[PEIRCE-L] observation and phaneroscopy

List, In this and following posts on the topic (if any) I’m going to use the term “phaneroscopy” for Peirce’s specific brand of the science, and “phenomenology” more broadly to include the work of those who use that name responsibly for their own discipline. Phaneroscopy then is a species of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

List, I just noticed that the message below, from Jeff Downard, did not go to the list, although he clearly intended it to. I think the question he poses at the end is a fascinating one, but hardly know where to start in working toward an answer. (Perhaps I should start with Peirce’s writings

[PEIRCE-L] RE: The Nature of Peirce's Phenomenology and Phaneroscopy

List, This post follows up on Gary Richmond’s post from yesterday, but I’ve altered the subject line to eliminate some redundancy and the reference to EGs. I’m also assuming that Peirce’s definitions of phenomenology and of the phaneron, which are easily found and quoted, are not enough to

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

John, list, I think everything you’ve said about EGs here, and how they might represent continuous predicates, is exactly right. What you’ve said about Jon’s MEGs, though, is true only if we read the lines in those diagrams as Lines of Identity; and the main modification Jon made was to read

RE: [PEIRCE-L] EGs and phaneroscopy

Jon (and list), I can’t honestly say that I find this post (or your follow-up to it) very useful for explicating the relationship between EGs and phaneroscopy — but I’ve had a few distractions in recent days and haven’t had time yet to prepare a better alternative. For one thing, I’m not

RE: [PEIRCE-L] EGs and phaneroscopy

Jon, list, I think you’ve made a number of unwarranted inferences from the Peirce passages you quoted, but rather than a detailed critique of your post, I’m going to quote another passage from Peirce’s “PAP” draft which I think deals more directly with the issue in our subject line, and then

RE: [PEIRCE-L] EGs and phaneroscopy

Jeff, List, JD: Is there some textual reason to give priority to the analysis of the proposition in the argument for the categories? GF: Well, there is a historical priority, in that Peirce’s “New List of Categories” (1867) was explicitly based on analysis of the proposition. But I’m not

RE: [PEIRCE-L] EGs and phaneroscopy

Jon, list, If you’ve read the whole of the Atkins book I’ll have to catch up with you, as I’m only on Chapter 5 (of 7). But we could begin this thread with what Atkins calls the “Modified Kantian Insight”: The phenomenological categories somehow are based on, are derived from, are generated

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semiosis

Jeff, I wonder if CP 4.641-2 might be the kind of thing you have in mind in posing your question — though I don’t know whether you’d count it as clarification. It’s from the concluding piece in Peirce’s Monist series on “Some Amazing Mazes.” The core idea would seem to be that semiosis is

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semiosis

I think Jeff’s post shows clearly the sense in which semiosic processes are continuous in character. But that doesn’t necessarily entail that semiosic processes are continuous with one another in that sense. Indeed, if all cognition were continuous, then I don’t think there could be any

RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

John, you wrote: “The categories of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns are ways of classifying experiences in the phaneron, not the physical things that caused the experiences.” I think this calls for some clarification. The idea that physical things cause experiences is a metaphysical one, and in phaneroscopy,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

Jon, you wrote that “As for Entelechy, Peirce quite explicitly associated that term (as well as the perfect sign) with the ideal end of semiosis--that toward which growth is proceeding, not the process of growth itself.” I can’t agree with you there. For one thing, I don’t see how entelechy can

RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

Jon, list, You’ve been pointing out an apparent discrepancy between “New Elements” (and other 1904 texts) and MS 283 of 1906 (selection 27 in EP2), which I’ve been quoting in this thread. The question is whether Aristotelian matter and form correspond to Peircean firstness and secondness

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

Helmut, list, When we talk about “matter” in the English of our time, we tend to think of it as tangible stuff, or in physics, as stuff that has mass. Aristotle’s “matter” (ὕλη) is a very different concept, pertaining more to logic than to physics, and Peirce says in the excerpt Jon quoted,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

Jon, you seem determined to take a firm stand that for Peirce, “Form is first and Matter is second” — although Peirce does not explicitly mention the phaneroscopic categories either in the excerpt you’ve quoted or in “The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences” (MS 283), the article

RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

Helmut, that’s an interesting new term you’ve introduced into metaphysical discourse, but I wonder whether it will stick … it might help if you explain what it means. (But maybe that would make the discussion overfucked?) Anyway … your reason for asserting that “matter is first, and form

[PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

Some further thoughts (from my blog, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2018/12/sex-life-and-logic/ ) on the Aristotelian matter/form distinction and the Peircean concept of “Growth”: Merleau-Ponty refers to perception as the ‘coition, so to speak, of our body with things’. The phrase ‘so to speak’ marks

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'

Gary R, Jon, list, Gary, to answer your question first: If matter corresponds to 1ns in this selection, what corresponds to 2ns seems to be experience, or perhaps more specifically, experience of the unfamiliar. Or we might say that 2ns is the force of determination. Read the whole selection

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'

John S, list, Speaking of Aristotle’s influence on Peirce, and in particular the connection between De Anima and Peirce’s concept of quasi-mind, there is a very explicit example in one of Peirce’s 1906 drafts for his Monist series on pragmatism, the one beginning at EP2:371. Peirce deals here

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

List, Robert Marty addressed this post to me and to the list, but apparently didn’t send it to the list address, so I’m forwarding it here. It contains some important comments on Peirce’s use of the term “replica.” Thank you, Robert! Gary f. From: marty.rob...@neuf.fr

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

Jon, a few brief responses inserted: From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 19-Sep-18 13:07 Gary F., List: I was not previously aware of Peirce's marginal note about "Replica," so thank you for bringing it to my attention; the CP editors dated it "c. 1910," not 1904. He used "Replica" quite

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

Jon, list, I agree with you (and Gary R) that “sign-vehicle” is an unfortunate choice of term, for the reasons you’ve given. But similar reasons apply to your term “Sign-Replica,” another term that Peirce himself never used (with or without the hyphen), as far as I can tell. He did use the

[PEIRCE-L] bringing Peirce into the 21st century

List, The current issue of Science magazine features two articles that provoke me to share a few reflections on the subject line, which I’ve chosen to represent the recurring calls on this list for more postings that apply Peircean ideas to “real-world” issues and investigations (as opposed to

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being

List, To Jon’s points in this post, which I think are well taken, I’d like to add a few remarks taken from Peirce’s Lowell Lecture 7 (1903), which might clarify the nature of the Peircean trichotomy of Arguments: Deduction/Induction/Abduction (a key feature of his “speculative grammar”). The

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?

John, you wrote, “If Peirce ever said that there are things in the mind, in thought, or in the phaneron that are not signs, I'd like to see the quotation.” Peirce to James, 1904: “Percepts are signs for psychology; but they are not so for phenomenology” (CP 8.300) On the “ultimate logical

RE: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?

Jeff, I'm puzzled by the fact that the two questions you pose are both about "the formal and material categories," when by his own account (CP 1.284 for instance), all of Peirce's phenomenological or phaneroscopic analyses deal with the formal categories (or "formal elements of the phaneron") and

RE: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?

John, list, I have to agree with Francesco and Auke. I’m guessing that you don’t want to include semiotics with logic, as Peirce did in the Syllabus classification of 1903 (without using the word “semiotic”), because it doesn’t seem normative enough. Peirce recognized the problem here and had

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jeff, Francesco, list, In the discussion of an officer giving a soldier a command to "Ground Arms", Jeff, I don’t see why you assume that the object created by the sign is the immediate object. I think it is the dynamic object, the same one that determines the Sign — which is of course an

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

John, have you considered ideal/actual for the root dichotomy? (Or the trichotomy ideal/actual/significant?) Gary f. -Original Message- From: John F Sowa Sent: 23-Aug-18 11:26 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

John, I’m always happy to trade findings with a fellow searcher of etymological dictionaries! Just a couple of comments: JS: The word 'mark' has a much broader range of senses than 'tone'. GF: I agree that, in judging the appropriateness of a terminological choice for semiotics, the range of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Jon, OK, I think I’ve been misunderstanding the purpose of your “hypothesis.” I’ve been treating it as an inductively testable hypothesis about Peirce’s use of terms. But evidently you are not testing it in that way, but rather “trying it out” as a proposed improvement over Peirce’s actual

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

John, I’m in agreement with everything you say here, but I think it’s important to recognize your preference for “mark” over “tone” as a term in semiotics or ontology is a strictly personal preference (rather than a logical principle or a fact of Peircean usage). In the first place, the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Jon, John, list, Regarding the type/token/tone trichotomy: This was introduced in Peirce’s 1906 “Prolegomena”, and I think the paragraph in which it appears is worth another look. I’m leaving open the question of whether this trichotomy is conceptually identical to the 1903

