subject:"Re\: Reality"



On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 4:50:36 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/5/2020 2:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 4:01:26 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2/5/2020 7:25 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 9:19:00 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>> wrote: 
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 6:06:18 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: 



 On Tuesday, February 4, 2020 at 6:47:41 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote: 
>
> REALITY.SYS Corrupted: Re-boot universe? (Y/N/Q)
>
>  John K Clark
>
>

 quantumetric computer

 The idea basically is to combine

 • quantum computer
 • relativistic computer

 e.g. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405. 

 @philipthrift

>>>
>>> No hypercomputation. The event horizon of a black hole and what might be 
>>> called the quantum horizon are a parts or dual aspects of a general 
>>> epistemic horizon. 
>>>
>>> LC 
>>>
>>
>> What is a model of a relativistic computer that is not hypercomputing?
>>
>>
>> If you send your computer off on a spaceship to do its computation; then 
>> when it comes back it's done relativistic hypocomputing.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> That's not what I'm looking for.
>
>
> You don't always get what you're looking for, but you get what you ask for.
>
> Brent
>



Good thing I got the answer somewhere else.

@philipthrift 

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Re: Reality is a Quantumetric Computer

2020-02-05 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 2/5/2020 2:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 4:01:26 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 2/5/2020 7:25 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 9:19:00 AM UTC-6, Lawrence
Crowell wrote:

On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 6:06:18 AM UTC-6, Philip
Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, February 4, 2020 at 6:47:41 AM UTC-6, John
Clark wrote:

REALITY.SYS Corrupted: Re-boot universe? (Y/N/Q)

 John K Clark



quantumetric computer

The idea basically is to combine

• quantum computer
• relativistic computer

e.g. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.


@philipthrift


No hypercomputation. The event horizon of a black hole and
what might be called the quantum horizon are a parts or dual
aspects of a general epistemic horizon.

LC


What is a model of a relativistic computer that is not
hypercomputing?


If you send your computer off on a spaceship to do its
computation; then when it comes back it's done relativistic
hypocomputing.

Brent


That's not what I'm looking for.


You don't always get what you're looking for, but you get what you ask for.

Brent

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Re: Reality is a Quantumetric Computer



On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 4:01:26 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/5/2020 7:25 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 9:19:00 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
> wrote: 
>>
>> On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 6:06:18 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, February 4, 2020 at 6:47:41 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote: 

 REALITY.SYS Corrupted: Re-boot universe? (Y/N/Q)

  John K Clark


>>>
>>> quantumetric computer
>>>
>>> The idea basically is to combine
>>>
>>> • quantum computer
>>> • relativistic computer
>>>
>>> e.g. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405. 
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>> No hypercomputation. The event horizon of a black hole and what might be 
>> called the quantum horizon are a parts or dual aspects of a general 
>> epistemic horizon. 
>>
>> LC 
>>
>
> What is a model of a relativistic computer that is not hypercomputing?
>
>
> If you send your computer off on a spaceship to do its computation; then 
> when it comes back it's done relativistic hypocomputing.
>
> Brent
>

That's not what I'm looking for.

@philipthrift 

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Re: Reality is a Quantumetric Computer

2020-02-05 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 2/5/2020 7:25 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 9:19:00 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
wrote:


On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 6:06:18 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift
wrote:



On Tuesday, February 4, 2020 at 6:47:41 AM UTC-6, John Clark
wrote:

REALITY.SYS Corrupted: Re-boot universe? (Y/N/Q)

 John K Clark



quantumetric computer

The idea basically is to combine

• quantum computer
• relativistic computer

e.g. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.


@philipthrift


No hypercomputation. The event horizon of a black hole and what
might be called the quantum horizon are a parts or dual aspects of
a general epistemic horizon.

LC


What is a model of a relativistic computer that is not hypercomputing?


If you send your computer off on a spaceship to do its computation; then 
when it comes back it's done relativistic hypocomputing.


Brent

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Re: Reality is a Quantumetric Computer



On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 3:40:41 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/5/2020 4:06 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, February 4, 2020 at 6:47:41 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote: 
>>
>> REALITY.SYS Corrupted: Re-boot universe? (Y/N/Q)
>>
>>  John K Clark
>>
>>
>
> quantumetric computer
>
> The idea basically is to combine
>
> • quantum computer
> • relativistic computer
>
> e.g. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405. 
>
> @philipthrift
>
>
> *Obviously, this set-up assumes, quite unrealistically, that the computer 
> never crashes,*
> *is free of programming bugs, has access to an arbitrary large memory and*
> *to an arbitrarily large amount of energy, and never encounters any other*
> *obstacle to its proper functioning. Alas, none of this is true of the 
> computer*
> *on which this essay was written. However, these assumptions are 
> consistent*
> *with the laws of physics as best we currently know them and shall thus 
> not*
> *stall us in our considerations of matters of principle.7*
>
> These assumptions obviously are NOT consistent with the laws of physics as 
> expressed in quantum mechanics.
>
> Brent
>

And thus, as you seen, the latest, better, approach.

@philipthrift 

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Re: Reality is a Quantumetric Computer

2020-02-05 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 2/5/2020 4:06 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, February 4, 2020 at 6:47:41 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:

REALITY.SYS Corrupted: Re-boot universe? (Y/N/Q)

 John K Clark



quantumetric computer

The idea basically is to combine

• quantum computer
• relativistic computer

e.g. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.

@philipthrift

///
//Obviously, this set-up assumes, quite unrealistically, that the 
computer never crashes,//

//is free of programming bugs, has access to an arbitrary large memory and//
//to an arbitrarily large amount of energy, and never encounters any other//
//obstacle to its proper functioning. Alas, none of this is true of the 
computer//
//on which this essay was written. However, these assumptions are 
consistent//
//with the laws of physics as best we currently know them and shall thus 
not//

//stall us in our considerations of matters of principle.7/

These assumptions obviously are NOT consistent with the laws of physics 
as expressed in quantum mechanics.


Brent

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Re: Reality is a Quantumetric Computer



On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 9:25:26 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 9:19:00 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 6:06:18 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, February 4, 2020 at 6:47:41 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:

 REALITY.SYS Corrupted: Re-boot universe? (Y/N/Q)

  John K Clark


>>>
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>> No hypercomputation. The event horizon of a black hole and what might be 
>> called the quantum horizon are a parts or dual aspects of a general 
>> epistemic horizon. 
>>
>> LC 
>>
>
> What is a model of a relativistic computer that is not hypercomputing? 
>
> @philipthrift
>




I realize it is via this approach 


quantumetric computer

combines

• quantum computer (quantum mechanics)
• relativistic computer (general relativity)

 =

quantum neural network

  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_neural_network

https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.03918 - *an artificial quantum neural network 
based on gravity-like synaptic connections and a symmetry structure that 
allows to describe the network in terms of geometry of a d-dimensional 
space*

The neural network can be described in terms of a quantum field, via 
identifying the different neurons with the different momentum modes of the 
field, while identifying the synaptic connections among the neurons with 
the interactions among the corresponding momentum modes. Such a mapping 
allows to attribute a well-defined sense of geometry to an intrinsically 
non-local system, such as the neural network, and vice versa, it allows to 
represent the quantum field model as a neural network.

   
@philipthrift

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Re: Reality is a Quantumetric Computer

2020-02-05 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

For me, a simpleton, it's hard to imagine a singularity (gravitational?) doing 
anything but falling in on itself, black hole style. If it somehow, goes into 
very fast spinning, I could see it being a cosmological wormhole, and thus, 
being a tunnel to somewhere else in the cosmos. There are, of course, other, 
views on this more, physics-oriented to my, wee, conjecturing. Does this 
hypercomputing go on somewhere else on the edge the universe? Like I imagine 
malament-hogarth universes are supposed to be?


-Original Message-
From: Philip Thrift 
To: Everything List 
Sent: Wed, Feb 5, 2020 10:25 am
Subject: Re: Reality is a Quantumetric Computer



On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 9:19:00 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 6:06:18 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:


On Tuesday, February 4, 2020 at 6:47:41 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
REALITY.SYS Corrupted: Re-boot universe? (Y/N/Q)

 John K Clark



quantumetric computer
The idea basically is to combine
• quantum computer• relativistic computer
e.g. https://arxiv.org/abs/ 1405. 
@philipthrift

No hypercomputation. The event horizon of a black hole and what might be called 
the quantum horizon are a parts or dual aspects of a general epistemic horizon. 
LC 

What is a model of a relativistic computer that is not hypercomputing? 
@philipthrift-- 
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Re: Reality is a Quantumetric Computer



On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 9:19:00 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 6:06:18 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, February 4, 2020 at 6:47:41 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> REALITY.SYS Corrupted: Re-boot universe? (Y/N/Q)
>>>
>>>  John K Clark
>>>
>>>
>>
>> quantumetric computer
>>
>> The idea basically is to combine
>>
>> • quantum computer
>> • relativistic computer
>>
>> e.g. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405. 
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> No hypercomputation. The event horizon of a black hole and what might be 
> called the quantum horizon are a parts or dual aspects of a general 
> epistemic horizon. 
>
> LC 
>

What is a model of a relativistic computer that is not hypercomputing? 

@philipthrift

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Re: Reality is a Quantumetric Computer

2020-02-05 Thread Lawrence Crowell

On Wednesday, February 5, 2020 at 6:06:18 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, February 4, 2020 at 6:47:41 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> REALITY.SYS Corrupted: Re-boot universe? (Y/N/Q)
>>
>>  John K Clark
>>
>>
>
> quantumetric computer
>
> The idea basically is to combine
>
> • quantum computer
> • relativistic computer
>
> e.g. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405. 
>
> @philipthrift
>

No hypercomputation. The event horizon of a black hole and what might be 
called the quantum horizon are a parts or dual aspects of a general 
epistemic horizon. 

LC 

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Re: Reality is a Quantumetric Computer



On Tuesday, February 4, 2020 at 6:47:41 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> REALITY.SYS Corrupted: Re-boot universe? (Y/N/Q)
>
>  John K Clark
>
>

quantumetric computer

The idea basically is to combine

• quantum computer
• relativistic computer

e.g. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405. 

@philipthrift

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Re: Reality is a Quantumetric Computer

2020-02-04 Thread John Clark

REALITY.SYS Corrupted: Re-boot universe? (Y/N/Q)

 John K Clark

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Re: Reality is not matter, it's Heidegger's dasein, which is Leibniz's monad

2013-12-06 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 06 Dec 2013, at 02:15, Roger Clough wrote:

Reality is not matter, it's Heidegger's dasein, which is Leibniz's  
monad


Materialists spend much effort on trying to show that reality is  
simply
physics.  But the philosophy of Plato, Leibniz, Kant, and now  
Heidegger

shows that materialism and analytic philosophy is incomplete,
since it omits mind from reality.


The notion of matter does not even make sense, if we assume mechanism.  
It is like phlogiston or ether.

It is not much incomplete than epistemologically inconsistent.

Bruno





Leibniz modeled reality as material bodies in the dualism of a monad,
which is the corresponding mental being of matter.  The matter is
in spacetime, the monad is outside of spacetime.

Heidegger's dasein is a combination of the german words
da, meaning there, and sein meaning being or mental.
The da is in spacetime and the sein is outside of spacetime,
so a dasein is a monad.

Thus Heidegger's universe is essentially the same as Leibniz's,
an infinite collection of monads or daseins.





Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
See my Leibniz site at
http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough



This email is free from viruses and malware because avast! Antivirus  
protection is active.




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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Reality is not matter, it's Heidegger's dasein, which is Leibniz's monad

2013-12-06 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 06 Dec 2013, at 02:21, LizR wrote:


On 6 December 2013 14:15, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
Reality is not matter, it's Heidegger's dasein, which is Leibniz's  
monad


Materialists spend much effort on trying to show that reality is  
simply
physics.  But the philosophy of Plato, Leibniz, Kant, and now  
Heidegger

shows that materialism and analytic philosophy is incomplete,
since it omits mind from reality.

For some unaccountable reason you have left Bruno off your list.


Thanks Liz :)

Bruno






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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Reality is not matter, it's Heidegger's dasein, which is Leibniz's monad

2013-12-05 Thread LizR

On 6 December 2013 14:15, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:

  Reality is not matter, it's Heidegger's dasein, which is Leibniz's monad

 Materialists spend much effort on trying to show that reality is simply
 physics.  But the philosophy of Plato, Leibniz, Kant, and now Heidegger
 shows that materialism and analytic philosophy is incomplete,
 since it omits mind from reality.


For some unaccountable reason you have left Bruno off your list.

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Re: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

2012-11-24 Thread Roger Clough

Hi Bruno Marchal 

It is known that I think Hilbert and other great mathematicians 
thought at least initially in terms of images or pictures.
That is more evidence in support of Lucas and Penrose.

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/24/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-23, 14:41:13
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]




On 23 Nov 2012, at 16:43, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal,


I find this statement on http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mmk/papers/05-KI.html :

the Lucas-Penrose argument, which can be summarized as follows: 
Since G?el proved that in each sound formal system - which is strong 
enough to formulate arithmetic - there exists a formula which cannot be proved 
by the system (assumed the system is consistent), and since we (human beings) 
can see that such a formula must be true, human and machine reasoning must 
inevitably be different in nature, even in the restricted area of mathematical 
logic. 
This attributes to human mathematical reasoning a very particular role, which 
seems to go beyond rational thought. 

I can't think of an arithmetic example that LP could use, which they should 
have provided.
So as the question is posed, LP seem to be mistaken or at least incomplete 
themselves. 


G?el talk about axiomatic logical theories, or machine, theorem prover. It 
shows that for such theories or machine, we can find true statement that the 
machine or theory cannot prove.


But the reason why Penrose and Lucas is based on the fact that G?el provide an 
algorithm for finding that true but non provable proposition. So machines excel 
in finding the true proposition about other little machine, that the little 
machine cannot find.


L?ian machine can prove theorem own G?el's theorem, and develop transfinite 
autonomous self-extension in provability matter. G and G* remains correct at 
each state, and Becklemishev has found extension of G and G* formalizing the 
multimodal logic captureing the [] = [0] and the [alpha] transfinite 
provability level.


(But you need to study logic for making sense of this).











At any rate, many factual statements can obviously be true but unproveable
by a computer alone. That the sky is blue would be such a statement. 


OK. We are not obviously more gifted than the computer. 






Or
any piece of data not in its data bank.


