Hardware, Software, Humans: Truth, Fiction, and Abstraction

[Philip Thrift]

*Hardware, Software, Humans: Truth, Fiction, and Abstraction*
Graham White [ http://www.eecs.qmul.ac.uk/profiles/whitegraham.html ]

pdf: 
https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/11717/White%20Hardware,%20Software,%20Humans%3A%20Truth,%20Fiction%20and%20Abstraction%202015%20Accepted.pdf?sequence=1

@philipthrift

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Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 6:57:54 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 5:21:25 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 3:48:25 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/6/2019 4:05 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 5:42:13 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote: 
>>>>
>>>> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 12:59:15 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle
>>>>>  
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of 
>>>>> mathematical objectivity – the view that mathematical statements are made 
>>>>> true by reference to abstract mathematical objects that are in some way 
>>>>> real, even though we can’t see, touch or feel them. 
>>>>>
>>>>> According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the 
>>>>> proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language 
>>>>> which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and 
>>>>> predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also 
>>>>> whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, 
>>>>> then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the 
>>>>> whole sentence.
>>>>>
>>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This leads me to appreciate on some level why Feynman called this 
>>>> philosofuzzy.
>>>>
>>>> LC 
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Which is why Feyerabend (who I think was together with Feynman when he 
>>> came to some conferences in Berkeley) said 
>>>
>>> The withdrawal of philosophy into a "professional" shell of its own has 
>>> had disastrous consequences. The younger generation of physicists, the 
>>> *Feynman*s <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Feynman>, the 
>>> Schwingers <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Schwinger>, etc., may 
>>> be very bright; they may be more intelligent than their predecessors, than 
>>> Bohr <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niels_Bohr>, Einstein 
>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein>, Schrödinger 
>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erwin_Schr%C3%B6dinger>, Boltzmann 
>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Boltzmann>, Mach 
>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_Mach> and so on. *But they are 
>>> uncivilized savages: they lack in philosophical depth.*
>>>
>>> So true.
>>>
>>>
>>> Depth is no virtue when you're just muddying the water.
>>>
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>>
>>> Each philosopher knows a lot but, as a whole, philosophers don't know 
>>> anything. If they did, they would be scientists.
>>>   --- Ludwig Krippahl
>>>
>>> "The point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to 
>>> seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one 
>>> will believe it."
>>>--- Bertrand Russell
>>>
>>> Philosophie ist der systematische Missbrauch einer eigens zu
>>> diesem Zweck entwickelten Terminologie."
>>>  ---Wolfgang Pauli
>>>
>>> "The philosophy of science is just about as useful to scientists
>>> as ornithology is to birds."
>>>   --- Steven Weinberg
>>>
>>> So is Feyerabend so sure his depth is more profound than theirs?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> What some scientist calls "philosofuzzy" (Frege, Wittgenstein, Quine) 
>> perhaps is to hide their own fuzzy philosophy. (I can't find a reference 
>> for Feynman ever using that term though).
>>
>> *Physicists Are Philosophers, Too*
>> Victor J. Stenger
>>
>> https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/physicists-are-philosophers-too/ 
>> <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.scientificamerican.com%2Farticle%2Fphysicists-are-philosophers-too%2F=D=1=AFQjCNFAQ_dYRuAIZIUK1qHoPwDk_zkrLw>
>>
>> What we are seeing h

Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 5:21:25 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 3:48:25 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12/6/2019 4:05 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 5:42:13 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote: 
>>>
>>> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 12:59:15 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle
>>>>  
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of 
>>>> mathematical objectivity – the view that mathematical statements are made 
>>>> true by reference to abstract mathematical objects that are in some way 
>>>> real, even though we can’t see, touch or feel them. 
>>>>
>>>> According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the 
>>>> proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language 
>>>> which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and 
>>>> predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also 
>>>> whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, 
>>>> then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the 
>>>> whole sentence.
>>>>
>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>
>>>
>>> This leads me to appreciate on some level why Feynman called this 
>>> philosofuzzy.
>>>
>>> LC 
>>>
>>
>>
>> Which is why Feyerabend (who I think was together with Feynman when he 
>> came to some conferences in Berkeley) said 
>>
>> The withdrawal of philosophy into a "professional" shell of its own has 
>> had disastrous consequences. The younger generation of physicists, the 
>> *Feynman*s <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Feynman>, the 
>> Schwingers <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Schwinger>, etc., may 
>> be very bright; they may be more intelligent than their predecessors, than 
>> Bohr <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niels_Bohr>, Einstein 
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein>, Schrödinger 
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erwin_Schr%C3%B6dinger>, Boltzmann 
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Boltzmann>, Mach 
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_Mach> and so on. *But they are 
>> uncivilized savages: they lack in philosophical depth.*
>>
>> So true.
>>
>>
>> Depth is no virtue when you're just muddying the water.
>>
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>>
>> Each philosopher knows a lot but, as a whole, philosophers don't know 
>> anything. If they did, they would be scientists.
>>   --- Ludwig Krippahl
>>
>> "The point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to 
>> seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one 
>> will believe it."
>>--- Bertrand Russell
>>
>> Philosophie ist der systematische Missbrauch einer eigens zu
>> diesem Zweck entwickelten Terminologie."
>>  ---Wolfgang Pauli
>>
>> "The philosophy of science is just about as useful to scientists
>> as ornithology is to birds."
>>   --- Steven Weinberg
>>
>> So is Feyerabend so sure his depth is more profound than theirs?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>>
> What some scientist calls "philosofuzzy" (Frege, Wittgenstein, Quine) 
> perhaps is to hide their own fuzzy philosophy. (I can't find a reference 
> for Feynman ever using that term though).
>
> *Physicists Are Philosophers, Too*
> Victor J. Stenger
> https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/physicists-are-philosophers-too/
>
> What we are seeing here is not a recent phenomenon. In his 1992 book 
> Dreams of a Final Theory, Nobel laureate *Steven Weinberg* has a whole 
> chapter entitled “Against Philosophy.” Referring to the famous observation 
> of Nobel laureate physicist Eugene Wigner about “the unreasonable 
> effectiveness of mathematics,” Weinberg puzzles about “the unreasonable 
> ineffectiveness of philosophy.”
>
> Weinberg does not dismiss all of philosophy, just the philosophy of 
> science, noting that its arcane discussions interest few scientists. He 
> points out the problems with the philosophy of positivism, although he 
> agrees that it played a role in the early development of b

Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 3:48:25 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/6/2019 4:05 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 5:42:13 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote: 
>>
>> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 12:59:15 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle
>>>  
>>>
>>>
>>> Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of 
>>> mathematical objectivity – the view that mathematical statements are made 
>>> true by reference to abstract mathematical objects that are in some way 
>>> real, even though we can’t see, touch or feel them. 
>>>
>>> According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the 
>>> proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language 
>>> which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and 
>>> predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also 
>>> whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, 
>>> then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the 
>>> whole sentence.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>> This leads me to appreciate on some level why Feynman called this 
>> philosofuzzy.
>>
>> LC 
>>
>
>
> Which is why Feyerabend (who I think was together with Feynman when he 
> came to some conferences in Berkeley) said 
>
> The withdrawal of philosophy into a "professional" shell of its own has 
> had disastrous consequences. The younger generation of physicists, the 
> *Feynman*s <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Feynman>, the Schwingers 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Schwinger>, etc., may be very 
> bright; they may be more intelligent than their predecessors, than Bohr 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niels_Bohr>, Einstein 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein>, Schrödinger 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erwin_Schr%C3%B6dinger>, Boltzmann 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Boltzmann>, Mach 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_Mach> and so on. *But they are 
> uncivilized savages: they lack in philosophical depth.*
>
> So true.
>
>
> Depth is no virtue when you're just muddying the water.
>
>
> @philipthrift
>
>
> Each philosopher knows a lot but, as a whole, philosophers don't know 
> anything. If they did, they would be scientists.
>   --- Ludwig Krippahl
>
> "The point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to 
> seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one 
> will believe it."
>--- Bertrand Russell
>
> Philosophie ist der systematische Missbrauch einer eigens zu
> diesem Zweck entwickelten Terminologie."
>  ---Wolfgang Pauli
>
> "The philosophy of science is just about as useful to scientists
> as ornithology is to birds."
>   --- Steven Weinberg
>
> So is Feyerabend so sure his depth is more profound than theirs?
>
> Brent
>
>
>
>
What some scientist calls "philosofuzzy" (Frege, Wittgenstein, Quine) 
perhaps is to hide their own fuzzy philosophy. (I can't find a reference 
for Feynman ever using that term though).

*Physicists Are Philosophers, Too*
Victor J. Stenger
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/physicists-are-philosophers-too/

What we are seeing here is not a recent phenomenon. In his 1992 book Dreams 
of a Final Theory, Nobel laureate *Steven Weinberg* has a whole chapter 
entitled “Against Philosophy.” Referring to the famous observation of Nobel 
laureate physicist Eugene Wigner about “the unreasonable effectiveness of 
mathematics,” Weinberg puzzles about “the unreasonable ineffectiveness of 
philosophy.”

Weinberg does not dismiss all of philosophy, just the philosophy of 
science, noting that its arcane discussions interest few scientists. He 
points out the problems with the philosophy of positivism, although he 
agrees that it played a role in the early development of both relativity 
and quantum mechanics. He argues that positivism did more harm than good, 
however, writing, “The positivist concentration on observables like 
particle positions and momenta has stood in the way of a ‘realist’ 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, in which the wave function is the 
representative of physical reality.”

Weinberg and [others], in fact, are expressing a platonic view of reality 
commonly held by many theoretical physicists and mathematicians. They are 
taking their equations and model as existing on one-to-one correspondence 
with the ultimate nature of reality.

@philipthrift

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Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/6/2019 4:05 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 5:42:13 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 12:59:15 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift
wrote:




https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle

<https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle>



Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of
mathematical objectivity – the view that mathematical
statements are made true by reference to abstract mathematical
objects that are in some way real, even though we can’t see,
touch or feel them.

According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is
the proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest
unit of language which can be used to say anything at all. The
meaningfulness of names and predicates is a matter of the
place they occupy in the sentence, and also whether the
sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object,
then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the
    truth of the whole sentence.

@philipthrift


This leads me to appreciate on some level why Feynman called this
philosofuzzy.

LC



Which is why Feyerabend (who I think was together with Feynman when he 
came to some conferences in Berkeley) said


The withdrawal of philosophy into a "professional" shell of its own 
has had disastrous consequences. The younger generation of physicists, 
the***Feynman*s <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Feynman>, the 
Schwingers <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Schwinger>, etc., may 
be very bright; they may be more intelligent than their predecessors, 
than Bohr <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niels_Bohr>, Einstein 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein>, Schrödinger 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erwin_Schr%C3%B6dinger>, Boltzmann 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Boltzmann>, Mach 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_Mach> and so on. *But they are 
uncivilized savages: they lack in philosophical depth.*


So true.


Depth is no virtue when you're just muddying the water.



@philipthrift


Each philosopher knows a lot but, as a whole, philosophers don't know 
anything. If they did, they would be scientists.

  --- Ludwig Krippahl

"The point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to 
seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one 
will believe it."

   --- Bertrand Russell

Philosophie ist der systematische Missbrauch einer eigens zu
diesem Zweck entwickelten Terminologie."
 ---Wolfgang Pauli

"The philosophy of science is just about as useful to scientists
as ornithology is to birds."
  --- Steven Weinberg

So is Feyerabend so sure his depth is more profound than theirs?

Brent



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Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 5:42:13 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 12:59:15 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle
>>
>>
>> Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of mathematical 
>> objectivity – the view that mathematical statements are made true by 
>> reference to abstract mathematical objects that are in some way real, even 
>> though we can’t see, touch or feel them. 
>>
>> According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the 
>> proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language 
>> which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and 
>> predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also 
>> whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, 
>> then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the 
>> whole sentence.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> This leads me to appreciate on some level why Feynman called this 
> philosofuzzy.
>
> LC 
>


Which is why Feyerabend (who I think was together with Feynman when he came 
to some conferences in Berkeley) said 

The withdrawal of philosophy into a "professional" shell of its own has had 
disastrous consequences. The younger generation of physicists, the *Feynman*
s <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Feynman>, the Schwingers 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Schwinger>, etc., may be very bright; 
they may be more intelligent than their predecessors, than Bohr 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niels_Bohr>, Einstein 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein>, Schrödinger 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erwin_Schr%C3%B6dinger>, Boltzmann 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Boltzmann>, Mach 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_Mach> and so on. *But they are 
uncivilized savages: they lack in philosophical depth.*

So true.

@philipthrift

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Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 12:59:15 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
>
> https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle
>
>
> Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of mathematical 
> objectivity – the view that mathematical statements are made true by 
> reference to abstract mathematical objects that are in some way real, even 
> though we can’t see, touch or feel them. 
>
> According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the 
> proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language 
> which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and 
> predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also 
> whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, 
> then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the 
> whole sentence.
>
> @philipthrift
>

This leads me to appreciate on some level why Feynman called this 
philosofuzzy.

LC 

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Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, December 6, 2019 at 1:46:13 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/5/2019 10:59 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
>
> https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle
>  
>
>
> Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of mathematical 
> objectivity – the view that mathematical statements are made true by 
> reference to abstract mathematical objects that are in some way real, even 
> though we can’t see, touch or feel them. 
>
> According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the 
> proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language 
> which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and 
> predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also 
> whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, 
> then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the 
> whole sentence.
>
>
> Is that true?  Doesn't the sentence have different truth values depending 
> on what object a name refers to?  not just whether it refers or not?  A 
> name can refer and be meaningful even when the sentence is false.
>
> Brent
>



[ via https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Context_principle ]

In the philosophy of language 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_language>, the *context 
principle* is a form of semantic holism 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_holism> holding that a philosopher 
should "never ... ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in 
the context of a proposition" (Frege).

If semantic holism is interpreted as the thesis that any linguistic 
expression *E* (a word, a phrase or sentence) of some natural language *L* 
cannot 
be understood in isolation and that there are inevitably many ties between 
the expressions of *L*, it follows that to understand *E* one must 
understand a set *K* of expressions to which *E* is related. If, in 
addition, no limits are placed on the size of *K* (as in the cases of 
Davidson, Quine and, perhaps, Wittgenstein), then *K* coincides with the 
"whole" of *L*.


For Quine then (although Fodor and Lepore have maintained the contrary), 
and for many of his followers, confirmation holism 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_holism> and semantic holism are 
inextricably linked.

As Quine states it:


All of our so-called knowledge or convictions, from questions of geography 
and history to the most profound laws of atomic physics or even mathematics 
and logic, are an edifice made by man that touches experience only at the 
margins. Or, to change images, science in its globality is like a force 
field whose limit points are experiences...a particular experience is never 
tied to any proposition inside the field except indirectly, for the needs 
of equilibrium which affect the field in its globality.


@philipthrift 

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Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/5/2019 10:59 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle 




Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of 
mathematical objectivity – the view that mathematical statements are 
made true by reference to abstract mathematical objects that are in 
some way real, even though we can’t see, touch or feel them.


According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the 
proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of 
language which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness 
of names and predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the 
sentence, and also whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name 
refers to an object, then, is a matter of the contribution the name 
makes to the truth of the whole sentence.


Is that true?  Doesn't the sentence have different truth values 
depending on what object a name refers to?  not just whether it refers 
or not?  A name can refer and be meaningful even when the sentence is false.


Brent

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Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

[Philip Thrift]

https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle


Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of mathematical 
objectivity – the view that mathematical statements are made true by 
reference to abstract mathematical objects that are in some way real, even 
though we can’t see, touch or feel them. 

According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the 
proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language 
which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and 
predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also 
whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, 
then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the 
whole sentence.

@philipthrift

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Re: Indefinite truth

[Lawrence Crowell]

He might have been listening to The Rolling Stones, "I can't get no 
satisfaction." Hamkins is pretty reliable though.

LC

On Tuesday, April 10, 2018 at 1:39:54 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> I wonder if Bruno is familiar with this paper? 
>
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1312.0670.pdf 
>
> Brent 
>

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Re: Indefinite truth

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 10 Apr 2018, at 08:39, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> 
> I wonder if Bruno is familiar with this paper?
> 
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1312.0670.pdf



Not bad at all, interesting! I did not got the time to verify all details, but 
it looks valid!

But all what they show is that , let me quote them:

<<
Thus, two models of set theory can agree on which natural numbers exist and 
agree on all the details of the standard model of arithmetic, yet disagree on 
which sentences are true in that model.
>>

The contrary would have been astonishing. That is part of why I insist 
Mechanism is a theology, a risky invitation of an unknown at the table, which 
looks strangely like yourself.

The Model of Set Theory have too much imagination. I am already happy that ZF 
and ZFC captured the same arithmetical truth. 

The paper does not illustrate that the notion of arithmetical truth is not 
definite. It illustrates that machine with diverse beliefs in diverse 
infinities will not find a common approximation oft that truth easily, and 
might indeed interpret it differently, and disagrees on many, arithmetical 
sentences.

The universal numbers are condemned to have difficulties to agree or disagree 
already on their relations with the “other” universal numbers. Set theory is a 
tool for understanding the numbers, but by incompleteness it cannot do that 
completely, and the paper here illustrates that ZF + very different axioms can 
get different part of the arithmetical truth, limited, and different from each 
others. That would not be the case, with semis-computable sets, so this is 
weakened, in the computationalist realm by the use of actual infinities.

You can relate this also to the fact that the Löbian universal machine 
disagrees already with all complete theories you would claim about it/her. 

Bruno


> 
> Brent
> 
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Indefinite truth

[Brent Meeker]

I wonder if Bruno is familiar with this paper?

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1312.0670.pdf

Brent

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Proof and truth are not the same thing (was: substitution level)

[John Clark]

On Sun, Jun 4, 2017 at 1:15 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​>> ​
>> Anything that can be done a Turing Machine can do, if it can't be done
>> then a Turing Machine can't do it, and neither can anything else.​
>
>

​> ​
> If "can be done" means "can compute or emulate", I am OK. That is
> basically Church's Thesis.
> ​ ​
> If by "can be done" mean solve a problem, or prove a theorem, then it is
> an entirely different story.
>

​
If you were bound and determined to prove that the Halting Problem had a
solution you could certainly find starting axioms that would allow you to
construct that conclusion, but then you could also prove there was a one to
one correspondence between the integers and the Real Numbers. Perhaps that
doesn't frighten you but a proof is only as good as the axioms it starts
with
​,​
so I want to be very very conservative with my choice of axioms because I'd
rather there be true statements that have no proof they are true than false
statements that do have a proof they are true. In the fist case you can't
know everything for certain and that's a shame, but in the second case you
can't know anything for certain and that's worse.

John K Clark

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Re: Truth and Existence

[David Nyman]

epts, but perhaps it's important that we should. In my view, these
>> components are a perceptual or concrete one - the observable part, and an
>> abstract, mathematical or mechanistic component - the theoretical or
>> reductive part. ISTM that any putative "theory of everything" must stand on
>> both of these legs or be left seriously lame. Now, the odd thing is that
>> most people are convinced that the observables of the first component
>> "exist" in a sense they are more reluctant to grant to the ontological
>> constituency of the unobservable, abstract or theoretical one. Seeing is
>> believing, apparently, in this instance. But surely it is obvious, at least
>> after a little reflection, that the observable part isn't properly an
>> "existent". It's not in itself a "thing" that can be decomposed into
>> constituent parts. That decomposition always takes place in terms of the
>> second or theoretical component, which is FAPP the putative existent - i.e.
>> the assumptive, reductive ontology of the theory in which the reasoning
>> takes place. The second and all subsequently derivative parts lie within
>> the domain of an epistemology, not an ontology, and as such are more
>> tractable in terms of an adequate theory of knowledge.
>>
>> If the foregoing is valid (and obviously I think it may well be) then a
>> more illuminating criterion to be applied in matters within the observable
>> or perceptual spectrum is not whether they exist in an ontological sense
>> but rather whether they are true in an epistemological one. By true I don't
>> mean necessarily "veridical" in the conventional sense that all, or indeed
>> any, inferences that might be drawn from them are thereby accurate. The
>> sense of truth I'm using here is more or less equivalent to Descartes'
>> realisation that the primary characteristic of experience (pace Brent's
>> parsing of the precise grammar of this claim) is that it is logically
>> indubitable. Veridicality in the more general sense relies on much more
>> than primary perceptual indubitability. But does anyone in fact doubt any
>> of this? Well, yes, if their claims are to be taken at face value, the
>> school of Patricia Churchland and Daniel Dennett et al do believe that such
>> experiences (or in their terms mere claims to experience) only "seem" to be
>> true but in fact are illusory. However, it isn't too hard to unravel such
>> language games; in these cases, "seemings" or "illusions" do work that is
>> in no way distinguishable from the experiences their (largely implicit)
>> theory requires them to sweep under the rug. In the sense they seem to
>> intend, the entire concrete, observable world only seems to exist, or is an
>> illusion. I wouldn't actual object too much to this terminology so long as
>> it's made clear that these are illusions that seem to be true! Nevertheless
>> I think we can see that proponents of these ideas are willy-nilly using
>> terminology that does indeed fall within the epistemological scope of a
>> general theory, rather than within its ontological part.
>>
>> So in terms of the computationalist framework the assumptive ontology is
>> computation based in arithmetic and its basic combinatorial relations
>> (*,+). These then are the reductive "existents" of the theory in terms of
>> which everything else is to be inferred. However, such inferences cannot
>> add further existents, or even relations, to the ontology. Rather, whatever
>> else is added must be explicable in terms of composite entities and
>> relations arising out of an adequate epistemological analysis deriving
>> solely from the original ontological assumptions. From the perspective of
>> computationalism, this amounts to whatever is computable and thus emulable
>> within the mechanist framework. However, since what is emulable encompasses
>> a logic of self-reflection or subjectivity, there is a crucially
>> determinative "internal" or truth-related view that will ultimately be
>> related to an uncomputable superposition of  such subjective perspectives.
>> The initial criterion of validity of any such epistemological analysis will
>> lie in correspondence with (perceptual) fact or, equivalently, primary
>> experiential truth. Beyond this, for such provisional facts or truths to be
>> consistent with the unfolding of events as experienced, this correspondence
>> must in turn be consequent on the epistemological singularisation, or
>> "observer selection", of a stable, pervasive and consistent physical
>&

Re: Truth and Existence

[Jason Resch]

David,

I always appreciate your e-mails. Your comments regarding the term
"existence" reminds me of what Minsky says of the word (2 minutes 50
seconds in):
https://www.closertotruth.com/series/what-are-possible-worlds#video-2729

I agree that humans have an innate prejudice against the reality of things
we can't see. Even the idea that objects continue to exist when we no
longer see them has to be learned
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Object_permanence>, through repeatedly
witnessing objects that have fallen out of our sight.

I think this may explain:
1. Why humans gravitate towards presentism rather than eternalism, (because
we don't revisit past points in time), despite what relativity tells us
<https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/11921131.pdf> on the matter.
2. Why people resist the many worlds interpretation, (because we don't see
the other branches) against what the mathematics* of the theory should lead
them to believe.
3. Why some find the idea of a singular "universal experiencer/person/soul"
bewildering, (because we don't recall being others), despite the failures
<https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Arnold_Zuboff/publication/233329805_One_Self_The_Logic_of_Experience/links/54adcdb60cf2213c5fe419ec/One-Self-The-Logic-of-Experience.pdf?origin=publication_detail=pub_int_prw_xdl=cR_Vf6yO0w0TxJLfXpxJsT4Bu9N4y1OCBbZRtI5V6s9RyXBkRLN7tKs7eBghPMvO5mY0j-jih4ZXHvndC_kXmKLwoxcnwnlaiiz5pj-E6y8.GCSsZWt0E3f67EyFl-vMGFvAlLNCffh4TQC9Dpsp05YlGsjWWaJF7q3zvst2PqInB3MpVTlQ1yplnlQY8aLYlQ.aAIvUJAPeRBi6jtU13bB9jmlARn1T5u4oa9haeIpqbW7mdY4AugPadt0A-5dKB3LWh6UL41fzbmCCCdFXF20aQ.ln9En2cg8QGzfO07gQHu-9T3YLouB3QhZCQR3hAh4CFePZRTOyF98AfMIgJ8bPF7INoFF2YtFopam7Z1q2NZiQ>
of conventional theories of personal identity.


* “Schrödinger also had the basic idea of parallel universes shortly before
Everett, but he didn't publish it. He mentioned it in a lecture in Dublin,
in which he predicted that the audience would think he was crazy. Isn't
that a strange assertion coming from a Nobel Prize winner—that he feared
being considered crazy for claiming that his equation, the one that he won
the Nobel Prize for, might be true.” -- David Deutsch



Jason

On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 11:06 AM, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:

> Recent discussions have got me thinking again about these categories. ISTM
> in particular that there's a lot of probably unhelpful worrying about the
> application of the term "existence". For example, it's held in some
> quarters that physics exists in a sense that mathematics or computation
> doesn't. However, I've become more and more convinced that such confusion
> arises from a fundamental mis-categorisation of concepts. For example, when
> we speak of physics we typically don't parse it into its component
> concepts, but perhaps it's important that we should. In my view, these
> components are a perceptual or concrete one - the observable part, and an
> abstract, mathematical or mechanistic component - the theoretical or
> reductive part. ISTM that any putative "theory of everything" must stand on
> both of these legs or be left seriously lame. Now, the odd thing is that
> most people are convinced that the observables of the first component
> "exist" in a sense they are more reluctant to grant to the ontological
> constituency of the unobservable, abstract or theoretical one. Seeing is
> believing, apparently, in this instance. But surely it is obvious, at least
> after a little reflection, that the observable part isn't properly an
> "existent". It's not in itself a "thing" that can be decomposed into
> constituent parts. That decomposition always takes place in terms of the
> second or theoretical component, which is FAPP the putative existent - i.e.
> the assumptive, reductive ontology of the theory in which the reasoning
> takes place. The second and all subsequently derivative parts lie within
> the domain of an epistemology, not an ontology, and as such are more
> tractable in terms of an adequate theory of knowledge.
>
> If the foregoing is valid (and obviously I think it may well be) then a
> more illuminating criterion to be applied in matters within the observable
> or perceptual spectrum is not whether they exist in an ontological sense
> but rather whether they are true in an epistemological one. By true I don't
> mean necessarily "veridical" in the conventional sense that all, or indeed
> any, inferences that might be drawn from them are thereby accurate. The
> sense of truth I'm using here is more or less equivalent to Descartes'
> realisation that the primary characteristic of experience (pace Brent's
> parsing of the precise grammar of this claim) is that it is logically
> indubitable. Veridicality in the more general sense relies on much more
> than primary perceptual in

Re: The search of truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 Jul 2016, at 17:32, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

To my ignorant brain, the very definition of matter needs, somehow,  
to be precisely, described, and the same with energy.



And the same with numbers, or anything we are willing to talk about.

But we can't do that.

