last for trillions of 
years.  Final conclusion?  Well, I'll let you do the math...


But if it's scientific, it's not religion, is it? Religion means believing 
something in the absence of sufficient evidence.


Stathis Papaioannou

_
Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! 
http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-12 Thread Graeme Mcquilkin

Hi ,

Can someone please tell me how I unsubscrive from this mailing list ?

Thanks

Graeme


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


Danny Mayes writes:

I haven't participated in the list in a while, but I try to keep up 
with the discussion here and there as time permits.  I personally was 
raised a fundamentalist Baptist, but lost most of my interest in that 
religion when I was taught at 9 years old that all the little kids in 
Africa that are never told about Jesus Christ go to Hell.  Even at 9, 
I knew that wasn't something I was going to be buying.  Who wants to 
believe in a God that cruel?  Even without the problematic cruel 
creator, I have always been to oriented toward logic and proof to 
just accept stuff on faith.



I sympathise with the conclusions of the young Danny, but there is a 
philosophical non sequitur here. The fact that I would like something 
to be true, or not to be true, has no bearing on whether it is in fact 
true. I don't like what happened in Germany under the Nazis, but that 
doesn't mean I should believe the Nazis did not exist, so why should 
my revulsion at the thought of infidels burning in Hell lead me to 
believe that God and Hell do not exist? It might make me reluctant to 
worship such a God, but that is not the same as believing he does not 
exist.


I started redeveloping religious belief, ironically, when I picked up 
a book on quantum physics 6 or so years ago.  I was at a legal 
seminar and needed something to read during the boring  sessions, and 
the author ran through a number of experiments of QM and concluded 
that the MWI was the most logical interpretation of these 
experiments.  I had read all the Sci Fi strories of alternate 
realities and whatnot, but this was my first exposure to the concept 
that reality is created in such a way to allow all things to exist 
(that also actually appeared to be supported by some real science).  
I still remember my excitement in  contemplating this explanation, in 
that it seems to explain so many questions.


I guess I could go into a long explanation as to why I now believe 
intelligence plays a key role in understanding the nature of our 
reality and how it came to be, but I probably wouldn't be able to say 
much that almost anyone on this board has not already heard.  For me 
it boils down to this: I see absolutely no reason to believe our 
experiences are not emulable.  I strongly suspect it is possible to 
create a quantum computer.  I strongly suspect technology will 
continue to evolve and computer processing will get more and more 
powerful.  Finally, even if we are somehow precluded from creating 
new universes in the future (i.e. universes implented on the same 
level of reality as our universe, virtual universes are obviously 
possible), the one we are in will last for trillions of years.  Final 
conclusion?  Well, I'll let you do the math...



But if it's scientific, it's not religion, is it? Religion means 
believing something in the absence of sufficient evidence.


Stathis Papaioannou

_
Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's 
FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/







Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-12 Thread Russell Standish
On Thu, Jan 12, 2006 at 11:12:13PM -0500, Benjamin Udell wrote:
 Russell, list,
 
  Tegmark's 4 level Multiverse (actually the Multiverse is only one of the 
  levels) does not really have viewpoints at each level.
  In my book, which largely follows the tradition of this list, there is 3 
  viewpoints identified: 1st person, 1st person plural and 3rd person.
  The 3rd person corresponds to the bird viewpoint of the Multiverse, or 
  Tegmark Level 3 'verse. Calling it a viewpoint is a stretch of the language 
  since necessarily observers must be embedded in the Multiverse.
 
 Where does Tegmark say that the Multiverse is only one of the levels? Which 
 one?

Multiverse was coined by David Deutsch to refer to the many worlds
of MWI. This corresponds to Tegmark's level 3 parallel universe. I
follow this terminology, as do many others on this list. We also tend
to use the terms Plenitude or Platonia to refer to his Level 4
parallel universe. The other levels have not been christened so to speak.

Tegmark uses multiverse to refer to any type of parallel universe -
which I think contradicts usual usage.

 
 What is meant by viewpoint? Tegmark's elementary description of the four 
 levels sounds like the outline of four viewpoints, with frog and bird 
 marking the extremes of a four-step set of gradations. Level IV is associated 
 with pure maths. Level III is associated with alternatives among cases, 
 which marks it as associated with maths of logic, information, probability, 
 etc., despite what Tegmark says about logic's being the most general and 
 underlying thing in maths. Level III is more abstract than Level II and 
 actualizes alternate outcomes across quantum branchings, while Level II 
 actualizes alternate outcomes in various times and places along a single 
 branch, so that the two levels come out the same in their features. Level II 
 seems associable with statistical theory, some areas of information theory, 
 and some other fields deal in a general way with gathering data from various 
 actual places and times and drawing ampliatively-inductive conclusions from 
 parts, samples, etc., to totalities. Level I, with its possibly idiosyncratic 
 constants, initial conditions, historical dependencies, seems associable with 
 physical, chemical, life sciences and human  social studies. So those seem 
 four viewpoints with distinctive content and associations, though not the 
 kind of content which the idea of viewpoint seems to have received on the 
 everything list, which is decidedly not to say that there's anything wrong 
 with the kind of content given on the everything list to the idea of 
 viewpoint.
 
 Is it Tegmark's view, that the bird's eye view is associated particularly 
 with Level III, or does it depend on ideas as developed on the everything 
 list? Why wouldn't a view be associated with Level IV as well? (I thought 
 that, at least in Tegmark's view, the bird's eye view _was_ Level IV).
 

The term bird/frog viewpoint is Tegmark's, which he used in his 1998
paper. I can well imagine applying to his 2003 multilevel scheme.

The association of 3rd person viewpoint (not bird viewpoint) with the
Multiverse is mine, and is justified on the basis that all observers
must be embedded in quantum mechanical many worlds structure. This
result is derived by assuming a level 4 plenitude, and is given in my
2004 paper Why Occams Razor. Bruno's work also seems to point to a
similar conclusion.

The particular Plenitude I assume (ensemble of all bitstrings) is
actually a completely uninteresting place to have a view of (it has
precisely zero informational complexity).

I do not see any particular arguments suggesting that observers must
be embedded in a universe described by string theory (which would move
the 3rd person viewpoint to level 2) or embedded in just this universe
(moved to level 1), but I would not rule it out a priori.

  Both of the 1st person viewpoints correspond to the frog viewpoint, the 
  difference being the 1st person plural is an objective viewpoint - all 
  things in the 1pp vpt will be agreed upon by 2 or more observers, whereas 
  the 1p vpt is subjective, containing items such as quantum immortality that 
  are _necessarily_ subjective.
 
 The idea of quantum immortality doesn't seem like something that you could 
 call an experience. If you found yourself alive even after what seemed an 
 unlikely long period of time, after a series of periodic extraordinary 
 escapes, any other observers would agree that you're still alive -- in other 
 words, you'd still be alive from the 1pp vpt. Only in the case where _no 
 records_ remain of your much earlier existence, nothing but your personal 
 memory of it, would quantum immortality seem possibly like an experience, an 
 especially subjective one. The quantum immortality idea seems like, not an 
 experience, but an idea requiring one's intellectually adopting some sort of 
 3rd-person view.
 

I never used the word experience. 

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Benjamin, List,


I will comment your long post, taking into account some posts from its 
sequel (to avoid repetition).
But I will try to make a sort of synthesis so that people will be able 
to recast the present thread, concerned with the theology-naming 
issue, and the more general goal of the list which consists globally in 
the search of a TOE (Theory of Everything) and more particularly 
consists (at our present stage) to find a measure on the computational 
histories.
For this I need to summarise my own contribution in the list, which 
consists mainly in explaining results I got in the seventies, published 
in the eighties (in obscure journals or proceedings though) and 
eventually defended as a PhD thesis in France in 1998.
This includes many things from the necessity of distinguishing first 
and third person notions, the first person comp indeterminacy, the comp 
immortality and its theoretical confirmation through the quantum 
suicide and quantum immortality, but mainly all this can be sum up into 
the reversal result. This is the result that IF we assume the 
computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science then the physical 
science cannot be fundamental and are derivable from the laws of 
mind. With the comp hyp. the laws of mind can be taken as the laws of 
computation and computability, although a precise formulation would 
lead, well, to our current naming issue. The reduction of physics 
appears to be both epistemological and ontological. That means that not 
only physics will appear to be a sub-branch of computer science, but 
that Matter is secondary to Mind. All this in a very precise sense. 
So precise that the proof I gave is really constructive: it shows how 
to derive physics from computer science, and the whole technical parts 
of my thesis (the one which rely on the G-G* logics) consists in the 
beginning of such a derivation.
And then this entails that the comp hyp. (actually even a much weaker 
hyp.) is empirically testable: just compare the physics extracted from 
comp and the physics extracted from the usual observation/theory back 
and forth. And until now I got only confirmation (and not refutation) 
of comp because I can already shows that comp entails that the logic of 
the observable is quite  a quantum logic.
The proof of the reversal is mainly given by the Universal Dovetailer 
Argument together with either some Occam Razor (the easiest way) or the 
Movie-Graph Argument (or the latter Maudlin's Olympia).
Of course you are not asked to take for granted any of those results. 
You can either study the UDA (which you have perhaps already done on 
the list), or you can, just for the sake of the present discussion, 
keep the result in mind. I would withdraw anything I say in case 
someone would found an error in the argument.


Now why theology?
My answer in a nutshell: because that is the most correct wording, and 
then I tend to assume, perhaps with a big amount of naïveté, that it is 
always best to use the (most) correct wording. But I know you and 
others tend to disagree with this. So before I comment your post, let 
me explain why I do think theology is the correct wording. Note that 
I have use it in my preliminary long version of my PhD thesis 
Conscience  Mécanisme where I motivate directly the field of modal 
logic through theology, seen as a theory of all possible accessible 
state of mind/consciousness. Those who knows the French or who want to 
see the drawings can download that pdf-chapter from my web page:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume1CC/4z1_2sansp.pdf
I have been asked by the French not to use that word, and to use the 
word  psychology instead. There are many reasons I would like to use 
again the theological vocabulary for the writing of an English long 
version of the thesis, if only because the psychological wording seems 
to me less correct (or more faulty).
Let me enumerate and briefly describe the reason why theology seems 
suitable:


1) The main one is just to recall the admittedly subtle nature of the 
comp hyp. It is scientific in the sense of being falsifiable (cf result 
descibed above), and religious (because there is a sort of promise of 
hell in case you decide to take it for granted).


2) Then there is the one mentioned by George Levy: since the beginning 
we are talking about the soul, and comp can be sum up into the slogan: 
I can put my soul on a disc.


3) The notion of first person has as many thing in common with the 
notion of soul than the notion of soul is different from one theologian 
to another (so to distinguish soul from first-person *is* falling 
into the 1004-fallacy.


4) Comp-immortality and quantum-immortality. The immortality notion 
is traditionally put in the theological discourses. We talk about this 
since the beginning.


5) I have already criticise Tegmark for his naïve notion of *all math*. 
The first mathematician who has try to get a mathematical view of all 
math, not only did not 

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-11 Thread Benjamin Udell
Bruno, list,

Well, on the basis of that which you say below (much of which I unfortunately 
only vaguely understand), where you don't focus it all decidedly on the 
particular issues of faith and belief, it actually does now sound more like 
some sort of theology. It has various elements of theology in the broader or 
more comprehensive sense. The thing that it seems to be missing is gods or God. 
Considered as theology, it seems like a wheel sorely missing its hub. At this 
point, in terms of descriptive accuracy, this hublessness seems the hub of the 
matter. So it sounds like a kind of psycho-cosmology, or -- well, not a 
psychophysics, but, in order to suggest your computationalist primacy of the 
soul -- a physiopsychics (in English, if the adjective is physicopsychical, 
it's a little less suggestive of paranormalism, which is strongly associated 
nowadays with the adjective psychic.)

(C.S. Peirce held that matter is congealed mind. Though he thought that space 
would turn out to be curved, he was pre-Einstein and saw matter as a kind of 
spentness and barrenness rather than as a tight lockup of energy.)

Your theory may be empirically refutable but, if it survives such tests, what 
is there to support its affirmation? Is derivability of physical laws from 
laws of mind really enough? An information theorist, John Collier, said at 
the peirce email forum peirce-l that he had managed to derive each two among 
logic, information theory, and probability theory, from the third remaining, 
though I don't know whether he ever published these derivations. Have you shown 
that your laws of mind cannot be derived from physics in a way that shows 
that the nonderivability is not merely a result of our insufficent knowledge of 
physical law? You may also encounter some flak on your conception of mind. 

For what it's worth, for my part, I would hold that a key factor in 
intelligence, at least, which learns and grows, is an evolvability factor, a 
kind of sufficient un-boundness to its codes and its methods and systems of 
interpretation, in order to be able to test those codes, methods, systems and 
to do so not only by trial and error but more sophisticated kinds of learning 
and testing, such that memory and active recollection take on particular 
importance. Do your laws of mind take evolvability into account? Maybe they 
don't need to, though, depending on what you mean by mind. I tend to think 
that the mind must involve the retention and evolvability factor in some 
radical way, but it's quite vague to me how that would work. Maybe there are 
things which could fairly be called mind though I would never have thought of 
them that way.

If I understood your theory I might also try to challenge the idea that the 
soul is both ontologically AND epistemologically primary. Actually I wouldn't 
use, for my views, the term primary in a strong foundationalist sense, I just 
mean that, for various reasons, I regard the (sequential) order of knowledge to 
be the opposite of the (sequential) order of being. Of course, in logic, some 
oppositions seems to reverse themselves across changes of level, so who knows, 
I'm not totally convinced about my own views either.

Best, Ben Udell


- Original Message - 
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wednesday, January 11, 2006 10:38 AM
Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue


Hi Benjamin, List,


I will comment your long post, taking into account some posts from its 
sequel (to avoid repetition).
But I will try to make a sort of synthesis so that people will be able 
to recast the present thread, concerned with the theology-naming 
issue, and the more general goal of the list which consists globally in 
the search of a TOE (Theory of Everything) and more particularly 
consists (at our present stage) to find a measure on the computational 
histories.
For this I need to summarise my own contribution in the list, which 
consists mainly in explaining results I got in the seventies, published 
in the eighties (in obscure journals or proceedings though) and 
eventually defended as a PhD thesis in France in 1998.
This includes many things from the necessity of distinguishing first 
and third person notions, the first person comp indeterminacy, the comp 
immortality and its theoretical confirmation through the quantum 
suicide and quantum immortality, but mainly all this can be sum up into 
the reversal result. This is the result that IF we assume the 
computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science then the physical 
science cannot be fundamental and are derivable from the laws of 
mind. With the comp hyp. the laws of mind can be taken as the laws of 
computation and computability, although a precise formulation would 
lead, well, to our current naming issue. The reduction of physics 
appears to be both epistemological and ontological. That means that not 
only physics will appear

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-10 Thread Bruno Marchal
Ben, here is a comment to Stathis's post which can serve as a 
preliminary for the synthesis I will try to do this week and which 
should answer some of your comments.


Le 10-janv.-06, à 01:46, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

If you remain true to the Greek roots of the words, atheists lack a 
belief in the existence of God, as agnostics lack knowledge of whether 
God exists: a- = without, theism = belief in God (by later 
convention, a personal God), gnosis = knowledge.  It is not quite 
the same as saying that God definitely does not exist, or that 
knowledge about the existence of God is impossible, respectively, 
although a few atheists and rather more agnostics would go on to make 
these stronger claims.



OK but this is perhaps too much etymological and it could be confusing 
to use knowledge already in tis setting, unless we give already some 
minimal theory of belief and knowledge right at the start. Even in that 
case we are at risk to mix a too much precise notion of knowledge with 
a too much imprecise notion of God.
And if you look at the page referred too by Jesse, it seems that the 
more common acceptation for the meaning of agnostic is:  I don't 
know/believe if G exists or not, and for atheist it is: I 
think/belief that God does not exists. Nobody will say I know that God 
does not exist, because it seems ridiculous or too much arrogant.
Also, the idea that knowledge about the existence of God is 
impossible can indeed be defended by some atheist and agnostic, but is 
also the favourite affirmation of many mystical theists, including some 
Neoplatonist, but also some Buddhist.


In any case, it will be useful to agree on some axioms for belief and 
knowledge:
I hope everyone will agree that both knowledge and belief makes the 
following formula true.
I assume a classical (platonist) background, and by p - q I mean 
that either p is false or q is true. It is the IF ... THEN ... of the 
classical mathematicians.


B(p - q) - (Bp - Bq) (named K, for Kripke)

In French:  if I believe that (p - q) then if I belief p then I will 
belief q
  if I know that (p - q) then if I know p then I 
will know q.


Note that this axioms is already criticised in some AI approaches to 
knowledge, because it gives rise to a form of omniscience. This is not 
a problem given that I will extract the measure on the comp histories 
from the limitation of that omniscience, and Bp is really more p is 
believable or p is knowable instead of believes or knows. Having 
said that, I hope people will agree with the following axioms, again 
both for *believability* and *knowability*:


Bp - BBp  (named 4, by modal logicians, in honour of C.I. 
Lewis)


In French:   if I believe p then I will believe that I believe p
 if I know p then I will know that I know p.

In the classical background all classical tautologies are accepted, and 
I will suppose, at least in the beginning that the theories are closed 
for the rule of modus ponens and the rule of necessitation, and some 
substitution rules. The first one means that if I have already prove p 
and (p - q), I am entitled to derive q. The second one says that if I 
have already prove p then I am entitled to derive Bp.


What does, then, distinguish knowledge and belief (or better 
knowability and believability)?
By definition we just cannot know something false. Nobody will say I 
knew that (a+b)^2 = a^2 + b^2, but I was wrong. People say: I 
believed that (a+b)^2 = a^2 + b^2, but I was wrong, and this is a 
symptom that the most basic distinction between knowledge and belief is 
that we just cannot know a falsity. Of course we can believe falsity 
(in dreams, in the state of error, or in trusting misfortunately some 
liar for example). So to get an (axiomatic) theory of knowledge it is 
enough to add the axioms Bp - p (either you don't know p or p is 
true).