No, the computer can assert much more than what is in the data bank. Much much 
more. What it deduces from it, what it induces from it, and all the hazardous 
theories, if not the lie and delusion etc. 


Look at the difference between the string z_n := (z_(n-1))^2 +1, which is the 
data bank content, and what the universal machine says from that :
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G0nmVUU_7IQ









So I conclude that LP are correct at least for most factual statements
and they only needed one example. 




?


No LP are not correct. They can do what they pretend on simpler machine than 
themselves, and machines can do that too. But they cannot do that for 
themselves without changing themselves, and the machine can do that too. The 
machine already knows that it is a bit risky. If the truth is possible, the 
lies and errors are possible too.




Bruno










[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/23/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-21, 12:23:40
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]




On 21 Nov 2012, at 11:32, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal 

I'm trying to understand your paper, but a seemingly much simpler
form of your argument keeps getting in the way. The
simpler form is the Lucas argument, discussed in  great
scholarly detail on

 http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/


To be franc there is nothing new in that paper, on the contrary it fails to 
mention the work done by Webb (not to talk on mine on Lucas, Benacerraf and the 
Penrose argument).


I have counted more than 50 errors in Lucas paper. Some are uninteresting, and 
some are very interesting. The argument of Lucas and Penrose are typically 
invalid, but it can be corrected, and it leads to the proposition according to 
whioch:


If I am a machine, then I cannot know which machine I am, and this plays some 
role in the formal part of the study of the first person indeterminacy.


Lucas and Penrose assumes that they are sound, and that they know that they are 
sound, but this is already inconsistent, even if the soundness is restricted to 
arithmetic.


In Conscience  Mechanism, I show how all L?ian machines can refute Lucas and 
Penrose. Basically they confuse []p (3p beliefs) with []p  p (1p knowledge).. 







It seems to me to be self-evident that

1p cannot be part of 3p 




But that is good

Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

2012-11-24 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 24 Nov 2012, at 11:22, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

It is known that I think Hilbert and other great mathematicians
thought at least initially in terms of images or pictures.
That is more evidence in support of Lucas and Penrose.


You assume that machines cannot do that without justification.

Even if comp is false, Penrose and Lucas' use of Gödel incompleteness  
to show this remains wrong.


Bruno






[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/24/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-23, 14:41:13
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]


On 23 Nov 2012, at 16:43, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal,


I find this statement on http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mmk/papers/05-KI.html 
 :


the Lucas-Penrose argument, which can be summarized as follows:
Since Gödel proved that in each sound formal system - which is strong
enough to formulate arithmetic - there exists a formula which  
cannot be proved
by the system (assumed the system is consistent), and since we  
(human beings)
can see that such a formula must be true, human and machine  
reasoning must
inevitably be different in nature, even in the restricted area of  
mathematical logic.
This attributes to human mathematical reasoning a very particular  
role, which

seems to go beyond rational thought. 

I can't think of an arithmetic example that LP could use, which  
they should have provided.
So as the question is posed, LP seem to be mistaken or at least  
incomplete themselves.


Gödel talk about axiomatic logical theories, or machine, theorem  
prover. It shows that for such theories or machine, we can find true  
statement that the machine or theory cannot prove.


But the reason why Penrose and Lucas is based on the fact that Gödel  
provide an algorithm for finding that true but non provable  
proposition. So machines excel in finding the true proposition about  
other little machine, that the little machine cannot find.


Löbian machine can prove theorem own Gödel's theorem, and develop  
transfinite autonomous self-extension in provability matter. G and  
G* remains correct at each state, and Becklemishev has found  
extension of G and G* formalizing the multimodal logic captureing  
the [] = [0] and the [alpha] transfinite provability level.


(But you need to study logic for making sense of this).







At any rate, many factual statements can obviously be true but  
unproveable

by a computer alone. That the sky is blue would be such a statement.


OK. We are not obviously more gifted than the computer.




Or
any piece of data not in its data bank.


No, the computer can assert much more than what is in the data bank.  
Much much more. What it deduces from it, what it induces from it,  
and all the hazardous theories, if not the lie and delusion etc.


Look at the difference between the string z_n := (z_(n-1))^2 +1,  
which is the data bank content, and what the universal machine says  
from that :

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G0nmVUU_7IQ






So I conclude that LP are correct at least for most factual  
statements

and they only needed one example.



?

No LP are not correct. They can do what they pretend on simpler  
machine than themselves, and machines can do that too. But they  
cannot do that for themselves without changing themselves, and the  
machine can do that too. The machine already knows that it is a bit  
risky. If the truth is possible, the lies and errors are possible too.



Bruno







[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/23/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-21, 12:23:40
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]


On 21 Nov 2012, at 11:32, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

I'm trying to understand your paper, but a seemingly much simpler
form of your argument keeps getting in the way. The
simpler form is the Lucas argument, discussed in  great
scholarly detail on

 http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/


To be franc there is nothing new in that paper, on the contrary it  
fails to mention the work done by Webb (not to talk on mine on  
Lucas, Benacerraf and the Penrose argument).


I have counted more than 50 errors in Lucas paper. Some are  
uninteresting, and some are very interesting. The argument of Lucas  
and Penrose are typically invalid, but it can be corrected, and it  
leads to the proposition according to whioch:


If I am a machine, then I cannot know which machine I am, and this  
plays some role in the formal part of the study of the first person  
indeterminacy.


Lucas and Penrose assumes that they are sound, and that they know  
that they are sound, but this is already inconsistent, even if the  
soundness is restricted to arithmetic.


In Conscience

Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

2012-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 23 Nov 2012, at 16:43, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal,


I find this statement on http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mmk/papers/05-KI.html 
 :


the Lucas-Penrose argument, which can be summarized as follows:
Since Gödel proved that in each sound formal system - which is strong
enough to formulate arithmetic - there exists a formula which cannot  
be proved
by the system (assumed the system is consistent), and since we  
(human beings)
can see that such a formula must be true, human and machine  
reasoning must
inevitably be different in nature, even in the restricted area of  
mathematical logic.
This attributes to human mathematical reasoning a very particular  
role, which

seems to go beyond rational thought. 

I can't think of an arithmetic example that LP could use, which they  
should have provided.
So as the question is posed, LP seem to be mistaken or at least  
incomplete themselves.


Gödel talk about axiomatic logical theories, or machine, theorem  
prover. It shows that for such theories or machine, we can find true  
statement that the machine or theory cannot prove.


But the reason why Penrose and Lucas is based on the fact that Gödel  
provide an algorithm for finding that true but non provable  
proposition. So machines excel in finding the true proposition about  
other little machine, that the little machine cannot find.


Löbian machine can prove theorem own Gödel's theorem, and develop  
transfinite autonomous self-extension in provability matter. G and G*  
remains correct at each state, and Becklemishev has found extension of  
G and G* formalizing the multimodal logic captureing the [] = [0] and  
the [alpha] transfinite provability level.


(But you need to study logic for making sense of this).







At any rate, many factual statements can obviously be true but  
unproveable

by a computer alone. That the sky is blue would be such a statement.


OK. We are not obviously more gifted than the computer.




Or
any piece of data not in its data bank.


No, the computer can assert much more than what is in the data bank.  
Much much more. What it deduces from it, what it induces from it, and  
all the hazardous theories, if not the lie and delusion etc.


Look at the difference between the string z_n := (z_(n-1))^2 +1,  
which is the data bank content, and what the universal machine says  
from that :

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G0nmVUU_7IQ






So I conclude that LP are correct at least for most factual statements
and they only needed one example.



?

No LP are not correct. They can do what they pretend on simpler  
machine than themselves, and machines can do that too. But they cannot  
do that for themselves without changing themselves, and the machine  
can do that too. The machine already knows that it is a bit risky. If  
the truth is possible, the lies and errors are possible too.



Bruno







[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/23/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-21, 12:23:40
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]


On 21 Nov 2012, at 11:32, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

I'm trying to understand your paper, but a seemingly much simpler
form of your argument keeps getting in the way. The
simpler form is the Lucas argument, discussed in  great
scholarly detail on

 http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/


To be franc there is nothing new in that paper, on the contrary it  
fails to mention the work done by Webb (not to talk on mine on  
Lucas, Benacerraf and the Penrose argument).


I have counted more than 50 errors in Lucas paper. Some are  
uninteresting, and some are very interesting. The argument of Lucas  
and Penrose are typically invalid, but it can be corrected, and it  
leads to the proposition according to whioch:


If I am a machine, then I cannot know which machine I am, and this  
plays some role in the formal part of the study of the first person  
indeterminacy.


Lucas and Penrose assumes that they are sound, and that they know  
that they are sound, but this is already inconsistent, even if the  
soundness is restricted to arithmetic.


In Conscience  Mechanism, I show how all Löbian machines can refute  
Lucas and Penrose. Basically they confuse []p (3p beliefs) with []p  
 p (1p knowledge)..






It seems to me to be self-evident that

1p cannot be part of 3p



But that is good insight of you. For correct machine, this can be  
proved, as the machine cannot prove the true equivalence between []p  
and []p  p, as they don't know that they are correct.


[]p can be defined in the language of the universal machine, but []p  
and p cannot. By assuming correctness of some other machine, the  
Löbian one can prove that for simpler machine than themselves, and  
they can bet on their correctness and lift that idea at their own  
level, with the usual theological risk

Re: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

2012-11-22 Thread Roger Clough

Hi Bruno Marchal 

You say

 OK, but invalid when used to pretend that we are not machine, like 
Godel and Lucas did. 

So basically, whether you believe the Lucas-Penrose theory depends
on whether you believe in comp or no. I have serious problems
with comp because the 1ps and hence the 3ps of various
people and various computer programs will vary. I don't
see how they can all be the same. 

Meanwhile, I'll look at the counter-arguments to Lucas and Penrose.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/22/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-21, 12:23:40
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]




On 21 Nov 2012, at 11:32, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal 

I'm trying to understand your paper, but a seemingly much simpler
form of your argument keeps getting in the way. The
simpler form is the Lucas argument, discussed in  great
scholarly detail on

 http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/


To be franc there is nothing new in that paper, on the contrary it fails to 
mention the work done by Webb (not to talk on mine on Lucas, Benacerraf and the 
Penrose argument).


I have counted more than 50 errors in Lucas paper. Some are uninteresting, and 
some are very interesting. The argument of Lucas and Penrose are typically 
invalid, but it can be corrected, and it leads to the proposition according to 
whioch:


If I am a machine, then I cannot know which machine I am, and this plays some 
role in the formal part of the study of the first person indeterminacy.


Lucas and Penrose assumes that they are sound, and that they know that they are 
sound, but this is already inconsistent, even if the soundness is restricted to 
arithmetic.


In Conscience  Mechanism, I show how all L?ian machines can refute Lucas and 
Penrose. Basically they confuse []p (3p beliefs) with []p  p (1p knowledge).. 







It seems to me to be self-evident that

1p cannot be part of 3p 




But that is good insight of you. For correct machine, this can be proved, as 
the machine cannot prove the true equivalence between []p and []p  p, as they 
don't know that they are correct.


[]p can be defined in the language of the universal machine, but []p and p 
cannot. By assuming correctness of some other machine, the L?ian one can prove 
that for simpler machine than themselves, and they can bet on their correctness 
and lift that idea at their own level, with the usual theological risk of this 
(forgetting the bet in the process).







Which seems to be a equivalent to Godels's theorm. 


OK, but invalid when used to pretend that we are not machine, like Godel and 
Lucas did.







Or the observer can't be part of what is observed.
Or more generally, the prover cannot be part of the proof.


Well, both the observer (3p) and the prover (3p) can do that, without 
necessarily knwoing that they do that. 
But the knower (1p) cannot.


To explain the details of this would need more familiarity in logic, and 
notably Solovay's theorems, which I might explain someday.


Bruno








[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/21/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-20, 10:05:13
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]




On 20 Nov 2012, at 14:51, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal 


Sorry, where are the steps of UD ?


You can find them here:


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html




You can download the PDF, and also the unique slide with a diagram for each 
step, as this can help to remember them. For the step 8, the best version is in 
this list in the MGA thread (the Movie Graph Argument). The seven first steps 
already explains the reversal physics---/---number's bio-psycho-theo-logy 
though.


Bruno







[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/20/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-19, 09:33:19
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]




On 19 Nov 2012, at 11:22, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal 

I thought that comp is exactly opposite to what you say,
that computationalism is the belief that we can simulate
the mind with a computer program-- that the mind is computable.


Yes that is correct (if by mind you mean the 3p feature of mind, and not 
consciousness per se).


What I wrote in the quote (below) is that the physical reality is not 
completely Turing emulable, once we assume the mind is.


Comp is just the idea that I can survive with a computer at the place of the 
brain. This does NOT mean that a computer create the consciousness. It means 
only that the consciousness can only be made

Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

2012-11-22 Thread Bruno Marchal


Hi Roger,

On 22 Nov 2012, at 11:25, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

You say

 OK, but invalid when used to pretend that we are not machine, like
Penrose and Lucas did.

So basically, whether you believe the Lucas-Penrose theory


It is not a theory.

It is an informal argument according to which Gödel's theorem would  
show that we are not machine. The argument has never convinced any  
logicians and can be shown wrong in many different ways.


On the contrary, incompleteness protects the consistency of Church  
thesis, and thus comp.






depends
on whether you believe in comp or no.


Not at all. The argument show that Gödel's theorem (incompleteness)  
== non-comp. This would imply that comp === Gödel's theorem is  
wrong, which is absurd.


The most basic error is that Lucas/Penrose believe that a human can  
know that they are sound.


Like Watson can play jeopardy, Gödel already knew that the Löbian  
machine can detect the error made in Penrose and Lucas type of  
argument. This is developed in my long text: Conscience  Mécanisme.  
Judson Webb wrote a book on this.


In his second book, Penrose correct his mistake, but does not really  
take the correction into account, and thus miss the formal first  
person indeterminacy.





I have serious problems
with comp because the 1ps and hence the 3ps of various
people and various computer programs will vary.
I don't
see how they can all be the same.


I don't understand your point.




Meanwhile, I'll look at the counter-arguments to Lucas and Penrose.



You need to study Gödel's incompleteness theorem. Most popular account  
of it are non valid. An nice exception is Hofstadter Gödel, Escher  
Bach.






[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/22/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-21, 12:23:40
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]


On 21 Nov 2012, at 11:32, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

I'm trying to understand your paper, but a seemingly much simpler
form of your argument keeps getting in the way. The
simpler form is the Lucas argument, discussed in  great
scholarly detail on

 http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/


To be franc there is nothing new in that paper, on the contrary it  
fails to mention the work done by Webb (not to talk on mine on  
Lucas, Benacerraf and the Penrose argument).