What we can do is agreeing on some formula about them, and thus using  
what is known as axiomatic method.


This means, when we talk on fundamental question, that at some point  
we have to put the hypotheses in some language which avoids all the  
metaphysical baggage, even if the goal is a metaphysical theory (like  
a TOE has to be).


Computationalism is a priori neutral on the idea that we have to  
assume the existence of a physical reality. We have to locally assume  
it, because we bet on doctors and brains and computers, which are  
physical object, but we identofy ourselves to an immaterial entity,  
capable of surviving a digital encodings at some level.


Then it leads to a problem, for all Turing complete theory, similar to  
the "interpretation of QM problem".



Sometimes, I feel, even doing this is an impossible task. This  
exchange makes me posit two questions, related, but perhaps dull- 
making to the writers. Is it conceivable in the physics of what we  
know, that there is some physical, hyperspace, call it Platonic,  
where a computation can run?


If physicalism is right, and QM is correct, and Everett is correct, is  
not the universal wave equation such a "Platonic hyperspace"?


But if computationalism is right, you need no more than the sigma_1  
truth, for what will be said to exist, and the usual second-order  
arithmetic, analysis, for studying the statistics of the relative  
state of the sigma_1 observers, which usually will have much stronger  
beliefs than the sigma_1 beliefs. (Basically "sigma_1-complete" is the  
arithmetical version of Turing universal.


You need to understand what John Clark try to deny, which is that the  
theory of computability, alias Recursion Theory or Theoretical  
Computer Science, is a branch of mathematical logic, and it happens  
that the (partial) computable set/functions can be defined by the  
sigma_1 predicates. Gödel's beweisbar, []p, is itself sigma_1, and  
indeed, is Turing universal. That theory can be faithfully embedded in  
arithmetic. Once one universal system is fixed, machine became number  
identifiable, a bit like when one coordinate system is fixed, position  
becomes number identifiable.


In that frame, you can almost redefine physicalism itself, like by  
saying that the physical reality is that number, + some oracle may be.


But, computationalism shows that this cannot work, the physical  
computationalist bottom of the arithmetical reality seen from inside  
is necessarily given by a statistic on all the infinitely many  
computations going through your actual state. The only possible  
constraints are the logical and self-referential one, at that level.  
The physical becomes secondary: it is the border of the universal mind  
when it observes itself close enough. It is not new, Parmenides,  
Moderatus of Gades, Plotinus, Sri Aurobindo, and many others get close  
to something like this, and logically it comes from the (antic) dream  
argument.




Back to matter-energy, is a photon, or a neutrino, massless, is that  
matter or energy?


Since Einstein, this is basically the same thing. Mass is sort of  
condensed energy (E=mc^2). Nuclear energy is when the mass release  
that energy (in stars that happens all the times).




Secondly, do virtual particles, say a photon (are photons the only  
such virtual particle?), that emerge from (where?) and the re-absorb  
to (where?)??


Virtual is a relative notion in QM with Everett. To get the exact  
result we need to compute all path, but macroscopically, the random  
phasing of the aberrant histories focuses us on the shortest path. But  
that is exactly what we need to verify in arithmetic to test  
computationalism. Carzily enough, at the propositional level, it works.






I ask, philosophically, because, as we say in the States, I am not  
the sharpest tool in the shed. If calculation space for computations  
exist,



Computations exists and are "realized", "implemented" "manifested" ...  
in all the relative way in a tiny segment of arithmetic.


It seems that the physical is Turing complete, and this in many ways,  
so the physical can run universal systems, and DNA, brain and  
computers are examples. Is the ultimate reality physical or  
arithmetical? Given that we have all computations in the sigma_1  
reality, and given that a Turing machine first person view evolution  
is a statistic on all computations (in arithmetic) we can test this  
empirically.


The thing which should be obvious is that today we don't know, but  
also that thanks to QM (without collapse) the evidence are for the  
numbers 

Re: The search of truth

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

Physical is good, that means, in principle, we can interact with it.



-Original Message-
From: John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Fri, Jul 1, 2016 2:57 pm
Subject: Re: The search of truth






On Fri, Jul 1, 2016 at 11:32 AM, spudboy100 via Everything List 
<everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:



​> ​
To my ignorant brain, the very definition of matter needs, somehow, to be 
precisely, described,




​Matter is everything that is not nothing. Nothing is infinite unbounded 
homogeneity in every dimension, so matter is stuff that is finite or bounded or 
heterogeneous or all 3.  ​
 
 

​> ​
and the same with energy.




​E=MC^2​
 
 

​> ​
Is it conceivable in the physics of what we know, that there is some physical, 
hyperspace, call it Platonic, where a computation can run?




​Sure it's conceivable, but if it's ​physical hyperspace then it's physical not 
mathematical.



 John K Clark






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Re: The search of truth

[PGC]

On Friday, July 1, 2016 at 8:57:31 PM UTC+2, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Jul 1, 2016 at 11:32 AM, spudboy100 via Everything List <
> everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> To my ignorant brain, the very definition of matter needs, somehow, to be 
>> precisely, described,
>>
>
> ​Matter is everything that is not nothing. Nothing is infinite unbounded 
> homogeneity in every dimension, so matter is stuff that is finite or 
> bounded or heterogeneous or all 3. 
>

It would be nice if things were so clear and simple. I will try to 
convolute this a bit:

Unfortunately, both physicalism and comp fail to account for the bottom of 
the hallway of the memory of the source of the primary reason of the 
foundation of farts, which constitute a definite unbounded homogeneity in 
every dimension surrounding me when actualized. Some quick notes for the 
beginners:


To the trained nose such a homogeneity is clearly intuitionist quantum 
logically nothing, therefore trivial and finitely bounded in sensation of 
all entities within its range or entirely in its domain, but to other 
groups, such as all elevator acquaintances, colleagues, or friends, the 
matter is less clear and more smelly at times. 


To fart amateurs and novices, the composition will seem most pertinent; 
most would cite co2, hydrogen, methane, oxygen, and nitrogen as “making up 
the fart”, which unfortunately ignores the fart’s position on the border 
between nothing and existence. Even the exact composition and mass of a 
fart will give no a priori indication as to the fart’s loudness or its 
concrete meaning, which is why its existential status remains a mystery 
independent of the theory we choose.


To persons who appear to not be me, my farts appear heterogeneous and 
unbounded, which I can relate to on the level of their performativity: *their 
raw power *may appear impressive to laypersons but not to the experts among 
us who will be forced at least to scratch their heads, if not entirely fan 
their noses considering the most important parameter of my farts: their 
local magnitude. 


Unfortunately we have to keep the infinite functions of a fart in mind 
while we try to escape their reach: it could be a stealthy motivator for 
others to leave a certain room or area, a hidden code or communication, or 
a trap that leads to … a larger, most mesmerizing fart. Farting in morse is 
a tactic only navy seal team leaders are required to master, mainly with 
the function to distract, or the fart could be punchline to infinities of 
non sequitur irrelevancies. The list is provably uncountable. 


The larger question is of course: do farts MATTER? Are they just hot air or 
does the nothing between those particles allow existence to exist, and 
therefore the fart to come into that same existence in the first place? 


And the holy grail of fart theory: why the fuck is a fart *that* *funny?*


Most people simply don’t want to realize how funny a fart can be.


None of you know anything about science… :-( PGC

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Re: The search of truth

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jul 1, 2016 at 11:32 AM, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

​> ​
> To my ignorant brain, the very definition of matter needs, somehow, to be
> precisely, described,
>

​Matter is everything that is not nothing. Nothing is infinite unbounded
homogeneity in every dimension, so matter is stuff that is finite or
bounded or heterogeneous or all 3.  ​



> ​> ​
> and the same with energy.
>

​E=MC^2​



> ​> ​
> Is it conceivable in the physics of what we know, that there is some
> physical, hyperspace, call it Platonic, where a computation can run?
>

​Sure it's conceivable, but if it's ​physical hyperspace then it's physical
not mathematical.

 John K Clark

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Re: The search of truth

[John Clark]

On Thu, Jun 30, 2016 at 10:54 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​>> ​
>> Forget the "primary" crap. Matter is needed for the existence of
>> computations period.
>
>

> ​> ​
> No, matter is needed locally to make a calculation relative to you in the
> physical reality.
>

​OK fine, but then by your own admission matter has properties that
mathematics alone does not have, the ability to make things real to you.  ​



> ​> ​
> But the relative computations exist,
>

​I don't know if abstract
Platonia
​ exists, but if it does then both correct and incorrect calculations exist
there, and the only way to tell one from the other is through physics.
Calculations of Mercury's orbit using Newton's theory will be incorrect
even if no mathematical error is made, and the only way to know the
calculation was incorrect is to check the calculations against physical
reality. At that point we have to ask somebody (like Einstein) to use the
laws of physics to find a calculation that is less incorrect.


> ​> ​
> you systematically argue like a dogmatic priest from an institutionalized
> religion.
>

Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that
one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

​ John K Clark​

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Re: The search of truth

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

To my ignorant brain, the very definition of matter needs, somehow, to be 
precisely, described, and the same with energy. Sometimes, I feel, even doing 
this is an impossible task. This exchange makes me posit two questions, 
related, but perhaps dull-making to the writers. Is it conceivable in the 
physics of what we know, that there is some physical, hyperspace, call it 
Platonic, where a computation can run? Back to matter-energy, is a photon, or a 
neutrino, massless, is that matter or energy? Secondly, do virtual particles, 
say a photon (are photons the only such virtual particle?), that emerge from 
(where?) and the re-absorb to (where?)?? 

I ask, philosophically, because, as we say in the States, I am not the sharpest 
tool in the shed. If calculation space for computations exist, where 
physically, might such a "phase space" exist, or is this metaphor? I imagine 
gigantic super machines whirring away somewhere in my mythical hyperspace, 
waiting for humans to use AI to develop the technology to contact them. This, 
is known as Fantasy, gibberish, and my favorite science fiction. Hey! This is 
how I function. 

I am having enough trouble learning and memorizing computer networking, let, 
alone, join discussions of the Cosmos, yet, here I write. 
 
 
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Thu, Jun 30, 2016 10:54 am
Subject: Re: The search of truth




On 26 Jun 2016, at 00:04, John Clark wrote:


Forget the "primary" crap. Matter is needed for the existence of computations 
period. 


No, matter is needed locally to make a calculation relative to you in the 
physical reality. 
But the relative computations exist,  provably so in any sigma_1 complete 
theory.
Good, as the existence and explanation of the physical reality appearances 
relies on those computations existing in arithmetic.


You begin again to just repeat nonsensical slogan. I will (try) to not answer 
them, as they have all already been answered. 
You say you are not religious, but you systematically argue like a dogmatic 
priest from an institutionalized religion.


Bruno






 
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



 


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Re: The search of truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Jun 2016, at 00:04, John Clark wrote:

Forget the "primary" crap. Matter is needed for the existence of  
computations period.


No, matter is needed locally to make a calculation relative to you in  
the physical reality.
But the relative computations exist,  provably so in any sigma_1  
complete theory.
Good, as the existence and explanation of the physical reality  
appearances relies on those computations existing in arithmetic.


You begin again to just repeat nonsensical slogan. I will (try) to not  
answer them, as they have all already been answered.
You say you are not religious, but you systematically argue like a  
dogmatic priest from an institutionalized religion.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The search of truth

[John Clark]

On Mon, Jun 20, 2016 at 1:07 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote

>>​Y​our step-3 confusion.
>>
>>
>
>> >>  If one isn't confused by gibberish then one doesn't have critical
>> thinking skills.
>
>

  > I gave you the precision asked,


John Clark must have missed that post, all the ones John Clark saw were
nothing
​
but a chaotic mass of wall to wall unattributed
​
pronouns
​.

>
​>>
>>  Nobody needs to assume mechanism because it can be demonstrated.
>
>
> ​>
>  That is just ridiculous. But if you have a demonstration, please give it
> to us.


Speaking of ridiculous, you know you've reached that point when somebody
demands a demonstration of physical cause and effect.


> >
>>> ​>
>>> > Calculation have been defined mathematically,
>>
>>
>> >
>> ​>
>> And a definition can't calculate one damn thing; never has never will.
>
>
> > That shows that the definition of calculation cannot calculate.


Yes, and a definition of a calculator can't calculate either, but
calculator can.


> > But calculation calculated


And a calculation can't calculate,
​
but a calculator can.

​>>
>> Unlike God matter and atoms are *NOT invisible*.
>
>
> ​>
> You (again) seem to play with the words.
>

​Playing with words my ass. Matter and atoms are visible but the invisible
man in the sky is, well, invisible.



> ​> ​
> If you need to assume a physical reality, it is primitive by definition.
>

​
To hell with "primitive"! If you're interested in consciousness, and that
seems to be the only thing you are interested in, then it's irrelevant if
matter is "primitive" or not; either way if you want consciousness you're
going to need something physical.
. ​



> ​> ​
> I was alluding to the primary or primitive notion of matter.
>

​I know you were, I want to know why. Even if you had a proof that was so
good it even convinced me that mathematics was more fundamental than
physics (and you have no such proof) if wouldn't change the fact that
calculations as well as intelligence and consciousness require something
physical.

​>>​
>> If you insist on changing the language and calling matter "God" then
>> you're going to have to invent a new work for a *invisible* conscious
>> person who created the universe, but such a word game is not science
>> or mathematics or even philosophy, it's just silly.
>
>
> ​> ​
> Why would you invoke a notion of God only for a God which does not exist.
>

​You don't invoke the notion of God, like most educated people you reject
the notion of a omnipotent omniscient conscious person who created the
universe, but like most people you DON'T reject
the English word "G-O-D" hence your radical redefinitions and
your silly word game.​


​And now dear Bruno that's your cue to start talking about the ancient
Greeks as if people who didn't even know where the sun went at night would
be of the slightest help in solving modern scientific problems. ​

​>> ​
>> Well, perform one calculation without using matter and the laws of
>> physics and I'll stop believing in that "God". Just add 2+2, that's all I
>> ask.
>
>
> ​> ​
> You ask me something totally impossible and totally irrelevant,
>

​T​
otally impossible
​ yes but not ​
totally irrelevant,
​ ​in fact that impossibility is saying something of vital importance about
the nature of our world and it might be wise to listen to what it's saying.


​> ​
>  "primary matter is needed for having the existence of computations in
> general".
>


Forget the "primary" crap. Matter is needed for the existence of
computations period. Something else may or may not be needed for  existence
of matter but it wouldn't change the fact that matter is needed for the the
existence of computations.

​> ​
> Nobody should talk like if he/she knew the truth.
>

​I may not know The Truth, but I know nonsense when I hear it.

 John K Clark​

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The search of truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Jun 2016, at 01:05, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Jun 19, 2016 at 12:45 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>  
wrote:


> Chalmers' enunciation of the problem assumes a physical universe  
(= making it primitive).
That is why, well that's one reason why, you're so very very  
confused;  the existence of the the physical universe does not imply  
that physics must be primitive (although it could be) anymore than  
the existence of molecules implies that molecules must be primitive.




I never said the contrary.






> I do think that when we assume mechanism [blah blah]

Nobody needs to assume mechanism because it can be demonstrated.



That is just ridiculous. But if you have a demonstration, please give  
it to us.






>  your step-3 confusion.

If one isn't confused by gibberish then one doesn't have critical  
thinking skills.




I gave you the precision asked, but you came back without using them  
again and again.






> Calculation have been defined mathematically,

And a definition can't calculate one damn thing; never has never will.



That shows that the definition of calculation cannot calculate.

But calculation calculated, independently of being interpreted in  
Arithmetic or in any other Turing complete possible reality, be it  
implemented in the physical reality or not.






> You seem to introduce an invisible God (matter, the atoms, ...)

Unlike God matter and atoms are NOT invisible.



You (again) seem to play with the words. If you need to assume a  
physical reality, it is primitive by definition.


And obviously, given the context, I was alluding to the primary or  
primitive notion of matter.





If you insist on changing the language and calling matter "God" then  
you're going to have to invent a new work for a invisible conscious  
person who created the universe, but such a word game is not science  
or mathematics or even philosophy, it's just silly.




Why would you invoke a notion of God only for a God which does not  
exist. *That* is silly. In science, when a theory about something is  
shown inconsistent or not plausible with the facts, we change the  
theory, instead of keeping the same all the time and mocking it.






 > to decide what is real or not.
Well, perform one calculation without using matter and the laws of  
physics and I'll stop believing in that "God". Just add 2+2, that's  
all I ask.




You ask me something totally impossible and totally irrelevant, as we  
have explained more than once.









>> you use mechanism every time you decide to scratch your nose.

> No. I scratched my nose a long time before I assumed mechanism.
Of course, mechanism doesn't give a damn if you think it exists or  
not, it just keeps doing its thing regardless, and when the nerves  
from your brain tell the muscles in your arm to scratch your nose  
that is exactly what happens. In cartoons Wile E Coyote can run off  
a cliff and he won't start to fall until he realizes he's  
unsupported and is supposed to drop, but that's not the way real  
physics works.


 > Now evolution does not explain consciousness,
Evolution certainly explains why intelligence exists because it  
effects behavior, if consciousness wasn't a byproduct of  
intelligence and if the Turing Test doesn't work for it then  
consciousness wouldn't exist, and yet I know for certain of at least  
one instance in which consciousness does exist.




That type of rhetoric has already been debunked. Your  'faking idiot'   
style of arguing has already made us laugh once, but repeating it ad  
nauseam is not that fun.


To sum up the state on the subject: you confuse:

"matter (primary or not) is needed for humans to compute or build  
machines computing for them". Which is correct.


And "primary matter is needed for having the existence of computations  
in general". Which is close to nonsensical when we assume digital  
mechanism (that is not obvious and is a subproduct of the UD-Argument).


The existence of computations is a theorem in all sigma_1 complete  
theory, and so for a TOE we can start (at least) by assuming one such  
system, and I use elementary arithmetic for that purpose (formalized  
by the theory Q by Raphael Robinson, but which I have called RA).


Then, given that we attribute consciousness to the relevant relative  
person canonically ascribed to some computational relations, which are  
actually already provable by RA, we explain the appearances of matter  
by the necessity of restricting/enlarging the measure by invoking  
truth or consistency, (or both), and, surprise, it works, in the sense  
of providing a type of quantum logic on which we can hope some future  
"Gleason theorem".


You should be able to appreciate or hate the change of paradigm well  
before seeing that indeed, betting on computationalism instead of  
(weak) materialism, that change of paradigm (in theology and scie

Re: Proof, Truth and Physics

[John Clark]

On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 2:56 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

​>> ​
>> In this case even mathematicians, even mathematicians who specialize in
>> number theory, would give physics the last word in determining what is true
>> and what is not,
>>
>
> ​> ​
> It would not be physics that showed the proof incorrect, but the existence
> of a counter example.
>

​But you only know it's a ​counter example because a computer, a
deterministic machine made of matter that obeys the laws of physics, told
you it was a counter example. And like any sane person when the laws
of physics tells you something you believe it.


> ​>​
> Unless you are somehow proposing a strange physical law that interferes
> with the final result of the calculation to produce a program that believes
> X^4 + Y^4 = Z^4 when otherwise it should not.
>

​A
physical law like that would be able to produce physical objects that were
logically self contradictory, and I am not proposing that, no sane person
would. Even mathematicians would say that physics was the boss and physics
was correct and number theory as developed by human beings was just wrong.


> ​> ​
> I don't know how mathematicians and physicists would resolve such a
> contradiction.
>

​I do, they would say that somewhere somehow mathematicians had made a
mistake. And I know what they would not say, they would not say the laws of
physics had made a mistake.

 John K Clark ​

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Re: Proof, Truth and Physics

[Jason Resch]

On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 12:34 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> Fermat proved 350 years ago that no three integers exist that satisfy the
> equation X^4 + Y^4 =Z^4 and since that time few have bothered to look for
> such numbers because they knew it was a fool's errand; but suppose
> Professor Bozo, a eccentric computer scientist, decided to look anyway and
> suppose he used his physical computer and found 3 large integers that
> actually worked. What then? Obviously people (including me) would say Bozo
> was lying, but then suppose thousands of reports came in from all around
> the world of people trying Professor Bozo's integers on their own physical
> computers and finding it's true, the 3 Bozo integers really do solve the
> equation. What then? Would mathematicians say that all that shows is that
> the laws of physics can cause a physical system (like a computer) to be in
> a logically inconsistent state and Fermat was right and physics was wrong?
> No, they would say that either there was some subtle error in Fermat's
> proof that nobody in the last 350 years has been smart enough to catch or
> that Fermat had started his proof with some "self evidently true" axiom
> that he shouldn't have because it wasn't true regardless of how self
> evident it seemed to be.
>

There are 3 possibilities (aside form mass delusion):

The assumed axioms were wrong
The proof was wrong
The computer program or computer hardware was flawed

Somewhat analagously in physics, let's say we have an experiment that shows
the EM drive has a thrust, that would imply either:

The assumed laws of physics were wrong
The experimental setup was wrong
There were measurement errors


>
> In this case even mathematicians, even mathematicians who specialize in
> number theory, would give physics the last word in determining what is true
> and what is not,
>

It would not be physics that showed the proof incorrect, but the existence
of a counter example. (Unless you are somehow proposing a strange physical
law that interferes with the final result of the calculation to produce a
program that believes X^4 + Y^4 = Z^4 when otherwise it should not. I don't
know how mathematicians and physicists would resolve such a contradiction.)

Jason


> and if a system made of matter that obeys the laws of physics says that
> there are three integers that satisfy the equation X^4 + Y^4 =Z^4 then
> that's just the way things are and mathematicians are just going to have to
> learn to live with it.
>
> Maybe you think this is all a little far fetched, but compared with some
> other thought experiments I've seen on this list the idea of a
> mathematician being wrong really isn't all that far out into the
> stratosphere.
>
>  John K Clark
>
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Proof, Truth and Physics

[John Clark]

Fermat proved 350 years ago that no three integers exist that satisfy the
equation X^4 + Y^4 =Z^4 and since that time few have bothered to look for
such numbers because they knew it was a fool's errand; but suppose
Professor Bozo, a eccentric computer scientist, decided to look anyway and
suppose he used his physical computer and found 3 large integers that
actually worked. What then? Obviously people (including me) would say Bozo
was lying, but then suppose thousands of reports came in from all around
the world of people trying Professor Bozo's integers on their own physical
computers and finding it's true, the 3 Bozo integers really do solve the
equation. What then? Would mathematicians say that all that shows is that
the laws of physics can cause a physical system (like a computer) to be in
a logically inconsistent state and Fermat was right and physics was wrong?
No, they would say that either there was some subtle error in Fermat's
proof that nobody in the last 350 years has been smart enough to catch or
that Fermat had started his proof with some "self evidently true" axiom
that he shouldn't have because it wasn't true regardless of how self
evident it seemed to be.

In this case even mathematicians, even mathematicians who specialize in
number theory, would give physics the last word in determining what is true
and what is not, and if a system made of matter that obeys the laws of
physics says that there are three integers that satisfy the equation X^4 +
Y^4 =Z^4 then that's just the way things are and mathematicians are just
going to have to learn to live with it.

Maybe you think this is all a little far fetched, but compared with some
other thought experiments I've seen on this list the idea of a
mathematician being wrong really isn't all that far out into the
stratosphere.

 John K Clark

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Re: Google to Decide Truth

[meekerdb]

An interesting approach to knowledge as coherence.  Still has problems to be resolved as 
noted in the paper http://arxiv.org/pdf/1502.03519v1.pdf.


Brent


On 3/1/2015 11:36 AM, :

Google has created an automated system for collecting facts:

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22329832.700-googles-factchecking-bots-build-vast-knowledge-bank.html#.VPNoW3zMSSo

as interesting as this is towards the creation of an AI (as something that learns more 
and gets smarter when provided with more reading material), somewhat disturbingly they 
intends to use these facts in the ranking of search results:


http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22530102.600-google-wants-to-rank-websites-based-on-facts-not-links.html#.VPNpN3zMSSo


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Google to Decide Truth

[Jason Resch]

Google has created an automated system for collecting facts:

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22329832.700-googles-factchecking-bots-build-vast-knowledge-bank.html#.VPNoW3zMSSo

as interesting as this is towards the creation of an AI (as something that
learns more and gets smarter when provided with more reading material),
somewhat disturbingly they intends to use these facts in the ranking of
search results:

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22530102.600-google-wants-to-rank-websites-based-on-facts-not-links.html#.VPNpN3zMSSo

Jason

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Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Mar 2014, at 21:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/12/2014 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hello Terren,


On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:


Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I  
haven't had the time to follow the modal logic threads, so please  
forgive me but I don't understand how you could represent reality  
with t.



Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A is  
possible.


Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it  
can mean situation, state, and actually it can mean anything.


To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is dangerous,  
would consist in showing a situation, or a world, or a reality in  
which a dog is dangerous.


so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with the  
idea that this means that there is a reality in which A is true.


Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of a  
reality verifying a proposition.


In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the  
constant true, or 1=1 in arithmetic, simply means that there is a  
reality.


t is possible looks like a category error to me.


t is equivalent with (p - p), it is the constant boolean valued  
function true. So t is an admissible atomic formula and  applies  
to all formula.


In the arithmetical interpretation (of the modal logic G), t is  
consistent('~(0=1)'), that is ~beweisbar('~(0=1)').


NOT PROVABLE FALSE = CONSISTENT TRUE.

~[]f  = t

This is standard use, in both modal logic and meta-arithmetic.





  A is possible means A refers to the state of some world.


No. It refers to a state, or to a world, or to a number, or to a cow.  
At this abstraction level, some world looks like a 1004 distracting  
pseudo-information. We are not doing metaphysics, just math, which  
then is applied to formulate the comp measure problem, and get quantum  
logic from there.




I don't see that t or 1=1 refers to some world, they are just  
tautologies, artifacts of language.


t is indeed a tautology, that is a proposition true (by definition) in  
all possible worlds (a world here is simply a function from the set  
of atomic sentences letter in {0, 1}, or {false, true}.


But 1=1 cannot be deduced from logic alone, and you need primitive  
terms, like s and 0, to name the non trivial object s(0), and you need  
some axioms on equality, =. Usually x = x, is an axiom.


In particular 1 = 1 does refer to a reality, which is the usual  
(standard) model of arithmetic, denoted by the mathematical structure  
(N, +, x).


1=1 is supposed to refer to that (mathematical) reality.






This, Aristotle and Leibniz understood, but Kripke enriched the  
notion of possibility by making the notion of possibility  
relative to the world you actually are.


Somehow, for the machine talking in first predicate logic, like PA  
and ZF, more can be said, once we interpret the modal box by the  
Gödelian beweisbar('p'), which can be translated in arithmetic.


First order theories have a nice metamathematical property,  
discovered by Gödel (in his PhD thesis), and know as completeness,  
which (here) means that provability is equivalent with truth in all  
models, where models are mathematical structure which can verify or  
not, but in a well defined mathematical sense, a formula of  
classical first order logical theories.
For example PA proves some sentences A, if and only if, A is true  
in all models of PA.


