subject:"Re\: What day is it\?"

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 25 Oct 2015, at 10:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 25/10/2015 6:12 pm, Pierz wrote:
It's hard to see how physics can be self-consistent without the a  
priori existence of arithmetic.


Maybe it is because the self-consistency of physics is what makes  
arithmetic possible.



That is too much fuzzy. To make it precise you might need to give the  
theory "physics", and prove the consistency of arithmetic in it.


But by Gödel's incompleteness theorem we know once thing, which is  
that to prove the consistency of arithmetic, you will need more than  
arithmetic. But you don't need a primary physical universe to prove  
that, nor anyone primary one actually.


Now, I have not yet heard of any physical theory which does not assume  
arithmetic. The proof that photon and mass zero even use the well know  
number theoretical truth that 1+2+3+4+... = -1/12, which is indeed  
provable in Peano-Arithmetic.


To avoid confusion, we should distinguish:


1) the theory/machine,  (a finite sequence of symbols, a machine)

2) the proofs/computations (finite sequences of symbols, the finite  
working of a machine)


3) The model of the theory (a structure validating the theorems of the  
theory, the beliefs of the machine)


4) Reality or parts of reality: when it happens the reality we are  
interested in, and on which we bet on the existence, fits with a  
model, partially or completely defined by the theory.



We might decide to forget about the "reality", and concentrate only on  
the theories, and judge which one explains better the other one.


So, give me your theory "physics".


I am a scientist, and I hate wasteful pseudo-philosophy. I have  
already given three different way to express "my" theory. (Classical  
logic + Robinson Arithmetic, or SK-combinators + identity theory, or a  
system of diophantine polynomials). The derivation of mind and matter  
is independent of which one.


In any of such theory, I can define the universal numbers, prove their  
existence, and prove the existence of all there finite computations,  
and I can prove the discovery by richer universal numbers of the  
existence of many non-finite computations as well. "Richer" can be  
defined in term amount of induction axioms:


(F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(s(x))) -> AxF(x), with F(x) being a formula in  
the arithmetical language (with "0, s, +, *),


In fact I recover that incompleteness forces, from the machine's point  
of view to distinguish 5 main variants of truth:


1) truth itself
2) the part which is justifiable/comprehensible/intelligible
3) the part which is justifiable/comprehensible/intelligible and which  
is also true
4) the part which is justifiable/comprehensible/intelligible and which  
is also consistent
5) the part which is justifiable/comprehensible/intelligible and which  
is also consistent, and true


For each machine, each such view defines a set of numbers with a  
highly non trivial structure, and if you understand the UDA, and  
Gödel's beweisbar, you get that 3, 4, and 5, give the physical modes,  
making this testable.


If you accept the idea that the brain is Turing emulable, it is easier  
to explain how numbers hallucinate in physical realities, than to  
invoke some primary matter for which we have no evidence at all, and  
which would do a selection (how?) of the many lives of the universal  
number, or better the universal person associated to it, in arithmetic.


At first sight, it looks we get an inflation of possibilities, but  
taking into account the self-referential correctness of the machine  
gives very strong constraints






Though admittedly that is a different point to whether or not  
physics is "emulated" in arithmetic.


True. But no-one has yet emulated any physics in arithmetic.


I insist often on this, but I guess it is a bit subtle. Neither  
matter, nor consciousness are ever emulated in arithmetic. Only the  
computations are emulated in arithmetic. Consciousness and matter are  
defined by the first person points points of view of the (universal)  
person supported by those computations, and are somehow defined by the  
projections of all their histories. Your current first person point of  
view is defined by *all* computations in arithmetic getting through  
your cognitive states. That subtlity, when translated in arithmetic,  
concerns the fact that, although we have :


p -> []p,

(recall that the propositional variable p are interpreted by the  
arithmetical sigma_1 sentences).


and that the machine can prove or justifie it (the Löbian machine, not  
RA!)


And we have also that

[]p -> p,


but luckily, for all this making sense, the machine cannot prove it  
for all p.


G1* can prove p -> []p, and []p -> p, but G1 cannot.

Despite this equivalence, we have not that []<>p -> p, but we do have  
p -> []<>p. making this playing some role on the graded quantizations.


(All this for those who remember previous explanations, or reaad my  
papers, with the help of the right

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 26 Oct 2015, at 16:49, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> Physics is what is observable. The "computable physical  
certainty" is described by the intensional variant of Gödel's self- 
referential prdicate, []p, that is mainly []p & <>t, (with or  
without & p)

Regardless of what it is describing  "Gödel's self-referential  
prdicate, []p, that is mainly []p & <>t, (with or without & p)"   
isn't actually DOING anything, that string of ASCII characters  
certainly isn't calculating anything, it's just sitting there like a  
lump.

Nor do the schroedinger equation; but you confuse the symbols with  
what they are denoting.

> And like I said, Aristotle was the worst physicist who  
ever lived. 

> He was the first scientist.

You can't be a scientist if you don't believe in the scientific  
method and Aristotle did not.  And Thales of Miletus died 162  
years before Aristotle was born, the same difference as between  
George Washington and actor Kevin Spacey. And Thales of Miletus  
actually performed experiments with amber that revealed  
important new things about the nature of electricity. Aristotle  
and all the greeks after Socrates (and unfortunately many on this  
list) think that to do physics all you need to do is sit on your ass  
and think and never need to get your hands dirty with experiments.

And the persians made crazy math thousand years before, no doubt. I  
was talking to the recent invent, in the "modern" sense related to the  
birth of the materialist religion, if you want.

>  my point is that his theology is refuted by all Universal  
machine looking inward enough.

Well good for  "all Universal machine looking inward  
enough", how nice for them.

Yes, and too bas for those which simulatneously are not looking inward  
enough, and not treying to listen to those machines who do.

>>>  Physics has no relevance at all here. What I  
said is true in both the case where the Algol interpreter or  
compiler run [...]

>> Run? RUN! Without physics nothing is running, your  
FORTRAN or Algol program is just static squiggles on a paper doing  
absolutely  nothing. 

> Using a non standard, but common, sense of running.

So a step by step process that produces a particular answer to a  
particular problem is non standard, but if I print a computer  
program on a paper and take that paper and run down the street with  
it then it would be standard usage to say "I am running the program".

If you invoke the necessity of a physical assumption in your the  
definition of computation, you are not working with the standard  
definition  given by Post, Church, Kleene.

> The notion of computation I use is the original given by  
Church, Kleene, Post, Turing, etc. Running is defined by

I don't care because no definition made by anyone about anything  
can make a calculation.

True. But no one ever said that.

But all numbers can do (different things) relativeley to (different)  
universal numbers.

"do" in the sense of Post, Church, etc. Precisely: in the sense of  
intensional church thesis.

But a microprocessor made of matter that obeys the laws of physics  
can.

Yes, but models of arithmetic can too. (Intuitively or mathematically)

> a purely arithmetical relation involving

The problem is that "a purely arithmetical relation" doesn't DO  
anything, it doesn't change anything, to actually DO something  
physics is required.

"do" is used in the sense allowed by computer science. Once I simulate  
a register machine with a diophantine polynomial relation, I can say  
"the register machine do this or that", without reminding that this is  
emulated by an atemporal diophantine relation, a bit like a digital  
block multiverse.

> I agree that such a physical universe is apparent, but that  
is explained by the existence of some measure on the computations  
when seen from inside

Inside or outside everybody has access to numbers,  and if  
numbers are the most fundamental thing there is you are unable to  
explain why we always need matter that obeys the laws of physics to  
make a calculation.

The point is that we don't.

We have an infinity of sharable "video game"  in arithmetic which  
makes us believe, for good reason, that we do need such matter  
appearance to compute and share results: it is unavoidable, and that  
is why there is no need to assume primary matter exist. We derive the  
belief in its existence, and its 1-plural need.

Bruno

 John K Clark

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-26 Thread Bruce Kellett


On 26/10/2015 4:45 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 12:41 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:


On 10/25/2015 10:32 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

In both those cases you do have evidence: your knowledge about
how matter organizes itself, and the current state of AI. To say
other realities/structures besides our universe exist is
something you have absolutely zero evidence for.


So having zero evidence for them I proportion my belief to the
evidence (c.f. Hume)


That was a typo, I meant to say "To say other realities/structures 
besides our universe *don't* exist is something you have absolutely 
zero evidence for."


I take it you have now corrected your proportion of belief for the 
above statement to reflect the amount of evidence you have.


I tend to go with the evidence. If there is no evidence that something 
exists, I tend to be sceptical about its existence -- in inverse 
proportion to the likelihood of direct evidence if it did exist. In 
which case, absence of evidence is evidence of absence.


Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-26 Thread Jason Resch

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 12:50 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/25/2015 10:34 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 12:25 AM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 10/25/2015 10:09 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> On 26/10/2015 3:48 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 11:05 PM, Bruce Kellett <
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>> The only sort of existence for which we have concrete evidence is
>>> physical existence. We can understand imaginary things, but we have no
>>> direct evidence for their existence -- certainly not for their physical
>>> existence.
>>>
>>
>> Do you acknowledge that we have no evidence that such things do not
>> exist? And therefore, we should at least remain agnostic on the idea rather
>> than reject the idea out of hand?
>>
>>
>> Imaginary things do not have physical existence.
>>
>>
>> I think that's why they're called imaginary.   I think Jason wants us to
>> believe we can't think of imaginary things.  If you think of it, it exists.
>>
>>
> You and Bruce want us to believe if we can imagine it, and we can't see
> it, then it definitely does not exist anywhere in reality.
>
>
> I only suggest that you proportion your belief to the evidence.  If there
> is no evidence, not even indirect evidence, then it is that intellectual
> infirmity called "faith" to believe.
>
> Brent
> "My view is that if there is no evidence for it, then forget about it. An
> agnostic is somebody who doesn't believe in something until there is
> evidence for it, so I'm agnostic."
> --- Carl Sagan
>
> Ahh, but there is evidence for it. I just wanted you and Bruce to first
accept and agree to the idea that there is no evidence against it.

It is good to hear you are agnostic on it (assuming ignorance of the
evidence for the existence of other things besides this universe).

Jason

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-26 Thread Brent Meeker

On 10/25/2015 10:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 12:41 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:

On 10/25/2015 10:32 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 12:23 AM, Brent Meeker
> wrote:

On 10/25/2015 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 11:05 PM, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

The only sort of existence for which we have concrete
evidence is physical existence. We can understand
imaginary things, but we have no direct evidence for
their existence -- certainly not for their physical
existence.

Do you acknowledge that we have no evidence that such things
do not exist? And therefore, we should at least remain
agnostic on the idea rather than reject the idea out of hand?

Hmm?  Shall I be agnostic about the existence of a teapot
orbiting Jupiter?  I have no evidence it doesn't exist.  I
wonder if Jason Resch is really a very cleverly programmed
chatbot?  Maybe I'll be agnostic about it.

In both those cases you do have evidence: your knowledge about
how matter organizes itself, and the current state of AI. To say
other realities/structures besides our universe exist is
something you have absolutely zero evidence for.

So having zero evidence for them I proportion my belief to the
evidence (c.f. Hume)

That was a typo, I meant to say "To say other realities/structures 
besides our universe *don't* exist is something you have absolutely 
zero evidence for."

I take it you have now corrected your proportion of belief for the 
above statement to reflect the amount of evidence you have.

No, I find that you've convinced me of your way of thinking.  I can 
conceive of all those other realities/structures NOT existing and so I 
must adopt that as my belief.

Brent

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-26 Thread PGC

On Monday, October 26, 2015 at 7:08:04 AM UTC+1, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 12:50 AM, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 10/25/2015 10:34 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 12:25 AM, Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/25/2015 10:09 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>> On 26/10/2015 3:48 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>> On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 11:05 PM, Bruce Kellett < 
>>> bhke...@optusnet.com.au > wrote:
>>>
 The only sort of existence for which we have concrete evidence is 
 physical existence. We can understand imaginary things, but we have no 
 direct evidence for their existence -- certainly not for their physical 
 existence.

>>>
>>> Do you acknowledge that we have no evidence that such things do not 
>>> exist? And therefore, we should at least remain agnostic on the idea rather 
>>> than reject the idea out of hand?
>>>
>>>
>>> Imaginary things do not have physical existence.
>>>
>>>
>>> I think that's why they're called imaginary.   I think Jason wants us to 
>>> believe we can't think of imaginary things.  If you think of it, it exists.
>>>
>>>
>> You and Bruce want us to believe if we can imagine it, and we can't see 
>> it, then it definitely does not exist anywhere in reality.
>>
>>
>> I only suggest that you proportion your belief to the evidence.  If there 
>> is no evidence, not even indirect evidence, then it is that intellectual 
>> infirmity called "faith" to believe.
>>
>> Brent
>> "My view is that if there is no evidence for it, then forget about it. An 
>> agnostic is somebody who doesn't believe in something until there is 
>> evidence for it, so I'm agnostic." 
>> --- Carl Sagan
>>
>> Ahh, but there is evidence for it. I just wanted you and Bruce to first 
> accept and agree to the idea that there is no evidence against it.
>

Why? They and trolling Clark have demonstrated the desire to remain naive 
in terms of such assumptions repeatedly, essentially blurting "my way or 
the highway because I am more awesome than you; believe me when I tell you 
reality is physical because it just is... you morons" like some helpless 
mantra of inverting the reversal over and over, consistently failing to 
address the eliminativism that would save them from being zombies, and not 
providing the clarity of what such reversal entails, if anything, for the 
mathematics of silly imaginary things that they *effin imagine* like 
physics. The imaginary bites and kicks back. In their faces. Right here. 
Now.

This counts more as convincing evidence of lack of confidence in their 
"argument" and the apparent need for some self-hypnosis brainwash prayer 
technique to stay convinced, than convincing evidence that their wishful 
thinking is correct. Numbers being imaginary bullshit from which physics 
can be separated neatly and discreetly; that's some imaginary bullshit if 
there ever was any.

But why even all this pretense to end up merely splitting fancy hairs? If 
people "argue" like this, one could settle the "argument" in the usual all 
too human fashion with "who has more guns or the longest dick". And the 
winner gets an ice cream and gets to call arithmetic his physical no real 
numbers bitch, how about that? Taking this position, they assume the 
reversal to be absurd, and fail to see that UDA refutes computationalism 
for them. Forest for trees. Let's go bowling. PGC

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-26 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> > 
> Physics is what is observable. The "computable physical certainty" is
> described by the intensional variant of Gödel's self-referential prdicate,
> []p, that is mainly []p & <>t, (with or without & p)
>

Regardless of what it is describing  "Gödel's self-referential prdicate,
[]p, that is mainly []p & <>t, (with or without & p)"  isn't actually
DOING anything, that string of ASCII characters certainly isn't
calculating anything, it's just sitting there like a lump.

>> > 
>> And like I said, Aristotle was the worst physicist who ever lived. 
>
>
>
> > 
> He was the first scientist.
>

You can't be a scientist if you don't believe in the scientific method and
Aristotle did not.  And
Thales of Miletus
 died 162 years before Aristotle was born, the same difference as between
George Washington and actor Kevin Spacey. And 
Thales of Miletus
 actually performed experiments with

amber that revealed important new things about the nature of electricity.
Aristotle and all the greeks after Socrates (and unfortunately many on this
list) think that to do physics all you need to do is sit on your ass and
think and never need to get your hands dirty with experiments.

> > 
>  my point is that his theology is refuted by all Universal machine looking
> inward enough.
>

Well good for 

"
all Universal machine looking inward enough
", how nice for them.

> >
>>> >>
>>>  Physics has no relevance at all here.
>>>  
>>> What I said is true in both the case where the Algol interpreter or
>>> compiler run
>>>  [...]
>>>
>>
> >> 
>> Run? RUN! Without physics nothing is running, your FORTRAN or Algol
>> program is just static squiggles on a paper doing absolutely  nothing. 
>
> > 
> Using a non standard, but common, sense of running.
>

So a step by step process that produces a particular answer to a
particular problem is non standard, but if I print a computer program on a
paper and take that paper and run down the street with it then it would be
standard usage to say "I am running the program".

> > 
> The notion of computation I use is the original given by Church, Kleene,
> Post, Turing, etc. Running is defined by
>

I don't care because no definition made by anyone about anything can make
a calculation. But a microprocessor made of matter that obeys the laws of
physics can.

> > 
> a purely arithmetical relation involving
>

The problem is that "a purely arithmetical relation" doesn't *DO*
anything, it doesn't change anything, to actually *DO* something physics is
required.

> > 
> I do not assume a primary physical universe
>

That's OK, 

the physical universe isn't angry with you over that slight, therefore the
physical universe still DOES assume that 
Bruno Marchal
 exists. And that is certainly very fortunate for you!

> 
> I agree that such a physical universe is apparent, but that is explained
> by the existence of some measure on the computations when seen from inside
>

Inside or outside everybody has access to numbers, 

and if numbers are the most fundamental thing there is you are unable to
explain why we always need matter that obeys the laws of physics to make a
calculation.

> > 
> You are just using the favorite dogma of the Catholics
>
Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that
one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

>> >> 
>> don't blame me for that, you're the one who said calculations don't need
>> physics not me. 
>
>
>
> > 
> Just read the original papers leading to that field. Or any textbook.
>

Can those original papers or textbooks make calculations without physics?
If so contact INTEL immediately!! 

> 
> In the math part, I use only the axioms of RA,
>

Can RA
make calculations without physics? If so contact INTEL immediately!! 

> > 
> It exploits known relationship between computability and (sigma_1)
> provability.
>

Can a
 "
known relationship between computability and (sigma_1) provability
" 
make calculations without physics? If so contact INTEL immediately!!

> 
> You are a believer in comp, even a practicer of comp.
>

I am not 
 a practicer of
"
comp
"  or
a believer in
"
comp
" nor a disbeliever in "comp". I don't give a hoot in hell about "comp".

> 
> Stop playing with words,
>

You're the one playing with homemade baby talk not me.

 John K Clark

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-26 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 1:29 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:

>> 
>> In this context, absence of evidence is evidence of absence.
>>
>
> > 
> I disagree.
>

There is no evidence for or against the existence of a teapot in orbit
around Uranus, so should I call myself a teapot agnostic or a teapot
atheist? Agnostic would seem to imply a 50-50 chance but I think if I
decide to call myself a teapot atheist there is somewhat less than a 50%
chance I will come to regret that decision, and I am willing to live with
that risk because "Danger" is my middle name.

John D Clark

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Pierz

It's hard to see how physics can be self-consistent without the a priori 
existence of arithmetic. Though admittedly that is a different point to 
whether or not physics is "emulated" in arithmetic.

On Saturday, October 24, 2015 at 4:32:47 PM UTC+11, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Oct 19, 2015 at 7:42 AM, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>  
>
> In arithmetic all emulation of programs exists,
>
>
> That is totally unimportant, It's not worth arguing about because it 
> wouldn't change anything even if it were true. But I'll tell you the REALLY 
> important question, is physics a emulation of arithmetic or is arithmetic a 
> emulation of physics?
> 
>
> >
> >>
> There is word for "100% accurate simulation", we call that an emulation. 
> The models of RA emulates all computations. 
>
> ...

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Bruce Kellett


On 25/10/2015 6:12 pm, Pierz wrote:
It's hard to see how physics can be self-consistent without the a 
priori existence of arithmetic.


Maybe it is because the self-consistency of physics is what makes 
arithmetic possible.


Though admittedly that is a different point to whether or not physics 
is "emulated" in arithmetic.


True. But no-one has yet emulated any physics in arithmetic. All the we 
have is mathematical accounts of discovered physical laws -- arithmetic 
based in physics.


Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Brent Meeker




On 10/25/2015 5:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 3:46 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 10/25/2015 8:38 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 4:39 AM, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 25/10/2015 6:12 pm, Pierz wrote:

It's hard to see how physics can be self-consistent
without the a priori existence of arithmetic.


Maybe it is because the self-consistency of physics is what
makes arithmetic possible.

Though admittedly that is a different point to whether or
not physics is "emulated" in arithmetic.


True. But no-one has yet emulated any physics in arithmetic.
All the we have is mathematical accounts of discovered
physical laws -- arithmetic based in physics.


I recently replied to someone on the FOAR list who expressed a
similar criticism:

 Something has to "run" the math... ;)  electricity or not.


Isn't this being a bit one-sided?
Physics can run itself, but objects in math cannot.
A physical universe can exist independently of anything else, but
a mathematical object cannot.
A physical computation can result in consciousness, a
mathematical computation results in nothing.

From where does such bias originate?


From experience as a physical being.


Your experience provides evidence for the existence of the physical 
universe, but don't confuse this for evidence of the non-existence of 
anything outside the physical universe.


You mean don't confuse it with existence of imaginary things?

Brent

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Bruce Kellett

The only sort of existence for which we have concrete evidence is 
physical existence. We can understand imaginary things, but we have no 
direct evidence for their existence -- certainly not for their physical 
existence.

Bruce

On 26/10/2015 2:44 pm, Jason Resch wrote:

There it is again. Where is your evidence? Or are you led by your faith?

On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 10:04 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:

On 10/25/2015 5:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 3:46 PM, Brent Meeker
> wrote:

On 10/25/2015 8:38 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 4:39 AM, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 25/10/2015 6:12 pm, Pierz wrote:

It's hard to see how physics can be self-consistent
without the a priori existence of arithmetic.

Maybe it is because the self-consistency of physics is
what makes arithmetic possible.

Though admittedly that is a different point to
whether or not physics is "emulated" in arithmetic.

True. But no-one has yet emulated any physics in
arithmetic. All the we have is mathematical accounts of
discovered physical laws -- arithmetic based in physics.

I recently replied to someone on the FOAR list who expressed
a similar criticism:

 Something has to "run" the math... ;)  electricity or not.

Isn't this being a bit one-sided?
Physics can run itself, but objects in math cannot.
A physical universe can exist independently of anything
else, but a mathematical object cannot.
A physical computation can result in consciousness, a
mathematical computation results in nothing.

From where does such bias originate?

From experience as a physical being.

Your experience provides evidence for the existence of the
physical universe, but don't confuse this for evidence of the
non-existence of anything outside the physical universe.

You mean don't confuse it with existence of imaginary things?

Brent

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Jason Resch

On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 3:46 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/25/2015 8:38 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 4:39 AM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 25/10/2015 6:12 pm, Pierz wrote:
>>
>>> It's hard to see how physics can be self-consistent without the a priori
>>> existence of arithmetic.
>>>
>>
>> Maybe it is because the self-consistency of physics is what makes
>> arithmetic possible.
>>
>> Though admittedly that is a different point to whether or not physics is
>>> "emulated" in arithmetic.
>>>
>>
>> True. But no-one has yet emulated any physics in arithmetic. All the we
>> have is mathematical accounts of discovered physical laws -- arithmetic
>> based in physics.
>
>
> I recently replied to someone on the FOAR list who expressed a similar
> criticism:
>
>  Something has to "run" the math... ;)  electricity or not.
>>
>
> Isn't this being a bit one-sided?
> Physics can run itself, but objects in math cannot.
> A physical universe can exist independently of anything else, but a
> mathematical object cannot.
> A physical computation can result in consciousness, a mathematical
> computation results in nothing.
>
> From where does such bias originate?
>
>
> From experience as a physical being.
>

Your experience provides evidence for the existence of the physical
universe, but don't confuse this for evidence of the non-existence of
anything outside the physical universe.

Jason

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Jason Resch

On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 11:05 PM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> The only sort of existence for which we have concrete evidence is physical
> existence. We can understand imaginary things, but we have no direct
> evidence for their existence -- certainly not for their physical existence.
>

Do you acknowledge that we have no evidence that such things do not exist?
And therefore, we should at least remain agnostic on the idea rather than
reject the idea out of hand?

Jason


>
>
> Bruce
>
>
>
> On 26/10/2015 2:44 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> There it is again. Where is your evidence? Or are you led by your faith?
>
> On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 10:04 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 10/25/2015 5:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 3:46 PM, Brent Meeker < 
>> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 10/25/2015 8:38 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 4:39 AM, Bruce Kellett <
>>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>
 On 25/10/2015 6:12 pm, Pierz wrote:

> It's hard to see how physics can be self-consistent without the a
> priori existence of arithmetic.
>

 Maybe it is because the self-consistency of physics is what makes
 arithmetic possible.

 Though admittedly that is a different point to whether or not physics
> is "emulated" in arithmetic.
>

 True. But no-one has yet emulated any physics in arithmetic. All the we
 have is mathematical accounts of discovered physical laws -- arithmetic
 based in physics.
>>>
>>>
>>> I recently replied to someone on the FOAR list who expressed a similar
>>> criticism:
>>>
>>>  Something has to "run" the math... ;)  electricity or not.

>>>
>>> Isn't this being a bit one-sided?
>>> Physics can run itself, but objects in math cannot.
>>> A physical universe can exist independently of anything else, but a
>>> mathematical object cannot.
>>> A physical computation can result in consciousness, a mathematical
>>> computation results in nothing.
>>>
>>> From where does such bias originate?
>>>
>>>
>>> From experience as a physical being.
>>>
>>
>> Your experience provides evidence for the existence of the physical
>> universe, but don't confuse this for evidence of the non-existence of
>> anything outside the physical universe.
>>
>>
>> You mean don't confuse it with existence of imaginary things?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Jason Resch

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 12:09 AM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 26/10/2015 3:48 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 11:05 PM, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>
>> The only sort of existence for which we have concrete evidence is
>> physical existence. We can understand imaginary things, but we have no
>> direct evidence for their existence -- certainly not for their physical
>> existence.
>>
>
> Do you acknowledge that we have no evidence that such things do not exist?
> And therefore, we should at least remain agnostic on the idea rather than
> reject the idea out of hand?
>
>
> Imaginary things do not have physical existence.
>

Maybe things in our imaginations else elsewhere.


> You can dream up some other kind of existence if you like, but you have no
> evidence that any such notion has useful content.
>

I've posted on this before. Maybe you've missed them.


> In this context, absence of evidence is evidence of absence.
>
>
>
I disagree. Not sure there's much more I can say.

Jason

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Jason Resch

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 12:41 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/25/2015 10:32 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 12:23 AM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 10/25/2015 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 11:05 PM, Bruce Kellett <
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>> The only sort of existence for which we have concrete evidence is
>>> physical existence. We can understand imaginary things, but we have no
>>> direct evidence for their existence -- certainly not for their physical
>>> existence.
>>>
>>
>> Do you acknowledge that we have no evidence that such things do not
>> exist? And therefore, we should at least remain agnostic on the idea rather
>> than reject the idea out of hand?
>>
>>
>> Hmm?  Shall I be agnostic about the existence of a teapot orbiting
>> Jupiter?  I have no evidence it doesn't exist.  I wonder if Jason Resch is
>> really a very cleverly programmed chatbot?  Maybe I'll be agnostic about it.
>>
>
> In both those cases you do have evidence: your knowledge about how matter
> organizes itself, and the current state of AI. To say other
> realities/structures besides our universe exist is something you have
> absolutely zero evidence for.
>
>
> So having zero evidence for them I proportion my belief to the evidence
> (c.f. Hume)
>
>
That was a typo, I meant to say "To say other realities/structures besides
our universe *don't* exist is something you have absolutely zero evidence
for."

I take it you have now corrected your proportion of belief for the above
statement to reflect the amount of evidence you have.

Jason

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Brent Meeker




On 10/25/2015 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 11:05 PM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:


The only sort of existence for which we have concrete evidence is
physical existence. We can understand imaginary things, but we
have no direct evidence for their existence -- certainly not for
their physical existence.


Do you acknowledge that we have no evidence that such things do not 
exist? And therefore, we should at least remain agnostic on the idea 
rather than reject the idea out of hand?


Hmm?  Shall I be agnostic about the existence of a teapot orbiting 
Jupiter?  I have no evidence it doesn't exist.  I wonder if Jason Resch 
is really a very cleverly programmed chatbot?  Maybe I'll be agnostic 
about it.


Brent

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Jason Resch

There it is again. Where is your evidence? Or are you led by your faith?

On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 10:04 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/25/2015 5:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 3:46 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 10/25/2015 8:38 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 4:39 AM, Bruce Kellett <
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>> On 25/10/2015 6:12 pm, Pierz wrote:
>>>
 It's hard to see how physics can be self-consistent without the a
 priori existence of arithmetic.

>>>
>>> Maybe it is because the self-consistency of physics is what makes
>>> arithmetic possible.
>>>
>>> Though admittedly that is a different point to whether or not physics is
 "emulated" in arithmetic.