I have counted more than 50 errors in Lucas paper. Some are  
uninteresting, and some are very interesting. The argument of Lucas  
and Penrose are typically invalid, but it can be corrected, and it  
leads to the proposition according to whioch:


If I am a machine, then I cannot know which machine I am, and this  
plays some role in the formal part of the study of the first person  
indeterminacy.


Lucas and Penrose assumes that they are sound, and that they know  
that they are sound, but this is already inconsistent, even if the  
soundness is restricted to arithmetic.


In Conscience  Mechanism, I show how all Löbian machines can refute  
Lucas and Penrose. Basically they confuse []p (3p beliefs) with []p  
 p (1p knowledge)..






It seems to me to be self-evident that

1p cannot be part of 3p



But that is good insight of you. For correct machine, this can be  
proved, as the machine cannot prove the true equivalence between []p  
and []p  p, as they don't know that they are correct.


[]p can be defined in the language of the universal machine, but []p  
and p cannot. By assuming correctness of some other machine, the  
Löbian one can prove that for simpler machine than themselves, and  
they can bet on their correctness and lift that idea at their own  
level, with the usual theological risk of this (forgetting the bet  
in the process).






Which seems to be a equivalent to Godels's theorm.


OK, but invalid when used to pretend that we are not machine, like  
Godel and Lucas did.






Or the observer can't be part of what is observed.
Or more generally, the prover cannot be part of the proof.


Well, both the observer (3p) and the prover (3p) can do that,  
without necessarily knwoing that they do that.

But the knower (1p) cannot.

To explain the details of this would need more familiarity in logic,  
and notably Solovay's theorems, which I might explain someday.


Bruno






[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/21/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-20, 10:05:13
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]


On 20 Nov 2012, at 14:51, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal


Sorry, where are the steps of UD ?


You can find them here:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html


You can download the PDF, and also the unique slide with a diagram  
for each step

Re: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

2012-11-21 Thread Roger Clough

Hi Bruno Marchal 

I'm trying to understand your paper, but a seemingly much simpler
form of your argument keeps getting in the way. The
simpler form is the Lucas argument, discussed in  great
scholarly detail on

 http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/

It seems to me to be self-evident that

1p cannot be part of 3p 

Which seems to be a equivalent to Godels's theorm. 

Or the observer can't be part of what is observed.
Or more generally, the prover cannot be part of the proof.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/21/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-20, 10:05:13
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]




On 20 Nov 2012, at 14:51, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal 


Sorry, where are the steps of UD ?


You can find them here:


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html




You can download the PDF, and also the unique slide with a diagram for each 
step, as this can help to remember them. For the step 8, the best version is in 
this list in the MGA thread (the Movie Graph Argument). The seven first steps 
already explains the reversal physics---/---number's bio-psycho-theo-logy 
though.


Bruno







[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/20/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-19, 09:33:19
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]




On 19 Nov 2012, at 11:22, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal 

I thought that comp is exactly opposite to what you say,
that computationalism is the belief that we can simulate
the mind with a computer program-- that the mind is computable.


Yes that is correct (if by mind you mean the 3p feature of mind, and not 
consciousness per se).


What I wrote in the quote (below) is that the physical reality is not 
completely Turing emulable, once we assume the mind is.


Comp is just the idea that I can survive with a computer at the place of the 
brain. This does NOT mean that a computer create the consciousness. It means 
only that the consciousness can only be made manifestable through relative 
bodies, but it exists only in Platonia. But then matter too, and it relies 
statistically on all computations going through my current comp states, and the 
math shows that this will include some continuous/analog observable.


I am not sure this can be understood without getting a personal understanding 
of at least the first seven step of the UD reasoning.


Bruno







[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/19/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-18, 07:46:20
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]


On 17 Nov 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote:



  Original Message 


 More In This Article
 * Overview
 _Is Quantum Reality Analog after All?_
 (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all
  
 )



 Conventional wisdom says that quantum mechanics is a theory of
 discreteness, describing a world of irreducible building blocks. 
 It stands to reason
 that computers??which process information in discrete 
 chunks??should be able
 to simulate nature fully, at least in principle. But it turns out 
 that
 certain asymmetries in particle physics cannot be discretized; 
 they are
 irreducibly continuous. In that case, says David Tong, author of 
 _Is Quantum
 Reality Analog after All?_
 (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all
  
 )  in the December 2012 issue of
 Scientific American, the world can never be fully simulated on a 
 computer.


That would be a nice confirmation of comp. As I have often insisted 
digital physics (the world can be fully be Turing emulated) violated 
the consequence of comp which makes necessary the presence of non 
computable observable, and even non enumerable spectra.

Digital physics is self-contradictory. It implies comp, but comp 
implies the negation of digital physics, so, with or without comp, 
digital physics is contradictory.

Bruno




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Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

2012-11-21 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 21 Nov 2012, at 11:32, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

I'm trying to understand your paper, but a seemingly much simpler
form of your argument keeps getting in the way. The
simpler form is the Lucas argument, discussed in  great
scholarly detail on

 http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/


To be franc there is nothing new in that paper, on the contrary it  
fails to mention the work done by Webb (not to talk on mine on Lucas,  
Benacerraf and the Penrose argument).


I have counted more than 50 errors in Lucas paper. Some are  
uninteresting, and some are very interesting. The argument of Lucas  
and Penrose are typically invalid, but it can be corrected, and it  
leads to the proposition according to whioch:


If I am a machine, then I cannot know which machine I am, and this  
plays some role in the formal part of the study of the first person  
indeterminacy.


Lucas and Penrose assumes that they are sound, and that they know that  
they are sound, but this is already inconsistent, even if the  
soundness is restricted to arithmetic.


In Conscience  Mechanism, I show how all Löbian machines can refute  
Lucas and Penrose. Basically they confuse []p (3p beliefs) with []p   
p (1p knowledge)..






It seems to me to be self-evident that

1p cannot be part of 3p



But that is good insight of you. For correct machine, this can be  
proved, as the machine cannot prove the true equivalence between []p  
and []p  p, as they don't know that they are correct.


[]p can be defined in the language of the universal machine, but []p  
and p cannot. By assuming correctness of some other machine, the  
Löbian one can prove that for simpler machine than themselves, and  
they can bet on their correctness and lift that idea at their own  
level, with the usual theological risk of this (forgetting the bet  
in the process).






Which seems to be a equivalent to Godels's theorm.


OK, but invalid when used to pretend that we are not machine, like  
Godel and Lucas did.






Or the observer can't be part of what is observed.
Or more generally, the prover cannot be part of the proof.


Well, both the observer (3p) and the prover (3p) can do that, without  
necessarily knwoing that they do that.

But the knower (1p) cannot.

To explain the details of this would need more familiarity in logic,  
and notably Solovay's theorems, which I might explain someday.


Bruno






[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/21/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-20, 10:05:13
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]


On 20 Nov 2012, at 14:51, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal


Sorry, where are the steps of UD ?


You can find them here:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html


You can download the PDF, and also the unique slide with a diagram  
for each step, as this can help to remember them. For the step 8,  
the best version is in this list in the MGA thread (the Movie Graph  
Argument). The seven first steps already explains the reversal  
physics---/---number's bio-psycho-theo-logy though.


Bruno






[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/20/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-19, 09:33:19
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]


On 19 Nov 2012, at 11:22, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

I thought that comp is exactly opposite to what you say,
that computationalism is the belief that we can simulate
the mind with a computer program-- that the mind is computable.


Yes that is correct (if by mind you mean the 3p feature of mind,  
and not consciousness per se).


What I wrote in the quote (below) is that the physical reality is  
not completely Turing emulable, once we assume the mind is.


Comp is just the idea that I can survive with a computer at the  
place of the brain. This does NOT mean that a computer create the  
consciousness. It means only that the consciousness can only be  
made manifestable through relative bodies, but it exists only in  
Platonia. But then matter too, and it relies statistically on all  
computations going through my current comp states, and the math  
shows that this will include some continuous/analog observable.


I am not sure this can be understood without getting a personal  
understanding of at least the first seven step of the UD reasoning.


Bruno





[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/19/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-18, 07:46:20
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation  
[Audio]


On 17 Nov 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote

Re: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

2012-11-20 Thread Roger Clough

Hi Bruno Marchal 


Sorry, where are the steps of UD ?



[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/20/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-19, 09:33:19
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]




On 19 Nov 2012, at 11:22, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal 

I thought that comp is exactly opposite to what you say,
that computationalism is the belief that we can simulate
the mind with a computer program-- that the mind is computable.


Yes that is correct (if by mind you mean the 3p feature of mind, and not 
consciousness per se).


What I wrote in the quote (below) is that the physical reality is not 
completely Turing emulable, once we assume the mind is.


Comp is just the idea that I can survive with a computer at the place of the 
brain. This does NOT mean that a computer create the consciousness. It means 
only that the consciousness can only be made manifestable through relative 
bodies, but it exists only in Platonia. But then matter too, and it relies 
statistically on all computations going through my current comp states, and the 
math shows that this will include some continuous/analog observable.


I am not sure this can be understood without getting a personal understanding 
of at least the first seven step of the UD reasoning.


Bruno







[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/19/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-18, 07:46:20
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]


On 17 Nov 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote:



  Original Message 


 More In This Article
 * Overview
 _Is Quantum Reality Analog after All?_
 (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all
  
 )



 Conventional wisdom says that quantum mechanics is a theory of
 discreteness, describing a world of irreducible building blocks. 
 It stands to reason
 that computers??which process information in discrete 
 chunks??should be able
 to simulate nature fully, at least in principle. But it turns out 
 that
 certain asymmetries in particle physics cannot be discretized; 
 they are
 irreducibly continuous. In that case, says David Tong, author of 
 _Is Quantum
 Reality Analog after All?_
 (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all
  
 )  in the December 2012 issue of
 Scientific American, the world can never be fully simulated on a 
 computer.


That would be a nice confirmation of comp. As I have often insisted 
digital physics (the world can be fully be Turing emulated) violated 
the consequence of comp which makes necessary the presence of non 
computable observable, and even non enumerable spectra.

Digital physics is self-contradictory. It implies comp, but comp 
implies the negation of digital physics, so, with or without comp, 
digital physics is contradictory.

Bruno




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Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

2012-11-20 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 19 Nov 2012, at 19:46, meekerdb wrote:


On 11/19/2012 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


and the math shows that this will include some continuous/analog  
observable.


How does it show that?


Intuitively: by dovetailing on each programs coupled with real  
numbers. Each computations are done again with all possible streams of  
real numbers, oracles, etc. Yes the UD is that dumb.
But this is probably needed for the measure question. We can even bet  
that such a coupling has to be exploited by the winner program in  
some special way, if it exists, because even the white rabbit  
realities are multiplied into a continuum by the existence of that  
coupling (which is unavoidable: you can't diagonalize against the UD  
to build a UD avoiding those couplings).


Formally: the existence of such a semantics based on a continuum is  
reflected in the possible topological semantics of the material  
hypostases S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*, which gives rise to the arithmetical  
quantum logics.
The formal reasons are different for S4Grz1, and the Z and X logics.  
The topology is intrinsic to the S4Grz type of semantics, but it might  
still be discrete at that level. For the X1* and Z1*, it comes in part  
from the lack of necessitation, and the necessity to have infinite  
sequences of neighborhood structures à la Scott-Montague.
If he quantum logic would have given only by S4Grz1, that would have  
been an argument for loop gravity, and the continuum would have been  
restricted to the frequency-statistical operator (like in Preskill and  
Hartle or Graham).
If it would have appeared only in the Z and X logic, that would have  
suggested that String theory might be the correct comp physics.  
Amazingly the arithmetical/comp quantum logics seems to appear in  
the three possible candidates (S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*).



Needless to say this is suggestive and it remains quite a lot of open  
problems in logic to proceed. What I hope is that the arithmetical  
quantum logics will give the quantum logic searched, but not found, by  
von Neumann, which have the property that the probabilities can be  
derived from the constrains given by the laws for the case of P(x) =  
1. If this does not work, it means that we might use a stronger  
definition of knowledge than the one given by Theaetetus.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

2012-11-20 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 19 Nov 2012, at 20:14, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2012/11/19 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 11/19/2012 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

and the math shows that this will include some continuous/analog
observable.

How does it show that?

Brent

Because the material reality is the sum of the infinity of
computations going through your current state. So materiality must
somehow reflect that.

Yes, that's the main reason. That infinity of computations has
cardinality 2^Aleph_0, because they are coupled with dovetailing on
the reals (similar to infinite iteration of WM-like duplications).

Bruno

Quentin

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Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

2012-11-20 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 20 Nov 2012, at 14:51, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal


Sorry, where are the steps of UD ?


You can find them here:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html


You can download the PDF, and also the unique slide with a diagram for  
each step, as this can help to remember them. For the step 8, the best  
version is in this list in the MGA thread (the Movie Graph Argument).  
The seven first steps already explains the reversal physics---/--- 
number's bio-psycho-theo-logy though.


Bruno






[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/20/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-19, 09:33:19
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]


On 19 Nov 2012, at 11:22, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

I thought that comp is exactly opposite to what you say,
that computationalism is the belief that we can simulate
the mind with a computer program-- that the mind is computable.


Yes that is correct (if by mind you mean the 3p feature of mind, and  
not consciousness per se).


What I wrote in the quote (below) is that the physical reality is  
not completely Turing emulable, once we assume the mind is.


Comp is just the idea that I can survive with a computer at the  
place of the brain. This does NOT mean that a computer create the  
consciousness. It means only that the consciousness can only be made  
manifestable through relative bodies, but it exists only in  
Platonia. But then matter too, and it relies statistically on all  
computations going through my current comp states, and the math  
shows that this will include some continuous/analog observable.


I am not sure this can be understood without getting a personal  
understanding of at least the first seven step of the UD reasoning.


Bruno





[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/19/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-18, 07:46:20
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

On 17 Nov 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote:



  Original Message 


 More In This Article
 * Overview
 _Is Quantum Reality Analog after All?_
 
(http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all
 )



 Conventional wisdom says that quantum mechanics is a theory of
 discreteness, describing a world of irreducible building blocks.
 It stands to reason
 that computersÿÿwhich process information in discrete
 chunksÿÿshould be able
 to simulate nature fully, at least in principle. But it turns out
 that
 certain asymmetries in particle physics cannot be discretized;
 they are
 irreducibly continuous. In that case, says David Tong, author of
 _Is Quantum
 Reality Analog after All?_
 
(http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all
 )  in the December 2012 issue of
 Scientific American, the world can never be fully simulated on a
 computer.