If []A is provability (beweisbar('A')), the dual A is consistency  
(~beweisbar('~A').


A = ~[]~A.

~A  is equivalent with  A - f   (as you can verify by doing the  
truth table)


 A = ~[]~A =  ~([](A - f))

Saying that you cannot prove a contradiction (f),  from A, means  
that A is consistent.


So t means, for PA, with the arithmetical translation  
~beweisbar('~t'), = ~beweisbar('f'), that PA is consistent, and by  
Gödel completeness theorem, this means that there is a mathematical  
structure (model) verifying 1=1.


So, although ~beweisbar('~t'), is an arithmetical proposition  
having some meaning in term of syntactical object (proofs)  
existence, it is also a way for PA, or Löbian entities, to refer,  
implicitly at first, to the existence of a reality.


But why should the failure to prove f imply anything about reality?


Because it preserves the hope that there is a reality to which you are  
connected.


If you prove 1=1 in classical logic, you can prove anything, you get  
inconsistent. There might still be a reality, but you are not  
connected to it.


You are in a cul-de-sac world, when seen in Kripke semantics of G.  
But don't take this in any literal way, except in terms of the  
behavior, including discourse of the machine.


The theory is correct for any arithmetically effective machines having  
sound extension beliefs of those beliefs:


0 ≠ (x + 1)
((x + 1) = (y + 1))  - x = y
x + 0 = x
x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1
x * 0 = 0
x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x

+ the induction axioms

Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Mar 2014, at 21:51, LizR wrote:


On 13 March 2014 04:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hello Terren,

On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:

Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I  
haven't had the time to follow the modal logic threads, so please  
forgive me but I don't understand how you could represent reality  
with t.
Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A is  
possible.


Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it can  
mean situation, state, and actually it can mean anything.


To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is dangerous,  
would consist in showing a situation, or a world, or a reality in  
which a dog is dangerous.


so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with the  
idea that this means that there is a reality in which A is true.


Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of a  
reality verifying a proposition.


In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the  
constant true, or 1=1 in arithmetic, simply means that there is a  
reality.


You mean t asserts there is a reality in which the relevant  
proposition is true (e.g. one in which the dog is dangerous) ?


Exactly. (Although possible(dog is dangerous) is more (dog-is- 
dangerous) than t, which is more like possible(dog is dog).


That's Kripke semantics: A is true in alpha IF THERE IS A REALITY  
beta verifying A.


so

t is true in alpha if there is a reality beta verifying t.

Now, Kripke semantics extends classical propositional logic, and t is  
verified in all worlds. So, if alpha verifies t (if t is true in  
alpha), then t means simply that there is some world beta accessible  
(given that t is true in all world).


t = truth is possible = I am consistent = there is a reality  
out there = I am connected to a reality =truth is accessible.


Note that this well captured by modal logic, but also by important  
theorem for first order theories. In particular Gödel completeness  
theorem, which can put in this way: a theory is consistent if and only  
the theory has a model.


Gödel completeness (two equivalent versions):
- provable(p) (in a theory) entails p is true in all models of the  
theory.
- consistent(p) (in a theory) entails there is at least one model in  
which p is verified (true).


Bruno





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Re: truth of experience

[meekerdb]

On 3/13/2014 8:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Mar 2014, at 21:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/12/2014 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hello Terren,


On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:


Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I haven't had the 
time to follow the modal logic threads, so please forgive me but I don't understand 
how you could represent reality with t.



Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A is possible.

Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it can mean situation, 
state, and actually it can mean anything.


To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is dangerous, would consist in 
showing a situation, or a world, or a reality in which a dog is dangerous.


so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with the idea that this 
means that there is a reality in which A is true.


Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of a reality verifying 
a proposition.


In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the constant true, or 1=1 
in arithmetic, simply means that there is a reality.


t is possible looks like a category error to me.


t is equivalent with (p - p), it is the constant boolean valued function true. So t 
is an admissible atomic formula and  applies to all formula.


In the arithmetical interpretation (of the modal logic G), t is consistent('~(0=1)'), 
that is ~beweisbar('~(0=1)').


NOT PROVABLE FALSE = CONSISTENT TRUE.

~[]f  = t

This is standard use, in both modal logic and meta-arithmetic.





  A is possible means A refers to the state of some world.


No. It refers to a state, or to a world, or to a number, or to a cow. At this 
abstraction level, some world looks like a 1004 distracting pseudo-information. We are 
not doing metaphysics, just math, which then is applied to formulate the comp measure 
problem, and get quantum logic from there.




I don't see that t or 1=1 refers to some world, they are just tautologies, 
artifacts of language.


t is indeed a tautology, that is a proposition true (by definition) in all possible 
worlds (a world here is simply a function from the set of atomic sentences letter in 
{0, 1}, or {false, true}.


But 1=1 cannot be deduced from logic alone, and you need primitive terms, like s and 
0, to name the non trivial object s(0), and you need some axioms on equality, =. 
Usually x = x, is an axiom.


In particular 1 = 1 does refer to a reality, which is the usual (standard) model of 
arithmetic, denoted by the mathematical structure (N, +, x).


1=1 is supposed to refer to that (mathematical) reality.






This, Aristotle and Leibniz understood, but Kripke enriched the notion of 
possibility by making the notion of possibility relative to the world you actually are.


Somehow, for the machine talking in first predicate logic, like PA and ZF, more can be 
said, once we interpret the modal box by the Gödelian beweisbar('p'), which can be 
translated in arithmetic.


First order theories have a nice metamathematical property, discovered by Gödel (in 
his PhD thesis), and know as completeness, which (here) means that provability is 
equivalent with truth in all models, where models are mathematical structure which can 
verify or not, but in a well defined mathematical sense, a formula of classical first 
order logical theories.

For example PA proves some sentences A, if and only if, A is true in all models 
of PA.

If []A is provability (beweisbar('A')), the dual A is consistency 
(~beweisbar('~A').

A = ~[]~A.

~A  is equivalent with  A - f   (as you can verify by doing the truth table)

 A = ~[]~A =  ~([](A - f))

Saying that you cannot prove a contradiction (f),  from A, means that A is 
consistent.

So t means, for PA, with the arithmetical translation ~beweisbar('~t'), 
= ~beweisbar('f'), that PA is consistent, and by Gödel *_completeness_* theorem, this 
means that there is a mathematical structure (model) verifying 1=1.


So, although ~beweisbar('~t'), is an arithmetical proposition having some meaning in 
term of syntactical object (proofs) existence, it is also a way for PA, or Löbian 
entities, to refer, implicitly at first, to the existence of a reality.


But why should the failure to prove f imply anything about reality?


Because it preserves the hope that there is a reality to which you are 
connected.

If you prove 1=1 in classical logic, you can prove anything, you get inconsistent. 
There might still be a reality, but you are not connected to it.


Above you deflect the criticism of a category error by saying, We are not doing 
metaphysics, just math, which then is applied to formulate the comp measure problem, and 
get quantum logic from there.  But then it turns out you really are doing metaphysics. 
You are taking a tautology in mathematics and using it to infer things about reality and 
your relation to it.


Brent




You are in a cul-de-sac world, when seen in Kripke semantics of G

Re: truth of experience

[meekerdb]

On 3/13/2014 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Mar 2014, at 21:51, LizR wrote:


On 13 March 2014 04:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Hello Terren,

On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:

Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I haven't 
had the
time to follow the modal logic threads, so please forgive me but I don't
understand how you could represent reality with t.

Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A is possible.

Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it can mean
situation, state, and actually it can mean anything.

To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is dangerous, would 
consist in
showing a situation, or a world, or a reality in which a dog is dangerous.

so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with the idea 
that this
means that there is a reality in which A is true.

Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of a reality
verifying a proposition.

In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the constant true, 
or
1=1 in arithmetic, simply means that there is a reality.


You mean t asserts there is a reality in which the relevant proposition is true (e.g. 
one in which the dog is dangerous) ?


Exactly. (Although possible(dog is dangerous) is more (dog-is-dangerous) than t, 
which is more like possible(dog is dog).


That's Kripke semantics: A is true in alpha IF THERE IS A REALITY beta 
verifying A.

so

t is true in alpha if there is a reality beta verifying t.

Now, Kripke semantics extends classical propositional logic, and t is verified in all 
worlds.


This is a point that confuses me in trying your exercises (which I'm attempting to do 
without reading your exchanges with Liz).  There you refer to a formula being respected 
when it is true in all worlds for all valuations.  But does all valuations of a formula 
A include f when A=p-p?  Are we to assume that t is a formula in all worlds and it's 
value is always t?  And then is f also a formula in every world?


Brent


So, if alpha verifies t (if t is true in alpha), then t means simply that there is 
some world beta accessible (given that t is true in all world).


t = truth is possible = I am consistent = there is a reality out there = I am 
connected to a reality =truth is accessible.


Note that this well captured by modal logic, but also by important theorem for first 
order theories. In particular Gödel completeness theorem, which can put in this way: a 
theory is consistent if and only the theory has a model.


Gödel completeness (two equivalent versions):
- provable(p) (in a theory) entails p is true in all models of the theory.
- consistent(p) (in a theory) entails there is at least one model in which p is verified 
(true).


Bruno





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Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Mar 2014, at 17:56, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/13/2014 8:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Mar 2014, at 21:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/12/2014 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hello Terren,


On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:


Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately  
I haven't had the time to follow the modal logic threads, so  
please forgive me but I don't understand how you could represent  
reality with t.



Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A  
is possible.


Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it  
can mean situation, state, and actually it can mean anything.


To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is  
dangerous, would consist in showing a situation, or a world, or a  
reality in which a dog is dangerous.


so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with  
the idea that this means that there is a reality in which A is  
true.


Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of  
a reality verifying a proposition.


In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the  
constant true, or 1=1 in arithmetic, simply means that there is  
a reality.


t is possible looks like a category error to me.


t is equivalent with (p - p), it is the constant boolean valued  
function true. So t is an admissible atomic formula and   
applies to all formula.


In the arithmetical interpretation (of the modal logic G), t is  
consistent('~(0=1)'), that is ~beweisbar('~(0=1)').


NOT PROVABLE FALSE = CONSISTENT TRUE.

~[]f  = t

This is standard use, in both modal logic and meta-arithmetic.





  A is possible means A refers to the state of some world.


No. It refers to a state, or to a world, or to a number, or to a  
cow. At this abstraction level, some world looks like a 1004  
distracting pseudo-information. We are not doing metaphysics, just  
math, which then is applied to formulate the comp measure problem,  
and get quantum logic from there.




I don't see that t or 1=1 refers to some world, they are just  
tautologies, artifacts of language.


t is indeed a tautology, that is a proposition true (by definition)  
in all possible worlds (a world here is simply a function from  
the set of atomic sentences letter in {0, 1}, or {false, true}.


But 1=1 cannot be deduced from logic alone, and you need  
primitive terms, like s and 0, to name the non trivial object s(0),  
and you need some axioms on equality, =. Usually x = x, is an  
axiom.


In particular 1 = 1 does refer to a reality, which is the usual  
(standard) model of arithmetic, denoted by the   
mathematical structure (N, +, x).


1=1 is supposed to refer to that (mathematical) reality.






This, Aristotle and Leibniz understood, but Kripke enriched the  
notion of possibility by making the notion of possibility  
relative to the world you actually are.


Somehow, for the machine talking in first predicate logic, like  
PA and ZF, more can be said, once we interpret the modal box by  
the Gödelian beweisbar('p'), which can be translated in  
arithmetic.


First order theories have a nice metamathematical property,  
discovered by Gödel (in his PhD thesis), and know as  
completeness, which (here) means that provability is equivalent  
with truth in all models, where models are mathematical structure  
which can verify or not, but in a well defined mathematical  
sense, a formula of classical first order logical theories.
For example PA proves some sentences A, if and only if, A is true  
in all models of PA.


If []A is provability (beweisbar('A')), the dual A is  
consistency (~beweisbar('~A').


A = ~[]~A.

~A  is equivalent with  A - f   (as you can verify by doing the  
truth table)


 A = ~[]~A =  ~([](A - f))

Saying that you cannot prove a contradiction (f),  from A, means  
that A is consistent.


So t means, for PA, with the arithmetical translation  
~beweisbar('~t'), = ~beweisbar('f'), that PA is consistent, and  
by Gödel completeness theorem, this means that there is a  
mathematical structure (model) verifying 1=1.


So, although ~beweisbar('~t'), is an arithmetical proposition  
having some meaning in term of syntactical object (proofs)  
existence, it is also a way for PA, or Löbian entities, to refer,  
implicitly at first, to the existence of a reality.


But why should the failure to prove f imply anything about reality?


Because it preserves the hope that there is a reality to which you  
are connected.


If you prove 1=1 in classical logic, you can prove anything, you  
get inconsistent. There might still be a reality, but you are not  
connected to it.


Above you deflect the criticism of a category error by saying, We  
are not doing metaphysics, just math, which then is applied to  
formulate the comp measure problem, and get quantum logic from  
there.  But then it turns out you really are doing metaphysics.   
You are taking a tautology in mathematics and using it to infer

Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Mar 2014, at 18:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/13/2014 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Mar 2014, at 21:51, LizR wrote:


On 13 March 2014 04:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hello Terren,

On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:

Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I  
haven't had the time to follow the modal logic threads, so please  
forgive me but I don't understand how you could represent reality  
with t.
Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A is  
possible.


Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it  
can mean situation, state, and actually it can mean anything.


To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is dangerous,  
would consist in showing a situation, or a world, or a reality in  
which a dog is dangerous.


so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with  
the idea that this means that there is a reality in which A is true.


Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of  
a reality verifying a proposition.


In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the  
constant true, or 1=1 in arithmetic, simply means that there is  
a reality.


You mean t asserts there is a reality in which the relevant  
proposition is true (e.g. one in which the dog is dangerous) ?


Exactly. (Although possible(dog is dangerous) is more (dog-is- 
dangerous) than t, which is more like possible(dog is dog).


That's Kripke semantics: A is true in alpha IF THERE IS A  
REALITY beta verifying A.


so

t is true in alpha if there is a reality beta verifying t.

Now, Kripke semantics extends classical propositional logic, and t  
is verified in all worlds.


This is a point that confuses me in trying your exercises (which I'm  
attempting to do without reading your exchanges with Liz).  There  
you refer to a formula being respected when it is true in all  
worlds for all valuations.  But does all valuations of a formula A  
include f when A=p-p?


No, the valuations are defined only on the atomic  p, q, r,  (in  
modal propositional logic).
Then the arbitrary formula get their value by the truth table, and the  
modal formula get their value by the Kripke semantics, that is, the  
truth values of the boxed an diamonded propositions depends on the  
locally accessible worlds.





Are we to assume that t is a formula in all worlds and it's value  
is always t?


Yes. It is a boolean constant. You can suppress it and replaced it by  
(p - p), as this is true in all words (as this is true in the worlds  
where p is true, and is true in the worlds where p is false).







And then is f also a formula in every world?


You can represent it by (p  ~p), or just ~t, and it is false in every  
world.


The cul-de-sac worlds get close, as they verify []f.

Fortunately they don't verify []A - A.

f is never met, in any world, but you can met []f, [][]f, [][][]f, ...  
G* proves ◊[]f, ◊[][]f,◊[][][]f, ... in the G-worlds.


(Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊  ?)

Bruno







Brent


So, if alpha verifies t (if t is true in alpha), then t means  
simply that there is some world beta accessible (given that t is  
true in all world).


t = truth is possible = I am consistent = there is a reality  
out there = I am connected to a reality =truth is accessible.


Note that this well captured by modal logic, but also by important  
theorem for first order theories. In particular Gödel completeness  
theorem, which can put in this way: a theory is consistent if and  
only the theory has a model.


Gödel completeness (two equivalent versions):
- provable(p) (in a theory) entails p is true in all models of the  
theory.
- consistent(p) (in a theory) entails there is at least one model  
in which p is verified (true).


Bruno





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Re: truth of experience

[meekerdb]

On 3/13/2014 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Mar 2014, at 18:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/13/2014 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Mar 2014, at 21:51, LizR wrote:

On 13 March 2014 04:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be 
wrote:


Hello Terren,

On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:

Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I haven't 
had
the time to follow the modal logic threads, so please forgive me but I don't
understand how you could represent reality with t.

Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A is possible.

Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it can mean
situation, state, and actually it can mean anything.

To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is dangerous, would 
consist
in showing a situation, or a world, or a reality in which a dog is 
dangerous.

so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with the idea 
that
this means that there is a reality in which A is true.

Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of a reality
verifying a proposition.

In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the constant true, 
or
1=1 in arithmetic, simply means that there is a reality.


You mean t asserts there is a reality in which the relevant proposition is true 
(e.g. one in which the dog is dangerous) ?


Exactly. (Although possible(dog is dangerous) is more (dog-is-dangerous) than t, 
which is more like possible(dog is dog).


That's Kripke semantics: A is true in alpha IF THERE IS A REALITY beta 
verifying A.

so

t is true in alpha if there is a reality beta verifying t.

Now, Kripke semantics extends classical propositional logic, and t is verified in all 
worlds.


This is a point that confuses me in trying your exercises (which I'm attempting to do 
without reading your exchanges with Liz).  There you refer to a formula being 
respected when it is true in all worlds for all valuations.  But does all 
valuations of a formula A include f when A=p-p?


No, the valuations are defined only on the atomic  p, q, r,  (in modal propositional 
logic).
Then the arbitrary formula get their value by the truth table, and the modal formula get 
their value by the Kripke semantics, that is, the truth values of the boxed an 
diamonded propositions depends on the locally accessible worlds.


Then t and f cannot be treated as atomic propositions, which was my objection to writing 
t. In such a formula, t can only be regarded as shorthand for some tautology.  So t 
doesn't mean There is some reality it means There is some tautology: a proposition that 
is t in virtue of the definition of relations , V, ~, etc.








Are we to assume that t is a formula in all worlds and it's value is always t?


Yes. It is a boolean constant. You can suppress it and replaced it by (p - p), as this 
is true in all words (as this is true in the worlds where p is true, and is true in the 
worlds where p is false).







And then is f also a formula in every world?


You can represent it by (p  ~p), or just ~t, and it is false in every world.

The cul-de-sac worlds get close, as they verify []f.

Fortunately they don't verify []A - A.

f is never met, in any world, but you can met []f, [][]f, [][][]f, ... G* proves ◊[]f, 
◊[][]f,◊[][][]f, ... in the G-worlds.


You say (p  ~p) is false in every world, but f is never met in any world.  That seems 
contradictory.  If p is a proposition in some world, are we not always allowed to form (p 
 ~p), which will have the value f for all valuations of p?






(Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊  ?)


I see it.

Brent

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Re: truth of experience

[LizR]

 (Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊  ?)

Yes I do!

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Re: truth of experience

[Russell Standish]

On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10:45AM +1300, LizR wrote:
  (Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊  ?)
 
 Yes I do!
 

Not me (alas). Although it is visible when typing my response.

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Mar 2014, at 20:05, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/13/2014 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Mar 2014, at 18:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/13/2014 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Mar 2014, at 21:51, LizR wrote:


On 13 March 2014 04:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hello Terren,

On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:

Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately  
I haven't had the time to follow the modal logic threads, so  
please forgive me but I don't understand how you could  
represent reality with t.
Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A  
is possible.


Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it  
can mean situation, state, and actually it can mean anything.


To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is  
dangerous, would consist in showing a situation, or a world, or  
a reality in which a dog is dangerous.


so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with  
the idea that this means that there is  
a  reality in which A is true.


Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence  
of a reality verifying a proposition.


In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the  
constant true, or 1=1 in arithmetic, simply means that there  
is a reality.


You mean t asserts there is a reality in which the relevant  
proposition is true (e.g. one in which the dog is dangerous) ?


Exactly. (Although possible(dog is dangerous) is more (dog-is- 
dangerous) than t, which is more like possible(dog is dog).


That's Kripke semantics: A is true in alpha IF THERE IS A  
REALITY beta verifying A.


so

t is true in alpha if there is a reality beta verifying t.

Now, Kripke semantics extends classical propositional logic, and  
t is verified in all worlds.


This is a point that confuses me in trying your exercises (which  
I'm attempting to do without reading your exchanges with Liz).   
There you refer to a formula being respected when it is true in  
all worlds for all valuations.  But does all valuations of a  
formula A include f when A=p-p?


No, the valuations are defined only on the atomic  p, q, r,   
(in modal propositional logic).
Then the arbitrary formula get their value by the truth table, and  
the modal formula get their value by the Kripke semantics, that is,  
the truth values of the boxed an diamonded propositions depends  
on the locally accessible worlds.


Then t and f cannot be treated as atomic propositions,


Why? Pi is constant, but still a (real) number. Why could we not have  
constant proposition?




which was my objection to writing t. In such a formula, t can only  
be regarded as shorthand for some tautology.


If you want. Any simple provable proposition would do.


So t doesn't mean There is some reality it means There is some  
tautology: a proposition that is t in virtue of the definition of  
relations , V, ~, etc.


t means, in Kripke semantics, that there is a world in which t is  
true (and as t is true in any world, it does mean that there is a world.


Then when A is the diamond consistency of A, it means that there  
is a model verufying A, by Gödel's completeness theorem.


Bruno












Are we to assume that t is a formula in all worlds and it's  
value is always t?


Yes. It is a boolean constant. You can suppress it and replaced it  
by (p - p), as this is true in all words (as this is true in the  
worlds where p is true, and is true in the worlds where p is false).







And then is f also a formula in every world?


You can represent it by (p  ~p), or just ~t, and it is false in  
every world.


The cul-de-sac worlds get close, as they verify []f.

Fortunately they don't verify []A - A.

f is never met, in any world, but you can met []f, [][]f, [][] 
[]f, ... G* proves ◊[]f, ◊[][]f,◊[][][]f, ... in the G- 
worlds.


You say (p  ~p) is false in every world, but f is never met in any  
world.  That seems contradictory.  If p is a proposition in some  
world, are we not always allowed to form (p  ~p), which will have  
the value f for all valuations of p?






(Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊  ?)


I see it.

Brent

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Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Mar 2014, at 22:10, LizR wrote:


 (Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊  ?)

Yes I do!


Nice, I hope everyone see it. Does someone not see a lozenge? Here:  ◊

Do someone not see Gödel's second theorem here: ◊t - ~[]◊t   ?

Bruno





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Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Mar 2014, at 01:49, Russell Standish wrote:


On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10:45AM +1300, LizR wrote:

(Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊  ?)


Yes I do!



Not me (alas).


Damned. I will need to use the more ugly  instead of the cute ◊ !

No problem.

Bruno




Although it is visible when typing my response.

Cheers

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Re: truth of experience

[meekerdb]

On 3/13/2014 9:54 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
which was my objection to writing t. In such a formula, t can only be regarded as 
shorthand for some tautology.


If you want. Any simple provable proposition would do.


Then f also occurs in every world since (p  ~p) can be formed in every world.  But you 
say we never meet f in any world?


Brent



So t doesn't mean There is some reality it means There is some tautology: a 
proposition that is t in virtue of the definition of relations , V, ~, etc.


t means, in Kripke semantics, that there is a world in which t is true (and as t is 
true in any world, it does mean that there is a world.


Then when A is the diamond consistency of A, it means that there is a model 
verufying A, by Gödel's completeness theorem.


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Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Mar 2014, at 06:08, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/13/2014 9:54 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
which was my objection to writing t. In such a formula, t can  
only be regarded as shorthand for some tautology.


If you want. Any simple provable proposition would do.


Then f also occurs in every world since (p  ~p) can be formed in  
every world.  But you say we never meet f in any world?


I meant that f, like (p  ~p), is FALSE in every world. By met it I  
mean met it true.


Bruno





Brent



So t doesn't mean There is some reality it means There is  
some tautology: a proposition that is t in virtue of the  
definition of relations , V, ~, etc.


t means, in Kripke semantics, that there is a world in which t is  
true (and as t is true in any world, it does mean that there is a  
world.


Then when A is the diamond consistency of A, it means that  
there is a model verufying A, by Gödel's completeness theorem.


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Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

Hello Terren,


On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:


Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I  
haven't had the time to follow the modal logic threads, so please  
forgive me but I don't understand how you could represent reality  
with t.



Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A is  
possible.


Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it can  
mean situation, state, and actually it can mean anything.


To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is dangerous,  
would consist in showing a situation, or a world, or a reality in  
which a dog is dangerous.


so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with the  
idea that this means that there is a reality in which A is true.


Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of a  
reality verifying a proposition.


In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the constant  
true, or 1=1 in arithmetic, simply means that there is a reality.



This, Aristotle and Leibniz understood, but Kripke enriched the notion  
of possibility by making the notion of possibility relative to the  
world you actually are.


Somehow, for the machine talking in first predicate logic, like PA and  
ZF, more can be said, once we interpret the modal box by the Gödelian  
beweisbar('p'), which can be translated in arithmetic.


First order theories have a nice metamathematical property, discovered  
by Gödel (in his PhD thesis), and know as completeness, which (here)  
means that provability is equivalent with truth in all models, where  
models are mathematical structure which can verify or not, but in a  
well defined mathematical sense, a formula of classical first order  
logical theories.
For example PA proves some sentences A, if and only if, A is true in  
all models of PA.


If []A is provability (beweisbar('A')), the dual A is consistency  
(~beweisbar('~A').


A = ~[]~A.

~A  is equivalent with  A - f   (as you can verify by doing the truth  
table)


 A = ~[]~A =  ~([](A - f))

Saying that you cannot prove a contradiction (f),  from A, means that  
A is consistent.


So t means, for PA, with the arithmetical translation  
~beweisbar('~t'), = ~beweisbar('f'), that PA is consistent, and by  
Gödel completeness theorem, this means that there is a mathematical  
structure (model) verifying 1=1.


So, although ~beweisbar('~t'), is an arithmetical proposition having  
some meaning in term of syntactical object (proofs) existence, it is  
also a way for PA, or Löbian entities, to refer, implicitly at first,  
to the existence of a reality. Of course, when asked about t, the  
sound machines stay mute (Gödel's first incompleteness theorem), and  
eventually, the Löbian one, like PA and ZF,  explains why they stay  
mute, by asserting

t - ~[]t (Gödel's second incompleteness).

This is capital, as it means that []p, although it implies p, that  
implication cannot be proved by the machine, so that to a get a  
probability on the relative consistent extension, the less you can  
ask, is p, and by incompleteness, although both []p and []p  p,  
will prove the same arithmetical propositions, they will obey  
different logics.


More on this later. When you grasp the link between modal logic and  
Gödel, you can see that modal logic can save a lot of work. Modal  
logic does not add anything to the arithmetical reality, nor even to  
self-reference, but it provides a jet to fly above the arithmetical  
abysses, even discover them, including their different panorama, when  
filtered by local universal machines/numbers. As there are also modal  
logics capable of representing quantum logic(s), modal logics can help  
to compare the way nature selects the observable-possibilities, and  
the computable, or sigma_1 arithmetical selection enforced, I think,  
by computationalism.