>>>
>>> True. But no-one has yet emulated any physics in arithmetic. All the we
>>> have is mathematical accounts of discovered physical laws -- arithmetic
>>> based in physics.
>>
>>
>> I recently replied to someone on the FOAR list who expressed a similar
>> criticism:
>>
>>  Something has to "run" the math... ;)  electricity or not.
>>>
>>
>> Isn't this being a bit one-sided?
>> Physics can run itself, but objects in math cannot.
>> A physical universe can exist independently of anything else, but a
>> mathematical object cannot.
>> A physical computation can result in consciousness, a mathematical
>> computation results in nothing.
>>
>> From where does such bias originate?
>>
>>
>> From experience as a physical being.
>>
>
> Your experience provides evidence for the existence of the physical
> universe, but don't confuse this for evidence of the non-existence of
> anything outside the physical universe.
>
>
> You mean don't confuse it with existence of imaginary things?
>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Jason Resch

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 12:25 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/25/2015 10:09 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On 26/10/2015 3:48 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 11:05 PM, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>
>> The only sort of existence for which we have concrete evidence is
>> physical existence. We can understand imaginary things, but we have no
>> direct evidence for their existence -- certainly not for their physical
>> existence.
>>
>
> Do you acknowledge that we have no evidence that such things do not exist?
> And therefore, we should at least remain agnostic on the idea rather than
> reject the idea out of hand?
>
>
> Imaginary things do not have physical existence.
>
>
> I think that's why they're called imaginary.   I think Jason wants us to
> believe we can't think of imaginary things.  If you think of it, it exists.
>
>
You and Bruce want us to believe if we can imagine it, and we can't see it,
then it definitely does not exist anywhere in reality.

Jason

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Jason Resch

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 12:23 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/25/2015 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 11:05 PM, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>
>> The only sort of existence for which we have concrete evidence is
>> physical existence. We can understand imaginary things, but we have no
>> direct evidence for their existence -- certainly not for their physical
>> existence.
>>
>
> Do you acknowledge that we have no evidence that such things do not exist?
> And therefore, we should at least remain agnostic on the idea rather than
> reject the idea out of hand?
>
>
> Hmm?  Shall I be agnostic about the existence of a teapot orbiting
> Jupiter?  I have no evidence it doesn't exist.  I wonder if Jason Resch is
> really a very cleverly programmed chatbot?  Maybe I'll be agnostic about it.
>

In both those cases you do have evidence: your knowledge about how matter
organizes itself, and the current state of AI. To say other
realities/structures besides our universe exist is something you have
absolutely zero evidence for.

Jason

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Brent Meeker




On 10/25/2015 10:34 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 12:25 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 10/25/2015 10:09 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 26/10/2015 3:48 pm, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 11:05 PM, Bruce Kellett
>
wrote:

The only sort of existence for which we have concrete
evidence is physical existence. We can understand imaginary
things, but we have no direct evidence for their existence
-- certainly not for their physical existence.


Do you acknowledge that we have no evidence that such things do
not exist? And therefore, we should at least remain agnostic on
the idea rather than reject the idea out of hand?


Imaginary things do not have physical existence.


I think that's why they're called imaginary.   I think Jason wants
us to believe we can't think of imaginary things.  If you think of
it, it exists.


You and Bruce want us to believe if we can imagine it, and we can't 
see it, then it definitely does not exist anywhere in reality.


I only suggest that you proportion your belief to the evidence.  If 
there is no evidence, not even indirect evidence, then it is that 
intellectual infirmity called "faith" to believe.


Brent
"My view is that if there is no evidence for it, then forget about it. 
An agnostic is somebody who doesn't believe in something until there is 
evidence for it, so I'm agnostic."

--- Carl Sagan

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Brent Meeker




On 10/25/2015 10:09 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 26/10/2015 3:48 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 11:05 PM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:


The only sort of existence for which we have concrete evidence is
physical existence. We can understand imaginary things, but we
have no direct evidence for their existence -- certainly not for
their physical existence.


Do you acknowledge that we have no evidence that such things do not 
exist? And therefore, we should at least remain agnostic on the idea 
rather than reject the idea out of hand?


Imaginary things do not have physical existence.


I think that's why they're called imaginary.   I think Jason wants us to 
believe we can't think of imaginary things.  If you think of it, it exists.


Brent

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Brent Meeker




On 10/25/2015 10:32 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 12:23 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 10/25/2015 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 11:05 PM, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

The only sort of existence for which we have concrete
evidence is physical existence. We can understand imaginary
things, but we have no direct evidence for their existence --
certainly not for their physical existence.


Do you acknowledge that we have no evidence that such things do
not exist? And therefore, we should at least remain agnostic on
the idea rather than reject the idea out of hand?


Hmm?  Shall I be agnostic about the existence of a teapot orbiting
Jupiter?  I have no evidence it doesn't exist.  I wonder if Jason
Resch is really a very cleverly programmed chatbot?  Maybe I'll be
agnostic about it.


In both those cases you do have evidence: your knowledge about how 
matter organizes itself, and the current state of AI. To say other 
realities/structures besides our universe exist is something you have 
absolutely zero evidence for.


So having zero evidence for them I proportion my belief to the evidence 
(c.f. Hume)


Brent

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Bruce Kellett


On 26/10/2015 3:48 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 11:05 PM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:


The only sort of existence for which we have concrete evidence is
physical existence. We can understand imaginary things, but we
have no direct evidence for their existence -- certainly not for
their physical existence.


Do you acknowledge that we have no evidence that such things do not 
exist? And therefore, we should at least remain agnostic on the idea 
rather than reject the idea out of hand?


Imaginary things do not have physical existence. You can dream up some 
other kind of existence if you like, but you have no evidence that any 
such notion has useful content. In this context, absence of evidence is 
evidence of absence.


Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 24 Oct 2015, at 07:32, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Oct 19, 2015 at 7:42 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

In arithmetic all emulation of programs exists,

That is totally unimportant, It's not worth arguing about  
because it wouldn't change anything even if it were true. But I'll  
tell you the REALLY important question, is physics a emulation of  
arithmetic or is arithmetic a emulation of physics?

Physics is what is observable. The "computable physical certainty" is  
described by the intensional variant of Gödel's self-referential  
prdicate, []p, that is mainly []p & <>t, (with or without & p)has  
morivated by the First person indterminacy, on the UD*, that is, on  
the Sigma_1 sentences.

Physics is a mode of self-perception. It is the mode []p & p, []p &  
<>t, or []p & <>t & p, and the last one are graded through box and  
diamond, and quantization (the "[]<>#") iterations.

Ypu don't need to believe in any of this. Just understand a bit of the  
intuition, then study how this is translated in arithmetic.

>>> There is word for "100% accurate simulation", we call  
that an emulation. The models of RA emulates all computations.

>>Don't tell me this wonderful news tell INTEL, their stock  
price will skyrocket! And I own some INTEL stock.

> You have repeated this straw man argument a lot,

Straw man my ass, if what you say was true the universe would be  
RADICALLY different from the world we observe, the world where  
people have to pay money for INTEL silicon microchips.

You need to prove this, and that would actually refute  
computationalism. But when we do the math, this fails, as a  
rrefutation of computationalism, as the "probabiility one" needs to  
bey the self-reference bet given above, and they do the quantization  
needed for having a good measure. We do get the projections and its  
orthoalgebra, and we can work toward some Gleason theorem.

Advantage? The logic splits on truth/justifiable, justifying  
indirectly yhe non-jutfifiable, and explaining the difference between,  
the different views: first person, first person plural, third person,  
etc.

> You do bad theology, like some fundamentalist. you invent a  
God
Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never  
heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

>  Like I said, you are a fundamentlist Aristotelians.

And like I said, Aristotle was the worst physicist who ever  
lived. 

He was the first scientist. he could have been wrong on everything, he  
was clear enough to be refuted and by this way he provided the path on  
the progresses which follows.

And then my point is that his theology is refuted by all Universal  
machine looking inward enough.

>> It will be 100% crap unless the Algol or FORTRAN program  
is running on a computer made of matter that obeys the laws of  
physics. 

> False. Physics has no relevance at all here. What I  
said is true in both the case where the Algol interpreter or  
compiler run [...]

Run? RUN! Without physics nothing is running, your FORTRAN or  
Algol program is just static squiggles on a paper doing absolutely   
nothing. 

Using a non standard, but common, sense of running. The notion of  
computation I use is the original given by Church, Kleene, Post,  
Turing, etc. Running is defined by a purely arithmetical relation  
involving a universal number and some universal or not numbers.

I do not assume a primary physical universe, I agree that such a  
physical universe is apparent, but that is explained by the existence  
of some measure on the computations when seen from inside: the  
observable is an indexical.

As an argument, you beg the question. You are just using the favorite  
dogma of the Catholics: primary matter; which to my knowledge has been  
technically used only on the question about the relationship between  
wine and the blood of christ. But yes, it is a common extrapolation by  
humans, and part of the current paradigm in both physics and many  
theologies.

I show it to be inconsistent with Descartes' idea that our body are  
mechanism.

Most people believe in both mechanism and materialism, but that does  
not work together.

>>> This does not make possible to extract the computations  
result directly, as we live in a physical reality, and must  
implement the computations in the physical reality to get that  
effect.

>> Why on earth would that be?? If the emulation is perfect  
and physical reality is of only of secondary importance and is  
being emulated by mathematics then we live in mathematical reality  
too. So why can't we extract the results of computations directly?

> Because that would be magical.

Indeed it would be but don't blame me for that, you're the one who  
said calculations don't need physics not me. 

Everyone in that vast field would say the same. Just read the original  
papers leading to

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 5:39 AM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

>
>  no-one has yet emulated any physics in arithmetic.


True, but computers emulate arithmetic in physics every day, in fact even
simple calculators do that.

 John K Clark

  

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 3:12 AM, Pierz  wrote:

> 
> It's hard to see how physics can be self-consistent without the a priori
> existence of arithmetic.
>

Two points:

1) It's not just hard it's impossible to see how arithmetic can PROVE the
 self- consistency of physics without the existence of arithmetic.

2) Truth and proof are not the same thing. It could be that physics is
perfectly consistent but arithmetic can never prove that it is consistent;
after all Godel showed us that true arithmetical statements exist that
arithmetic can never prove.

 John K Clark

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Brent Meeker




On 10/25/2015 8:38 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 4:39 AM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:


On 25/10/2015 6:12 pm, Pierz wrote:

It's hard to see how physics can be self-consistent without
the a priori existence of arithmetic.


Maybe it is because the self-consistency of physics is what makes
arithmetic possible.

Though admittedly that is a different point to whether or not
physics is "emulated" in arithmetic.


True. But no-one has yet emulated any physics in arithmetic. All
the we have is mathematical accounts of discovered physical laws
-- arithmetic based in physics.


I recently replied to someone on the FOAR list who expressed a similar 
criticism:


 Something has to "run" the math... ;)  electricity or not.


Isn't this being a bit one-sided?
Physics can run itself, but objects in math cannot.
A physical universe can exist independently of anything else, but a 
mathematical object cannot.
A physical computation can result in consciousness, a mathematical 
computation results in nothing.


From where does such bias originate?


From experience as a physical being.

Brent

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Jason Resch

On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 4:39 AM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 25/10/2015 6:12 pm, Pierz wrote:
>
>> It's hard to see how physics can be self-consistent without the a priori
>> existence of arithmetic.
>>
>
> Maybe it is because the self-consistency of physics is what makes
> arithmetic possible.
>
> Though admittedly that is a different point to whether or not physics is
>> "emulated" in arithmetic.
>>
>
> True. But no-one has yet emulated any physics in arithmetic. All the we
> have is mathematical accounts of discovered physical laws -- arithmetic
> based in physics.


I recently replied to someone on the FOAR list who expressed a similar
criticism:

 Something has to "run" the math... ;)  electricity or not.
>

Isn't this being a bit one-sided?
Physics can run itself, but objects in math cannot.
A physical universe can exist independently of anything else, but a
mathematical object cannot.
A physical computation can result in consciousness, a mathematical
computation results in nothing.

>From where does such bias originate?

Jason

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-25 Thread Brent Meeker

On 10/25/2015 12:12 AM, Pierz wrote:
It's hard to see how physics can be self-consistent without the a 
priori existence of arithmetic.

What do you mean by "physics" and what do you mean by "existence". 
Consistency is a relation of propositions and inference rules.  To say 
physics is consistent can only refer to the theories of physics, not to 
the events it attempts to describe.  Arithmetic is set of propositions, 
so it can be consistent; but it's not clear what is meant by that set 
"existing".  As Bruno has pointed out "exist" means different things 
depending on the context.

Brent

Though admittedly that is a different point to whether or not physics 
is "emulated" in arithmetic.

On Saturday, October 24, 2015 at 4:32:47 PM UTC+11, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Oct 19, 2015 at 7:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

In arithmetic all emulation of programs exists,

That is totally unimportant, It's not worth arguing about
because it wouldn't change anything even if it were true. But I'll
tell you the REALLY important question, is physics a emulation of
arithmetic or is arithmetic a emulation of physics?

 >
 >>
There is word for "100% accurate simulation", we call
that an emulation. The models of RA emulates all
computations. 

...

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-23 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Oct 19, 2015 at 7:42 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:


> In arithmetic all emulation of programs exists,
>

That is totally unimportant, It's not worth arguing about because it
wouldn't change anything even if it were true. But I'll tell you the REALLY
important question, is physics a emulation of arithmetic or is arithmetic a
emulation of physics?


> >
>>> >>
>>> There is word for "100% accurate simulation", we call that an
>>> emulation. The models of RA emulates all computations.
>>
>>

>>
>> Don't tell me this wonderful news tell INTEL, their stock price will
>> skyrocket! And I own some INTEL stock.
>
>

> 
> You have repeated this straw man argument a lot,
>


Straw man my ass, if what you say was true the universe would be *RADICALLY*
different from the world we observe, the world where people have to pay
money for INTEL silicon microchips.

> 
> You do bad theology, like some fundamentalist. you invent a God
>
Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that
one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

> > 
>  Like I said, you are a fundamentlist Aristotelians.


And like I said, Aristotle was the worst physicist who ever lived. 



> 
>> >> 
>> It will be 100% crap unless the Algol or FORTRAN program is running on a
>> computer made of matter that obeys the laws of physics. 
>
>
> > 
> False. Physics has no relevance at all here.
>  
> What I said is true in both the case where the Algol interpreter or
> compiler run
>  [...]
>

Run? RUN! Without physics nothing is running, your FORTRAN or Algol
program is just static squiggles on a paper doing absolutely  nothing. 


> >
>>> >>
>>> This does not make possible to extract the computations result directly,
>>> as we live in a physical reality, and must implement the computations in
>>> the physical reality to get that effect.
>>
>>
> 
>> >> 
>> Why on earth would that be?? If the emulation is perfect and physical
>> reality is of only of secondary importance and is being emulated by
>> mathematics then we live in mathematical reality too. So why can't we
>> extract the results of computations directly?
>
> > 
> Because that would be magical.
>

Indeed it would be but don't blame me for that, you're the one who said
calculations don't need physics not me. 


> > 
> and should be able to make arbitrarily large calculations instantly.
>
> > 
> Yes, comp predicted that this is possible,
>

I don't care what "comp" predicts because "comp" is one colossal bore.

  John K Clark

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 19 Oct 2015, at 04:29, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 4:47 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> A simulation is never 100% accurate,

> This not correct. In Virtue of the digitalness, a simulation  
can be 100% accurate,

Only if the numbers a computer uses are actual numbers not  
simulated numbers.

> notably when simulating a digital process.

Then it's not a simulated digital process, it's just a  
digital process.

You confuse levels. You confuse phi_u(x, y) with phi_r(u (x, y)). In  
arithmetic all emulation of programs exists, and all emulation of such  
emulation also exists, and are different computations.

(Using the standrad sense of computation, of course, and not your  
particular physicalist redefinition of the term).

> There is word for "100% accurate simulation", we call that an  
emulation. The models of RA emulates all computations.

Don't tell me this wonderful news tell INTEL, their stock price  
will skyrocket! And I own some INTEL stock.

You have repeated this straw man argument a lot, but it is valid only  
for a notion of computation which begs the questions in which we are  
interested. You add systematically "only when God made it", at the  
exact place we cannot use God.

You do bad theology, like some fundamentalist. you invent a God to  
prevent research. Like I said, you are a fundamentlist Aristotelians.  
You don't do science, you preach.

>You can emulate in algol a fortran computation of the  
factorial function. It will be 100 % accurate

It will be 100% crap unless the Algol or FORTRAN program is  
running on a computer made of matter that obeys the laws of  
physics. 

False. Physics has no relevance at all here. What I said is true in  
both the case where the Algol interpreter or compiler run in a model  
of arithmetic, or in a primitive physical reality.

> This does not make possible to extract the computations  
result directly, as we live in a physical reality, and must  
implement the computations in the physical reality to get that effect.

Why on earth would that be?? If the emulation is perfect and  
physical reality is of only of secondary importance and is being  
emulated by mathematics then we live in mathematical reality too. So  
why can't we extract the results of computations directly?

Because that would be magical. Even in arithmetic, the self-aware  
entities are confronted to a non trivial physical reality, and despite  
living in arithmetic (more exactly in its FPI limiting "border") they  
have to implement in their own "real-time and space" what they want to  
be able to access in their own  "real-time-and space".

To extract physics is about equivalent with explaining why we can't  
access all the arithmetical truth at once, despite being emergent  
entities there.

> that relative emulation of that process is emulated itself  
infinitely often in arithmetic.

If physics is being emulating by arithmetic

That might not necessarily happens. Comp (+ the idea that my  
generalized brain is not the entire physical reality) predicts that  
physics is NOT emulable in arithmetic. By the invariance of the first  
person for the delay of reconstitution made by the universal  
dovetailer, the observable here-and-now depends on infinities of  
computations, that we can not emulate in arithmetic, despite they  
emerge from the arithmetical truth (which is far beyond the sigma_1  
emulable part of arithmetic).

then we who live in the physical world are being emulating by  
arithmetic too

All our dreams, but never the physical reality. I don't expect you to  
swallow this as this use the FPI (and thus step 3).

and should be able to make arbitrarily large calculations instantly.

Yes, comp predicted that this is possible, and that is what happens  
when we exploits the infinities of computations below our subst-level,  
like in continuous quantum algorithm. Comp predicted such type of  
infinite computations, but I thought (wrongly) that QM+relativity  
forbids it, until the day I realize that QM does not need the wave  
collapse. But that is true only when we exploits what comp predicts  
can be "seen" below of substitution level.

If however its the other way around and physics is emulating  
arithmetic then it would be easy to explain why we can't make such  
calculations.

Yes, but we can. It is the comp-computations, or quantum computations.  
the computations which relies on the primitive matter, defined here by  
the "mess" below our substitution level, and which determines the  
domain of what I call the global FPI, and which is given by the logics  
S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*, when we do the math. And it works up to now, as  
we get the non trivial quantization on the sigma_1-sentences (the  
arithmetic Universal Dovetailer).

Bruno

> here you make a constant confusion of level

You can't make up your mind if X is

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 19 Oct 2015, at 03:22, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 17/10/2015 3:59 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Oct 2015, at 02:36, Bruce Kellett wrote:

It is the failure to clearly distinguish between these different  
senses of the word 'exists' that cause most of your confusion.



The mathematical theorem is that when a machine looks inward, in  
the sense made precise by Gödel, Kleene and others, the machine is  
forced to distinguish 8 main different sort of existence, and in  
fact many more.


The problem here is that we are not restricted to introspection --  
looking inward. We discover the physical by looking outward --  
observing the world around us. Sure, we can never prove that this  
world is not an illusion, but the important point is that even if  
the external world is an illusion, it defines what is real,


?

I would say that we infer the physical by postulating there is an  
outward we can looking for. And we cannot deduce from the observation,  
neither that there is an outward, still less use it to define what is  
real.


That requires a metaphysical act of faith, as the antic argument  
explained already. I might make a dream in which I discover a new  
planet with some telescope.


I just do not assume (thus primitive) a physical reality. I agree that  
there is one, but assuming it leads to insuperable difficulty in the  
cognitive science.




because it is what we see and interact with.


Assuming that exists.
But the theory which assumes that exists (Arstotelian metaphysics)  
fails on the mind body problem, so maybe we can take a look at a  
theory which does not assume a physical reality, but try to derive its  
appearance from something else, like the computations which already  
exists once we agree on the axioms of elementary arithmetic.





That is what defines physical existence.


For a Aristotelian believers. Not necessarily for a platonist.


The fact that you cannot dispense with this level of physical  
existence,


You have not prove that, and indeed what computationalism provides a  
counter-example.





but you can dispense with all of mathematics,


Even with aristotle metaphysics, I am not sure of that, and thus I am  
even less sure without it.





is a telling argument for the fact that the externally existing  
physical is more fundamental that arithmetic.


I don't see any argument. I see just an act of faith that there is an  
outward reality and that the observation defines it, which is an axiom  
of self-awakeness.





The universe existed long before there were any conscious beings,  
and even longer before arithmetic was invented.


1+1=2 well before humans invented arithmetic too. Don't confuse the  
arithmetical truth, and the language and theories developed by humans  
to explore it.






This is intrinsically different from any sense of the word 'exist'  
that you get below.


Indeed. if computationalism is true, that existence is fictional. It  
is a myth, a fairy tale. It explains neither consciousness nor the  
observation (it is not obvious, but your refutation of step 8 was not  
valid, as it invokes the primary matter, and attribute it something  
non Turing emulable having a role for consciousness, contradicting  
computationalism).




And it is the failure to understand that physical existence -- as  
defined by looking out --


Looking out can defined the physical existence, but does not prove  
that physical existence is not a particular modal existence.




is more fundamental that any purely theoretical 'existence' defined  
in terms of some internal system of thought, that is the main  
problem with your system.


There is a problem indeed, but it is interesting as it solution solves  
the three parts of the mind-body problem (the mind, the body and the  
relation in between). With an assumed or primitive material universe,  
we get that a mind problem, needs to add an identity thesis which  
makes computationalism inconsistent.


Of course, if you abandon computationalism (and most of its weakened  
version actually) then materialism might make sense. I find this  
unsatisfying because this is like inventing something nobody can prove  
the existence to make a simple theory false, before even studying it  
or testing it. Then most people believe in computationalism, and by  
keeping the materialist myth, they come up with the elimination of  
person and consciousness, which is nonsense for many.


Bruno






Bruce

The ontic basic existence can be based on any first order logical  
specification of a Turing universal language or system. Once  
chosen, the ExP(x) means it exists a basic element which has the  
property P.


To fix the thing I use as basic element the number+basic +/*laws,  
but the theology of the machine, including physics, will not depend  
on which universal basic system has been taken. The first basic  
Turing universal system is like a sort of base in which we can  
describe and study all the others.


I will

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 18 Oct 2015, at 22:37, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/18/2015 1:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Oct 2015, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/15/2015 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

If arithmetic is false, Church-Turing thesis makes no more sense.


?? It will make sense as an axiom in a certain branch of  
mathematics.


Then it is no more the classical Church's thesis. It will be  
something like intuitionist Church's thesis. That would again be  
just a change of subject. It is like saying that 1 cloud + 1  
cloud = 1 cloud can refute 1+1=2. That is not good logic.


But it's a good example of the limitations of axiomatic inferences.


Why?
Cloud are not the intended notion when we talk about natural numbers.


Exactly.  Axiomatic inference only works to the degree you can be  
sure the axioms apply.



No problem with this.

And the degree we can be "sure" the axioms apply (and that the  
inference rules preserve the application) determines the choice on  
axioms on which we can agree on what we are talking about.


So, about the natural numbers, all what is asked is something like do  
you agree with the following axioms:


0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

(+ do you agree that the modus ponens rule preserve the intuitive  
meaning we want to refer about).


In that case clouds are excluded for example. But the existence of a  
biggest number is not excluded, and you can add the axiom ExAy(x is >=  
y). That formula is consistent with the axiom above, as you can see by  
building (exercise) a mathematical structure satisfying all axioms  
above + ExAy(x is >= y).

(>= means greater or equal).

Bruno





Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 19 Oct 2015, at 05:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 18/10/2015 8:05 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Oct 2015, at 04:18, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 16/10/2015 12:53 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 7:36 PM, Bruce Kellett  wrote:


Two different meanings of the word 'exist'. Physical existence  
relates to physical objects; mathematical 'existence' relates to  
mathematical ideas.


If you think these are the same thing, then show me the conscious  
being that exists independently of any physical substrate. The  
fact that you appear unable to do this, and no-one else has ever  
done it either, is overwhelming evidence that no such non- 
physical conscious beings exist.



Until you can point to a difference that makes a difference,  
between physical existence and mathematical existence, and no-one  
else has ever done it either, I see no reason to accept that  
"physical existence" is somehow more special, or more capable  
than mathematical existence.


That particular difference does make a difference. Physical  
existence refers to objects of the physical world: mathematical  
'existence' refers to mathematical ideas that 'exist' only in  
Patonia. Such platonic objects cannot be touched, kicked, or  
otherwise manipulated except insofar as physical objects might be  
taken to resemble them. If a calculation in platonia can produce  
consciousness, then show me the conscious being that is  
independent of any physical substrate.


 I will allow you to provide the necessary interface between the  
platonic and the physical, so that that conscious being can  
communicate with us mere mortals. Such an interface must be  
possible in your theory (though not in mine) because you claim  
that the physical is produced by the platonic objects.


To say that the physical is produced by the platonic object is an  
aristotelian, and a bit straw-man, way to sum up.

But that is what you say. And you have said it many times.


I have said it 0 times. On the contrary I insist that neither  
consciousness, nor matter is ever produced by anything definable,  
still less emulable, in arithmetic, and proved it.


Even for the artifical digital brain, I insist that it does not  
produce or create consciousness. Consciousness and matter is in  
platonia (or more exactly on its limiting FPI border), and what comp  
assumes is that a computer can make it possible for that consciousness  
to manifest itself relatively to my actual environment.








It is more correct to say that there is no production of the  
physical, but an experience of it, sharable by many universal  
numbers relatively emulated by other universal numbers. that  
experience of physical realities, emerges from the first person  
indeterminacy by the subjects which are emulated infinitely often  
in the arithmetical reality, for which you can take the usual (N,  
+, *) structure (used when you defined most concept in the  
mathematics used in physics). If that mathematics was not real/ 
kicking-back, physicists would not use them.
You say that conscious beings are emulated infinitely often in  
arithmetic.


I allow myself to make short sentences for not boring too much those  
who have studied the UDA. What I mean exactly is that arithmetic  
emulated the computations which can make those conscious person able  
to manifest themselves. Consciousness needs the computations + the  
relative right measure, and that measure is not emulable.  
Consciousness is a first person notion. It is just a shorthand to talk  
about an emulation of consciousness. It means emulation of a  
computation, on which you can associate a consciousness, in a normal  
computations (which has the relative measure "one").





It is strange that all such conscious objects that have ever been  
observed subsist on a physical substrate -- the evidence is always  
that consciousness supervenes on the physical.


Comp explains the appearance of this, but refute it in general. It is  
only needed for "relatively implemented person". It is open for  
dissociated conscious state, and if our level is not the entire  
physical universe, that should exist.




Just as physical beings that are conscious are emulated infinitely  
often in arithmetic, then so also are conscious beings who are not  
physical, but who can interface to the physical world we inhabit --  
through disembodied voices, spirit writing, interfacing to the  
internet and sending emails -- in an infinity of different ways, in  
fact. So if these beings are emulated in arithmetic just as often as  
embodied physical beings are, why do we not commonly encounter such  
beings?


Because we live in a physical universe, and to implement a non  
physical being, you need to use the physical stuff accessible  
relatively to us. Comp explains why the laws of physics are  
constrained in that way. The explanation is not obvious at all, it  
relies specifically of the logic of

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-18 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 4:47 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> >> 
>> A simulation is never 100% accurate,
>>
>
> > 
> This not correct. In Virtue of the digitalness, a simulation can be 100%
> accurate,
>

Only if the numbers a computer uses are actual numbers not simulated
numbers.

> > 
> notably when simulating a digital process.
>

Then it's not a simulated 
digital process
, it's just a 
digital process
.

> > 
> There is word for "100% accurate simulation", we call that an emulation.
> The models of RA emulates all computations.
>

Don't tell me this wonderful news tell INTEL, their stock price will
skyrocket! And I own some INTEL stock.

>
> You can emulate in algol a fortran computation of the factorial function.
> It will be 100 % accurate
>

It will be 100% crap unless the Algol or FORTRAN program is running on a
computer made of matter that obeys the laws of physics. 

> > 
> This does not make possible to extract the computations result directly,
> as we live in a physical reality, and must implement the computations in
> the physical reality to get that effect.
>

Why on earth would that be?? If the emulation is perfect and physical
reality is of only of secondary importance and is being emulated by
mathematics then we live in mathematical reality too. So why can't we
extract the results of computations directly?

> > 
> that relative emulation of that process is emulated itself infinitely
> often in arithmetic.
>

If physics is being emulating by arithmetic then we who live in the
physical world are being
emulating by arithmetic
 too
and should be able to make arbitrarily large calculations instantly. If
however its the other way around and physics is emulating arithmetic then
it would be easy to explain why we can't make such calculations.   

> > 
> here you make a constant confusion of level
>

You can't make up your mind if X is emulating Y or Y is emulating X and
I'm the one who makes "
a constant confusion of level
s"?

> 
> You confess having not read the works,
>

Bragged would be a better word than "confessed", only a fool would keep
reading a proof after he found a error.