To sum up the (very standard) notions of believability and knowability 
are given by the theories K4 and KT4 respectively:



K4  (believability, or introspective belief):

K  B(p - q) - (Bp - Bq)
4  Bp - BBp
+ rules of modus ponens, necessitation and substitution



KT4 (better known as S4, it is the fourth modal system of C.I. Lewis, 
knowability or introspective knowledge):


K  B(p - q) - (Bp - Bq)
T   Bp - p
4   Bp - BBp
+ rules of modus ponens, necessitation and substitution


Then I propose, if only for the sake of the discussion to define 
agnostic by the ~B~g  ~Bg clause, letting open the question if B if 
for belief or knowledge.



Exercises for those who want (I am so sorry, but it will be useful for 
a latter deepening):
1) What is your feeling about formal provability by a consistent or 
even correct (sound) machine: I mean does it follows K4, KT4. Is formal 
provability closer to knowledge or to belief?  (This is tricky!)
2) Remember and explain to your children or husband/wife or parents 
what is a Kripke multiverse and what it means for a proposition to 

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-10 Thread Benjamin Udell
 - interpretation with a 
fourth stage, one of recognition, confirmation, etc., correlated vaguely to the 
verificatory recipient in info theory. Certain four-fold processes and stru!
 ctures like that are why I'm interested in Tegmark's picture o!
 f a four
-level Multiverse.) As a practical matter, not only can intepretive results be 
interpreted in their turn, but substantiations can in turn be substantiated -- 
or overturned --, which happens almost naturally to at least some extent in 
science when science is healthy, building on firm (or firm-seeming) results. 
What's built on a supposedly firm basis should start to have problems if the 
building is valid but the basis is in fact infirm.

Best, Ben Udell

- Original Message - 
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tuesday, January 10, 2006 8:24 AM
Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue


Ben, here is a comment to Stathis's post which can serve as a 
preliminary for the synthesis I will try to do this week and which 
should answer some of your comments.

Le 10-janv.-06, à 01:46, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

 If you remain true to the Greek roots of the words, atheists lack a 
 belief in the existence of God, as agnostics lack knowledge of whether 
 God exists: a- = without, theism = belief in God (by later 
 convention, a personal God), gnosis = knowledge.  It is not quite 
 the same as saying that God definitely does not exist, or that 
 knowledge about the existence of God is impossible, respectively, 
 although a few atheists and rather more agnostics would go on to make 
 these stronger claims.

OK but this is perhaps too much etymological and it could be confusing 
to use knowledge already in tis setting, unless we give already some 
minimal theory of belief and knowledge right at the start. Even in that 
case we are at risk to mix a too much precise notion of knowledge with 
a too much imprecise notion of God.
And if you look at the page referred too by Jesse, it seems that the 
more common acceptation for the meaning of agnostic is:  I don't 
know/believe if G exists or not, and for atheist it is: I 
think/belief that God does not exists. Nobody will say I know that God 
does not exist, because it seems ridiculous or too much arrogant.
Also, the idea that knowledge about the existence of God is 
impossible can indeed be defended by some atheist and agnostic, but is 
also the favourite affirmation of many mystical theists, including some 
Neoplatonist, but also some Buddhist.

In any case, it will be useful to agree on some axioms for belief and 
knowledge:
I hope everyone will agree that both knowledge and belief makes the 
following formula true.
I assume a classical (platonist) background, and by p - q I mean 
that either p is false or q is true. It is the IF ... THEN ... of the 
classical mathematicians.

B(p - q) - (Bp - Bq) (named K, for Kripke)

In French:  if I believe that (p - q) then if I belief p then I will 
belief q
   if I know that (p - q) then if I know p then I 
will know q.

Note that this axioms is already criticised in some AI approaches to 
knowledge, because it gives rise to a form of omniscience. This is not 
a problem given that I will extract the measure on the comp histories 
from the limitation of that omniscience, and Bp is really more p is 
believable or p is knowable instead of believes or knows. Having 
said that, I hope people will agree with the following axioms, again 
both for *believability* and *knowability*:

Bp - BBp  (named 4, by modal logicians, in honour of C.I. 
Lewis)

In French:   if I believe p then I will believe that I believe p
  if I know p then I will know that I know p.

In the classical background all classical tautologies are accepted, and 
I will suppose, at least in the beginning that the theories are closed 
for the rule of modus ponens and the rule of necessitation, and some 
substitution rules. The first one means that if I have already prove p 
and (p - q), I am entitled to derive q. The second one says that if I 
have already prove p then I am entitled to derive Bp.

What does, then, distinguish knowledge and belief (or better 
knowability and believability)?
By definition we just cannot know something false. Nobody will say I 
knew that (a+b)^2 = a^2 + b^2, but I was wrong. People say: I 
believed that (a+b)^2 = a^2 + b^2, but I was wrong, and this is a 
symptom that the most basic distinction between knowledge and belief is 
that we just cannot know a falsity. Of course we can believe falsity 
(in dreams, in the state of error, or in trusting misfortunately some 
liar for example). So to get an (axiomatic) theory of knowledge it is 
enough to add the axioms Bp - p (either you don't know p or p is 
true).

To sum up the (very standard) notions of believability and knowability 
are given by the theories K4 and KT4 respectively:

K4

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-10 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

Bruno Marchal writes:


Le 08-janv.-06, à 12:22, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

We can argue about the precise definition of words, but I think a 
fundamental point is missed if religion and atheism are put on a par. It 
is like the Christian fundamentalists' demand that creation science be 
taught in schools alongside evolutionary biology, because nobody can 
reasonably claim that evolutionary biology is *certainly* true and 
creation science *certainly* false.


There is a clear difference between, on the one hand, believing x despite 
the lack of any supporting evidence and, on the other hand, not believing 
x because of the lack of any supporting evidence - especially if x is 
something inherently bizarre or incredible.



Here you make a point. But this is because creation science is just not a 
science. Those who pretend it is a science are just doing rhetorical 
tricks.


Perhaps one day creation science will appear. This would be the case if 
creation science (the doctrine that the best explanation for the 
existence of the universe is that God has made it recently in less than 7 
days) is made enough precise to not only be tested but to provide a best 
overview of reality, etc. But of course today this is not the case, and 
creation science, *as* a science is much more a like a fuzzy speculation 
predicting and actually explaining nothing. Their proponents just are no 
playing the game.


Yes, but this is the problem with belief in a personal God versus 
non-belief. Theism would be an empirical, or equivalently scientific, belief 
if its proponents were consistent: if God intervenes in the world, then by 
definition he must leave some evidence of this intervention. (The 
alternative believers' position is deism, the idea that God made the world 
but then refrained from any further interventions in its affairs. Deism has 
never really inspired religious devotion like theism has.) The reality is, 
however, that there is less evidence for religious beliefs than there is for 
most bizarre secular beliefs, such as the belief that Elvis is alive, or 
that aliens regularly abduct humans to experiment on them.


It is worth stressing that what normally counts for religious belief (in the 
Western tradition) is *not* a vague deism, but very specific beliefs about a 
Personal God: for example, that he caused one third of himself to be born of 
a virgin so that he could live as a human and, though immortal and destined 
to rise again, die a horrible death in order to save  humans from being 
punished for Adam and Eve's original transgression against God in the Garden 
of Eden at the instigation of a snake which told Eve she and Adam would lose 
their ignorance if they ate the fruit of a certain forbidden (by God) tree; 
and that anyone who believes this and admits he is a miserable sinner will 
go to Heaven, while non-believers will suffer eternal torment in Hell. I 
mean, give me Elvis and aliens with anal probes any time...



Now, most people who says I don't believe in God, in general believe in a 
physical or material universe; and that is still a sort of religious 
belief. Atheist are not just believer because they believe in 0 God, as 
George put it, but also because they replace God by something else, without 
really explaining what it is and how it helps us to figure what exist, etc.


In my state of ignorance I would even say that for me GOD and UNIVERSE are 
both enough fuzzy that distinguishing them at the start could be a 1004 
fallacy.
But, perhaps unlike some of you, I did not get any religious education, and 
all what I know in theology comes from study and experience, and all what 
I do appreciate in the Monism of the Jewish, Muslim and Christian 
theologies (but present also in some Chinese and Indian philosophical 
systems) seems to be the parts they have kept from the pre-Christian and 
pre-Muslim neo-Platonician theology. Today's catholic theologians who 
insist too much on the quality in rigour of that type of theology get 
trouble with the Roman Authority.


If GOD and UNIVERSE are fuzzy and difficult to distinguish, you're very far 
from talking about the God of people who are religious.



Stathis Papaioannou

_
Buy now @ Tradingpost.com.au 
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Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-10 Thread danny mayes
I haven't participated in the list in a while, but I try to keep up with 
the discussion here and there as time permits.  I personally was raised 
a fundamentalist Baptist, but lost most of my interest in that religion 
when I was taught at 9 years old that all the little kids in Africa that 
are never told about Jesus Christ go to Hell.  Even at 9, I knew that 
wasn't something I was going to be buying.  Who wants to believe in a 
God that cruel?  Even without the problematic cruel creator, I have 
always been to oriented toward logic and proof to just accept stuff on 
faith.


I started redeveloping religious belief, ironically, when I picked up a 
book on quantum physics 6 or so years ago.  I was at a legal seminar and 
needed something to read during the boring  sessions, and the author ran 
through a number of experiments of QM and concluded that the MWI was the 
most logical interpretation of these experiments.  I had read all the 
Sci Fi strories of alternate realities and whatnot, but this was my 
first exposure to the concept that reality is created in such a way to 
allow all things to exist (that also actually appeared to be supported 
by some real science).  I still remember my excitement in  contemplating 
this explanation, in that it seems to explain so many questions. 

I guess I could go into a long explanation as to why I now believe 
intelligence plays a key role in understanding the nature of our reality 
and how it came to be, but I probably wouldn't be able to say much that 
almost anyone on this board has not already heard.  For me it boils down 
to this: I see absolutely no reason to believe our experiences are not 
emulable.  I strongly suspect it is possible to create a quantum 
computer.  I strongly suspect technology will continue to evolve and 
computer processing will get more and more powerful.  Finally, even if 
we are somehow precluded from creating new universes in the future (i.e. 
universes implented on the same level of reality as our universe, 
virtual universes are obviously possible), the one we are in will last 
for trillions of years.  Final conclusion?  Well, I'll let you do the 
math...


Danny Mayes  



Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


Bruno Marchal writes:


Le 08-janv.-06, à 12:22, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

We can argue about the precise definition of words, but I think a 
fundamental point is missed if religion and atheism are put on a 
par. It is like the Christian fundamentalists' demand that creation 
science be taught in schools alongside evolutionary biology, 
because nobody can reasonably claim that evolutionary biology is 
*certainly* true and creation science *certainly* false.


There is a clear difference between, on the one hand, believing x 
despite the lack of any supporting evidence and, on the other hand, 
not believing x because of the lack of any supporting evidence - 
especially if x is something inherently bizarre or incredible.




Here you make a point. But this is because creation science is just 
not a science. Those who pretend it is a science are just doing 
rhetorical tricks.


Perhaps one day creation science will appear. This would be the 
case if creation science (the doctrine that the best explanation 
for the existence of the universe is that God has made it recently in 
less than 7 days) is made enough precise to not only be tested but to 
provide a best overview of reality, etc. But of course today this is 
not the case, and creation science, *as* a science is much more a 
like a fuzzy speculation predicting and actually explaining nothing. 
Their proponents just are no playing the game.



Yes, but this is the problem with belief in a personal God versus 
non-belief. Theism would be an empirical, or equivalently scientific, 
belief if its proponents were consistent: if God intervenes in the 
world, then by definition he must leave some evidence of this 
intervention. (The alternative believers' position is deism, the idea 
that God made the world but then refrained from any further 
interventions in its affairs. Deism has never really inspired 
religious devotion like theism has.) The reality is, however, that 
there is less evidence for religious beliefs than there is for most 
bizarre secular beliefs, such as the belief that Elvis is alive, or 
that aliens regularly abduct humans to experiment on them.


It is worth stressing that what normally counts for religious belief 
(in the Western tradition) is *not* a vague deism, but very specific 
beliefs about a Personal God: for example, that he caused one third of 
himself to be born of a virgin so that he could live as a human and, 
though immortal and destined to rise again, die a horrible death in 
order to save  humans from being punished for Adam and Eve's original 
transgression against God in the Garden of Eden at the instigation of 
a snake which told Eve she and Adam would lose their ignorance if they 
ate the fruit of a certain forbidden (by God) tree; and that 

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-09 Thread Benjamin Udell
Jesse, George, Stathis, list,

A relevant variable here seems to be the degree to which one is aware of or 
cares about the question of whether there is a God (or gods). The kind and 
depth and commitment of the belief-attitude are a variable which makes terms 
belief, suspicion, disbelief, and doubt, whose collective structure is 
otherwise like that of logical quantification, take on sufficient variation of 
shades of connotation in order to generate disputes as to whether, for 
instance, somebody devoid of belief in God is a disbeliever in God. 

If we assume that all the persons in question have reasonably large and equal 
amounts of awareness and concern about the question, then the structure is like 
that of Aristotelian quantification. Non-belief (in the sense of non-100% 
belief, will be equivalent to doubt. Non-disbelief (in the sense of non-100% 
disbelief) will be equivalent to suspicion. A complete lack of belief, the lack 
of any significant suspicion, that God exists, will be equivalent to disbelief 
that God exists.

If we assume that each person either (a) has that same degree or (b) has no 
awareness at all of the question, then the structure will be like that of 
Boolean quantification. For instance, the belief that God exists will appear as 
a compound of suspicion that God exists and non-suspicion that God doesn't 
exist. Also, we won't need to restrict the range of the terms of belief, 
suspicion, etc., to persons, beings capable of belief-attitudes about God's 
existence. But having to regard belief as such a compound rather than as a 
simpler kind of tranformation (~suspect that ~...) is, in terms of logical 
structure, perhaps somewhat inconvenient, and I suppose that that's the reason 
for the use of a structure more similar to that of Aristotelian logical 
quantification and for a restriction of range to persons aware of the question 
of whether God exists.

If we make no assumptions about degrees, motivations, justifications, etc., of 
the belief-attitudes, then the words terms belief, suspicion, disbelief, and 
doubt come into relief as a rather coarse-grained way to characterize 
belief-atttitudes toward God's existence. Clearly, in the absence of clarity 
and consensus about logical assumptions about the relevant terms, they occasion 
equivocation and ambiguity about the difference between disbelief and complete 
lack of belief. But, coarse-grained as they may be, they're still quite 
convenient. 

The word religious will certainly compound the ambiguities and vaguenesses. 
If questions of corroboration/discorrobration by evidence are relevant for 
characterizing belief, disbelief, etc., as religious, then, depending on how 
the evidence stands, and depending on how narrowly or widely one construes 
religious, the theist, atheist, and agnostic might, each of them, be called 
religious or be called non-religious. 

Some theists like to lump agnostics in with atheists. I guess some atheists 
like to do so too. For my part, at least, as an agnostic, both suspecting and 
doubting God's existence, and venturing such suspicion and doubt in any case 
with only vague notions of what God would be or do, I prefer to be 
characterized neither as atheist nor as theist, but as agnostic.

Best, Ben Udell

- Original Message - 
From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, January 09, 2006 2:29 AM
Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
George Levy  wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

George Levy writes:

One more point for Stathis: If atheism is not a religion, then zero is 
not a number.

There is a clear difference between, on the one hand, believing x despite 
the lack of any supporting evidence and, on the other hand, not believing 
x because of the lack of any supporting evidence


As far as I know atheists believe in  no god ( B~G  or equivalently B( G=f 
)  ) and agnostics do not commit themselves to believing in god. (~BG) . In 
that sense atheists are true believers. You are confusing the instance with 
the class. The fact that zero represents a null value does not mean that 
its status as a number is nil. The fact that atheists believe in zero god 
does not mean they do not believe in anything.

George


Atheists do not always define the term atheism as believing there is no 
God, they often define it simply as lacking any belief in God--see the 
quotes from various atheist writers at 
http://www.infidels.org/news/atheism/sn-definitions.html






Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith

2006-01-09 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 06-janv.-06, à 02:40, Benjamin Udell a écrit :


I don't know a whole lot about math, and I tend to be fallibilist, so 
I wonder whether anybody really does know, like Penrose claims, that 
those maths are in fact really and truly are consistent, which are 
consistent _provably_ only on the unprovable assumption of 
arithmetic's consistency. I think of seeming inconsistencies that get 
patched up, 0 divided by 0 equals any number you want -- so, more 
carefully define equality to exclude that problem. Denominators 
seemingly turning to 0 in calculus got remedied. And so on.




I think that all mathematicians (99,999...%) believes correctly in the 
consistency of Peano Arithmetic (PA). Note that PA is a simple 
example of a lobian theory or machine).


Few mathematician doubt about the consistency of Zermelo-Fraenkel Set 
Theory (ZF), although George Boolos makes a case that ZF could be 
inconsistent.


Famous results by Godel and Cohen have shown the relative consistency 
of many doubtful math assertion: precisely it has been shown that IF 
ZF is consistency THEN ZF + the axiom of choice is consistent. The same 
for the continuum hypothesis, etc.


Note that (a theorem prover for) ZF is also a Lobian machine.

Much more difficult is the question of the consistency of (rather 
exotic) set theories like Quine's New Foundation (NF).


There is no sense to ask about the consistency of the whole math, 
because the whole math cannot be presented in a formal theory or 
theorem proving machine (if only by Godel incompleteness result). It is 
a reason to doubt about Penrose' use of the notion of consistency in 
his godelian argument against Mechanism/Comp. All what such types of 
reasoning show is that: IF I am a sound Lobian Machine THEN I cannot 
know which machine I am (and then I cannot know which computational 
history extends me, and that is what I use eventually for solving the 
OM measure problem).



Bruno

PS  I will answer your long naming-issue post, Ben, and some others 
to, asap.




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-09 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 07-janv.-06, à 00:07, Jesse Mazer a écrit :

s pistis related to episteme, the greek word for knowledge which 
is the root of Epistemology? Epistemology is the philosophical study 
of beliefs and whether they are justified--see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology . Would machine 
epistemology work for Bruno?