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Jon, If you choose to take Peirce’s terminology during the “New Elements” period as your baseline, and say that his usage at other times was “inconsistent” with that, I won’t try to talk you out of it. I’m just pointing out that it would be equally reasonable (and equally uncharitable) to say

RE: Determination in Logic as Semeiotic vs Biosemiotic, was, [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Interpretants

Jon, You appear to be arguing that in 1904, or whenever he wrote “New Elements,” Peirce decided that only Types (or Legisigns) were properly called “signs,” i.e. Replicas (or Sinsigns) should not be called “signs.” But several of the classes of signs he named in 1906-08 are not Types or

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 8

It is of the very essence of thought and purpose that it should be special, just as truly as it is of the essence of either that it should be general. This statement by Charles S. Peirce is from his Lowell Lecture 8 of 1903 - and more specifically, from a

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 8

Lowell Lecture fans, The eighth and final lecture of the series is now up on my website at http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell8.htm. It is now possible to read the whole 1903 series, beginning at http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm, and to view the manuscripts side by side with the 'raw' transcriptions at

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Interpretants

Helmut, Unicorns and phoenixes (phoenices?) do not exist apart from their being represented, but representations of them certainly do exist, and thus can serve as dynamic objects that determine future references to them, and as objects of study. Myths are not factual, but mythologies are. The

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Interpretants

Jon, list, I’m not sure what you mean by saying the sign “would dissolve,” but yes, a genuine Secondness between sign and object is required if the Thirdness of its mediation is to be genuine. (It’s in this respect that the icon is described as “degenerate” in “New Elements”). The index, on

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Recommendation: In email notes, avoid the word 'you'

John, JS: [[ I took 2 examples from each of 3 participants. But those sentences would be insulting in any context. ]] GF: Are you seriously claiming this as a FACT? And not an insult to those 3 participants, or a wholly arbitrary designation on your part, calling a sign by that name even when

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Interpretants

Jon, thanks for posting this. Responses inserted (paragraphs beginning GF: ). Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 2-Aug-18 14:52 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Interpretants Gary F., Gary R., List: Prompted by the on-List exchange below a couple of days ago,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Recommendation: In email notes, avoid the word 'you'

John, You have taken your example quotes out of context. Now, is the above sentence a “gratuitous insult” because it has the word “you” in it? And would it be less insulting if I had written “The examples selected for this argument are taken out of context”, pretending that I didn’t know who

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Recommendation: In email notes, avoid the word 'you'

John, As we’ve seen here recently, people who are inclined to be defensive (and to engage in heated debates) will tend to do so regardless of the presence or absence of the word “you” (or any other particular word) in a message. Shifting the focus from the statement by “taking it personally”

FW: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logical Depth and Signification

Jon, list, This strikes me as a very cogent line of thinking. I'm particularly struck by your statement that "The Immediate Object of any Sign is the overlap of Informed Breadth and Depth that is necessary and sufficient for an interpreting Quasi-mind to identify that Sign's Dynamic Object."

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logical Depth and Signification

Edwina, I’m glad to see that you now acknowledge the reality of truth. The issue you are still ignoring is that truth can only be approached by inductive reasoning, i.e. by repeated testing of a hypothesis by as many observers as possible — a process which is by nature always incomplete. A

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logical Depth and Signification

Gary R, list, In support of the important points you’ve said here, Gary, I’d like to submit this excerpt from Peirce’s Harvard Lecture 7 (1903, EP2:532): [[ the good of abduction, as such, that is, its adaptation to its end, will consist of its being of such a character that its deductive

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: peerages

Gary R, Near the end of your post, which makes a number of points worthy of a good moderator, you wrote: [[ So, contra your view of the list, Gary f, I do not see Peirce-L as essentially a "community of inquiry," ]] I also do not see Peirce-L as essentially a "community of inquiry"; I see it

[PEIRCE-L] RE: peerages

Helmut, list, I did not say that the exchange of opinions is in any way contradictory to hypothesis testing. (If you think I did, perhaps you’ve been influenced by Edwina’s furious attempt to start a debate instead of responding to what I actually wrote.) As you probably know (because I

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: peerages

John, I made no attempt to classify you, or Peirce, or anyone else, according to their interests. I agree with what you say here, but what does it have to do with my observation that there is more than one community within the peirce-l community? Gary f. -Original Message- From: John