> 
> You involve yourself into an ontological commitment (that is religion)
>

Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that
one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

> > 
> You proceed like a creationist,
>

Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that
one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

> > 
> I did not ever dreamed about someone confirming so well that strong
> non-agnostic materialist atheism belong to fundamentalist religion.
>

 Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard
that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

 John K Clark

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-18 Thread Bruce Kellett


On 18/10/2015 8:05 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Oct 2015, at 04:18, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 16/10/2015 12:53 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 7:36 PM, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:


Two different meanings of the word 'exist'. Physical existence 
relates to physical objects; mathematical 'existence' relates to 
mathematical ideas.



If you think these are the same thing, then show me the
conscious being that exists independently of any physical
substrate. The fact that you appear unable to do this, and
no-one else has ever done it either, is overwhelming evidence
that no such non-physical conscious beings exist.


Until you can point to a difference that makes a difference, between 
physical existence and mathematical existence, and no-one else has 
ever done it either, I see no reason to accept that "physical 
existence" is somehow more special, or more capable than 
mathematical existence.


That particular difference does make a difference. Physical existence 
refers to objects of the physical world: mathematical 'existence' 
refers to mathematical ideas that 'exist' only in Patonia. Such 
platonic objects cannot be touched, kicked, or otherwise manipulated 
except insofar as physical objects might be taken to resemble them. 
If a calculation in platonia can produce consciousness, then show me 
the conscious being that is independent of any physical substrate.


 I will allow you to provide the necessary interface between the 
platonic and the physical, so that that conscious being can 
communicate with us mere mortals. Such an interface must be possible 
in your theory (though not in mine) because you claim that the 
physical is produced by the platonic objects.


To say that the physical is produced by the platonic object is an 
aristotelian, and a bit straw-man, way to sum up.

But that is what you say. And you have said it many times.

It is more correct to say that there is no production of the physical, 
but an experience of it, sharable by many universal numbers relatively 
emulated by other universal numbers. that experience of physical 
realities, emerges from the first person indeterminacy by the subjects 
which are emulated infinitely often in the arithmetical reality, for 
which you can take the usual (N, +, *) structure (used when you 
defined most concept in the mathematics used in physics). If that 
mathematics was not real/kicking-back, physicists would not use them.
You say that conscious beings are emulated infinitely often in 
arithmetic. It is strange that all such conscious objects that have ever 
been observed subsist on a physical substrate -- the evidence is always 
that consciousness supervenes on the physical. Just as physical beings 
that are conscious are emulated infinitely often in arithmetic, then so 
also are conscious beings who are not physical, but who can interface to 
the physical world we inhabit -- through disembodied voices, spirit 
writing, interfacing to the internet and sending emails -- in an 
infinity of different ways, in fact. So if these beings are emulated in 
arithmetic just as often as embodied physical beings are, why do we not 
commonly encounter such beings?


As has been said before, your account of existence does not explain our 
experience, since it does not explain why we do not see these things, as 
we should, if consciousness is more fundamental than the physical. 
Science must go by the evidence, and the evidence is all against you.


Advantage? The theory of everything is crazily simple, already known 
by everyone having the primary school diploma, and, and that is the 
key point, it solves the mind-body problem. Not only person are not 
eliminated, but that notion is the building block to get both 
consciousness and matter. It provides also a rational explanation of 
the mystical discourse, notably by providing a transparent 
interpretation of the neopythagorean and neoplatonist accounts of God, 
Intellect, Soul, and Matter.  And up to now, it fits the data, and 
explain also the quantum weirdness, which becomes the norm in that 
computationalist theory.
You have not solved the mind-body problem because you have not explained 
why we do not observe disembodied minds. You have not explained quantum 
mechanics -- that is your standard 'dog = cat' argument. You notice a 
superficial similarity and then claim identity. Science requires you to 
do a bit better than this.


Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-18 Thread Brent Meeker




On 10/18/2015 1:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Oct 2015, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/15/2015 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

If arithmetic is false, Church-Turing thesis makes no more sense.


?? It will make sense as an axiom in a certain branch of mathematics.


Then it is no more the classical Church's thesis. It will be 
something like intuitionist Church's thesis. That would again be 
just a change of subject. It is like saying that 1 cloud + 1 cloud = 
1 cloud can refute 1+1=2. That is not good logic.


But it's a good example of the limitations of axiomatic inferences.


Why?
Cloud are not the intended notion when we talk about natural numbers. 


Exactly.  Axiomatic inference only works to the degree you can be sure 
the axioms apply.


Brent

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-18 Thread Bruce Kellett


On 17/10/2015 3:59 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Oct 2015, at 02:36, Bruce Kellett wrote:

It is the failure to clearly distinguish between these different 
senses of the word 'exists' that cause most of your confusion.


The mathematical theorem is that when a machine looks inward, in the 
sense made precise by Gödel, Kleene and others, the machine is forced 
to distinguish 8 main different sort of existence, and in fact many more.


The problem here is that we are not restricted to introspection -- 
looking inward. We discover the physical by looking outward -- observing 
the world around us. Sure, we can never prove that this world is not an 
illusion, but the important point is that even if the external world is 
an illusion, it defines what is real, because it is what we see and 
interact with. That is what defines physical existence. The fact that 
you cannot dispense with this level of physical existence, but you can 
dispense with all of mathematics, is a telling argument for the fact 
that the externally existing physical is more fundamental that 
arithmetic. The universe existed long before there were any conscious 
beings, and even longer before arithmetic was invented.


This is intrinsically different from any sense of the word 'exist' that 
you get below. And it is the failure to understand that physical 
existence -- as defined by looking out -- is more fundamental that any 
purely theoretical 'existence' defined in terms of some internal system 
of thought, that is the main problem with your system.


Bruce

The ontic basic existence can be based on any first order logical 
specification of a Turing universal language or system. Once chosen, 
the ExP(x) means it exists a basic element which has the property P.


To fix the thing I use as basic element the number+basic +/*laws, but 
the theology of the machine, including physics, will not depend on 
which universal basic system has been taken. The first basic Turing 
universal system is like a sort of base in which we can describe and 
study all the others.


I will also say that a relation R(x,y, ..) or a property P(x) exists 
for a shorten of it is true that R(x, y, z) for some x, y, z.


Then we have the 8 nuances that no machine can miss when looking 
inward deep enough, which is exactly what they can do when they 
believe in enough induction axioms.


Then I define the set of beliefs of the ideally correct machine *in* 
the language of the machine, which here will be elementary arithmetic, 
given that we have fixed that one. The most typical 
machine/number/theory/belief-set is Peano Arithmetic.


RA can prove that PA exists (trivially actually), and RA imitate all 
machine, notably in proving all the details of the computations that 
PA does when doing her "thinking".


I write []A for "PA proves A", and I think about it as translated in 
the language of the machine. In our case this makes []A an 
arithmetical proposition.


Then you get all the sort of existence by the quantified modal logics:

ExP(x)
[]ExP(x)
[]Ex []P(x)

With [] put for []p, and for []p & p, and for []p & <>t, and for []p & 
<>t & p, and some infinity of graded variants, depending on the points 
of view.


The apparent primary matter is given by the quantization:

[]<>ExP(x)
[]<>Ex []<>P(x)

(but here only on []p & p, []p & <>t, []p & <>t & p, with p obeying p 
-> []p).


So there are indeed many sort of existence, and most error in 
philosophy and theology can be reduced to a confusion between such 
existence, or a confusion between the corresponding hypostases.


If you define [1]p = []p & p, [2]p = []p & <>t and [3]p = []p & <>t & 
p, and [0]p = []p, you get the five hypostases, and even 8, as three 
of them split between a provable and true part. The incompleteness 
makes the true part extending properly the provable part, and that 
split is inherited by [2]p and [3]p.


Lucas-Penrose invalid use of Gödel's incompleteness can be seen as a 
confusion between [0] and [1]. The separation between science and 
theology can be sees as a confusion between [0] ans [0]* for the logic 
which split along proof and truth. Obviously some confusion entail others.


I recall the epistemological the plotinian lexicon:

p
[]p
[]p & p
[]p & <>t
[]p & <>t & p

One
Intellect
Soul
Intelligible Matter
Sensible Matter

Truth
Provability
Knowledge
Observable
Sensible

Only One (God) and the Soul do not split along proof and truth.

Up to now it works. It is a pure mathematical theory, and physics is 
determined by them, so just let us look if it works. Thanks the 
quantum weird logic and possible interpretations, it works.


The neoplatonism of the universal (Turing) machine suggests that the 
Heisenberg relations *are* consequence of the (mathematical) 
self-reference limitations. Aristotelians cannot see that because they 
tend to confuse the One with the Observable.


The theory gives the tools to test all this, and measure a possible 
departure from the neopythagoreanism or

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-18 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 17 Oct 2015, at 21:53, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Oct 17, 2015 at 1:31 PM, Jason Resch   
wrote:

>>> Of the 10^500 string theory physics, maybe 1 in a  
million or fewer are rich enough to support life.

>> If so then there are 10^494 universes rich enough to  
support life, and there is a 100% probability that the universe I  
live in is one of them.

> Which implies a high probability that other universes, ruled  
by different laws, exist.

Obviously, except of course the physical law that makes you  
conclude that there are 10^500 universes in the first place. So  
what's your point?

>> If physical objects like a calculator or your brain don't  
have access to numbers then you know nothing about numbers you only  
know about simulated numbers.

> If the simulation is accurate, you gain accurate information  
about that which is simulated.

A simulation is never 100% accurate,

This not correct. In Virtue of the digitalness, a simulation can be  
100% accurate, notably when simulating a digital process. There is  
word for "100% accurate simulation", we call that an emulation. The  
models of RA emulates all computations. RA is obviously consistent, so  
it has at least one model, and PA can prove that RA is consistent.

You can emulate in algol a fortran computation of the factorial  
function. It will be 100 % accurate if there is no bug in your program.

All universal machine, in the non material sense of Church or Turing,  
Post, Kleene, etc. can emulate, simulate exactly all other universal  
machine, and the arithmetical reality (the standard model of  
arithmetic) do that.

This does not make possible to extract the computations result  
directly, as we live in a physical reality, and must implement the  
computations in the physical reality to get that effect. But that  
relative emulation of that process is emulated itself infinitely often  
in arithmetic. So, here you make a constant confusion of level when  
you come with the straw man argument that an arithmetical computation  
cannot be used relatively to our physical history. True, but that does  
not make the physical reality ontologically prior to the arithmetical  
reality. The physical reality can still, and has to (by the UD  
Argument), emerges from all computations going through our actual  
state in arithmetic.

if they were absolutely identical there would be no point in doing  
it because we already have the real one. I think that when a  
physical object like your brain adds 2 and 2 it's not a simulation  
at all and the 4 it produces is as real as integers get and is  
exactly precisely 4. But you think it's just simulation so all you  
know is that simulated 2 and simulated 2 is approximately 4, but  
its exact value depends on how good the simulation is.

> If physical objects like a calculator or your brain do  
have access to actual non-simulated numbers and if numbers are all  
that's required to make a calculation then physical object should be  
able to make arbitrarily large calculations instantly with no  
expenditure of energy.

> Right that's the problem. The computations and their results  
exist out there already. But they don't interact with the atoms of  
our universe.

They don't interact with the atoms of our universe?! Why the  
hell not, according to you those very atoms are made of nothing but  
numbers! 

>>> For us to arrange atoms in a way that corresponds to  
these computations or results, we need to build physical simulations  
of those computations.

 >> So why can't you?

> What kind of mechanism are you proposing is possible to cause  
atoms to arrange themselves into the final result of a long running  
calculation?

You tell me. You're the one who insists that numbers pull the  
strings on everything that happens in the physical world not me.

>>> you should by extension believe that P(P(P(P( ...  
(s_1) ... = s_n independently of you, me,

>> Those are some very nice ASCII characters you've typed  
there, but the truth is I don't care if it's independent of you or  
not because "P(P(P(P( ... (s_1) ... = s_n"  can't make a  
calculation nor can any sequence of ASCII characters, but a silicon  
microprocessor can.

> You are conflating a computation with a physical  
approximation/simulation

OK,  your physical brain has run a approximation/simulation of  
2 + 2 so now you know the answer is approximately 4, but it could be  
3.9 or 4.1.

> of that computation.

"P(P(P(P( ... (s_1) ... = s_n" can't perform a calculation  
or a simulation or even an approximation because  "P(P(P(P( ...  
(s_1) ... = s_n" is just a sequence of ASCII  
characters.  But a physical microprocessor can do all of those  
things.

> I give up.

OK.

 > You clearly aren't interested in learning.

I'm always willing to learn, but only from those who have  
something true and interesting

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-18 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 15 Oct 2015, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/15/2015 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

If arithmetic is false, Church-Turing thesis makes no more sense.


?? It will make sense as an axiom in a certain branch of  
mathematics.


Then it is no more the classical Church's thesis. It will be  
something like intuitionist Church's thesis. That would again be  
just a change of subject. It is like saying that 1 cloud + 1 cloud  
= 1 cloud can refute 1+1=2. That is not good logic.


But it's a good example of the limitations of axiomatic inferences.


Why?
Cloud are not the intended notion when we talk about natural numbers.  
It makes no sense to ask oneself of what is the successor of a cloud,  
or to accept that for all clouds x e have s(x) ≠ 0.


The fact that some mathematical structure are not group is not a  
limitation of the theory of group, nor of the axiomatic or semi- 
axiomatic approach.


Bruno






BRent

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-18 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 16 Oct 2015, at 04:18, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 16/10/2015 12:53 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 7:36 PM, Bruce Kellett  wrote:


Two different meanings of the word 'exist'. Physical existence  
relates to physical objects; mathematical 'existence' relates to  
mathematical ideas.


If you think these are the same thing, then show me the conscious  
being that exists independently of any physical substrate. The fact  
that you appear unable to do this, and no-one else has ever done it  
either, is overwhelming evidence that no such non-physical  
conscious beings exist.



Until you can point to a difference that makes a difference,  
between physical existence and mathematical  existence,  
and no-one else has ever done it either, I see no reason to accept  
that "physical existence" is somehow more special, or more capable  
than mathematical existence.


That particular difference does make a difference. Physical  
existence refers to objects of the physical world: mathematical  
'existence' refers to mathematical ideas that 'exist' only in  
Patonia. Such platonic objects cannot be touched, kicked, or  
otherwise manipulated except insofar as physical objects might be  
taken to resemble them. If a calculation in platonia can produce  
consciousness, then show me the conscious being that is independent  
of any physical substrate.


 I will allow you to provide the necessary interface between the  
platonic and the physical, so that that conscious being can  
communicate with us mere mortals. Such an interface must be possible  
in your theory (though not in mine) because you claim that the  
physical is produced by the platonic objects.


To say that the physical is produced by the platonic object is an  
aristotelian, and a bit straw-man, way to sum up.


It is more correct to say that there is no production of the physical,  
but an experience of it, sharable by many universal numbers relatively  
emulated by other universal numbers. that experience of physical  
realities, emerges from the first person indeterminacy by the subjects  
which are emulated infinitely often in the arithmetical reality, for  
which you can take the usual (N, +, *) structure (used when you  
defined most concept in the mathematics used in physics). If that  
mathematics was not real/kicking-back, physicists would not use them.


Advantage? The theory of everything is crazily simple, already known  
by everyone having the primary school diploma, and, and that is the  
key point, it solves the mind-body problem. Not only person are not  
eliminated, but that notion is the building block to get both  
consciousness and matter. It provides also a rational explanation of  
the mystical discourse, notably by providing a transparent  
interpretation of the neopythagorean and neoplatonist accounts of God,  
Intellect, Soul, and Matter.  And up to now, it fits the data, and  
explain also the quantum weirdness, which becomes the norm in that  
computationalist theory.


Bruno




Get to it.

Otherwise this conversation has become repetitive and pointless.

Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-17 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Oct 16, 2015 at 5:55 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

> 
> Of the 10^500 string theory physics, maybe 1 in a million or fewer are
> rich enough to support life.
>

If so then there are 10^494 universes 
rich enough to support life
, and there is a 100% probability that the universe I live in is one of
them.

>> 
>> a simulation is not identical to the thing being simulated, if it was
>> there would be no reason to go to all the bother of simulating it, we
>> already have the real thing. Simulations take shortcuts and sometimes end
>> up being wrong as the weather department could tell you. If you believe
>> that our arithmetic is just simulated arithmetic then all you know is that
>> with our current simulations simulated 2 and simulated 2 is the same as
>> simulated 4, but as our simulations get better you must consider the
>> possibility that it could approach 4.01. However if you believe as I do
>> that the numbers we use in our arithmetic are not simulated but are the
>> real deal and if you believe as I do not that numbers are more fundamental
>> than physics then you have grave problems explaining why INTEL bothers with
>> silicon microchips and doesn't just make calculations directly with pure
>> numbers.
>>
>
> > 
> I don't know what you are arguing here.
>

If physical objects like a calculator or your brain *don't* have access to
numbers then you know nothing about numbers you only know about simulated
numbers. If physical objects like a calculator or your brain *do* have
access to actual non-simulated numbers and if numbers are all that's
required to make a calculation then physical object should be able to make
arbitrarily large calculations instantly with no expenditure of energy. So
why can't you?

> >> 
>> I think it's a fact about the physical universe that humans have
>> discovered that is independent of them, but if whenever 2 rocks and 2 rocks
>> were brought together a new rock would pop into existence then humans would
>> say 2 +2 =5, but that's not the way the physical world works.
>>
>>
>
> > 
> then you should by extension believe that P(P(P(P( ... (s_1) ... =
> s_n independently of you, me,
>

Those are some very nice ASCII characters you've typed there, but the truth
is I don't care if it's independent of you or not because "P(P(P(P( ...
(s_1) ... = s_n"  can't make a calculation nor can any sequence of
ASCII characters, but a silicon microprocessor can.

>> 
>> It doesn't matter what I believe and it doesn't matter what I can prove
>> because neither a belief nor a proof can make a calculation, but a silicon
>> microprocessor can.  
>>
>>
>
> > 
> This follows from your assumption that the physical laws as true.
>

No
.

The
 calculation doesn't follow from
an

assumption
,
it follows from a silicon microprocessor
.

>> >> 
>> Talk about delusions of grandeur! So Russell and Bruno can derive Quantum
>> Mechanics from nothing but pure numbers,
>>
>
> > 
> And a few assumptions about reality.
>

Unless one of the assumptions about reality is that quantum theory as
developed by Planck, Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrodinger, Dirac,
Feynman and hundreds of other brilliant minds over the last century is true
you are talking about one of the purest forms of Bullshit I have ever seen.

> > 
> It will take a lot of computation to determine what the distribution is
> for computations that contain conscious sub-components, and what types of
> physics those conscious sub-components observe of their environments.
>

But that should be easy!

You say calculations don't require matter
or
 energy or time, all that's needed is numbers; well you have access to
numbers so
JUST 
make the calculation
.
It should take you no time at all.

  John K Clark

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-17 Thread Jason Resch

On Sat, Oct 17, 2015 at 12:03 PM, John Clark  wrote:

>
> On Fri, Oct 16, 2015 at 5:55 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> > 
>> Of the 10^500 string theory physics, maybe 1 in a million or fewer are
>> rich enough to support life.
>>
>
> If so then there are 10^494 universes 
> rich enough to support life
> , and there is a 100% probability that the universe I live in is one of
> them.
>
>

Which implies a high probability that other universes, ruled by different
laws, exist.


>
> >> 
>>> a simulation is not identical to the thing being simulated, if it was
>>> there would be no reason to go to all the bother of simulating it, we
>>> already have the real thing. Simulations take shortcuts and sometimes end
>>> up being wrong as the weather department could tell you. If you believe
>>> that our arithmetic is just simulated arithmetic then all you know is that
>>> with our current simulations simulated 2 and simulated 2 is the same as
>>> simulated 4, but as our simulations get better you must consider the
>>> possibility that it could approach 4.01. However if you believe as I do
>>> that the numbers we use in our arithmetic are not simulated but are the
>>> real deal and if you believe as I do not that numbers are more fundamental
>>> than physics then you have grave problems explaining why INTEL bothers with
>>> silicon microchips and doesn't just make calculations directly with pure
>>> numbers.
>>>
>>
>> > 
>> I don't know what you are arguing here.
>>
>
> If physical objects like a calculator or your brain *don't* have access
> to numbers then you know nothing about numbers you only know about
> simulated numbers.
>

If the simulation is accurate, you gain accurate information about that
which is simulated.


> If physical objects like a calculator or your brain *do* have access to
> actual non-simulated numbers and if numbers are all that's required to make
> a calculation then physical object should be able to make arbitrarily large
> calculations instantly with no expenditure of energy.
>

Right that's the problem. The computations and their results exist out
there already. But they don't interact with the atoms of our universe. For
us to arrange atoms in a way that corresponds to these computations or
results, we need to build physical simulations of those computations.


> So why can't you?
>

What kind of mechanism are you proposing is possible to cause atoms to
arrange themselves into the final result of a long running calculation?


>
>
>> >> 
>>> I think it's a fact about the physical universe that humans have
>>> discovered that is independent of them, but if whenever 2 rocks and 2 rocks
>>> were brought together a new rock would pop into existence then humans would
>>> say 2 +2 =5, but that's not the way the physical world works.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> > 
>> then you should by extension believe that P(P(P(P( ... (s_1) ... =
>> s_n independently of you, me,
>>
>
> Those are some very nice ASCII characters you've typed there, but the
> truth is I don't care if it's independent of you or not because "P(P(P(P(
> ... (s_1) ... = s_n"  can't make a calculation nor can any sequence of
> ASCII characters, but a silicon microprocessor can.
>

You are conflating a computation with a physical approximation/simulation
of that computation.


>
> >> 
>>> It doesn't matter what I believe and it doesn't matter what I can prove
>>> because neither a belief nor a proof can make a calculation, but a silicon
>>> microprocessor can.  
>>>
>>>
>>
>> > 
>> This follows from your assumption that the physical laws as true.
>>
>
> No
> .
>
> The
>  calculation doesn't follow from
> an
> 
> assumption
> ,
> it follows from a silicon microprocessor
> .
>
> 
>>> >> 
>>> Talk about delusions of grandeur! So Russell and Bruno can derive
>>> Quantum Mechanics from nothing but pure numbers,
>>>
>>
>> > 
>> And a few assumptions about reality.
>>
>
> Unless one of the assumptions about reality is that quantum theory as
> developed by Planck, Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrodinger, Dirac,
> Feynman and hundreds of other brilliant minds over the last century is
> true you are talking about one of the purest forms of Bullshit I have ever
> seen.
>
>
>> > 
>> It will take a lot of computation to determine what the distribution is
>> for computations that contain conscious sub-components, and what types of
>> physics those conscious sub-components observe of their environments.
>>
>
> But that should be easy!
>  
> You say calculations don't require matter
> or
>  energy or time, all that's needed is numbers; well you have access to
> numbers so
> JUST 
> make the calculation
> .
> It should take you no time at all.
>
>
>
I give up. You clearly aren't interested in learning.

Jason

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-17 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Oct 17, 2015 at 1:31 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

>
>>> >>
>>> 
>>> Of the 10^500 string theory physics, maybe 1 in a million or fewer are
>>> rich enough to support life.
>>>
>>
>> 
>> >> 
>> If so then there are 10^494 universes 
>> rich enough to support life
>> , and there is a 100% probability that the universe I live in is one of
>> them.
>>
>>
>
> > 
> Which implies a high probability that other universes, ruled by different
> laws, exist.
>

Obviously, except of course the physical law that makes you conclude that
there are 10^500 universes in the first place. So what's your point?

>> 
>> If physical objects like a calculator or your brain *don't* have access
>> to numbers then you know nothing about numbers you only know about
>> simulated numbers.
>>
>
> > 
> If the simulation is accurate, you gain accurate information about that
> which is simulated.
>

A simulation is never 100% accurate, if they were absolutely identical
there would be no point in doing it because we already have the real one. I
think that when a physical object like your brain adds 2 and 2 it's not a
simulation at all and the 4 it produces is as real as integers get and i
s exactly precisely 4. But you think it's just simulation so all you know
is that simulated 2 and simulated 2 is approximately 4, but its exact
value depends on how good the simulation is.

> > 
>> If physical objects like a calculator or your brain *do* have access to
>> actual non-simulated numbers and if numbers are all that's required to make
>> a calculation then physical object should be able to make arbitrarily large
>> calculations instantly with no expenditure of energy.
>>
>
> > 
> Right that's the problem. The computations and their results exist out
> there already. But they don't interact with the atoms of our universe.
>

They don't interact with the atoms of our universe
?! Why the hell not, according to you those very atoms are made of nothing
but numbers! 

> >
>>> >> 
>>> For us to arrange atoms in a way that corresponds to these computations
>>> or results, we need to build physical simulations of those computations.
>>
>>

>> >> 
>> So why can't you?
>
>
> > 
> What kind of mechanism are you proposing is possible to cause atoms to
> arrange themselves into the final result of a long running calculation?
>

You tell me. You're the one who insists that numbers pull the strings on
everything that happens in the physical world not me.

>
>>> >>
>>> 
>>> you should by extension believe that P(P(P(P( ... (s_1) ... = s_n
>>> independently of you, me,
>>>
>>
>> >> 
>> Those are some very nice ASCII characters you've typed there, but the
>> truth is I don't care if it's independent of you or not because "P(P(P(P(
>> ... (s_1) ... = s_n"  can't make a calculation nor can any sequence of
>> ASCII characters, but a silicon microprocessor can.
>>
>
> > 
> You are conflating a computation with a physical approximation/simulation
>

OK,  your physical brain has run a approximation/simulation of 2 + 2 so
now you know the answer is approximately 4, but it could be 3.9 or 4.1.

> 
> of that computation.

"P(P(P(P( ... (s_1) ... = s_n"
 can't perform a calculation or a simulation or even an approximation
because  
"P(P(P(P( ... (s_1) ... = s_n"
 is just a sequence of ASCII characters. 

But a physical microprocessor can do all of those things.

> 
> I give up.
>

OK.

> > 
> You clearly aren't interested in learning.

I'm always willing to learn, but only from those who have something true
and interesting to teach.

 John K Clark

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-16 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 16 Oct 2015, at 02:36, Bruce Kellett wrote:

It is the failure to clearly distinguish between these different  
senses of the word 'exists' that cause most of your confusion.

The mathematical theorem is that when a machine looks inward, in the  
sense made precise by Gödel, Kleene and others, the machine is forced  
to distinguish 8 main different sort of existence, and in fact many  
more.

The ontic basic existence can be based on any first order logical  
specification of a Turing universal language or system. Once chosen,  
the ExP(x) means it exists a basic element which has the property P.

To fix the thing I use as basic element the number+basic +/*laws, but  
the theology of the machine, including physics, will not depend on  
which universal basic system has been taken. The first basic Turing  
universal system is like a sort of base in which we can describe and  
study all the others.

I will also say that a relation R(x,y, ..) or a property P(x) exists  
for a shorten of it is true that R(x, y, z) for some x, y, z.

Then we have the 8 nuances that no machine can miss when looking  
inward deep enough, which is exactly what they can do when they  
believe in enough induction axioms.

Then I define the set of beliefs of the ideally correct machine *in*  
the language of the machine, which here will be elementary arithmetic,  
given that we have fixed that one. The most typical machine/number/ 
theory/belief-set is Peano Arithmetic.

RA can prove that PA exists (trivially actually), and RA imitate all  
machine, notably in proving all the details of the computations that  
PA does when doing her "thinking".

I write []A for "PA proves A", and I think about it as translated in  
the language of the machine. In our case this makes []A an  
arithmetical proposition.

Then you get all the sort of existence by the quantified modal logics:

ExP(x)
[]ExP(x)
[]Ex []P(x)

With [] put for []p, and for []p & p, and for []p & <>t, and for []p &  
<>t & p, and some infinity of graded variants, depending on the points  
of view.

The apparent primary matter is given by the quantization:

[]<>ExP(x)
[]<>Ex []<>P(x)

(but here only on []p & p, []p & <>t, []p & <>t & p, with p obeying p - 
> []p).

So there are indeed many sort of existence, and most error in  
philosophy and theology can be reduced to a confusion between such  
existence, or a confusion between the corresponding hypostases.

If you define [1]p = []p & p, [2]p = []p & <>t and [3]p = []p & <>t &  
p, and [0]p = []p, you get the five hypostases, and even 8, as three  
of them split between a provable and true part. The incompleteness  
makes the true part extending properly the provable part, and that  
split is inherited by [2]p and [3]p.

Lucas-Penrose invalid use of Gödel's incompleteness can be seen as a  
confusion between [0] and [1]. The separation between science and  
theology can be sees as a confusion between [0] ans [0]* for the logic  
which split along proof and truth. Obviously some confusion entail  
others.

I recall the epistemological the plotinian lexicon:

p
[]p
[]p & p
[]p & <>t
[]p & <>t & p

One
Intellect
Soul
Intelligible Matter
Sensible Matter

Truth
Provability
Knowledge
Observable
Sensible

Only One (God) and the Soul do not split along proof and truth.