Actually, at some point I will defend that the term machine 
epistemology is indeed defensible for the logic G, and perhaps even 
more for its Theaetetical variant S4Grz.
But it cannot work for G*. But then I need to say more. Given the 
relatively high number of recent posts I will try to make a synthesis 
(if not I will confuse people I think).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-09 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 07-janv.-06, à 01:17, George Levy a écrit :

I understand Bruno's stand on Machine Theology. After all we are 
really talking about the soul in the machine.




That is already the case with the STRONG AI thesis, which, despite its 
name; is much weaker than the COMP hyp.


As the reader of the list know (or should know) I think that to make 
prematurely too much precise distinctions is a fallacy ( the 1004 
fallacy).
So I do believe that we can identify the soul and the first person (as 
you have also suggest somewhere else) until difficulties force us to 
add nuances. In that case the strong AI thesis can be defined by the 
assertion that machine can have a soul, and the whole AI enterprise has 
something theological in it.
But with comp, which is the doctrine that I am a machine (not simply 
that machine can think like with the STRONG AI, but that I am a machine 
(and I assume that humans can think of course)) the theological aspect 
seems to me obvious: it even entails some ancestors cult like doing 
the backup of parents, grandparents, etc.

I will come back on this in my answer to Benjamin's long post.




It is really controversial but so what? It will certainly drive the 
point home.



I do think so.


Bruno





One more point for Stathis: If atheism is not a religion, then zero is 
not a number.



George



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-09 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 08-janv.-06, à 12:22, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

We can argue about the precise definition of words, but I think a 
fundamental point is missed if religion and atheism are put on a par. 
It is like the Christian fundamentalists' demand that creation 
science be taught in schools alongside evolutionary biology, because 
nobody can reasonably claim that evolutionary biology is *certainly* 
true and creation science *certainly* false.


There is a clear difference between, on the one hand, believing x 
despite the lack of any supporting evidence and, on the other hand, 
not believing x because of the lack of any supporting evidence - 
especially if x is something inherently bizarre or incredible.



Here you make a point. But this is because creation science is just 
not a science. Those who pretend it is a science are just doing 
rhetorical tricks.


Perhaps one day creation science will appear. This would be the case 
if creation science (the doctrine that the best explanation for the 
existence of the universe is that God has made it recently in less than 
7 days) is made enough precise to not only be tested but to provide a 
best overview of reality, etc. But of course today this is not the 
case, and creation science, *as* a science is much more a like a 
fuzzy speculation predicting and actually explaining nothing. Their 
proponents just are no playing the game.


Now, most people who says I don't believe in God, in general believe 
in a physical or material universe; and that is still a sort of 
religious belief. Atheist are not just believer because they believe in 
0 God, as George put it, but also because they replace God by something 
else, without really explaining what it is and how it helps us to 
figure what exist, etc.


In my state of ignorance I would even say that for me GOD and UNIVERSE 
are both enough fuzzy that distinguishing them at the start could be a 
1004 fallacy.
But, perhaps unlike some of you, I did not get any religious education, 
and all what I know in theology comes from study and experience, and 
all what I do appreciate in the Monism of the Jewish, Muslim and 
Christian theologies (but present also in some Chinese and Indian 
philosophical systems) seems to be the parts they have kept from the 
pre-Christian and pre-Muslim neo-Platonician theology. Today's catholic 
theologians who insist too much on the quality in rigour of that type 
of theology get trouble with the Roman Authority.



Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-09 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 09-janv.-06, à 00:26, John M a écrit :


Just keep in mind that with theology libraries and
buyers will connotate a religious oeuvre, with
psychology a neurological or psychiatric one, wich
mewchanism an engineering treatise, with
1st person a psychological babble, so people will
abstain from reading it.
Did you identify a topic for the library systematic?
(I wonder)


Let me anticipate on something which I will say to Benjamin.
I think we should separate two discussions:

1) is theology the correct wording (especially when comp is assumed)
2) is theology not too much undiplomatic (for historical reasons and 
uses)


I will come back on both issues. Let me say that one of the growing 
version of the english version of my thesis has the title elementary 
*testable* theology, but I don't exclude at all I could change my mind 
about that title, either for diplomatic reasons and/or for scientific 
reasons (in case Ben succeed for example in explaining that G* has 
nothing to do with theology (even comp theologies), which I doubt.


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith

2006-01-09 Thread Benjamin Udell
Bruno, list

[Ben] I don't know a whole lot about math, and I tend to be fallibilist, so I 
wonder whether anybody really does know, like Penrose claims, that those 
maths are in fact really and truly are consistent, which are consistent 
_provably_ only on the unprovable assumption of arithmetic's consistency. I 
think of seeming inconsistencies that get patched up, 0 divided by 0 equals 
any number you want -- so, more carefully define equality to exclude that 
problem. Denominators seemingly turning to 0 in calculus got remedied. And so 
on.
 
[Bruno] I think that all mathematicians (99,999...%) believes correctly in the 
consistency of Peano Arithmetic (PA). Note that PA is a simple example of a 
lobian theory or machine).
 
Then I think the main reason not to call this sort of thing knowledge is the 
context of epistemology as a discipline which has focused often on hyperbolic 
doubts and an idea of knowledge or episteme rather like that of Aristotle's 
idea, where knowledge is reached deductively from firm principles. I wish that 
it were not so, accustomed as I am to the English word knowledge with its 
vagueness on such distinctions as between _scire_ and _cognovisse_, and between 
_savoir_ and _connai^tre, etc.
 
If mathematicians believe correctly or know that Peano Arithmetic is 
consistent, then I think that the simplest explanation is that they have -- not 
formally, but nevertheless -- drawn this as an ampliative inductive conclusion 
from general corroboratory experience with Peano Arithmetic and with 
mathematics generally. Generalizations and surmises, the latter of which 
arguably include perceptual judgments, can be quite compelling though 
non-deductive.
 
A problem here may be an inevitable reliance on small number of words for a 
less small number of ideas. Something sufficiently corroborated or confirmed 
for a given theoretical or practical purpose can be called knowledge in one 
sense, but, according to another standard, that, for instance, of Aristotle, is 
merely belief.
 
[Bruno] Few mathematician doubt about the consistency of Zermelo-Fraenkel Set 
Theory (ZF), although George Boolos makes a case that ZF could be inconsistent.
[Bruno] Famous results by Godel and Cohen have shown the relative consistency 
of many doubtful math assertion: precisely it has been shown that IF ZF is 
consistency THEN ZF + the axiom of choice is consistent. The same for the 
continuum hypothesis, etc.
[Bruno] Note that (a theorem prover for) ZF is also a Lobian machine.
[Bruno] Much more difficult is the question of the consistency of (rather 
exotic) set theories like Quine's New Foundation (NF).
[Bruno] There is no sense to ask about the consistency of the whole math, 
because the whole math cannot be presented in a formal theory or theorem 
proving machine (if only by Godel incompleteness result). It is a reason to 
doubt about Penrose' use of the notion of consistency in his godelian 
argument against Mechanism/Comp. All what such types of reasoning show is that: 
IF I am a sound Lobian Machine THEN I cannot know which machine I am (and then 
I cannot know which computational history extends me, and that is what I use 
eventually for solving the OM measure problem).
 
You've outline a whole range of degrees of cognitive assurance from firm to 
uncertain, and I continue to doubt that it can all be fitted under the notion 
faith or belief at all. Now, if it is agreed (and maybe it isn't) that some 
sort of ampliative induction is involved in all these cases, then it's worth 
pointing out that the Greek word is _epagögé_ (in case the extended characters 
don't survive the server, that's epagoge'), and the field of interest is a 
kind of epagogics. But this seems too general, because we use this kind of 
inference in order to infer about many more things than the consistency of an 
arithmetic or the overall sanity of oneself. I dislike pointing to all these 
problems without offering a solution. If only I had formally studied Greek! 
Besides, I'm not aware (and am not the kind of person who would be likely to 
know) that anybody has done work outlining the character of informal inductive 
inferences about arithmetic consistency etc., and I'm kin!
 d winging it with regard to the character of G*, I don't have the background 
to understand it well. 
 
[Bruno] PS  I will answer your long naming-issue post, Ben, and some others 
to, asap.
 
Thanks, I'll be quite interested in it.
 
Best, Ben Udell




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-09 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 09-janv.-06, à 08:29, Jesse Mazer a écrit :

Atheists do not always define the term atheism as believing there is 
no God, they often define it simply as lacking any belief in God--see 
the quotes from various atheist writers at 
http://www.infidels.org/news/atheism/sn-definitions.html



Thanks. But it is normal. It is strategy of atheist to put the agnostic 
in their rank. In his treatise of atheology a Belgium atheist 
described agnostic as just a polite form of atheism.


I just discover that Raymond Smullyan in a little book on religion Who 
knows? says also that atheism and religious believer are much more 
alike compare with the agnostics.


With Ben I propose that we stick with (g = God exists)
religious believer = Bg
atheism = B~g
agnosticism = ~Bg  ~B~g

Of course atheism will be relative to a notion of God.
Many people believe they are atheist, and then agree that they are just 
agnostic once the definition above is recalled or given. But I know 
personaly real atheist and even atheist sects, and in general they 
hate much more the agnostics than the religious believer. atheist and 
religious believer have in common that they dislike doubts on that 
subjects. For them it cannot be a priori a matter of science (that is a 
matter of doubt).



Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-09 Thread Benjamin Udell
Bruno, John, list,

Bruno wrote:

...I don't exclude at all I could change my mind about that title, either for 
diplomatic reasons and/or for scientific reasons (in case Ben succeed for 
example in explaining that G* has nothing to do with theology (even comp 
theologies), which I doubt.

That bar is set too high, I think. I've certainly never claimed that G* has 
nothing to do with theology. Like with any two things, in order to be called 
theology, G* needs more than a significant relation with theology.

Best, Ben Udell





Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith

2006-01-09 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 09-janv.-06, à 17:43, Benjamin Udell a écrit :

You've outline a whole range of degrees of cognitive assurance from 
firm to uncertain, and I continue to doubt that it can all be fitted 
under the notion faith or belief at all.



Not at all. It was not my goal. More explanation soon.

Ben, before I (try) to anwer your long post, could you explain briefly 
what you mean by ampliative induction? Thanks.
I will try to make a synthetical answer to your long post tomorrow or 
the day after.


Best,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith

2006-01-09 Thread Benjamin Udell
Bruno, list,

By ampliative induction I mean, not mathematical induction.

I also use the term to suggest that I mean inference that is not only 
ampliative (a technical term meaning that the inference adds info in its 
conclusion) but also retentive (not a technical term, so far as I know). In 
saying induction, usually I mean not simple induction (premise about a sample 
group to a conclusion about another individual) or statistical syllogism, etc., 
but instead inference that is both ampliative and retentive (in terms of formal 
implication relations, both non-preservative of truth and preservative of 
falsity), such that all information in the premisses is retained (still of 
interest) in the conclusion and the conclusion contains further information. 
I.e., some kind of generalization to the extent of a distribution, tendency, 
trend, etc. across a larger population or set of items. (I need a more general 
word than population since I've also talked (though somewhat vaguely) about 
the use of induction in for the kind of ideas studied by philosophy.)

This is all especially in distinction from surmise, by which I usually mean 
inference that, in terms of formal implication relations, is neither 
truth-preservative nor falsity-preservative. In other words, if my premiss is 
that the sun has risen every day for a thousand years, and my conclusion is 
that the sun will rise tomorrow, I call that a surmise (to an instance or 
individual) and if my conclusion is that there will never have been a day when 
the sun doesn't rise, I call that a surmise (to a law, though a weak surmise, 
since, among other things, it is not at all luminously explanatory with its 
law; and surmise is of more distinctive interest when, for instance, it is not 
clear which among various patterns should be used as premisses). The dropping 
out of premissed information from the conclusion reflects the focus of 
interest, just as a strict or non-reversible deduction drops some info in 
order to highlight other info.

Best, Ben Udell

Le 09-janv.-06, à 17:43, Benjamin Udell a écrit :

 You've outline a whole range of degrees of cognitive assurance from 
 firm to uncertain, and I continue to doubt that it can all be fitted 
 under the notion faith or belief at all.


Not at all. It was not my goal. More explanation soon.

Ben, before I (try) to anwer your long post, could you explain briefly 
what you mean by ampliative induction? Thanks.
I will try to make a synthetical answer to your long post tomorrow or 
the day after.

Best,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-09 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


If you remain true to the Greek roots of the words, atheists lack a belief 
in the existence of God, as agnostics lack knowledge of whether God exists: 
a- = without, theism = belief in God (by later convention, a personal 
God), gnosis = knowledge.  It is not quite the same as saying that God 
definitely does not exist, or that knowledge about the existence of God is 
impossible, respectively, although a few atheists and rather more agnostics 
would go on to make these stronger claims.


The fairest way to decide what a word applying to a group means is probably 
to ask the members of that group. Most atheists would say that they are 
reasonably sure that a personal God does not exist, just as they are 
reasonable sure that Santa Claus dioes not exist and that the Sun will rise 
tomorrow. They would not claim to be *absolutely* sure if they have even a 
smattering of philosophical sophistication, since no empirical fact can be 
absolutely certain (except perhaps the belief that I am having this thought 
at this moment). An agnostic, on the other hand, can vary from someone who 
has exactly the same view as that of the rational atheist just described, to 
someone who tends to be a theist but rejects the requirement common in many 
religions that he be absolutely certain even in the absence of any good 
evidence. I expect that most professed agnostics would tend towards atheism 
rather than theism, and could probably as easily describe themselves as 
atheists without changing any of their beliefs.


Stathis Papaioannou


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


George Levy writes:

One more point for Stathis: If atheism is not a religion, then zero is 
not a number.


There is a clear difference between, on the one hand, believing x despite 
the lack of any supporting evidence and, on the other hand, not believing 
x because of the lack of any supporting evidence



As far as I know atheists believe in  no god ( B~G  or equivalently B( G=f 
)  ) and agnostics do not commit themselves to believing in god. (~BG) . In 
that sense atheists are true believers. You are confusing the instance with 
the class. The fact that zero represents a null value does not mean that 
its status as a number is nil. The fact that atheists believe in zero god 
does not mean they do not believe in anything.


George



_
Buy now @ Tradingpost.com.au 
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Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-08 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

George Levy writes:

I understand Bruno's stand on Machine Theology. After all we are really 
talking about the soul in the machine. It is really controversial but so 
what? It will certainly drive the point home.


One more point for Stathis: If atheism is not a religion, then zero is not 
a number.


We can argue about the precise definition of words, but I think a 
fundamental point is missed if religion and atheism are put on a par. It is 
like the Christian fundamentalists' demand that creation science be taught 
in schools alongside evolutionary biology, because nobody can reasonably 
claim that evolutionary biology is *certainly* true and creation science 
*certainly* false.


There is a clear difference between, on the one hand, believing x despite 
the lack of any supporting evidence and, on the other hand, not believing x 
because of the lack of any supporting evidence - especially if x is 
something inherently bizarre or incredible.


Stathis Papaioannou

_
realestate.com.au: the biggest address in property   
http://ninemsn.realestate.com.au




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-08 Thread George Levy

Bruno
I am still thinking about the naming issue and I am not 100% satisfied 
with any suggestion. The field we are discussing is really at the 
intersection of three subjects: Theology, Physics and Psychology. This 
reminds me that about six years ago I wrote a book which was never 
published (I did not have the credentials and/or the book was too far 
out for the editors). I entitled the book God, the World and I.  In 
terms of your theory God, the World and I may correspond to G*, G and 
the first person.


I am not sure how this could affect the naming issue. Trying to combine 
these three concepts we could get titles such as:


First person Theological Physics? First-person Theo-Mechanics? 
First-person Physical Theology? First-person Machine Theology?? 
Theological Physical Psychology?


Psychology is not really satisfying... I should really be the science of 
the first-person, the self or the observer possibly the term 
for it is relativistic instead of psychology)...so we get 
Relativistic Theological Physics  or  Relativistic Theological 
Mechanics.h Upon hearing these words, people may decide to 
lock us up in an insane asilum. :-\


George



Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-08 Thread Russell Standish
Except I think that identifying G* with God is unhelpful. God is at
best an incoherent concept, which is part of the reason why theology
is a problematic word. G* is basically Truth by another name.

Bruno wants to use theology in its original Hellenistic sense - fine,
except he will have his work cut out explaining that this is how he
intends to use the word. Of course if he picks a completely new word
then he will need to explain this as well.

Cheers

On Sun, Jan 08, 2006 at 12:16:29PM -0800, George Levy wrote:
 Bruno
 I am still thinking about the naming issue and I am not 100% satisfied 
 with any suggestion. The field we are discussing is really at the 
 intersection of three subjects: Theology, Physics and Psychology. This 
 reminds me that about six years ago I wrote a book which was never 
 published (I did not have the credentials and/or the book was too far 
 out for the editors). I entitled the book God, the World and I.  In 
 terms of your theory God, the World and I may correspond to G*, G and 
 the first person.
 

-- 
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 ()
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02



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Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-08 Thread John M


 Bruno
it is you and only you who can decide about the title.


Just keep in mind that with theology libraries and
buyers will connotate a religious oeuvre, with
psychology a neurological or psychiatric one, wich
mewchanism an engineering treatise, with 
1st person a psychological babble, so people will
abstain from reading it. 
Did you identify a topic for the library systematic?
(I wonder)

I mentioned 'blickfang' and it is a real term. It
sells the text (not in money-terms, but in
readership). 
I would not suggest Advanced thinking beyond the
misconceptions 
of conventional sciences but I strongly advise
against words with
misleading baggage. (If my suggestion is any worth).
Maybe tuppence?

John M



Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-08 Thread George Levy




Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
George Levy writes:
  
  One more point for Stathis: If atheism is not
a religion, then zero is not a number.