That would be a nice confirmation of comp. As I have often insisted
digital physics (the world can be fully be Turing emulated) violated
the consequence of comp which makes necessary the presence of non
computable observable, and even non enumerable spectra.

Digital physics is self-contradictory. It implies comp, but comp
implies the negation of digital physics, so, with or without comp,
digital physics is contradictory.

Bruno




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Re: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

2012-11-19 Thread Roger Clough

Hi Bruno Marchal 

I thought that comp is exactly opposite to what you say,
that computationalism is the belief that we can simulate
the mind with a computer program-- that the mind is computable.

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/19/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-18, 07:46:20
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]


On 17 Nov 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote:



  Original Message 


 More In This Article
 * Overview
 _Is Quantum Reality Analog after All?_
 (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all
  
 )



 Conventional wisdom says that quantum mechanics is a theory of
 discreteness, describing a world of irreducible building blocks. 
 It stands to reason
 that computers??which process information in discrete 
 chunks??should be able
 to simulate nature fully, at least in principle. But it turns out 
 that
 certain asymmetries in particle physics cannot be discretized; 
 they are
 irreducibly continuous. In that case, says David Tong, author of 
 _Is Quantum
 Reality Analog after All?_
 (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all
  
 )  in the December 2012 issue of
 Scientific American, the world can never be fully simulated on a 
 computer.


That would be a nice confirmation of comp. As I have often insisted 
digital physics (the world can be fully be Turing emulated) violated 
the consequence of comp which makes necessary the presence of non 
computable observable, and even non enumerable spectra.

Digital physics is self-contradictory. It implies comp, but comp 
implies the negation of digital physics, so, with or without comp, 
digital physics is contradictory.

Bruno




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 .


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

2012-11-19 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 19 Nov 2012, at 11:22, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

I thought that comp is exactly opposite to what you say,
that computationalism is the belief that we can simulate
the mind with a computer program-- that the mind is computable.


Yes that is correct (if by mind you mean the 3p feature of mind, and  
not consciousness per se).


What I wrote in the quote (below) is that the physical reality is not  
completely Turing emulable, once we assume the mind is.


Comp is just the idea that I can survive with a computer at the place  
of the brain. This does NOT mean that a computer create the  
consciousness. It means only that the consciousness can only be made  
manifestable through relative bodies, but it exists only in Platonia.  
But then matter too, and it relies statistically on all computations  
going through my current comp states, and the math shows that this  
will include some continuous/analog observable.


I am not sure this can be understood without getting a personal  
understanding of at least the first seven step of the UD reasoning.


Bruno





[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/19/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-18, 07:46:20
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

On 17 Nov 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote:



  Original Message 


 More In This Article
 * Overview
 _Is Quantum Reality Analog after All?_
 
(http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all
 )



 Conventional wisdom says that quantum mechanics is a theory of
 discreteness, describing a world of irreducible building blocks.
 It stands to reason
 that computersÿÿwhich process information in discrete
 chunksÿÿshould be able
 to simulate nature fully, at least in principle. But it turns out
 that
 certain asymmetries in particle physics cannot be discretized;
 they are
 irreducibly continuous. In that case, says David Tong, author of
 _Is Quantum
 Reality Analog after All?_
 
(http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all
 )  in the December 2012 issue of
 Scientific American, the world can never be fully simulated on a
 computer.


That would be a nice confirmation of comp. As I have often insisted
digital physics (the world can be fully be Turing emulated) violated
the consequence of comp which makes necessary the presence of non
computable observable, and even non enumerable spectra.

Digital physics is self-contradictory. It implies comp, but comp
implies the negation of digital physics, so, with or without comp,
digital physics is contradictory.

Bruno




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Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

2012-11-19 Thread meekerdb


On 11/19/2012 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

and the math shows that this will include some continuous/analog observable.


How does it show that?

Brent

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Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

2012-11-19 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2012/11/19 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net

  On 11/19/2012 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 and the math shows that this will include some continuous/analog
 observable.


 How does it show that?

 Brent


Because the material reality is the sum of the infinity of computations
going through your current state. So materiality must somehow reflect that.

Quentin


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Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

2012-11-19 Thread meekerdb


On 11/19/2012 1:14 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2012/11/19 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net

On 11/19/2012 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

and the math shows that this will include some continuous/analog observable.


How does it show that?

Brent


Because the material reality is the sum of the infinity of computations going through 
your current state. So materiality must somehow reflect that.


Quentin


That's pretty vague.  Many QM observables are discrete.  Does that mean they are NOT the 
sum of an infinity of computations through my current state?


Brent

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Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

2012-11-19 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2012/11/19 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net

  On 11/19/2012 1:14 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



 2012/11/19 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net

  On 11/19/2012 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 and the math shows that this will include some continuous/analog
 observable.


 How does it show that?

 Brent


 Because the material reality is the sum of the infinity of computations
 going through your current state. So materiality must somehow reflect that.

 Quentin


 That's pretty vague.  Many QM observables are discrete.  Does that mean
 they are NOT the sum of an infinity of computations through my current
 state?


The material reality as experienced is not the result of a single QM
experiment, so I fail to see how it is relevant.

Regards,
Quentin


 Brent

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Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]

2012-11-18 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 17 Nov 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote:

Original Message

More In This Article
*Overview
_Is Quantum Reality Analog after All?_
(http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all
)

Conventional wisdom says that quantum mechanics is a theory of
discreteness, describing a world of irreducible building blocks.
It stands to reason
that computersÿÿwhich process information in discrete
chunksÿÿshould be able
to simulate nature fully, at least in principle. But it turns out
that
certain asymmetries in particle physics cannot be discretized;
they are
irreducibly continuous. In that case, says David Tong, author of
_Is Quantum

Reality Analog after All?_
(http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all
) in the December 2012 issue of
Scientific American, the world can never be fully simulated on a
computer.

That would be a nice confirmation of comp. As I have often insisted
digital physics (the world can be fully be Turing emulated) violated
the consequence of comp which makes necessary the presence of non
computable observable, and even non enumerable spectra.

Digital physics is self-contradictory. It implies comp, but comp
implies the negation of digital physics, so, with or without comp,
digital physics is contradictory.

Bruno

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Re: Reality as Dust

2012-11-12 Thread Richard Ruquist

On Fri, Nov 9, 2012 at 10:31 AM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Thu, Nov 8, 2012 at 12:30 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net 
 wrote:
 On 11/8/2012 10:04 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

 The compact manifolds, what I call string theory monads, are more
 fundamental than strings. Strings with spin, charge and mass, as well
 as spacetime, emerge from the compact manifolds, perhaps in the manner
 that you indicate below.


 Hi Richard,

 OK, but then you are thinking in terms that are different from the
 formal models that are in the literature. You will have to define all of the
 terms, if they are different. For example. How is the property of
 compactness defined in your idea? Why are the Calabi-Yau manifolds are
 topological objects that are part of a wide class of minimal surfaces.
 There is a huge zoo of these in topology. See
 http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Calabi-Yau_manifold


 According to Cumrun Vafa spacetime emerges from the compactification process.
 However after a few hours attempting to find any theory of the
 compactification process,
 not even where Vafa says that two dimensions must compactify for one
 to inflate, which is kind of a oxymoron, I have to give up.

I just found a review article on Compactified String
Theories-http://arxiv.org/pdf/1204.2795v1.pdf that appears to be
relevant
plus an earlier paper http://arxiv.org/pdf/1003.1982v1.pdf
that constructs specific Calabi-Yau compact manifolds.

But neither address the compactification process
in relation to space inflation.
Richard





   The one difference from what you are
 considering and the compact manifolds (CMs) that I can see is that the
 CMs are fixed in the emergent space and not free floating- which in
 itself implies a spacetime manifold.


 If you have a proposal that explains how space-time emerges from the
 CMs, cool, but you have to explain it to us and answer our question. One
 question that I have is: What fundamental process within the compact
 manifolds enables them to generate the appearance of space-time. I think
 that you are assuming a substantiabalist hypothesis; that substance is
 ontologically primitive. There is a long history of this idea, which is by
 the way, the idea that Bruno and others -including me- are arguing against.
 This article covers the debate well:
 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/

 I agree that the compact manifolds are substantive.
 You and Bruno IMO are arguing that something can come from nothing.
 I contend that the arithmetic must come from something substantive.

 Perhaps another is that from your discussion, it appears that all your
 monads can be identical, whereas the CMs are required to be different
 and distinct in order for consciousness to emerge from an arithmetic
 of real numbers.


 Why? What is acting to distinguish the CMs externally? You seem to
 assume an external observer or consciousness or some other means to overcome
 to problem of the identity of indiscernibles.

 My argument is based on empirical observation that the fine structure
 varies monotonically from north to south in an earth perspective
 across the universe. That could only be true if the monads were
 variable since the constants and laws of physics are properties of the
 compact manifolds/monads.

 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/ I think that your
 idea is not that much different from that of Roger and mine. I just would
 like to better understand some of your assumptions. You seem to have some
 unstated assumptions, we all do. Having these discussions is a good way of
 teasing them out, but we have to be willing to consider our own ideas
 critically and not be too emotionally wed to them.

   However since from wiki Each Boolean algebra B has
 an associated topological space, denoted here S(B), called its Stone
 space and For any Boolean algebra B, S(B) is a compact totally
 disconnected Hausdorff space and Almost all spaces encountered in
 analysis are Hausdorff; most importantly, the real numbers,


 No, actually. Real numbers are not Stone spaces. P-adic numbers, OTOH,
 are. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Totally_disconnected_space#Examples

 If so, you should rewrite those wikis.




 I contend
 that your monads as well as mine must be enumerable-that is all
 different and distinct.


 Yes, they would be, but the idea that they are distinct cannot just be
 assumed to exist without some means for the information of that partitioning
 of the aggregate comes to be knowable.

 Covered in a previous comment above.

One thing that consciousness does is
 that it distinguishes things from each other. Maybe we are putting in the
 activity of consciousness into our explanations at the start!

 Maybe the property of distinguishability of consciousness stems from
 distinguishable monads


 I apologize for using wiki. But I confess that what it says is the
 limit of my understanding.


 I love Wiki, but I prefer other

Re: Reality as Dust

2012-11-09 Thread Richard Ruquist

On Thu, Nov 8, 2012 at 12:30 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
 On 11/8/2012 10:04 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

 The compact manifolds, what I call string theory monads, are more
 fundamental than strings. Strings with spin, charge and mass, as well
 as spacetime, emerge from the compact manifolds, perhaps in the manner
 that you indicate below.


 Hi Richard,

 OK, but then you are thinking in terms that are different from the
 formal models that are in the literature. You will have to define all of the
 terms, if they are different. For example. How is the property of
 compactness defined in your idea? Why are the Calabi-Yau manifolds are
 topological objects that are part of a wide class of minimal surfaces.
 There is a huge zoo of these in topology. See
 http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Calabi-Yau_manifold


According to Cumrun Vafa spacetime emerges from the compactification process.
However after a few hours attempting to find any theory of the
compactification process,
not even where Vafa says that two dimensions must compactify for one
to inflate, which is kind of a oxymoron, I have to give up.



   The one difference from what you are
 considering and the compact manifolds (CMs) that I can see is that the
 CMs are fixed in the emergent space and not free floating- which in
 itself implies a spacetime manifold.


 If you have a proposal that explains how space-time emerges from the
 CMs, cool, but you have to explain it to us and answer our question. One
 question that I have is: What fundamental process within the compact
 manifolds enables them to generate the appearance of space-time. I think
 that you are assuming a substantiabalist hypothesis; that substance is
 ontologically primitive. There is a long history of this idea, which is by
 the way, the idea that Bruno and others -including me- are arguing against.
 This article covers the debate well:
 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/

I agree that the compact manifolds are substantive.
You and Bruno IMO are arguing that something can come from nothing.
I contend that the arithmetic must come from something substantive.

 Perhaps another is that from your discussion, it appears that all your
 monads can be identical, whereas the CMs are required to be different
 and distinct in order for consciousness to emerge from an arithmetic
 of real numbers.


 Why? What is acting to distinguish the CMs externally? You seem to
 assume an external observer or consciousness or some other means to overcome
 to problem of the identity of indiscernibles.

My argument is based on empirical observation that the fine structure
varies monotonically from north to south in an earth perspective
across the universe. That could only be true if the monads were
variable since the constants and laws of physics are properties of the
compact manifolds/monads.

 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/ I think that your
 idea is not that much different from that of Roger and mine. I just would
 like to better understand some of your assumptions. You seem to have some
 unstated assumptions, we all do. Having these discussions is a good way of
 teasing them out, but we have to be willing to consider our own ideas
 critically and not be too emotionally wed to them.

   However since from wiki Each Boolean algebra B has
 an associated topological space, denoted here S(B), called its Stone
 space and For any Boolean algebra B, S(B) is a compact totally
 disconnected Hausdorff space and Almost all spaces encountered in
 analysis are Hausdorff; most importantly, the real numbers,


 No, actually. Real numbers are not Stone spaces. P-adic numbers, OTOH,
 are. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Totally_disconnected_space#Examples

If so, you should rewrite those wikis.




 I contend
 that your monads as well as mine must be enumerable-that is all
 different and distinct.


 Yes, they would be, but the idea that they are distinct cannot just be
 assumed to exist without some means for the information of that partitioning
 of the aggregate comes to be knowable.

Covered in a previous comment above.

One thing that consciousness does is
 that it distinguishes things from each other. Maybe we are putting in the
 activity of consciousness into our explanations at the start!

Maybe the property of distinguishability of consciousness stems from
distinguishable monads


 I apologize for using wiki. But I confess that what it says is the
 limit of my understanding.


 I love Wiki, but I prefer other references if they can be found. It
 helps people to get a better idea of what is being discussed if they wish to
 drill down into the complicated ideas that we discuss here in the Everything
 List.

 Any way what I propose is that all of what you say below may more or
 less be appropriate for the compact manifolds of string theory if we
 replace the dust with an array.


 A dust is more simple - has less structure to be

Re: Reality as Dust

2012-11-08 Thread Stephen P. King


On 11/8/2012 10:04 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

The compact manifolds, what I call string theory monads, are more
fundamental than strings. Strings with spin, charge and mass, as well
as spacetime, emerge from the compact manifolds, perhaps in the manner
that you indicate below.