Bruno



On Tue, Mar 11, 2014 at 2:18 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:

Hi Terran,


On 11 Mar 2014, at 17:10, Terren Suydam wrote:



Hi Bruno,

Sure, consciousness here-and-now is undoubtable. But the p refers  
to the contents of consciousness, which is not undoubtable in many  
cases. I am in pain cannot be doubted when one is feeling it, but  
other felt sensations can be doubted, e.g. see http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2956899/


Such illusions of experience can even be helpful, as in  
Ramachandran's Mirror Box therapy for phantom limb sufferers, see http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3468806/


Illusions of experience are evidence that what we experience is of  
our brains' constructions, like a waking dream, guided in healthy  
brains by the patterns of information streaming from our sense  
organs.


Exactly: like a walking dream. That's the root of the Bp  p idea,  
in the Theaetetus. To do the math I concentrate to rich (Löbian)  
machine for the B, but the idea of defining knowledge by true  
belief is an act of modesty with respect

Re: truth of experience

[meekerdb]

On 3/12/2014 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hello Terren,


On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:


Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I haven't had the time 
to follow the modal logic threads, so please forgive me but I don't understand how you 
could represent reality with t.



Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A is possible.

Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it can mean situation, 
state, and actually it can mean anything.


To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is dangerous, would consist in 
showing a situation, or a world, or a reality in which a dog is dangerous.


so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with the idea that this means 
that there is a reality in which A is true.


Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of a reality verifying a 
proposition.


In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the constant true, or 1=1 in 
arithmetic, simply means that there is a reality.


t is possible looks like a category error to me.   A is possible means A refers to the 
state of some world.  I don't see that t or 1=1 refers to some world, they are just 
tautologies, artifacts of language.





This, Aristotle and Leibniz understood, but Kripke enriched the notion of possibility 
by making the notion of possibility relative to the world you actually are.


Somehow, for the machine talking in first predicate logic, like PA and ZF, more can be 
said, once we interpret the modal box by the Gödelian beweisbar('p'), which can be 
translated in arithmetic.


First order theories have a nice metamathematical property, discovered by Gödel (in his 
PhD thesis), and know as completeness, which (here) means that provability is equivalent 
with truth in all models, where models are mathematical structure which can verify or 
not, but in a well defined mathematical sense, a formula of classical first order 
logical theories.

For example PA proves some sentences A, if and only if, A is true in all models 
of PA.

If []A is provability (beweisbar('A')), the dual A is consistency 
(~beweisbar('~A').

A = ~[]~A.

~A  is equivalent with  A - f   (as you can verify by doing the truth table)

 A = ~[]~A =  ~([](A - f))

Saying that you cannot prove a contradiction (f),  from A, means that A is 
consistent.

So t means, for PA, with the arithmetical translation ~beweisbar('~t'), 
= ~beweisbar('f'), that PA is consistent, and by Gödel *_completeness_* theorem, this 
means that there is a mathematical structure (model) verifying 1=1.


So, although ~beweisbar('~t'), is an arithmetical proposition having some meaning in 
term of syntactical object (proofs) existence, it is also a way for PA, or Löbian 
entities, to refer, implicitly at first, to the existence of a reality.


But why should the failure to prove f imply anything about reality?

Brent


Of course, when asked about t, the sound machines stay mute (Gödel's *_first 
incompleteness_* theorem), and eventually, the Löbian one, like PA and ZF,  explains why 
they stay mute, by asserting

t - ~[]t (Gödel's *_second_* *_incompleteness_*).

This is capital, as it means that []p, although it implies p, that implication cannot 
be proved by the machine, so that to a get a probability on the relative consistent 
extension, the less you can ask, is p, and by incompleteness, although both []p and 
[]p  p, will prove the same arithmetical propositions, they will obey different logics.


More on this later. When you grasp the link between modal logic and Gödel, you can see 
that modal logic can save a lot of work. Modal logic does not add anything to the 
arithmetical reality, nor even to self-reference, but it provides a jet to fly above the 
arithmetical abysses, even discover them, including their different panorama, when 
filtered by local universal machines/numbers. As there are also modal logics capable of 
representing quantum logic(s), modal logics can help to compare the way nature selects 
the observable-possibilities, and the computable, or sigma_1 arithmetical selection 
enforced, I think, by computationalism.


Bruno


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Re: truth of experience

[LizR]

On 13 March 2014 04:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Hello Terren,

 On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:

 Hi Bruno,

 Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I haven't
 had the time to follow the modal logic threads, so please forgive me but I
 don't understand how you could represent reality with t.

 Shortly, A most general meaning is that the proposition A is
 possible.

 Modal logician uses the word world in a very general sense, it can mean
 situation, state, and actually it can mean anything.

 To argue for example that it is possible that  a dog is dangerous, would
 consist in showing a situation, or a world, or a reality in which a dog is
 dangerous.

 so you can read A, as A is possible, or possible(A), with the idea
 that this means that there is a reality in which A is true.

 Reality is not represented by A, it is more the existence of a
 reality verifying a proposition.

 In particular, t, which is t is possible, where t is the constant
 true, or 1=1 in arithmetic, simply means that there is a reality.


You mean t asserts there is a reality in which the relevant proposition
is true (e.g. one in which the dog is dangerous) ?

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truth of experience

[Terren Suydam]

Hi Bruno,

Sure, consciousness here-and-now is undoubtable. But the p refers to the
contents of consciousness, which is not undoubtable in many cases. I am in
pain cannot be doubted when one is feeling it, but other felt sensations
can be doubted, e.g. see
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2956899/

Such illusions of experience can even be helpful, as in Ramachandran's
Mirror Box therapy for phantom limb sufferers, see
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3468806/

Illusions of experience are evidence that what we experience is of our
brains' constructions, like a waking dream, guided in healthy brains by the
patterns of information streaming from our sense organs.  Brains that are
defective in this manner result in schizophrenia and presumably other
dissociative pathologies.

For me it all casts doubt on whether Bp  p is an accurate formalization
for experience, but I might be missing something. Can you make sense of Bp
 p for a schizophrenic who hears voices?  How about your own salvia
experiences?

T

On Mon, Mar 10, 2014 at 3:26 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 10 Mar 2014, at 16:28, Terren Suydam wrote:


 Question for you Bruno:.

 You say (with help from Theaetetus) that 1p experience is given by Bp 
 p. Yet, our experience is often deluded, as in optical illusions, or in
 various kinds of emotional  psychological denial. Can we ever really say
 that our knowledge, even 1p experience, refers to anything True?


 In public?  No.

 In private?  Yes.

 I would say.

 Then in the frame of theories about such 1p things, like consciousness, we
 can decide to agree on some property of the notion. Then,
 consciousness-here-and-now might be a candidate for a possible true
 reference, if you agree consciousness-here-and-now is undoubtable or
 incorrigible.

 Then we can approximate many sort of truth, by the very plausible, the
 probable, the relatively expectable, etc.

 If someone complains, is the pain real or fake? Eventually it is a
 question for a judge.

 The truth is what no machine can really grasp the whole truth, but all
 machines can know very well some aspect of it, I think, but very few in
 justifiable modes.


 Bruno




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Re: truth of experience

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, March 11, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote:


 Hi Bruno,

 Sure, consciousness here-and-now is undoubtable. But the p refers to the 
 contents of consciousness, which is not undoubtable in many cases. I am in 
 pain cannot be doubted when one is feeling it, but other felt sensations 
 can be doubted, e.g. see 
 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2956899/

 Such illusions of experience can even be helpful, as in Ramachandran's 
 Mirror Box therapy for phantom limb sufferers, see 
 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3468806/

 Illusions of experience are evidence that what we experience is of our 
 brains' constructions,


Illusions are only evidence that experience has multiple layers of 
reference and expectation, and the brain conditions affect those layers. 
That doesn't mean that the brain is constructing anything though (except 
for neurotransmitters). If what we experience is a construction, then that 
means the entire universe could be a construction, including the 
expectation of a universe which is either 'illusory' or not.
 

 like a waking dream, guided in healthy brains by the patterns of 
 information streaming from our sense organs.  Brains that are defective in 
 this manner result in schizophrenia and presumably other dissociative 
 pathologies.

 For me it all casts doubt on whether Bp  p is an accurate formalization 
 for experience, but I might be missing something. Can you make sense of Bp 
  p for a schizophrenic who hears voices?  How about your own salvia 
 experiences?


As far as I can tell, Bp  p is a fragile notion that has been generalized 
from from formalities within communication and has very little to do with 
experience. It is a radically normative and narrow consideration of only 
one aspect of consciousness.

Craig


 T

 On Mon, Mar 10, 2014 at 3:26 PM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.bejavascript:
  wrote:


 On 10 Mar 2014, at 16:28, Terren Suydam wrote:


 Question for you Bruno:.

 You say (with help from Theaetetus) that 1p experience is given by Bp  
 p. Yet, our experience is often deluded, as in optical illusions, or in 
 various kinds of emotional  psychological denial. Can we ever really say 
 that our knowledge, even 1p experience, refers to anything True?


 In public?  No.

 In private?  Yes.

 I would say.

 Then in the frame of theories about such 1p things, like consciousness, 
 we can decide to agree on some property of the notion. Then, 
 consciousness-here-and-now might be a candidate for a possible true 
 reference, if you agree consciousness-here-and-now is undoubtable or 
 incorrigible.

 Then we can approximate many sort of truth, by the very plausible, the 
 probable, the relatively expectable, etc.

 If someone complains, is the pain real or fake? Eventually it is a 
 question for a judge.

 The truth is what no machine can really grasp the whole truth, but all 
 machines can know very well some aspect of it, I think, but very few in 
 justifiable modes.


 Bruno




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Re: truth of experience

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Terran,


On 11 Mar 2014, at 17:10, Terren Suydam wrote:



Hi Bruno,

Sure, consciousness here-and-now is undoubtable. But the p refers  
to the contents of consciousness, which is not undoubtable in many  
cases. I am in pain cannot be doubted when one is feeling it, but  
other felt sensations can be doubted, e.g. see http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2956899/


Such illusions of experience can even be helpful, as in  
Ramachandran's Mirror Box therapy for phantom limb sufferers, see http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3468806/


Illusions of experience are evidence that what we experience is of  
our brains' constructions, like a waking dream, guided in healthy  
brains by the patterns of information streaming from our sense organs.


Exactly: like a walking dream. That's the root of the Bp  p idea, in  
the Theaetetus. To do the math I concentrate to rich (Löbian)  
machine for the B, but the idea of defining knowledge by true belief  
is an act of modesty with respect to the question if we are dreaming  
or not, or more generally, if we are wrong or not.





 Brains that are defective in this manner result in schizophrenia  
and presumably other dissociative pathologies.


OK.





For me it all casts doubt on whether Bp  p is an accurate  
formalization for experience, but I might be missing something.


As I said above, it is a simplest meta definition which capture the  
main thing (the truth of the experience) without needing to define it.


Also, for the physical first person *experience*, Bp  p, which is  
only the knower, is not enough, you will need Bp  t  p, which by  
incompleteness has its own logic, quantum like when restricted to the  
sigma_1 truth. You need a reality (t).





Can you make sense of Bp  p for a schizophrenic who hears voices?


If a schizophrenic says that he hears voices, and if he hears voice  
(mentally, virtually, arithmetically, brain-biologically, ...), then  
he knows he hears voice.


An insane guy who says that he is Napoleon does not know that he is  
napoleon, but he believes it only. He still might know that he  
believes being Napoleon, and be only ignorant or denying that this is  
false.







How about your own salvia experiences?


It is very hard to describe, even more to interpret. And I am biased.

It is indeed:  [](... what-the-f.) and ... what the f.  Most plausibly.

It is like remembering forgotten qualia since eons.

It might confirms the idea that brains, machines, words, theories  
filter consciousness only.

Consciousness would be a close sister of (arithmetical) truth.

Salvia might open the appetite for platonism, but of course it is also  
a question of taste.



Bruno








T

On Mon, Mar 10, 2014 at 3:26 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 10 Mar 2014, at 16:28, Terren Suydam wrote:



Question for you Bruno:.

You say (with help from Theaetetus) that 1p experience is given by  
Bp  p. Yet, our experience is often deluded, as in optical  
illusions, or in various kinds of emotional  psychological denial.  
Can we ever really say that our knowledge, even 1p experience,  
refers to anything True?


In public?  No.

In private?  Yes.

I would say.

Then in the frame of theories about such 1p things, like  
consciousness, we can decide to agree on some property of the  
notion. Then, consciousness-here-and-now might be a candidate for  
a possible true reference, if you agree consciousness-here-and-now  
is undoubtable or incorrigible.


Then we can approximate many sort of truth, by the very plausible,  
the probable, the relatively expectable, etc.


If someone complains, is the pain real or fake? Eventually it is a  
question for a judge.


The truth is what no machine can really grasp the whole truth, but  
all machines can know very well some aspect of it, I think, but very  
few in justifiable modes.



Bruno



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Re: truth of experience

[Terren Suydam]

Hi Bruno,

Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on t?  Unfortunately I haven't
had the time to follow the modal logic threads, so please forgive me but I
don't understand how you could represent reality with t.

Thanks,
T


On Tue, Mar 11, 2014 at 2:18 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Hi Terran,


 On 11 Mar 2014, at 17:10, Terren Suydam wrote:


 Hi Bruno,

 Sure, consciousness here-and-now is undoubtable. But the p refers to the
 contents of consciousness, which is not undoubtable in many cases. I am in
 pain cannot be doubted when one is feeling it, but other felt sensations
 can be doubted, e.g. see
 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2956899/

 Such illusions of experience can even be helpful, as in Ramachandran's
 Mirror Box therapy for phantom limb sufferers, see
 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3468806/

 Illusions of experience are evidence that what we experience is of our
 brains' constructions, like a waking dream, guided in healthy brains by the
 patterns of information streaming from our sense organs.


 Exactly: like a walking dream. That's the root of the Bp  p idea, in the
 Theaetetus. To do the math I concentrate to rich (Löbian) machine for the
 B, but the idea of defining knowledge by true belief is an act of modesty
 with respect to the question if we are dreaming or not, or more generally,
 if we are wrong or not.




  Brains that are defective in this manner result in schizophrenia and
 presumably other dissociative pathologies.


 OK.




 For me it all casts doubt on whether Bp  p is an accurate formalization
 for experience, but I might be missing something.


 As I said above, it is a simplest meta definition which capture the
 main thing (the truth of the experience) without needing to define it.

 Also, for the physical first person *experience*, Bp  p, which is only
 the knower, is not enough, you will need Bp  t  p, which by
 incompleteness has its own logic, quantum like when restricted to the
 sigma_1 truth. You need a reality (t).



 Can you make sense of Bp  p for a schizophrenic who hears voices?


 If a schizophrenic says that he hears voices, and if he hears voice
 (mentally, virtually, arithmetically, brain-biologically, ...), then he
 knows he hears voice.

 An insane guy who says that he is Napoleon does not know that he is
 napoleon, but he believes it only. He still might know that he believes
 being Napoleon, and be only ignorant or denying that this is false.





 How about your own salvia experiences?


 It is very hard to describe, even more to interpret. And I am biased.

 It is indeed:  [](... what-the-f.) and ... what the f.  Most plausibly.

 It is like remembering forgotten qualia since eons.

 It might confirms the idea that brains, machines, words, theories filter
 consciousness only.
 Consciousness would be a close sister of (arithmetical) truth.

 Salvia might open the appetite for platonism, but of course it is also a
 question of taste.


 Bruno







 T

 On Mon, Mar 10, 2014 at 3:26 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 10 Mar 2014, at 16:28, Terren Suydam wrote:


 Question for you Bruno:.

 You say (with help from Theaetetus) that 1p experience is given by Bp 
 p. Yet, our experience is often deluded, as in optical illusions, or in
 various kinds of emotional  psychological denial. Can we ever really say
 that our knowledge, even 1p experience, refers to anything True?


 In public?  No.

 In private?  Yes.

 I would say.

 Then in the frame of theories about such 1p things, like consciousness,
 we can decide to agree on some property of the notion. Then,
 consciousness-here-and-now might be a candidate for a possible true
 reference, if you agree consciousness-here-and-now is undoubtable or
 incorrigible.

 Then we can approximate many sort of truth, by the very plausible, the
 probable, the relatively expectable, etc.

 If someone complains, is the pain real or fake? Eventually it is a
 question for a judge.

 The truth is what no machine can really grasp the whole truth, but all
 machines can know very well some aspect of it, I think, but very few in
 justifiable modes.


 Bruno



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Re: The Nature of Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 08 Jan 2014, at 23:11, John Mikes wrote:


Bruno and Brent:

did you agree whether TRUE BELIEF means in your sentences

1. one's belief that is TRUE, (not likely),


It is that one. Bp  p means that p is believed (by some machine)  
and that it is the case that p.




or
2. the TRUTH  that one believes in it (a maybe)?


No. That would be equivalent with Bp.

Bruno




(none of the two may be 'true').

JM


On Wed, Jan 1, 2014 at 5:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 31 Dec 2013, at 21:09, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/31/2013 1:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

only rules to extract knowledge from assumed beliefs.



?
I answered no to your question. Knowledge is not extracted in  
any way from belief (assumed or not). knowledge *is* belief, when  
or in the world those beliefs are true, but this you can never  
know as such.


Since your theory to an infinite number of semi-classical worlds  
with different events (and even different physics) it seems that  
true belief is not a very useful concept.


It is, because by incompleteness, we will have that Bp  p (true  
belief) obeys a different logic (an epistemic intuitionist logic)   
despite G* knows that it is the same machine, having the same  
action. The machine just dont know that, although it can infer it  
from comp + a sort of faith in herself.





Every belief is going to have probability zero of being true.


neither Bp  nor Bp  p is a priori related to probability. For this  
you need []p - p, which is ocrrect for Bp  p, though, and indeed  
a physics appears already there, but that is a sort of anomaly  
(which confirms what I took as an anomaly in Plotinus, but the  
machine agrees with him).
Now, Bp, when present in the nuances, gives the logic of the  
corresponding certainty, so it is trivially a probability one. We  
need to extract the logic, and the probability different from 1 are  
handled by the mathematics, and is related to the Dp (not Bp). The  
probability bears on the accessible worlds.




The interesting concept is the probability of future events  
relative to one's current state.


That's exactly why we need to go from Bp to Bp  Dt (or Bp  Dt  p,  
or actually Bp  p). This gives the relevant notion of relative  
consistency together with some temporal interpretation.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: The Nature of Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Jan 2014, at 05:55, meekerdb wrote:

Bruno writes Bp  p, where Bp ambiguously means Proves  
p (Beweisbar?) and Believes p.


What is ambiguous? I said that I limit the interview to Platonist  
*correct* machine, believing in arithmetic or in recursively  
enumerable extension of arithmetic. And the fact that the machine  
cannot prove Bp - p for all p, suggest that provability obeys to the  
axioms I gave for belief, and not for knowledge (where Bp-p is not  
just true but believed as well).





Believes p and P is then a belief that is true.


OK. That's correct.


I put scare quotes around true because I think it just means is a  
consequence of some (Peano's) axioms, which is not necessarily the  
same as expresses a fact.


At the meta-level (G*), that is true, but the machine does not know  
that, and for correct machine, this change nothing. We have Bp - p  
(as a theorem of G*, not of G).


Bruno






Brent

On 1/8/2014 2:11 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno and Brent:

did you agree whether TRUE BELIEF means in your sentences

1. one's belief that is TRUE, (not likely), or
2. the TRUTH  that one believes in it (a maybe)?
(none of the two may be 'true').

JM


On Wed, Jan 1, 2014 at 5:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 31 Dec 2013, at 21:09, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/31/2013 1:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

only rules to extract knowledge from assumed beliefs.



?
I answered no to your question. Knowledge is not extracted in  
any way from belief (assumed or not). knowledge *is* belief, when  
or in the world those beliefs are true, but this you can never  
know as such.


Since your theory to an infinite number of semi-classical worlds  
with different events (and even different physics) it seems that  
true belief is not a very useful concept.


It is, because by incompleteness, we will have that Bp  p (true  
belief) obeys a different logic (an epistemic intuitionist logic)   
despite G* knows that it is the same machine, having the same  
action. The machine just dont know that, although it can infer it  
from comp + a sort of faith in herself.





Every belief is going to have probability zero of being true.


neither Bp  nor Bp  p is a priori related to probability. For this  
you need []p - p, which is ocrrect for Bp  p, though, and  
indeed a physics appears already there, but that is a sort of  
anomaly (which confirms what I took as an anomaly in Plotinus, but  
the machine agrees with him).
Now, Bp, when present in the nuances, gives the logic of the  
corresponding certainty, so it is trivially a probability one. We  
need to extract the logic, and the probability different from 1 are  
handled by the mathematics, and is related to the Dp (not Bp). The  
probability bears on the accessible worlds.




The interesting concept is the probability of future events  
relative to one's current state.


That's exactly why we need to go from Bp to Bp  Dt (or Bp  Dt   
p, or actually Bp  p). This gives the relevant notion of relative  
consistency together with some temporal interpretation.


Bruno



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Re: The Nature of Truth

[John Mikes]

Bruno and Brent:

did you agree whether *TRUE BELIEF* means in your sentences

1. one's belief that is TRUE, (not likely), or
2. the TRUTH  that one believes in it (a maybe)?
(none of the two may be 'true').

JM


On Wed, Jan 1, 2014 at 5:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 31 Dec 2013, at 21:09, meekerdb wrote:

  On 12/31/2013 1:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

  only rules to extract knowledge from assumed beliefs.



  ?
 I answered no to your question. Knowledge is not extracted in any way
 from belief (assumed or not). knowledge *is* belief, when or in the world
 those beliefs are true, but this you can never know as such.


 Since your theory to an infinite number of semi-classical worlds with
 different events (and even different physics) it seems that true belief
 is not a very useful concept.


 It is, because by incompleteness, we will have that Bp  p (true belief)
 obeys a different logic (an epistemic intuitionist logic)  despite G* knows
 that it is the same machine, having the same action. The machine just dont
 know that, although it can infer it from comp + a sort of faith in herself.



 Every belief is going to have probability zero of being true.


 neither Bp  nor Bp  p is a priori related to probability. For this you
 need []p - p, which is ocrrect for Bp  p, though, and indeed a physics
 appears already there, but that is a sort of anomaly (which confirms what I
 took as an anomaly in Plotinus, but the machine agrees with him).
 Now, Bp, when present in the nuances, gives the logic of the corresponding
 certainty, so it is trivially a probability one. We need to extract the
 logic, and the probability different from 1 are handled by the mathematics,
 and is related to the Dp (not Bp). The probability bears on the accessible
 worlds.



 The interesting concept is the probability of future events relative to
 one's current state.


 That's exactly why we need to go from Bp to Bp  Dt (or Bp  Dt  p, or
 actually Bp  p). This gives the relevant notion of relative consistency
 together with some temporal interpretation.

 Bruno




 Brent

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Re: The Nature of Truth

[meekerdb]

Bruno writes Bp  p, where Bp ambiguously means Proves p (Beweisbar?) and Believes 
p. Believes p and P is then a belief that is true.  I put scare quotes around true 
because I think it just means is a consequence of some (Peano's) axioms, which is not 
necessarily the same as expresses a fact.


Brent

On 1/8/2014 2:11 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno and Brent:

did you agree whether *TRUE BELIEF* means in your sentences

1. one's belief that is TRUE, (not likely), or
2. the TRUTH  that one believes in it (a maybe)?
(none of the two may be 'true').

JM


On Wed, Jan 1, 2014 at 5:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



On 31 Dec 2013, at 21:09, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/31/2013 1:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

only rules to extract knowledge from assumed beliefs.



?
I answered no to your question. Knowledge is not extracted in any way from
belief (assumed or not). knowledge *is* belief, when or in the world those 
beliefs
are true, but this you can never know as such.


Since your theory to an infinite number of semi-classical worlds with 
different
events (and even different physics) it seems that true belief is not a 
very
useful concept.


It is, because by incompleteness, we will have that Bp  p (true belief) 
obeys a
different logic (an epistemic intuitionist logic)  despite G* knows that it 
is the
same machine, having the same action. The machine just dont know that, 
although it
can infer it from comp + a sort of faith in herself.




Every belief is going to have probability zero of being true.


neither Bp  nor Bp  p is a priori related to probability. For this you need 
[]p -
p, which is ocrrect for Bp  p, though, and indeed a physics appears 
already
there, but that is a sort of anomaly (which confirms what I took as an 
anomaly in
Plotinus, but the machine agrees with him).
Now, Bp, when present in the nuances, gives the logic of the corresponding
certainty, so it is trivially a probability one. We need to extract the 
logic, and
the probability different from 1 are handled by the mathematics, and is 
related to
the Dp (not Bp). The probability bears on the accessible worlds.




The interesting concept is the probability of future events relative to 
one's
current state.


That's exactly why we need to go from Bp to Bp  Dt (or Bp  Dt  p, or 
actually Bp
 p). This gives the relevant notion of relative consistency together with 
some
temporal interpretation.

Bruno



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Re: The Nature of Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 31 Dec 2013, at 21:09, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/31/2013 1:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

only rules to extract knowledge from assumed beliefs.



?
I answered no to your question. Knowledge is not extracted in any  
way from belief (assumed or not). knowledge *is* belief, when or in  
the world those beliefs are true, but this you can never know as  
such.


Since your theory to an infinite number of semi-classical worlds  
with different events (and even different physics) it seems that  
true belief is not a very useful concept.


It is, because by incompleteness, we will have that Bp  p (true  
belief) obeys a different logic (an epistemic intuitionist logic)   
despite G* knows that it is the same machine, having the same action.  
The machine just dont know that, although it can infer it from comp +  
a sort of faith in herself.





Every belief is going to have probability zero of being true.


neither Bp  nor Bp  p is a priori related to probability. For this  
you need []p - p, which is ocrrect for Bp  p, though, and indeed a  
physics appears already there, but that is a sort of anomaly (which  
confirms what I took as an anomaly in Plotinus, but the machine agrees  
with him).
Now, Bp, when present in the nuances, gives the logic of the  
corresponding certainty, so it is trivially a probability one. We  
need to extract the logic, and the probability different from 1 are  
handled by the mathematics, and is related to the Dp (not Bp). The  
probability bears on the accessible worlds.




The interesting concept is the probability of future events relative  
to one's current state.


That's exactly why we need to go from Bp to Bp  Dt (or Bp  Dt  p,  
or actually Bp  p). This gives the relevant notion of relative  
consistency together with some temporal interpretation.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: The Nature of Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Dec 2013, at 20:02, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


To summarize, there is no possible pure knowledge,


Why? On the contrary, beliefs can intersect truth, sometimes, and  
provably so for simpler machine than us.
What happens is that only God knows when your beliefs are genuine  
knowledge. For some, you can know that, but not necessarily in a  
justifiable way, or only in a trivial justifiable way, like taking  
them as (possibly new) axiom.





only rules to extract knowledge from assumed beliefs.



?
I answered no to your question. Knowledge is not extracted in any  
way from belief (assumed or not). knowledge *is* belief, when or in  
the world those beliefs are true, but this you can never know as such.