Up to now it works. It is a pure mathematical theory, and physics is  
determined by them, so just let us look if it works. Thanks the  
quantum weird logic and possible interpretations, it works.

The neoplatonism of the universal (Turing) machine suggests that the  
Heisenberg relations *are* consequence of the (mathematical) self- 
reference limitations. Aristotelians cannot see that because they tend  
to confuse the One with the Observable.

The theory gives the tools to test all this, and measure a possible  
departure from the neopythagoreanism or neoplatonism canonically  
associated to the universal machine.

If the quantum logic we got is good enough, we can apply Gleason  
theorem and prove the unicity of the measure on the computations (when  
seen from inside, observed), and if some quantum logicians are correct  
(hard paper!), the whole standard model might follow.

UDA is for the human babies, AUDA, the translation, is for all  
universal Löbian number, where a number is Löbian when it can prove p - 
> []p for all Sigma_1 arithmetical sentences.

Note that the ontology is given by RA, for which p -> []p is true, but  
RA don't know that. For PA, which exists in the mind of RA (so to  
speak) p->[]p is not only true, but provable. She knows, like you,  
that she is Turing universal, and Löbian.

Keep this post, as further conversation could help to make all this  
clear and simple. You might put some good book on logic (Mendelson,  
Boolos and Jeffrey, Epstein & Carnielli) near your bed.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-16 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 6:15 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

> >> 
>> does Susskind say there is less than a
>>  
>> 100% chance that the universe I live in would be a universe amenable to
>> life
>> ?
>>
>
> > 
> He lays out a convincing case that the probability that any possible
> string-theory universe would not be expected to be capable of supporting
> life,
>

**Any possible string-theory

universe? Any? Then string theory must be wrong because there is a 100%
probability that the universe I live in IS a universe capable of supporting
life. I will now go out on a limb and make a bold statement: any universe
that has life in it is a universe capable of supporting life.

> > 
> which suggests that many universes with different laws exist.
>

Yes but obviously not all of the physical laws could be different, not
the physical laws that suggested there were 10^500 universes for one
example. I also think the second law of thermodynamics would have to be
true in all of them.

> >> 
>> you said a calculator or anything physical is simulating arithmetic so
>> all you can believe is that simulated 2 and simulated 2 is equal to
>> simulated 4. 
>>
>>
>
> > 
> 2 + 2 = 4, and we know that because our simulations of 2 + 2 turn come out
> to equal 4.
>

But a simulation is not identical to the thing being simulated, if it was
there would be no reason to go to all the bother of simulating it, we
already have the real thing. Simulations take shortcuts and sometimes end
up being wrong as the weather department could tell you. If you believe
that our arithmetic is just simulated arithmetic then all you know is that
with our current simulations simulated 2 and simulated 2 is the same as
simulated 4, but as our simulations get better you must consider the
possibility that it could approach 4.01. However if you believe as I do
that the numbers we use in our arithmetic are not simulated but are the
real deal and if you believe as I do not that numbers are more fundamental
than physics then you have grave problems explaining why INTEL bothers with
silicon microchips and doesn't just make calculations directly with pure
numbers.

>> 
>> A function "will" do absolutely nothing, in the future the function
>> will be exactly the same as it is right now.  A function can not perform a
>> calculation and neither can a definition, but a microprocessor made of
>> matter that obeys the laws of physics can.
>>
>
> > 
> If you think: 2 + 2 = 4, independently of you, me or anything else,
>

I think it's a fact about the physical universe that humans have
discovered that is independent of them, but if whenever 2 rocks and 2 rocks
were brought together a new rock would pop into existence then humans would
say 2 +2 =5, but that's not the way the physical world works.

> > 
> then you should by extension believe that P(P(P(P( ... (s_1) ... =
> s_n independently of you, me, or anything else.
>

It doesn't matter what I believe and it doesn't matter what I can prove
because neither a belief nor a proof can make a calculation, but a silicon
microprocessor can.  

>> 
>> If 
>> Nick Bostrom is right
>>  then 
>> the John Clark program is
>> STILL 
>> being run on 3 pounds of grey goo
>> , it's just that the 
>> 3 pounds of grey goo
>>  is being run on a computer at a higher level. Computer X may be
>> simulating computer Y which is simulating computer Z which is running the
>> John Clark program, but computer Z is still running the John Clark program.
>>
>
> > 
> You still can't know that, because the computer might just be implementing
> your mind program directly, rather than simulating all the details of the
> grey goo between your ears.
>

But every time one of those details about that grey goo between my ears
changes my consciousness changes, and every time my consciousness changes
one of those details about that grey goo between my ears changes

> 
> If computationalism is true, then to be able to know that you are grey
> goo, rather than a silicon computer, violates the Church-Turing thesis.
>

I don't know where you got that, all the Church-Turing thesis says is
that you can calculate something if and only if a Turing Machine can make
the same calculation.

>

Russel Standish and Bruno Marchal both recovered a quantum reality from
information theory and self-reference logic alone, respectively.

>> >>
>> Anybody who had done half of what you claimed would be not just the
>> greatest scientists who ever lived but the greatest human being who ever
>> lived times 1000. And I just don't think Russell or Bruno are in that
>> category.
>
>
> > 
> It takes about 100 years on average, before the new scientific discoveries
> bubble down to be common knowledge.
>
(See Copernicus, Darwin, Everett). Maybe in 100 years, people will look
> upon you as we now look at the Nobel prize committee who thought Einstein's
> theory of relativity was too radical of an

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-16 Thread Jason Resch

On Fri, Oct 16, 2015 at 3:36 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 6:15 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
>> >> 
>>> does Susskind say there is less than a
>>>  
>>> 100% chance that the universe I live in would be a universe amenable to
>>> life
>>> ?
>>>
>>
>> > 
>> He lays out a convincing case that the probability that any possible
>> string-theory universe would not be expected to be capable of supporting
>> life,
>>
>
> **Any possible string-theory
>  
> universe? Any? Then string theory must be wrong because there is a 100%
> probability that the universe I live in IS a universe capable of supporting
> life. I will now go out on a limb and make a bold statement: any universe
> that has life in it is a universe capable of supporting life.
>
>

Of the 10^500 string theory physics, maybe 1 in a million or fewer are rich
enough to support life.


> > 
>> which suggests that many universes with different laws exist.
>>
>
> Yes but obviously not all of the physical laws could be different, not
> the physical laws that suggested there were 10^500 universes for one
> example. I also think the second law of thermodynamics would have to be
> true in all of them.
>
>

That's because it is a statistical law, not a physical law.


>
>
>> >> 
>>> you said a calculator or anything physical is simulating arithmetic so
>>> all you can believe is that simulated 2 and simulated 2 is equal to
>>> simulated 4. 
>>>
>>>
>>
>> > 
>> 2 + 2 = 4, and we know that because our simulations of 2 + 2 turn come
>> out to equal 4.
>>
>
> But a simulation is not identical to the thing being simulated, if it
> was there would be no reason to go to all the bother of simulating it, we
> already have the real thing. Simulations take shortcuts and sometimes end
> up being wrong as the weather department could tell you. If you believe
> that our arithmetic is just simulated arithmetic then all you know is that
> with our current simulations simulated 2 and simulated 2 is the same as
> simulated 4, but as our simulations get better you must consider the
> possibility that it could approach 4.01. However if you believe as I do
> that the numbers we use in our arithmetic are not simulated but are the
> real deal and if you believe as I do not that numbers are more fundamental
> than physics then you have grave problems explaining why INTEL bothers with
> silicon microchips and doesn't just make calculations directly with pure
> numbers.
>

I don't know what you are arguing here.


>
>
> >> 
>>> A function "will" do absolutely nothing, in the future the function
>>> will be exactly the same as it is right now.  A function can not perform a
>>> calculation and neither can a definition, but a microprocessor made of
>>> matter that obeys the laws of physics can.
>>>
>>
>> > 
>> If you think: 2 + 2 = 4, independently of you, me or anything else,
>>
>
> I think it's a fact about the physical universe that humans have
> discovered that is independent of them, but if whenever 2 rocks and 2 rocks
> were brought together a new rock would pop into existence then humans would
> say 2 +2 =5, but that's not the way the physical world works.
>
>

>
>> > 
>> then you should by extension believe that P(P(P(P( ... (s_1) ... =
>> s_n independently of you, me, or anything else.
>>
>
> It doesn't matter what I believe and it doesn't matter what I can prove
> because neither a belief nor a proof can make a calculation, but a silicon
> microprocessor can.  
>
>

This follows from your assumption that the physical laws as true. But what
you fail to realize is that it may also follow from a much simpler
assumption, that the arithmetical laws are true.


>
> >> 
>>> If 
>>> Nick Bostrom is right
>>>  then 
>>> the John Clark program is
>>> STILL 
>>> being run on 3 pounds of grey goo
>>> , it's just that the 
>>> 3 pounds of grey goo
>>>  is being run on a computer at a higher level. Computer X may be
>>> simulating computer Y which is simulating computer Z which is running the
>>> John Clark program, but computer Z is still running the John Clark program.
>>>
>>
>> > 
>> You still can't know that, because the computer might just be
>> implementing your mind program directly, rather than simulating all the
>> details of the grey goo between your ears.
>>
>
> But every time one of those details about that grey goo between my ears
> changes my consciousness changes, and every time my consciousness changes
> one of those details about that grey goo between my ears changes
>

That may be how your simulated experience is deceiving you.


>
> > 
>> If computationalism is true, then to be able to know that you are grey
>> goo, rather than a silicon computer, violates the Church-Turing thesis.
>>
>
> I don't know where you got that, all the Church-Turing thesis says is
> that you can calculate something if and only if a Turing Machine can make
> the same calculation.

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-16 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 15 Oct 2015, at 19:54, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/15/2015 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Not at all, I only assume a brain needs an external world to be  
aware of.


Either what you add to the brain is Turing emulable, and that means  
you are just lmowering the substittution level, and the reasoning I  
presented still follows (as he used the "generaluzed brain").


That misses the point.  It's not lowering the substitution level,  
it's also expanding the scope of the emulation to include the  
environment.  Although brains are relatively isolated except for  
efferent and afferent nerve signals, they are not absolutely  
isolated.  They depend on decoherence in order to function as quasi- 
classical computers.  Decoherence depends on interactions with the  
environment.


But if the emulation must be expanded to include an evironment it is  
not longer just an emulation of a brain, it is an emulation of a  
brain in a world.  The "physics" of that world is essential to the  
emulation.



The emulation of the whole cluster of galaxies around us, at the  
Planck level, with n* 10^100 correct decimal is reproduced an infinity  
of times in arithmetic, for all n.


I put the diameter of the generalized brain into the notion of level.  
High level makes the 6 first steps of the reasoning easier, but step  
seven eliminates that high level assumption.


Bruno

PS, I answer only this (and Stathis post) due to time scheduling. I  
will probably comment other posts later, this days or next week.







Brent



















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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-16 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 15 Oct 2015, at 10:27, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 15 Oct 2015, at 1:41 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:



On 14 Oct 2015, at 05:21, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


...
Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether  
matter is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer  
(or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed  
to computationalism disagree. They believe either that is not  
possible to make a computer that behaves like a human because  
there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger  
Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that  
behaves like a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg.  
John Searle).


But the problem with what you say is that on this list  
"computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make  
a computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".   
Bruno claims to have proven that your simple statement  
logically entails that all of physics and consciousness.  But  
that is not so generally accepted and so when someone "reject  
computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the  
inferences Bruno claims it entails.


I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the  
conclusions he draws from it.


But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are  
not true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot)  
that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to  
computationalism disagree."  Those who reject (extended)  
computationalism, may very well agree.


If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the  
extended conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show  
where Bruno's argument is wrong.


Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and  
others have done.



I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?


No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the  
arguments.


1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't  
instantiate consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and  
doesn't logic entail its conclusion.  In fact the whole MGA is an  
argument from incredulity.  Mallah, who has his own version of the  
argument, takes the reductio to prove computationalism is false.


We suppose that when you survive with an artificial brain, this due  
to the fact that the physical implementation of brain implements  
the relevant computations, and not some other magical phenomenon  
added to the description.


In that frame the recording cannot be conscious because it does not  
constitute an implementation of the relevant computations.


The core question here is what it means to "implement a  
computation". It can be argued that a recording (which cannot handle  
counterfactuals) implements a computation, or that any system with  
multiple states implements a computation under a particular mapping.


A computation is any behavior of a universal machine/number when feed  
some (possibly empty) data. That behavior is isomorphic with some  
(sigma-1) arithmetical relations.


I will come back on this. The exactness of the notion of  
implementation is entirely due to the discreteness of the relation  
involved.




A response to this is that such systems do not implement  
computations that can interact with their environment. But what  
about computations that do not interact with the substrate of their  
implementation, but give rise to dreaming consciousnesses or (so  
Brent won't object) entire virtual worlds?


They will be conscious, like the person supported by a brain in a vat.  
Of course, such a person is handicaped if you want play soccer with  
them, but it is not impossible to play soccer in a virtual  
environment, if you manage to interface them with the right "video- 
game)like" environment. The consciousness itself is in arithmetic, in  
a non time dependent way.




There seems no good reason to say that these computations are not  
implemented; and if they are, it is equivalent to saying that they  
are implemented by virtue of their status as platonic entities,  
since the presence of a physical substrate becomes irrelevant.


Yes. I agree. A machine cannot see by introspection if she is run by a  
Physical Reality emulating or implementing an interpreter LISP  
emulating RA emulating a DIOPH. POLYNO. emulating a topological  
computer emulating a program FORTRAN emulating a game of life pattern  
emulating them, from RA emulating a an interpreter LISP emulating RA  
emulating a DIOPH. POLYNO.

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 15 Oct 2015, at 11:56, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 15/10/2015 6:40 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Oct 2015, at 00:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 15/10/2015 2:10 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:


You talk like if I have claim knowing some truth. I do not. You  
are doing philosophy of comp-theology.  That  
belongs to the field of philosophy of science, which is not my  
expertise. You cannot use philosophy for making people doubting a  
logical argument.


..

of course if you doubt the truth of RA axioms, then I can't  
explain.


Above you claim that you do not know some truth. So how do you  
know the truth of the RA axioms?


By some truth, I meant some big metaphysical truth.

Then I do not *know* the truth of RA axioms, in any publicly  
communicable way. I assume them, and that is not a problem, because  
we all assume them when we do science.


No, you don't assume the truth of the RA axioms -- you assume that  
these axioms are true statements about the particular field under  
study, such as the properties of rocks in a field. The RA axioms are  
not true statements if your field of study is drops of water or  
clouds.


Of course. A theory is always about the particular, intended field of  
study. but in this case, RA becomes the theory of everything. That is  
the consequence of comp, by the UDA reasoning (even without step 8),  
if you accept some form of Occam razor.






This is where the careless use of the word 'truth' can lead to poor  
reasoning. Propositions can be true or false, axioms are neither.


No, but they are, or not, verified by the intended model of the  
theory. As nobody have any problem with the usual intended model of  
the arithmetical theories, this provides a clean notion of truth. That  
notion of truth is known to be definable in informal or formal set  
theories.







Of course, you are just being cavalier with your use of the word  
'truth'. Axioms are not things which can be said to be either true  
of false, at best they are only useful and productive, or not.


They are true or false in the standard model of arithmetic, that is  
the mathematical structure (N, +, *).


Even PA can define what is true for any formula with a bounded  
numer of quantifiers. What PA cannot do is to define the truth for  
arbitrary formula, by Tarski Theorem.


When you claim that PA can define what is true for any bounded  
formula, what you are actually saying is that some theorems can be  
proved in PA.


Not at all. PA can proves its own incompleteness and so can know that  
provability is different from truth. I mean literally that for the  
formula F having a bounded number of quantifier, PA can define a  
predicate T such that PA can prove A <-> T('A'). PA can prove that A  
is actually equivalent with the truth of the formula represented with  
Gödel number 'A'. That has nothing to do with provability.





Then if the axioms are true of the model under consideration, and  
the rules of inference are truth-preserving, then the theorems are  
true statements in that model.


If arithmetic is false, Church-Turing thesis makes no more sense.  
You will have difficulties in defining   
computable function from N to N.


See above. Arithmetic is neither true nor false, it is only useful  
or not, depending on the context.


That is too vague. What do you mean by "Arithmetic"? "true" or  
"false" apply only to arithmetical sentences. Then "true" means  
"true in the standard model". That can be defined in analysis or  
set theory (not in any arithmetical theory).


Right. 'true' and 'false' apply only to sentences (propositions) in  
a particular model, not to axioms per se.


OK. But in number theory, like in set theory (and unlike in group or  
ring theory), there is a notion of intended model. In group theory, we  
like to study many different group at once. But in number theory, we  
try to remains in the unique standard intended model. We have never  
heard a mathematician saying that Wiles has proven Fermat theorem in  
the standard model. We just say that Wiles has proven fermat theorem.  
For number theory, only logicians studied and used the existence of  
non standard models, motivated by question in logic, not in number  
theory.







All proof of negative results are argument from incredulity.  
Proving ~p is the same as proving p -> f.


This is just nonsense. An argument from incredulity is an argument  
that claims that the difficulty of believing a conclusion  
(incredulity) is a valid reason for rejecting the argument.

Proofs are things that happen in formal systems --


Formal proofs. But in science we don't use formal proofs. We reason  
informally about them.
In our case (step 8) the "incredulity" just show that if we keep  
materialism we have to accept non Turing emulable components in the  
(generalized) brain playing a necessary role for consciousness to  
proceed. It shows that you need a creationist-like God of the

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


> On 15 Oct 2015, at 1:41 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> 
> 
>> On 14 Oct 2015, at 05:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
 On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
 
 
> On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> 
> 
>> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker  wrote:
 
 
 On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> ...
> Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter 
> is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) 
> that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism 
> disagree. They believe either that is not possible to make a computer 
> that behaves like a human because there is non-computable physics in 
> the brain (eg. Roger Penrose), or that it is  
>   possible to make a computer that 
> behaves like a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John 
> Searle).
 
 But the problem with what you say is that on this list 
 "computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a 
 computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno 
 claims to have proven that your simple 
statement logically entails that all of physics and 
 consciousness.  But that is not so generally accepted and so when 
 someone "reject computationalism" here, it may be they are just 
 rejecting the inferences Bruno claims it entails.
>>> 
>>> I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the 
>>> conclusions he draws from it.
>> 
>> But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not 
>> true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and 
>> acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree."  Those 
>> who reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree.
> 
> If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended 
> conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where Bruno's 
> argument is wrong.
 
 Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and others 
 have done.
>>> 
>>> I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?
>> 
>> No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the arguments.
>> 
>> 1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't instantiate 
>> consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and doesn't logic entail 
>> its conclusion.  In fact the whole MGA is an argument from incredulity.  
>> Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the reductio to prove 
>> computationalism is false.
> 
> We suppose that when you survive with an artificial brain, this due to the 
> fact that the physical implementation of brain implements the relevant 
> computations, and not some other magical phenomenon added to the description. 
> 
> In that frame the recording cannot be conscious because it does not 
> constitute an implementation of the relevant computations.

The core question here is what it means to "implement a computation". It can be 
argued that a recording (which cannot handle counterfactuals) implements a 
computation, or that any system with multiple states implements a computation 
under a particular mapping. A response to this is that such systems do not 
implement computations that can interact with their environment. But what about 
computations that do not interact with the substrate of their implementation, 
but give rise to dreaming consciousnesses or (so Brent won't object) entire 
virtual worlds? There seems no good reason to say that these computations are 
not implemented; and if they are, it is equivalent to saying that they are 
implemented by virtue of their status as platonic entities, since the presence 
of a physical substrate becomes irrelevant.

> 
>> 
>> 2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while isolated.  He 
>> tries to make this plausible by supposing that his scenario takes place as a 
>> dream; but this is not convincing.  Even a dream needs prior experience of 
>> an outside world. 
> 
> As you say: prior. But then the physical supervenience is already false, as 
> it asks for attributing consciousness s at the time of the physical emulation.
> 
> 
> 
>> So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can exist 
>> independent of anexternal world.
> 
> Which world? Comp assume enough to make sense of 2+2=4. No more. It

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Bruce Kellett


On 15/10/2015 6:19 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Oct 2015, at 00:34, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 15/10/2015 2:31 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Computationalism has an ontology on which everyone agree. Those who 
claim to disagree usually add philosophical commitment which is not 
used in the reasoning.


An ontology *is* a philosophical commitment,


Not in metamathematics, nor in metaphysics or theology. An ontology is 
given by the terms of the theory, which are supposed to be realized in 
some model, at the meta-level.


In general, ontology is the science of being in general, embracing such 
issues as the nature and the categorical structure of reality. It is a 
specifically metaphysical term.


I guess you are referring to the special use of the word 'ontology' that 
is common in much scientific metaphysics: ontology refers to the set of 
things whose existence is acknowledged by a particular theory or system 
of thought. It is the sense in which one speaks of 'the' ontology of a 
theory, or of a metaphysical system. In brief, it is the set of things 
that the theory or metaphysical system claims actually 'exist'.


In this sense, one can reject the ontology of a theory, and this would 
give one reason to doubt the applicability of that theory to the real 
world. By "real world' I mean the world of common experience.


Bruce

even if 'everyone' agrees on it. If the ontology is part of the 
reasoning, then it is opinion/philosophy, not logic.


Not at the meta-level. I agree this is not an easy point, but the 
difficulties go away once you agree with the "final" theory, which 
here is Robinson arithmetic. So you need, for the reasoning and its 
conclusion to just *understand* 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ...  Then the 
philosophical or ontological/metaphysical/theological commitment is 
invoked only when you say "yes" to the doctor. Everyone can get the 
consequences of comp, even those who does not believe in comp.


Bruno


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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Bruce Kellett


On 15/10/2015 6:19 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Oct 2015, at 00:34, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 15/10/2015 2:31 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Computationalism has an ontology on which everyone agree. Those who 
claim to disagree usually add philosophical commitment which is not 
used in the reasoning.


An ontology *is* a philosophical commitment,


Not in metamathematics, nor in metaphysics or theology. An ontology is 
given by the terms of the theory, which are supposed to be realized in 
some model, at the meta-level.


In general, ontology is the science of being in general, embracing such 
issues as the nature and the categorical structure of reality. It is a 
specifically metaphysical term.


I guess you are referring to the special use of the word 'ontology' that 
is common in much scientific metaphysics: ontology refers to the set of 
things whose existence is acknowledged by a particular theory or system 
of thought. It is the sense in which one speaks of 'the' ontology of a 
theory, or of a metaphysical system. In brief, it is the set of things 
that the theory or metaphysical system claims actually 'exist'.


In this sense, one can reject the ontology of a theory, and this would 
give one reason to doubt the applicability of that theory to the real 
world. By "real world' I mean the world of common experience.


Bruce

even if 'everyone' agrees on it. If the ontology is part of the 
reasoning, then it is opinion/philosophy, not logic.


Not at the meta-level. I agree this is not an easy point, but the 
difficulties go away once you agree with the "final" theory, which 
here is Robinson arithmetic. So you need, for the reasoning and its 
conclusion to just *understand* 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ...  Then the 
philosophical or ontological/metaphysical/theological commitment is 
invoked only when you say "yes" to the doctor. Everyone can get the 
consequences of comp, even those who does not believe in comp.


Bruno


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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 15 Oct 2015, at 00:34, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 15/10/2015 2:31 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Computationalism has an ontology on which everyone agree. Those who  
claim to disagree usually add philosophical commitment which is not  
used in the reasoning.


An ontology *is* a philosophical commitment,


Not in metamathematics, nor in metaphysics or theology. An ontology is  
given by the terms of the theory, which are supposed to be realized in  
some model, at the meta-level.




even if 'everyone' agrees on it. If the ontology is part of the  
reasoning, then it is opinion/philosophy, not logic.


Not at the meta-level. I agree this is not an easy point, but the  
difficulties go away once you agree with the "final" theory, which  
here is Robinson arithmetic. So you need, for the reasoning and its  
conclusion to just *understand* 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ...  Then the  
philosophical or ontological/metaphysical/theological commitment is  
invoked only when you say "yes" to the doctor. Everyone can get the  
consequences of comp, even those who does not believe in comp.


Bruno






Bruce

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Bruce Kellett


On 15/10/2015 6:40 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Oct 2015, at 00:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 15/10/2015 2:10 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:


You talk like if I have claim knowing some truth. I do not. You are 
doing philosophy of comp-theology. That belongs to the field of 
philosophy of science, which is not my expertise. You cannot use 
philosophy for making people doubting a logical argument.


..

of course if you doubt the truth of RA axioms, then I can't explain.


Above you claim that you do not know some truth. So how do you know 
the truth of the RA axioms?


By some truth, I meant some big metaphysical truth.

Then I do not *know* the truth of RA axioms, in any publicly 
communicable way. I assume them, and that is not a problem, because we 
all assume them when we do science.


No, you don't assume the truth of the RA axioms -- you assume that these 
axioms are true statements about the particular field under study, such 
as the properties of rocks in a field. The RA axioms are not true 
statements if your field of study is drops of water or clouds.


This is where the careless use of the word 'truth' can lead to poor 
reasoning. Propositions can be true or false, axioms are neither.


Of course, you are just being cavalier with your use of the word 
'truth'. Axioms are not things which can be said to be either true of 
false, at best they are only useful and productive, or not.


They are true or false in the standard model of arithmetic, that is 
the mathematical structure (N, +, *).


Even PA can define what is true for any formula with a bounded numer 
of quantifiers. What PA cannot do is to define the truth for arbitrary 
formula, by Tarski Theorem.


When you claim that PA can define what is true for any bounded formula, 
what you are actually saying is that some theorems can be proved in PA. 
Then if the axioms are true of the model under consideration, and the 
rules of inference are truth-preserving, then the theorems are true 
statements in that model.


If arithmetic is false, Church-Turing thesis makes no more sense. 
You will have difficulties in defining computable function from N to N.


See above. Arithmetic is neither true nor false, it is only useful or 
not, depending on the context.


That is too vague. What do you mean by "Arithmetic"? "true" or "false" 
apply only to arithmetical sentences. Then "true" means "true in the 
standard model". That can be defined in analysis or set theory (not in 
any arithmetical theory).


Right. 'true' and 'false' apply only to sentences (propositions) in a 
particular model, not to axioms per se.


All proof of negative results are argument from incredulity. Proving 
~p is the same as proving p -> f.


This is just nonsense. An argument from incredulity is an argument 
that claims that the difficulty of believing a conclusion 
(incredulity) is a valid reason for rejecting the argument.

Proofs are things that happen in formal systems --


Formal proofs. But in science we don't use formal proofs. We reason 
informally about them.
In our case (step 8) the "incredulity" just show that if we keep 
materialism we have to accept non Turing emulable components in the 
(generalized) brain playing a necessary role for consciousness to 
proceed. It shows that you need a creationist-like God of the argument 
to save a metaphysical commitment, despite there is no evidence for 
it. It is a religious move, in the pejorative sense of religious. You 
can as well add that you need a god to sustain that primitive matter. 
It is a God-of-the-gap, and it is used to not proceed in the 
formulation of a problem.


I do not accept this analysis of step 8. In the MGA you simply argue 
that you cannot believe that the recording is conscious, and proceed to 
give some specious reasons for this belief. You do not establish the 
points that you make above -- they are the conclusions you wish to draw 
from your incredulity about the possibility of a conscious recording. So 
you have not presented a valid argument.


In fact, as established by earlier discussion, it is really by the 
application of Occam's razor that you seek to demonstrate that 
non-existence of primitive matter (whatever that is). Occam's razor is 
not an valid rule of inference either. It is a rhetorical device -- not 
a truth-preserving principle of inference.


starting from axioms and following pre-defined rules of inference. So 
the proof of ~p is simply a sound demonstration that ~p follows from 
the axioms according to the rules of inference.


~p is an abbreviation of (p -> f). It assumes at the metalevel that 
you are incredule of f. (that is consistent).


I think you had better refine your use of the word 'incredulity'. I take 
it that (p -> f) is an attempt to formalize the conclusion that p is 
false. But that is the case only if the axioms of your system apply to 
the subject matter under consideration and that you have a formal proof 
of ~p. As we agree, the axioms of RA do not

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 14 Oct 2015, at 22:09, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/14/2015 8:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 Oct 2015, at 06:59, Brent Meeker wrote:




Yes.  A brain in a vat with no connections would not be able to  
sustain consciousness.


Aaaahh... OK, but then you assume indeed, like Bruce Kellet that  
computationalism is false.


Not at all, I only assume a brain needs an external world to be  
aware of.


Either what you add to the brain is Turing emulable, and that means  
you are just lmowering the substittution level, and the reasoning I  
presented still follows (as he used the "generaluzed brain").


Or you assume a world made of some non Turing emulable primitive  
matter, and this contradicts computationalism.