Hi Richard,

OK, but then you are thinking in terms that are different from the 
formal models that are in the literature. You will have to define all of 
the terms, if they are different. For example. How is the property of 
compactness defined in your idea? Why are the Calabi-Yau manifolds are 
topological objects that are part of a wide class of minimal surfaces. 
There is a huge zoo of these in topology. See 
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Calabi-Yau_manifold



  The one difference from what you are
considering and the compact manifolds (CMs) that I can see is that the
CMs are fixed in the emergent space and not free floating- which in
itself implies a spacetime manifold.


If you have a proposal that explains how space-time emerges from 
the CMs, cool, but you have to explain it to us and answer our question. 
One question that I have is: What fundamental process within the compact 
manifolds enables them to generate the appearance of space-time. I think 
that you are assuming a substantiabalist hypothesis; that substance is 
ontologically primitive. There is a long history of this idea, which is 
by the way, the idea that Bruno and others -including me- are arguing 
against.  This article covers the debate well: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/



Perhaps another is that from your discussion, it appears that all your
monads can be identical, whereas the CMs are required to be different
and distinct in order for consciousness to emerge from an arithmetic
of real numbers.


Why? What is acting to distinguish the CMs externally? You seem to 
assume an external observer or consciousness or some other means to 
overcome to problem of the identity of indiscernibles. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/ I think that 
your idea is not that much different from that of Roger and mine. I just 
would like to better understand some of your assumptions. You seem to 
have some unstated assumptions, we all do. Having these discussions is a 
good way of teasing them out, but we have to be willing to consider our 
own ideas critically and not be too emotionally wed to them.



  However since from wiki Each Boolean algebra B has
an associated topological space, denoted here S(B), called its Stone
space and For any Boolean algebra B, S(B) is a compact totally
disconnected Hausdorff space and Almost all spaces encountered in
analysis are Hausdorff; most importantly, the real numbers,


No, actually. Real numbers are not Stone spaces. P-adic numbers, 
OTOH, are. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Totally_disconnected_space#Examples




I contend
that your monads as well as mine must be enumerable-that is all
different and distinct.


Yes, they would be, but the idea that they are distinct cannot just 
be assumed to exist without some means for the information of that 
partitioning of the aggregate comes to be knowable. One thing that 
consciousness does is that it distinguishes things from each other. 
Maybe we are putting in the activity of consciousness into our 
explanations at the start!




I apologize for using wiki. But I confess that what it says is the
limit of my understanding.


I love Wiki, but I prefer other references if they can be found. It 
helps people to get a better idea of what is being discussed if they 
wish to drill down into the complicated ideas that we discuss here in 
the Everything List.



Any way what I propose is that all of what you say below may more or
less be appropriate for the compact manifolds of string theory if we
replace the dust with an array.


A dust is more simple - has less structure to be explained than an 
array. We can add structure to a dust to get an array, but we can get 
lots of other things as well. We need to be able to get smooth fields in 
some limit. Can an array do this?



Richard



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Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Reality

2012-09-06 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 05 Sep 2012, at 19:24, Roger Clough wrote:

Leibniz, my mentor, believed that reality (being mental)
consists of an infinite collection of (inextended)
mathematical points called monads.

These can never be created or destroyed.

Like the numbers. Note this, the numbers 1, 2, 3 in front of a
universal number u, get dynamical, as u(i,x) define the sequence phi_i.
You have also the metamachines, or meta-program with the phi_phi_i,
like u(u(i,x), x), etc.

Programs with self, like with phi_e(x,y) = T(e, x, y), etc.

The soul is a number which moves itself (Xenocrates). :)

Bruno

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/5/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.

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Re: Reality as simplicity

2009-03-11 Thread ronaldheld


I thought I would add the paper:Temporal Platonic
Metaphysics:arxiv.org:0903.18001v1

On Mar 9, 12:26 pm, ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com wrote:
 Not certain what thread this belongs in so I started up a new one.
 arxiv.org:0903.1193v1
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Re: Reality

2008-12-28 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Tom,

On 27 Dec 2008, at 22:50, Tom Caylor wrote:


 Bruno,

 Just coming at this after not thinking about it much.


Good method :)



 Sometimes
 that's an advantage, but sometimes it results in forgetting pertinent
 points that were understood before.


As a math teacher, I know perfectly well that a student can genuinely  
understand a point, and forget later. Understanding is not enough, you  
have to forget and come back, repeatedly, sometimes from different  
directions,  until the familiarity develops. Some theorem are so deep  
that you get surprises each time you come back to them. A bit like  
with music and art.
Even more so with a simple but not so simple counter-intuitive  
argument in a still a bit taboo domain.
In public discussion, possible new people can benefit from clear  
question. No problem asking.





 Taking two of your statements and trying to synthesize them, first
 this one:

 On Dec 27, 11:51 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 ...
 Then I propose an argument that IF we say yes to the doctor, that is,
 IF there is a level of self-description such that  a digital
 substitution preserves my identity feeling and my consciousness THEN
 numbers (or combinators, ...) have to be enough at the ontological
 level. The rest can be described as internal gluing epistomologies,
 the lawful many dreams.  This is going in *your* direction, it  
 seems
 to me.


 From your first statement, my initial off the cuff (quick) reaction
 was that there is a contradiction between two parts of the supposed
 theory of everything:

 A) (IF) there is a level of self-description such that a digital
 substitution preserves my identity feeling and my consciousness
 B) The rest can be described as internal gluing epistomologies, the
 lawful many dreams

 The rest in B is truly huge, is it not?



Yes, it is, indeed. It is the whole first person plenitude, the  
sharable and the non sharable. Even the perceptible and the non  
perceptible.
The dreams were defined as computations as seen from some first  
person points of view (cf the throught experiments). That is why I  
have put lawful before the many dreams: those things are real and  
big.  They are as real as the total or partial computable functions,  
and their relative implementations. By a Skolem like phenomenon the  
little box of numbers, once seen from inside by numbers is *very* big,  
uncomputably big.


 And it is part of reality
 is it not?


Yes, it is, if by reality you mean the truth which kicks back soon or  
later when we are wrong or lie about them. In this case it is really  
the computational truth, or the Sigma_1 truth, but again seen from an  
inside point of view (making it climbs far higher than Sigma_1). It  
does not just look more complex there: it *is* more complex there.



 Out internal gluing epistemolgies are something that is
 going on in our mind, and our mind is part of reality.


OK. But then you have to make precise that by our mind you mean the  
mind of the universal machines /numbers (in the relative way).

When you say mind is part of reality, some will take this in the  
naturalist way (like mind = functioning of the brain).

But with the UDA reversal you have something like NUMBERS  ==  
UNIVERSAL MACHINE == UNIVERSAL MIND == primary hypostases ==  
secondary hypostases (that is: sensible and intelligible matter).



 And this
 rest is larger than anything that can be simulated (digitally,
 computably), right?


Absolutely so.





 And yet it is something in our consciousness,
 that is, it is part of A.


I refer you to my text, which you have gently quoted above. Your A  
is a bit truncated if I may say.





  It seems that wanting to have non-
 simulatable internal gluing epistemologies and also have a
 simulatable consciousness is like wanting to have your cake and not
 have your cake too.

Who said that consciousness is simulable or simulatable?

Saying yes to the digital doctor does not mean a brain simulate a  
consciousness or a first person. On the contrary, as exemplified by  
the reasoning and mainly by UDA.8 (the MGA), consciousness does not  
even supervene on the activity of the brain. The brain makes only  
higher the probability that some first person, incarnated locally  
through a hopefully self-referential correct machine with respect to  
its normal histories, remain able to manifest herself again relatively  
to those most probable histories/dreams. The real person in the  
machine is really connected to a continuum of histories, not obeying  
*only* computable laws.






 But then perhaps this is not a contradiction in light of your last
 statement:


 After the discovery of the Universal Machine, the Mechanist
 hypothesis, or even just the strong AI thesis,  is not a
 reductionism, it is an openness of our mind toward a peculiar Unknown
 which invites itself to our table.

 Bruno

 The supposed contradiction was that it seemed you were wanting
 reductionism and

Re: Reality

2008-12-28 Thread John Mikes

 out an agreeing tone. I don't even know a yes, not only a no.


 And then, there is a frequent confusion between realm and theories. MEC
 is not really a theory, it is more a bridge between realms. To say yes to
 the doctor, and to realize afterward that the fundamental TOE is number
 theory is just a change of realms (physics/arithmetic,
 psychology/arithmetic). This is because, after Gödel, we know that we cannot
 capture all the truth about the numbers in a definitive theory.
 Once we take into account the MEC hypothesis, or just the intensional
 (coding) property of numbers the mess among the numbers become almost
 transparent, and it is the merit of Gödel to show it to be necessary. Once
 we define addition and multiplication numbers begin to reflect each other,
 and they can defeat all theories wanting to be definitive about them,. This
 is a fact reflected by the universal machine alone.

 The universal machine(s) defeat(s) all complete (total) theories about it
 or them. Already. (that's an attractive feature for me).


'JM': hiere I can put an astounding agreement, with a wish to learn more
about these marvels.
I call 'reductionism' the view of a limited part (model as I call it) of the
totality, maybe 'all of we know, or can imagine' from the unlimited
possibilities. I don't use it pejoratively. This is the way how we can think
(or understand) in our restricted capabilities. I try to step further - but
so far I am in the vagueness of inadequate words and unspecifiable ideas. I
do appreciate your way: to stay in a 'numbers' segment (plane?) and adjust
words to talk about it. I dream.


 After the discovery of the Universal Machine, the Mechanist hypothesis, or
 even just the strong AI thesis,  is not a reductionism, it is
 an openness of our mind toward a peculiar Unknown which invites itself to
 our table.


 Bruno



   'JM'




 - Original Message -
 *From:* Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
 *To:* everything-l...@googlegroups.com
 *Sent:* Monday, December 22, 2008 11:11 AM
 *Subject:* Re: Reality

 M.A.,

  On 20 Dec 2008, at 15:21, M.A. wrote:

  *Bruno,*
 * Does the term reality have any meaning in MEC?*
 *
 m.a.*

 What makes you think the term reality has no meaning in MEC?

 Even physical reality keeps its main practical meaning, except it becomes
 emerging from a deeper reality (the reality of the relation among numbers).

 Why would you say yes to a doctor if you don't believe in a reality?


 Bruno

  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/










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Re: Reality

2008-12-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

John,


On 25 Dec 2008, at 14:46, John Mikes wrote:

 Bruno et al.:

 I don't feel comfortable with the view reality OF something.  
 Reality IMO is the
 unfathomable existence (whatever that may be) and WE - machines,  
 mind, you
 name it are having access to portions that we interpret (realize?)  
 in ways we can.
 This portion (part, view, ensemble, whatever) is our perceived  
 reality which may
 be 'physical', 'numbers', 'faith', what WE deem (our) REALITY.


Scientists know that a theory is always intrinsically hypothetical,  
and probably wrong. Making it precise makes it possible to be *shown*  
wrong, and so we can abandon it, partially or completely, but so we  
learn.




 Within such we may accept certain items as real, what does not  
 make them
  THE REALITY only accepted aspects in our perception.




THE REALITY is what we search. Nobody here pretend to know it in any  
public way. THE REALITY is what we postulate theories about.
Then I propose an argument that IF we say yes to the doctor, that is,   
IF there is a level of self-description such that  a digital  
substitution preserves my identity feeling and my consciousness THEN  
numbers (or combinators, ...) have to be enough at the ontological  
level. The rest can be described as internal gluing epistomologies,  
the lawful many dreams.  This is going in *your* direction, it seems  
to me.

MEC is not reductionist because it attribute consciousness to relative  
sequences of numbers.  It attributes personhood to sufficiently  
introspective self-transforming machine. It points to the fact that we  
can already listen to their opinions in some (precise) sense.






 The TOE may be pertinent to the 'reality', from the view of that  
 particular 'theory'
 - in the case of this list: physical-mathematical aspects.




? Are we not conversing on consciousness, persons and the mind body  
problem? Is there no an attempt emphasize computer science and logic?

John, when you say that we must take into account the fact that our  
theories are biased by the fact that they are our own theories, you  
are right. But then, this is a theorem in the theory MEC, where we can  
mathematically begin to study the degree of bias of possible self- 
observing machines.

I, and the universal machine,  agrees often with what you are saying,  
John, but I rarely understand the critical tone, like if the existence  
of a bias should discourage the search for theories. (It should  
discourage only the velleity of certainties there.  If that is your  
point, I agree).

And then, there is a frequent confusion between realm and theories.  
MEC is not really a theory, it is more a bridge between realms. To say  
yes to the doctor, and to realize afterward that the fundamental TOE  
is number theory is just a change of realms (physics/arithmetic,  
psychology/arithmetic). This is because, after Gödel, we know that we  
cannot capture all the truth about the numbers in a definitive theory.
Once we take into account the MEC hypothesis, or just the intensional  
(coding) property of numbers the mess among the numbers become almost  
transparent, and it is the merit of Gödel to show it to be necessary.  
Once we define addition and multiplication numbers begin to reflect  
each other, and they can defeat all theories wanting to be definitive  
about them,. This is a fact reflected by the universal machine alone.

The universal machine(s) defeat(s) all complete (total) theories about  
it or them. Already. (that's an attractive feature for me).

After the discovery of the Universal Machine, the Mechanist  
hypothesis, or even just the strong AI thesis,  is not a  
reductionism, it is an openness of our mind toward a peculiar Unknown  
which invites itself to our table.


Bruno





 - Original Message -
 From: Bruno Marchal
 To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com
 Sent: Monday, December 22, 2008 11:11 AM
 Subject: Re: Reality

 M.A.,


 On 20 Dec 2008, at 15:21, M.A. wrote:

 Bruno,
  Does the term reality have any meaning in MEC?
  
m 
 .a.




 What makes you think the term reality has no meaning in MEC?

 Even physical reality keeps its main practical meaning, except it  
 becomes emerging from a deeper reality (the reality of the relation  
 among numbers).

 Why would you say yes to a doctor if you don't believe in a reality?


 Bruno

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Reality

2008-12-27 Thread Tom Caylor


Bruno,

Just coming at this after not thinking about it much.  Sometimes
that's an advantage, but sometimes it results in forgetting pertinent
points that were understood before.  So if it's the latter, I hope you
forgive me.