  
There is a clear difference between, on the one hand, believing x
despite the lack of any supporting evidence and, on the other hand, not
believing x because of the lack of any supporting evidence 


As far as I know atheists believe in no god ( B~G or
equivalently B( G=f ) ) and agnostics do not commit themselves to
believing in god. (~BG) . In that sense atheists are true believers.
You are confusing the instance with the class. The fact that zero
represents a null value does not mean that its status as a number is
nil. The fact that atheists believe in zero god does not mean
they do not believe in anything.

George





Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-08 Thread Jesse Mazer


George Levy  wrote:



Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


George Levy writes:

One more point for Stathis: If atheism is not a religion, then zero is 
not a number.


There is a clear difference between, on the one hand, believing x despite 
the lack of any supporting evidence and, on the other hand, not believing 
x because of the lack of any supporting evidence



As far as I know atheists believe in  no god ( B~G  or equivalently B( G=f 
)  ) and agnostics do not commit themselves to believing in god. (~BG) . In 
that sense atheists are true believers. You are confusing the instance with 
the class. The fact that zero represents a null value does not mean that 
its status as a number is nil. The fact that atheists believe in zero god 
does not mean they do not believe in anything.


George



Atheists do not always define the term atheism as believing there is no 
God, they often define it simply as lacking any belief in God--see the 
quotes from various atheist writers at 
http://www.infidels.org/news/atheism/sn-definitions.html





Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-07 Thread Benjamin Udell
, and is applied in physical, chemical, and biological 
sciences and in social and human studies (be they called sciences or not), I 
see no reason to confine one's attention to its use for practical ends (be it 
practical in the everyday sense or in the Kantian sense). We can be more 
general about it. Such reasoning might even suffice for a kind of recognition 
of G*'s truth as long as we don't use the words recognize or know in too 
absolute a sense but instead in a sense of reasonably well corroborated/!
  confirmed for whatever theoretical or practical purposes may be involved. 
Where it becomes an issue, then it ought to be shown very clearly, and the 
importance not minimized, that G* cannot be proven deductively like G.

Best, Ben Udell

- Original Message - 
From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Friday, January 06, 2006 6:07 PM
Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue



Benjamin Udell wrote:


Bruno, list,

The most that I can say about responding so lengthily to Bruno's lengthy 
response to my lengthy comment, is that I've kept it in one post!

[Ben] Bruno, list,
  I've looked over Bruno's recent replies and, though I don't understand 
much about Bruno's work or modal logic, etc., I wish to attempt a few 
general remarks.
  If Bruno is, as he puts it, [searching for] a general name for a field 
which studies fundamental type of faith, hope, fear, bets, etc., then 
there are set of Ancient Greek words like _pistis_ (faith, belief, 
confidence), _pistos_ (confident, faithful), _pisteuticos_ (deserving of 
faith or belief), etc. So he could call it Pistics (sounds awful in 
English, though, because of that to which it sound similar) or Pisteutics, 
etc. Or maybe there's some form of this word with a prefix which would make 
it sound less like, well, um, piss plus a suffix, and, having considered 
it, I do think that that's an issue. Ancient Greek is too unfamiliar to me, 
otherwise I'd try to come up with such a word myself, keeping in mind the 
next paragraph:

[Bruno:] Well thanks. Pistology perhaps? I must say I like to use already 
existing terms, but I am still trying to understand why people seems so 
negative for the term theology ... I do think, perhaps unmodestly, that 
my approach belongs to the Classical Platonic Theology from Pythagoras to 
Proclus. (Of course Pythagoras comes before Plato but can be considered as 
its one of its main important precursor.)

Pistology or some longer word. Actually I'm surprised that a word like this 
doesn't already exist. Searching on the 'Net, I find that the World 
Congress of Faiths has coined a word fideology. (I'm not religious and 
I've never heard of them.) http://www.worldfaiths.org/fideology2004.htm . 
I'll bet they entertained the coinage pistology and rejected it in favor 
of fideology even though fideology is a Latin-Greek combo. Evidence 
that pistology might be better off with some euphonious prefix.

Is pistis related to episteme, the greek word for knowledge which is the 
root of Epistemology? Epistemology is the philosophical study of beliefs 
and whether they are justified--see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology . Would machine epistemology 
work for Bruno?

I found a page which seems to say the difference between pistis and 
episteme has something to do with practical vs. theoretical knowledge:

http://www.civsoc.com/reconphil/reconphil2.html

Ethics and politics are fields of practical philosophy. A person who 
possesses knowledge in these fields is not someone who can construct proofs, 
but rather someone who deliberates well about particular cases -- i.e., 
someone whose deliberation leads to happy results. What can philosophy 
contribute to a development of the capacity to deliberate well?

  While philosophy is master in the cognitive realm of pure theory, 
philosophy has a lesser contribution to make in the fields of ethics and 
politics. In these fields, experience and skills in deliberation are 
paramount. Philosophy can provide a vocabulary and a moral grammar that can 
make deliberation more effective. But knowledge in these fields is 
ultimately of the particular case and, of the particular case, there can be 
no certain, final, or complete knowledge.

  The field of practical knowledge is a field in which pistis or 
true belief, as opposed to episteme, constitutes the maximum goal. At the 
conclusion of deliberation, i.e., at the moment of ethical and political 
decision, it is impossible to know with certainty whether the particular 
case has been judged rightly. Only time can tell that and never with 
finality. The final state reached in deliberation is thus a state of being 
persuaded. Ethical and political deliberation thus calls into play the 
cognitive categories proper to rhetoric.

...

Thus, Aristotelian political philosophy, in identifying itself strictly as 
a form of practical reflection as opposed to theoretical cognition, i.e

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
I don't think you can get a semantics (above syntax) by referring to 
some hypothetical external primitive world, which btw is what I would 
like to explain (away), unless you presuppose Physicalism/Materialism. 
In that case you should either abandon comp (and weaker theories) or 
perhaps tell me where the Universal Dovetailer Argument + 
movie-graph/Occam goes wrong, as it should in that situation.


Bruno



Le 05-janv.-06, à 19:04, Brent Meeker a écrit :


Bruno Marchal wrote:

Le 04-janv.-06, à 19:30, Brent Meeker a écrit :

Bruno Marchal wrote:


Hi John,
I think you may have problems because you are not used neither 
trained in axiomatic thinking. The idea consists in NOT defining 
the objects we want to talk about, and keeping just some needed 
properties from which we prove other theorem.
Let me give an example with the idea of knowledge. Many 
philosophers agree that knowledge should verify the following law, 
and I take it as the best definition of knowledge we can have:

1) If I know some proposition then that proposition is true
2) If I know some proposition then I know that I know that 
proposition
3) If I know that some proposition a entails some proposition b, 
then if I know a, I will know b.



But that doesn't capture meaning of know.
But nobody knows or agree on the *meaning* of know, that's was my 
point. If *you* think it leaves something out, for a mathematician it 
means that you agree with the definition!

And then you propose a stronger theory by adding 4:
It leaves out 4) If I know some proposition then I have experience 
causally connected to the fact that makes it true.  See c.f. 
Gettier's paradox.
Now, that 4 *is* problematical because it refers to a undefined 
notion of causality, which itself can only be defined axiomatically.

Bruno


It's undefined, and it's definition is problematic, but I don't see 
why it can *only* be defined axiomatically.  ISTM that some things 
must be defined empirically (i.e. ostensively) otherwise we have only 
syntax and no semantics.


Brent Meeker



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-06 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Brent,

The D is put for the modal Diamond possibility. Dp is ~B~p (possible 
p = not necessary not p). With the provability logics (G and/or G*): 
the B represent formal provability and the D represents formal 
consistency. Dt is the same as ~Bf and represents (self)-consistency. 
Semantically it is equivalent with the existence of at least one 
model/world/situation/observer-moment. You can translate Dt - ~BDt, by 
if I am consistent then I cannot prove my consistency, or 
(semantically): if there is an observer-moment then I cannot prove 
there is an observer-moment.
I was just saying that there is a (next) observer-moment is already 
faith-based (theological?) for the lobian machine (or any lobian 
entity, actually).


Bruno


Le 05-janv.-06, à 19:16, Brent Meeker a écrit :



Science should be agnostic, at least methodologically, even with g = 
there is a universe or there is an observer moment. Comp science is 
provably agnostic: Dt - ~BDt.


What's D mean?


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-06 Thread Bruno Marchal


Hi Benjamin,



Bruno, list,

I've looked over Bruno's recent replies and, though I don't understand 
much about Bruno's work or modal logic, etc., I wish to attempt a few 
general remarks.


If Bruno is, as he puts it, [searching for] a general name for a 
field which studies fundamental type of faith, hope, fear, bets, 
etc., then there are set of Ancient Greek words like _pistis_ (faith, 
belief, confidence), _pistos_ (confident, faithful), _pisteuticos_ 
(deserving of faith or belief), etc. So he could call it Pistics 
(sounds awful in English, though, because of that to which it sound 
similar) or Pisteutics, etc. Or maybe there's some form of this word 
with a prefix which would make it sound less like, well, um, piss 
plus a suffix, and, having considered it, I do think that that's an 
issue. Ancient Greek is too unfamiliar to me, otherwise I'd try to 
come up with such a word myself, keeping in mind the next paragraph:




Well thanks. Pistology perhaps? I must say I like to use already 
existing terms, but I am still trying to understand why people seems so 
negative for the term theology ... I do think, perhaps unmodestly, 
that my approach belongs to the Classical Platonic Theology from 
Pythagoras to Proclus. (Of course Pythagoras comes before Plato but can 
be considered as its one of its main important precursor.)







What kind of belief? The focus in religion and theology on faith, 
belief, etc., seems (e.g., in Credo quia absurdum) to arise from a 
stubbornness in the belief despite resultant seemingly contradictory 
or inadequate interpretations and understandings, and despite 
seemingly contradictory or inadequate confirmations, corroborations, 
knowledge (knowledge in the everyday sense).



Even just with the quantum hyp., or more deeply (I think) with just the 
comp hyp. I would say that we can say the same things about the notion 
of matter, or the notion of a primitive or primordial universe.
... Except that it is far more easier (cf UDA) to explain the 
epistemological contradictory nature of matter than of God, which I 
take as being PERHAPS just a more general notion of reality, like our 
common (with comp) unnameable ignorance, or even the 
Platonico-Aristotelian notion of Self, etc.
Today's physics take for granted implicitly a major part of Aristotle 
theology: the religious idea of Nature, and the idea of linking souls 
to bodies in some one-one manner.





This is a special kind of belief, not the most general kind, and we 
tend to distinguish it in English by calling it faith though faith 
does have other meanings. It tends to be motivated by valuations not 
pertaining primarily to investigating and establishing the character 
of the world. For Bruno, the question is, does he mean a kind of 
belief which, howsoever motivated, is stubborn? (in the face of 
resultant contradictory or inadequate understandings and in the face 
of contradictory knowledge or inadequate knwledge). For what it's 
worth, I think that the name most suitable will have the meaning!

  of this kind of belief.



You don't need to be stubborn to belief (or hope) in God, especially if 
you are willing to take seriously pre-christian theology. Of course if 
you define God by a white male senior sitting on a cloud, it seems to 
me reasonable to suppose some level of stubbornness indeed.






Are religion and theism just about belief? Maybe I'm wrong, because 
there's a lot of background here on the everything-list threads that I 
don't understand, so maybe I'm interpreting things in the wrong light, 
but there seems to be a tendency here to regard religion as if it were 
fundamentally a cognitive discipline -- as if it consisted in a set of 
cognitive beliefs about facts.



Not at all. I would say the driving force is just truth, or even Truth. 
Then the theology of machine is entirely dependant of the gap between 
proof and truth, which you can seen as a gap between cognitive ability 
and the Truth.
Perhaps I am just talking in a premature way, and I should explain more 
on the Godel-Lob provability-truth gap (G* \ G).
Note that the Truth About-a-Lobian-Machine is an unnameable notion BY 
the lobian machine, and it verifies my favorite axiom of ...  which 
is that it has no name.
Note that I am not identifying God with Truth or with the Self. But in 
the whole family of Platonic thought, such notion are frequently 
related.




Religion has been many things and in some societies has taken many 
forms in being involved in every aspect of life. But the core toward 
which it seems sometimes to retrench, seems to be affectivity and 
valuing with regard to decision-making, power, submission, governance 
and self-governance -- including valuing with regard to the greatest 
powers in one's life and in the universe.



Science too, including affectivity, at least in practice.





(All the same, I fully admit that religion can get involved quite 
widely, in valuings with regard to competence and work, and 

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-06 Thread Benjamin Udell
Bruno, list,

The most that I can say about responding so lengthily to Bruno's lengthy 
response to my lengthy comment, is that I've kept it in one post!

[Ben] Bruno, list,
 I've looked over Bruno's recent replies and, though I don't understand much 
 about Bruno's work or modal logic, etc., I wish to attempt a few general 
 remarks.
 If Bruno is, as he puts it, [searching for] a general name for a field 
 which studies fundamental type of faith, hope, fear, bets, etc., then there 
 are set of Ancient Greek words like _pistis_ (faith, belief, confidence), 
 _pistos_ (confident, faithful), _pisteuticos_ (deserving of faith or 
 belief), etc. So he could call it Pistics (sounds awful in English, though, 
 because of that to which it sound similar) or Pisteutics, etc. Or maybe 
 there's some form of this word with a prefix which would make it sound less 
 like, well, um, piss plus a suffix, and, having considered it, I do think 
 that that's an issue. Ancient Greek is too unfamiliar to me, otherwise I'd 
 try to come up with such a word myself, keeping in mind the next paragraph:

[Bruno:] Well thanks. Pistology perhaps? I must say I like to use already 
existing terms, but I am still trying to understand why people seems so 
negative for the term theology ... I do think, perhaps unmodestly, that my 
approach belongs to the Classical Platonic Theology from Pythagoras to Proclus. 
(Of course Pythagoras comes before Plato but can be considered as its one of 
its main important precursor.)

Pistology or some longer word. Actually I'm surprised that a word like this 
doesn't already exist. Searching on the 'Net, I find that the World Congress of 
Faiths has coined a word fideology. (I'm not religious and I've never heard 
of them.) http://www.worldfaiths.org/fideology2004.htm . I'll bet they 
entertained the coinage pistology and rejected it in favor of fideology 
even though fideology is a Latin-Greek combo. Evidence that pistology might 
be better off with some euphonious prefix.

66~
Fideology is the study and practice of faith as trust.   There are many 
misleading arguments about faith.   Millions would say it is belief in God.  

FIDEOLOGY points out the difference between faith and belief.  (see FAITH AND 
BELIEF by W. Cantwell Smith).   Faith is trust.  While millions do not have a 
theology, to be human is to practice trust.  
~99

They're talking about trust among people, as trust, credit, etc. It's not alien 
to the subject of faith in God, though there is a certain tension there. See 
Melville's _The Confidence Man: His Masquerade_ 
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~MA96/atkins/cmmain.html.

One of the problems with using the word theology is that you don't seem to 
have been mentioning God or gods. So, unless you're planning to focus the 
subject ultimately on God or gods, I'd suggest that the field's name focus on 
that which you say it would be focused -- faith. It would be a study of faith 
just as epistemology is a study of knowledge. If you're interested in something 
more similar to an ontology, i.e., interested more in the subject matter of 
faith than in faith itself, then maybe Pisteutics, a study of that which is 
worth believing in, having faith in.

[Ben] What kind of belief? The focus in religion and theology on faith, 
belief, etc., seems (e.g., in Credo quia absurdum) to arise from a 
stubbornness in the belief despite resultant seemingly contradictory or 
inadequate interpretations and understandings, and despite seemingly 
contradictory or inadequate confirmations, corroborations, knowledge 
(knowledge in the everyday sense).

[Bruno] Even just with the quantum hyp., or more deeply (I think) with just 
the comp hyp. I would say that we can say the same things about the notion of 
matter, or the notion of a primitive or primordial universe.
 ... Except that it is far more easier (cf UDA) to explain the 
 epistemological contradictory nature of matter than of God, which I take 
 as being PERHAPS just a more general notion of reality, like our common (with 
 comp) unnameable ignorance, or even the Platonico-Aristotelian notion of 
 Self, etc.
 Today's physics take for granted implicitly a major part of Aristotle 
 theology: the religious idea of Nature, and the idea of linking souls to 
 bodies in some one-one manner.

[Ben]  This is a special kind of belief, not the most general kind, and we 
tend to distinguish it in English by calling it faith though faith does 
have other meanings. It tends to be motivated by valuations not pertaining 
primarily to investigating and establishing the character of the world. For 
Bruno, the question is, does he mean a kind of belief which, howsoever 
motivated, is stubborn? (in the face of resultant contradictory or inadequate 
understandings and in the face of contradictory knowledge or inadequate 
knwledge). For what it's worth, I think that the name most suitable will have 
the meaning of this kind of belief.

[Bruno] You don't need to 

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-06 Thread Jesse Mazer


Benjamin Udell wrote:



Bruno, list,

The most that I can say about responding so lengthily to Bruno's lengthy 
response to my lengthy comment, is that I've kept it in one post!


[Ben] Bruno, list,
 I've looked over Bruno's recent replies and, though I don't understand 
much about Bruno's work or modal logic, etc., I wish to attempt a few 
general remarks.
 If Bruno is, as he puts it, [searching for] a general name for a field 
which studies fundamental type of faith, hope, fear, bets, etc., then 
there are set of Ancient Greek words like _pistis_ (faith, belief, 
confidence), _pistos_ (confident, faithful), _pisteuticos_ (deserving of 
faith or belief), etc. So he could call it Pistics (sounds awful in 
English, though, because of that to which it sound similar) or Pisteutics, 
etc. Or maybe there's some form of this word with a prefix which would make 
it sound less like, well, um, piss plus a suffix, and, having considered 
it, I do think that that's an issue. Ancient Greek is too unfamiliar to me, 
otherwise I'd try to come up with such a word myself, keeping in mind the 
next paragraph:


[Bruno:] Well thanks. Pistology perhaps? I must say I like to use already 
existing terms, but I am still trying to understand why people seems so 
negative for the term theology ... I do think, perhaps unmodestly, that 
my approach belongs to the Classical Platonic Theology from Pythagoras to 
Proclus. (Of course Pythagoras comes before Plato but can be considered as 
its one of its main important precursor.)