Thanks. But I already knew so.


I am not sure you really grasp what I said.





But i the realm of reality,  i.e. sensible experience, Edgar is  
right here.



The realm of reality is what we bet on, and search, not what we  
believe already (except for the non justifiable consciousness).



Bruno







2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be

On 30 Dec 2013, at 15:25, Alberto G. Corona wrote:





2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be

On 30 Dec 2013, at 12:39, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

All,

In response to the discussion of the possibility of a Final  
Theory I'm starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this  
is an important and separate issue from previous discussions.



1, it is impossible to directly know the external fundamental  
reality, we know external reality only filtered through the  
structures of our own minds. What we really know is only our own  
mental model of external reality which is provably very very  
different than actual external reality.


2, However we can easily prove that we do know external fundamental  
reality to an extent sufficient for us to function reasonably  
effectively within it. If we didn't have some actual true knowledge  
of external reality we could not even function within it and thus  
could not exist. So our very existence in actual reality  
demonstrates we do have some true knowledge of it. (This true  
knowledge consists of snippets of logical structure rather than the  
physical world we believe it to be.)


That are belief, not knowledge.

Then, what is knowledge? the one derived from mathematical  
deductions based on the belief on + and succ ?



That one is still on the type belief (a consequence of Gödel's  
incompleteness).


To know that 1+ 1 = 2, you need to

1) believe that 1 + 1 = 2, but you need also that

2) it is the case that 1 + 1 = 2   (in your reality)

If you put arithmetical realism on the table, anyone believing that  
1 + 1 = 2, knows that 1 + 1 = 2. This needs some reality  
satisfying the fact that 1+1=2, and we do suspect its existence  
indeed, as the structure (N, 0, s, +, *) taught in high school.


Usually rational belief in a large sense is axiomatized by the  
modal axiom K


B(x - y) -(Bx - By),

with or without the necessitation rule (inferring Bx from x), but  
(almost) always with the modus ponens (inferring B from A - B and A).


Then a form of self-awareness is captured by the possible axioms Bx - 
 BBx.


Gödel provability obeys that. That are the K4 reasoners. 4 is the  
name (sic) of the formula Bx - BBx, as it was the main axiom of the  
fourth system by Lewis (S4).


S4 is the knowledge theory. It is K4 together with the axiom Bx -  
x.  By definition of knowledge, if you know x, x is true. If p were  
not true, i.e; if it was not the case that p, you would just be  
believing wrongly.


Gödel's provability obeys K4 (indeed K4 + B(Bx-x)-Bx), but does  
not obeys Bx - x, at least from the machine 3p points' of view on  
itself.


But the conjunction of Bx  x does obeys S4 (indeed S4 + B(B(x-Bx)- 
x)-x, the Grzegorczyk formula).


Set theoretically, knowledge is the intersection of your beliefs and  
truth.


It can be explained that some machine, like PA and ZF, already  
understand (prove, or prove from some Dt conditional, or more) that  
their *personal* knowledge escape all possible 3p definitions.  They  
can't believe they are any machine. They still can bet on it, like  
nature apparently already did.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: The Nature of Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Dec 2013, at 23:32, John Mikes wrote:

Dear Edgar: allow me not to copy your post the 8th time, just  
marking the #s of your par-s into my short remarks.


#1
As long as we don't know ALL of the (external?) complexity-stuff  
we cannot claim 'knowledge' of any 'reality',



An (ideal, sober) scientist will *never* claim knowledge of any  
reality. The very idea that there is a reality satisfying his/her  
belief is already asking for an act of faith, which is the religious  
part of any exploration.





only quote the so far received part and that, too, as adjusted into  
our contemporary mental ways.
Compare such stuff of today with a similar 'analysis' 3000 years  
ago...
Is 'today' different in the continuing course of past to future?  
(cf: #5)


#2
I would not mix the (final?) theoretical conclusion with our  
practical ways of today. We live and so did our forefathers '3000  
years ago' (or whenever).


#3
I would not mix the 'final (theoretical?) conclusion' about the  
entire world into a contemporary human-mind product (our logic).


#4
You (I?) cannot compare the today available portion - and that  
transformed into human belief - with the entirety of the infinite  
complexity so I would not mention truth. Again: compare your  
contemporary 'truth' concepts with a similar stance - say - of 3000  
years ago. Did Ishtarians have the same 'truth'?


#5
Right you are. What was 'true' for UGGH the caveman is different  
from what you described as 'true' for today. Do you think that 5000  
years into the future - if humanity survives that long - our  
descendants will find the SAME truth as we may identify today?


In science, we do not find truth in a sense that we can justify. We  
can only propose belief, and with some luck, we can see them refute  
in the life time.
Now, we *can* believe that UGGH find the fire to be hot, and the night  
to be dark, and that 17 is prime, if we give him/her the definition.






And one more thing: (last par) I would not be so firm that 'our'  
internal model of reality is representing the 'external' reality at  
all. We just don't know about that 'external' stuff and our present  
internal ideas about it are our human fabrications.


They always will be, in the terrestrial plane. It is universal  
numbers fabrication and selection. Even with non-comp, humans are  
particular case of universal numbers. What you say can be generalized  
on them. With comp we are not more, in computability power, than  
universal numbers, and so their limitation apply to us.





I do not believe it is time to think of a Final Theory.


Why? If we don't think about a final theory and build it, it will  
never been refuted, and we will never learn on the final thing. I  
think we can always thing of a final theory. What we can never do it  
is to know it is final. But this we will never know, at least in  
normal state of consciousness but probably in all state of  
consciousness in which communication can make sense.

What would be like a better time to think of a final theory?

Bruno






John Mikes


On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 6:39 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net  
wrote:

All,

In response to the discussion of the possibility of a Final Theory  
I'm starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an  
important and separate issue from previous discussions.



1, it is impossible to directly know the external fundamental  
reality, we know external reality only filtered through the  
structures of our own minds. What we really know is only our own  
mental model of external reality which is provably very very  
different than actual external reality.


2, However we can easily prove that we do know external fundamental  
reality to an extent sufficient for us to function reasonably  
effectively within it. If we didn't have some actual true knowledge  
of external reality we could not even function within it and thus  
could not exist. So our very existence in actual reality  
demonstrates we do have some true knowledge of it. (This true  
knowledge consists of snippets of logical structure rather than the  
physical world we believe it to be.)


3. External reality is a consistent logical structure. It is  
computed, and for it to be computed it must follow consistent  
logical rules.


4. Therefore the only real test of truth is its internal logical  
consistency over the entire scope of knowledge. We can not directly  
compare our knowledge to the external world because it is filtered  
through the structures of our own senses and minds, but we do know  
that our knowledge is truth to the extent it is internally self- 
consistent over maximum scope.


5. In fact this is the actual working basis of scientific method,  
forensics, our successful functioning in daily life and in all human  
endeavors that seek truth. Namely is the body of knowledge in  
question internally consistent. If it is not then something is UNtrue.


This is the Consistency Theory

Re: The Nature of Truth

[meekerdb]

On 12/31/2013 1:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

only rules to extract knowledge from assumed beliefs.



?
I answered no to your question. Knowledge is not extracted in any way from belief 
(assumed or not). knowledge *is* belief, when or in the world those beliefs are true, 
but this you can never know as such.


Since your theory to an infinite number of semi-classical worlds with different events 
(and even different physics) it seems that true belief is not a very useful concept.  
Every belief is going to have probability zero of being true.  The interesting concept is 
the probability of future events relative to one's current state.


Brent

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The Nature of Truth

[Edgar L. Owen]

All,

In response to the discussion of the possibility of a Final Theory I'm 
starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an important and 
separate issue from previous discussions.


1, it is impossible to directly know the external fundamental reality, we 
know external reality only filtered through the structures of our own 
minds. What we really know is only our own mental model of external reality 
which is provably very very different than actual external reality.

2, However we can easily prove that we do know external fundamental reality 
to an extent sufficient for us to function reasonably effectively within 
it. If we didn't have some actual true knowledge of external reality we 
could not even function within it and thus could not exist. So our very 
existence in actual reality demonstrates we do have some true knowledge of 
it. (This true knowledge consists of snippets of logical structure rather 
than the physical world we believe it to be.)

3. External reality is a consistent logical structure. It is computed, and 
for it to be computed it must follow consistent logical rules.

4. Therefore the only real test of truth is its internal logical 
consistency over the entire scope of knowledge. We can not directly compare 
our knowledge to the external world because it is filtered through the 
structures of our own senses and minds, but we do know that our knowledge 
is truth to the extent it is internally self-consistent over maximum scope.

5. In fact this is the actual working basis of scientific method, 
forensics, our successful functioning in daily life and in all human 
endeavors that seek truth. Namely is the body of knowledge in question 
internally consistent. If it is not then something is UNtrue.

This is the Consistency Theory of Knowledge. Consistency over maximum scope 
IS truth, the only truth possible to know.

There is and can be no direct knowledge of truth, there is only consistency.

This applies to all types of truth, from the logical structures in daily 
life moment to moment, as well as to knowledge of a Final Theory.


There is however one important exception. Our mental model of reality is 
part of the actual external reality, and we do have direct knowledge of 
that. The truth of that is the thing itself. But its truth is an internal 
mental model of external reality, not the external reality it pretends to 
be.

Edgar

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Re: The Nature of Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Dec 2013, at 12:39, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


All,

In response to the discussion of the possibility of a Final Theory  
I'm starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an  
important and separate issue from previous discussions.



1, it is impossible to directly know the external fundamental  
reality, we know external reality only filtered through the  
structures of our own minds. What we really know is only our own  
mental model of external reality which is provably very very  
different than actual external reality.


2, However we can easily prove that we do know external fundamental  
reality to an extent sufficient for us to function reasonably  
effectively within it. If we didn't have some actual true knowledge  
of external reality we could not even function within it and thus  
could not exist. So our very existence in actual reality  
demonstrates we do have some true knowledge of it. (This true  
knowledge consists of snippets of logical structure rather than the  
physical world we believe it to be.)


That are belief, not knowledge.

Standard theories of knowledge accepts the axiom Know(p) - p.  (If I  
know p, then it is the case that p).






3. External reality is a consistent logical structure.


What do you mean by reality and external reality. You make a strong  
assumption here.






It is computed,


That is so strong that it is inconsistent.




and for it to be computed it must follow consistent logical rules.

4. Therefore the only real test of truth is its internal logical  
consistency over the entire scope of knowledge. We can not directly  
compare our knowledge to the external world because it is filtered  
through the structures of our own senses and minds, but we do know  
that our knowledge is truth to the extent it is internally self- 
consistent over maximum scope.


Knowledge needs correctness ([]p - p), but consistency is much weaker  
([]f - f). Correct implies consistent, but consistent does not imply  
correct.






5. In fact this is the actual working basis of scientific method,  
forensics, our successful functioning in daily life and in all human  
endeavors that seek truth. Namely is the body of knowledge in  
question internally consistent. If it is not then something is UNtrue.


This is the Consistency Theory of Knowledge. Consistency over  
maximum scope IS truth, the only truth possible to know.


You are not using those terms with the usual meaning. I guess you mean  
belief when you say knowledge.

Machine's knowledge is not definable by machine.
Machine's consistency is definable by machine, but not provable by  
consistent machine.






There is and can be no direct knowledge of truth, there is only  
consistency.


This applies to all types of truth, from the logical structures in  
daily life moment to moment, as well as to knowledge of a Final  
Theory.



There is however one important exception. Our mental model of  
reality is part of the actual external reality, and we do have  
direct knowledge of that. The truth of that is the thing itself. But  
its truth is an internal mental model of external reality, not the  
external reality it pretends to be.


The truth of that is consciousness, which is undoubtable and  
incorrigible, but that does not say much on the nature of the  
external reality, if that exists.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The Nature of Truth

[Alberto G. Corona]

2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 30 Dec 2013, at 12:39, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

  All,

 In response to the discussion of the possibility of a Final Theory I'm
 starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an important and
 separate issue from previous discussions.


 1, it is impossible to directly know the external fundamental reality, we
 know external reality only filtered through the structures of our own
 minds. What we really know is only our own mental model of external reality
 which is provably very very different than actual external reality.

 2, However we can easily prove that we do know external fundamental
 reality to an extent sufficient for us to function reasonably effectively
 within it. If we didn't have some actual true knowledge of external reality
 we could not even function within it and thus could not exist. So our very
 existence in actual reality demonstrates we do have some true knowledge of
 it. (This true knowledge consists of snippets of logical structure rather
 than the physical world we believe it to be.)


 That are belief, not knowledge.

 Then, what is knowledge? the one derived from mathematical deductions
based on the belief on + and succ ?


 Standard theories of knowledge accepts the axiom Know(p) - p.  (If I know
 p, then it is the case that p).





 3. External reality is a consistent logical structure.


 What do you mean by reality and external reality. You make a strong
 assumption here.




  It is computed,


 That is so strong that it is inconsistent.




  and for it to be computed it must follow consistent logical rules.

 4. Therefore the only real test of truth is its internal logical
 consistency over the entire scope of knowledge. We can not directly compare
 our knowledge to the external world because it is filtered through the
 structures of our own senses and minds, but we do know that our knowledge
 is truth to the extent it is internally self-consistent over maximum scope.


 Knowledge needs correctness ([]p - p), but consistency is much weaker
 ([]f - f). Correct implies consistent, but consistent does not imply
 correct.





 5. In fact this is the actual working basis of scientific method,
 forensics, our successful functioning in daily life and in all human
 endeavors that seek truth. Namely is the body of knowledge in question
 internally consistent. If it is not then something is UNtrue.

 This is the Consistency Theory of Knowledge. Consistency over maximum
 scope IS truth, the only truth possible to know.


 You are not using those terms with the usual meaning. I guess you mean
 belief when you say knowledge.
 Machine's knowledge is not definable by machine.
 Machine's consistency is definable by machine, but not provable by
 consistent machine.





 There is and can be no direct knowledge of truth, there is only
 consistency.

 This applies to all types of truth, from the logical structures in daily
 life moment to moment, as well as to knowledge of a Final Theory.


 There is however one important exception. Our mental model of reality is
 part of the actual external reality, and we do have direct knowledge of
 that. The truth of that is the thing itself. But its truth is an internal
 mental model of external reality, not the external reality it pretends to
 be.


 The truth of that is consciousness, which is undoubtable and incorrigible,
 but that does not say much on the nature of the external reality, if that
 exists.

 Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: The Nature of Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Dec 2013, at 15:25, Alberto G. Corona wrote:





2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be

On 30 Dec 2013, at 12:39, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

All,

In response to the discussion of the possibility of a Final Theory  
I'm starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an  
important and separate issue from previous discussions.



1, it is impossible to directly know the external fundamental  
reality, we know external reality only filtered through the  
structures of our own minds. What we really know is only our own  
mental model of external reality which is provably very very  
different than actual external reality.


2, However we can easily prove that we do know external fundamental  
reality to an extent sufficient for us to function reasonably  
effectively within it. If we didn't have some actual true knowledge  
of external reality we could not even function within it and thus  
could not exist. So our very existence in actual reality  
demonstrates we do have some true knowledge of it. (This true  
knowledge consists of snippets of logical structure rather than the  
physical world we believe it to be.)


That are belief, not knowledge.

Then, what is knowledge? the one derived from mathematical  
deductions based on the belief on + and succ ?



That one is still on the type belief (a consequence of Gödel's  
incompleteness).


To know that 1+ 1 = 2, you need to

1) believe that 1 + 1 = 2, but you need also that

2) it is the case that 1 + 1 = 2   (in your reality)

If you put arithmetical realism on the table, anyone believing that 1  
+ 1 = 2, knows that 1 + 1 = 2. This needs some reality satisfying  
the fact that 1+1=2, and we do suspect its existence indeed, as the  
structure (N, 0, s, +, *) taught in high school.


Usually rational belief in a large sense is axiomatized by the modal  
axiom K


B(x - y) -(Bx - By),

with or without the necessitation rule (inferring Bx from x), but  
(almost) always with the modus ponens (inferring B from A - B and A).


Then a form of self-awareness is captured by the possible axioms Bx -  
BBx.


Gödel provability obeys that. That are the K4 reasoners. 4 is the name  
(sic) of the formula Bx - BBx, as it was the main axiom of the fourth  
system by Lewis (S4).


S4 is the knowledge theory. It is K4 together with the axiom Bx - x.   
By definition of knowledge, if you know x, x is true. If p were not  
true, i.e; if it was not the case that p, you would just be believing  
wrongly.


Gödel's provability obeys K4 (indeed K4 + B(Bx-x)-Bx), but does not  
obeys Bx - x, at least from the machine 3p points' of view on itself.


But the conjunction of Bx  x does obeys S4 (indeed S4 + B(B(x-Bx)- 
x)-x, the Grzegorczyk formula).


Set theoretically, knowledge is the intersection of your beliefs and  
truth.


It can be explained that some machine, like PA and ZF, already  
understand (prove, or prove from some Dt conditional, or more) that  
their *personal* knowledge escape all possible 3p definitions.  They  
can't believe they are any machine. They still can bet on it, like  
nature apparently already did.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The Nature of Truth

[Alberto G. Corona]

To summarize, there is no possible pure knowledge, only rules to extract
knowledge from assumed beliefs. Thanks. But I already knew so.

But i the realm of reality,  i.e. sensible experience, Edgar is right here.




2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 30 Dec 2013, at 15:25, Alberto G. Corona wrote:




 2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 30 Dec 2013, at 12:39, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

  All,

 In response to the discussion of the possibility of a Final Theory I'm
 starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an important and
 separate issue from previous discussions.


 1, it is impossible to directly know the external fundamental reality,
 we know external reality only filtered through the structures of our own
 minds. What we really know is only our own mental model of external reality
 which is provably very very different than actual external reality.

 2, However we can easily prove that we do know external fundamental
 reality to an extent sufficient for us to function reasonably effectively
 within it. If we didn't have some actual true knowledge of external reality
 we could not even function within it and thus could not exist. So our very
 existence in actual reality demonstrates we do have some true knowledge of
 it. (This true knowledge consists of snippets of logical structure rather
 than the physical world we believe it to be.)


 That are belief, not knowledge.

 Then, what is knowledge? the one derived from mathematical deductions
 based on the belief on + and succ ?



 That one is still on the type belief (a consequence of Gödel's
 incompleteness).

 To know that 1+ 1 = 2, you need to

 1) believe that 1 + 1 = 2, but you need also that

 2) it is the case that 1 + 1 = 2   (in your reality)

 If you put arithmetical realism on the table, anyone believing that 1 + 1
 = 2, knows that 1 + 1 = 2. This needs some reality satisfying the fact
 that 1+1=2, and we do suspect its existence indeed, as the structure (N, 0,
 s, +, *) taught in high school.

 Usually rational belief in a large sense is axiomatized by the modal
 axiom K

 B(x - y) -(Bx - By),

 with or without the necessitation rule (inferring Bx from x), but (almost)
 always with the modus ponens (inferring B from A - B and A).

 Then a form of self-awareness is captured by the possible axioms Bx - BBx.

 Gödel provability obeys that. That are the K4 reasoners. 4 is the name
 (sic) of the formula Bx - BBx, as it was the main axiom of the fourth
 system by Lewis (S4).

 S4 is the knowledge theory. It is K4 together with the axiom Bx - x.  By
 definition of knowledge, if you know x, x is true. If p were not true, i.e;
 if it was not the case that p, you would just be believing wrongly.

 Gödel's provability obeys K4 (indeed K4 + B(Bx-x)-Bx), but does not
 obeys Bx - x, at least from the machine 3p points' of view on itself.

 But the conjunction of Bx  x does obeys S4 (indeed S4 +
 B(B(x-Bx)-x)-x, the Grzegorczyk formula).

 Set theoretically, knowledge is the intersection of your beliefs and truth.

 It can be explained that some machine, like PA and ZF, already understand
 (prove, or prove from some Dt conditional, or more) that their *personal*
 knowledge escape all possible 3p definitions.  They can't believe they are
 any machine. They still can bet on it, like nature apparently already did.

 Bruno



  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The Nature of Truth

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 8:02 PM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.comwrote:

 To summarize, there is no possible pure knowledge, only rules to extract
 knowledge from assumed beliefs. Thanks. But I already knew so.

 But i the realm of reality,


And where may one find this realm of realms?


  i.e. sensible experience, Edgar is right here.


The only truth Edgar is unearthing for me is:

You can enlist entire mailing lists as free reviewers for any book project
you may have, without paying them one cent for doing so. Vanity and
altruism make good bedfellows. PGC






 2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 30 Dec 2013, at 15:25, Alberto G. Corona wrote:




 2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 30 Dec 2013, at 12:39, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

  All,

 In response to the discussion of the possibility of a Final Theory
 I'm starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an important
 and separate issue from previous discussions.


 1, it is impossible to directly know the external fundamental reality,
 we know external reality only filtered through the structures of our own
 minds. What we really know is only our own mental model of external reality
 which is provably very very different than actual external reality.

 2, However we can easily prove that we do know external fundamental
 reality to an extent sufficient for us to function reasonably effectively
 within it. If we didn't have some actual true knowledge of external reality
 we could not even function within it and thus could not exist. So our very
 existence in actual reality demonstrates we do have some true knowledge of
 it. (This true knowledge consists of snippets of logical structure rather
 than the physical world we believe it to be.)


 That are belief, not knowledge.

 Then, what is knowledge? the one derived from mathematical deductions
 based on the belief on + and succ ?



 That one is still on the type belief (a consequence of Gödel's
 incompleteness).

 To know that 1+ 1 = 2, you need to

 1) believe that 1 + 1 = 2, but you need also that

 2) it is the case that 1 + 1 = 2   (in your reality)

 If you put arithmetical realism on the table, anyone believing that 1 + 1
 = 2, knows that 1 + 1 = 2. This needs some reality satisfying the fact
 that 1+1=2, and we do suspect its existence indeed, as the structure (N, 0,
 s, +, *) taught in high school.

 Usually rational belief in a large sense is axiomatized by the modal
 axiom K

 B(x - y) -(Bx - By),

 with or without the necessitation rule (inferring Bx from x), but
 (almost) always with the modus ponens (inferring B from A - B and A).

 Then a form of self-awareness is captured by the possible axioms Bx -
 BBx.

 Gödel provability obeys that. That are the K4 reasoners. 4 is the name
 (sic) of the formula Bx - BBx, as it was the main axiom of the fourth
 system by Lewis (S4).

 S4 is the knowledge theory. It is K4 together with the axiom Bx - x.  By
 definition of knowledge, if you know x, x is true. If p were not true, i.e;
 if it was not the case that p, you would just be believing wrongly.

 Gödel's provability obeys K4 (indeed K4 + B(Bx-x)-Bx), but does not
 obeys Bx - x, at least from the machine 3p points' of view on itself.

 But the conjunction of Bx  x does obeys S4 (indeed S4 +
 B(B(x-Bx)-x)-x, the Grzegorczyk formula).

 Set theoretically, knowledge is the intersection of your beliefs and
 truth.

 It can be explained that some machine, like PA and ZF, already understand
 (prove, or prove from some Dt conditional, or more) that their *personal*
 knowledge escape all possible 3p definitions.  They can't believe they are
 any machine. They still can bet on it, like nature apparently already did.

 Bruno



  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The Nature of Truth

[meekerdb]

On 12/30/2013 3:39 AM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

All,

In response to the discussion of the possibility of a Final Theory I'm starting a new 
topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an important and separate issue from previous 
discussions.



1, it is impossible to directly know the external fundamental reality, we know external 
reality only filtered through the structures of our own minds. What we really know is 
only our own mental model of external reality which is provably very very different than 
actual external reality.


I'm not sure this is right.  If our mental model includes our best and most fundamental 
scientific theories, then we don't *know* they are very different from reality.  And we 
only say we know this about our naive, inbuilt model of the world (which is more 
Newtonian) because we compare it with the scientific models; yet the latter is derived 
from the former. Science is just common sense writ large.




2, However we can easily prove that we do know external fundamental reality to an extent 
sufficient for us to function reasonably effectively within it. If we didn't have some 
actual true knowledge of external reality we could not even function within it and thus 
could not exist. So our very existence in actual reality demonstrates we do have some 
true knowledge of it. (This true knowledge consists of snippets of logical structure 
rather than the physical world we believe it to be.)


3. External reality is a consistent logical structure. It is computed, and for it to be 
computed it must follow consistent logical rules.


4. Therefore the only real test of truth is its internal logical consistency over the 
entire scope of knowledge. We can not directly compare our knowledge to the external 
world because it is filtered through the structures of our own senses and minds, but we 
do know that our knowledge is truth to the extent it is internally self-consistent over 
maximum scope.


5. In fact this is the actual working basis of scientific method, forensics, our 
successful functioning in daily life and in all human endeavors that seek truth. Namely 
is the body of knowledge in question internally consistent. If it is not then something 
is UNtrue.


This is the Consistency Theory of Knowledge. Consistency over maximum scope IS truth, 
the only truth possible to know.


There is and can be no direct knowledge of truth, there is only consistency.

This applies to all types of truth, from the logical structures in daily life moment to 
moment, as well as to knowledge of a Final Theory.



There is however one important exception. Our mental model of reality is part of the 
actual external reality, and we do have direct knowledge of that. The truth of that is 
the thing itself. But its truth is an internal mental model of external reality, not the 
external reality it pretends to be.


OK, except I think your terminology is confusing because you use truth as a noun, and 
write thins like truth of our mental model is the thing itself.  If you would stick to 
true as an adjective applying to sentences the above could be a lot cleaner.


Brent

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Re: The Nature of Truth

[LizR]

On 31 December 2013 08:20, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com
 wrote:

 On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 8:02 PM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.comwrote:

 To summarize, there is no possible pure knowledge, only rules to extract
 knowledge from assumed beliefs. Thanks. But I already knew so.

 But i the realm of reality,


 And where may one find this realm of realms?


   i.e. sensible experience, Edgar is right here.


 The only truth Edgar is unearthing for me is:

 You can enlist entire mailing lists as free reviewers for any book project
 you may have, without paying them one cent for doing so. Vanity and
 altruism make good bedfellows. PGC

 I doubt if Edgar was expecting his ideas to be taken apart quite so
thoroughly. The only sensible response to what he's been told would be to
completely rewrite it in light of the misunderstandings that have been
pointed out in his basic assumptions!

I can't see that happening though.

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Re: The Nature of Truth

[Alberto G. Corona]

2013/12/30 Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com




 On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 8:02 PM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.comwrote:

 To summarize, there is no possible pure knowledge, only rules to extract
 knowledge from assumed beliefs. Thanks. But I already knew so.

 But i the realm of reality,


 And where may one find this realm of realms?


Is the realm where you pay taxes.



   i.e. sensible experience, Edgar is right here.


 The only truth Edgar is unearthing for me is:

 You can enlist entire mailing lists as free reviewers for any book project
 you may have, without paying them one cent for doing so. Vanity and
 altruism make good bedfellows. PGC






 2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 30 Dec 2013, at 15:25, Alberto G. Corona wrote:




 2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 30 Dec 2013, at 12:39, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

  All,

 In response to the discussion of the possibility of a Final Theory
 I'm starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an important
 and separate issue from previous discussions.