Taking two of your statements and trying to synthesize them, first
this one:

On Dec 27, 11:51 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 ...
 Then I propose an argument that IF we say yes to the doctor, that is,  
 IF there is a level of self-description such that  a digital
 substitution preserves my identity feeling and my consciousness THEN  
 numbers (or combinators, ...) have to be enough at the ontological  
 level. The rest can be described as internal gluing epistomologies,
 the lawful many dreams.  This is going in *your* direction, it seems  
 to me.


From your first statement, my initial off the cuff (quick) reaction
was that there is a contradiction between two parts of the supposed
theory of everything:

A) (IF) there is a level of self-description such that a digital
substitution preserves my identity feeling and my consciousness
B) The rest can be described as internal gluing epistomologies, the
lawful many dreams

The rest in B is truly huge, is it not?  And it is part of reality
is it not?  Out internal gluing epistemolgies are something that is
going on in our mind, and our mind is part of reality.  And this
rest is larger than anything that can be simulated (digitally,
computably), right?  And yet it is something in our consciousness,
that is, it is part of A.  It seems that wanting to have non-
simulatable internal gluing epistemologies and also have a
simulatable consciousness is like wanting to have your cake and not
have your cake too.

But then perhaps this is not a contradiction in light of your last
statement:


 After the discovery of the Universal Machine, the Mechanist
 hypothesis, or even just the strong AI thesis,  is not a
 reductionism, it is an openness of our mind toward a peculiar Unknown
 which invites itself to our table.

 Bruno

The supposed contradiction was that it seemed you were wanting
reductionism and non-reductionism at the same time.  But here you say
otherwise.  It seems that you are saying that if our consciousness is
simulatable then there is an Unknown that will always remain unknown,
in other words, this implies that there can be no theory of
everything.

Tom
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Re: Reality

2008-12-25 Thread John Mikes

Bruno et al.:

I don't feel comfortable with the view reality *OF* something. Reality IMO
is the
unfathomable existence (whatever that may be) and *WE - machines, mind,* you

name it are having access to portions that we interpret (realize?) in ways *we
can.*
This portion (part, view, ensemble, whatever) is our *perceived reality *which
may
be 'physical', 'numbers', 'faith', what *WE deem (our) REALITY.*
Within such we may accept certain items as *real*, what does not make them
 *THE REALITY* only accepted aspects in our perception.

The TOE may be pertinent to the 'reality', from the view of that particular
'theory'
- in the case of this list: physical-mathematical aspects.

John M


On Mon, Dec 22, 2008 at 12:19 PM, M.A. marty...@bellsouth.net wrote:

  Not being mathematically inclined, I don't feel comfortable with a
 reality of numbers. But if it's the only game in town, I can live with it.
 Season's Best,



  marty a.






 - Original Message -
 *From:* Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
 *To:* everything-l...@googlegroups.com
 *Sent:* Monday, December 22, 2008 11:11 AM
 *Subject:* Re: Reality

 M.A.,

  On 20 Dec 2008, at 15:21, M.A. wrote:

  *Bruno,*
 * Does the term reality have any meaning in MEC?*
 *
 m.a.*





 What makes you think the term reality has no meaning in MEC?

 Even physical reality keeps its main practical meaning, except it becomes
 emerging from a deeper reality (the reality of the relation among numbers).

 Why would you say yes to a doctor if you don't believe in a reality?


 Bruno

  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



 


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Re: Reality

2008-12-22 Thread M.A.

Not being mathematically inclined, I don't feel comfortable with a reality of 
numbers. But if it's the only game in town, I can live with it. Season's Best,



 marty a.





  - Original Message - 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Monday, December 22, 2008 11:11 AM
  Subject: Re: Reality


  M.A.,




  On 20 Dec 2008, at 15:21, M.A. wrote:


Bruno,
 Does the term reality have any meaning in MEC?

m.a.








  What makes you think the term reality has no meaning in MEC?


  Even physical reality keeps its main practical meaning, except it becomes 
emerging from a deeper reality (the reality of the relation among numbers).


  Why would you say yes to a doctor if you don't believe in a reality?




  Bruno


  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/







  

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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-10-01 Thread 1Z



Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:

 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 In-Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 COL
  Yes. Causal chains, no matter how improbable, executed at the tiniest
 of
  scales the same ones that make LUCY our literal ancestor. connect
 us.
 

 LZ
  It depends what you , mean by connect. I am connected to these things,
 but they can manage without me. It is a one-way
  kind of connection.
 

 COL
 We are touching on the unidirectionality of time, here. Specifically the
 2nd law of thermodynamics. Myriad infinitesimal entropy transactions
 resulting in overall increases in disorder but localised increases in
 order ( complexity , russel's playground) where net energy inflow exists
 - such as where we are in the beam of the floodlight called sol.

 If you mean the current state is the sum of the transactions of the entire
 history of the transactions comprising you... then yes, your present state
 is connected to all this causal history. The thing is that you literally
 _are_ it.

No, I'm literally *not* it. I am *not*, literally , the state of
the universe at the Big Bang. Even though it caused me,
in a sense. Causes are not the same entities as their effects, in
general.

 You are not like some bulldozed pile of independent stuff. So
 the idea that you and the causality that got you to your current state are
 separate is meaningless. You literally are causality - intrinsically made
 of change, but change that results in persistent structure that is you.

 So. yes. The model I am working with is untrinsically unidirectional, I
 suppose - one way in a flow sense and one way in a causal sense that the
 present (current state) did not 'cause' the past (previous states), nor
 can the future cause the present state.

 The easiest way to imagine it is to think of it as computation. Go through
 the sequence of operations 2+5=7. The 'present' is the state of the
 computation as is progresses (load, 2, load 5 add, display result, for
 example). The 7 did not cause a 2 and 5 to be added. Similarly 7's
 participation in a future computation cannot be said to have caused the 7.

 I know we can _imagine_ realms where bidirectional causality may be so.
 These are best represented in our formal mathemtical depictions of our
 world that have t in them, t for time). What I am saying is that the realm
 we are in is not like them. This is the one _we_ inhabit, with particular
 instances of particular kinds of things going on. Or perhaps a little more
 generally - the one we inhabit is currently in a state where
 unidirectional causality (albeit intrinsically randomised in selecttion of
 particular outcomes) rules. A really good book on this is 'The end of
 certainty' by Prigogine.

 COL
  identical to other sorts of neuron cohorts nearby. One set delivers
 qualia. The others do not.

 LZ
 
  How do you know ?


 COL
 Human verbal reports in a very detailed experimental regime. This was done
 by imaging humans and controlling for various physiological circumstances
 to eliminate the cohorts involved in things like (in the case of thirst)
 the 'mouth-dryness' factor and micturition state. When you control
 everything you end up being able to isolate one specific, unique region
 that is correlated only with the experienced emotion of 'thirst'
 (reasulting in an 'imperious desire' for drinking behaviour). The imaging
 results are in the book.

 The interesting thing in the case of these low level emotions is that they
 are all separate cohorts (thirst, hunger, sex drive etc). It's not one
 cohort that changes in subjective quality. There must be an evolutionary
 reason for this... maybe in DNA or maybe the emotions compete for
 behavioural dominance (micturition thwarting, for example, may stop you
 being afraid of something or vice versa)

So science *is* investigating phenomenal consciousness, not ignroaing
it?

 
  So there are 2 parts to an explanation:
  a) single neuron properties
  b) cohort organisation
  Unless thesre is a property of single neurons to use for a cohort to do
 something with, you are attributing 'magical emergence' to a cohort. This
  is a logical inevitability.

 LZ
  y-e-e-s. But where are you without emergence? Qualia would
  then be properties of quarks. Wihich brings on a Grain problem with a
 vengeance.
 

 COL
 There are no gaines to have a problem with. See below.

?


 COL
  Magical emergence means attributing some sort of property inherent in
 organisation itself.

 LZ
 
  The point of emergence is rather that the property is *not* inherent in
 the lower-level parts and relations.

 COL
 Yes, but these properties cannot exist without colligative actions of
 _something_. Like I said:


And pheomenal properties at the neuronal level must emerge from
colligative actions of molecules.

 LAKE is to H20
 as
 REDness is to 'what?'.

 That is, what elemental property is dragged along with matter (atoms,
 molecules) that can result in it being 'like something' to

Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-29 Thread 1Z


Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
 
 
  Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
   The problem is that cells are defined and understood only through
  being
   observed with our phenomenal consciousness.
  
   Not only. Cognition and instrumentation are needed too.
 
  Yes. But the instruments are observed. All the instruments do is extend
  the causal chain between your phenomenality and the observed phenomena.
  Provided you can justify the causal source...all is OK... but that's
  part
  of the critical argument process using existing knowledge. The observer
  is
  fundamentally in the causal chain from the deepest levels all the way
  through all of the instrumentation and into the sensory systems of the
  observer. The observer is part of every observation.
 
  Hmmm. Are you sure? Is an earthbound astronomer fundamentally
  part of a supernovca which exploded millionsof years ago ? What
  do you mean by fundamentally ?
 
 Yes. Causal chains, no matter how improbable, executed at the tiniest of
 scales the same ones that make LUCY our literal ancestor. connect us.

It depends what you , mean by connect. I am connected to these
things, but they can manage without me. It is a one-way
kind of connection.

 Consider them entropy transactions. When you objectify it, formalise it
 and it looks (is equivalent to) 'light cone' causal proximity, but that's
 only how it appearas.




 Causal chains all the way from the sub-sub-quark level, all the way out of
 the experiment, up through the instruments, across the room, into your
 eye, action potentials along nerves and then the neuron(s) that deliver
 the qualia... observation.

  Consciousness is not a 'high level' emergent property of massive numbers
  of neurons in a cortex context. It is a fundamental property of matter
  that single excitable cells make good use of that is automatically
  assembled along with assembling cells in certain ways.
 
  There are a number of leaps there. from basal areas
  to single neurons, for instance.

 When you look at the imaging it's very small cohorts of neurons. They look
 identical to other sorts of neuron cohorts nearby. One set delivers
 qualia. The others do not.

How do you know ?

 So there are 2 parts to an explanation:
 a) single neuron properties
 b) cohort organisation

 Unless thesre is a property of single neurons to use for a cohort to do
 something with, you are attributing 'magical emergence' to a cohort. This
 is a logical inevitability.

y-e-e-s. But where are you without emergence ? Qualia would
then be properties of quarks. Wihich brings on a Grain problem with
a vengeance.

 Magical emergence means attributing some sort of property inherent in
 organisation itself.

The point of emergence is rather that the property is *not* inherent in
the
lower-level parts and realtions.

 This leads to logical nonsense in other
 considerations of organisation (eg sentient plumbing in Beijing).

 That leaves us with a property of excitable cells which can
 a) be optionally established by a single cell
 then
 b) be used to collective effect (including cancellation/nullification)

A phenomenal property of a single cell would be emergent relative to
the
molecular/atomic level.

 At this stage I don;t know which option does the priordial emptions. What
 I do know is that without single cell expression of a kind of
 'elemental-quale' you can't make qualia.

 Crick and Koch also attributed qualia to small cohorts or possibly single
 cells (but in cortical material in 2003). No we have moved it out of the
 cortext, the arrow is pointing towards single cells... and what do you
 know? they are all different - 'excitable' = electromagnetic behaviour. We
 have a fairly large pointer which says this is a single cell
 electromagnetic phenomenon as like a pixel in a qualia picture.
 
 colin hales


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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-29 Thread Colin Geoffrey Hales


[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
In-Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

COL
 Yes. Causal chains, no matter how improbable, executed at the tiniest
of
 scales the same ones that make LUCY our literal ancestor. connect
us.


LZ
 It depends what you , mean by connect. I am connected to these things,
but they can manage without me. It is a one-way
 kind of connection.


COL
We are touching on the unidirectionality of time, here. Specifically the
2nd law of thermodynamics. Myriad infinitesimal entropy transactions
resulting in overall increases in disorder but localised increases in
order ( complexity , russel's playground) where net energy inflow exists
- such as where we are in the beam of the floodlight called sol.

If you mean the current state is the sum of the transactions of the entire
history of the transactions comprising you... then yes, your present state
is connected to all this causal history. The thing is that you literally
_are_ it. You are not like some bulldozed pile of independent stuff. So
the idea that you and the causality that got you to your current state are
separate is meaningless. You literally are causality - intrinsically made
of change, but change that results in persistent structure that is you.

So. yes. The model I am working with is untrinsically unidirectional, I
suppose - one way in a flow sense and one way in a causal sense that the
present (current state) did not 'cause' the past (previous states), nor
can the future cause the present state.

The easiest way to imagine it is to think of it as computation. Go through
the sequence of operations 2+5=7. The 'present' is the state of the
computation as is progresses (load, 2, load 5 add, display result, for
example). The 7 did not cause a 2 and 5 to be added. Similarly 7's
participation in a future computation cannot be said to have caused the 7.

I know we can _imagine_ realms where bidirectional causality may be so.
These are best represented in our formal mathemtical depictions of our
world that have t in them, t for time). What I am saying is that the realm
we are in is not like them. This is the one _we_ inhabit, with particular
instances of particular kinds of things going on. Or perhaps a little more
generally - the one we inhabit is currently in a state where
unidirectional causality (albeit intrinsically randomised in selecttion of
particular outcomes) rules. A really good book on this is 'The end of
certainty' by Prigogine.

COL
 identical to other sorts of neuron cohorts nearby. One set delivers
qualia. The others do not.

LZ

 How do you know ?


COL
Human verbal reports in a very detailed experimental regime. This was done
by imaging humans and controlling for various physiological circumstances
to eliminate the cohorts involved in things like (in the case of thirst)
the 'mouth-dryness' factor and micturition state. When you control
everything you end up being able to isolate one specific, unique region
that is correlated only with the experienced emotion of 'thirst'
(reasulting in an 'imperious desire' for drinking behaviour). The imaging
results are in the book.

The interesting thing in the case of these low level emotions is that they
are all separate cohorts (thirst, hunger, sex drive etc). It's not one
cohort that changes in subjective quality. There must be an evolutionary
reason for this... maybe in DNA or maybe the emotions compete for
behavioural dominance (micturition thwarting, for example, may stop you
being afraid of something or vice versa)


 So there are 2 parts to an explanation:
 a) single neuron properties
 b) cohort organisation
 Unless thesre is a property of single neurons to use for a cohort to do
something with, you are attributing 'magical emergence' to a cohort. This
 is a logical inevitability.