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: peerages

Edwina, Since you addressed this post to me, I think you owe me the courtesy of reading what I actually wrote before you respond, rather than putting your own words in my mouth and reacting to those instead. You wrote “I disagree with your evaluation of the 'value' of each community.” But

[PEIRCE-L] RE: peerages

Gary R, list, I don’t think there’s any question that the subscribers to this list are a community of peers. But I do think it’s become clear that there is more than one community within this community. There is one community engaged in inquiry about Peirce’s work, his system, if we may use

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logical Depth and Signification

Jon, list, I see you’ve been making some progress, Jon, in your inquiry, though I don’t have anything very interesting to say about it. My own time has been split between finishing up my transcription of the Lowell Lectures and revising the late chapters of my book Turning Signs (which is not

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logical Depth and Signification

Jon, That’s an interesting hypothesis, or set of hypotheses, but I don’t have any more specific comment on it, because I haven’t read that 1867 paper of Peirce’s since I published my paper on his concept of information in 2010. I don’t think your contrast of “systematic” and “exegetical” quite

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logical Depth and Signification

Helmut, Edwina, Perhaps I should have specified that I was referring to Peirce’s usage of these terms, including “analysis.” I know there are other uses of these terms, but on the Peirce list I feel bound by Peirce’s ethics of terminology, without bothering to say so. To make up for that

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logical Depth and Signification

Helmut, Sign, object and interpretant are the three correlates of a triadic relation. They are not matters of a sign’s composition. An immediate object could be considered a “matter of the sign’s composition” in the sense that it is “within” or “part of” the sign; a dynamic object is not. The

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logical Depth and Signification

Jon, Your explanation confirms my hypothesis as to why you see a contradiction where Peirce evidently doesn’t. If you don’t mind a metaphor, you’re trying to fit Peirce’s terms together as if they were rigid pieces of a flat picture puzzle (rather than products of various logical analyses made

RE: [PEIRCE-L] MSS for existential graphs

Thanks John — Kloesel's list gives an inkling of the magnitude of the task of understanding how EGs fit into Peirce's philosophy as a whole. Especially when you consider how much text is included in MS "279-300". I'm just starting work on transcriptions of MSs 298 and 299 (thanks to the SPIN

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logical Depth and Signification

Jon, you’re asking: If the logical depth/signification of a Sign corresponds to its Interpretan … then where does the Sign's information fit into the picture? But you’ve already answered that yourself: “The information (breadth x depth) of a Sign then corresponds to the unity of the Object with

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jon, Thanks for this, I will add it … you cite “200:E94-E97” — does that refer to Peirce’s own numbering of the pages in R 200? It is useful in its way of bringing the “principle of contradiction” into the same context with “direct experience.” Regarding your other (longer) post, the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 7

Jeff, I think this is a very astute analysis of what Peirce is doing in the latter Lowell lectures. Certainly they focus on the classification of arguments, which is in a sense the climax of speculative grammar; and what stands out to me lately is the overlapping of the three main divisions of

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 7

Peirceans, My transcription of Lowell Lecture 7 of 1903 is now available at the SPIN site, https://www.fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-473-474-1903 -lowell-lecture-vii , and has been added to the series on my website, at http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell7.htm. This one is all about

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

Jerry, Peirce always insisted that the analysis of propositions or of their meanings should not be based on linguistic grammar, i.e. on the ‘parts of speech’ involved, because the linguistic structure of the sentences that represent propositions varies from language to language, and

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

Jon, It is probably true that Peirce did not explicitly talk about a “signified interpretant” before 1906, but that usage is a natural extension of the concept of signification and of depth as opposed to breadth, which did not change in Peirce’s mind. Have a look at Peirce’s entry on

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

Jon, just one question here: What’s the change of mind that you are referring to when you say “Peirce's initial parallelism here aligns the Object of a Sign with its Breadth, and its Interpretant with its Depth; so he evidently had changed his mind about the latter already by 1906”? Change from

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

Jon, you asked, “How would you spell out the difference between a Rheme and a Seme? What would be an example of something that is a Seme, but not a Rheme?” I think Bellucci gives a very lucid explanation of the two-stage process of generalization that went from term/proposition/argument to