Pistology or some longer word. Actually I'm surprised that a word like this 
doesn't already exist. Searching on the 'Net, I find that the World 
Congress of Faiths has coined a word fideology. (I'm not religious and 
I've never heard of them.) http://www.worldfaiths.org/fideology2004.htm . 
I'll bet they entertained the coinage pistology and rejected it in favor 
of fideology even though fideology is a Latin-Greek combo. Evidence 
that pistology might be better off with some euphonious prefix.


Is pistis related to episteme, the greek word for knowledge which is the 
root of Epistemology? Epistemology is the philosophical study of beliefs 
and whether they are justified--see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology . Would machine epistemology 
work for Bruno?


I found a page which seems to say the difference between pistis and 
episteme has something to do with practical vs. theoretical knowledge:


http://www.civsoc.com/reconphil/reconphil2.html

Ethics and politics are fields of practical philosophy. A person who 
possesses knowledge in these fields is not someone who can construct proofs, 
but rather someone who deliberates well about particular cases -- i.e., 
someone whose deliberation leads to happy results. What can philosophy 
contribute to a development of the capacity to deliberate well?


 While philosophy is master in the cognitive realm of pure theory, 
philosophy has a lesser contribution to make in the fields of ethics and 
politics. In these fields, experience and skills in deliberation are 
paramount. Philosophy can provide a vocabulary and a moral grammar that can 
make deliberation more effective. But knowledge in these fields is 
ultimately of the particular case and, of the particular case, there can be 
no certain, final, or complete knowledge.


 The field of practical knowledge is a field in which pistis or 
true belief, as opposed to episteme, constitutes the maximum goal. At the 
conclusion of deliberation, i.e., at the moment of ethical and political 
decision, it is impossible to know with certainty whether the particular 
case has been judged rightly. Only time can tell that and never with 
finality. The final state reached in deliberation is thus a state of being 
persuaded. Ethical and political deliberation thus calls into play the 
cognitive categories proper to rhetoric.


...

Thus, Aristotelian political philosophy, in identifying itself strictly as 
a form of practical reflection as opposed to theoretical cognition, i.e., as 
belonging to the cognitive domain of pistis as opposed to episteme, viewed 
itself more or less self-consciously as a component of what I would call 
Greek republican civic culture.


This page says something similar, that the distinction is about convincing 
others using rhetoric vs. justifying them in some absolute theoretical 
sense:


http://www.crvp.org/book/Series01/I-26/chapter_two.htm

Thus, in 1985, although he himself didn’t describe it in these terms (and, 
for that matter, no doubt still wouldn’t), Rawls, in effect, reinterpreted 
his philosophical project as a project belonging to the cognitive realm of 
rhetoric. Traditionally, rhetorical reason defined its cognitive realm as 
the realm of pistis or belief, as opposed to the cognitive realm claimed by 
philosophy, the realm of episteme or science. Belief, or pistis, is the 
state of being persuaded. To the extent that any discourse aims at producing 
belief, 

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-06 Thread George Levy
I understand Bruno's stand on Machine Theology. After all we are really 
talking about the soul in the machine. It is really controversial but 
so what? It will certainly drive the point home.


One more point for Stathis: If atheism is not a religion, then zero is 
not a number.



George



Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 04-janv.-06, à 19:30, Brent Meeker a écrit :


Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hi John,
I think you may have problems because you are not used neither 
trained in axiomatic thinking. The idea consists in NOT defining the 
objects we want to talk about, and keeping just some needed 
properties from which we prove other theorem.
Let me give an example with the idea of knowledge. Many philosophers 
agree that knowledge should verify the following law, and I take it 
as the best definition of knowledge we can have:

1) If I know some proposition then that proposition is true
2) If I know some proposition then I know that I know that proposition
3) If I know that some proposition a entails some proposition b, then 
if I know a, I will know b.


But that doesn't capture meaning of know.



But nobody knows or agree on the *meaning* of know, that's was my 
point. If *you* think it leaves something out, for a mathematician it 
means that you agree with the definition!

And then you propose a stronger theory by adding 4:


It leaves out 4) If I know some proposition then I have experience 
causally connected to the fact that makes it true.  See c.f. Gettier's 
paradox.



Now, that 4 *is* problematical because it refers to a undefined 
notion of causality, which itself can only be defined axiomatically.


Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 04-janv.-06, à 22:37, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :


Bruno Marchal wrote: 

...
Late James Higgo would have perhaps added that many trends in the

Buddhist traditions have much in common with Platonism and Plotinism.

Brent Meeker wrote:

Theism is the belief that the world was created by a single
omnipotent, superhuman agent who cares about human behavoir and 
intervenes in worldly events. 

 
Is that your theory?? 
 
Brent Meeker
Atheism is not a religion, just as a vacant lot is not a type of 
building, and health is not a form of sickness. Atheism is not a 
religion. 
  --- Jim Heldberg, San Francisco Atheist Coordinator 

 
The above quote from Heldberg would have made sense if, instead of 
atheism, he used a word like anti-religion-ism.  Religion should 
not be equated with theism or theology.  For instance Buddhism is not 
theistic, but it is a religion.



OK.





I do agree with you, Brent, that theism, or theology, is not a good 
word for Bruno's beliefs.


Careful, I don't remember having communicated any personal belief. I 
guess you meant my theory, which I recall is just the sound lobian 
machine theory.




 (But I don't totally agree with your definition of theism, as it is 
closer to monotheism, since you included the word single.)


Yes.



Back on Bruno's beliefs, perhaps a word like spirituality would be a 
step in the right direction, away from theology.


You mean spiritualitylogy then? I am seraching a general name for a 
field which studies fundamental type of faith, hope, fear, bets, etc. 
The idea is that G is machine science, and then G* should be machine 
theology (which is only (meta)scientific for those willing to assume 
comp (or weaker).



It is also a step away from the word psychology.  Psychology is 
often associated with trying to figure out what is wrong with the 
psyche, whereas spirituality opens it up to an exploration of the 
unknown.


I agree. Psychology does not address any spiritual question, except 
as some form of delusions. It could work for G but applying 
psychology to G* is akin to put G* in the machine science, and that 
does lead to a contradiction.






The word religion locks into the idea of a set of beliefs about 
reality, even beliefs that can't be proved, but also adds a set of 
beliefs that certain ways of living, traditions and/or rituals are 
required to live life properly.


The same with any applied science. Except that science lacks 
rituals and holiness, but perhaps for wrong reason.



Theists and atheists alike can ascribe to a religion, as I've already 
noted above (e.g. Buddhism).  But I would say the word religion is 
also too specific (in that it adds the ways-of-living) to refer to 
Bruno's beliefs, at least at this point, if I follow him correctly.


But the comp science adds way of living too, like saying yes to a 
doctor, using teleportation device, accepting having more than one 
body, accepting some ancestor cults consisting of handling the godel 
number of your parents, grandparents, etc. (at least for your 
comp-descendants).




Speaking of religion and beliefs, Bruno, I recall that Confucius said 
something like, To know that we know what we know, and to know that 
we don't know what we don't know: that is true knowledge.
 If I am correct, interpreting Bp as knowing p, could this be 
translated into the following two propositions?


Bp - BBp
~Bq - B~Bq  =  D~q - BD~q  =  Dp - BDp  (where p=~q)

I would say that these propositions take faith, which is in the realm 
of spirituality.  However, I would also say that we have to hold to 
these propositions to stay sane, and also to do science and explore 
the unknown.


Lao-tseu has already criticise many of Confucius' oversimplifying 
epistemological thesis.
Your formula Dp - BDp is interesting, it means that we know what we 
don't know. It it sometimes used in the semantics of computer data 
bases, and then known as the closer-world assumption. Practically it is 
a tool for making all data queries stopping, making the system NON 
Turing universal. But, once a system is turing universal and 
self-referentially correct, then we get Dp - ~BDp (Godel 
incompleteness), which contradicts your formula, and which makes 
machine prone to non-stopping behavior. And this remains true when we 
define knowledge from the logic G and G* through the Theaetetical 
variants.
To know what we don't know, well, this is just impossible for machines 
and even stronger (in provability abilities) entities.
But of course your point could be considered as a point against comp 
(or some weaker or stronger thesis).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 05-janv.-06, à 00:19, Russell Standish a écrit :




Also, I think God is just a chapter in theology,


again this seems to be using theology in a more expansive meaning than
it usually is. Theology to me is the study of belief in God, although
I note that the Oxford concise dictionary defines it thusly:

a study of or system of religion; rational analysis of a religious
faith



Yes it is exactly what I mean by theology: rational study of faith, and 
I recall that any practice of comp requires some sort of faith.






Indeed, however most people would not regard Pythagoranism, Platonism
et al as a topic of theology. If you insist on using the term, you
will be condemned to defining the word theology so as to include
Pythagoranism etc as part of its domain of study in every paper your 
write.



Actually neoplatonist like Plotinus or Proclus does that. Not only 
Pythagoranism has been conceived in a religious form, but like taoism 
in China, it has evolved into religious practice accompagnied by many 
form of superstition. Pyhtagoranism has even evloved into sectarian 
systems.






Psychology, on the other hand seems unproblematical, as psychology
normally covers belief as part of its remit.




But psychologist does not tackle the (certainly problematical) notion 
of truth, still less of unprovable truth ... It remains neutral, where 
comp *cannot* be.



Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 05-janv.-06, à 03:57, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :


Brent Meeker writes:

Theism is the belief that the world was created by a single 
omnipotent, superhuman agent who cares about human behavoir and 
intervenes in worldly events.


Is that your theory??

Brent Meeker
Atheism is not a religion, just as a vacant lot is not a type of
building, and health is not a form of sickness.  Atheism is not a
religion.
--- Jim Heldberg, San Francisco Atheist Coordinator


Indeed! And the lack of belief in the Sun and the Moon as deities is 
not a religion, and the lack of belief in Santa Claus and the Grinch 
Who Stole Christmas is not a religion.



Here I disagree very much. With all my respect I think you are probably 
confusing agnosticism with atheism:


- the lack of belief in God is agnosticism (if g = God exists, and B 
is belief, it corresponds to ~Bg. This is compatible with the lack of 
belief in the non existence of Gods: ~B~g)
-atheist are believer: they believes that God does not exist. This is 
B~g, and this is inconsistent with ~B~g.


Science should be agnostic, at least methodologically, even with g = 
there is a universe or there is an observer moment. Comp science is 
provably agnostic: Dt - ~BDt.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 05-janv.-06, à 04:10, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :


Quentin Anciaux writes:


Le Mercredi 4 Janvier 2006 19:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :

 Theism is the belief that the world was created by a single 
omnipotent,
 superhuman agent who cares about human behavoir and intervenes in 
worldly

 events.

 Is that your theory??

 Brent Meeker
 Atheism is not a religion, just as a vacant lot is not a type of
 building, and health is not a form of sickness.  Atheism is not a
 religion.
--- Jim Heldberg, San Francisco Atheist Coordinator

Atheïsm is a religion as I would say any metaphysical theories... 
(which are
only set of beliefs... if not they are falsifiable and enter the 
realm of

physical theories/science.

Atheism is not science in that it is not falsifiable... Atheïsm is 
composed of
dogma negation of the existence of any god/suprem being and is a 
set of

beliefs and as such fit well in the religion category.


Atheism means, from the Greek, without God or without a belief in 
God.



I would like to insist, because it could be the root of the problem 
with the word theology.
Atheism is the belief that God does not exist, and is always relative 
to some chosen notion of God. Agnosticism is the lack of belief in God. 
I believe atheism and belief in God have much more in common than is 
usually thought. Agnosticism is very different from both atheism and 
any sort of religious  belief.




It is like saying you don't believe in fairies, or Santa Claus. Of 
course, Santa Claus may well live at the North Pole, and hide whenever 
anyone goes there to look: no reasonable person could deny that, but 
no reasonable person would entertain it as a real possibility, either.


Sure.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 05-janv.-06, à 06:06, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :



It is worth repeating that machine theology would be a bad choice of 
words quite aside from the debate that has been generated on this 
thread about the meaning of atheism etc.



OK, this is another point.



This is because of the negative reaction the term theology would 
inspire in the (English-speaking, at least) scientific and 
philosophical community. I think even the savvier crackpots would 
avoid that word! It may not be fair, but that's the way it is.



I must think about that. I am not entirely convinced because it could 
be that the bad reaction is due to ... some basic theological error.


It is very nice that all of you try to convince me that the term 
theology should be avoided, although I am not yet sure that I can 
avoid it, and remaining at the same time a little bit honest if not 
just consistent.
Also, the fact that using theology makes you (all of you(*)) so 
nervous means perhaps that it is perhaps *urgent* we use it together 
with more serious connotations so that with some luck we will be able 
to finish the 3d millenium with the needed modesty to proceed.


Have you heard about Godel's proof of the existence of God? Godel did 
take the definition of God given by St-Anselm and formalised it in the 
S5 modal logic (actually the one proposed by Tom Caylor in its recent 
post!).
I don't take this, personally as  a proof of the existence of God. This 
is because I don't believe in St-Anselm definition of God (nor even 
that God is definable), nor do I believe in the S5 modal logic. But I 
*do* believe that Godel did prove that theology can be done in the 
scientific way, with definitions and proofs, etc.

See a sketch here:
http://www.stats.uwaterloo.ca/~cgsmall/ontology.html

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-05 Thread Benjamin Udell
. (There is a kind of philosophical 
panpsychism which tends to be more cognitive in aim, but that's the 
exception). And in fact the secularist-religious conflicts ongoing today are 
about all that further stuff, and not just about the particular factual issues 
which sometimes are made their arena.

So, again, I think that Bruno needs a name that carries the meaning of a kind 
of belief, and not one that just says God.

One added note: Agnosticism originally meant holding that it can't be known 
whether God exists -- un-knowledge-ism. It is still used, I think, by some in 
that sense. Anyway, earlier in philosophical and theological traditions it was 
used in that sense. Many also use it to mean that one is simply unsure -- I 
don't know whether God exists, but maybe you do, etc. There one simultanously 
suspects and doubts that God exists, i.e., neither believes nor disbelieves, 
but has some awareness of the question and treats it as suitable for 
belief-attitudes.

Best, Ben Udell

- Original Message - 
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2006 10:50 AM
Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue



Le 05-janv.-06, à 06:06, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :


 It is worth repeating that machine theology would be a bad choice of 
 words quite aside from the debate that has been generated on this 
 thread about the meaning of atheism etc.


OK, this is another point.



 This is because of the negative reaction the term theology would 
 inspire in the (English-speaking, at least) scientific and 
 philosophical community. I think even the savvier crackpots would 
 avoid that word! It may not be fair, but that's the way it is.


I must think about that. I am not entirely convinced because it could 
be that the bad reaction is due to ... some basic theological error.

It is very nice that all of you try to convince me that the term 
theology should be avoided, although I am not yet sure that I can 
avoid it, and remaining at the same time a little bit honest if not 
just consistent.
Also, the fact that using theology makes you (all of you(*)) so 
nervous means perhaps that it is perhaps *urgent* we use it together 
with more serious connotations so that with some luck we will be able 
to finish the 3d millenium with the needed modesty to proceed.

Have you heard about Godel's proof of the existence of God? Godel did 
take the definition of God given by St-Anselm and formalised it in the 
S5 modal logic (actually the one proposed by Tom Caylor in its recent 
post!).
I don't take this, personally as  a proof of the existence of God. This 
is because I don't believe in St-Anselm definition of God (nor even 
that God is definable), nor do I believe in the S5 modal logic. But I 
*do* believe that Godel did prove that theology can be done in the 
scientific way, with definitions and proofs, etc.
See a sketch here:
http://www.stats.uwaterloo.ca/~cgsmall/ontology.html

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/






Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith

2006-01-05 Thread John M
Dear Ben U, 
What a post! 
It is a joy to read it, however let me pick one little
phrase with a question attached to it:

...The focus in religion and theology on faith,
belief, etc., seems (e.g., in Credo quia absurdum)
to arise from a stubbornness in the belief despite
resultant seemingly contradictory or inadequate
interpretations and understandings, and despite
seemingly contradictory or inadequate confirmations,
corroborations, knowledge (knowledge in the everyday
sense)... 

Does not the Latin phrase express that Since I cannot
KNOW so (in all what you added) the only way left for
me is TO BELIEVE? Does it not express the idea in the
back of the mind that it should be rejected, unless
(by the stubbornness you mentioned) you WANT to uphold
it and the only way is faith?
I know it is not the customary explanation, but I try
it.

Regards

John Mikes  


--- Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 Bruno, list,
 
 I've looked over Bruno's recent replies and, though
 I don't understand much about Bruno's work or modal
 logic, etc., I wish to attempt a few general
 remarks.
 
 If Bruno is, as he puts it, [searching for] a
 general name for a field which studies fundamental
 type of faith, hope, fear, bets, etc., then there
 are set of Ancient Greek words like _pistis_ (faith,
 belief, confidence), _pistos_ (confident, faithful),
 _pisteuticos_ (deserving of faith or belief), etc.
 So he could call it Pistics (sounds awful in
 English, though, because of that to which it sound
 similar) or Pisteutics, etc. Or maybe there's some
 form of this word with a prefix which would make it
 sound less like, well, um, piss plus a suffix,
 and, having considered it, I do think that that's an
 issue. Ancient Greek is too unfamiliar to me,
 otherwise I'd try to come up with such a word
 myself, keeping in mind the next paragraph:
 
 What kind of belief? The focus in religion and
 theology on faith, belief, etc., seems (e.g., in
 Credo quia absurdum) to arise from a stubbornness
 in the belief despite resultant seemingly
 contradictory or inadequate interpretations and
 understandings, and despite seemingly contradictory
 or inadequate confirmations, corroborations,
 knowledge (knowledge in the everyday sense). This
 is a special kind of belief, not the most general
 kind, and we tend to distinguish it in English by
 calling it faith though faith does have other
 meanings. It tends to be motivated by valuations not
 pertaining primarily to investigating and
 establishing the character of the world. For Bruno,
 the question is, does he mean a kind of belief
 which, howsoever motivated, is stubborn? (in the
 face of resultant contradictory or inadequate
 understandings and in the face of contradictory
 knowledge or inadequate knwledge). For what it's
 worth, I think that the name most suitable will have
 the meaning!
   of this kind of belief.
 