But then we are outside the scope of what I am deriving consequence  
of.


(N, +) is not a group. That does not refute the theory of group.








  So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can  
exist independent of an external world.  It may be that physics  
can be derived from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that  
self-evaluation exists in arithmetic.  For the theory to work it  
must produce a world to be conscious of, and so far it doesn't do  
that.  Bruno just writes things like, IF comp is true then  
physics must follow.  But that's like saying IF Christianity is  
true Jesus will return.


There is a lot of independent evidence for computationalism.


Name some that's not also compatible with physicalism.

The Church-Turing Thesis means a computer can perfectly replicate  
all human behaviors.


First, it's a "thesis", not a fact.


But we don't even try to talk on facts. We do hypotheses and derive  
conclusion.


You talk like if I have claim knowing some truth. I do not. You are  
doing philosophy of comp-theology. That belongs to the field of  
philosophy of science, which is not my expertise. You cannot use  
philosophy for making people doubting a logical argument.


You may make them doubt the premises or the rules of inference.


But, together with comp,  the premise are of the type 2+2=4, and the  
inference rule is modus ponens, (in the pure mathematical theory  
extracted from comp). Which one are you doubting?











Second, it doesn't mean that an abstract computation can replicate  
human behavior.  If human cogitation is Turing emulable, it may  
still have to be physically realized, which means its finite,  
which means the infinities of arithmetic are not necessary to  
intelligence or consciousness.


yes, but by step 8, you need to add something non Turing emulable  
to some Aristotelian Primary Matter, in which already the  
physicists never assume when doing theoretical physics. And again  
that would need computationalism being false.


I don't think step 8 proves that.  My view is that computation to  
instantiate consciousness needs a world, all the potential  
counterfactuals, in order to exist.


(Sigma_1)-Arithmetic contains all counterfactual computations.

Then see above. You introduce something non Turing emulable on the  
mind side: that is non-comp.




But that makes the conclusion of step 8 trivial; it reduces to a  
computational realization of a world can include a computational  
instantiation of consciousness of that world.  Once it is expressed  
that way the word "computational" is seen to otiose (just like  
"primary matter" is otiose to physics).


So the world can be instantiated in arithmetic? Then we are back to  
comp, and what we observe must be derived from all such "world"  
executed below our substitution level.














A rejection of zombies, or a rejection of the idea that we can  
have no reliable knowledge of our own conscious states + Church- 
Turing Thesis gives you computationalism.


But what do you mean by "computationalism"?  Just that  
consciousness can be instantiated by an artifact?...by a digital  
computer?  Or does "computationalism" imply all the inferences  
Bruno argues for, but which are not commonly accepted.





3. Peter Jones wrote several critiques pointing out that there is  
no reason to suppose a UDA exists, it's merely a hypothetical  
abstraction.  A related criticism is that Bruno assumes  
arithmetic is infinite in order to use Godel's theorems about  
what a system cannot prove about itself.  But physics doesn't  
need infinities, they are just calculational conveniences.


Ultrafinitism is a fringe theory which leads to a break down of  
mathematics as we know it. I think it is an extreme length to go  
to reject the UDA, to say there is a biggest number to which 1  
cannot be added to.


That's just your prejudice.  Try reading Feng Ye and Jan  
Mycielski.  I think it's telling that you look at the mere  
existence of alternative number theory as destroying "mathematics  
as we know it".  Mathematics is just a bunch of axiom/theorem  
systems.  There's no one really real mathematics any more than  
there's one real language.


of course if you doubt

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 15 Oct 2015, at 03:59, Jason Resch wrote:




On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 4:01 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 14 Oct 2015, at 05:50, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker   
wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


...
Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether  
matter is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer  
(or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed  
to computationalism disagree. They believe either that is not  
possible to make a computer that behaves like a human because  
there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger  
Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that  
behaves like a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg.  
John Searle).


But the problem with what you say is that on this list  
"computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a  
computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno  
claims to have proven that your simple statement logically  
entails that all of physics and consciousness.  But that is not  
so generally accepted and so when someone "reject  
computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the  
inferencesBruno  
claims it entails.


I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the  
conclusions he draws from it.


But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are  
not true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that  
thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism  
disagree."  Those who reject (extended) computationalism, may  
very well agree.


If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the  
extended conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show  
where Bruno's argument is wrong.


Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and  
others have done.



I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?


No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the  
arguments.


1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't  
instantiate consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and  
doesn't logic entail its conclusion.  In fact the whole MGA is an  
argument from incredulity.


The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X  
by Y pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording  
shows. Therefore I don't see how one could argue (assuming  
computationalism) that a recording invokes the computation one  
presumes is necessary to instantiate a conscious state.


Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the reductio  
to prove computationalism is false.


So then what is his theory of mind?


2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while  
isolated.  He tries to make this plausible by supposing that his  
scenario takes place as a dream; but this is not convincing.  Even  
a dream needs prior experience of an outside world.


Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that  
it could be isolated from the outside world?


  So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can exist  
independent of an external world.  It may be that physics can be  
derived from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that self- 
evaluation exists in arithmetic.  For the theory to work it must  
produce a world to be conscious of, and so far it doesn't do that.   
Bruno just writes things like, IF comp is true then physics must  
follow.  But that's like saying IF Christianity is true Jesus will  
return.


There is a lot of independent evidence for computationalism. The  
Church-Turing Thesis means a computer can perfectly replicate all  
human behaviors. A rejection of zombies, or a rejection of the idea  
that we can have no reliable knowledge of our own conscious states  
+ Church-Turing Thesis gives you computationalism.



3. Peter Jones wrote several critiques pointing out that there is  
no reason to suppose a UDA exists, it's merely a hypothetical  
abstraction.  A related criticism is that Bruno assumes arithmetic  
is infinite in order to use Godel's theorems about what a system  
cannot prove about itself.  But physics doesn't need infinities,  
they are just calculational conveniences.


Ultrafinitism is a fringe theory which leads to a break down of  
mathematics as we know it. I think it is an extreme length to go to  
reject the UDA, to say there is a biggest number to which 1 cannot  
be added to.


Actually, Robinson

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 15 Oct 2015, at 00:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 15/10/2015 2:10 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:


You talk like if I have claim knowing some truth. I do not. You are  
doing philosophy of comp-theology. That belongs to the field of  
philosophy of science, which is not my expertise. You cannot use  
philosophy for making people doubting a logical argument.


..

of course if you doubt the truth of RA axioms, then I can't explain.


Above you claim that you do not know some truth. So how do you know  
the truth of the RA axioms?


By some truth, I meant some big metaphysical truth.

Then I do not *know* the truth of RA axioms, in any publicly  
communicable way. I assume them, and that is not a problem, because we  
all assume them when we do science.






Of course, you are just being cavalier with your use of the word  
'truth'. Axioms are not things which can be said to be either true  
of false, at best they are only useful and productive, or not.


They are true or false in the standard model of arithmetic, that is  
the mathematical structure (N, +, *).


Even PA can define what is true for any formula with a bounded numer  
of quantifiers. What PA cannot do is to define the truth for arbitrary  
formula, by Tarski Theorem.






If arithmetic is false, Church-Turing thesis makes no more sense.  
You will have difficulties in defining computable function from N  
to N.


See above. Arithmetic is neither true nor false, it is only useful  
or not, depending on the context.



That is too vague. What do you mean by "Arithmetic"? "true" or "false"  
apply only to arithmetical sentences. Then "true" means "true in the  
standard model". That can be defined in analysis or set theory (not in  
any arithmetical theory).







All proof of negative results are argument from incredulity.  
Proving ~p is the same as proving p -> f.


This is just nonsense. An argument from incredulity is an argument  
that claims that the difficulty of believing a conclusion  
(incredulity) is a valid reason for rejecting the argument.

Proofs are things that happen in formal systems --


Formal proofs. But in science we don't use formal proofs. We reason  
informally about them.
In our case (step 8) the "incredulity" just show that if we keep  
materialism we have to accept non Turing emulable components in the  
(generalized) brain playing a necessary role for consciousness to  
proceed. It shows that you need a creationist-like God of the argument  
to save a metaphysical commitment, despite there is no evidence for  
it. It is a religious move, in the pejorative sense of religious. You  
can as well add that you need a god to sustain that primitive matter.  
It is a God-of-the-gap, and it is used to not proceed in the  
formulation of a problem.




starting from axioms and following pre-defined rules of inference.  
So the proof of ~p is simply a sound demonstration that ~p follows  
from the axioms according to the rules of inference.


~p is an abbreviation of (p -> f). It assumes at the metalevel that  
you are incredule of f. (that is consistent).



It is not a 'proof' that p is false. As I must stress again, truth  
and falsity are not words that can be applied within the context of  
axiomatic systems.


It can be applied only there, when we do science about it. It is  
called "model theory" or semantic.
As non-logician do not know much of model theory, I spare them with  
using it too much. I can do that because everyone agree with the  
elementary arithmetical truth (except when doing bad philosophy).


If you have a real doubt that 17 is prime, you can't proceed. But if  
you agree with such proposition, you should not have any problem,  
neither in UDA nor in the translation in arithmetic.


Bruno





Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Brent Meeker

On 10/15/2015 2:56 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 12:34 AM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:

On 15/10/2015 12:07 pm, Jason Resch wrote:

On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 1:17 AM, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 14/10/2015 4:45 pm, Jason Resch wrote:

Cochlear implants and artificial retinas give evidence
toward multiple realizability, and therefore, against
mind-brain identity theory. They show that it is functional
equivalence, rather than material/compositional equivalence
that matters. Since computers can realize any finite
function, then assuming there are no necessary infinities
within the brain, computers can realize any functional state
the brain is able to realize. For physicalism to be correct,
you have to believe either that functional states are
irrelevant to consciousness, or that physics can instantiate
functional states which Turing machines cannot.

That is simply false.

Well that explains it.

Again it's not clear what you mean by
computationalism.   Bruce can speak for himself, but I
think he agrees that strong AI is possible.

Strong AI implies consciousness is substrate independent.
But I thought Bruce argued against consciousness being
derivable from mathematical computations, which would mean
consciousness is substrate dependent: that it depends on
physically implemented Turing machines.

I certainly argued that consciousness could not be sustained
on platonic computations in arithmetic. But that was because
I do not accept that such things exist.

What evidence have you seen that led you to this conclusion?

What evidence do you need to say that something does not exist?
Absence of evidence is, in this case, evidence of absence.

Why is that so in this case, when the standard form of that phrase is 
"Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence"?

Also, despite your claims to there being no evidence, there is in fact 
evidence of platonic computations. They exist independently of you, 
mean, and this physical universe, as surely as "7 is prime" is true 
independently of you, me and the physical universe.

In mathematics you have descriptions of Turing machines and
descriptions of computations, but no live machines or
computations.

There are both.

What evidence do you have for this assertion?

The existence of a UD implies a quantum reality, and we observe a 
quantum reality.
Accepting the truth of arithmetical systems like the axioms of 
Peano/Robinson arithmetic, implies their existence.

Does accepting the truth of "Watson was Sherlock Holmes sidekick." 
implies that they both existed?

Substrate independence simply means that you can replace all
or part of the human brain with computer-based equivalents.
In other words, strong AI. No need for platonia in order to
say that consciousness is independent of the substrate.

But if it is independent of substrate, and if computations exist
platonically, then those platonic computations are equally
capable of instantiating consciousness.

You are confusing the meaning of 'substrate'. In the context, I
meant an explicitly physical substrate. Platonia is an idea,

If Platonia is an idea, then so is "The primary physical reality". It 
is up to science now, to determine which of these two ideas is more 
likely to be true.

it is no more 'physically real' than is the idea of a unicorn, or
of Hogwarts School.

Of course it isn't physically real. But why assume physical existence 
is the only kind of existence? That seems to be an idea based purely 
faith.

We commonly assume other kinds of existence; they're called "fictional".

Brent

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Jason Resch

On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 6:37 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/15/2015 2:56 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 12:34 AM, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>
>> On 15/10/2015 12:07 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 1:17 AM, Bruce Kellett <
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>> On 14/10/2015 4:45 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>> Cochlear implants and artificial retinas give evidence toward multiple
>>> realizability, and therefore, against mind-brain identity theory. They show
>>> that it is functional equivalence, rather than material/compositional
>>> equivalence that matters. Since computers can realize any finite function,
>>> then assuming there are no necessary infinities within the brain, computers
>>> can realize any functional state the brain is able to realize. For
>>> physicalism to be correct, you have to believe either that functional
>>> states are irrelevant to consciousness, or that physics can instantiate
>>> functional states which Turing machines cannot.
>>>
>>>
>>> That is simply false.
>>>
>>
>> Well that explains it.
>>
>>
>>> Again it's not clear what you mean by computationalism.   Bruce can
 speak for himself, but I think he agrees that strong AI is possible.


>>> Strong AI implies consciousness is substrate independent. But I thought
>>> Bruce argued against consciousness being derivable from mathematical
>>> computations, which would mean consciousness is substrate dependent: that
>>> it depends on physically implemented Turing machines.
>>>
>>>
>>> I certainly argued that consciousness could not be sustained on platonic
>>> computations in arithmetic. But that was because I do not accept that such
>>> things exist.
>>>
>>
>> What evidence have you seen that led you to this conclusion?
>>
>>
>> What evidence do you need to say that something does not exist? Absence
>> of evidence is, in this case, evidence of absence.
>>
>
> Why is that so in this case, when the standard form of that phrase is
> "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence"?
>
> Also, despite your claims to there being no evidence, there is in fact
> evidence of platonic computations. They exist independently of you, mean,
> and this physical universe, as surely as "7 is prime" is true independently
> of you, me and the physical universe.
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> In mathematics you have descriptions of Turing machines and descriptions
>>> of computations, but no live machines or computations.
>>>
>>
>> There are both.
>>
>>
>> What evidence do you have for this assertion?
>>
>
> The existence of a UD implies a quantum reality, and we observe a quantum
> reality.
> Accepting the truth of arithmetical systems like the axioms of
> Peano/Robinson arithmetic, implies their existence.
>
>
> Does accepting the truth of "Watson was Sherlock Holmes sidekick." implies
> that they both existed?
>
>

If you believe in axioms wherein you can derive a valid proof that "Watson
was Sherlock Holmes sidekick" and that they exist.


>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Substrate independence simply means that you can replace all or part of
>>> the human brain with computer-based equivalents. In other words, strong AI.
>>> No need for platonia in order to say that consciousness is independent of
>>> the substrate.
>>>
>>
>> But if it is independent of substrate, and if computations exist
>> platonically, then those platonic computations are equally capable of
>> instantiating consciousness.
>>
>>
>> You are confusing the meaning of 'substrate'. In the context, I meant an
>> explicitly physical substrate. Platonia is an idea,
>>
>
> If Platonia is an idea, then so is "The primary physical reality". It is
> up to science now, to determine which of these two ideas is more likely to
> be true.
>
>
>> it is no more 'physically real' than is the idea of a unicorn, or of
>> Hogwarts School.
>>
>
> Of course it isn't physically real. But why assume physical existence is
> the only kind of existence? That seems to be an idea based purely faith.
>
>
> We commonly assume other kinds of existence; they're called "fictional".
>
>
To say something exists "only in fiction" means it exists only as a false
account from someone's imagination with no ties to reality.

Jason

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Bruce Kellett


On 16/10/2015 12:53 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 7:36 PM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:


Two different meanings of the word 'exist'. Physical existence relates 
to physical objects; mathematical 'existence' relates to mathematical 
ideas.



If you think these are the same thing, then show me the conscious
being that exists independently of any physical substrate. The
fact that you appear unable to do this, and no-one else has ever
done it either, is overwhelming evidence that no such non-physical
conscious beings exist.


Until you can point to a difference that makes a difference, between 
physical existence and mathematical existence, and no-one else has 
ever done it either, I see no reason to accept that "physical 
existence" is somehow more special, or more capable than mathematical 
existence.


That particular difference does make a difference. Physical existence 
refers to objects of the physical world: mathematical 'existence' refers 
to mathematical ideas that 'exist' only in Patonia. Such platonic 
objects cannot be touched, kicked, or otherwise manipulated except 
insofar as physical objects might be taken to resemble them. If a 
calculation in platonia can produce consciousness, then show me the 
conscious being that is independent of any physical substrate.


 I will allow you to provide the necessary interface between the 
platonic and the physical, so that that conscious being can communicate 
with us mere mortals. Such an interface must be possible in your theory 
(though not in mine) because you claim that the physical is produced by 
the platonic objects.


Get to it.

Otherwise this conversation has become repetitive and pointless.

Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Bruce Kellett


On 16/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 5:26 PM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:


On 16/10/2015 8:56 am, Jason Resch wrote:

On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 12:34 AM, Bruce Kellett
 wrote:


What evidence do you need to say that something does not
exist? Absence of evidence is, in this case, evidence of absence.


Why is that so in this case, when the standard form of that
phrase is "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence"?


Because if there is no evidence for something where one would, if
that thing existed, expect evidence, then one is justified in
saying that the thing does not exist.


So what evidence would you expect to see if platonic computations existed?


Evidence of conscious beings independent of any physical substrate. In 
other words, ghosts and the other insubstantial beings of popular 
mythology and fiction. I see no evidence of such beings where might 
expect to see it if they existed, so I conclude that they do not exist.


If there were an elephant in my room at this moment, I would
expect to see it when I turned round. The fact that I do not see
an elephant when I turn round is good evidence that there is no
elephant in my room. Absence of evidence is evidence of absence.


Bruno has shown that one thing we would expect to see is a quantum 
reality. And what do we see?


Bruno has shown no such thing.

Also, despite your claims to there being no evidence, there is in 
fact evidence of platonic computations. They exist independently of 
you, mean, and this physical universe, as surely as "7 is prime" is 
true independently of you, me and the physical universe.


The statement "7 is prime" is true by virtue of the axioms of 
arithmetic and the definition of a prime number. That does not imply 
that "7" exists in any sense whatsoever.


It does if you accept the truth of the axioms. Do you deny the axioms 
are true?


As a general matter, yes. Axioms are not true or false, per se. They can 
only ever be 'true' in particulr models. They are 'true' in some, and 
not in others. I refer you to my concurrent discussion with Bruno.



You confuse "true" being used of a proposition, with "exists".
That is a profound and serious confusion.


The truth of "7 is prime" implies no integer factors of 7 exist 
besides 1 and 7. The truth of "8 is composite" implies the existence 
of integer factors of 8 besides 1 and 8. I do not confuse truth with 
existence. It is the truth of a proof of existence that implies existence.
Perhaps of existence within that formal system. But you must be careful 
to distinguish between the notions of 'exist' as meaning that there is a 
true proposition in some formal system about that object, and 'exist' as 
in physical existence -- there is a physical object corresponding to 
that description. So "7" exists in the sense that there is a true 
proposition in formal arithmetic which states that "7" is prime. But 
there is no physical object corresponding to that abstract notion of 
"7". Confusing the two meanings of the word 'exist' lies at the heart of 
all your reasoning. And that is why I am so easily able to dismiss it.




In mathematics you have descriptions of Turing machines and
descriptions of computations, but no live machines or
computations.


There are both.


What evidence do you have for this assertion?


The existence of a UD implies a quantum reality, and we observe a 
quantum reality.
Accepting the truth of arithmetical systems like the axioms of 
Peano/Robinson arithmetic, implies their existence.


But I do not accept the 'truth' of these mathematical structures.

How can you do physics if you cannot count or add one number to another?


I can count without believing that numbers exist independently of their 
physical representation.


And, even if taken as a set of axioms upon which one can reason,
they do not imply that anything like a UD actually exists in any
useful sense. The UD is an idea in platonia, and it is totally
without function until it receives a physical implementation.


So then the Bruce Kellet that exist within a platonic calculation of a 
simulation of the milky way galaxy on the Planck scale is a zombie? 
Too bad for him, that his galaxy is only "abstract", rather than 
"concrete".


Ah, but there you betray the essential importance of the physical 
substrate. You are simulating a galaxy to support a conscious being. And 
that simulation is, of necessity, carried out on a physical computer. 
You have not yet given evidence of any consciousness existing without 
such a physical substrate.



Substrate independence simply means that you can replace all or
part of the human brain with computer-based equivalents. In
other words, strong AI. No need for platonia in order to say
that consciousness is

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Jason Resch

On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 7:36 PM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 16/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 5:26 PM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 16/10/2015 8:56 am, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 12:34 AM, Bruce Kellett <
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> What evidence do you need to say that something does not exist? Absence
>>> of evidence is, in this case, evidence of absence.
>>>
>>
>> Why is that so in this case, when the standard form of that phrase is
>> "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence"?
>>
>>
>> Because if there is no evidence for something where one would, if that
>> thing existed, expect evidence, then one is justified in saying that the
>> thing does not exist.
>>
>
> So what evidence would you expect to see if platonic computations existed?
>
>
> Evidence of conscious beings independent of any physical substrate. In
> other words, ghosts and the other insubstantial beings of popular mythology
> and fiction. I see no evidence of such beings where might expect to see it
> if they existed, so I conclude that they do not exist.
>

For your eyes to see them, they would need to be capable of manifesting
physical effects in this universe. E.g. they would have to be physical and
part of this universe. But we defined them as separate from and independent
of this universe. Therefore, we should not expect to see them with our eyes
or any other physical measurement apparatus.

This reminds me of the letter Everett wrote to Dewitt to convince him that
his inability to feel himself splitting could not count as evidence that he
was not splitting, for the theory explained why he would not be able to
feel himself split: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/manyworlds/orig-02.html

A crucial point in deciding on a theory is that one does *not *accept or
reject the theory on the basis of whether the basic world picture it
presents is compatible with everyday experience. Rather, one accepts or
rejects on the basis of whether or not the *experience which is predicted
by the theory* is in accord with actual experience.

Let me clarify this point. One of the basic criticisms leveled against the
Copernican theory was that "the mobility of the earth as a real physical
fact is incompatible with the common sense interpretation of nature." In
other words, as any fool can plainly see the earth doesn't *really* move
because we don't experience any motion. However, a theory which involves
the motion of the earth is not difficult to swallow if it is a complete
enough theory that one can also deduce that no motion will be felt by the
earth's inhabitants (as was possible with Newtonian physics). Thus, in
order to decide whether or not a theory contradicts our experience, it is
necessary to see what the theory itself predicts our experience will be.

Now in your letter you say, "the trajectory of the memory configuration of
a real physical observer, on the other hand, does *not* branch. I can
testify to this from personal introspection, as can you. I simply do
*not* branch."
I can't resist asking: Do you feel the motion of the earth?

>
>
>
> If there were an elephant in my room at this moment, I would expect to see
>> it when I turned round. The fact that I do not see an elephant when I turn
>> round is good evidence that there is no elephant in my room. Absence of
>> evidence is evidence of absence.
>>
>
> Bruno has shown that one thing we would expect to see is a quantum
> reality. And what do we see?
>
>
> Bruno has shown no such thing.
>

Have you fully read and fully understood Bruno's work on this?

>
>
> Also, despite your claims to there being no evidence, there is in fact
> evidence of platonic computations. They exist independently of you, mean,
> and this physical universe, as surely as "7 is prime" is true independently
> of you, me and the physical universe.
>
>
> The statement "7 is prime" is true by virtue of the axioms of arithmetic
> and the definition of a prime number. That does not imply that "7" exists
> in any sense whatsoever.
>
> It does if you accept the truth of the axioms. Do you deny the axioms are
> true?
>
>
> As a general matter, yes. Axioms are not true or false, per se. They can
> only ever be 'true' in particulr models. They are 'true' in some, and not
> in others. I refer you to my concurrent discussion with Bruno.
>

But in any model of the integers, 7 is prime will be true, and "7 exists"
is a provably true statement.

>
>
> You confuse "true" being used of a proposition, with "exists". That is a
>> profound and serious confusion.
>>
>
> The truth of "7 is prime" implies no integer factors of 7 exist besides 1
> and 7. The truth of "8 is composite" implies the existence of integer
> factors of 8 besides 1 and 8. I do not confuse truth with existence. It is
> the truth of a proof of existence that implies existence.
>
> Perhaps of existence

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Jason Resch

On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 9:18 PM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 16/10/2015 12:53 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 7:36 PM, Bruce Kellett <
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
>
> Two different meanings of the word 'exist'. Physical existence relates to
> physical objects; mathematical 'existence' relates to mathematical ideas.
>
>>
>> If you think these are the same thing, then show me the conscious being
>> that exists independently of any physical substrate. The fact that you
>> appear unable to do this, and no-one else has ever done it either, is
>> overwhelming evidence that no such non-physical conscious beings exist.
>>
>>
> Until you can point to a difference that makes a difference, between
> physical existence and mathematical existence, and no-one else has ever
> done it either, I see no reason to accept that "physical existence" is
> somehow more special, or more capable than mathematical existence.
>
>
> That particular difference does make a difference. Physical existence
> refers to objects of the physical world: mathematical 'existence' refers to
> mathematical ideas that 'exist' only in Patonia. Such platonic objects
> cannot be touched, kicked, or otherwise manipulated except insofar as
> physical objects might be taken to resemble them. If a calculation in
> platonia can produce consciousness, then show me the conscious being that
> is independent of any physical substrate.
>
>  I will allow you to provide the necessary interface between the platonic
> and the physical, so that that conscious being can communicate with us mere
> mortals. Such an interface must be possible in your theory (though not in
> mine) because you claim that the physical is produced by the platonic
> objects.
>
> Get to it.
>
> Otherwise this conversation has become repetitive and pointless.
>

See Bruno's interview of the machine.

Jason

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Jason Resch

On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 1:08 PM, John Clark  wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 11:20 PM, Jason Resch 
> wrote:
>
> > 
>> There is no evidence physical objects change.
>>
>
> Be honest now, do you really believe that remark deserves a response?
>
>

I wonder whether your e-mail deserves a response when you dishonestly
subvert the original message's content and references.

I can point you to sources/data, but can't make you read them nor think
about them. Is that my fault or your own?


>
> > 
>> Most of reality we cannot observe. I'm comfortable with there being many
>> things outside our small sphere of observability. Why aren't you?
>>
>
> If something is outside my
>  
> sphere of observability
>  then
> for me to
>  
> take it seriously
>  
> I insist I understand WHY it is
>  
> outside my
>  
> sphere of observability
> .
>  
> I clearly understand why objects more distant than 13.8 billion light
> years are outside my sphere of observability
>  
> so I take them seriously, but if calculations without matter that obeys
> the laws of physics do exist nobody has been able to explain to me why I
> can't observe them, so until somebody shows me such a calculation or
>  
> explains why I can't see them
> I
>  can't take
>  
> the idea
>  
> seriously.
>

It should be pretty clear why other universes and platonic objects are
outside your sphere of observability.


>
> 
>>> >> 
>>> I think there was a 100% chance that the universe I live in would be a
>>> universe amenable to life,
>>>
>>
>> > 
>> Read "The Cosmic Landscape".
>>
>
> Why, does Susskind say there is less than a
>  
> 100% chance that the universe I live in would be a universe amenable to
> life
> ?
>

He lays out a convincing case that the probability that any possible
string-theory universe would not be expected to be capable of supporting
life, which suggests that many universes with different laws exist. This is
science's most-accepted answer for explaining the apparent fine-tuning
observed in the physics of our universe.


>
> >>
>>> I 
>>> deny anything
>>> that contradicts experimental results.  
>>>
>>
>> > 
>> So then you have no reason to deny other universes which are by
>> definition unobservable.
>>
>
> I never said I did, in fact I said more than once that I thought Many
> Worlds was the best
> (perhaps least wrong would be more accurate)
>  
> quantum interpretation
> that I know of, 
> but that doesn't prove it's correct.
>
>
> > 
>> If you believe 2 + 2 = 4,
>>
>
> I do but apparently you do not, you said a calculator or anything
> physical is simulating arithmetic so all you can believe is that simulated
> 2 and simulated 2 is equal to simulated 4. 
>
>

2 + 2 = 4, and we know that because our simulations of 2 + 2 turn come out
to equal 4.


>
>
>> > 
>> then you should also believe the function F defined as F(x) = x + 2, will
>> return 4 when given input x = 2. And if you believe this, then you should
>> also believe there is a function P(s) which when given s_1 as encoding the
>> state of the tape and registers of a Turing machine returns a number s_2
>> encoding the state of the tape and registers after the Turing machine
>> advances by one step. And if you believe in such functions like P, you also
>> the function P(P(P(P( ... (s_1) ... implements N steps of a Turing
>> machine initialized with state s_1 and returns s_n. These functions exist,
>> and compute as surely as F(x) adds 2 to x.
>>
>
> A function "will" do absolutely nothing, in the future the function will
> be exactly the same as it is right now.  A function can not perform a
> calculation and neither can a definition, but a microprocessor made of
> matter that obeys the laws of physics can.
>

If you think: 2 + 2 = 4, independently of you, me or anything else, then
you should by extension believe that P(P(P(P( ... (s_1) ... = s_n
independently of you, me, or anything else. Therefore the truth of "P(P(P(P(
... (s_1) ... = s_n" implies the existence of the computation of n
steps by a Turing machine defined by P on input s_1.