LZ
 y-e-e-s. But where are you without emergence? Qualia would
 then be properties of quarks. Wihich brings on a Grain problem with a
vengeance.


COL
There are no gaines to have a problem with. See below.

COL
 Magical emergence means attributing some sort of property inherent in
organisation itself.

LZ

 The point of emergence is rather that the property is *not* inherent in
the lower-level parts and relations.

COL
Yes, but these properties cannot exist without colligative actions of
_something_. Like I said:

LAKE is to H20
as
REDness is to 'what?'.

That is, what elemental property is dragged along with matter (atoms,
molecules) that can result in it being 'like something' to be those
atoms/molecules? Yes, you can say they are behaving in a specific way
...like neural cells doing the qualia dance but you are still stuck
with not knowing the 'what?' shown above. This is only
correlation/description , not causation/explanation. The real question is
to ask yourself what are the innate circumstances in the universe that
would mean doing the neural qualia dance be 'like something'? This
fundamentally questions your view of the universe.

That view is, in my model, that

Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-28 Thread 1Z



Colin Hales wrote:
 1Z
 
  Colin Hales wrote:
   
So I ask again HOW would we act DIFFERENTLY if we acted as-if MIND
EXISTED.  So far
the only difference I SEE is writing a lot of stuff in CAPS.
   
Brent Meeker
   
  
   FIRSTLY
   Formally we would investigate new physics of underlying reality such as
   this:
 
  Why not investigate consciousness at the neuronal level rather than
  the fundamental-particle level?
 
 

 The problem is that cells are defined and understood only through being
 observed with our phenomenal consciousness.

Not only. Cognition and instrumentation are needed too.

 That process, for the reasons
 that I have been outlining, can never supply a reason why it shall be
 necessarily 'like something' to be a cell of a collection of them.

I'm afraid that reason has passed me by

 That
 reason is buried deep in the fabric of things. If you understand the
 underlying structure giving rise to phenomenality then the underlying
 structure will literally predict the existence, shape, size, behaviour and
 interconnectivity of neurons and astrocytes _in order_ that you be
 conscious.

And do you understand the underlying structure ?

 Our logic is all backwards: We need to have a theory predicting brain
 material. A theory based on brain material cannot predict brain material,

Why not? Cars cannot understand themselves, but they
cannot understand anything else. The fact that the brain
is being refelexively usd to understand itself is
a unique feature of cosnciousness studies,
but it is not clear why it make cosnciousness studies flatly
impossible.
You might expect it to make the study of consiousness
easier, in sone respects.

 especially one that has used the property we are trying to find to observe
 the brain material. The whole exploratory loop is screwed up.
 
 Cheers
 
 Colin Hales


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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-28 Thread Colin Geoffrey Hales


 The problem is that cells are defined and understood only through being
 observed with our phenomenal consciousness.

 Not only. Cognition and instrumentation are needed too.

Yes. But the instruments are observed. All the instruments do is extend
the causal chain between your phenomenality and the observed phenomena.
Provided you can justify the causal source...all is OK... but that's part
of the critical argument process using existing knowledge. The observer is
fundamentally in the causal chain from the deepest levels all the way
through all of the instrumentation and into the sensory systems of the
observer. The observer is part of every observation.


 That process, for the reasons
 that I have been outlining, can never supply a reason why it shall be
 necessarily 'like something' to be a cell of a collection of them.

 I'm afraid that reason has passed me by

If it occurs to you... let us know... there's a Nobel prize in it.


 That
 reason is buried deep in the fabric of things. If you understand the
 underlying structure giving rise to phenomenality then the underlying
 structure will literally predict the existence, shape, size, behaviour
 and
 interconnectivity of neurons and astrocytes _in order_ that you be
 conscious.

 And do you understand the underlying structure ?


I have my models. Others have models (see refs in previous post). All
anyone has is models. The point is that it's possible to get an
understanding of it _because_ the underlying structure is as responsible
for phenomenal consciousues as anything else - indeed phenomenal
consciousness is the first place to start because it is the most evidenced
thing. It literally _is_ observation/evidence. It participates (is
mandated by science) in every scientific observation.

 Our logic is all backwards: We need to have a theory predicting brain
 material. A theory based on brain material cannot predict brain
 material,

 Why not? Cars cannot understand themselves, but they
 cannot understand anything else. The fact that the brain
 is being refelexively usd to understand itself is
 a unique feature of cosnciousness studies,
 but it is not clear why it make cosnciousness studies flatly
 impossible.
 You might expect it to make the study of consiousness
 easier, in sone respects.


The current literature has traced the conscious processes of primordial
emotions (those related to the 'appetites'/homeostasis) out of the cortex
to the basal areas and into the reptilian brain. This has been done
empirically.

Derek Denton
The primordial emotions: The dawning of consciousness

Phenomenal consciousness does not need a cortex to exist. It does not need
an explicit self model or reflexivity/indexicality. The I of a lizard
can be implicit (it hurts 'ME', I am hungry, I need air etc...ergo
behave).

This means that single neurons and/or small groups of neurons are all that
is needed for _phenomenal_ consciousness.

'Consciousness' is therefore at least traced back through the vertebrate
line of evolution and to the very origins of the basal brain structures.
This supports the potential for cosnciousness in possibly in invertebrates
and back to single cell animals...

Consciousness is not a 'high level' emergent property of massive numbers
of neurons in a cortex context. It is a fundamental property of matter
that single excitable cells make good use of that is automatically
assembled along with assembling cells in certain ways.

cheers
colin hales



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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-28 Thread 1Z



Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
  The problem is that cells are defined and understood only through being
  observed with our phenomenal consciousness.
 
  Not only. Cognition and instrumentation are needed too.

 Yes. But the instruments are observed. All the instruments do is extend
 the causal chain between your phenomenality and the observed phenomena.
 Provided you can justify the causal source...all is OK... but that's part
 of the critical argument process using existing knowledge. The observer is
 fundamentally in the causal chain from the deepest levels all the way
 through all of the instrumentation and into the sensory systems of the
 observer. The observer is part of every observation.

Hmmm. Are you sure? Is an earthbound astronomer fundamentally
part of a supernovca which exploded millionsof years ago ? What
do you mean by fundamentally ?

  Why not? Cars cannot understand themselves, but they
  cannot understand anything else. The fact that the brain
  is being refelexively usd to understand itself is
  a unique feature of cosnciousness studies,
  but it is not clear why it make cosnciousness studies flatly
  impossible.
  You might expect it to make the study of consiousness
  easier, in sone respects.
 

 The current literature has traced the conscious processes of primordial
 emotions (those related to the 'appetites'/homeostasis) out of the cortex
 to the basal areas and into the reptilian brain. This has been done
 empirically.

 Derek Denton
 The primordial emotions: The dawning of consciousness

 Phenomenal consciousness does not need a cortex to exist. It does not need
 an explicit self model or reflexivity/indexicality. The I of a lizard
 can be implicit (it hurts 'ME', I am hungry, I need air etc...ergo
 behave).

 This means that single neurons and/or small groups of neurons are all that
 is needed for _phenomenal_ consciousness.

 'Consciousness' is therefore at least traced back through the vertebrate
 line of evolution and to the very origins of the basal brain structures.
 This supports the potential for cosnciousness in possibly in invertebrates
 and back to single cell animals...

 Consciousness is not a 'high level' emergent property of massive numbers
 of neurons in a cortex context. It is a fundamental property of matter
 that single excitable cells make good use of that is automatically
 assembled along with assembling cells in certain ways.

There are a number of leaps there. from basal areas
to single neurons, for instance.

 cheers
 colin hales


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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-28 Thread Colin Geoffrey Hales




 Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
  The problem is that cells are defined and understood only through
 being
  observed with our phenomenal consciousness.
 
  Not only. Cognition and instrumentation are needed too.

 Yes. But the instruments are observed. All the instruments do is extend
 the causal chain between your phenomenality and the observed phenomena.
 Provided you can justify the causal source...all is OK... but that's
 part
 of the critical argument process using existing knowledge. The observer
 is
 fundamentally in the causal chain from the deepest levels all the way
 through all of the instrumentation and into the sensory systems of the
 observer. The observer is part of every observation.

 Hmmm. Are you sure? Is an earthbound astronomer fundamentally
 part of a supernovca which exploded millionsof years ago ? What
 do you mean by fundamentally ?

Yes. Causal chains, no matter how improbable, executed at the tiniest of
scales the same ones that make LUCY our literal ancestor. connect us.
Consider them entropy transactions. When you objectify it, formalise it
and it looks (is equivalent to) 'light cone' causal proximity, but that's
only how it appearas.

Causal chains all the way from the sub-sub-quark level, all the way out of
the experiment, up through the instruments, across the room, into your
eye, action potentials along nerves and then the neuron(s) that deliver
the qualia... observation.

 Consciousness is not a 'high level' emergent property of massive numbers
 of neurons in a cortex context. It is a fundamental property of matter
 that single excitable cells make good use of that is automatically
 assembled along with assembling cells in certain ways.

 There are a number of leaps there. from basal areas
 to single neurons, for instance.

When you look at the imaging it's very small cohorts of neurons. They look
identical to other sorts of neuron cohorts nearby. One set delivers
qualia. The others do not.

So there are 2 parts to an explanation:
a) single neuron properties
b) cohort organisation

Unless thesre is a property of single neurons to use for a cohort to do
something with, you are attributing 'magical emergence' to a cohort. This
is a logical inevitability.

Magical emergence means attributing some sort of property inherent in
organisation itself. This leads to logical nonsense in other
considerations of organisation (eg sentient plumbing in Beijing).

That leaves us with a property of excitable cells which can
a) be optionally established by a single cell
then
b) be used to collective effect (including cancellation/nullification)

At this stage I don;t know which option does the priordial emptions. What
I do know is that without single cell expression of a kind of
'elemental-quale' you can't make qualia.

Crick and Koch also attributed qualia to small cohorts or possibly single
cells (but in cortical material in 2003). No we have moved it out of the
cortext, the arrow is pointing towards single cells... and what do you
know? they are all different - 'excitable' = electromagnetic behaviour. We
have a fairly large pointer which says this is a single cell
electromagnetic phenomenon as like a pixel in a qualia picture.

colin hales




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RE: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-27 Thread John M




--- Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
(among a lot other things, quoted and replied to):

I disagree and can show empirical proof that we
scientists only THINK we are not being solipsistic.

I wrote in this sense lately (for the past say 40
years) but now I tend to change my solipsistic mind in
view of your position - maybe the other way around,
but for a mathematician (whay I amnot) a
multiplication with -1 is no big deal. 

As I formulate my new ideas (did not elevate them to
'position') everybody with an active mind (e.g. with a
mentality that generates ideas) is living in a
solipsistic air of his own ideas. This is relevant to
peasants, to religious fanatics, also to scientists
etc. (I don't know which applies to me, I never
proclaimed  myself a 'scientist', am not religious and
have no farm). We may pretend to see 3rd person errors
(sic) but really we live in our 1st person enclave. 
This is OK in my own little nuthouse. I pretended to
be more open and 'think' about a reality I can never
attain, but behind such pretension was my hypocrisy. 

Thanks for adding something (even if considerable as
negative) to my thinking (solipstic as it is - pardon
me the pun, it is a typo).

With best regards (also from me to me, but never mind:
you can accept it)

John Mikes

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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-27 Thread 1Z



Colin Hales wrote:
 1Z
 snip
  Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 3:19 AM
 Brent Meeker
It wouldn't make any difference: if solipsism were true, people would
   behave exactly as they do behave,
most of them not giving the idea that there is no external world any
   consideration at all, the rest deciding
that although it is a theoretical possibility, there is no practical
   purpose served by worrying about it.
   
Their explanation, if they have any, as to why they behave
as they do would be peppered with as ifs. Solipisism is
for people who prefer certainty to understanding.
   
  
   COLIN HALES:
   Yay! someone 'got' my little dialogue!
  
   The point is that scientists are actually ALL tacit solipsists.
 
  My point was that scientists *do* prefer understanding
  to certainty, and therefore are *not* solipsists. I can't think of
  anything I have said, or that you have said, that leads
  to the conclusion that scientists ingenreal are solpsitsts.
  (I'm still wiating for an example of an instrumetalist
  ornithologist...)
 

 I disagree and can show empirical proof that we scientists only THINK we are
 not being solipsistic.

 We ARE actually -methodologically- solipsistic because consciousness
 (phenomenal consciousness itself) = [seeing itself] is not accepted as
 evidence of anything. We only accept the 'contents' of phenomenal
 consciousness' = [that which is seen] as scientific evidence.

What's the difference?


 We think that
 predicting 'seeing'

What do you mean by seeing ?

 will come from the act of analysing that which is
 seen... this is logically fallacious. Like observing the behaviour of
 monalisa within the painting and then using that behaviour to divine canvas,
 paint and an artist: silly/illogical.
 This behaviour is 'as-if' we are solipsists - that we do not believe mind
 (other minds) exist. We are being inconsistent in an extremely fundamental
 way. This is a complex and subtle point - a cultural blind of enormous
 implication.
 As for an example of an instrumentalist ornithologists? Hmmm... perhaps ask
 the utilitarianist nominalist paleontologists. They may know! :-)

I have to say, I found your porrf to be pretty incomprehensible.

 
   The only
   way a solipsist can exist is to outwardly agree with the massive
   confabulation they appear to inhabit whilst inwardly maintaining the
  only
   'real truth'.
 
  It isn't a real truth. if it were, it wouldn't matter
  how they behave.
 
There's no external reality...It's not real!...so being
   duplicitous is OK.
  
   But to go on being a tacit solipsist affirmed by inaction: not admitting
   consciouness itself of actually caused by something...is equivalent to
  an
   inward belief of Bishop Berkeley-esque magical intervention on a massive
   scale without actually realising it. The whole delusion is maintained by
  a
   belief in an 'objective-view' that makes it seem like we're directly
   accessing an external world when we are not - it's all mediated by MIND,
 
  What are we, if we are neither mind nor world ?

 Your words assume that mind is not part of/distinct from/intrinsically apart
 from the world. This is a linguistic trap.

So It *is* part of (etc) the world ?

 WE are inside a universe of stuff, WE are made of stuff with
 perceptions(appearances) of stuff constructed by stuff behaviour. When WE
 look as atoms WE are seeing stuff behave atomly. Other stuff in our heads
 paints atoms to look like that. Does that make sense?

Not really.

 There is no objective view in this. Only appearances. We are NOT directly
 accessing the external world. We never have and we never will.

How do you know ?