 1, it is impossible to directly know the external fundamental reality,
 we know external reality only filtered through the structures of our own
 minds. What we really know is only our own mental model of external 
 reality
 which is provably very very different than actual external reality.

 2, However we can easily prove that we do know external fundamental
 reality to an extent sufficient for us to function reasonably effectively
 within it. If we didn't have some actual true knowledge of external 
 reality
 we could not even function within it and thus could not exist. So our very
 existence in actual reality demonstrates we do have some true knowledge of
 it. (This true knowledge consists of snippets of logical structure rather
 than the physical world we believe it to be.)


 That are belief, not knowledge.

 Then, what is knowledge? the one derived from mathematical deductions
 based on the belief on + and succ ?



 That one is still on the type belief (a consequence of Gödel's
 incompleteness).

 To know that 1+ 1 = 2, you need to

 1) believe that 1 + 1 = 2, but you need also that

 2) it is the case that 1 + 1 = 2   (in your reality)

 If you put arithmetical realism on the table, anyone believing that 1 +
 1 = 2, knows that 1 + 1 = 2. This needs some reality satisfying the fact
 that 1+1=2, and we do suspect its existence indeed, as the structure (N, 0,
 s, +, *) taught in high school.

 Usually rational belief in a large sense is axiomatized by the modal
 axiom K

 B(x - y) -(Bx - By),

 with or without the necessitation rule (inferring Bx from x), but
 (almost) always with the modus ponens (inferring B from A - B and A).

 Then a form of self-awareness is captured by the possible axioms Bx -
 BBx.

 Gödel provability obeys that. That are the K4 reasoners. 4 is the name
 (sic) of the formula Bx - BBx, as it was the main axiom of the fourth
 system by Lewis (S4).

 S4 is the knowledge theory. It is K4 together with the axiom Bx - x.
  By definition of knowledge, if you know x, x is true. If p were not true,
 i.e; if it was not the case that p, you would just be believing wrongly.

 Gödel's provability obeys K4 (indeed K4 + B(Bx-x)-Bx), but does not
 obeys Bx - x, at least from the machine 3p points' of view on itself.

 But the conjunction of Bx  x does obeys S4 (indeed S4 +
 B(B(x-Bx)-x)-x, the Grzegorczyk formula).

 Set theoretically, knowledge is the intersection of your beliefs and
 truth.

 It can be explained that some machine, like PA and ZF, already
 understand (prove, or prove from some Dt conditional, or more) that their
 *personal* knowledge escape all possible 3p definitions.  They can't
 believe they are any machine. They still can bet on it, like nature
 apparently already did.

 Bruno



  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The Nature of Truth

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

:-) Those realms can be avoided, especially if one is flexible with where
one... but off-topic. PGC


On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 10:21 PM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.comwrote:




 2013/12/30 Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com




 On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 8:02 PM, Alberto G. Corona 
 agocor...@gmail.comwrote:

 To summarize, there is no possible pure knowledge, only rules to extract
 knowledge from assumed beliefs. Thanks. But I already knew so.

 But i the realm of reality,


 And where may one find this realm of realms?


 Is the realm where you pay taxes.



   i.e. sensible experience, Edgar is right here.


 The only truth Edgar is unearthing for me is:

 You can enlist entire mailing lists as free reviewers for any book
 project you may have, without paying them one cent for doing so. Vanity and
 altruism make good bedfellows. PGC






 2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 30 Dec 2013, at 15:25, Alberto G. Corona wrote:




 2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 30 Dec 2013, at 12:39, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

  All,

 In response to the discussion of the possibility of a Final Theory
 I'm starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an 
 important
 and separate issue from previous discussions.


 1, it is impossible to directly know the external fundamental
 reality, we know external reality only filtered through the structures of
 our own minds. What we really know is only our own mental model of 
 external
 reality which is provably very very different than actual external 
 reality.

 2, However we can easily prove that we do know external fundamental
 reality to an extent sufficient for us to function reasonably effectively
 within it. If we didn't have some actual true knowledge of external 
 reality
 we could not even function within it and thus could not exist. So our 
 very
 existence in actual reality demonstrates we do have some true knowledge 
 of
 it. (This true knowledge consists of snippets of logical structure rather
 than the physical world we believe it to be.)


 That are belief, not knowledge.

 Then, what is knowledge? the one derived from mathematical deductions
 based on the belief on + and succ ?



 That one is still on the type belief (a consequence of Gödel's
 incompleteness).

 To know that 1+ 1 = 2, you need to

 1) believe that 1 + 1 = 2, but you need also that

 2) it is the case that 1 + 1 = 2   (in your reality)

 If you put arithmetical realism on the table, anyone believing that 1 +
 1 = 2, knows that 1 + 1 = 2. This needs some reality satisfying the fact
 that 1+1=2, and we do suspect its existence indeed, as the structure (N, 0,
 s, +, *) taught in high school.

 Usually rational belief in a large sense is axiomatized by the modal
 axiom K

 B(x - y) -(Bx - By),

 with or without the necessitation rule (inferring Bx from x), but
 (almost) always with the modus ponens (inferring B from A - B and A).

 Then a form of self-awareness is captured by the possible axioms Bx -
 BBx.

 Gödel provability obeys that. That are the K4 reasoners. 4 is the name
 (sic) of the formula Bx - BBx, as it was the main axiom of the fourth
 system by Lewis (S4).

 S4 is the knowledge theory. It is K4 together with the axiom Bx - x.
  By definition of knowledge, if you know x, x is true. If p were not true,
 i.e; if it was not the case that p, you would just be believing wrongly.

 Gödel's provability obeys K4 (indeed K4 + B(Bx-x)-Bx), but does not
 obeys Bx - x, at least from the machine 3p points' of view on itself.

 But the conjunction of Bx  x does obeys S4 (indeed S4 +
 B(B(x-Bx)-x)-x, the Grzegorczyk formula).

 Set theoretically, knowledge is the intersection of your beliefs and
 truth.

 It can be explained that some machine, like PA and ZF, already
 understand (prove, or prove from some Dt conditional, or more) that their
 *personal* knowledge escape all possible 3p definitions.  They can't
 believe they are any machine. They still can bet on it, like nature
 apparently already did.

 Bruno



  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The Nature of Truth

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 9:21 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 31 December 2013 08:20, Platonist Guitar Cowboy 
 multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 8:02 PM, Alberto G. Corona 
 agocor...@gmail.comwrote:

 To summarize, there is no possible pure knowledge, only rules to extract
 knowledge from assumed beliefs. Thanks. But I already knew so.

 But i the realm of reality,


 And where may one find this realm of realms?


   i.e. sensible experience, Edgar is right here.


 The only truth Edgar is unearthing for me is:

 You can enlist entire mailing lists as free reviewers for any book
 project you may have, without paying them one cent for doing so. Vanity and
 altruism make good bedfellows. PGC

 I doubt if Edgar was expecting his ideas to be taken apart quite so
 thoroughly. The only sensible response to what he's been told would be to
 completely rewrite it in light of the misunderstandings that have been
 pointed out in his basic assumptions!

 I can't see that happening though.


We'll see. It's not as if one of the more seasoned posters was testing
something they had read, picked up, or developed somehow. He just swooped
in and took everybody's nuggets home, while calling them fairytale people.
Anyways, happy New Years everybody! PGC


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Re: The Nature of Truth

[John Mikes]

Dear Edgar: allow me not to copy your post the 8th time, just marking the
#s of your par-s into my short remarks.

#1
As long as we don't know ALL of the (external?) complexity-stuff we
cannot claim 'knowledge' of any 'reality', only quote the so far received
part and that, too, as adjusted into our contemporary mental ways.
Compare such stuff of today with a similar 'analysis' 3000 years ago...
Is 'today' different in the continuing course of past to future? (cf: #5)

#2
I would not mix the (final?) *theoretical* conclusion with our
*practical*ways of today. We live and so did our forefathers '3000
years ago' (or
whenever).

#3
I would not mix the 'final (theoretical?) conclusion' about the entire
world into a contemporary human-mind product (our logic).

#4
You (I?) cannot compare the today available portion - and that transformed
into human belief - with the entirety of the infinite complexity so I would
not mention truth. Again: compare your contemporary 'truth' concepts with
a similar stance - say - of 3000 years ago. Did Ishtarians have the same
'truth'?

#5
Right you are. What was 'true' for UGGH the caveman is different from what
you described as 'true' for today. Do you think that 5000 years into the
future - if humanity survives that long - our descendants will find the
SAME truth as we may identify today?

And one more thing: (last par) I would not be so firm that 'our' internal
model of reality is representing the 'external' reality at all. We just
don't know about that 'external' stuff and our present internal ideas about
it are our human fabrications. I do not believe it is time to think of a
Final Theory.

John Mikes


On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 6:39 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:

 All,

 In response to the discussion of the possibility of a Final Theory I'm
 starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an important and
 separate issue from previous discussions.


 1, it is impossible to directly know the external fundamental reality, we
 know external reality only filtered through the structures of our own
 minds. What we really know is only our own mental model of external reality
 which is provably very very different than actual external reality.

 2, However we can easily prove that we do know external fundamental
 reality to an extent sufficient for us to function reasonably effectively
 within it. If we didn't have some actual true knowledge of external reality
 we could not even function within it and thus could not exist. So our very
 existence in actual reality demonstrates we do have some true knowledge of
 it. (This true knowledge consists of snippets of logical structure rather
 than the physical world we believe it to be.)

 3. External reality is a consistent logical structure. It is computed, and
 for it to be computed it must follow consistent logical rules.

 4. Therefore the only real test of truth is its internal logical
 consistency over the entire scope of knowledge. We can not directly compare
 our knowledge to the external world because it is filtered through the
 structures of our own senses and minds, but we do know that our knowledge
 is truth to the extent it is internally self-consistent over maximum scope.

 5. In fact this is the actual working basis of scientific method,
 forensics, our successful functioning in daily life and in all human
 endeavors that seek truth. Namely is the body of knowledge in question
 internally consistent. If it is not then something is UNtrue.

 This is the Consistency Theory of Knowledge. Consistency over maximum
 scope IS truth, the only truth possible to know.

 There is and can be no direct knowledge of truth, there is only
 consistency.

 This applies to all types of truth, from the logical structures in daily
 life moment to moment, as well as to knowledge of a Final Theory.


 There is however one important exception. Our mental model of reality is
 part of the actual external reality, and we do have direct knowledge of
 that. The truth of that is the thing itself. But its truth is an internal
 mental model of external reality, not the external reality it pretends to
 be.

 Edgar

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Re: Belief vs Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Nov 2013, at 07:09, Chris de Morsella wrote:




From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com 
] On Behalf Of meekerdb

Sent: Friday, November 22, 2013 9:11 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Belief vs Truth

On 11/22/2013 3:24 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno:
 Brent's dichotomy - as you pointed out - about exist and true may  
go deeper in my opinion:
If we THINK of something: it DOES exist indeed (in our mind) but may  
not be true. I refrain from calling  T R U E  anything in our  
restsricted (partial) knowledge capability. WE THINK IT IS TRUE is  
in our belief system.
Now it is up to you to call the EXISTING thought as 'truly  
existing' We fabricate 'truth' in this respect but only in this  
respect. Otherwise I am just waiting for additional input disproving  
what I 'beleived-in' so far.


John M

PS I read this remark of mine to my wife who asked: if somebody  
KILLS a person (cuts her throat):
is it TRUE, or NOT? (pointing to the more convoluted sides of the  
topic). I tried to save face by saying:
Don't you apply our 'wisdom-concepts' to practical life! We seek the  
theoretical truth! (laugh).
(As a matter of fact 'true' is not confoundable with 'truth' just as  
conscious is not the adjective representing  consciousness - in most  
cases)

JM

In my meta-physics true is an attribute of a sentence meaning that  
the sentence expresses some fact.  Facts do not depend on sentences,  
they can be facts even though no one says so in a sentence.  Exist  
has different meaning in different contexts.  In physics the  
essential parts of a model are thought to exist just in case the  
model is true.


Truth, perhaps, depends on some frame of reference; one could even  
describe it as an emergent phenomena that has meaning only within  
the frame of reference from which it emerges.


Logicians distinguish theory (which are set of sentences close for  
some applications of some inference rules), and models, which are  
mathematical structures together with a notion of satisfaction of  
sentences. So a sentence (close formula) is never true per se. It is  
only satisfied, or not, by this or that model. Validity or theoremhood  
will correspond with the idea of being true in *all* models of a  
theory, at least for first order theories (which have such nice model  
theory). In that case the validity of a reasoning is independent of  
the interpretation of the theory.


Physics, biology and theology brought some difficulty here, as it  
assumes some reality, and normally we should distinguish the theory,  
the models of the theory, and the relation between those models and  
reality.
Physicists usually ignore the model theory level intermediate between  
theory and reality, and logicians, like mathematicians, ignore  
reality, which they take as a dirty notion used only by engineers or  
philosophers.


Now, I can agree that many truth can emerge, but they have to emerge  
from some truth, which are needed to be considered as primitive. With  
comp, computer science or just arithmetic constitute(s) enough basic  
truth to explain the emergence of many different notions of truth and  
existence (indeed one for each person points of view).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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RE: Belief vs Truth

[Chris de Morsella]

 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Saturday, November 23, 2013 1:14 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Belief vs Truth

 

 

On 23 Nov 2013, at 07:09, Chris de Morsella wrote:





 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2013 9:11 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Belief vs Truth

 

On 11/22/2013 3:24 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno: 

 Brent's dichotomy - as you pointed out - about exist and true may go deeper
in my opinion:

If we THINK of something: it DOES exist indeed (in our mind) but may not be
true. I refrain from calling  T R U E  anything in our restsricted (partial)
knowledge capability. WE THINK IT IS TRUE is in our belief system. 

Now it is up to you to call the EXISTING thought as 'truly existing'
We fabricate 'truth' in this respect but only in this respect. Otherwise I
am just waiting for additional input disproving what I 'beleived-in' so far.


 

John M

 

PS I read this remark of mine to my wife who asked: if somebody KILLS a
person (cuts her throat):

is it TRUE, or NOT? (pointing to the more convoluted sides of the topic). I
tried to save face by saying:

Don't you apply our 'wisdom-concepts' to practical life! We seek the
theoretical truth! (laugh). 

(As a matter of fact 'true' is not confoundable with 'truth' just as
conscious is not the adjective representing  consciousness - in most cases)

JM


In my meta-physics true is an attribute of a sentence meaning that the
sentence expresses some fact.  Facts do not depend on sentences, they can be
facts even though no one says so in a sentence.  Exist has different
meaning in different contexts.  In physics the essential parts of a model
are thought to exist just in case the model is true.

 

Truth, perhaps, depends on some frame of reference; one could even describe
it as an emergent phenomena that has meaning only within the frame of
reference from which it emerges.

 

Logicians distinguish theory (which are set of sentences close for some
applications of some inference rules), and models, which are mathematical
structures together with a notion of satisfaction of sentences. So a
sentence (close formula) is never true per se. It is only satisfied, or not,
by this or that model. Validity or theoremhood will correspond with the idea
of being true in *all* models of a theory, at least for first order theories
(which have such nice model theory). In that case the validity of a
reasoning is independent of the interpretation of the theory.

 

Physics, biology and theology brought some difficulty here, as it assumes
some reality, and normally we should distinguish the theory, the models of
the theory, and the relation between those models and reality. 

Physicists usually ignore the model theory level intermediate between theory
and reality, and logicians, like mathematicians, ignore reality, which
they take as a dirty notion used only by engineers or philosophers.

 

Now, I can agree that many truth can emerge, but they have to emerge from
some truth, which are needed to be considered as primitive. With comp,
computer science or just arithmetic constitute(s) enough basic truth to
explain the emergence of many different notions of truth and existence
(indeed one for each person points of view).

 

Very well put. I am attracted by this idea that some abstract mathematical
reality -- itself emerging from the vastly numerous and subtle interactions
of orthogonal infinities of recursive null sets/equations existing outside
and apart from any and all frames of reference, by which our, and any other,
for that matter, emerged reality are characterized. It provides an elegant
means to exit from those endless hall of mirrors logic situations -- or
turtles holding turtles (also a nice metaphor) that is uncovered at the
bottom of so many attempts to present a foundation for everything.

Chris

 

 

Bruno

 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 

 

 

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Re: Belief vs Truth

[Alberto G. Corona]

2013/11/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 23 Nov 2013, at 07:09, Chris de Morsella wrote:



  *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [
 mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com everything-list@googlegroups.com
 ] *On Behalf Of *meekerdb
 *Sent:* Friday, November 22, 2013 9:11 PM
 *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
 *Subject:* Re: Belief vs Truth

 On 11/22/2013 3:24 PM, John Mikes wrote:

 Bruno:
  Brent's dichotomy - as you pointed out - about exist and true may go
 deeper in my opinion:
 If we *THINK *of something: it DOES *exist* indeed *(in our mind)* but
 may not be true. I refrain from calling  T R U E  anything in our
 restsricted (partial) knowledge capability. WE THINK IT IS TRUE is in our
 belief system.
 Now it is up to you to call the EXISTING thought as 'truly existing'
 We fabricate 'truth' in this respect but only in this respect. Otherwise I
 am just waiting for additional input disproving what I 'beleived-in' so
 far.

 John M

 PS I read this remark of mine to my wife who asked: if somebody KILLS a
 person (cuts her throat):
 is it TRUE, or NOT? (pointing to the more convoluted sides of the topic).
 I tried to save face by saying:
 Don't you apply our 'wisdom-concepts' to practical life! We seek the
 theoretical truth! (laugh).
 (As a matter of fact 'true' is not confoundable with 'truth' just as
 conscious is not the adjective representing  consciousness - in most cases)
 JM


 In my meta-physics true is an attribute of a sentence meaning that the
 sentence expresses some fact.  Facts do not depend on sentences, they can
 be facts even though no one says so in a sentence.  Exist has different
 meaning in different contexts.  In physics the essential parts of a model
 are thought to exist just in case the model is true.

 Truth, perhaps, depends on some frame of reference; one could even
 describe it as an emergent phenomena that has meaning only within the frame
 of reference from which it emerges.


 Logicians distinguish theory (which are set of sentences close for
 some applications of some inference rules), and models, which are
 mathematical structures together with a notion of satisfaction of
 sentences. So a sentence (close formula) is never true per se. It is only
 satisfied, or not, by this or that model. Validity or theoremhood will
 correspond with the idea of being true in *all* models of a theory, at
 least for first order theories (which have such nice model theory). In that
 case the validity of a reasoning is independent of the interpretation of
 the theory.

 Physics, biology and theology brought some difficulty here, as it assumes
 some reality, and normally we should distinguish the theory, the models
 of the theory, and the relation between those models and reality.
 Physicists usually ignore the model theory level intermediate between
 theory and reality, and logicians, like mathematicians, ignore reality,
 which they take as a dirty notion used only by engineers or philosophers.




 Now, I can agree that many truth can emerge, but they have to emerge from
 some truth, which are needed to be considered as primitive.


Very well stated.


 With comp, computer science or just arithmetic constitute(s) enough basic
 truth to explain the emergence of many different notions of truth and
 existence (indeed one for each person points of view).


For example?. For me comp explain to much., (even what is not observed) and
to few (of the truths that are self evident). There are other basic truths
that work better


 Bruno

  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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-- 
Alberto.

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Re: Belief vs Truth

[Alberto G. Corona]

the factual notions of truth and existence are linked by the notion that
what is true kick back and what kick back can render you nonexistent at the
moment  `t +1`  if you negate its truth at the moment `t`.

Now natural selection can make the units of time really really long. So it
is not a surprise that people agree most in the truth and existence of
things that kick back in order of seconds by the natural law of physics
than abstract things that kick back in orders of generations by the natural
law of game theory applied to social proceses..

But both kinds of truths are in our common sense by means of the
Lorenzian-Kantian-evolitionary process that I mentioned above. The first
kind of knowledge are in our common sense by means of the perception of
solid objects in space and time. The second kind of knowledge are in the
form of moral intuitions.


2013/11/23 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com




 2013/11/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 23 Nov 2013, at 07:09, Chris de Morsella wrote:



  *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [
 mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.comeverything-list@googlegroups.com
 ] *On Behalf Of *meekerdb
 *Sent:* Friday, November 22, 2013 9:11 PM
 *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
 *Subject:* Re: Belief vs Truth

 On 11/22/2013 3:24 PM, John Mikes wrote:

 Bruno:
  Brent's dichotomy - as you pointed out - about exist and true may go
 deeper in my opinion:
 If we *THINK *of something: it DOES *exist* indeed *(in our mind)* but
 may not be true. I refrain from calling  T R U E  anything in our
 restsricted (partial) knowledge capability. WE THINK IT IS TRUE is in our
 belief system.
 Now it is up to you to call the EXISTING thought as 'truly
 existing' We fabricate 'truth' in this respect but only in this
 respect. Otherwise I am just waiting for additional input disproving what I
 'beleived-in' so far.

 John M

 PS I read this remark of mine to my wife who asked: if somebody KILLS a
 person (cuts her throat):
 is it TRUE, or NOT? (pointing to the more convoluted sides of the topic).
 I tried to save face by saying:
 Don't you apply our 'wisdom-concepts' to practical life! We seek the
 theoretical truth! (laugh).
 (As a matter of fact 'true' is not confoundable with 'truth' just as
 conscious is not the adjective representing  consciousness - in most cases)
 JM


 In my meta-physics true is an attribute of a sentence meaning that the
 sentence expresses some fact.  Facts do not depend on sentences, they can
 be facts even though no one says so in a sentence.  Exist has different
 meaning in different contexts.  In physics the essential parts of a model
 are thought to exist just in case the model is true.

 Truth, perhaps, depends on some frame of reference; one could even
 describe it as an emergent phenomena that has meaning only within the frame
 of reference from which it emerges.


 Logicians distinguish theory (which are set of sentences close for
 some applications of some inference rules), and models, which are
 mathematical structures together with a notion of satisfaction of
 sentences. So a sentence (close formula) is never true per se. It is only
 satisfied, or not, by this or that model. Validity or theoremhood will
 correspond with the idea of being true in *all* models of a theory, at
 least for first order theories (which have such nice model theory). In that
 case the validity of a reasoning is independent of the interpretation of
 the theory.

 Physics, biology and theology brought some difficulty here, as it assumes
 some reality, and normally we should distinguish the theory, the models
 of the theory, and the relation between those models and reality.
 Physicists usually ignore the model theory level intermediate between
 theory and reality, and logicians, like mathematicians, ignore reality,
 which they take as a dirty notion used only by engineers or philosophers.




 Now, I can agree that many truth can emerge, but they have to emerge from
 some truth, which are needed to be considered as primitive.


 Very well stated.


  With comp, computer science or just arithmetic constitute(s) enough
 basic truth to explain the emergence of many different notions of truth and
 existence (indeed one for each person points of view).


 For example?. For me comp explain to much., (even what is not observed)
 and to few (of the truths that are self evident). There are other basic
 truths that work better


 Bruno

  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



  --
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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 --
 Alberto.




-- 
Alberto.

-- 
You received

Re: Belief vs Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Nov 2013, at 16:30, Alberto G. Corona wrote:





2013/11/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be

On 23 Nov 2013, at 07:09, Chris de Morsella wrote:




From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com 
] On Behalf Of meekerdb

Sent: Friday, November 22, 2013 9:11 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Belief vs Truth

On 11/22/2013 3:24 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno:
 Brent's dichotomy - as you pointed out - about exist and true may  
go deeper in my opinion:
If we THINK of something: it DOES exist indeed (in our mind) but  
may not be true. I refrain from calling  T R U E  anything in our  
restsricted (partial) knowledge capability. WE THINK IT IS TRUE  
is in our belief system.
Now it is up to you to call the EXISTING thought as 'truly  
existing' We fabricate 'truth' in this respect but only in this  
respect. Otherwise I am just waiting for additional input  
disproving what I 'beleived-in' so far.


John M

PS I read this remark of mine to my wife who asked: if somebody  
KILLS a person (cuts her throat):
is it TRUE, or NOT? (pointing to the more convoluted sides of the  
topic). I tried to save face by saying:
Don't you apply our 'wisdom-concepts' to practical life! We seek  
the theoretical truth! (laugh).
(As a matter of fact 'true' is not confoundable with 'truth' just  
as conscious is not the adjective representing  consciousness - in  
most cases)

JM

In my meta-physics true is an attribute of a sentence meaning  
that the sentence expresses some fact.  Facts do not depend on  
sentences, they can be facts even though no one says so in a  
sentence.  Exist has different meaning in different contexts.  In  
physics the essential parts of a model are thought to exist just in  
case the model is true.


Truth, perhaps, depends on some frame of reference; one could even  
describe it as an emergent phenomena that has meaning only within  
the frame of reference from which it emerges.


Logicians distinguish theory (which are set of sentences close for  
some applications of some inference rules), and models, which are  
mathematical structures together with a notion of satisfaction of  
sentences. So a sentence (close formula) is never true per se. It  
is only satisfied, or not, by this or that model. Validity or  
theoremhood will correspond with the idea of being true in *all*  
models of a theory, at least for first order theories (which have  
such nice model theory). In that case the validity of a reasoning is  
independent of the interpretation of the theory.


Physics, biology and theology brought some difficulty here, as it  
assumes some reality, and normally we should distinguish the  
theory, the models of the theory, and the relation between those  
models and reality.
Physicists usually ignore the model theory level intermediate  
between theory and reality, and logicians, like mathematicians,  
ignore reality, which they take as a dirty notion used only by  
engineers or philosophers.



Now, I can agree that many truth can emerge, but they have to emerge  
from some truth, which are needed to be considered as primitive.


Very well stated.

With comp, computer science or just arithmetic constitute(s) enough  
basic truth to explain the emergence of many different notions of  
truth and existence (indeed one for each person points of view).


For example?.


The points of view of truth (p)
The points of view of rational testable deduction (Bp)
The points of view of knowledge/intuition (Bp  p)
The points of view of observation/bet (Bp  Dt)
The points of view sensations/feeling (Bp  Dt  p).

That leads to eight points of view, due to the splitting between  
provable and true, which take part for Bp, Bp  Dt, Bp  Dt  p.
This gives 8 interelated intensional mathematics corresponding to  
arithmetic seen by machines whose histories are comp-supported by the  
computations emulated in arithmetic.







For me comp explain to much., (even what is not observed) and to few  
(of the truths that are self evident). There are other basic truths  
that work better



It depends on what you are interested. String theory might be useful  
to marry gravitation and gravity in a coherent global picture for the  
physical reality, but be hopelessly useless to make a pizza, or, to  
study afterlife.


Comp explains where QM comes from, in a way which distinguishes what  
we (the machine) can prove and what is true about us but that we  
cannot prove. That is still awfully useless to make a pizza, but is  
handy to get some possible (hypothetical) light on after life and  
parallel life, and the complex mind-body relation. And comp is  
testable, which was the goal.