>
>
>
>> >
 >>
 
 The Church-Turing thesis says that it is impossible for any computation
 (or program) to know what hardware it is running on.

>>>
>>> >> 
>>> It's not impossible at all, the John Clark program knows it is being
>>> run on 3 pounds of grey goo.
>>>
>>
>> > 
>> He doesn't. As he said earlier, he doesn't know whether or not Nick
>> Bostrom is right.
>>
>
> If 
> Nick Bostrom is right
>  then 
> the John Clark program is
> STILL 
> being run on 3 pounds of grey goo
> , it's just that the 
> 3 pounds of grey goo
>  is being run on a computer at a higher level. Computer X may be
> simulating computer Y which is simulating computer Z which is running the
> John Clark program, but computer Z is still running the John Clark program.
>

You still can't know that, because

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Jason Resch

On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 12:34 AM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 15/10/2015 12:07 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 1:17 AM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 14/10/2015 4:45 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> Cochlear implants and artificial retinas give evidence toward multiple
>> realizability, and therefore, against mind-brain identity theory. They show
>> that it is functional equivalence, rather than material/compositional
>> equivalence that matters. Since computers can realize any finite function,
>> then assuming there are no necessary infinities within the brain, computers
>> can realize any functional state the brain is able to realize. For
>> physicalism to be correct, you have to believe either that functional
>> states are irrelevant to consciousness, or that physics can instantiate
>> functional states which Turing machines cannot.
>>
>>
>> That is simply false.
>>
>
> Well that explains it.
>
>
>> Again it's not clear what you mean by computationalism.   Bruce can speak
>>> for himself, but I think he agrees that strong AI is possible.
>>>
>>>
>> Strong AI implies consciousness is substrate independent. But I thought
>> Bruce argued against consciousness being derivable from mathematical
>> computations, which would mean consciousness is substrate dependent: that
>> it depends on physically implemented Turing machines.
>>
>>
>> I certainly argued that consciousness could not be sustained on platonic
>> computations in arithmetic. But that was because I do not accept that such
>> things exist.
>>
>
> What evidence have you seen that led you to this conclusion?
>
>
> What evidence do you need to say that something does not exist? Absence of
> evidence is, in this case, evidence of absence.
>

Why is that so in this case, when the standard form of that phrase is
"Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence"?

Also, despite your claims to there being no evidence, there is in fact
evidence of platonic computations. They exist independently of you, mean,
and this physical universe, as surely as "7 is prime" is true independently
of you, me and the physical universe.


>
>
>
> In mathematics you have descriptions of Turing machines and descriptions
>> of computations, but no live machines or computations.
>>
>
> There are both.
>
>
> What evidence do you have for this assertion?
>

The existence of a UD implies a quantum reality, and we observe a quantum
reality.
Accepting the truth of arithmetical systems like the axioms of
Peano/Robinson arithmetic, implies their existence.


>
>
>
> Substrate independence simply means that you can replace all or part of
>> the human brain with computer-based equivalents. In other words, strong AI.
>> No need for platonia in order to say that consciousness is independent of
>> the substrate.
>>
>
> But if it is independent of substrate, and if computations exist
> platonically, then those platonic computations are equally capable of
> instantiating consciousness.
>
>
> You are confusing the meaning of 'substrate'. In the context, I meant an
> explicitly physical substrate. Platonia is an idea,
>

If Platonia is an idea, then so is "The primary physical reality". It is up
to science now, to determine which of these two ideas is more likely to be
true.


> it is no more 'physically real' than is the idea of a unicorn, or of
> Hogwarts School.
>

Of course it isn't physically real. But why assume physical existence is
the only kind of existence? That seems to be an idea based purely faith.


> Neither unicorns nor Hogwarts can instantiate consciousness. No more can
> the idea of platonia.
>

The idea of platonia doesn't instantiate consciousness, but objects within
platonia do.


>
> If you want to demonstrate that the idea of platonia can sustain
> consciousness of itself, then all you have to do is produce a conscious
> being that does not have an accompanying physical substrate. Until you do
> that, I think you should shut up about platonia.
>

Would you demand of Everett to produce a conscious being from another
branch of the wave function, or else shut up about the other branches of
the wave function?

If not, then why demand that I shut up about the consequences of
well-accepted theories?


>
> Why?  Arithmetic is system of propositions.  Whether it is real or not has
>> no effect on Church-Turing.
>>
>
> Then you should be equally happy to have your brain implemented by "unreal
> computations" as "real computations" :-)
>
>
> Computations in platonia are 'unreal' -- they do not exist, so cannot
> implement anything.
>
>
You said earlier that you have no evidence that objects of platonia do not
exist. So why insist so adamantly that they do not?


>
> and it's difficult to make sense of computationalism if you can no longer
> define computation or computability. So if you accept computationalism, you
> are implicitly accepting infinity and arithmetical realism. Given this, the
> rest of Bruno's

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Bruce Kellett


On 16/10/2015 8:56 am, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 12:34 AM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:



What evidence do you need to say that something does not exist?
Absence of evidence is, in this case, evidence of absence.


Why is that so in this case, when the standard form of that phrase is 
"Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence"?


Because if there is no evidence for something where one would, if that 
thing existed, expect evidence, then one is justified in saying that the 
thing does not exist. If there were an elephant in my room at this 
moment, I would expect to see it when I turned round. The fact that I do 
not see an elephant when I turn round is good evidence that there is no 
elephant in my room. Absence of evidence is evidence of absence.


Also, despite your claims to there being no evidence, there is in fact 
evidence of platonic computations. They exist independently of you, 
mean, and this physical universe, as surely as "7 is prime" is true 
independently of you, me and the physical universe.


The statement "7 is prime" is true by virtue of the axioms of arithmetic 
and the definition of a prime number. That does not imply that "7" 
exists in any sense whatsoever. You confuse "true" being used of a 
proposition, with "exists". That is a profound and serious confusion.



In mathematics you have descriptions of Turing machines and
descriptions of computations, but no live machines or
computations.


There are both.


What evidence do you have for this assertion?


The existence of a UD implies a quantum reality, and we observe a 
quantum reality.
Accepting the truth of arithmetical systems like the axioms of 
Peano/Robinson arithmetic, implies their existence.


But I do not accept the 'truth' of these mathematical structures. And, 
even if taken as a set of axioms upon which one can reason, they do not 
imply that anything like a UD actually exists in any useful sense. The 
UD is an idea in platonia, and it is totally without function until it 
receives a physical implementation.




Substrate independence simply means that you can replace all or
part of the human brain with computer-based equivalents. In other
words, strong AI. No need for platonia in order to say that
consciousness is independent of the substrate.


But if it is independent of substrate, and if computations exist 
platonically, then those platonic computations are equally capable of 
instantiating consciousness.


You are confusing the meaning of 'substrate'. In the context, I meant 
an explicitly physical substrate. Platonia is an idea,


If Platonia is an idea, then so is "The primary physical reality". It 
is up to science now, to determine which of these two ideas is more 
likely to be true.


Sure. And science has proved many times over that physical reality 
exists and can be operated on, while platonia is an idea that has no 
useful consequences whatsoever.



it is no more 'physically real' than is the idea of a unicorn, or
of Hogwarts School.


Of course it isn't physically real. But why assume physical existence 
is the only kind of existence? That seems to be an idea based purely 
faith.


Neither unicorns nor Hogwarts can instantiate consciousness. No
more can the idea of platonia.


The idea of platonia doesn't instantiate consciousness, but objects 
within platonia do.


Prove it by showing me this magical platonic conscious being.



If you want to demonstrate that the idea of platonia can sustain
consciousness of itself, then all you have to do is produce a
conscious being that does not have an accompanying physical
substrate. Until you do that, I think you should shut up about
platonia.


Would you demand of Everett to produce a conscious being from another 
branch of the wave function, or else shut up about the other branches 
of the wave function?


 Yes, of course. The other branches of the wave function are not real 
in any useful sense. They are an idea, just as is platonia. And ideas 
can have effects in the real world only through the intermediary action 
of conscious physical beings, never by magic.


If not, then why demand that I shut up about the consequences of 
well-accepted theories?


Well-accepted?



Why?  Arithmetic is system of propositions.  Whether it is real
or not has no effect on Church-Turing.


Then you should be equally happy to have your brain implemented by 
"unreal computations" as "real computations" :-)


Computations in platonia are 'unreal' -- they do not exist, so cannot 
implement anything.


You said earlier that you have no evidence that objects of platonia do 
not exist. So why insist so adamantly that they do not?


You should learn to read. I said no such thing. I said that the absence 
of evidence for platonia was evidence that it did not exist.


Are you familiar with Max Tegmark's

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Jason Resch

On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 5:26 PM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 16/10/2015 8:56 am, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 12:34 AM, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>
>>
>> What evidence do you need to say that something does not exist? Absence
>> of evidence is, in this case, evidence of absence.
>>
>
> Why is that so in this case, when the standard form of that phrase is
> "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence"?
>
>
> Because if there is no evidence for something where one would, if that
> thing existed, expect evidence, then one is justified in saying that the
> thing does not exist.
>

So what evidence would you expect to see if platonic computations existed?



> If there were an elephant in my room at this moment, I would expect to see
> it when I turned round. The fact that I do not see an elephant when I turn
> round is good evidence that there is no elephant in my room. Absence of
> evidence is evidence of absence.
>

Bruno has shown that one thing we would expect to see is a quantum reality.
And what do we see?


>
>
> Also, despite your claims to there being no evidence, there is in fact
> evidence of platonic computations. They exist independently of you, mean,
> and this physical universe, as surely as "7 is prime" is true independently
> of you, me and the physical universe.
>
>
> The statement "7 is prime" is true by virtue of the axioms of arithmetic
> and the definition of a prime number. That does not imply that "7" exists
> in any sense whatsoever.
>

It does if you accept the truth of the axioms. Do you deny the axioms are
true?


> You confuse "true" being used of a proposition, with "exists". That is a
> profound and serious confusion.
>

The truth of "7 is prime" implies no integer factors of 7 exist besides 1
and 7. The truth of "8 is composite" implies the existence of integer
factors of 8 besides 1 and 8. I do not confuse truth with existence. It is
the truth of a proof of existence that implies existence.


>
>
> In mathematics you have descriptions of Turing machines and descriptions
>>> of computations, but no live machines or computations.
>>>
>>
>> There are both.
>>
>>
>> What evidence do you have for this assertion?
>>
>
> The existence of a UD implies a quantum reality, and we observe a quantum
> reality.
> Accepting the truth of arithmetical systems like the axioms of
> Peano/Robinson arithmetic, implies their existence.
>
>
> But I do not accept the 'truth' of these mathematical structures.
>

How can you do physics if you cannot count or add one number to another?


> And, even if taken as a set of axioms upon which one can reason, they do
> not imply that anything like a UD actually exists in any useful sense. The
> UD is an idea in platonia, and it is totally without function until it
> receives a physical implementation.
>

So then the Bruce Kellet that exist within a platonic calculation of a
simulation of the milky way galaxy on the Planck scale is a zombie? Too bad
for him, that his galaxy is only "abstract", rather than "concrete".


>
>
>
> Substrate independence simply means that you can replace all or part of
>> the human brain with computer-based equivalents. In other words, strong AI.
>> No need for platonia in order to say that consciousness is independent of
>> the substrate.
>>
>
> But if it is independent of substrate, and if computations exist
> platonically, then those platonic computations are equally capable of
> instantiating consciousness.
>
>
> You are confusing the meaning of 'substrate'. In the context, I meant an
> explicitly physical substrate. Platonia is an idea,
>
> If Platonia is an idea, then so is "The primary physical reality". It is
> up to science now, to determine which of these two ideas is more likely to
> be true.
>
>
> Sure. And science has proved many times over that physical reality exists
> and can be operated on, while platonia is an idea that has no useful
> consequences whatsoever.
>

Science has never proven that the physical reality is not merely an
appearance to conscious entities that exist as a consequence of
platonically existing computations.


>
>
>
>
> it is no more 'physically real' than is the idea of a unicorn, or of
>> Hogwarts School.
>>
>
> Of course it isn't physically real. But why assume physical existence is
> the only kind of existence? That seems to be an idea based purely faith.
>
>
Can I take your lack of reply to mean you agree that it is only by pure
faith that you believe physical existence is the only kind of existence?


>
>
>> Neither unicorns nor Hogwarts can instantiate consciousness. No more can
>> the idea of platonia.
>>
>
> The idea of platonia doesn't instantiate consciousness, but objects within
> platonia do.
>
>
> Prove it by showing me this magical platonic conscious being.
>

Look in the nearest mirror.


>
>
>> If you want to demonstrate that the idea of platonia can sustain
>> consciousness of itself, then all you have

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Brent Meeker

On 10/15/2015 6:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 6:37 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:

On 10/15/2015 2:56 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 12:34 AM, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 15/10/2015 12:07 pm, Jason Resch wrote:

On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 1:17 AM, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 14/10/2015 4:45 pm, Jason Resch wrote:

Cochlear implants and artificial retinas give evidence
toward multiple realizability, and therefore, against
mind-brain identity theory. They show that it is
functional equivalence, rather than
material/compositional equivalence that matters. Since
computers can realize any finite function, then
assuming there are no necessary infinities within the
brain, computers can realize any functional state the
brain is able to realize. For physicalism to be
correct, you have to believe either that functional
states are irrelevant to consciousness, or that physics
can instantiate functional states which Turing machines
cannot.

That is simply false.

Well that explains it.

Again it's not clear what you mean by
computationalism. Bruce can speak for himself, but
I think he agrees that strong AI is possible.

Strong AI implies consciousness is substrate
independent. But I thought Bruce argued against
consciousness being derivable from mathematical
computations, which would mean consciousness is
substrate dependent: that it depends on physically
implemented Turing machines.

I certainly argued that consciousness could not be
sustained on platonic computations in arithmetic. But
that was because I do not accept that such things exist.

What evidence have you seen that led you to this conclusion?

What evidence do you need to say that something does not
exist? Absence of evidence is, in this case, evidence of absence.

Why is that so in this case, when the standard form of that
phrase is "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence"?

Also, despite your claims to there being no evidence, there is in
fact evidence of platonic computations. They exist independently
of you, mean, and this physical universe, as surely as "7 is
prime" is true independently of you, me and the physical universe.

In mathematics you have descriptions of Turing machines
and descriptions of computations, but no live machines
or computations.

There are both.

What evidence do you have for this assertion?

The existence of a UD implies a quantum reality, and we observe a
quantum reality.
Accepting the truth of arithmetical systems like the axioms of
Peano/Robinson arithmetic, implies their existence.

Does accepting the truth of "Watson was Sherlock Holmes sidekick."
implies that they both existed?

If you believe in axioms wherein you can derive a valid proof that 
"Watson was Sherlock Holmes sidekick" and that they exist.

"Believe in" would be a strange thing to do with axioms.  But it's 
trivial to devise axioms that entail "Watson was Sherlock Holmes sidekick.":

1) Watson was Sherlock Holmes sidekick.

Substrate independence simply means that you can replace
all or part of the human brain with computer-based
equivalents. In other words, strong AI. No need for
platonia in order to say that consciousness is
independent of the substrate.

But if it is independent of substrate, and if computations
exist platonically, then those platonic computations are
equally capable of instantiating consciousness.

You are confusing the meaning of 'substrate'. In the context,
I meant an explicitly physical substrate. Platonia is an idea,

If Platonia is an idea, then so is "The primary physical
reality". It is up to science now, to determine which of these
two ideas is more likely to be true.

it is no more 'physically real' than is the idea of a
unicorn, or of Hogwarts School.

Of course it isn't physically real. But why assume physical
existence is the only kind of existence? That seems to be an idea
based purely faith.

We commonly assume other kinds of existence; they're called
"fictional".

To say something exists "only in fiction" means it exists only as a 
false account from someone's imagination with no ties to reality.

In free logics propositions may

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Brent Meeker




On 10/15/2015 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

If arithmetic is false, Church-Turing thesis makes no more sense.


?? It will make sense as an axiom in a certain branch of mathematics.


Then it is no more the classical Church's thesis. It will be something 
like intuitionist Church's thesis. That would again be just a change 
of subject. It is like saying that 1 cloud + 1 cloud = 1 cloud can 
refute 1+1=2. That is not good logic.


But it's a good example of the limitations of axiomatic inferences.

BRent

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 11:20 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

> 
> There is no evidence physical objects change.
>

Be honest now, do you really believe that remark deserves a response?

> 
> Most of reality we cannot observe. I'm comfortable with there being many
> things outside our small sphere of observability. Why aren't you?
>

If something is outside my

sphere of observability
 then
for me to

take it seriously

I insist I understand WHY it is

outside my

sphere of observability
.

I clearly understand why objects more distant than 13.8 billion light years
are outside my sphere of observability

so I take them seriously, but if calculations without matter that obeys the
laws of physics do exist nobody has been able to explain to me why I can't
observe them, so until somebody shows me such a calculation or

explains why I can't see them
I
 can't take

the idea

seriously.

>> >> 
>> I think there was a 100% chance that the universe I live in would be a
>> universe amenable to life,
>>
>
> > 
> Read "The Cosmic Landscape".
>

Why, does Susskind say there is less than a

100% chance that the universe I live in would be a universe amenable to life
?

>>
>> I 
>> deny anything
>> that contradicts experimental results.  
>>
>
> > 
> So then you have no reason to deny other universes which are by definition
> unobservable.
>

I never said I did, in fact I said more than once that I thought Many
Worlds was the best
(perhaps least wrong would be more accurate)

quantum interpretation
that I know of, 
but that doesn't prove it's correct.

> 
> If you believe 2 + 2 = 4,
>

I do but apparently you do not, you said a calculator or anything physical
is simulating arithmetic so all you can believe is that simulated 2 and
simulated 2 is equal to simulated 4. 

> > 
> then you should also believe the function F defined as F(x) = x + 2, will
> [...]
>

A function "will" do absolutely nothing, in the future the function will
be exactly the same as it is right now.  A function can not perform a
calculation and neither can a definition, but a microprocessor made of
matter that obeys the laws of physics can.

> >
>>> >>
>>> 
>>> The Church-Turing thesis says that it is impossible for any computation
>>> (or program) to know what hardware it is running on.
>>>
>>
>> >> 
>> It's not impossible at all, the John Clark program knows it is being run
>> on 3 pounds of grey goo.
>>
>
> > 
> He doesn't. As he said earlier, he doesn't know whether or not Nick
> Bostrom is right.
>

If 
Nick Bostrom is right
 then 
the John Clark program is
STILL 
being run on 3 pounds of grey goo
, it's just that the 
3 pounds of grey goo
 is being run on a computer at a higher level. Computer X may be
simulating computer Y which is simulating computer Z which is running the
John Clark program, but computer Z is still running the John Clark program.

>>> > 
>>> the material universe is only apparent.
>>
>>
>> >> 
>> how would things be different if the
>>  material universe
>> was not
>>  only apparent
>> ?
>>
>
> > 
> It wouldn't be any different.
>

I agree, therefore the words 

"only apparent" that you use above has no meaning. 

>
>>> >
>>> >>
>>> 
>>> Russel Standish and Bruno Marchal both recovered a quantum reality from
>>> information theory and self-reference logic alone, respectively.
>>>
>>
>> >> 
>> Extra virgin, triple distilled, premium grade *BULLSHIT!!! *
>>
>
> > 
> Your bold-faced text and explanation points were extra convincing.
>

Yes I thought so too that's why I did it, not that much convincing is
necessary; anybody who had done half of what you claimed would be not just
the greatest scientists who ever lived but the greatest human being who
ever lived times 1000. And I just don't think Russell or Bruno are in that
category.

 John K Clark

>

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-15 Thread Brent Meeker




On 10/15/2015 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Not at all, I only assume a brain needs an external world to be aware of.


Either what you add to the brain is Turing emulable, and that means 
you are just lmowering the substittution level, and the reasoning I 
presented still follows (as he used the "generaluzed brain").


That misses the point.  It's not lowering the substitution level, it's 
also expanding the scope of the emulation to include the environment.  
Although brains are relatively isolated except for efferent and afferent 
nerve signals, they are not absolutely isolated.  They depend on 
decoherence in order to function as quasi-classical computers.  
Decoherence depends on interactions with the environment.


But if the emulation must be expanded to include an evironment it is not 
longer just an emulation of a brain, it is an emulation of a brain in a 
world.  The "physics" of that world is essential to the emulation.


Brent



















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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 14 Oct 2015, at 06:59, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/13/2015 8:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker   
wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


...
Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether  
matter is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer  
(or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed  
to computationalism disagree. They believe either that is not  
possible  
to   
make a computer that behaves like a human because there is non- 
computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger Penrose), or that it  
is possible to make a computer that behaves like a human but  
not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).


But the problem with what you say is that on this list  
"computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a  
computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno  
claims to have proven that your simple statement logically  
entails that all of physics and consciousness.  But that is not  
so generally accepted and so when someone "reject  
computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the  
inferences Bruno claims it entails.


I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the  
conclusions he draws from it.


But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are  
not true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that  
thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism  
disagree."  Those who reject (extended) computationalism, may  
very well agree.


If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the  
extended conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show  
where Bruno's argument is wrong.


Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and  
others have done.



I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?


No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the  
arguments.


1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't  
instantiate consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and  
doesn't logic entail its conclusion.  In fact the whole MGA is an  
argument from incredulity.


The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X  
by Y pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording  
shows. Therefore I don't see how one could argue (assuming  
computationalism) that a recording invokes the computation one  
presumes is necessary to instantiate a conscious state.


"Presume" is the operative word there.



Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the reductio  
to prove computationalism is false.


So then what is his theory of mind?


Dunno, probably physicalism.  But he's not obliged to have an  
alternative in order to reject one premise of a reductio.





2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while  
isolated.  He tries to make this plausible by supposing that his  
scenario takes place as a dream; but this is not convincing.  Even  
a dream needs prior experience of an outside world.


Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that  
it could be isolated from the outside world?


Yes.  A brain in a vat with no connections would not be able to  
sustain consciousness.


Aaaahh... OK, but then you assume indeed, like Bruce Kellet that  
computationalism is false.


But then we are outside the scope of what I am deriving consequence of.

(N, +) is not a group. That does not refute the theory of group.








  So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can exist  
independent of an external world.  It may be that physics can be  
derived from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that self- 
evaluation exists in arithmetic.  For the theory to work it must  
produce a world to be conscious of, and so far it doesn't do that.   
Bruno just writes things like, IF comp is true then physics must  
follow.  But that's like saying IF Christianity is true Jesus will  
return.


There is a lot of independent evidence for computationalism.


Name some that's not also compatible with physicalism.

The Church-Turing Thesis means a computer can perfectly replicate  
all human behaviors.


First, it's a "thesis", not a fact.


But we don't even try to talk on facts. We do hypotheses and derive  
conclusion.


You talk like if I have claim knowing some truth. I do not. You are  
doing philosophy of comp-theology. That belongs to the field of  
philosophy of science, which is not my

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 14 Oct 2015, at 08:17, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 14/10/2015 4:45 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
Cochlear implants and artificial retinas give evidence toward  
multiple realizability, and therefore, against  mind- 
brain identity theory. They show that it is functional equivalence,  
rather than material/compositional  equivalence that  
matters. Since computers can realize any finite function, then  
assuming there are no necessary infinities within the brain,  
computers can realize any functional state the brain is able to  
realize. For physicalism to be correct, you have to believe either  
that functional states are irrelevant to consciousness, or that  
physics can instantiate functional states which Turing machines  
cannot.


That is simply false.


Again it's not clear what you mean by computationalism.   Bruce can  
speak for himself, but I think he agrees that strong AI is possible.



Strong AI implies consciousness is substrate independent. But I  
thought Bruce argued against consciousness being derivable from  
mathematical computations, which would mean consciousness is  
substrate dependent: that it depends on physically implemented  
Turing machines.


I certainly argued that consciousness could not be sustained on  
platonic computations in arithmetic. But that was because I do not  
accept that such things exist. In mathematics you have descriptions  
of Turing machines and descriptions of computations, but no live  
machines or computations. Substrate independence simply means that  
you can replace all or part of the human brain with computer-based  
equivalents.


That is comp. And then comp entails that there is no such primitive  
substance capable of selecting a computation for consciousness.




In other words, strong AI.


That is incorrect. Strong AI just says that digital machine can think/ 
be-conscious. This does not logically entails that human or me are  
machine. machine might be conscious does not entail logically that  
only machines can be conscious.


But of course, if you agree that I (and you) am conscious, comp  
entails strong AI, as I or you would be example of thinking/conscious  
machine.





No need for platonia in order to say that consciousness is  
independent of the substrate.



But you need the "arithmetical platonia" to even define the term  
computation. No platonia entails no notion of computation at all.











Why?  Arithmetic is system of propositions.  Whether it is real or  
not has no effect on Church-Turing.


Then you should be equally happy to have your brain implemented by  
"unreal computations" as "real computations" :-)


Computations in platonia are 'unreal' -- they do not exist, so  
cannot implement anything.



In a sense of implementation different from the standard sense.






and it's difficult to make sense of computationalism if you can no  
longer define computation or computability. So if you accept  
computationalism, you are implicitly accepting infinity and  
arithmetical realism. Given this, the rest of Bruno's result is a  
logical proof, which is either correct or has an error.


No, you missed the point that it is not a logical proof.  It's an  
argument from incredulity.


"A Turing Machine either reaches a halting state or runs forever"
"A Turing Machine can emulate any other Turing machine"
"A Turing Machine has an unlimited tape"

None of the above items are true for physical approximations of  
Turing machines. If these basic principals of computer science are  
not true for physical Turing machines, then what kind of Turing  
machines are they true for? Is Computer Science founded on lies, or  
does it concern itself with a recently-discovered mathematical  
object for which these statements are true?


The definition is of an ideal Turing machine. No such ideal machine  
exists. Mathematical objects are idealizations: they do not exist.  
Any realization of a mathematical objects is necessarily less than  
ideal.


Well, you just assert that you believe in Aristotle theology. No  
problem as you accept that comp has to be false in that case. But comp  
is just what you called string-ai above. It is the assumption leading  
to the epistemological and ontological reversal.



Bruno




Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 14 Oct 2015, at 05:21, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker   
wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


...
Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether  
matter is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer  
(or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to  
computationalism disagree. They believe either that is not  
possible to make a computer that behaves like a human because  
there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger  
Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves  
like a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John  
Searle).


But the problem with what you say is that on this list  
"computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a  
computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno  
claims to have proven that your simple statement logically  
entails that all of physics and consciousness.  But that is not  
so generally accepted and so when someone "reject  
computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the  
inferences Bruno claims it entails.


I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the  
conclusions he draws from it.


But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are  
not true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that  
thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism  
disagree."  Those who reject (extended) computationalism, may very  
well agree.


If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended  
conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where  
Bruno's argument is wrong.


Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and  
others have done.



I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?


No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the  
arguments.


1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't  
instantiate consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and  
doesn't logic entail its conclusion.  In fact the whole MGA is an  
argument from incredulity.  Mallah, who has his own version of the  
argument, takes the reductio to prove computationalism is false.


We suppose that when you survive with an artificial brain, this due to  
the fact that the physical implementation of brain implements the  
relevant computations, and not some other magical phenomenon added to  
the description.


In that frame the recording cannot be conscious because it does not  
constitute an implementation of the relevant computations.






2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while  
isolated.  He tries to make this plausible by supposing that his  
scenario takes place as a dream; but this is not convincing.  Even a  
dream needs prior experience of an outside world.


As you say: prior. But then the physical supervenience is already  
false, as it asks for attributing consciousness s at the time of the  
physical emulation.




So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can exist  
independent of an external world.


Which world? Comp assume enough to make sense of 2+2=4. No more. It is  
a priori, at the start agnostic on Matter and God(s).




  It may be that physics can be derived from arithmetic, but it is  
not enough to say that self-evaluation existsin arithmetic.  For  
the theory to work it must produce a world to be conscious of,


I guess you mean a physical world, but then you beg the question.




and so far it doesn't do that.


It does, and it justifies already a quantum quantization for the  
measure one.





Bruno just writes things like, IF comp is true then physics must  
follow.  But that's like saying IF Christianity is true Jesus will  
return.


First, UDA proves that if comp is true, then physics *must* follow.  
There is no must in the second sentence.

Second, we get the entire propositional "jesus", so it is there.
Then given that it is the only precise theory explaining both Matter  
and Mind, and their relations, well, if you have another one, I am  
listening.





3. Peter Jones wrote several critiques pointing out that there is no  
reason to suppose a UDA exists, it's merely a hypothetical  
abstraction.


Peter Jones argument does not take into account the MGA (step 8).



A related criticism is that Bruno assumes arithmetic is infinite in  
order to use Godel's theorems about what a system cannot prove about  
itself.  But physics doesn't need infinities, they are just  
calculational conveniences.