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

Jon, I have no particular problem with your “amendment” (and agree with at least part of it) so my inserted comments begin further down. I’ve changed the subject line to better reflect what we’re talking about. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 29-Jun-18 21:05 Gary F., List: I

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Helmut, Maybe you should finish your train of thought before you post it. That would make it easier for the rest of us to engage in dialogue with you.  Gary f. From: Helmut Raulien Sent: 30-Jun-18 16:07 Suppsuppsupp: Sorry, that this is becoming a monologue, this will be the last

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's last words about existential graphs

John, Thanks for this summary of your argument regarding Peirce's last words about EGs. For my part, along with Jon A.S. and a few others, I’ve been trying to sort out some rather complex questions regarding Peirce’s late classification of signs, toward which purpose I’ve been adding some new

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jon, Thanks for noting my typo where I cited “CP 4.581” where I meant 583. I agree that the context there is important — as always with Peirce! By the way, it’s been pointed out to me offlist that I didn’t include the word “list” in the opening line of my reply to your post. That’s because I

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jon, Yes, that’s close to the distinction I had in mind. But … Please read this through carefully before you begin composing a response. (Not that you’re obligated to respond at all, of course.) When Peirce says (EP2:481) that “the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jerry, I didn’t get the joke in your earlier post, but I do see that your example in this one is not to be taken seriously. Gary f. From: Jerry LR Chandler Sent: 29-Jun-18 09:59 Yes. Over the past several months, my involvement with city government has declined from very active to

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jerry R, No, it’s an observation about the real objects of those two general terms. Can you give an example of a process of involvement? Gary f. From: Jerry LR Chandler Sent: 29-Jun-18 09:45 Gary F On Jun 29, 2018, at 6:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jon, No, I haven’t found an instance of Peirce using “evolve” or “evolution” (or “involution”) in this kind of technical sense when discussing semeiotic. In fact, I’ve only found one place where he uses the verb “evolve” at all after 1903, and that one (in the “Neglected Argument” of 1908)

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jeff, list, A couple of comments inserted . Gary f. From: Jeffrey Brian Downard Sent: 27-Jun-18 14:50 Gary F, List, If I confused matters by using the noun form in place of the verb form of the words, then my apologies. GF: No, that didn't confuse me, as I too had looked up both

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jeff, You've put a lot of questions on our plate here, and I'm still working on the first one: "Can the distinction you are drawing between the analytic and synechistic approaches also be expressed in terms of the evolution and involution of signs and their relations?" I don't have a definite

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jeff, I see the question you've posed here as one manifestation of the necessary tension between analysis and synechism which drives Peircean semiotic. For the synechist, semiosis is a continuous process: any parts it has are of the same nature as itself. Yet for the analyst, it has three

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Gary R, I apologize for giving the impression that I consider my reading of Peirce more legitimate than yours, or anyone’s. What I said was that IF one reads any work of semiotic analysis as if it were a polemic, one will miss the point of it. I still consider that conditional proposition

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Gary R, you wrote: Although I've clearly stated that I agree with you, Bellucci, and Stjernfel, that the dicisign is perhaps of particular importance in semiosis, I think that valorizing it by claiming that it is the only sign class that has an immediate object needs to be proved. You suggest

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jon, list, I’d like to remind you of what Peirce says in Lowell Lecture 3: [[ I confine the word Representation to the operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the interpreter of the representation. The concrete subject that represents I call a sign or a representamen. I use these

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Gary R, You appear to have reacted to my post without reading it to the end — otherwise you couldn’t have said that I “completely ignore here that Peirce writes that a Rheme will perhaps "afford some information."” This is simply not true, as you will see if you read the latter part of my

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jon, list, Response inserted. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 24-Jun-18 15:27 Gary F., List: GF: The real question for inquiry, in my view, is What is an immediate object? In simplest terms, the IO is "the Object as the Sign itself represents it" (CP 4.536; 1906). GF: Yes,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jon, You don’t need to be a Frege scholar to comprehend what Bellucci means by “the Fregean interpretation,” because Bellucci spells out quite clearly what he means by that phrase, and as you say, you’ve read Bellucci. Whether it’s a good choice of term on Bellucci’s part is quite irrelevant,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Gary R, list, To clarify: I do think a debate over whether “every sign has an immediate object” or “only dicisigns have immediate objects” is pointless, for reasons I’ve already given regarding the importance of context, but mostly because taking either side in the debate presupposes a fixed