 Are religion and theism just about belief? Maybe I'm
 wrong, because there's a lot of background here on
 the everything-list threads that I don't understand,
 so maybe I'm interpreting things in the wrong light,
 but there seems to be a tendency here to regard
 religion as if it were fundamentally a cognitive
 discipline -- as if it consisted in a set of
 cognitive beliefs about facts. Religion has been
 many things and in some societies has taken many
 forms in being involved in every aspect of life. But
 the core toward which it seems sometimes to
 retrench, seems to be affectivity and valuing with
 regard to decision-making, power, submission,
 governance and self-governance -- including valuing
 with regard to the greatest powers in one's life and
 in the universe. 
 
 (All the same, I fully admit that religion can get
 involved quite widely, in valuings with regard to
 competence and work, and with regard to feelings and
 gratifications, and with regard to cognition and
 knowledge -- and, also, it can get involved in a
 variety of cognitively based disciplines with regard
 to those just-listed subjects, so as to influence,
 e.g., education and community planning, productive
 arts, affective arts {painting, literature, music,
 drama, cinema, etc., etc.} and, among the maths and
 sciences, cosmology, as well; and religion can get
 involved in the arenas -- political, economic,
 cultural, discussional, and in non-conflictual
 practices of corresponding kinds.) 
 
 Why do we associate religion especially with
 stubborn beliefs and certain disputed issues of
 fact? At the core of most of those things which we'd
 call religion in the strict sense, the sense in
 which the word religion is usually meant when the
 context is vague, are claims of miracles, miraculous
 powers in impassioned settings. Civilization tends
 to ask of religion that it renounce compulsion,
 tampering and interference, and provocation, but has
 tended in some cases to leave the improbable
 unsupported claims about facts more or less alone.
 For one thing, many of us who are not religious tend
 to recognize 

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith

2006-01-05 Thread Benjamin Udell
The usual translation, to which you alluded, of Credo quia absurdum is I 
believe [it] because [it's] absurd.

But you're right either way in that, either way, it represents a stubbornness 
of belief, maybe even a use of habitual stubbornness as a method of solidifying 
one's belief, which is, despite that which I said in my earlier post, is not 
really what Bruno is getting at -- at least so it seems to me now. Maybe I'm 
wrong this time rather than last time. I'm feeling quite uncertain now!

Believing math to be consistent, is that really stubbornness? I mentioned 
contradictory or inadequate understandings and confirmations, but really it's 
a question of Goedel-unprovability and that sort of thing. And if you didn't 
fully believe math to be consistent, what then? Well, which math? Before an 
apparent consistency is uncovered, or afterward, when maybe it's been remedied 
through revision? Having said that I may have overstated the kind of 
stubbornness involved in the kind of belief which interests Bruno, I still 
hesitate to go down the path of revealing ever more of my ignorance. 
Nevertheless...

I don't know a whole lot about math, and I tend to be fallibilist, so I wonder 
whether anybody really does know, like Penrose claims, that those maths are 
in fact really and truly are consistent, which are consistent _provably_ only 
on the unprovable assumption of arithmetic's consistency. I think of seeming 
inconsistencies that get patched up, 0 divided by 0 equals any number you 
want -- so, more carefully define equality to exclude that problem. 
Denominators seemingly turning to 0 in calculus got remedied. And so on.

I guess I'll stop there. Thanks for your response, and for liking my previous 
post.

Best,
Ben Udell

- Original Message - 
From: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everythinglist 
everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2006 3:10 PM
Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith


Dear Ben U, 
What a post! 
It is a joy to read it, however let me pick one little
phrase with a question attached to it:

...The focus in religion and theology on faith, belief, etc., seems (e.g., in 
Credo quia absurdum) to arise from a stubbornness in the belief despite 
resultant seemingly contradictory or inadequate interpretations and 
understandings, and despite seemingly contradictory or inadequate 
confirmations, corroborations, knowledge (knowledge in the everyday
sense)... 

Does not the Latin phrase express that Since I cannot KNOW so (in all what you 
added) the only way left for me is TO BELIEVE? Does it not express the idea in 
the back of the mind that it should be rejected, unless (by the stubbornness 
you mentioned) you WANT to uphold it and the only way is faith?
I know it is not the customary explanation, but I try it.

Regards

John Mikes  


--- Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 Bruno, list,
 
 I've looked over Bruno's recent replies and, though
 I don't understand much about Bruno's work or modal
 logic, etc., I wish to attempt a few general
 remarks.
 
 If Bruno is, as he puts it, [searching for] a
 general name for a field which studies fundamental
 type of faith, hope, fear, bets, etc., then there
 are set of Ancient Greek words like _pistis_ (faith,
 belief, confidence), _pistos_ (confident, faithful),
 _pisteuticos_ (deserving of faith or belief), etc.
 So he could call it Pistics (sounds awful in
 English, though, because of that to which it sound
 similar) or Pisteutics, etc. Or maybe there's some
 form of this word with a prefix which would make it
 sound less like, well, um, piss plus a suffix,
 and, having considered it, I do think that that's an
 issue. Ancient Greek is too unfamiliar to me,
 otherwise I'd try to come up with such a word
 myself, keeping in mind the next paragraph:
 
 What kind of belief? The focus in religion and
 theology on faith, belief, etc., seems (e.g., in
 Credo quia absurdum) to arise from a stubbornness
 in the belief despite resultant seemingly
 contradictory or inadequate interpretations and
 understandings, and despite seemingly contradictory
 or inadequate confirmations, corroborations,
 knowledge (knowledge in the everyday sense). This
 is a special kind of belief, not the most general
 kind, and we tend to distinguish it in English by
 calling it faith though faith does have other
 meanings. It tends to be motivated by valuations not
 pertaining primarily to investigating and
 establishing the character of the world. For Bruno,
 the question is, does he mean a kind of belief
 which, howsoever motivated, is stubborn? (in the
 face of resultant contradictory or inadequate
 understandings and in the face of contradictory
 knowledge or inadequate knwledge). For what it's
 worth, I think that the name most suitable will have
 the meaning!
   of this kind of belief.
 
 Are religion and theism just about belief? Maybe I'm
 wrong, because there's a lot of background here on
 the everything

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi John,

I think you may have problems because you are not used neither trained 
in axiomatic thinking. The idea consists in NOT defining the objects we 
want to talk about, and keeping just some needed properties from which 
we prove other theorem.


Let me give an example with the idea of knowledge. Many philosophers 
agree that knowledge should verify the following law, and I take it as 
the best definition of knowledge we can have:


1) If I know some proposition then that proposition is true
2) If I know some proposition then I know that I know that proposition
3) If I know that some proposition a entails some proposition b, then 
if I know a, I will know b.


Then you don't need to look in a dictionary for a definition of 
knowledge, because mathematician will *defined* it by anything which 
obeys the laws above.
Also the laws above are made more easily readable and memorisable when 
written in a shorter way like


1) Bp - p
2) Bp - BBp
3) B(p - q) - (Bp - Bq)

Biologist, Chemist, and many Physicists just does not use the axiomatic 
method, and sometimes they feel they cannot understand math or logic 
because they feel they do not know the definition, when in fact there 
is just no definition at all: just axioms and rules describing some 
behavior of undefined terms or formulas.


Actually I have already try to explain the systems G and G* in a non 
axiomatic way; notably when discussing with Hal Finney in the course of 
some trip into Smullyan Knight Knaves Island.


And this settles also Stathis' natural  question: given that there are 
many modal logics and many corresponding notion of multiverses, how to 
choose the right modal logic.


The concrete answer I can give is that we will just interview a naive 
chatting Platonist machine which believe in enough arithmetical truth. 
With such a machine we can take the following expression as synonymous:


- The machine will print that 1+1=2
- The machine will prove that 1+1=2
- The machine will believe that 1+1=2
-The machine will say that 1+1=2,   or more simply (more shortly):
- B1+1=2

This is very concrete. You must imagine yourself in front of some 
concrete machine/device which print propositions from time to time.


Now, if the machine is enough rich in its language ability then the 
proposition The machine will print 1+1=2 is itself a proposition of 
the machine language. It could be that one day the machine will print 
the proposition the machine will print 1+1=2. In that way, the 
machine is able to talk about itself.
Do you understand the difference between Bp (the machine print p) and 
BBp (the machine prints Bp) ?


And the questions are then:
A) what laws do the machine printability (provability ...) obey to?
B) what laws do the machine prints

And the answer for A will be given by a modal logic know as G*, and the 
answer for B will be given by  a modal logic known as G.


I stop here in case you want already make a remark. Believe me, what I 
try to say is probably much more simple than you may imagine. There is 
probably less to understand than what you think.
The hardest part of logic for beginners consists in understanding how 
simple it really is.


Best,

Bruno


Le 29-déc.-05, à 17:56, John M a écrit :


your brief added last par is of great help. I would
NEVER mix provability and probability, I am not
Spanish (b=v?) and think in semantical rather than
formal meanings. I wish I knew what is a modal logic
(G and G*) and am a bit perplexed of your (??) logic
defining G* as beeing 'something or not'. (Like: F
is =,, or , of B)- Then again true may not
exist, indeed. (1st pers?)
Similarly it does not help me, if I get a lot of other
'names' for something I don't know what it is to begin
with. I like WORDS.
(I also like word-puzzles, but only solvable ones in
my domains).
*
I glanced over the Stanford blurb and found exciting
titles. When clicked, they overpoured me with
equational lettering and I had no idea about their
meaning. Even if I had a vocabulary of those letters,
it is practically (humanly) impossible to read a
text
and follow those equations by looking up every letter
for the meaning and content (with, of course clicking
after all the  connotations galore). Besides it is
full of signs I cannot even read out and have nothing
similar on my keyboard (maybe they are in some hidden
modes as are the French accents).
***
As a comparison: here is a description of a statement
from my old profession about something I did:
when mixing the DVB and St in a DBP catalysed 1:3
stoichiometry
it exotherms and has to be temp-controled. At
reaction-startup I added the DEB and then dispersed
the mix in an aqueous medium with PVA stabilizer. The
beads were then WV-boiled off and filtered.
They showed a controllable macroporous structure with
large sp. surface internally for adsorptive sites.
Then came the transform by polymeranalogous reactions
to introduce polar or ionic sites.

And so on. It made perfect sense in my profession.
(Never mind)

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-04 Thread Brent Meeker

Bruno Marchal wrote:


Le 26-déc.-05, à 04:14, Russell Standish a écrit :



On Wed, Dec 21, 2005 at 04:07:28PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:


(*) Well, I'm certainly interested in that naming issue, and perhaps I
could ask you right now what expression do you find the less shocking:
Physics is derivable from machine psychology, or
Physics is derivable from machine theology  ?
'course, you can put computer science or number theory instead of
machine psycho or theology, but then the reference to a soul or a
person is eliminated, and giving the current tendency of many scientist
to just eliminate the person from the possible object of rational
inquiry, I prefer to avoid it. Note that in conscience and mechanism
I have used the expression theology, and in computability, physics
and cognition, I have been asked to use psychology instead. I find
theology much more correct and honest, but then I realise
(empirically) that it it could seem too much shocking for some people
(especially the atheist). What do you think?
I have already avoid metaphysics because it is confusing in the
metamathematical (Godelian) context, and also I'm in a country where
the word metaphysics already means crackpot. Does the word
theology means crackpot in some country ? I don't think so, but
please tell me if you know about such practice.

Bruno



My preference is for machine psychology. This is shocking enough, but
amerliorated by the prefix machine. Theology, on the other hand does
not seem justified. In my mind, and I suspect for most people,
theology means the study of God. A study of atheism would probably be
included in this also,






Thanks for giving me your feeling. I obviously agree with you that 
atheism is a religion. Actually I see this as a reason to keep the word 
theology , although I remain open to the possibility of changing my 
mind on this issue. I have (G*) reason to consider that just the belief 
in one Observer-Moment, or World, State, Situation, etc. is already 
theological, like the hope in our own sanity or consistency. Physics is 
already theological too; in particular most physicists endow implicitly 
Aristotle solution of the mind-body problem, which is in part a sort 
of bullet making impossible to really progress there.







 however, I fail to see what the study of the
limits to machine intelligence has to do with something as nebulous as 
God.





It is, I think, as nebulous as any everything concept, except that it 
makes clearer the necessity of distinguishing a sort of pure science, 
captured by G and the whole truth about that captured by G*. I can 
come back on this but I think I should attempt to say more in some non 
technical way about the G G* gap.
Also, I think God is just a chapter in theology, and I don't even 
address that chapter neither in Conscience et Mecanisme, where I do 
introduce the term theology, nor in Calculabilité Physique et 
Cognition, where I have been asked to use machine psychology instead 
of theology, and then I am  beginning to think it is a sort of 
logical error. Like I said to George, either I try to be as clear as 
possible, but then it looks provocative; or I try to manage the ten 
thousands human susceptibilities, but then the message will take more 
that one millenium to be conveyed :(

Ah la la..
One of my current motivation for using the label theology is the fact 
that my work can be framed into the Pythagorean, Platonist and 
NeoPlatonist tradition.
People interested could read the very gentle introduction to Plotinus 
by Dominic O'Meara:


   Plotinus. An Introduction to the Enneads. Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1992.


Note that The Enneads have been themselves published by Penguin, with 
a readable translation.
The fact is that the arithmetical interpretation of Plato's Theaetetus 
leads to a rather natural arithmetical interpretation of many questions 
and answers by Plotinus around the mind-body problem, and apparently 
this bounces back toward an arithmetical interpretation of the whole 
Plato's Parmenides. But here I am not yet convinced and I am perhaps 
just overoptimistic, for sure.
Late James Higgo would have perhaps added that many trends in the 
Buddhist traditions have much in common with Platonism and Plotinism.


Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Theism is the belief that the world was created by a single omnipotent, 
superhuman agent who cares about human behavoir and intervenes in worldly events.


Is that your theory??

Brent Meeker
Atheism is not a religion, just as a vacant lot is not a type of
building, and health is not a form of sickness.  Atheism is not a
religion.
--- Jim Heldberg, San Francisco Atheist Coordinator



Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-04 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Hi,

Le Mercredi 4 Janvier 2006 19:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :

 Theism is the belief that the world was created by a single omnipotent,
 superhuman agent who cares about human behavoir and intervenes in worldly
 events.

 Is that your theory??

 Brent Meeker
 Atheism is not a religion, just as a vacant lot is not a type of
 building, and health is not a form of sickness.  Atheism is not a
 religion.
   --- Jim Heldberg, San Francisco Atheist Coordinator

Atheïsm is a religion as I would say any metaphysical theories... (which are 
only set of beliefs... if not they are falsifiable and enter the realm of 
physical theories/science.

Atheism is not science in that it is not falsifiable... Atheïsm is composed of 
dogma negation of the existence of any god/suprem being and is a set of 
beliefs and as such fit well in the religion category.

Quentin



Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-04 Thread Russell Standish
On Wed, Jan 04, 2006 at 12:30:49PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 Thanks for giving me your feeling. I obviously agree with you that 
 atheism is a religion. Actually I see this as a reason to keep the word 
 theology , although I remain open to the possibility of changing my 
 mind on this issue. I have (G*) reason to consider that just the belief 
 in one Observer-Moment, or World, State, Situation, etc. is already 
 theological, like the hope in our own sanity or consistency. Physics is 
 already theological too; in particular most physicists endow implicitly 
 Aristotle solution of the mind-body problem, which is in part a sort 
 of bullet making impossible to really progress there.
 

You seem to be confusing a study of metaphysical beliefs with a study
of a subset of metaphysical beliefs called the belief in one or more
Gods (which is what theology means to most people). I would not use
the word theology to describe the study of physics' foundational
beliefs - not sure what word I would use actually, it probably an
indication that very few people think about it.

 Also, I think God is just a chapter in theology, 

again this seems to be using theology in a more expansive meaning than
it usually is. Theology to me is the study of belief in God, although
I note that the Oxford concise dictionary defines it thusly:

a study of or system of religion; rational analysis of a religious
faith

Using this definition, the study of Kosher practices would be
considered theology, which doesn't seem right to me. It should come
under the label of cultural studies, or comparative religion perhaps.

 and I don't even 
 address that chapter neither in Conscience et Mecanisme, where I do 
 introduce the term theology, nor in Calculabilit? Physique et 
 Cognition, where I have been asked to use machine psychology instead 
 of theology, and then I am  beginning to think it is a sort of 
 logical error. Like I said to George, either I try to be as clear as 
 possible, but then it looks provocative; or I try to manage the ten 
 thousands human susceptibilities, but then the message will take more 
 that one millenium to be conveyed :(
 Ah la la..
 One of my current motivation for using the label theology is the fact 
 that my work can be framed into the Pythagorean, Platonist and 
 NeoPlatonist tradition.

Indeed, however most people would not regard Pythagoranism, Platonism
et al as a topic of theology. If you insist on using the term, you
will be condemned to defining the word theology so as to include
Pythagoranism etc as part of its domain of study in every paper your write.

Psychology, on the other hand seems unproblematical, as psychology
normally covers belief as part of its remit. About the only real
problem I see with it is those who think machine psychology is an
oxymoron (contradiction of terms). But those same people would think
computationalism is incoherent as well...

On a related point, which I meant to comment on earlier, but ran out
of time. In French and German, there is no distinction between the
words mind, soul, ghost or spirit. In French the word esprit covers
all these notions, and in German, the words are Geist and Seele. Yet
in English soul as well as ghost/spirit (the latter two being largely
synonymous) imply an independent existence apart from the body,
whereas mind has no such connotation. Soul tends to be used in a
theological setting, whereas ghost appears more in  literature or movies
- ghost stories :). But apart from that, I cannot see any obvious
distinction.