It is not a question of working or not working. It is question of  
showing that some things does not work, (like comp + materialism) and  
might not work (like perhaps comp).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed

Re: Belief vs Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Nov 2013, at 16:47, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

the factual notions of truth and existence are linked by the notion  
that what is true kick back and what kick back can render you  
nonexistent at the moment  `t +1`  if you negate its truth at the  
moment `t`.


Now natural selection can make the units of time really really long.  
So it is not a surprise that people agree most in the truth and  
existence of things that kick back in order of seconds by the  
natural law of physics than abstract things that kick back in orders  
of generations by the natural law of game theory applied to social  
proceses..


But both kinds of truths are in our common sense by means of the  
Lorenzian-Kantian-evolitionary process that I mentioned above. The  
first kind of knowledge are in our common sense by means of the  
perception of solid objects in space and time. The second kind of  
knowledge are in the form of moral intuitions.


OK.

Bruno






2013/11/23 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com



2013/11/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be

On 23 Nov 2013, at 07:09, Chris de Morsella wrote:




From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com 
] On Behalf Of meekerdb

Sent: Friday, November 22, 2013 9:11 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Belief vs Truth

On 11/22/2013 3:24 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno:
 Brent's dichotomy - as you pointed out - about exist and true may  
go deeper in my opinion:
If we THINK of something: it DOES exist indeed (in our mind) but  
may not be true. I refrain from calling  T R U E  anything in our  
restsricted (partial) knowledge capability. WE THINK IT IS TRUE  
is in our belief system.
Now it is up to you to call the EXISTING thought as 'truly  
existing' We fabricate 'truth' in this respect but only in this  
respect. Otherwise I am just waiting for additional input  
disproving what I 'beleived-in' so far.


John M

PS I read this remark of mine to my wife who asked: if somebody  
KILLS a person (cuts her throat):
is it TRUE, or NOT? (pointing to the more convoluted sides of the  
topic). I tried to save face by saying:
Don't you apply our 'wisdom-concepts' to practical life! We seek  
the theoretical truth! (laugh).
(As a matter of fact 'true' is not confoundable with 'truth' just  
as conscious is not the adjective representing  consciousness - in  
most cases)

JM

In my meta-physics true is an attribute of a sentence meaning  
that the sentence expresses some fact.  Facts do not depend on  
sentences, they can be facts even though no one says so in a  
sentence.  Exist has different meaning in different contexts.  In  
physics the essential parts of a model are thought to exist just in  
case the model is true.


Truth, perhaps, depends on some frame of reference; one could even  
describe it as an emergent phenomena that has meaning only within  
the frame of reference from which it emerges.


Logicians distinguish theory (which are set of sentences close for  
some applications of some inference rules), and models, which are  
mathematical structures together with a notion of satisfaction of  
sentences. So a sentence (close formula) is never true per se. It  
is only satisfied, or not, by this or that model. Validity or  
theoremhood will correspond with the idea of being true in *all*  
models of a theory, at least for first order theories (which have  
such nice model theory). In that case the validity of a reasoning is  
independent of the interpretation of the theory.


Physics, biology and theology brought some difficulty here, as it  
assumes some reality, and normally we should distinguish the  
theory, the models of the theory, and the relation between those  
models and reality.
Physicists usually ignore the model theory level intermediate  
between theory and reality, and logicians, like mathematicians,  
ignore reality, which they take as a dirty notion used only by  
engineers or philosophers.



Now, I can agree that many truth can emerge, but they have to emerge  
from some truth, which are needed to be considered as primitive.


Very well stated.

With comp, computer science or just arithmetic constitute(s) enough  
basic truth to explain the emergence of many different notions of  
truth and existence (indeed one for each person points of view).


For example?. For me comp explain to much., (even what is not  
observed) and to few (of the truths that are self evident). There  
are other basic truths that work better


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--
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Re: Belief vs Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Nov 2013, at 19:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 11/21/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Let´s go to a human level:

in evolutionary terms, I would say that truth is a belief  
hardcoded by natural selection.


This is self-defeating or circular. You need the truth of natural  
selection to make sense of it.


That seems to confound truth and existence.


I don't see why. I was talking on the truth of the evolution facts.



There are some facts that make the theory of natural selection true  
(if it is true).


Yes.



  Those facts may include hardwired beliefs in human brains and then  
they exist whether there is a theory that expresses them or not.


So you say they exist is true. What I said is that this is circular  
when used to define truth from evolution.






It's not circular if it is grounded in facts.


No. Evolution remains circular as an explanation of truth (it is not  
circular as an explanation of the species, but that's another topic).


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Belief vs Truth

[John Mikes]

Bruno:
 Brent's dichotomy - as you pointed out - about exist and true may go
deeper in my opinion:
If we *THINK *of something: it DOES *exist* indeed *(in our mind)* but may
not be true. I refrain from calling  T R U E  anything in our restsricted
(partial) knowledge capability. WE THINK IT IS TRUE is in our belief
system.
Now it is up to you to call the EXISTING thought as 'truly existing'
We fabricate 'truth' in this respect but only in this respect. Otherwise I
am just waiting for additional input disproving what I 'beleived-in' so
far.

John M

PS I read this remark of mine to my wife who asked: if somebody KILLS a
person (cuts her throat):
is it TRUE, or NOT? (pointing to the more convoluted sides of the topic). I
tried to save face by saying:
Don't you apply our 'wisdom-concepts' to practical life! We seek the
theoretical truth! (laugh).
(As a matter of fact 'true' is not confoundable with 'truth' just as
conscious is not the adjective representing  consciousness - in most cases)
JM


On Fri, Nov 22, 2013 at 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 21 Nov 2013, at 19:28, meekerdb wrote:

  On 11/21/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

  Let´s go to a human level:

  in evolutionary terms, I would say that truth is a belief hardcoded by
 natural selection.


  This is self-defeating or circular. You need the truth of natural
 selection to make sense of it.


 That seems to confound truth and existence.


 I don't see why. I was talking on the truth of the evolution facts.



 There are some facts that make the theory of natural selection true (if it
 is true).


 Yes.



   Those facts may include hardwired beliefs in human brains and then they
 exist whether there is a theory that expresses them or not.


 So you say they exist is true. What I said is that this is circular when
 used to define truth from evolution.




 It's not circular if it is grounded in facts.


 No. Evolution remains circular as an explanation of truth (it is not
 circular as an explanation of the species, but that's another topic).

 Bruno



 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Belief vs Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Nov 2013, at 00:24, John Mikes wrote:


Bruno:
 Brent's dichotomy - as you pointed out - about exist and true may  
go deeper in my opinion:
If we THINK of something: it DOES exist indeed (in our mind) but may  
not be true. I refrain from calling  T R U E  anything in our  
restsricted (partial) knowledge capability. WE THINK IT IS TRUE is  
in our belief system.


I refrain from using both real and true in any scientific  
proposal. But in theology, we still need the concept of real or true,  
because it is part of the subject matter.
I don't separate them. True is only an assertative variant of real,  
and both reality and truth concerns the many form of existence. Atoms  
exists, temperature exists, countries exist, persons exist;  all in  
different true senses, for example.




Now it is up to you to call the EXISTING thought as 'truly  
existing'


I reserve the terming really existing or truly existing for the  
terms which are assumed in the base (ontological) theory.  But that is  
only a convention, depending of the choice of the basic terms, which  
is arbitrary insofar that we have laws making the base system  
universal (in Turing sense).



We fabricate 'truth' in this respect but only in this respect.  
Otherwise I am just waiting for additional input disproving what I  
'beleived-in' so far.


Me too.




PS I read this remark of mine to my wife who asked: if somebody  
KILLS a person (cuts her throat):
is it TRUE, or NOT? (pointing to the more convoluted sides of the  
topic). I tried to save face by saying:
Don't you apply our 'wisdom-concepts' to practical life! We seek the  
theoretical truth! (laugh).


Very good remark by your wife!



(As a matter of fact 'true' is not confoundable with 'truth' just as  
conscious is not the adjective representing  consciousness - in most  
cases)


Agreed. Now you can define truth (in some domain) by the set of true  
propositions (about the objects of that domain). Logicians do things  
like that. It can help. Arithmetical truth = the collection of all  
true arithmetical sentences, for example.


Bruno




JM


On Fri, Nov 22, 2013 at 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 21 Nov 2013, at 19:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 11/21/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Let´s go to a human level:

in evolutionary terms, I would say that truth is a belief  
hardcoded by natural selection.


This is self-defeating or circular. You need the truth of  
natural selection to make sense of it.


That seems to confound truth and existence.


I don't see why. I was talking on the truth of the evolution facts.



There are some facts that make the theory of natural selection true  
(if it is true).


Yes.



  Those facts may include hardwired beliefs in human brains and  
then they exist whether there is a theory that expresses them or not.


So you say they exist is true. What I said is that this is  
circular when used to define truth from evolution.






It's not circular if it is grounded in facts.


No. Evolution remains circular as an explanation of truth (it is not  
circular as an explanation of the species, but that's another topic).


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Belief vs Truth

[meekerdb]

On 11/22/2013 3:24 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno:
 Brent's dichotomy - as you pointed out - about exist and true may go deeper in 
my opinion:
If we *_THINK _*of something: it DOES *_exist_* indeed */(in our mind)/* but may not be 
true. I refrain from calling  T R U E  anything in our restsricted (partial) knowledge 
capability. WE THINK IT IS TRUE is in our belief system.
Now it is up to you to call the EXISTING thought as 'truly existing' We fabricate 
'truth' in this respect but only in this respect. Otherwise I am just waiting for 
additional input disproving what I 'beleived-in' so far.


John M

PS I read this remark of mine to my wife who asked: if somebody KILLS a person (cuts her 
throat):
is it TRUE, or NOT? (pointing to the more convoluted sides of the topic). I tried to 
save face by saying:
Don't you apply our 'wisdom-concepts' to practical life! We seek the theoretical truth! 
(laugh).
(As a matter of fact 'true' is not confoundable with 'truth' just as conscious is not 
the adjective representing  consciousness - in most cases)

JM


In my meta-physics true is an attribute of a sentence meaning that the sentence 
expresses some fact.  Facts do not depend on sentences, they can be facts even though no 
one says so in a sentence.  Exist has different meaning in different contexts.  In 
physics the essential parts of a model are thought to exist just in case the model is true.


Brent

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RE: Belief vs Truth

[Chris de Morsella]

 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2013 9:11 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Belief vs Truth

 

On 11/22/2013 3:24 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno:  

 Brent's dichotomy - as you pointed out - about exist and true may go deeper
in my opinion: 

If we THINK of something: it DOES exist indeed (in our mind) but may not be
true. I refrain from calling  T R U E  anything in our restsricted (partial)
knowledge capability. WE THINK IT IS TRUE is in our belief system. 

Now it is up to you to call the EXISTING thought as 'truly existing'
We fabricate 'truth' in this respect but only in this respect. Otherwise I
am just waiting for additional input disproving what I 'beleived-in' so far.


 

John M

 

PS I read this remark of mine to my wife who asked: if somebody KILLS a
person (cuts her throat):

is it TRUE, or NOT? (pointing to the more convoluted sides of the topic). I
tried to save face by saying:

Don't you apply our 'wisdom-concepts' to practical life! We seek the
theoretical truth! (laugh). 

(As a matter of fact 'true' is not confoundable with 'truth' just as
conscious is not the adjective representing  consciousness - in most cases)

JM


In my meta-physics true is an attribute of a sentence meaning that the
sentence expresses some fact.  Facts do not depend on sentences, they can be
facts even though no one says so in a sentence.  Exist has different
meaning in different contexts.  In physics the essential parts of a model
are thought to exist just in case the model is true.

 

Truth, perhaps, depends on some frame of reference; one could even describe
it as an emergent phenomena that has meaning only within the frame of
reference from which it emerges.

Chris



Brent 

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Re: Belief vs Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Nov 2013, at 21:57, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

To say that F = m . a   or e= m c2  as truth it is necessary to  
accept certain beliefs. Belief that at the next moment the laws will  
not change for example.


e=mc^2 is an interesting theory (belief), or an interesting theorem in  
an interesting theory. True. Perhaps, but that's a question for  
theologian, not physicists.






Let´s go to a human level:

in evolutionary terms, I would say that truth is a belief hardcoded  
by natural selection.


This is self-defeating or circular. You need the truth of natural  
selection to make sense of it.





Truth would say, is the constants plus the algorthm,


OK. But that's equivalent with saying that we accept elementary  
arithmetic as true, and then proceed from there. With comp, we cannot  
take more axioms.







The data that the living being processes, are the beliefs.


OK.





The pivotal affirmation from Conrad Lorenz: The kantian a priori   
where shaped in our mind as a  result of natural selection


This presupposed some theory, implicitly as being true.



has a very far reaching: it means that self evident  truths like the  
existence of persons, animals, space, time and all self evident  
truths that derives from them are hardcoded, and we have hardcoded  
algorithms for processing them. That is the reason why they appear  
behind us and we react to them without any doubt about their  
existence. We also have also algoritm for adquiring derived concepts  
in certain ways and not in others.


OK. But all this depends on your fundamental theory. What is natural  
selection when you have no time, no space, no persons, etc. What are  
your starting assumptions?






Truth in a ample sense is whatever that kick-back: a stone wall for  
example.


OK. I like to see truth as a queen which win all wars without any army  
(but that can take times!).




But that is not all. in evolutionary terms, the kick-back can happen  
across generations. If we doubt about certain abstract truths (like  
to kill is bad),


That's not a truth. It is a normative imperative. (A good one imo).



we will not receive an inmediate negative feedback, but perhaps in a  
few years or even our gene/meme descendants. That is why the  
Lorenz`s mechanism has included in our mind a lot of  innate common  
sense truths).


That materialist explanation paradoxically end up in the idea  that  
there is no space neither time neither persons outside the world of  
the mind, that is what really exist. Out of the mind there is  
nothing. Perhaps mathematics.


With comp we can't really use more than arithmetic for the ontology,  
and we need full higher order mathematics for anything inside  
arithmetic seen from arithmetic. Arithmetic seen from inside is much  
bigger than arithmetic (cf the Skolem phenomenon).






 I´m in aggreement with Craig on this.


I don't see this. Craig assumes some primitive matter, and attribute  
mind to it. You seem more to be in agreement with comp than with  
Craig, it seems to me.


Bruno






2013/6/3 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be

On 03 Jun 2013, at 01:41, Stephen Paul King wrote:


How do we integrate empirical data into Bpp?




Technically, by restricting p to the leaves of the UD* (the true,  
and thus provable, sigma_1 sentences).
Then to get the physics (the probability measure à-la-UDA), you can  
do the same with Bp  Dp  p. Think about the WM-duplication, where  
the W or M selection plays the role of a typical empirical data.


More on this when you came back to this, probably on FOAR.

Bruno








On Saturday, June 1, 2013 3:41:56 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote:
Russell wrote:
...When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I  
can see it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true  
theorems, as opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't  
knowledge.
But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific  
knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.

And that's about where I left it - years ago.
...
Interesting difference between 'scientific' and 'mathematical'
(see the Nobel Prize distinction) - also in falsifiability, that  
does not automatically escape the agnostic questioning about the  
circumstances of the falsifying and the original images. Same  
difficulty as in judging proof.
Scientific knowledge indeed is part of a belief system. In  
conventional sciences we THINK we know, in math we assume

(apologies, Bruno).
John M


On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 6:43 PM, Russell Standish  
li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:

On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
 You mean unprovable?  I get confused because it seems that you
 sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p


To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. I believe in
this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I  
don't

believe it - it is merely a conjecture.

In modal logic, the operator B captures both

Re: Belief vs Truth

[Alberto G. Corona]

2013/11/21 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 20 Nov 2013, at 21:57, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

 To say that F = m . a   or e= m c2  as truth it is necessary to accept
 certain beliefs. Belief that at the next moment the laws will not change
 for example.


 e=mc^2 is an interesting theory (belief), or an interesting theorem in an
 interesting theory. True. Perhaps, but that's a question for theologian,
 not physicists.




 Let´s go to a human level:

 in evolutionary terms, I would say that truth is a belief hardcoded by
 natural selection.


 This is self-defeating or circular. You need the truth of natural
 selection to make sense of it.


 It do not try to define truth beyond the psychological truth. However, the
psychological truths are  the self evident truths, that are the true
absolute truths. You want a pure mathematical or logical notion of absolute
truth, which is impossible.   natural selection is like e= mc2 . it explain
things, but has implicit beliefs, but expand the categories of problems and
the deep of them that we can think of, create new hypothesis and test them.
The Konrad Lorenz theory about the Kantian a prioris is one of them.


 Truth would say, is the constants plus the algorthm,


 OK. But that's equivalent with saying that we accept elementary arithmetic
 as true, and then proceed from there. With comp, we cannot take more axioms.

 It is not the same IMHO. To Accept as truth the constants and the
algorithm of a being actually living (like humans), which implies heavy
constraints imposed by the environment (for example moral rules as a result
of  almost a infinite sucession of games of life and death in society) than
the wider affirmation that elementary aritmetic is true.

Aritmetic theory is true is not a self evident truth.   to kill your
neighbour is bad is a constant or part of an algoritm for the
 navigation in the social environment. It has psychological meaning of
truth  at the psychological level. and therefore is true in the sense
that humans use the word true.





 The data that the living being processes, are the beliefs.


 OK.




 The pivotal affirmation from Conrad Lorenz: The kantian a priori  where
 shaped in our mind as a  result of natural selection


 This presupposed some theory, implicitly as being true.



 has a very far reaching: it means that self evident  truths like the
 existence of persons, animals, space, time and all self evident truths that
 derives from them are hardcoded, and we have hardcoded algorithms for
 processing them. That is the reason why they appear behind us and we react
 to them without any doubt about their existence. We also have also algoritm
 for adquiring derived concepts in certain ways and not in others.


 OK. But all this depends on your fundamental theory. What is natural
 selection when you have no time, no space, no persons, etc. What are your
 starting assumptions?

 Natural selection then becomes a non-process in a block universe defined
by a mathematical equation which contains Self aware structures. As Tegmark
defines them.

NS is perceived psychologically as a law  of the spacetime. A law at the
macro level which operate at very large scales, but not very different that
any law with space and time embedded in it, like s= v . t .  But this is
just the way we perceive them.




 Truth in a ample sense is whatever that kick-back: a stone wall for
 example.


 OK. I like to see truth as a queen which win all wars without any army
 (but that can take times!).



 But that is not all. in evolutionary terms, the kick-back can happen
 across generations. If we doubt about certain abstract truths (like to kill
 is bad),


 That's not a truth. It is a normative imperative. (A good one imo).

 In terms of psychological self evident truths, it is absolute, since there
is no higher truth in the world of the mind, by definition, but self
evident , psychological truths.  What kiked-back across generations was
incorporated in our algoritms as self evident truths of the reality. By
means of?  by the evolution of the genetic program that develop our brains.
that is what Konrad Lorenz said.



 we will not receive an inmediate negative feedback, but perhaps in a few
 years or even our gene/meme descendants. That is why the Lorenz`s mechanism
 has included in our mind a lot of  innate common sense truths).

 That materialist explanation paradoxically end up in the idea  that there
 is no space neither time neither persons outside the world of the mind,
 that is what really exist. Out of the mind there is nothing. Perhaps
 mathematics.


 With comp we can't really use more than arithmetic for the ontology, and
 we need full higher order mathematics for anything inside arithmetic seen
 from arithmetic. Arithmetic seen from inside is much bigger than arithmetic
 (cf the Skolem phenomenon).


 But as i said before, there is no pure mathematical notion of truth that
can model what humans take for truth. Only the world of the mind has

Re: Belief vs Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Nov 2013, at 11:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote:





2013/11/21 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be

On 20 Nov 2013, at 21:57, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

To say that F = m . a   or e= m c2  as truth it is necessary to  
accept certain beliefs. Belief that at the next moment the laws  
will not change for example.


e=mc^2 is an interesting theory (belief), or an interesting theorem  
in an interesting theory. True. Perhaps, but that's a question for  
theologian, not physicists.






Let´s go to a human level:

in evolutionary terms, I would say that truth is a belief hardcoded  
by natural selection.


This is self-defeating or circular. You need the truth of natural  
selection to make sense of it.



It do not try to define truth beyond the psychological truth.



OK. I heard you. But it is almost the difference between reality and  
dream, or between the first hypostase (God, truth, the real, the  
One, ..), and the first person (the soul, the subjective, etc.).




However, the psychological truths are  the self evident truths, that  
are the true absolute truths. You want a pure mathematical or  
logical notion of absolute truth, which is impossible.


I don't want it, but here computationalism simplifies the picture a  
lot. Despite this, the absolute truth remains non definable, non  
expressible, and ply the role of the God that you cannot name.




natural selection is like e= mc2 . it explain things, but has  
implicit beliefs,


In the fundamental science, there is a point where we have to make all  
the beliefs explicit.





but expand the categories of problems and the deep of them that we  
can think of, create new hypothesis and test them. The Konrad Lorenz  
theory about the Kantian a prioris is one of them.


I have no problem with Kant.






Truth would say, is the constants plus the algorthm,


OK. But that's equivalent with saying that we accept elementary  
arithmetic as true, and then proceed from there. With comp, we  
cannot take more axioms.


It is not the same IMHO. To Accept as truth the constants and the  
algorithm of a being actually living (like humans), which implies  
heavy constraints imposed by the environment (for example moral  
rules as a result of  almost a infinite sucession of games of life  
and death in society) than the wider affirmation that elementary  
aritmetic is true.


Wider?




Aritmetic theory is true is not a self evident truth.


my own consciousness here and now is the only self-evident truth. All  
the rest are theories. Now far more people will find 2+2=4 more self- 
evident than thou shall not kill.




to kill your neighbour is bad is a constant or part of an  
algoritm for the  navigation in the social environment.


It can be a law, but we depart from the fundamental inquiry. We might  
talk on different things.




It has psychological meaning of truth  at the psychological level.  
and therefore is true in the sense that humans use the word true.


But that cannot be used to do science.










The data that the living being processes, are the beliefs.


OK.





The pivotal affirmation from Conrad Lorenz: The kantian a priori   
where shaped in our mind as a  result of natural selection


This presupposed some theory, implicitly as being true.



has a very far reaching: it means that self evident  truths like  
the existence of persons, animals, space, time and all self evident  
truths that derives from them are hardcoded, and we have hardcoded  
algorithms for processing them. That is the reason why they appear  
behind us and we react to them without any doubt about their  
existence. We also have also algoritm for adquiring derived  
concepts in certain ways and not in others.


OK. But all this depends on your fundamental theory. What is  
natural selection when you have no time, no space, no persons,  
etc. What are your starting assumptions?


Natural selection then becomes a non-process in a block universe  
defined by a mathematical equation which contains Self aware  
structures. As Tegmark defines them.


Tegmark use some identity thesis which is incoherent with comp. I think.
To put it shortly: I don't believe in a physical universe. The  
physical reality is a sharable dream by numbers.







NS is perceived psychologically as a law  of the spacetime. A law at  
the macro level which operate at very large scales, but not very  
different that any law with space and time embedded in it, like s=  
v . t .  But this is just the way we perceive them.


OK.









Truth in a ample sense is whatever that kick-back: a stone wall for  
example.


OK. I like to see truth as a queen which win all wars without any  
army (but that can take times!).




But that is not all. in evolutionary terms, the kick-back can  
happen across generations. If we doubt about certain abstract  
truths (like to kill is bad),


That's not a truth. It is a normative imperative. (A good one imo).

In terms of psychological self evident truths

Re: Belief vs Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Nov 2013, at 12:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 21 Nov 2013, at 11:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote:









The material phenomena are events in the mind.


That is partially true in the comp theory. But mind and matter  
emerges from the existence of [READ OR] absence of solution(s) to  
Diophantine equation, or even to just one of them(*).


So there was a typo error (Read OR instead of of). And the (*)  
was for this:


For your contemplative pleasure here is a unique system of Diophantine  
equation which is Turing universal. That is a precise TOE, written  
with only s, 0, + and *. It comes from a paper of P. Jones, which is  
based on the work of Matiyasevitch, Putnam, Davis and Robinson.
Of course an expression like Q^16 is an abbreviation of  
Q*Q*Q*Q*Q*Q*Q*QQ*Q*Q*Q*Q*Q*Q*Q*Q (with the parentheses that should be  
added!). By adding even more variables, we can get only one  
polynomial, with degree 4. The equation below asserts that X is in  
W_Nu (a Turing universal statement, in Davis' earlier sense, a bit  
more general than Davis change to it later).



Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y

ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2

Qu = B^(5^60)

La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5

Th +  2Z = B^5

L = U + TTh

E = Y + MTh

N = Q^16

R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + +  
LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N)

 + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1)

P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2

(P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2

4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2

K = R + 1 + HP - H

A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2

C = 2R + 1 Ph

D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga

D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1

F^2 = (A^2 - 1)(I^2)C^4 + 1

(D + OF)^2 = ((A + F^2(D^2 - A^2))^2 - 1)(2R + 1 + JC)^2 + 1

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Belief vs Truth

[meekerdb]

On 11/21/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Let´s go to a human level:

in evolutionary terms, I would say that truth is a belief hardcoded by natural 
selection.


This is self-defeating or circular. You need the truth of natural selection to make 
sense of it.


That seems to confound truth and existence.  There are some facts that make the theory 
of natural selection true (if it is true).  Those facts may include hardwired beliefs in 
human brains and then they exist whether there is a theory that expresses them or not.  
It's not circular if it is grounded in facts.


Brent

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Re: Belief vs Truth

[Alberto G. Corona]

To say that F = m . a   or e= m c2  as truth it is necessary to accept
certain beliefs. Belief that at the next moment the laws will not change
for example.

Let´s go to a human level:

in evolutionary terms, I would say that truth is a belief hardcoded by
natural selection. Truth would say, is the constants plus the algorthm, The
data that the living being processes, are the beliefs.

The pivotal affirmation from Conrad Lorenz: The kantian a priori  where
shaped in our mind as a  result of natural selection has a very far
reaching: it means that self evident  truths like the existence of persons,
animals, space, time and all self evident truths that derives from them are
hardcoded, and we have hardcoded algorithms for processing them. That is
the reason why they appear behind us and we react to them without any doubt
about their existence. We also have also algoritm for adquiring derived
concepts in certain ways and not in others.

Truth in a ample sense is whatever that kick-back: a stone wall for
example. But that is not all. in evolutionary terms, the kick-back can
happen across generations. If we doubt about certain abstract truths (like
to kill is bad), we will not receive an inmediate negative feedback, but
perhaps in a few years or even our gene/meme descendants. That is why the
Lorenz`s mechanism has included in our mind a lot of  innate common sense
truths).

That materialist explanation paradoxically end up in the idea  that there
is no space neither time neither persons outside the world of the mind,
that is what really exist. Out of the mind there is nothing. Perhaps
mathematics.  I´m in aggreement with Craig on this.