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jon, As I said before, “Fregean interpretation” is Bellucci’s label for your position, which I assumed you were already familiar with. Whether it should be called “pejorative” or not, I don’t know. Here is his note on the subject from Peirce’s Speculative Grammar (p. 350): [[ Peirce's

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jeff, Thanks for drawing attention to the very important point that understanding any one of Peirce's distinctions has to involve understanding his reasons for making them in the first place. This is a major virtue of Bellucci's book on speculative grammar, which follows his development

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Gary R, Jon, I’m well aware that Jon’s view of the IO, and yours — what Bellucci calls the “Fregean” view — is the most common view among Peirceans. It was my view too, until about a year ago, when I took a closer look at what Peirce was saying in 1904-1908. Bellucci even quotes half a dozen

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Helmut, you ask, “In the second entry he also writes: "In respect to its immediate object a sign may either be a sign of a quality, of an existent, or of a law." Does that not mean qualisign, sinsign, legisign?” No. A qualisign is a sign that IS a quality, and a sinsign IS a sign that is an

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jon, list, Jon, I’m well aware that your “understanding is that what a Sign signifies are certain qualities/characters of its Dynamic Object, which taken together constitute its Immediate Object.” But I’m only interested in continuing this dialogue if we can base it on Peirce’s definition of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jon, responses inserted … Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 21-Jun-18 13:21 Gary F., List: GF: Are you saying that neither a Possible nor a Necessitant can function indexically? I am saying that the Immediate Object only functions indexically for Designative Signs, not for

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jon (welcome back!), Responses inserted … Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 20-Jun-18 14:23 Gary F., List: Apologies for the long-delayed response, but I was traveling abroad on vacation during the last two weeks and am still catching up on certain things. Coincidentally (or

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 6

Lowell Lecture fans, My new transcription of the sixth of Peirce's Lowell Lectures of 1903 is now available on my website: http://www.gnusystems.ca/Lowell6.htm. This one is about probability and the "doctrine of chances", with some introductory remarks on the metaphysical issues involved and

[PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

List, While working on my transcription of Lowell Lecture 6 from the manuscript on the SPIN site (https://www.fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-472-1903-lowell-lecture-vi), I came across what strikes me as a key passage in it, and what struck me as a key term in it: “direct

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 5

Jeff, some responses inserted . Gary f. From: Jeffrey Brian Downard Sent: 15-May-18 12:54 To: g...@gnusystems.ca Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 5 Hi Gary F, List, Thanks for your initial hints about Lecture 5. Up to this point in my reading and

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 5

Jeff, list, Yes, working with the manuscript material on the SPIN (FromThePage) site continues to be a labor of love, though sometimes more laborious than I had expected. In the process of developing the lecture series, Peirce changed his mind several times about what he needed to focus on and

RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and theism

Gary R, Helmut, A couple of points I would add to what Gary has already said: For Peirce, “‘Real’ is a word invented in the thirteenth century to signify having Properties, i.e. characters sufficing to identify their subject, and possessing these whether they be anywise attributed to it by any

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 5

List, After a protracted struggle, I finally managed to get a transcription of Peirce's Fifth Lowell Lecture of 1903 up on my website, http://www.gnusystems.ca/Lowell5.htm. So the first five lectures are all on my website; but I don't plan to resume serializing them as I did with the first three.

[PEIRCE-L] RE: retroduction and abduction

Helmut, “Retroduction” is logically the same as “abduction”, but it’s the term Peirce used for it in his “Neglected Argument” (and other late papers), defining it as “reasoning from consequent to antecedent.” There is something “backwards” about that, so “retroduction” is probably a better

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and theism

Helmut, since you ask, The only “proof of existence” is direct experience; no kind of reasoning is up to the task of verifying the genuine Secondness of anything that exists — as opposed to an ens rationis, which may or may not be real, but its reality is not that of an existing thing.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and theism

Gary R, list, After Gary’s post I did a quick search to see what Peirce might have to say about “theism” (the word). To the Century Dictionary he didn’t contribute a definition of it, but he did define an “atheist” as “One who denies the existence of God, or of a supreme intelligent being” (CD

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Nature and Division of Signs (was Three Interpretants)

Jon, just to clarify: In Peirce’s 1903 classification, some signs (being individuals, sinsigns) are replicas of other signs, those other signs being general in themselves (legisigns). But in your classification, no signs are replicas, no replicas are signs, and an index is not a sign, since it

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