Interestingly in my aforementioned Oxford dictionary, it defines mind
as seat of consciousness (def 6.) and soul (def 7.) Oh well, maybe
everyday people's understanding of these things is muddied, or perhaps
my usage of these terms is particularly Australian (Australia being
one of the least religious countries in the world)

Cheers

-- 
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
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Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-04 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

Brent Meeker writes:

Theism is the belief that the world was created by a single omnipotent, 
superhuman agent who cares about human behavoir and intervenes in worldly 
events.


Is that your theory??

Brent Meeker
Atheism is not a religion, just as a vacant lot is not a type of
building, and health is not a form of sickness.  Atheism is not a
religion.
--- Jim Heldberg, San Francisco Atheist Coordinator


Indeed! And the lack of belief in the Sun and the Moon as deities is not a 
religion, and the lack of belief in Santa Claus and the Grinch Who Stole 
Christmas is not a religion.


Stathis Papaioannou

_
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Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2006-01-04 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


It is worth repeating that machine theology would be a bad choice of words 
quite aside from the debate that has been generated on this thread about the 
meaning of atheism etc. This is because of the negative reaction the term 
theology would inspire in the (English-speaking, at least) scientific and 
philosophical community. I think even the savvier crackpots would avoid that 
word! It may not be fair, but that's the way it is.


Stathis Papaioannou

_
ASUS M5 Ultra-slim lightweight is Now $1999 (was $2,999)  
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Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2005-12-29 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 27-déc.-05, à 05:43, George Levy a écrit :


Naming this field is difficult. This is why I made several suggestions 
none of which I thought were excellent.




I think it is difficult because there is a conflict between pedagogy 
and diplomacy there.








Bruno Marchal wrote:


I don't think it is a question of vocabulary,


It is only a question of vocabulary if you intend to communicate with 
other people. And this is where the difficulty lies. If you make the 
name too esoteric they will not even understand what the field is 
about.




OK. But is not theology less esoteric than psychomechanics. Everyone 
knows what theology is all about: immortalilty/mortality issues, soul's 
fate in possible consciousness states, where do we come from, 
cosmogony, etc.
Scientific theology is of course 100% agnostic on all this; yet it 
can provide theories and with comp (or weaker) even testable or 
partially testable theories (indeed with comp, physics is an integral 
part of theology: physics is given somehow by the mathematical 
structure describing the border of the intrinsic ignorance of machines.








and actually I am not sure we are not in, well *perfect* perhaps not, 
but at least in an a larger matching area than you think.
Perhaps, like so many, you have not yet really understand the impact 
of the discovery by Turing and its relation with Godel's theorem.
When I talk on Platonia, it is really Platonia updated by Godel's 
and Lob's theorem. I hope you are open to the idea I could perhaps 
progress in my way of communicating that. It really concerns machines 
and even many non-machines. I think about abandoning comp for ind, 
where ind is for indexical, given that G and G* applies to almost 
anything self-referentially correct.
I knew this for long, the comp hyp just makes the reasoning and the 
verification easier.


I can already say that I disagree the word quantum should be in it. 
The name should not issue what will or should be derived by the 
theory.



I do not fully understand the full ramification of how indexical 
relates to this field.





Indexical is used in philosophy to designate term like now, here, 
modern, I, this etc. Their meaning change with the situation of 
their uses. For example I means Bruno for me and George for you. 
here and now means Brussels and 10h54 am, here and now, but the time 
I finish the sentence it already means something else (Brussels and 
10h55 am). The approach I follow is based on the logic of 
self-reference. Bp is really an indexical: it means I prove p where 
I is put for a third person self-reference by the machine M, and 
strictly speaking the meaning of I is different for each machine (but 
by Godel Lob, still obeys similar laws of the  self-referentially 
correct machine).








However, I think that to use Indexical now is like Heisenberg using 
Entanglement instead of Quantum. Nobody would have understood what he 
was talking about. It was hard enough already to understand Quantum.



All right, but quantum still does not work for this field because it 
would give the wrong impression that the quantum hyp. is assumed, where 
the UDA shows it must be derived.
the comp hyp is neutral about which type of machine we would be. It 
could be a quantum one or not. All what matters is that the machine 
should be Turing emulable (or weaker: some Turing oracle can be assumed 
without changing the self-reference logics G and G*).






BTW, COMP is not very good, because you have to explain what it is.



Well, that is the name of the hypothesis. The point is to have some 
short acronym to put results in short formula like: COMP - REVERSAL. 
But we were discussing the name of the entire field. What *is* G* \ G  
from a machine point of view? It is the self-referential truth which we 
cannot prove, but which can be hope or fear or just bet upon, like Dt, 
DDt, ...





At first glance it appears to be the Mechanist Philosophy and this is 
what I originally thought.



Yes. Comp is the DIGITAL or numerical or computational mechanist 
hypothesis. The mechanist philosophy is logically weaker due to the 
(mathematical at least) existence of non Turing-emulable analogue 
machine. The UDA, as it is now, does not work on such analogue machine. 
Of course comp is a natural modern sister of the mechanist philosophy.







I think the best approach is to use a compound expression to bridge 
the gap between different fields. (i.e., Quantum electro-chromo 
dynamics, electro-magnetism, physical chemistry)


There is nothing surprising that quantum physics could be derived 
from quantum psycho mechanics.



Of course it is surprising...not to you or me or others on the list 
because we have been talking about it for so long... but to the 
average scientist in the street... or the university. And these are 
the people you intend to communicate with.




I don't follow what you say. Quantum mechanics assumes the quantum hyp 
, and some mechanics, by definition. 

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2005-12-29 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi John,

To search informations on the net on G and G*, it is easier to search 
on logic of provability.


G is also called KW, KW4, L, GL, PRL in other papers or book.
G* is also called G', PRL^omega, GLS

The Stanford entry is rather good:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-provability/

In brief words G is a modal logic which describes what a classical 
theory or machine can prove about its own provability abilities. And G* 
is a modal logic which describes what is true (provable or not by the 
machine) about its own provability abilities.


Don't confuse provability with probability. Careful when typing 
because the b and the v are close on the keyboard!


Bruno


Le 29-déc.-05, à 00:48, John M a écrit :


Bruno, could you include some BRIEF words for the
profanum vulgus about that ominous  G - G* magic as
well? I searched Google, Yahoo, Wikipedia, but could
not find any reasonable hint.
 You and other savants on the list apply this magic
many times always. Am I the only one who missed that
in grammar school?

John






http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2005-12-29 Thread John M
Thanks, Bruno,

your brief added last par is of great help. I would
NEVER mix provability and probability, I am not
Spanish (b=v?) and think in semantical rather than
formal meanings. I wish I knew what is a modal logic
(G and G*) and am a bit perplexed of your (??) logic
defining G* as beeing 'something or not'. (Like: F
is =,, or , of B)- Then again true may not
exist, indeed. (1st pers?)
Similarly it does not help me, if I get a lot of other
'names' for something I don't know what it is to begin
with. I like WORDS. 
(I also like word-puzzles, but only solvable ones in
my domains).
*
I glanced over the Stanford blurb and found exciting
titles. When clicked, they overpoured me with
equational lettering and I had no idea about their
meaning. Even if I had a vocabulary of those letters,
it is practically (humanly) impossible to read a
text 
and follow those equations by looking up every letter
for the meaning and content (with, of course clicking
after all the  connotations galore). Besides it is
full of signs I cannot even read out and have nothing
similar on my keyboard (maybe they are in some hidden
modes as are the French accents).
***
As a comparison: here is a description of a statement
from my old profession about something I did:
when mixing the DVB and St in a DBP catalysed 1:3
stoichiometry
it exotherms and has to be temp-controled. At
reaction-startup I added the DEB and then dispersed
the mix in an aqueous medium with PVA stabilizer. The
beads were then WV-boiled off and filtered.
They showed a controllable macroporous structure with
large sp. surface internally for adsorptive sites.
Then came the transform by polymeranalogous reactions
to introduce polar or ionic sites. 

And so on. It made perfect sense in my profession.
(Never mind)
No modal or out of modal logic, no 'ABC... with signs'
equations. 
***
How does the provability (no b) jibe with Poppers
scientific 'unprovability'? Is falsifiability =
provability? 

Bruno, I like what you SAY, I like YOUR logic, not
somebody else's. I don't want to 'give up' on you
because of a system so strange to me. I am 'fishing'
for word-hooks in your writings. In 1940 I took
philosophy (to major chemistry) and sociology. I
should have taken logic instead of the Br. of
Brandenstein. 
Of course it would have been of little use now, 65
years later.
With friendship

John

--- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 Hi John,
 
 To search informations on the net on G and G*, it is
 easier to search 
 on logic of provability.
 
 G is also called KW, KW4, L, GL, PRL in other papers
 or book.
 G* is also called G', PRL^omega, GLS
 
 The Stanford entry is rather good:
 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-provability/
 
 In brief words G is a modal logic which describes
 what a classical 
 theory or machine can prove about its own
 provability abilities. And G* 
 is a modal logic which describes what is true
 (provable or not by the 
 machine) about its own provability abilities.
 
 Don't confuse provability with probability.
 Careful when typing 
 because the b and the v are close on the
 keyboard!
 
 Bruno
 
 
 Le 29-déc.-05, à 00:48, John M a écrit :
 
  Bruno, could you include some BRIEF words for the
  profanum vulgus about that ominous  G - G* magic
 as
  well? I searched Google, Yahoo, Wikipedia, but
 could
  not find any reasonable hint.
   You and other savants on the list apply this
 magic
  many times always. Am I the only one who missed
 that
  in grammar school?
 
  John
 
 
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 
 
 



Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2005-12-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Stephen,

Le 24-déc.-05, à 02:27, Stephen Paul King a écrit :

As for a name, following the comments of George and John, what about I^st and 3^rd Person aspects in Computational Logics?

That is not too bad ... for the title of a paper, but I'm afraid it is too long for a field's name.

Also, strictly speaking, computational logic is misleading because people could take it as a form of constructive or effective or algorithmic logic (like computational chemistry is chemistry through algorithm). So, more correct, (and then obviously more ugly) would be 1st and 3rd Person aspects in computationalist logic. Remember that the first Person aspect is not necessarily computational or effective, although it is so, accidentally, for the propositional parts.

Many thanks for trying, and making me realise that the word theology is apparently as problematic in English than in French. Actually I am very astonished by that, and even somehow anxious about that. People can understand that Galileo has refuted Aristotle Physics, or even that QM is incompatible with Aristotle theory of substances. But Aristotle is also the first guy who did built a thoroughly scientific (Popper-Falsifiable) theology, and then the comp hyp refutes it, and forces us to go back to Plato and Pythagorus or to some neo-Platonician; mainly Plotinus, because the one who will follow Plotinus will again try to reintroduce some Aristotelian mind/body ideas which are, unlike Plato's and Pythagorus' one) incompatible with the comp hyp or even much weaker hyp.).

I am just trying to find simple word to convey to a general audience what are the logics G and G*.  I will say more this afternoon (It is 12h50 am in Brussels) in my reply to Kim.

Best regards,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2005-12-27 Thread Russell Standish
On Wed, Dec 21, 2005 at 04:07:28PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 (*) Well, I'm certainly interested in that naming issue, and perhaps I 
 could ask you right now what expression do you find the less shocking:
 Physics is derivable from machine psychology, or
 Physics is derivable from machine theology  ?
 'course, you can put computer science or number theory instead of 
 machine psycho or theology, but then the reference to a soul or a 
 person is eliminated, and giving the current tendency of many scientist 
 to just eliminate the person from the possible object of rational 
 inquiry, I prefer to avoid it. Note that in conscience and mechanism 
 I have used the expression theology, and in computability, physics 
 and cognition, I have been asked to use psychology instead. I find 
 theology much more correct and honest, but then I realise 
 (empirically) that it it could seem too much shocking for some people 
 (especially the atheist). What do you think?
 I have already avoid metaphysics because it is confusing in the 
 metamathematical (Godelian) context, and also I'm in a country where 
 the word metaphysics already means crackpot. Does the word 
 theology means crackpot in some country ? I don't think so, but 
 please tell me if you know about such practice.
 
 Bruno

My preference is for machine psychology. This is shocking enough, but
amerliorated by the prefix machine. Theology, on the other hand does
not seem justified. In my mind, and I suspect for most people,
theology means the study of God. A study of atheism would probably be
included in this also, however, I fail to see what the study of the
limits to machine intelligence has to do with something as nebulous as
God.

Cheers

-- 
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
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Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2005-12-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 23-déc.-05, à 23:46, John M a écrit :


BTW, Bruno, from the little I did understand from your
texts so far and from the lots I didn't I think we are
NOT in a perfect match of worldviews. Hard to
pinpoint, because I bleong to those who do not
speak/(think) within your vocabulary G



I don't think it is a question of vocabulary, and actually I am not 
sure we are not in, well *perfect* perhaps not, but at least in an a 
larger matching area than you think.
Perhaps, like so many, you have not yet really understand the impact of 
the discovery by Turing and its relation with Godel's theorem.
When I talk on Platonia, it is really Platonia updated by Godel's and 
Lob's theorem. I hope you are open to the idea I could perhaps progress 
in my way of communicating that. It really concerns machines and even 
many non-machines. I think about abandoning comp for ind, where ind is 
for indexical, given that G and G* applies to almost anything 
self-referentially correct.
I knew this for long, the comp hyp just makes the reasoning and the 
verification easier.


All what I say John is that anyone interested in Truth should look deep 
inside him or her or itself, and that's all.
That's hardly original, but I add something: a diskette with a couple 
of programs enabling you to follow in a finite time some sort of 
infinite conversation with a Universal Turing Machine looking deep 
inside herself.

Which programs? G, G*, G* \ G, S4Grz, S4Grz1, Z1, Z1*, X1, X1*, etc.

And this leads to a testable TOE explaining both qualia and quanta, 
without assuming quanta or any piece of stuff at the start. 
Verifiability is ensured by the fact that propositional physics should 
be given, with the ind hyp, by S4Grz1, or X1* or Z1* precise 
propositional logics (and as far as I have been able to proceed we got 
quantum logics there)


John, George, Stephen, Kim, thanks for your naming suggestion. I will 
continue to medidate upon! I can already say that I disagree the word 
quantum should be in it. The name should not issue what will or 
should be derived by the theory. There is nothing surprising that 
quantum physics could be derived from quantum psycho mechanics. Please 
recall I am not assuming anything physical.


Also, the questions that I address has been addressed by many people 
before (Plato, Plotinus, Proclos, and many others in different 
continents). Nobody would say that ocidental psychomechanics has begun 
with Plato or Plotinus. The word I am searching should be large, 
general, and without as few presupposition as possible.


Plato is the one who introduced the word theology with the meaning of 
Science of Gods, and by extension I take it as the science of what we 
can hope or bet upon.  It is just the truth *about* machine, and we can 
talk and reason about it without ever knowing that truth, given that no 
scientist at all can *know* the truth, at least as knowed.


To talk on immortality issues (cf: quantum immortality or 
comp-immortality) without accepting we are doing theology is perhaps a 
form of lack of modesty.


Nobody would dare to try to help me making a case for the use of the 
word theology?


I am not yet convinced by your argument against the use of the word  
theology but you help me to be aware that some misunderstanding 
prevails here. I  should perhaps say more about Plotinus, and other 
neo-platonists.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2005-12-26 Thread John M
Bruno,

thanks for your VERY considerate reply, I will respond
later in more detail. Now I simply want to point to
some facetious(?) connotations about words, as the
profanum vulgus may (flippantly) misunderstand them
(and YES, I believe it is vocabularial):

psycho (in a hazy phrase) points to loony. 
quantum recalls Niels Bohr and ilk. 
mechanics points to something 'physical'. Machinery,
gadget. 
And prejudice upon a title (words) is distorting
objectivity. 
(Don't forget, English is my 5th, so I am more bound
to semantic content than people born into (even any)
Indo-European. These are my feelings, maybe all
wrong.)

Are we close in thinking? I wish I had a well enough
formulated view to compare. I definitely would not
speak about TRUTH, which is 1st person belief, the
objective reality (not a perception of such) is IMO
beyond our mental capturing capability. 

I try to keep away from model-topics, like God or
longer: Godel, 
(although I use the proper German pronounciation). And
I am very suspicious about conclusions of the pre-Flat
Earth age old Greeks
- no matter how ingenious - missing humanity's 2.5
millenia-long epistemic/cognitive enrichment as basis
for their thinking. Still stifling our (free -
advanced) thinking.

Best regards

John


--- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 
 Le 23-déc.-05, à 23:46, John M a écrit :
 
  BTW, Bruno, from the little I did understand from
 your
  texts so far and from the lots I didn't I think we
 are
  NOT in a perfect match of worldviews. Hard to
  pinpoint, because I bleong to those who do not
  speak/(think) within your vocabulary G
 
 
 I don't think it is a question of vocabulary, and
 actually I am not 
 sure we are not in, well *perfect* perhaps not, but
 at least in an a 
 larger matching area than you think.
 Perhaps, like so many, you have not yet really
 understand the impact of 
 the discovery by Turing and its relation with
 Godel's theorem.
 When I talk on Platonia, it is really Platonia
 updated by Godel's and 
 Lob's theorem. I hope you are open to the idea I
 could perhaps progress 
 in my way of communicating that. It really concerns
 machines and even 
 many non-machines. I think about abandoning comp for
 ind, where ind is 
 for indexical, given that G and G* applies to almost
 anything 
 self-referentially correct.
 I knew this for long, the comp hyp just makes the
 reasoning and the 
 verification easier.
 
 All what I say John is that anyone interested in
 Truth should look deep 
 inside him or her or itself, and that's all.
 That's hardly original, but I add something: a
 diskette with a couple 
 of programs enabling you to follow in a finite time
 some sort of 
 infinite conversation with a Universal Turing
 Machine looking deep 
 inside herself.
 Which programs? G, G*, G* \ G, S4Grz, S4Grz1, Z1,
 Z1*, X1, X1*, etc.
 