2013/6/3 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 03 Jun 2013, at 01:41, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 How do we integrate empirical data into Bpp?



 Technically, by restricting p to the leaves of the UD* (the true, and
 thus provable, sigma_1 sentences).
 Then to get the physics (the probability measure à-la-UDA), you can do the
 same with Bp  Dp  p. Think about the WM-duplication, where the W or M
 selection plays the role of a typical empirical data.

 More on this when you came back to this, probably on FOAR.

 Bruno







 On Saturday, June 1, 2013 3:41:56 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote:

 Russell wrote:


 *...When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can
 see it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems,
 as opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge. But I am
 vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific knowledge, which has
 more to do with falsifiability, than with proof. And that's about where I
 left it - years ago.*
 *...*
 Interesting difference between 'scientific' and 'mathematical'
 (see the Nobel Prize distinction) - also in falsifiability, that does not
 automatically escape the agnostic questioning about the circumstances of
 the falsifying and the original images. Same difficulty as in judging
 proof.
 Scientific knowledge indeed is part of a belief system. In conventional
 sciences we THINK we know, in math we assume
 (apologies, Bruno).
 John M


 On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 6:43 PM, Russell Standish 
 li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote:

 On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
  You mean unprovable?  I get confused because it seems that you
  sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p
 

 To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. I believe in
 this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I don't
 believe it - it is merely a conjecture.

 In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly
 belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief -
 whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a
 Christian's notion is another matter entirely.

 When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see
 it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as
 opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.

 But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific
 knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.

 And that's about where I left it - years ago.

 Cheers

 --

 
 
 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Principal, High Performance Coders
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
 
 

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The last truth that ever matters:

[Stephen Lin]

Him: God has shown me all truth, but your love is beauty beyond
comprehension.

Her: God has shown me all beauty, but your love is truth beyond imagination.

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Re: Belief vs Truth

[John Mikes]

How about Tao?
JM

On Sun, Jun 2, 2013 at 9:11 AM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:

 I have to respond that in Judaism in the high holiday service there is a
  prayer praising doubt.
 I think that may be unique to Judaism?
 Richard


 On Sun, Jun 2, 2013 at 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:




 Russell wrote:
 *...When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can
 see it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems,
 as opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.
 *


 I can see your point, at least for arithmetic, but I am not sure that
 distinction is interesting, at least for awhile. In both case we assert
 some proposition, that we cannot prove. Then with some luck it can be true.



 * But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific knowledge,
 which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.
 *


 But the Löbian point is that proof, even when correct, are falsifiable.
 Why, because we might dream, even of a falsification.

 On 01 Jun 2013, at 21:41, John Mikes wrote:

 * And that's about where I left it - years ago.*
 *...*
 Interesting difference between 'scientific' and 'mathematical'
 (see the Nobel Prize distinction)


 That's one was contingent.
 Nobel was cocufied by a mathematician who would have deserved the price
 (Mittag Leffler I think). Hmm.. Wiki says it is a legend, and may be it is
 just the contingent current Aristotelianism. Some people believe that math
 is not a science, like David Deutsch. That makes no sense for me. Like
 Gauss I think math is the queen of science, and arithmetic is the queen of
 math ...



 - also in falsifiability, that does not automatically escape the agnostic
 questioning about the circumstances of the falsifying and the original
 images.


 Excellent point.



 Same difficulty as in judging proof.


 Formal, first order proof can be verified mechanically, but they still
 does not necessarily entail truth, as the premises might be inconsistent or
 incorrect.



 Scientific knowledge indeed is part of a belief system. In conventional
 sciences we THINK we know,


 Only the pseudo-religious or pseudo-scientist people think they know.



 in math we assume
 (apologies, Bruno).



 ?
 On the contrary I agree. I thought I insisted a lot on this. Except for
 the non scientific personal (not 3p) consciousness it is always assumption,
 that is why I say that I assume that 0 is a number, that 0 ≠ s(x) for all
 x, etc.

 In science there is only assumption. We never know-for-certain anything
 that we could transmit publicly.

 Science is born from doubt, lives in doubt and can only augment the
 doubts.

 In the ideal world of the correct machines, *all* certainties are madness.

 Bruno




 *
 *
 On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 6:43 PM, Russell Standish 
 li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote:

 On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
  You mean unprovable?  I get confused because it seems that you
  sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p
 

 To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. I believe in
 this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I don't
 believe it - it is merely a conjecture.

 In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly
 belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief -
 whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a
 Christian's notion is another matter entirely.

 When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see
 it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as
 opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.

 But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific
 knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.

 And that's about where I left it - years ago.

 Cheers

 --


 
 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Principal, High Performance Coders
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 

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Re: Belief vs Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 03 Jun 2013, at 16:08, John Mikes wrote:


How about Tao?
JM

On Sun, Jun 2, 2013 at 9:11 AM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com  
wrote:
I have to respond that in Judaism in the high holiday service there  
is a  prayer praising doubt.

I think that may be unique to Judaism?
Richard



I agree, the israelite (by which I mean the religious jewish) share  
with many other religion the idea that you can doubt, criticize, and  
comment freely whatever is said in religious text. Some buddhist  
repeat that we have to kill all the buddhas and it is often  
interpreted as a method to prevent the use of authoritative argument.  
Of course abuse, and political perversion can always exist. Another  
common point is the absence of proselytism, which does not make much  
sense for those trusting their gods.


Bruno








On Sun, Jun 2, 2013 at 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:





Russell wrote:
...When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I  
can see it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true  
theorems, as opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't  
knowledge.


I can see your point, at least for arithmetic, but I am not sure  
that distinction is interesting, at least for awhile. In both case  
we assert some proposition, that we cannot prove. Then with some  
luck it can be true.




But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific  
knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.


But the Löbian point is that proof, even when correct, are  
falsifiable. Why, because we might dream, even of a falsification.


On 01 Jun 2013, at 21:41, John Mikes wrote:


And that's about where I left it - years ago.
...
Interesting difference between 'scientific' and 'mathematical'
(see the Nobel Prize distinction)


That's one was contingent.
Nobel was cocufied by a mathematician who would have deserved the  
price (Mittag Leffler I think). Hmm.. Wiki says it is a legend, and  
may be it is just the contingent current Aristotelianism. Some  
people believe that math is not a science, like David Deutsch. That  
makes no sense for me. Like Gauss I think math is the queen of  
science, and arithmetic is the queen of math ...




- also in falsifiability, that does not automatically escape the  
agnostic questioning about the circumstances of the falsifying and  
the original images.


Excellent point.




Same difficulty as in judging proof.


Formal, first order proof can be verified mechanically, but they  
still does not necessarily entail truth, as the premises might be  
inconsistent or incorrect.




Scientific knowledge indeed is part of a belief system. In  
conventional sciences we THINK we know,


Only the pseudo-religious or pseudo-scientist people think they know.




in math we assume
(apologies, Bruno).



?
On the contrary I agree. I thought I insisted a lot on this. Except  
for the non scientific personal (not 3p) consciousness it is always  
assumption, that is why I say that I assume that 0 is a number, that  
0 ≠ s(x) for all x, etc.


In science there is only assumption. We never know-for-certain  
anything that we could transmit publicly.


Science is born from doubt, lives in doubt and can only augment the  
doubts.


In the ideal world of the correct machines, *all* certainties are  
madness.


Bruno







On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 6:43 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au 
 wrote:

On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
 You mean unprovable?  I get confused because it seems that you
 sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p


To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. I believe in
this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I  
don't

believe it - it is merely a conjecture.

In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly
belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief -
whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a
Christian's notion is another matter entirely.

When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see
it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems,  
as

opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.

But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific
knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.

And that's about where I left it - years ago.

Cheers

--


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Belief vs Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 03 Jun 2013, at 01:41, Stephen Paul King wrote:


How do we integrate empirical data into Bpp?




Technically, by restricting p to the leaves of the UD* (the true,  
and thus provable, sigma_1 sentences).
Then to get the physics (the probability measure à-la-UDA), you can do  
the same with Bp  Dp  p. Think about the WM-duplication, where the W  
or M selection plays the role of a typical empirical data.


More on this when you came back to this, probably on FOAR.

Bruno








On Saturday, June 1, 2013 3:41:56 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote:
Russell wrote:
...When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can  
see it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true  
theorems, as opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.
But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific  
knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.

And that's about where I left it - years ago.
...
Interesting difference between 'scientific' and 'mathematical'
(see the Nobel Prize distinction) - also in falsifiability, that  
does not automatically escape the agnostic questioning about the  
circumstances of the falsifying and the original images. Same  
difficulty as in judging proof.
Scientific knowledge indeed is part of a belief system. In  
conventional sciences we THINK we know, in math we assume

(apologies, Bruno).
John M


On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 6:43 PM, Russell Standish  
li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:

On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
 You mean unprovable?  I get confused because it seems that you
 sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p


To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. I believe in
this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I don't
believe it - it is merely a conjecture.

In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly
belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief -
whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a
Christian's notion is another matter entirely.

When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see
it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as
opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.

But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific
knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.

And that's about where I left it - years ago.

Cheers

--


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Belief vs Truth

[Richard Ruquist]

I have to respond that in Judaism in the high holiday service there is a
 prayer praising doubt.
I think that may be unique to Judaism?
Richard


On Sun, Jun 2, 2013 at 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:




 Russell wrote:
 *...When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see it
 captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as opposed
 to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.
 *


 I can see your point, at least for arithmetic, but I am not sure that
 distinction is interesting, at least for awhile. In both case we assert
 some proposition, that we cannot prove. Then with some luck it can be true.



 * But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific knowledge,
 which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.
 *


 But the Löbian point is that proof, even when correct, are falsifiable.
 Why, because we might dream, even of a falsification.

 On 01 Jun 2013, at 21:41, John Mikes wrote:

 * And that's about where I left it - years ago.*
 *...*
 Interesting difference between 'scientific' and 'mathematical'
 (see the Nobel Prize distinction)


 That's one was contingent.
 Nobel was cocufied by a mathematician who would have deserved the price
 (Mittag Leffler I think). Hmm.. Wiki says it is a legend, and may be it is
 just the contingent current Aristotelianism. Some people believe that math
 is not a science, like David Deutsch. That makes no sense for me. Like
 Gauss I think math is the queen of science, and arithmetic is the queen of
 math ...



 - also in falsifiability, that does not automatically escape the agnostic
 questioning about the circumstances of the falsifying and the original
 images.


 Excellent point.



 Same difficulty as in judging proof.


 Formal, first order proof can be verified mechanically, but they still
 does not necessarily entail truth, as the premises might be inconsistent or
 incorrect.



 Scientific knowledge indeed is part of a belief system. In conventional
 sciences we THINK we know,


 Only the pseudo-religious or pseudo-scientist people think they know.



 in math we assume
 (apologies, Bruno).



 ?
 On the contrary I agree. I thought I insisted a lot on this. Except for
 the non scientific personal (not 3p) consciousness it is always assumption,
 that is why I say that I assume that 0 is a number, that 0 ≠ s(x) for all
 x, etc.

 In science there is only assumption. We never know-for-certain anything
 that we could transmit publicly.

 Science is born from doubt, lives in doubt and can only augment the
 doubts.

 In the ideal world of the correct machines, *all* certainties are madness.

 Bruno




 *
 *
 On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 6:43 PM, Russell Standish 
 li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote:

 On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
  You mean unprovable?  I get confused because it seems that you
  sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p
 

 To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. I believe in
 this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I don't
 believe it - it is merely a conjecture.

 In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly
 belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief -
 whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a
 Christian's notion is another matter entirely.

 When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see
 it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as
 opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.

 But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific
 knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.

 And that's about where I left it - years ago.

 Cheers

 --


 
 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Principal, High Performance Coders
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 

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Re: Belief vs Truth

[Stephen Paul King]

How do we integrate empirical data into Bpp?

On Saturday, June 1, 2013 3:41:56 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote:

 Russell wrote:
 *...When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see it 
 captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as opposed 
 to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.
 But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific knowledge, 
 which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.
 And that's about where I left it - years ago.*
 *...*
 Interesting difference between 'scientific' and 'mathematical' 
 (see the Nobel Prize distinction) - also in falsifiability, that does not 
 automatically escape the agnostic questioning about the circumstances of 
 the falsifying and the original images. Same difficulty as in judging 
 proof.  
 Scientific knowledge indeed is part of a belief system. In conventional 
 sciences we THINK we know, in math we assume 
 (apologies, Bruno). 
 John M
 *
 *
 On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 6:43 PM, Russell Standish 
 li...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript:
  wrote:

 On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
  You mean unprovable?  I get confused because it seems that you
  sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p
 

 To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. I believe in
 this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I don't
 believe it - it is merely a conjecture.

 In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly
 belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief -
 whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a
 Christian's notion is another matter entirely.

 When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see
 it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as
 opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.

 But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific
 knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.

 And that's about where I left it - years ago.

 Cheers

 --


 
 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Principal, High Performance Coders
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript:
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 

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Re: Belief vs Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 31 May 2013, at 19:43, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/31/2013 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 31 May 2013, at 01:19, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/30/2013 3:43 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

You mean unprovable?  I get confused because it seems that you
sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p


To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing.


Not really.  You only believe the theorem you've proved if you  
believed the axioms and rules of inference.  What mathematicians  
generally believe is that a proof is valid, i.e. that the  
conclusion follows from the premise.  But they choose different  
premises, and even different rules of inference, just to see what  
comes out.



I believe in
this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I  
don't

believe it - it is merely a conjecture.

In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly
belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief -
whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a
Christian's notion is another matter entirely.


I don't think scientists, doing science, *believe* anything.


They believe that they publish papers, and usually share the  
consensual believes, like in rain, taxes, and death (of others).


All humans have many beliefs. A genuine scientist just know that  
those are beliefs, and not knowledge (even if they hope their  
belief to be true). So they will provides axioms/theories and  
derive from that, and compare with facts, in case the theory is  
applied in some concrete domain.


But those are not beliefs in the mathematicians sense, they are  
beliefs in the common sense.


?
The beliefs of the mathematicians are beliefs in the common sense. It  
seems to me.





They don't just believe the axioms and that the theorems follow from  
them.


?


Scientists usually call them hypotheses or models to emphasize that  
they are ideas that are held provisionally and are to be tested  
empirically.


Mathematicians do the same. It is just than on arithmetic we have kept  
the same hypothesis for long, and only weaken them, like replacing the  
induction axiom with set of numbers by the induction axioms on first  
order formula. But I am not sure there is any significant change. Only  
what is studied is different.














Of course they believe things in the common sense that they are  
willing to act/bet on something (at some odds).


Yes. For example most believe that there is no biggest prime numbers.



The Abrahamic religious notion of 'faith' is similar to that; the  
religious person must always act as if the religious dogma is true  
(at any odds).  This precludes doubting or questioning the dogma.


Very often, alas. But the israelites and the taoists encourage the  
comments and the discussion of texts. So there are degrees of  
dogmatic thinking.









When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can  
see
it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true  
theorems, as

opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.


Gettier (whom I know slightly) objected that one may believe a  
proposition that is true and is based on evidence but, because the  
evidence is not causally connected to the proposition should not  
count as knowledge.

http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html


It is equivalent with the dream argument made by someone who  
believes he knows that he is awake.

Gettier is right, but he begs the question.


What question is that?


The question of how to distinguish belief from knowledge.







But the theaetetus' idea works in arithlmetic, thank to  
incompleteness, and that's is deemed to be called, imo, a  
(verifiable) fact.


But does it work outside arithmetic?


AUDA is after UDA. We know (in the comp theory, 'course) that there  
is no outside of arithmetic ever needed to be assumed. The bosons and  
fermions are inside too.



Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Belief vs Truth

[John Mikes]

Brent,
thanks for your clear ideas - not controversial to what I try to explain in
my poor wordings.
No proof is valid, or true. Applicable, maybe.
In our 'makebilieve' world-model many facets SEEM true in our terms of
explanation, i.e. using conventional science and wisdom. Mathematicians are
even more stubborn.
JohnM

On Fri, May 31, 2013 at 1:43 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 5/31/2013 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 31 May 2013, at 01:19, meekerdb wrote:

  On 5/30/2013 3:43 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

 On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

 You mean unprovable?  I get confused because it seems that you
 sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p

  To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing.


 Not really.  You only believe the theorem you've proved if you believed
 the axioms and rules of inference.  What mathematicians generally believe
 is that a proof is valid, i.e. that the conclusion follows from the
 premise.  But they choose different premises, and even different rules of
 inference, just to see what comes out.

  I believe in
 this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I don't
 believe it - it is merely a conjecture.

 In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly
 belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief -
 whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a
 Christian's notion is another matter entirely.


 I don't think scientists, doing science, *believe* anything.


 They believe that they publish papers, and usually share the consensual
 believes, like in rain, taxes, and death (of others).

 All humans have many beliefs. A genuine scientist just know that those
 are beliefs, and not knowledge (even if they hope their belief to be true).
 So they will provides axioms/theories and derive from that, and compare
 with facts, in case the theory is applied in some concrete domain.


 But those are not beliefs in the mathematicians sense, they are beliefs in
 the common sense.  They don't just believe the axioms and that the theorems
 follow from them.  Scientists usually call them hypotheses or models to
 emphasize that they are ideas that are held provisionally and are to be
 tested empirically.







  Of course they believe things in the common sense that they are willing
 to act/bet on something (at some odds).


 Yes. For example most believe that there is no biggest prime numbers.



  The Abrahamic religious notion of 'faith' is similar to that; the
 religious person must always act as if the religious dogma is true (at any
 odds).  This precludes doubting or questioning the dogma.


 Very often, alas. But the israelites and the taoists encourage the
 comments and the discussion of texts. So there are degrees of dogmatic
 thinking.






 When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see
 it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as
 opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.


 Gettier (whom I know slightly) objected that one may believe a
 proposition that is true and is based on evidence but, because the evidence
 is not causally connected to the proposition should not count as knowledge.
 http://www.ditext.com/gettier/**gettier.htmlhttp://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html


 It is equivalent with the dream argument made by someone who believes he
 knows that he is awake.
 Gettier is right, but he begs the question.


 What question is that?



 But the theaetetus' idea works in arithlmetic, thank to incompleteness,
 and that's is deemed to be called, imo, a (verifiable) fact.


 But does it work outside arithmetic?

 Brent



 Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Belief vs Truth

[Bruno Marchal]

On 31 May 2013, at 01:19, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/30/2013 3:43 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

You mean unprovable?  I get confused because it seems that you
sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p


To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing.


Not really.  You only believe the theorem you've proved if you  
believed the axioms and rules of inference.  What mathematicians  
generally believe is that a proof is valid, i.e. that the conclusion  
follows from the premise.  But they choose different premises, and  
even different rules of inference, just to see what comes out.



I believe in
this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I  
don't

believe it - it is merely a conjecture.

In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly
belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief -
whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a
Christian's notion is another matter entirely.


I don't think scientists, doing science, *believe* anything.


They believe that they publish papers, and usually share the  
consensual believes, like in rain, taxes, and death (of others).


All humans have many beliefs. A genuine scientist just know that those  
are beliefs, and not knowledge (even if they hope their belief to be  
true). So they will provides axioms/theories and derive from that, and  
compare with facts, in case the theory is applied in some concrete  
domain.






Of course they believe things in the common sense that they are  
willing to act/bet on something (at some odds).


Yes. For example most believe that there is no biggest prime numbers.



The Abrahamic religious notion of 'faith' is similar to that; the  
religious person must always act as if the religious dogma is true  
(at any odds).  This precludes doubting or questioning the dogma.


Very often, alas. But the israelites and the taoists encourage the  
comments and the discussion of texts. So there are degrees of dogmatic  
thinking.









When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see
it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems,  
as

opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.


Gettier (whom I know slightly) objected that one may believe a  
proposition that is true and is based on evidence but, because the  
evidence is not causally connected to the proposition should not  
count as knowledge.

http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html


It is equivalent with the dream argument made by someone who believes  
he knows that he is awake.

Gettier is right, but he begs the question.

But the theaetetus' idea works in arithlmetic, thank to  
incompleteness, and that's is deemed to be called, imo, a (verifiable)  
fact.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Belief vs Truth

[meekerdb]

On 5/31/2013 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 31 May 2013, at 01:19, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/30/2013 3:43 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

You mean unprovable?  I get confused because it seems that you
sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p


To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing.


Not really.  You only believe the theorem you've proved if you believed the axioms and 
rules of inference.  What mathematicians generally believe is that a proof is valid, 
i.e. that the conclusion follows from the premise.  But they choose different premises, 
and even different rules of inference, just to see what comes out.



I believe in
this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I don't
believe it - it is merely a conjecture.

In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly
belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief -
whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a
Christian's notion is another matter entirely.


I don't think scientists, doing science, *believe* anything.


They believe that they publish papers, and usually share the consensual believes, like 
in rain, taxes, and death (of others).


All humans have many beliefs. A genuine scientist just know that those are beliefs, and 
not knowledge (even if they hope their belief to be true). So they will provides 
axioms/theories and derive from that, and compare with facts, in case the theory is 
applied in some concrete domain.


But those are not beliefs in the mathematicians sense, they are beliefs in the common 
sense.  They don't just believe the axioms and that the theorems follow from them.  
Scientists usually call them hypotheses or models to emphasize that they are ideas that 
are held provisionally and are to be tested empirically.








Of course they believe things in the common sense that they are willing to act/bet on 
something (at some odds).


Yes. For example most believe that there is no biggest prime numbers.



The Abrahamic religious notion of 'faith' is similar to that; the religious person must 
always act as if the religious dogma is true (at any odds).  This precludes doubting or 
questioning the dogma.


Very often, alas. But the israelites and the taoists encourage the comments and the 
discussion of texts. So there are degrees of dogmatic thinking.









When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see
it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as
opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.


Gettier (whom I know slightly) objected that one may believe a proposition that is true 
and is based on evidence but, because the evidence is not causally connected to the 
proposition should not count as knowledge.

http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html


It is equivalent with the dream argument made by someone who believes he knows that he 
is awake.

Gettier is right, but he begs the question.


What question is that?



But the theaetetus' idea works in arithlmetic, thank to incompleteness, and that's is 
deemed to be called, imo, a (verifiable) fact.


But does it work outside arithmetic?

Brent



Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: Belief vs Truth

[Kim Jones]

On 01/06/2013, at 3:35 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 All humans have many beliefs. A genuine scientist just know that those are 
 beliefs, and not knowledge (even if they hope their belief to be true). So 
 they will provides axioms/theories and derive from that, and compare with 
 facts, in case the theory is applied in some concrete domain.
 
 


Beliefs relate directly to needs. This is seperate to the issue already largely 
explored here as to whether belief and knowledge are the same. In general, all 
humans have needs. These needs range from the obvious (fuel ie food/drink, 
shelter etc) to less obvious things like respect, admiration from some other 
human or humans, a mission in life and a sense of achievement in relation to 
that mission. If our deep needs are not satisfied at least partially, we wither 
and dry-up like any plant.

Possibly because these less-obvious needs are such deep motivators of human 
activities on just about every level, it is rather boring (or sometimes frankly 
embarrassing) to talk about them or indeed to own-up to the fact. Freud's great 
achievement was that he got humans to fess-up to their needs and to stop 
bullshitting each about them. Even Einstein the Great was able to say I don't 
have any special talent. I'm just insatiably curious. Or words to that effect. 
Thus, his whole life was about satisfying his *personal need* to know stuff. 
That's fine; we all benefitted from his attending to his own needs in that 
regard. Beethoven wrote great music. Not because it was an expectation of 
others put on him that he tried to live up to, but because he perceived 
entities existing in a realm that can only be experienced in the mind via 
musical compositions. In fact he was exploring Platonia - as you do when you 
write great music or do great science. Please don't get out the Thor's Hammer 
of reductionism to clout me with because this is not reductionism. This is 
HONESTY.

In Edward de Bono's framework for Parallel Thinking The Six Thinking Hats the 
Red Hat is donned for the expression of feelings, hunches and intuitions. In 
other words, with the Red Hat on, everybody gets a chance to spruik their 
beliefs about something. There is no requirement that these be rational or even 
logical. You can spit the dummy if you want to, or, out a gut-feeling about 
the issue under consideration. No one can be criticised for having a bit of a 
rave or a rant under the Red Hat because that's the essence of Parallel 
Thinking: everyone wears the same-coloured hat at the same time and the result 
is that the neurotransmitters for that mental operation (beliefs, needs, 
emotions etc) are optimised. Later on, we take off the Red Hat and put on the 
Yellow Hat which is about everyone in the room optimising the neurotransmitters 
associated with positive thinking. If you cannot see anything positive or 
beneficial about an idea or an issue, (like John Clark in relation to Bruno's 
comp theory) then you are merely advertising the fact that you are an excellent 
Red Hat thinker but a lousy Yellow Hat thinker. There are benefits to 
everything. The trick is, to be able to see them. Then there is of course the 
Black Hat, which is the Logical Negative. Don't confuse the Red and Black 
Hats. The Red Hat has everything to do with needs and beliefs and nothing at 
all to do with logic. The Black Hat has everything to do with logic. Under the 
Black Hat, you must judge an idea as unworthy for the following 
logically-demonstrable reasons: a) - b) - c) etc. Indeed, you may BELIEVE and 
FEEL that an idea is just fine, but the logical operation of isolating and 
identifying faults and systemic errors may trump belief. In fact, it usually 
does.

The existence of the Red Hat is an acknowledgement of Freud's primary insight: 
that the core of the human self is a set of needs that will not go away and 
which it is absurd to try and rationalise as something else somehow (usually by 
some fancy logical discourse). The default mode of human thinking (so often 
observed on this and related lists) is to smuggle back in one's needs-based 
beliefs under the disguise of reason and evidence as Bruno is clearly 
saying in the quote, above. If you believe an idea will not work, or is 
dangerous in some regard, you may well be right, but then you may well be 
wrong. We cannot yet know. You can however, now be respected for having that 
belief because clearly you have a deep-seated emotional need to believe that. 
Only a fool would assert that their beliefs are purely rational and based only 
on reasoned evidence. As Camus said: which of the sun or the earth turns 
around the other is of absolutely no consequence whatsoever. The only 
philosophical question worth considering is whether life is worth living. This 
was an attempt (in Le Mythe de Sisyphe) to understand the supreme logic of 
suicide. 


Cheers,

Kim Jones





Kim Jones B.Mus.GDTL

Email: 

Belief vs Truth

[Russell Standish]

On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
 You mean unprovable?  I get confused because it seems that you
 sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p
 

To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. I believe in
this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I don't
believe it - it is merely a conjecture.

In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly
belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief -
whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a
Christian's notion is another matter entirely.

When it comes to Bp  p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see
it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as
opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.

But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific
knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.

And that's about where I left it - years ago.

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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