Physics miss consciousness. It is not addressed at all. We don't do

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 14 Oct 2015, at 07:45, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 11:59 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 8:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker   
wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


...
Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether  
matter is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer  
(or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed  
to computationalism disagree. They believe either that is not  
possible to make a computer that behaves like a human because  
there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger  
Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that  
behaves like a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg.  
John Searle).


But the problem with what you say is that on this list  
"computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a  
computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno  
claims to have proven that your simple statement logically  
entails that all of physics and consciousness.  But that is not  
so generally accepted and so when someone "reject  
computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the  
inferences 
  Bruno  
claims it entails.


I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the  
conclusions he draws from it.


But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are  
not true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that  
thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism  
disagree."  Those who reject (extended) computationalism, may  
very well agree.


If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the  
extended conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show  
where Bruno's argument is wrong.


Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and  
others have done.



I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?


No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the  
arguments.


1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't  
instantiate consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and  
doesn't logic entail its conclusion.  In fact the whole MGA is an  
argument from incredulity.


The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X  
by Y pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording  
shows. Therefore I don't see how one could argue (assuming  
computationalism) that a recording invokes the computation one  
presumes is necessary to instantiate a conscious state.


"Presume" is the operative word there.


Okay, I think we agree then. You can have a theory that says a  
recording is consciousness, but then that isn't computationalism.  
And if it isn't computationalism then you can't use that as an  
argument against the logic used in the UDA which starts from the  
assumption of computationalism.




Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the reductio  
to prove computationalism is false.


So then what is his theory of mind?


Dunno, probably physicalism.  But he's not obliged to have an  
alternative in order to reject one premise of a reductio.



I'm nor familiar enough with his argument to comment.




2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while  
isolated.  He tries to make this plausible by supposing that his  
scenario takes place as a dream; but this is not convincing.  Even  
a dream needs prior experience of an outside world.


Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that  
it could be isolated from the outside world?


Yes.  A brain in a vat with no connections would not be able to  
sustain consciousness.


Can you dream?





  So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can exist  
independent of an external world.  It may be that physics can be  
derived from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that self- 
evaluation exists in arithmetic.  For the theory to work it must  
produce a world to be conscious of, and so far it doesn't do that.   
Bruno just writes things like, IF comp is true then physics must  
follow.  But that's like saying IF Christianity is true Jesus will  
return.


There is a lot of independent evidence for computationalism.


Name some that's not also compatible with physicalism.

Cochlear implants and artificial retinas give evidence toward  
multiple realizability,and therefore, against mind-brain identity  
theory.


I think I guess your intuition

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Bruce Kellett


On 14/10/2015 4:45 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
Cochlear implants and artificial retinas give evidence toward multiple 
realizability, and therefore, against mind-brain identity theory. They 
show that it is functional equivalence, rather than 
material/compositional equivalence that matters. Since computers can 
realize any finite function, then assuming there are no necessary 
infinities within the brain, computers can realize any functional 
state the brain is able to realize. For physicalism to be correct, you 
have to believe either that functional states are irrelevant to 
consciousness, or that physics can instantiate functional states which 
Turing machines cannot.


That is simply false.



Again it's not clear what you mean by computationalism.   Bruce
can speak for himself, but I think he agrees that strong AI is
possible.


Strong AI implies consciousness is substrate independent. But I 
thought Bruce argued against consciousness being derivable from 
mathematical computations, which would mean consciousness is substrate 
dependent: that it depends on physically implemented Turing machines.


I certainly argued that consciousness could not be sustained on platonic 
computations in arithmetic. But that was because I do not accept that 
such things exist. In mathematics you have descriptions of Turing 
machines and descriptions of computations, but no live machines or 
computations. Substrate independence simply means that you can replace 
all or part of the human brain with computer-based equivalents. In other 
words, strong AI. No need for platonia in order to say that 
consciousness is independent of the substrate.







Why?  Arithmetic is system of propositions. Whether it is real or
not has no effect on Church-Turing.


Then you should be equally happy to have your brain implemented by 
"unreal computations" as "real computations" :-)


Computations in platonia are 'unreal' -- they do not exist, so cannot 
implement anything.


and it's difficult to make sense of computationalism if you can no 
longer define computation or computability. So if you accept 
computationalism, you are implicitly accepting infinity and 
arithmetical realism. Given this, the rest of Bruno's result is a 
logical proof, which is either correct or has an error.


No, you missed the point that it is not a logical proof.  It's an 
argument from incredulity.


"A Turing Machine either reaches a halting state or runs forever"
"A Turing Machine can emulate any other Turing machine"
"A Turing Machine has an unlimited tape"

None of the above items are true for physical approximations of Turing 
machines. If these basic principals of computer science are not true 
for physical Turing machines, then what kind of Turing machines are 
they true for? Is Computer Science founded on lies, or does it concern 
itself with a recently-discovered mathematical object for which these 
statements are true?


The definition is of an ideal Turing machine. No such ideal machine 
exists. Mathematical objects are idealizations: they do not exist. Any 
realization of a mathematical objects is necessarily less than ideal.


Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Brent Meeker

On 10/13/2015 10:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 11:59 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:

On 10/13/2015 8:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker
> wrote:

On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker
> wrote:

On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker
> wrote:

On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker
> wrote:

On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

...
Standard computationalism does not say
anything about whether matter is primary or
not. It says that you can make a computer (or
a robot) that thinks and acts like a human.
Those opposed to computationalism disagree.
They believe either that is not possible to
make a computer that behaves like a human
because there is non-computable physics in
the brain (eg. Roger Penrose), or that it is
possible to make a computer that behaves like
a human but not one that thinks like a human
(eg. John Searle).

But the problem with what you say is that on
this list "computationalism" tends to mean
much more than, "you can make a computer (or a
robot) that thinks and acts like a human". 
Bruno claims to have proven that your simple

statement logically entails that all of
physics and consciousness. But that is not so
generally accepted and so when someone "reject
computationalism" here, it may be they are
just rejecting the inferences Bruno claims it
entails.

I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean
computationalism plus the conclusions he draws
from it.

But with that extended meaning, the following two
sentences are not true: "It says that you can make
a computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a
human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree."
Those who reject (extended) computationalism, may
very well agree.

If someone believes computationalism does not lead to
the extended conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on
them to show where Bruno's argument is wrong.

Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily -
which I and others have done.

I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed
this?

No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of
the arguments.

1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't
instantiate consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity
and doesn't logic entail its conclusion.  In fact the whole
MGA is an argument from incredulity.

The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given
X by Y pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording
shows. Therefore I don't see how one could argue (assuming
computationalism) that a recording invokes the computation one
presumes is necessary to instantiate a conscious state.

"Presume" is the operative word there.

Okay, I think we agree then. You can have a theory that says a 
recording is consciousness, but then that isn't computationalism. And 
if it isn't computationalism then you can't use that as an argument 
against the logic used in the UDA which starts from the assumption of 
computationalism.

Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the
reductio to prove computationalism is false.

So then what is his theory of mind?

Dunno, probably physicalism.  But he's not obliged to have an
alternative in order to reject one premise of a reductio.

I'm nor familiar enough with his argument to comment.

2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while
isolated.  He tries to make this plausible by supposing that
his scenario takes place as a dream; but this is not
convincing.  Even a dream needs prior experience of an
outside world.

Do you

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 14 Oct 2015, at 00:41, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/13/2015 3:04 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 13/10/2015 11:43 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-10-13 14:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett  
:

...

Who said matter was the end point?


You... why do you insist on matter, if it is not primary and can  
be made of something else ?


Who said matter was not primary?

Who said it was ? If it is not, then reality can be explained in  
terms of computations alone, and matter could be a product of  
computations... You dislike that idea, that somehow must mean  
matter is primary in your view... so IMO, you're saying matter is  
primary, don't you ?


I am not denying that, in all likelihood, matter is primary. I do  
not have any problems with that idea. In fact, it is a very  
productive position to take, and has led to all manner of useful  
results: none of which have been produced by computationalism.  
Matter is primary, and mathematics is simply a game played  
according to a set of rules developed from our experience of the  
physical world. The utility of mathematics is completely explained  
by the fact that it is based on physical experience. The utility of  
physics is explained in the same way.


Arguments over "primary matter" are really just semantic.  If we  
have a theory of the world its ontology is primary whatever it is.   
Whether we call that ur-stuff matter or a ray in Hilbert space or a  
computation is just picking a name; whatever it is it us "primary"  
and that means it's not analyzed in terms of something else (at 
least in the given putative theory of the world).  This is most  
obvious in physics where "primary matter" has been Platonic solids,  
solids/liquids/gases, atoms, vortices, wave functions, consistent  
histories, strings, D-branes,...  And similarly in mathematics at  
different times the fundamental stuff has been points/planes/lines,  
integers, sets, homotopies, categories, propositions,...  There is  
no definition of "primary matter" or "basis of mathematics" because  
what is primary is in a sense indefinable except to say it's primary.


The question is just which one you use. Comp use only numbers (or  
combinators ...). It works until now.


Physics use either a wave + a non intelligible theory of mind, or it  
uses Comp + a wave. But this does not work. (UDA).


Bruno.




Brent

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 14 Oct 2015, at 08:26, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/13/2015 10:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 11:59 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 8:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


...
Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether  
matter is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer  
(or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed  
to computationalism disagree. They believe either that is  
not   
possible to make a computer that behaves like a human because  
there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger  
Penrose), or that it is possible to make  
a   
computer that behaves like a human but not one that thinks  
like a human (eg. John Searle).


But the problem with what you say is that on this list  
"computationalism" tends to  
mean   
much more than, "you can make a computer (or a robot) that  
thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno claims to have proven  
that your simple statement logically entails that all of  
physics and consciousness.  But that is not so generally  
accepted and so when someone "reject computationalism" here, it  
may be they are just rejecting the inferences Bruno claims it  
entails.


I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the  
conclusions he draws from it.


But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are  
not true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot)  
that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to  
computationalism disagree."  Those who reject (extended)  
computationalism, may very well agree.


If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the  
extended conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show  
where Bruno's argument is wrong.


Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and  
others have done.



I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?


No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the  
arguments.


1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't  
instantiate consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and  
doesn't logic entail its conclusion.  In fact the whole MGA is an  
argument from incredulity.


The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X  
by Y pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording  
shows. Therefore I don't see how one could argue (assuming  
computationalism) that a recording invokes the computation one  
presumes is necessary to instantiate a conscious state.


"Presume" is the operative word there.


Okay, I think we agree then. You can have a theory that says a  
recording is consciousness, but then that isn't computationalism.  
And if it isn't computationalism then you can't use that as an  
argument against the logic used in the UDA which starts from the  
assumption of computationalism.




Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the  
reductio to prove computationalism is false.


So then what is his theory of mind?


Dunno, probably physicalism.  But he's not obliged to have an  
alternative in order to reject one premise of a reductio.



I'm nor familiar enough with his argument to comment.




2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while  
isolated.  He tries to make this plausible by supposing that his  
scenario takes place as a dream; but this is not convincing.  Even  
a dream needs prior experience of an outside world.


Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that  
it could be isolated from the outside world?


Yes.  A brain in a vat with no connections would not be able to  
sustain consciousness.


Can you dream?


Even when you're dreaming you are still interacting with your  
environment.  And complete sensory deprivation leads to the mind  
going into loops.








  So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can  
exist independent of an external world.  It may be that physics  
can be derived from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that  
self-evaluation  exists in  
arithmetic.  For the theory to work it must produce a world to be  
conscious of, and so far it doesn't do that.  Bruno just writes  
things like, IF comp is true then physics must follow.  But that's

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 14 Oct 2015, at 05:50, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker   
wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


...
Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether  
matter is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer  
(or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to  
computationalism disagree. They believe either that is not  
possible to make a computer that behaves like a human because  
there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger  
Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves  
like a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John  
Searle).


But the problem with what you say is that on this list  
"computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a  
computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno  
claims to have proven that your simple statement logically  
entails that all of physics and consciousness.  But that is not  
so generally accepted and so when someone "reject  
computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the  
inferences Bruno claims it entails.


I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the  
conclusions he draws from it.


But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are  
not true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that  
thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism  
disagree."  Those who reject (extended) computationalism, may very  
well agree.


If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended  
conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where  
Bruno's argument is wrong.


Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and  
others have done.



I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?


No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the  
arguments.


1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't  
instantiate consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and  
doesn't logic entail its conclusion.  In fact the whole MGA is an  
argument from incredulity.


The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X  
by Y pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording  
shows. Therefore I don't see how one could argue (assuming  
computationalism) that a recording invokes the computation one  
presumes is necessary to instantiate a conscious state.


Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the reductio  
to prove computationalism is false.


So then what is his theory of mind?


2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while  
isolated.  He tries to make this plausible by supposing that his  
scenario takes place as a dream; but this is not convincing.  Even a  
dream needs prior experience of an outside world.


Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that it  
could be isolated from the outside world?


  So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can exist  
independent of an external world.  It may be that physics can be  
derived from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that self- 
evaluation exists in arithmetic.  For the theory to work it must  
produce a world to be conscious of, and so far it doesn't do that.   
Bruno just writes things like, IF comp is true then physics must  
follow.  But that's like saying IF Christianity is true Jesus will  
return.


There is a lot of independent evidence for computationalism. The  
Church-Turing Thesis means a computer can perfectly replicate all  
human behaviors. A rejection of zombies, or a rejection of the idea  
that we can have no reliable knowledge of our own conscious states +  
Church-Turing Thesis gives you computationalism.



3. Peter Jones wrote several critiques pointing out that there is no  
reason to suppose a UDA exists, it's merely a hypothetical  
abstraction.  A related criticism is that Bruno assumes arithmetic  
is infinite in order to use Godel's theorems about what a system  
cannot prove about itself.  But physics doesn't need infinities,  
they are just calculational conveniences.


Ultrafinitism is a fringe theory which leads to a break down of  
mathematics as we know it. I think it is an extreme length to go to  
reject the UDA, to say there is a biggest number to which 1 cannot  
be added to.


Actually, Robinson Arithmetic is consistent with ultrafinitism. So,  
logically, ultrafinitism is not a threat for comp at the ontological  
level. Of course, to get physics, we need to

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 13 Oct 2015, at 22:36, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Oct 12, 2015 at 7:14 PM, Jason Resch   
wrote:

> Well look into Bruno's theory if you want some possible  
answers.

Answers are a dime a dozen, correct answers are not. And Bruno  
doesn't even know what questions to ask, like, "what does the  
pronoun "you" refer to, or what does "free will" even mean, or does  
the word "God" mean anything other than a amorphous grey blob, or  
does a chain of "why" questions ever come to an end?".  Bruno hasn't  
even thought it important to ask these questions much less find the  
answers.

You are just lying, or have serious memory problem, as I did answer  
the questions with all details.

At the same time you have confessed not reading the papers, so ...

You are just doing propaganda for your religious beliefs, it seems to  
me. Or for your ego or something.

Bruno

> What you propose explains less and assumes more.
You assume:
Physical universe -> Turing Machines -> Conscious Minds +  
Turing Machines that exist in math -> Unconscious zombies
Whereas, we might simply assume: Turing Machines -> Conscious  
Minds

You conclude with "Conscious Minds" but I do NOT assume nor  
do I need to conclude that a conscious mind or the physical universe  
exist because I know both from direct experience.

>> this simulation is being done by your physical brain.  
So physics is simulating mathematics and NOT mathematics  
simulating physics.

> In this case, yes, a physical process is simulating the  
properties of a (relatively) abstract mathematical object.

And that is the one and only type of mathematical  
object there is any evidence for.  Maybe other types exist, and  
maybe Harry Potter does too but there is no evidence for either.  
Well OK maybe I've overstated my case, the 2 slit  
experiment is some evidence that many worlds exist, and if an  
infinite number of them exist then Harry Potter might too 
. But even many worlds can't help with conjuring non- 
simulated mathematical objects into existence

> the other postulated universes of the string theory landscape  
possess the same ontological properties as mathematical objects: we  
can learn about them from this universe, but only via simulation. We  
can't affect them, and they can't affect us,

If that were true and we can't effect them and they can't  
affect us then it would not be science it would be philosophy or  
even worse theology. But it isn't true. if strings exist (a big if)  
then every time you move your finger you effect the strings in your  
finger, and if the strings were different physics would be different  
and if physics were different chemistry would be different and if  
chemistry were different you would be different.

> Why not review the current evidence?

If I ever run across evidence that computations can be made  
without the use of matter that obeys the laws of physics I make a  
solemn promise to review it.   

>> Perhaps mathematics comes from a desire humans have to  
develop a language that is especially good at describing the  
workings of physics. It's true as you pointed out that a lot of  
higher very abstract mathematics seems to have little or nothing to  
do with physics, but like any language once it is developed  
mathematics can be used to write fiction as well as nonfiction,  
perhaps a lot of it is like a mathematical Harry Potter novel.

> What do you believe is real,

John Clark is one example.

> and why?

I think therefore I am. And when I think differently matter  
changes and when matter changes I think differently. 

> What do you believe is unreal,

Harry Potter. And ideas that nobody or nothing has ever thought  
or ever will think, and patterns of behavior that matter will never  
perform.

> and why?

Just a hunch.

> Occam's razor applies. If mathematical objects exist, then  
the physical universes exists as a mathematical object. One must  
explain what the additional assumption of a physical universe adds  
or explains.

Occam's razor applies. If physical objects exist, then the  
mathematical universes exists as a physical object. One must  
explain what the additional assumption of a mathematical  
universe adds or explains.

> It [physics] fails to answer, why if there is only one  
or some physical universes that exist why those are exist while  
other, perfectly valid (from a mathematical structure perspective)  
do not exist.

If you think that mathematics is more fundamental than physics and  
if you think other physical laws have a perfectly valid mathematical  
structure then it is your responsibility and not mine to explain why  
they do not exist!  The obvious explanation is that having a  
perfectly valid mathematical structure may be necessary for  
existence but it is not sufficient because physics is more  
fundamental than mathematics

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 14 Oct 2015, at 00:24, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 14/10/2015 3:11 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Oct 2015, at 12:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 13/10/2015 8:40 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Oct 2015, at 07:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Has computationalism predicted spin? Special relativity? Quantum  
field theory? General relativity?


Computationalism is used implicitly in the theory of evolution,  
in biology, and in physics once we abandon the collapse of the  
wave.


Non-computationalism is only a collection of incompatible, often  
vague, ideas. There is not yet any working theory.


Then computationalism explains both consciousness and matter  
appearance already. Physics do not even try, it assumes them, and  
some identity link. It works well to make local prediction, but  
it fails on consciousness (when it does not eliminate it).


Physics is not a science addressing those questions.

Theology is the original science addressing those question, and  
indeed computationalism explains why neoplatonist theology fit  
better the most obvious facts (existence of mind and matter  
appearance) than physics, when physics is seen as a theology  
(Aristotle idea).


You just seem to be not interested in "philosophy" of mind or  
theology, and at the same time you argue that physics is the only  
correct theology, but then give us what is your non- 
computationalist theory of mind.


Give me your computationalist account of why the world we observe  
around us has three spatial dimensions and one dimension of time,  
with these dimensions obeying the laws of special relativity (or  
general relativity). And not just some wishy-washy claptrap such  
as, "if computationalism then these things must be so." Derive  
the actual facts of existence.


I might first ask you the same task with your apparently non- 
computationalist theory. You will perhaps tell me that in physics  
we assume such facts of existence, and so are dispensed to explain  
them. But then your account of the facts of existence is no better  
than "God made it".


Brute facts are like that -- they have no more fundamental  
explanation.


When I asked a physicist how the collapse of the wave was possible, he  
told me exactly that. This is the boring shut up and calculate. I can  
understand if the goal was to build a rocket, but here the goal is to  
develop a theory which explains matter *and* mind, and the relation  
between.






And there are always going to be some brute facts of experience. But  
the great advantage of physics is that we can take some facts about  
the world, model them, devise laws describing them, and then use  
these models and laws to predict other things.


Yes, physicians are good at that. It is just not the goal when you  
search for the big picture, without eliminating key elements.



As this process has developed over several hundred years, we have  
come to the point where we have a very good understanding of, and  
explanations for, most of the facts of our everyday experience --  
based on very few irreducible 'brute facts'.


Most, but missing a very important one: the mind. Materialist use  
mechanism for this, but then are unaware that it does not work. It is  
nice when you look exactly why, as it provides a sort of Darwinian  
explanations of where the physical laws come from, and we don't need  
to appeal to "brute facts", which is not satisfying when we search an  
explanation of those "brute facts".




I see nothing to be ashamed of in this. And I think it is  
disingenuous of you to simply dismiss all physical explanation as  
nothing better than "God did it".


It is exactly like that when in metaphysics/theology (our subject)  
they invoke primary matter. I am not criticizing physics at all. Only  
the metaphysics making that physics into a theology, and claiming it  
to be compatible with mechanism.


Don't confuse the physical science and the theological sciences. It is  
like confusing chemistry and physics.







Second, it is my job of logician of explaining that there is a  
problem with computationalism: we have to explain physics from  
numbers. That is the main result, except that when I discovered  
Gödel's theorem, I realized that the tools exists to begin the  
derivation, or at least to formulate the math problem to solve to  
do so.


Now, you do point on an interesting problem that we cannot avoid  
with computationalism, which is that we have to derive physics, but  
cannot know exactly the difference between physics and geography by  
observation.


Yes, you have to derive physics from computationalism. Until you can  
do this, you have nothing more than the hope of a theory -- you do  
not actually have a viable theory.


?

What about qZ1*, qX1*, qS4Grz1? Themselves derived from Robinson  
Arithmetic (and comp +  ZF, say, for the metalevel).


It is not a lot, but it is a beginning, and it explains already the  
main thing: the difference between matter and mind, and

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 14 Oct 2015, at 00:46, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 13 October 2015 at 21:43, Bruce Kellett  
 wrote:

On 13/10/2015 7:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:
The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic computation  
being responsible for our consciousness, along with many other  
properties seen in physics.
Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The double slit  
experiment is evidence for quantum superpositions of waves and/or  
particles. Nothing to do with consciousness. As for the rest of  
physics??


The theory has survived numerous tests, without being disproven,  
which is all we can hope for as evidence for any theory.


Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory. Computationalism is  
not. Computationalism can't even get the basic physics right, much  
less explain how the universe came to exist long before  
consciousness emerged.


Computationalism is the theory that a computer could simulate not  
only the brain's behaviour, but also consciousness. It is possible  
that the brain utilises non-computable physics, in which case  
computationalism would be false. Is that what you believe?


You present a false dichotomy. The brain might well be Turing  
emulable, and computationalism false. That would be the case if  
matter is primary and arithmetic merely a formal game.


Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether  
matter is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or  
a robot) that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to  
computationalism disagree. They believe either that is not possible  
to make a computer that behaves like a human because there is non- 
computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger Penrose), or that it is  
possible to make a computer that behaves like a human but not one  
that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).


But the problem with what you say is that on this list  
"computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a  
computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno  
claims to have proven that your simple statement logically entails  
that all of physics and consciousness.  But that is not so generally  
accepted and so when someone "reject computationalism" here, it may  
be they are just rejecting the inferences Bruno claims it entails.


Yes. And then people doing so must show the flaw. Clark tried, but  
fails. His many arguments just introduce an ambiguity on the pronouns  
by omitting the 1p / 3p distinction.


Bruno




Brent



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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 14 Oct 2015, at 04:04, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker   
wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


...
Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether  
matter is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer  
(or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to  
computationalism disagree. They believe either that is not  
possible to make a computer that behaves like a human because  
there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger Penrose),  
or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves like a  
human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).


But the problem with what you say is that on this list  
"computationalism" tends to mean much  
more  than, "you can make a computer  
(or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno claims to  
have proven that your simple statement logically entails that all  
of physics and consciousness.  But that is not so generally  
accepted and so when someone "reject computationalism" here, it  
may be they are just rejecting the inferences Bruno claims it  
entails.


I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the  
conclusions he draws from it.


But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not  
true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that  
thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism  
disagree."   Those who reject (extended)  
computationalism, may very well agree.


If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended  
conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where Bruno's  
argument is wrong.


Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and  
others have done.


I don't think you did, except by invoking the use of Occam Razor, but  
then all applied theories can be refuted in that way. Modern physics  
has not refuted logically Ptolemeaus cycles, which are indeed  
projectively consistent. Your strategy  added  magic (non Turing  
emulable) actuality to the computations.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 13 Oct 2015, at 18:10, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/13/2015 1:57 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett  
 wrote:

On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:
The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic computation  
being responsible for our consciousness, along with many other  
properties seen in physics.
Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The double slit  
experiment is evidence for quantum superpositions of waves and/or  
particles. Nothing to do with consciousness. As for the rest of  
physics??


The theory has survived numerous tests, without being disproven,  
which is all we can hope for as evidence for any theory.


Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory. Computationalism is not.  
Computationalism can't even get  the basic physics  
right, much less explain how the universe came to exist long before  
consciousness emerged.


Computationalism is the theory that a computer could simulate not  
only the brain's behaviour, but also consciousness. It is possible  
that the brain utilises non-computable physics, in which case  
computationalism would be false. Is that what you believe?


Let's be clear though that "non-computable" means Church-Turing non- 
computable.  It's possible that physics at some level is  
instantiated by some higher level of computability.


It is even necessary, a priori. (assuming c.)



CT non-computable doesn't imply supernatural magic.


Indeed. physics depends on the FPI, which makes probable the use of a  
random oracle, the halting oracle, and possibly others.


Bruno




Brent

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 13 Oct 2015, at 18:34, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/13/2015 2:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Oct 2015, at 07:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Has computationalism predicted spin? Special relativity? Quantum  
field theory? General relativity?


Computationalism is used implicitly in the theory of evolution, in  
biology, and in physics once we abandon the collapse of the wave.


Except those sciences were well developed already using Newtonian  
physics and before anyone had even guessed at quantum mechanics.  So  
I think you give to much credit to computationalism.  I don't  
thinkthere's been even one application of Godel's theorem, much  
less implicit reliance on it.


Newtonian physics is not a computationalist theory. It is based on  
analysis. But the application does not exploits this, and that has  
been considered as a defect of classical physics, although it is not  
when we assume comp.


The impact of Gödel's theorem has been huge, and its technics are used  
in computer science everyday. Another use is the understanding of our  
limitations, like when we say that Hilbert 10th problem is unsolvable.  
You remind me someone saying that the discovery of the irrational  
numbers changes nothing, because we never use real numbers. But that  
is false, we use them all the time. We just rarely use them  
individually with all their decimal, but we use the way they are  
related.








Non-computationalism is only a collection of incompatible, often  
vague, ideas. There is not yet any working theory.


Sure there is:  If you change some process in the brain it will  
change the conscious experience of the person.


This usually assumes computationalism.



And there are lots of details to that theory as to how the changes  
happen and what the mechanism is.  Which incidentally,  
computationalism contributed nothing.


It is used at least implicitly when evoking the existence of that  
mechanism. Diderot defined rationalism by computationalism: the belief  
in mechanical causes and explanation.








Then computationalism explains both consciousness and matter  
appearance already.


So does "God did it."  but both explanations explain too much.


Not at all. Why are you unfair? That is not your usual style. Comp  
provides a constructive derivation of physics, and the propositional  
physics (the propositional logic of observability, ad defined by UDA  
and its translation in arithmetic) is already extracted. And we get  
the difference between quanta and qualia, which was the goal.






Physics do not even try, it assumes them, and some identity link.  
It works well to make local prediction, but it fails on  
consciousness (when it does not eliminate it).


It doesn't fail.  It just fails to meet your critereon to having an  
axiomatic explanation.


Not at all. It fails. When people reason correctly with mechanism and  
materialism, they do eliminate consciousness, and the step 8 explains  
why they have to. Physics just contradict the existence of the first  
person data. The error is already present in Aristotle Metaphysics.




But even quantum mechanics doesn't have an axiomatic basis - or  
rather it has several different ones; which is typical of physical  
theories.


Same with the theory of computations. The point is that physics does  
not address the first person perspective fully, even if you can  
consider that Galileo, Einstein and Everett made giant step in that  
direction. Comp extends this a lot.







Physics is not a science addressing those questions.


True, but computer science and neurophysiology are addressing them.


They adress the "easy problem", by using computationalism, but faiking  
to see that this eliminate matter. Or when some intuit this, they  
eliminate consciousness because they can't abandon their religious  
belief in something that is undetectable: primary matter.








Theology is the original science addressing those question,


Theology is the science of gods and man's relation to god.


Yes. And Plato is the first to understand that Truth plays the role of  
God, which means it has a transcendental roots, and can be intuited  
only through person experiences, called "mystical". Physics and  
mathematics is borned from that intution: reality is more than what we  
see.






and indeed computationalism explains why neoplatonist theology fit  
better the most obvious facts (existence of mind and matter  
appearance) than physics, when physics is seen as a theology  
(Aristotle idea).