 And this leads to a testable TOE explaining both
 qualia and quanta, 
 without assuming quanta or any piece of stuff at the
 start. 
 Verifiability is ensured by the fact that
 propositional physics should 
 be given, with the ind hyp, by S4Grz1, or X1* or Z1*
 precise 
 propositional logics (and as far as I have been able
 to proceed we got 
 quantum logics there)
 
 John, George, Stephen, Kim, thanks for your naming
 suggestion. I will 
 continue to medidate upon! I can already say that I
 disagree the word 
 quantum should be in it. The name should not issue
 what will or 
 should be derived by the theory. There is nothing
 surprising that 
 quantum physics could be derived from quantum psycho
 mechanics. Please 
 recall I am not assuming anything physical.
 
 Also, the questions that I address has been
 addressed by many people 
 before (Plato, Plotinus, Proclos, and many others in
 different 
 continents). Nobody would say that ocidental
 psychomechanics has begun 
 with Plato or Plotinus. The word I am searching
 should be large, 
 general, and without as few presupposition as
 possible.
 
 Plato is the one who introduced the word theology
 with the meaning of 
 Science of Gods, and by extension I take it as the
 science of what we 
 can hope or bet upon.  It is just the truth *about*
 machine, and we can 
 talk and reason about it without ever knowing that
 truth, given that no 
 scientist at all can *know* the truth, at least as
 knowed.
 
 To talk on immortality issues (cf: quantum
 immortality or 
 comp-immortality) without accepting we are doing
 theology is perhaps a 
 form of lack of modesty.
 
 Nobody would dare to try to help me making a case
 for the use of the 
 word theology?
 
 I am not yet convinced by your argument against the
 use of the word  
 theology but you help me to be aware that some
 misunderstanding 
 prevails here. I  should perhaps say more about
 Plotinus, and other 
 neo-platonists.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 
 



Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2005-12-26 Thread George Levy
Naming this field is difficult. This is why I made several suggestions 
none of which I thought were excellent.


Bruno Marchal wrote:

I don't think it is a question of vocabulary, 


It is only a question of vocabulary if you intend to communicate with 
other people. And this is where the difficulty lies. If you make the 
name too esoteric they will not even understand what the field is about.


and actually I am not sure we are not in, well *perfect* perhaps not, 
but at least in an a larger matching area than you think.
Perhaps, like so many, you have not yet really understand the impact 
of the discovery by Turing and its relation with Godel's theorem.
When I talk on Platonia, it is really Platonia updated by Godel's 
and Lob's theorem. I hope you are open to the idea I could perhaps 
progress in my way of communicating that. It really concerns machines 
and even many non-machines. I think about abandoning comp for ind, 
where ind is for indexical, given that G and G* applies to almost 
anything self-referentially correct.
I knew this for long, the comp hyp just makes the reasoning and the 
verification easier.  


I can already say that I disagree the word quantum should be in it. 
The name should not issue what will or should be derived by the theory. 



I do not fully understand the full ramification of how indexical relates 
to this field. However, I think that to use Indexical now is like 
Heisenberg using Entanglement instead of Quantum. Nobody would have 
understood what he was talking about. It was hard enough already to 
understand Quantum.


BTW, COMP is not very good, because you have to explain what it is. At 
first glance it appears to be the Mechanist Philosophy and this is what 
I originally thought.


I think the best approach is to use a compound expression to bridge the 
gap between different fields. (i.e., Quantum electro-chromo dynamics, 
electro-magnetism, physical chemistry)


There is nothing surprising that quantum physics could be derived from 
quantum psycho mechanics. 



Of course it is surprising...not to you or me or others on the list 
because we have been talking about it for so long... but to the average 
scientist in the street... or the university. And these are the people 
you intend to communicate with.


Plato is the one who introduced the word theology with the meaning 
of Science of Gods, and by extension I take it as the science of 
what we can hope or bet upon.  It is just the truth *about* machine, 
and we can talk and reason about it without ever knowing that truth, 
given that no scientist at all can *know* the truth, at least as knowed.


I think this science relates primarily to the self. As I said before, 
I think that it it the I that creates the (orderliness in the) world. 
This is not a new idea. Some philosophers have asserted this idea 
before.  Does this makes I a god? Not in the traditional sense of 
Theology which carries too much baggage.  This is my own emphasis 
which may not be shared by everyone on this list.
I am aware of the popular meaning of psycho = crazy as John mentioned. 
We could draw from other language than the Greek (auto, psyche) or Latin 
(anima, spiritus) but we lose the ability to be widely understood: 
Hebrew: nefesh, neshamah Japanese: tamashii.  Neshamah Mechanics is not 
going to fly. Tamashii Mechanics sounds like sushi to the average westerner.


To talk on immortality issues (cf: quantum immortality or 
comp-immortality) without accepting we are doing theology is perhaps a 
form of lack of modesty. Nobody would dare to try to help me making a 
case for the use of the word theology?


Of course we are doing theology but don't say it too loud or you'll get 
involved in a religious war. I think theology has too much baggage and 
is populated by people with faith - a virtue for them, a vice for us. :-)


George




Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2005-12-25 Thread George Levy

Bruno, John and Stephen

More on naming:

I think the name should include the following concepts
1) modal or relativistic or relative formulation or first person,
2) quantum or quantics,
3) psycho or psyche or consciousness or ego,
4) mechanics or theory.

So, picking one term from each row we could get names such as
first person quantum psychomechanics or
relative formulation of quantum psyche theory (this alludes to Everett's 
interpretation)


Sounds impressive!  :-)
George



Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2005-12-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

Le 22-déc.-05, à 23:51, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :


What I will say is of course obvious from third-person
hind-sight, but it helps me to guard against delusion to
point out the limitedness of email list dialogue when it comes
to accomplishing anything significant.  I think that the significance
is in becoming better at expressing ourselves.  


Especially on a delicate subject.



So, Bruno, I've been
bewildered for a while at why you are going to all this trouble to
help lowly list participants like me in learning the rudiments of modal
logic.  


Two bad news:
1) People on this list are one century in advance compared to what the average scientist can talk about in this time of overspecialisation and ivory towers.
2) I am probably *two* centuries in advance :)   Look, I am asking to people to listen to the machines, but people does not yet listen to people.
At least the lowly list participants seems to share some genuine interest in deep and hard fundamental questions.





Yes, I know English, and I could perhaps help with basic English
usage.  But when it comes to insider questions like machine psychology,
aren't there English-speaking philosophers out there that already know
what you're trying to get at?  


Those who can grasp enough see me as an outsider competitor, the others are not serious.
Very few people knows really simultaneously quantum mechanics, mathematical logic, and philosophy of mind.



You seem to be implying that there
are not.  This is surprising.  What is this path which can hardly be
avoided you talk about?


Listening to the machines.  Listening to what a vast class of machines can already correctly prove and correctly guess about themselves.



The word theology is made from the root theo, God, and this in my country is loaded with the historical baggage of puritanical (-hint to what my country is) whatever went wrong when I was growing up.  We use theology/religion as the scapegoat for whatever went wrong when I was growing up.  Some readers' blood pressure is already starting to rise.  So we put on our scientist hat so we can objectively step aside from whatever went wrong when I was growing up that I don't want to deal with any more, as purely subjective, lumping it all into the religious pot, or at least the ignore pot, until it comes out on our medical bill.  Yes, some of us out of necessity deal with some of it through the psychological label (or even mystical in a therapeutic sense), until we reach our personal saturation point, and then lump the rest of it into the religious/ignore pot.


I will think of that. I think the problem is not with theology, but with religious institutions. But then OK, I guess this should be better taken into account.



So I would say that both theology and psychology will not do if you are talking to the general audience.  


Gosh! I thought it would work *only* with some general audience. In academia I already know that most scientist are allergic to word like theology (but in my poor country, also in front of word like mind, person, thought, consciousness, and actually even quantum sometimes).



(Just to toss something out there, how about machine introspection?)  Of course, depending on who your audience is, even the words machine and physics are problematic.  The term physics is particularly problematic because it is interpreted in the reductionist sense, which may or may know include the mind.


Apparently many words are problematic here. Mathematicians should know the choice of word does not really matter. But most understand this only in their very specialised field.



Now here is where I will ask some questions, and then it will be clear that I am missing the point because I am still an outsider when it comes to this self-referential self-enlightened machine stuff.  


We all are, really.




Why are you afraid of eliminating the person? 


Look at history. All philosophies which eliminates the person lead to politics which eliminates the person, either in some bloody way of in some bureaucratic way ...
But the scientific  reason not to eliminate the person, is that it would be a scientific  error, as the machines can already explain by using the logic of self-reference and the definition of the knower by Theaetetus. 



I know you define personal identity through logic (double-diagonal stuff etc.)  But it sounds like you say, contrary to the reductionist view, that there is something essential to the person that cannot be completely described from the bottom-up, at least that there is something to a person that is forever incomplete.  


Yes, as Judson Webb(*)  already understood clearly, Godel's theorem is a vaccine against almost all form of reductionism.



Again, this is something contrary to the prevailing reductionist view, strengthened by simplistic popular desire, and a desire by some on this list, to have a COMPLETE explanation for everything.


Sorry for them, but this is as impossible as finding a period in the 

Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2005-12-23 Thread George Levy




Bruno

I don't think either "machine psychology" or "machine theology" work
because of the baggage those field already carry. In any case the
attribute "machine" sends the wrong picture. And as you have pointed
out the terms "computer science" and "number theory" do not capture
the real issue of machine consciousness. In fact I do not think
there is any word in English or French to describe what you are up to.

Why don't you use a new word with no baggage to describe what you are
doing?

"Psychomechanics" is not listed in most dictionaries
. Unfortunately, this word has already been invented. It can be found
on Google
in the context of animation and games and possibly Linguistics.

It may be that others in this list can think of a better word. 

George






Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2005-12-23 Thread John M
George (and Bruno, of course) 
First my coingrats to Bruno for completing his writing
up to t publishable level, and now comes the proble:
George, I struggle for the same quagmire, to find
words for terms unmatched/able to the baggage EVERY
habitual human word carries. I have 3 languages plus
Latin and a not so complete French to look into and
have a pretty good word-fantasy (I make lots of puns),
however whatever I try, it comes back to the
conventional meanings

It is almpost imposible to have a title-phrase for
an ignorant readership to take the text and read it -
and refer at the same time to a novelty unfathomed by
an innocent bystander so far. 
So I said: so what and explain my vocabulary
'inside' not minding those who will miss my divine
wisdom G. There is a slow process to the Nobel, and
not always open for the deservants. 
Our entire linguistics evolved while reductionist
conventionalism ruled the human thinking. I guess (I
gave up to 'understgand' his texts) Bruno has
absolutely new ways of speculation and novel
conclusions, different from the 'college-stuff' of
scientific terms (language). 
George, you are absolutely right that 85% of people
looking into titles of Elsevier (I reduced the
'audience already) will misunderstand 'machine',
'psych', tele- or the-ology, will think of software
engineering as 'comput/er/ing(?) science or comp, and
number theory will bring up integers, immaginaries, or
fractions.  The 15% will not care. I have problems
over a decade to explain over and over again that my
wholism is not holism as in some superstitious
healing process and wholistic view is not holistic
and does not look through a wormhole. But such is
life.

To be a mental pioneer does not mean the pecuniar
benefits of a bestseller. To put your foot into
Google/Wikipedia and watch for nitpickings by
misundestanding (but reading!) strangers is one of the
first steps. More than this (miraculous!)
list-membership.

BTW, Bruno, from the little I did understand from your
texts so far and from the lots I didn't I think we are
NOT in a perfect match of worldviews. Hard to
pinpoint, because I bleong to those who do not
speak/(think) within your vocabulary G

How about Ideational Mechanisms of the Totality
(world)?

With friendship

John

 
--- George Levy [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 Bruno
 
 I don't think either machine psychology or
 machine theology work 
 because of the baggage those field already carry. In
 any case the 
 attribute machine sends the wrong picture. And as
 you have pointed out 
 the terms computer science  and number theory do
 not capture the 
 real issue of machine consciousness. In fact I
 do not think there is 
 any word in English or French to describe what you
 are up to.
 
 Why don't you use a new word with no baggage to
 describe what you are doing?
 
 Psychomechanics is not listed in most dictionaries
 
 http://www.onelook.com/?w=psychomechanics+ls=a .
 Unfortunately, this 
 word has already been invented. It can be found on
 Google 

http://www.google.com/search?num=100hl=enlr=q=psychomechanicsbtnG=Search
 
 in the context of animation and games and possibly
 Linguistics.
 
 It may be that others in this list  can think of a
 better word.
 
 George
 
 
 



Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2005-12-23 Thread Stephen Paul King



Dear Bruno,

 As for a name, following the comments of 
George and John, what about "I^st and 3^rd Person aspects in Computational 
Logics"?

Onward!

Stephen


Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2005-12-22 Thread daddycaylor

Hi,

My paper has been published and should be available
on the site of Elsevier (not freely, except if your
institution has a free acces on Elsevier Journals).
The official reference are:

Marchal B. Theoretical computer science and the natural
science, Physics of Life Reviews, Vol 2/4, pp. 251-289.


Congratulations, at least from this one data point of reading the
above note.


I will probably be busy until end of January. In the meantime
I can give little exercises and then correct it. I know that a
mailing list is not necessarily the best place for teaching. I do
it because, at least concerning the approach I'm following, it
is a path which can hardly be avoided. But I'm sure also this
can be useful for a deepening of many everything-like issues,
even if just to introduce the work of David Lewis (one of the
main non quantum many-worlders).


What I will say is of course obvious from third-person
hind-sight, but it helps me to guard against delusion to
point out the limitedness of email list dialogue when it comes
to accomplishing anything significant.  I think that the significance
is in becoming better at expressing ourselves.  So, Bruno, I've been
bewildered for a while at why you are going to all this trouble to
help lowly list participants like me in learning the rudiments of modal
logic.  Yes, I know English, and I could perhaps help with basic English
usage.  But when it comes to insider questions like machine 
psychology,

aren't there English-speaking philosophers out there that already know
what you're trying to get at?  You seem to be implying that there
are not.  This is surprising.  What is this path which can hardly be
avoided you talk about?


Stathis has already shown that IF (W,R) is reflexive
THEN (W,R) respects Bp - p.
And Tom Caylor agrees that IF (W,R) is symmetric
THEN (W,R) respects p - BDp.



Is it OK for everyone?
Tom, Stathis, could you show the inverse ? That is:
IF (W,R) respects Bp - p, THEN the multiverse is reflexive.
IF (W,R) respects p - BDp, THEN the multiverse is symmetric.


Could you show that all multiverse (W,R) respects B(p - q) - (Bp - 

Bq) ?


I recall that a multiverse (W,R) respects a formula A
if A is true in all illuminated (W, R, V).
That is, whatever the illumination you choose
(= whatever the value of the sentence letters
you choose in each world) A is true in all the world of the 

multiverse.


Please feel free NOT trying to solve those problem.
First the UDA, which is not technical, is enough, it seems to me,
for a complete understanding that comp entails the reversal
between physics and computer science/machine-psychology/theology
(we can discuss naming issue later(*)). The math is needed ONLY for
making *explicit* the derivation of physics from comp, showing that
comp (or weaker) is a scientific hypothesis, i.e. comp is testable.



(*) Well, I'm certainly interested in that naming issue, and perhaps
I could ask you right now what expression do you find the less 

shocking:

Physics is derivable from machine psychology, or
Physics is derivable from machine theology ?
'course, you can put computer science or number theory
instead of machine psycho or theology, but then the reference
to a soul or a person is eliminated, and giving the current tendency
of many scientist to just eliminate the person from the possible
object of rational inquiry, I prefer to avoid it. Note that in
conscience and mechanism I have used the expression
theology, and in computability, physics and cognition,
I have been asked to use psychology instead. I find theology
much more correct and honest, but then I realise (empirically) that
it it could seem too much shocking for some people (especially the
atheist). What do you think?
I have already avoid metaphysics because it is confusing in the
metamathematical (Godelian) context, and also I'm in a country
where the word metaphysics already means crackpot. Does
the word theology means crackpot in some country ? I don't
think so, but please tell me if you know about such practice.

Bruno


The word theology is made from the root theo, God, and this in my 
country is loaded with the historical baggage of puritanical (-hint to 
what my country is) whatever went wrong when I was growing up.  We 
use theology/religion as the scapegoat for whatever went wrong when I 
was growing up.  Some readers' blood pressure is already starting to 
rise.  So we put on our scientist hat so we can objectively step 
aside from whatever went wrong when I was growing up that I don't 
want to deal with any more, as purely subjective, lumping it all into 
the religious pot, or at least the ignore pot, until it comes out 
on our medical bill.  Yes, some of us out of necessity deal with some 
of it through the psychological label (or even mystical in a 
therapeutic sense), until we reach our personal saturation point, and 
then lump the rest of it into the religious/ignore pot.


So I would say that both theology and psychology will not do if you 
are 

RE: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue

2005-12-22 Thread Stathis Papaioannou



Bruno Marchal writes:

(*) Well, I'm certainly interested in that naming issue, and perhaps I 
could ask you right now what expression do you find the less shocking:

Physics is derivable from machine psychology, or
Physics is derivable from machine theology  ?
'course, you can put computer science or number theory instead of 
machine psycho or theology, but then the reference to a soul or a person is 
eliminated, and giving the current tendency of many scientist to just 
eliminate the person from the possible object of rational inquiry, I prefer 
to avoid it. Note that in conscience and mechanism I have used the 
expression theology, and in computability, physics and cognition, I 
have been asked to use psychology instead. I find theology much more 
correct and honest, but then I realise (empirically) that it it could seem 
too much shocking for some people (especially the atheist). What do you 
think?
I have already avoid metaphysics because it is confusing in the 
metamathematical (Godelian) context, and also I'm in a country where the 
word metaphysics already means crackpot. Does the word theology means 
crackpot in some country ? I don't think so, but please tell me if you 
know about such practice.


My opinion is that theology would create at least as a bad an impression 
as metaphysics in the English-speaking world, if the intended audience is 
philosophers or scientists. Psychology is a more neutral and acceptable 
word.


That's the easy part of your post to answer. The modal logic problems will 
need more than a few spare moments at work...


Stathis Papaioannou

_
realestate.com.au: the biggest address in property   
http://ninemsn.realestate.com.au