It's really a slur to label physics "Aristotlean".   Aristotle never  
did physics.  He did arm chair theorizing which he could have  
immediately refuted by simple experiments which he never thought of  
doing.  Thales and Anaximander and Aristarchus could much more  
reasonably considered physicist - but their influence was cut off by  
theology, by referring all mysteries to the action of gods.


Aristotle create physics, then his theories has been

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Brent Meeker




On 10/14/2015 8:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 Oct 2015, at 06:59, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/13/2015 8:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker
 wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


...
Standard computationalism does not say anything
about whether matter is primary or not. It says
that you can make a computer (or a robot) that
thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to
computationalism disagree. They believe either
that is not possible to make a computer that
behaves like a human because there is
non-computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger
Penrose), or that it is possible to make a
computer that behaves like a human but not one
that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).


But the problem with what you say is that on this
list "computationalism" tends to mean much more
than, "you can make a computer (or a robot) that
thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno claims to
have proven that your simple statement logically
entails that all of physics and consciousness.
But that is not so generally accepted and so when
someone "reject computationalism" here, it may be
they are just rejecting the inferences Bruno
claims it entails.


I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism
plus the conclusions he draws from it.


But with that extended meaning, the following two
sentences are not true: "It says that you can make a
computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a
human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree." 
Those who reject (extended) computationalism, may very

well agree.


If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the
extended conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to
show where Bruno's argument is wrong.


Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I
and others have done.


I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?


No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of
the arguments.

1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't
instantiate consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity
and doesn't logic entail its conclusion.  In fact the whole MGA
is an argument from incredulity.


The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X 
by Y pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording 
shows. Therefore I don't see how one could argue (assuming 
computationalism) that a recording invokes the computation one 
presumes is necessary to instantiate a conscious state.


"Presume" is the operative word there.


Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the
reductio to prove computationalism is false.


So then what is his theory of mind?


Dunno, probably physicalism.  But he's not obliged to have an 
alternative in order to reject one premise of a reductio.




2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while
isolated.  He tries to make this plausible by supposing that his
scenario takes place as a dream; but this is not convincing.
Even a dream needs prior experience of an outside world.


Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that it 
could be isolated from the outside world?


Yes.  A brain in a vat with no connections would not be able to 
sustain consciousness.


Aaaahh... OK, but then you assume indeed, like Bruce Kellet that 
computationalism is false.


Not at all, I only assume a brain needs an external world to be aware of.



But then we are outside the scope of what I am deriving consequence of.

(N, +) is not a group. That does not refute the theory of group.







  So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can
exist independent of an external world.  It may be that physics
can be derived from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that
self-evaluation exists in arithmetic. For the theory to work it
must produce a world to be conscious of, and so far it doesn't
do that.

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Oct 13, 2015  Jason Resch  wrote:

>> >> 
>> Answers are a dime a dozen, correct answers are not. And Bruno doesn't
>> even know what questions to ask, like, "what does the pronoun "you" refer
>> to, or what does "free will" even mean, or does the word "God" mean
>> anything other than a amorphous grey blob, or does a chain of "why"
>> questions ever come to an end?".  Bruno hasn't even thought it important to
>> ask these questions much less find the answers.
>>
>
> > 
> You said you had no answers to the question of why matter obeys physical
> laws. Now that I show you one possibility, you say they are a dime a
> dozen.
>

I always have an answer but if I don't have a good answer to a question I
either say I don't know or just keep my mouth shut.

>> >> 
>> You conclude with "
>> Conscious Minds
>> "
>>
>
> > 
> This is the conclusion of computationalism.
>

No, the existence of conscious minds (or at least the existence of one
conscious mind) is a observation not a conclusion; it is the starting point
not the ending point.

> > 
> Anytime there exist appropriate Turing machines there will be
> consciousness.
>

That is a 
conclusion of computationalism.

> > 
> You assume only certain Turing machines (those implemented by matter) can
> be consciouss,
>

All computationalism needs is a 
Turing machine
 that can actually make a calculation, and so far every single one of them
has been made of matter. No exceptions have ever been found and no reason
to think one ever will be,
.

> >> 
>> but I do NOT assume nor do I need to conclude that a conscious mind or
>> the physical universe exist because I know both from direct experience.
>>
>
> > 
> This is an assumption
>

If my consciousness is an assumption could you give me a example of
something that is NOT an assumption?

> > 
> (but perhaps you are blind to it being an assumption). You cannot assume
> the existence of the physical world from an experience of a physical world,
> as our dreams and the movie The Matrix or The Thirteenth Floor illustrate.
>

Maybe I do live in virtual reality, Nick Bostrom thinks we almost
certainly do and he is a pretty smart man, but that would not shake my
confidence that my consciousness exists one bit, nor would it cause me to
think that the words "physical world" have no meaning or that  there isn't
a difference between London and Hogwarts or between Winston Churchill and
Harry Potter.

> > 
> Computationalism alone says you are not matter
>

True, 

c
omputationalism
 says I am the way matter behaves when it organized in a johnkclarkian way
and I have observed that when matter behaves in a 
 johnkclarkian way
consciousness is produced. I can use  
c
omputationalism
 to conclude that when matter is organized in a jasonreschian way
consciousness is also produced, but only
Jason Resch
 can observe it. 

> > 
> You also have said two identical computations do not result in two people,
> but are the implementation of the same mind.
>

Yes.

> > 
> From this you might conclude that you are everyone one of your
> implementations across all the many worlds or possible physical worlds.
>

No not every one of my implementations; one of the John Clarks is just
like me except he remembers becoming a rodeo clown and another of being
elected Pope, and I don't remember either of those things.

> > 
> But computationalism also tells us the substrate is of no relevance, you
> can make computers out of pulleys, twigs, water pipes, etc. In effect, the
> relations between registers in some silicon chip, or relations between
> neurons, or electrons, form computations.
>

Yes. 

> > 
> So why not go the last mile and accept that you can even build computers
> out of relations between integers,
>

Because for computers (or for anything else) to actually DO anything
change is involved, and there is plenty of evidence that one pulley can
change another pulley and one neuron can change another neuron

or one transistor can change another transistor, but there is ZERO
evidence one integer can change another.

> > 
> Since the physical world is in essense identical and isomorphic to some
> mathematical object
>  [...] 
>

They are not identical, physical objects can change by themselves but as
far as is known mathematical objects can not.

>
>>> >>
>>> 
>>> a physical process is simulating the properties of a (relatively)
>>> abstract mathematical object.
>>>
>>
>> >> 
>> And that is the one and only type of
>>  
>> mathematical object
>>  
>> there is any evidence for.
>>
>
> > 
> What about the >10^500 other models of physics implied by string theory?
>

What about them? There is ZERO experimental evidence that any of those
10^500 string theory worlds exist, and that is exactly why a lot of people
are getting fed up with string theory. Some say that a theory that predicts
10^500 unobservable things is not a theory of

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 5:16 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> 
> John,
> You are just doing propaganda for Aristotle theological primary matter
>
Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that
one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

  John K Clark

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Bruce Kellett


On 15/10/2015 2:31 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Computationalism has an ontology on which everyone agree. Those who 
claim to disagree usually add philosophical commitment which is not 
used in the reasoning.


An ontology *is* a philosophical commitment, even if 'everyone' agrees 
on it. If the ontology is part of the reasoning, then it is 
opinion/philosophy, not logic.


Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Bruce Kellett


On 15/10/2015 2:10 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:


You talk like if I have claim knowing some truth. I do not. You are 
doing philosophy of comp-theology. That belongs to the field of 
philosophy of science, which is not my expertise. You cannot use 
philosophy for making people doubting a logical argument.


..

of course if you doubt the truth of RA axioms, then I can't explain.


Above you claim that you do not know some truth. So how do you know the 
truth of the RA axioms?


Of course, you are just being cavalier with your use of the word 
'truth'. Axioms are not things which can be said to be either true of 
false, at best they are only useful and productive, or not.


If arithmetic is false, Church-Turing thesis makes no more sense. You 
will have difficulties in defining computable function from N to N.


See above. Arithmetic is neither true nor false, it is only useful or 
not, depending on the context.


All proof of negative results are argument from incredulity. Proving 
~p is the same as proving p -> f.


This is just nonsense. An argument from incredulity is an argument that 
claims that the difficulty of believing a conclusion (incredulity) is a 
valid reason for rejecting the argument. Proofs are things that happen 
in formal systems -- starting from axioms and following pre-defined 
rules of inference. So the proof of ~p is simply a sound demonstration 
that ~p follows from the axioms according to the rules of inference. It 
is not a 'proof' that p is false. As I must stress again, truth and 
falsity are not words that can be applied within the context of 
axiomatic systems.


Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Jason Resch

On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 1:17 AM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 14/10/2015 4:45 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> Cochlear implants and artificial retinas give evidence toward multiple
> realizability, and therefore, against mind-brain identity theory. They show
> that it is functional equivalence, rather than material/compositional
> equivalence that matters. Since computers can realize any finite function,
> then assuming there are no necessary infinities within the brain, computers
> can realize any functional state the brain is able to realize. For
> physicalism to be correct, you have to believe either that functional
> states are irrelevant to consciousness, or that physics can instantiate
> functional states which Turing machines cannot.
>
>
> That is simply false.
>
>
Well that explains it.


>
> Again it's not clear what you mean by computationalism.   Bruce can speak
>> for himself, but I think he agrees that strong AI is possible.
>>
>>
> Strong AI implies consciousness is substrate independent. But I thought
> Bruce argued against consciousness being derivable from mathematical
> computations, which would mean consciousness is substrate dependent: that
> it depends on physically implemented Turing machines.
>
>
> I certainly argued that consciousness could not be sustained on platonic
> computations in arithmetic. But that was because I do not accept that such
> things exist.
>

What evidence have you seen that led you to this conclusion?


> In mathematics you have descriptions of Turing machines and descriptions
> of computations, but no live machines or computations.
>

There are both.


> Substrate independence simply means that you can replace all or part of
> the human brain with computer-based equivalents. In other words, strong AI.
> No need for platonia in order to say that consciousness is independent of
> the substrate.
>

But if it is independent of substrate, and if computations exist
platonically, then those platonic computations are equally capable of
instantiating consciousness.


>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> Why?  Arithmetic is system of propositions.  Whether it is real or not
>> has no effect on Church-Turing.
>>
>
> Then you should be equally happy to have your brain implemented by "unreal
> computations" as "real computations" :-)
>
>
> Computations in platonia are 'unreal' -- they do not exist, so cannot
> implement anything.
>

[image: Inline image 1]


>
>
> and it's difficult to make sense of computationalism if you can no longer
> define computation or computability. So if you accept computationalism, you
> are implicitly accepting infinity and arithmetical realism. Given this, the
> rest of Bruno's result is a logical proof, which is either correct or has
> an error.
>
>
> No, you missed the point that it is not a logical proof.  It's an argument
> from incredulity.
>
> "A Turing Machine either reaches a halting state or runs forever"
> "A Turing Machine can emulate any other Turing machine"
> "A Turing Machine has an unlimited tape"
>
> None of the above items are true for physical approximations of Turing
> machines. If these basic principals of computer science are not true for
> physical Turing machines, then what kind of Turing machines are they true
> for? Is Computer Science founded on lies, or does it concern itself with a
> recently-discovered mathematical object for which these statements are true?
>
>
> The definition is of an ideal Turing machine. No such ideal machine
> exists. Mathematical objects are idealizations: they do not exist. Any
> realization of a mathematical objects is necessarily less than ideal.
>
>
If you born in a universe with slightly different laws, you would say this
universe is only abstract and doesn't exist. I think you are just biased by
what is familiar to you.

Jason

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Jason Resch

On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/13/2015 10:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 11:59 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 10/13/2015 8:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker < 
>> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker < 
>>> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>


 On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker < 
 meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>
>
> On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker < 
> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>> ...
>> Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter
>> is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that
>> thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree.
>> They believe either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves
>> like a human because there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg.
>> Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves 
>> like
>> a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).
>>
>>
>> But the problem with what you say is that on this list
>> "computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a computer
>> (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno claims to have
>> proven that your simple statement logically entails that all of physics 
>> and
>> consciousness.  But that is not so generally accepted and so when someone
>> "reject computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the
>> inferences Bruno claims it entails.
>>
>
> I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the
> conclusions he draws from it.
>
>
> But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not
> true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and
> acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree."  Those who
> reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree.
>

 If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended
 conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where Bruno's
 argument is wrong.


 Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and others
 have done.


>>> I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?
>>>
>>>
>>> No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the
>>> arguments.
>>>
>>> 1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't instantiate
>>> consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and doesn't logic entail
>>> its conclusion.  In fact the whole MGA is an argument from incredulity.
>>>
>>
>> The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X by Y
>> pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording shows. Therefore
>> I don't see how one could argue (assuming computationalism) that a
>> recording invokes the computation one presumes is necessary to instantiate
>> a conscious state.
>>
>>
>> "Presume" is the operative word there.
>>
>>
> Okay, I think we agree then. You can have a theory that says a recording
> is consciousness, but then that isn't computationalism. And if it isn't
> computationalism then you can't use that as an argument against the logic
> used in the UDA which starts from the assumption of computationalism.
>
>
>>
>>
>>> Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the reductio to
>>> prove computationalism is false.
>>>
>>
>> So then what is his theory of mind?
>>
>>
>> Dunno, probably physicalism.  But he's not obliged to have an alternative
>> in order to reject one premise of a reductio.
>>
>>
> I'm nor familiar enough with his argument to comment.
>
>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> 2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while isolated.
>>> He tries to make this plausible by supposing that his scenario takes place
>>> as a dream; but this is not convincing.  Even a dream needs prior
>>> experience of an outside world.
>>>
>>
>> Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that it
>> could be isolated from the outside world?
>>
>>
>> Yes.  A brain in a vat with no connections would not be able to sustain
>> consciousness.
>>
>
> Can you dream?
>
>
> Even when you're dreaming you are still interacting with your
> environment.  And complete sensory deprivation leads to the mind going into
> loops.
>
>
When your dreaming your brain

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:26 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

> 
> Here are the alternatives to computationalism, and their problems:
>
*Interactionism (Dualism):* Postulates a non-physical soul which
>  [...]
>

Which is contradicted by experiment. 

In every observation a change in consciousness corresponds to a change in
something physical (like a brain) and a change in something physical (like
a brain) corresponds to a change in consciousness.

> > 
> can both influence and be influenced by the physical world.
>

As you say that is a problem because that sounds like regular old matter
to me, there is nothing "
non-physical
" about a soul like that.

*> Epiphenomimalism (Dualism):* Postulates a non-physical soul which
>  [...]
>

Which is contradicted by experiment. 

In every observation a change in consciousness corresponds to a change in
something physical (like a brain) and a change in something physical (like
a brain) corresponds to a change in consciousness.

> > 
> is influenced by the physical world, but which does not affect the
> physical world.
>

I can perform an experiment right now on the internet to determine if that
is true or not. After I put a period to the end of this sentence I will
attempt to use my soul to effect the PHYSICAL X key on my keyboard by
moving the physical key inward, if you see such a X you will know that my
soul was able to change something in the physical world. X 

> *> Pre-Established Harmony (Dualism):* Postulates a distinct physical
> world and a mental world, neither of which can affect the other,
>  
> but through God are made to agree with one another.
>

In other words God is lying to us. And the universe is not 13.8 billion
years old and the memories you have as a child and dinosaur bones and the
cosmic microwave background radiation were all created by God 13.8 seconds
ago. Even on a list of very silly theories this is one of the silliest.

> > 
> This suffers from Occam's razor.
>

One of the greatest understatements 
of all time.

*> Idealism:* Is the result of eliminating the physical world but keeping
> the mental world. It cannot explain why we have succeeded in building
> predictive frameworks (such as physics).
>

Nor can it explain how things would be the slightest bit different if the
physical world were not eliminated, that is to say it can't explain what
 "eliminated" means.

*> Mind-Brain Identity Thesis (Physicalism):* Supposes a one-to-one
> mapping between mental states and brain states.
>

I have no trouble with one specific physical state leading to one specific
conscious state, but I see no reason why 2 very different physical states
couldn't lead to the same conscious state if they were computationally
equivalent.  

> > 
> The theory implies zombies,
>

If that theory implies zombies then either that theory is wrong or
Darwin's theory is wrong. I don't think Darwin's theory is wrong.

*> Non-Computable Physics (Physicalism):* Holds that computationalism is
> false due to conjectured (but as of yet undiscovered) operations in physics
> which are somehow necessary for consciousness.
>

The old magic causes consciousness theory, but that will not satisfy the
die hard consciousness fanboys because they will want to know how that
magic works and then it would become science not magic, and even then they
will not be satisfied because they will say that a step is still missing
because even magic is not consciousness.  

> > 
> Penrose supposes this might be quantum theory,
>

Even if true (and there is no evidence it is) that won't satisfy fanboys
because
quantum theory
 isn't consciousness either.

> 
> because he thinks humans can solve the halting problem but computers
> cannot.
>

I disagree with Penrose on some things but he is not a fool, he knows
that human beings can't solve the halting problem.

*> Weak AI / Biological Naturalism (Physicalism):* The power and
> generality of the Church-Turing thesis have led some, philosophers such as
> Searle, and Ned Block, to admit that a computer can replicate all behaviors
> associated with human intelligence, however, they think this computer would
> never be conscious.
>  
> This leads to issues such as fading/dancing qualia in cases of gradual
> neuron replacement, and philsophical zombies.
>

If that theory is true then Darwin's theory was wrong. I don't think
Darwin's theory was wrong.

None of the alternatives to computationalism are worth a bucket of warm
spit.

 John K Clark

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Jason Resch

On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 4:01 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 14 Oct 2015, at 05:50, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker < 
>>> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>


 On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



 On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker < 
 meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>
>
> On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> ...
> Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter
> is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that
> thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree.
> They believe either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves
> like a human because there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg.
> Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves 
> like
> a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).
>
>
> But the problem with what you say is that on this list
> "computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a computer
> (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno claims to have
> proven that your simple statement logically entails that all of physics 
> and
> consciousness.  But that is not so generally accepted and so when someone
> "reject computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the
> inferences Bruno claims it entails.
>

 I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the
 conclusions he draws from it.


 But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not
 true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and
 acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree."  Those who
 reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree.

>>>
>>> If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended
>>> conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where Bruno's
>>> argument is wrong.
>>>
>>>
>>> Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and others
>>> have done.
>>>
>>>
>> I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?
>>
>>
>> No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the
>> arguments.
>>
>> 1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't instantiate
>> consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and doesn't logic entail
>> its conclusion.  In fact the whole MGA is an argument from incredulity.
>>
>
> The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X by Y
> pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording shows. Therefore
> I don't see how one could argue (assuming computationalism) that a
> recording invokes the computation one presumes is necessary to instantiate
> a conscious state.
>
>
>> Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the reductio to
>> prove computationalism is false.
>>
>
> So then what is his theory of mind?
>
>
>>
>> 2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while isolated.  He
>> tries to make this plausible by supposing that his scenario takes place as
>> a dream; but this is not convincing.  Even a dream needs prior experience
>> of an outside world.
>>
>
> Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that it could
> be isolated from the outside world?
>
>
>>   So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can exist
>> independent of an external world.  It may be that physics can be derived
>> from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that self-evaluation exists in
>> arithmetic.  For the theory to work it must produce a world to be conscious
>> of, and so far it doesn't do that.  Bruno just writes things like, IF comp
>> is true then physics must follow.  But that's like saying IF Christianity
>> is true Jesus will return.
>>
>
> There is a lot of independent evidence for computationalism. The
> Church-Turing Thesis means a computer can perfectly replicate all human
> behaviors. A rejection of zombies, or a rejection of the idea that we can
> have no reliable knowledge of our own conscious states + Church-Turing
> Thesis gives you computationalism.
>
>
>>
>> 3. Peter Jones wrote several critiques pointing out that there is no
>> reason to suppose a UDA exists, it's merely a hypothetical abstraction.  A
>> related criticism is that Bruno assumes arithmetic is infinite in order to
>> use Godel's theorems about what a system cannot prove about itself.  But
>> physics doesn't need

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Jason Resch

On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 10:31 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 14 Oct 2015, at 07:45, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 11:59 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 10/13/2015 8:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker < 
>>> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>


 On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker < 
 meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>
>
> On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker < 
> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>> ...
>> Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter
>> is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that
>> thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree.
>> They believe either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves
>> like a human because there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg.
>> Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves 
>> like
>> a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).
>>
>>
>> But the problem with what you say is that on this list
>> "computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a computer
>> (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno claims to have
>> proven that your simple statement logically entails that all of physics 
>> and
>> consciousness.  But that is not so generally accepted and so when someone
>> "reject computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the
>> inferences Bruno claims it entails.
>>
>
> I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the
> conclusions he draws from it.
>
>
> But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not
> true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and
> acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree."  Those who
> reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree.
>

 If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended
 conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where Bruno's
 argument is wrong.


 Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and others
 have done.


>>> I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?
>>>
>>>
>>> No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the
>>> arguments.
>>>
>>> 1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't instantiate
>>> consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and doesn't logic entail
>>> its conclusion.  In fact the whole MGA is an argument from incredulity.
>>>
>>
>> The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X by Y
>> pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording shows. Therefore
>> I don't see how one could argue (assuming computationalism) that a
>> recording invokes the computation one presumes is necessary to instantiate
>> a conscious state.
>>
>>
>> "Presume" is the operative word there.
>>
>>
> Okay, I think we agree then. You can have a theory that says a recording
> is consciousness, but then that isn't computationalism. And if it isn't
> computationalism then you can't use that as an argument against the logic
> used in the UDA which starts from the assumption of computationalism.
>
>
>>
>>
>>> Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the reductio to
>>> prove computationalism is false.
>>>
>>
>> So then what is his theory of mind?
>>
>>
>> Dunno, probably physicalism.  But he's not obliged to have an alternative
>> in order to reject one premise of a reductio.
>>
>>
> I'm nor familiar enough with his argument to comment.
>
>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> 2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while isolated.
>>> He tries to make this plausible by supposing that his scenario takes place
>>> as a dream; but this is not convincing.  Even a dream needs prior
>>> experience of an outside world.
>>>
>>
>> Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that it
>> could be isolated from the outside world?
>>
>>
>> Yes.  A brain in a vat with no connections would not be able to sustain
>> consciousness.
>>
>
> Can you dream?
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>   So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can exist
>>> independent of an external world.  It may be that physics can be derived
>>> from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Brent Meeker




On 10/14/2015 6:59 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 4:01 AM, Bruno Marchal > wrote:






Actually, Robinson Arithmetic is consistent with ultrafinitism.
So, logically, ultrafinitism is not a threat for comp at the
ontological level. Of course, to get physics, we need to interview
non ultra-finitist observers, as they are mute on almost all
interesting questions, so Peter Jones argument could still be
recuperated by NOT listening or taking into account most observers
existing in the least model of RA. But this met your critics.

I just point to the fact that a biggest number is not so much a
logical threat that I thought once.

A good exercise: find a model of RA with a biggest natural number
(of course such a model will not please to an ultrafinitist).


1. 0 is not the predecessor of any number
2. predecessor of x = predecessor of y -> x = y
3. Every number is 0 or a predecessor of a number
4. x - 0 = x
5. x - predecessor of y = predecessor of (x - y)


??  x - predecessor of x = predecessor of (x - x)

Brent


6. x * 0 = 0
7. x * predecessor of y = (x * y) - x


Nelson wrote a book on predicative arithmetic, and defends the
idea that the exponentiation function n^x is not total. It can be
interesting in showing that ultrafinitism is really not relevant
for any mechanistic account of mind and nature.


What about when the biggest number isn't big enough to contain enough 
information to realize a conscious state?


Jason




4. Bruno leans heavily on saying his theory explains QM, but
it's not clear to me that it's even consistent with QM.  For
example how is the operation of Shor's algorithm consistent
with the multiple threads of the UDA?

I think Bruce Kellet has also made some critiques of Bruno's
argument.


Bruce's argument is that computationalism is false, and
arithmetical realism is false. If you reject these, it is no
conflict with the UDA, whose logic depends on those assumptions.

Your argument in #1 and #2, also rests implicity on a rejection
of computationslim. #1 implies the computations don't matter, and
#2 implies the right computations don't matter if they are isolated.

It is a red herring to ask "where is the error" because I
don't think his argument is a fallacy; I think it is less
than logic entailment.


You can dispute the assumptions (computationalism, infinity,
arithmetical realism, etc.) but if you reject infinity or
arithmetical realism, you must also reject Church-Turing's
thesis, and it's difficult to make sense of computationalism if
you can no longer define computation or computability. So if you
accept computationalism, you are implicitly accepting infinity
and arithmetical realism. Given this, the rest of Bruno's result
is a logical proof, which is either correct or has an error.

Jason

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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-14 Thread Jason Resch

On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 3:17 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015  Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> 
>>> >> 
>>> Answers are a dime a dozen, correct answers are not. And Bruno doesn't
>>> even know what questions to ask, like, "what does the pronoun "you" refer
>>> to, or what does "free will" even mean, or does the word "God" mean
>>> anything other than a amorphous grey blob, or does a chain of "why"
>>> questions ever come to an end?".  Bruno hasn't even thought it important to
>>> ask these questions much less find the answers.
>>>
>>
>> > 
>> You said you had no answers to the question of why matter obeys physical
>> laws. Now that I show you one possibility, you say they are a dime a
>> dozen.
>>
>
> I always have an answer but if I don't have a good answer to a question
> I either say I don't know or just keep my mouth shut.
>
>
> 
>>> >> 
>>> You conclude with "
>>> Conscious Minds
>>> "
>>>
>>
>> > 
>> This is the conclusion of computationalism.
>>
>
> No, the existence of conscious minds (or at least the existence of one
> conscious mind) is a observation not a conclusion; it is the starting point
> not the ending point.
>
>
>> > 
>> Anytime there exist appropriate Turing machines there will be
>> consciousness.
>>
>
> That is a 
> conclusion of computationalism.
>
>
>> > 
>> You assume only certain Turing machines (those implemented by matter) can
>> be consciouss,
>>
>
> All computationalism needs is a 
> Turing machine
>  that can actually make a calculation, and so far every single one of
> them has been made of matter. No exceptions have ever been found and no
> reason to think one ever will be,
> .
>
>> >> 
>>> but I do NOT assume nor do I need to conclude that a conscious mind or
>>> the physical universe exist because I know both from direct experience.
>>>
>>
>> > 
>> This is an assumption
>>
>
> If my consciousness is an assumption could you give me a example of
> something that is NOT an assumption?
>
>
>> > 
>> (but perhaps you are blind to it being an assumption). You cannot assume
>> the existence of the physical world from an experience of a physical world,
>> as our dreams and the movie The Matrix or The Thirteenth Floor illustrate.
>>
>
> Maybe I do live in virtual reality, Nick Bostrom thinks we almost
> certainly do and he is a pretty smart man, but that would not shake my
> confidence that my consciousness exists one bit, nor would it cause me to
> think that the words "physical world" have no meaning or that  there isn't
> a difference between London and Hogwarts or between Winston Churchill and
> Harry Potter.
>
>
>> > 
>> Computationalism alone says you are not matter
>>
>
> True, 
>
> c
> omputationalism
>  says I am the way matter behaves when it organized in a johnkclarkian
> way and I have observed that when matter behaves in a 
>  johnkclarkian way
> consciousness is produced. I can use  
> c
> omputationalism
>  to conclude that when matter is organized in a jasonreschian way
> consciousness is also produced, but only
> Jason Resch
>  can observe it. 
>
>
>> > 
>> You also have said two identical computations do not result in two
>> people, but are the implementation of the same mind.
>>
>
> Yes.
>
>
>
>> > 
>> From this you might conclude that you are everyone one of your
>> implementations across all the many worlds or possible physical worlds.
>>
>
> No not every one of my implementations; one of the John Clarks is just
> like me except he remembers becoming a rodeo clown and another of being
> elected Pope, and I don't remember either of those things.
>
>
>> > 
>> But computationalism also tells us the substrate is of no relevance, you
>> can make computers out of pulleys, twigs, water pipes, etc. In effect, the
>> relations between registers in some silicon chip, or relations between
>> neurons, or electrons, form computations.
>>
>
> Yes. 
>
>
>> > 
>> So why not go the last mile and accept that you can even build computers
>> out of relations between integers,
>>
>
> Because for computers (or for anything else) to actually DO anything
> change is involved, and there is plenty of evidence that one pulley can
> change another pulley and one neuron can change another neuron
>
> or one transistor can change another transistor, but there is ZERO
> evidence one integer can change another.
>

There is no evidence
 anything in
physics changes either. And some evidence
 against
it. If our universe is a four-dimensional static structure, then change is
only apparent.



>
>
>> > 
>> Since the physical world is in essense identical and isomorphic to some
>> mathematical object
>>  [...] 
>>
>
> They are not identical, physical objects can change by themselves but as
> far as is known mathematical objects can not.
>

There is no

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