  Why should it have a phsyics ? Is there a physics of stock markets
  ?
  Surely consicousness is a high-level phenomenon.
 

 [A glass of water] is a high level phenomenon of [water atoms]
 [consciousness] is a high level phenomenon of [what?]

Neurons, presumably.

 You can't have a high level phenomenon of a collection of something
 without a something. This belief is called 'magical emergentism'. In
 consciousness studies you can claim [what?] to be something seen with
 consciousness. The point is that the [what?] above will not be viewable with
 consciousness.

 That does not mean we can't be scientific about it. What it means is that
 the permission to examine potential [what?] is a behaviour currently
 prohibited by science because of the virtual solipsism I speak of. To speak
 of the [what?] is to speak of something that creates SEEING but is not SEEN
 directly. The correctly chosen [What?] will enable seeing that makes the
 seen look like it does, so 'seeing' is actually viable indirect evidence.



 If scientists are being virtual-solipsists by failing to accept seeing as
 evidence of something then seeing will never be explained. Do you 'see' how
 this blind works? Think of it like this:



 a) study New York traffic from Alpha-Centauri
 b) devise a very predictive 'LAW OF

Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-27 Thread 1Z



Colin Hales wrote:
 
  So I ask again HOW would we act DIFFERENTLY if we acted as-if MIND
  EXISTED.  So far
  the only difference I SEE is writing a lot of stuff in CAPS.
 
  Brent Meeker
 

 FIRSTLY
 Formally we would investigate new physics of underlying reality such as
 this:

Why not investigate consciousness at the neuronal level rather than
the fundamental-particle level?


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RE: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-27 Thread Colin Hales


1Z
 
 Colin Hales wrote:
  
   So I ask again HOW would we act DIFFERENTLY if we acted as-if MIND
   EXISTED.  So far
   the only difference I SEE is writing a lot of stuff in CAPS.
  
   Brent Meeker
  
 
  FIRSTLY
  Formally we would investigate new physics of underlying reality such as
  this:
 
 Why not investigate consciousness at the neuronal level rather than
 the fundamental-particle level?
 
 

The problem is that cells are defined and understood only through being
observed with our phenomenal consciousness. That process, for the reasons
that I have been outlining, can never supply a reason why it shall be
necessarily 'like something' to be a cell of a collection of them. That
reason is buried deep in the fabric of things. If you understand the
underlying structure giving rise to phenomenality then the underlying
structure will literally predict the existence, shape, size, behaviour and
interconnectivity of neurons and astrocytes _in order_ that you be
conscious.

Our logic is all backwards: We need to have a theory predicting brain
material. A theory based on brain material cannot predict brain material,
especially one that has used the property we are trying to find to observe
the brain material. The whole exploratory loop is screwed up.

Cheers

Colin Hales



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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test


On Sat, Sep 23, 2006 at 03:26:21PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Please allows me at this stage to be the most precise as possible. From 
 a logical point of view, your theory of Nothing is equivalent to
 Q1 + Q2 + Q3. It is a very weaker subtheory of RA. It is not sigma1 
 complete, you don't get the the UTM, nor all partial recursive 
 functions FI or all r.e. set Wi. Actually you cannot recover addition 
 and multiplication.

I'm not sure this is right, although I don't know what Q1, Q2 and Q3
are.

The Nothing itself does not have any properties in itself to speak
of. Rather it is the PROJECTION postulate that means we can treat it
as the set of all strings, from which any conscious viewpoint must
correspond to a subset of strings.

I should note that the PROJECTION postulate is implicit in your UDA
when you come to speak of the 1-3 distinction. I don't think it can be
derived explicitly from the three legs of COMP.

 But it is neither nothing. It is the natural numbers without addition 
 and multiplication, the countable order, + non standard models.

I disagree - it is more like the real numbers without order, addition
and multiplication group structures, but perhaps with the standard
topology, since I want to derive a measure.

But don't forget - this rich ontology is entirely due to the
PROJECTION postulate, not inherent to the Nothing.

 Or you have an implicit second order axiom in mind perhaps, but then 
 you need to express it; and then you have a much richer ontology than 
 the one expressed through RA.
 

Theres no implicit axioms in my mind, but it is always possible I have
unconsciously assumed something...

 
 
 
 
  One simply cannot observe this zero information object, one can only
  observe somethings, descriptions in my terminology. Anything in
  Sigma_1 is such a something.
 
 Sigma_1 is far richer. There are many sigma_1 true arithmetical 
 sentences (provable by RA, PA, ZF, ...) not provable in your system.
 

Please send their proofs to me. In doing so you disprove your statement.

Anything provable by a finite set of axioms is necessarily a finite string of
symbols, and can be found as a subset of my Nothing.



 
  Anything you can possibly to convey to me about
  any mathematical object must also be extractable.
 
 Again, strictly speaking this is not true. (Unless your implicit axioms 
 obviously ...)
 

How do you intend to convey the information to me, if not by some
finite string of symbols?

 
  However, there are
  possibly mathematical things not within the zero information objects,
  but they are inherently noncommunicable (shades of you G*\G perhaps?).
 
 You are very well below. You cannot even prove the existence of a prime 
 number in your theory.
 
 
 
  I think all that I say is that external reality is Nothing.
 
 No. Even your very weak theory as infinite models, and models of all 
 cardinality. But it has no finite models, still less the empty model 
 (which logicians avoid).
 

Why is the empty model Nothing? I don't think it is. Just as I don't
think the empty set is Nothing. However, the empty string happens to
be identical to Nothing.

But it does have finite things, which curiously correspond to infinite
subsets (via duality).


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RE: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-24 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


Peter Jones writes:

 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  Brent meeker writes:
 
   Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
John,
   
Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all under 
the impression that everything is a
construction of his own mind. People willingly suspend disbelief in 
order to indulge in fiction or computer
games, and a solipsist may believe that he is participating in the 
greatest and most perfect of games. I
think that most real solipsists would eventually go mad and start to 
believe that the game is reality.
  
   And that would make a difference how?
  
   Brent Meeker
 
  It wouldn't make any difference: if solipsism were true, people would 
  behave exactly as they do behave,
  most of them not giving the idea that there is no external world any 
  consideration at all, the rest deciding
  that although it is a theoretical possibility, there is no practical 
  purpose served by worrying about it.
 
 Their explanation, if they have any, as to why they behave
 as they do would be peppered with as ifs. Solipisism is
 for people who prefer certainty to understanding.

And we can't have certainty, right? The only empirical fact I know for certain 
is that I am having a conscious 
experience *now*; everything else is extrapolation and tentative assumption. 
Given two explanations for why 
things are as they seem, the correct one X and the simplest that is consistent 
with the facts Y, we have to choose 
Y. If we choose X because we like the sound of it or something we are lost as 
far as discovering truth about the 
world goes - even though X happens to be correct in this case.

Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-24 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 23-sept.-06,  07:01, Russell Standish a crit :


 Anything provable by a finite set of axioms is necessarily a finite 
 string of
 symbols, and can be found as a subset of my Nothing.


You told us that your Nothing contains all strings. So it contains all 
formula as theorems. But a theory which contains all formulas as 
theorems is inconsistent.
I am afraid you confuse some object level (the strings) and 
theory-level (the theorems about the strings).

Perhaps the exchange is unfair because I react as a professional 
logician, and you try to convey something informally. But I think that 
at some point, in our difficult subject, we need to be entirely clear 
on what we assume or not especially if you are using formal objects, 
like strings.



 I should note that the PROJECTION postulate is implicit in your UDA
 when you come to speak of the 1-3 distinction. I don't think it can be
 derived explicitly from the three legs of COMP.


I'm afraid your are confusing the UDA, which is an informal (but 
rigorous) argument showing that IF I am digitalisable machine, then 
physics  or the laws of Nature emerge and are derivable from number 
theory, and the translation of UDA in arithmetic, alias the interview 
of a universal chatty machine. The UDA is a reductio ad absurdo.  It 
assumes explicitly consciousness (or folk psychology or grandma 
psychology as I use those terms in the SANE paper) and a primitive 
physical universe. With this, the 1-3 distinction follows from the fact 
that if am copied at the correct level, the two copies cannot know the 
existence of each other and their personal discourse will 
differentiate. This is an illusion of projection like the wave packet 
*reduction* is an illusion in Everett theory. The UDA reasoning is 
simple and the conclusion is that there is no primitive physical 
universe or comp is false. Physics emerges then intuitively from just 
immaterial dreams with subtle overlappings. The UDA does not need to 
be formalized to become rigorous. But having that UDA-result, we have a 
thoroughly precise way to extract physics (and all the other 
hypostases) from the universal interview. For *this* we need to be 
entirely specific and formal. That is why in *all* my papers (on this 
subject) I never separate UDA from the lobian interview. This is hard: 
I would not have succeed without Godel, Lob and other incompleteness 
theorems.
I have a problem with your way of talking because you are mixing 
informal talk with formal object (like the strings). Like when you 
write:


 The Nothing itself does not have any properties in itself to speak
 of. Rather it is the PROJECTION postulate that means we can treat it
 as the set of all strings, from which any conscious viewpoint must
 correspond to a subset of strings.


It looks like a mixing of UDA and the lobian UDA. It is too much fuzzy 
for me.



 But it is neither nothing. It is the natural numbers without 
 addition
 and multiplication, the countable order, + non standard models.

 I disagree - it is more like the real numbers without order, addition
 and multiplication group structures, but perhaps with the standard
 topology, since I want to derive a measure.


Are you saying that your Nothing is the topological line? Again it is 
not nothing (or it is very confusing to call it nothing), and what you 
intend will depend on your axiomatization of it. If you stay in first 
order logic, this will give an even weaker theory than the theory of 
finite strings: you will no more be able to prove the existence of any 
integer, or if you take a second order logic presentation of it, then 
your nothing will contain much more than what the ontic comp toes 
needs, and this is still much more than nothing. To be franc I am 
astonished you want already infinite objects at the ontological level. 
If *all* infinite strings are in the ontology, that could be a 
departure from comp (and that would be interesting because, by UDA, 
that would make your theory predicting a different physics and then we 
could test it (at least in principle), and only when your theory will 
be precise enough.


 I don't know what Q1, Q2 and Q3
 are.


Robinson Arithmetic is formalized by the following set of axioms 
(written in first order language and in french):

Q1)   Ax0  s(x)[0 is not a successor]
Q2)   AxAyx  y - s(x)  s(y)  [different numbers have different 
successors]
Q3)   Ax(x  0  -  Ey(x = s(y))[all numbers are successor, 
except 0]

Together with the definition of addition:

Q4)   Axx + 0  =  x [adding 0 to a number doesn't change it]
Q5)   AxAy   x + s(y)  =  s(x + y)  {adding some number x with a 
successor of some number y gives the successor of the addition of x and 
y]

and the definition of multiplication:

Q6)   Ax x * 0  =  0 [multiplying a number by 0 gives 0]
Q7)   AxAyx * s(y) = (x * y) + x  [if someone asks I will put this 
one in english but it is long and less understandable!]


PA,

Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-24 Thread jamikes


Colin G. Hales:

so we are all liars.

As a matter of fact I never agreed to be a 'scientist' (and listmembers may
approve that), and I try to do science (my term) on science (their term). I
am still struggling with the identification of my term. Their term is: a
wrong model view.
But we all pretend to be smart liars.
*
Your last paragraph paved my way to the nuthouse.
Thanks

John M
- Original Message -
From: Colin Geoffrey Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Saturday, September 23, 2006 11:11 PM
Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test


...preliminaries deleted...

COLIN HALES:
Yay! someone 'got' my little dialogue!

The point is that scientists are actually ALL tacit solipsists. The only
way a solipsist can exist is to outwardly agree with the massive
confabulation they appear to inhabit whilst inwardly maintaining the only
'real truth'. There's no external reality...It's not real!...so being
duplicitous is OK.

But to go on being a tacit solipsist affirmed by inaction: not admitting
consciouness itself of actually caused by something...is equivalent to an
inward belief of Bishop Berkeley-esque magical intervention on a massive
scale without actually realising it. The whole delusion is maintained by a
belief in an 'objective-view' that makes it seem like we're directly
accessing an external world when we are not - it's all mediated by MIND,
which we deny by not admitting it to be evidence of anything and
around we go the whole picture is self consistent and inherently
deluded and ultimately not honest. This is the state of science the
last 2 paragraphs of the latest version of my little monologue are as
follows:

where:
CASE (a) world: Virtual solipsist world. In this world I accept my mind as
conclusive proof supporting continued fervent adherence to the belief in a
magical fabricator.

CASE (b) world: In this world I let a real external world be responsible
for all phenomenal mirrors. Concsiousness is held as proof of a separately
described underlying natural world, totally compatible with normally
traditional empirical science of appearances _within_ consciousness.


If I am right to be a solipsist scientist I live in the universe of the
magical fabricator, forced to play a pretend life ‘as-if’ there is a real
external world with fictitious scientific colleagues, all doing the same
thing. What is the reality of my life as a scientist telling me? I look
around myself and what do I see universal evidence of? The world I
actually live in is world (a). This evidence acts in support of my
solipsism. No scientist anywhere has, for any reason other than
accidentally, ever looked at systems producing worlds with scientists in
them complete with minds inside it, built of it. The world I actually live
in is the world of the 'as-if' ficticious objective view where scientist
believe without justification that they are literally describing the
natural world, and not how it appears to them. Indeed when someone tries
to describe an underlying world they the scientific world snaps back,
declares the attempt irrelevant, empirically unsupportable and therefore
unscientific metaphysicsconsistent with an implicit outward
methodological denial of mind.

But if I am wrong to be a solipsist, then the evidence paints a very odd
picture of science. In this bizarre world, ‘objective’ scientists
outwardly all act ‘as-if’ an external world exists yet scientists are
actually virtual solipsists outwardly acting ‘as-if’ there is no such
thing as mind whilst being totally reliant on their mind to do science and
also unaware that is the case. And, like me, being in methodological
denial of their own mind, are tacitly affirming belief in a magical
fabricator through a cultural omission of paying due attention to
reviewing their own scientific evidence system. Scientists in this world
will go on forever correlating appearances within their denied phenomenal
mirrors and never get to do science on phenomenal mirrors. Which one to
choose? Perhaps I’ll stay where the fictitious money is… in the land of
the virtual magical fabricator…and keep quiet.
==

I'm done with yet another paper.
This ..place... I have reached in depicting science I have reached from so
many different perspectives now it's almost mundane
... So many I don't know where to submit them any more!...
.each different approach results in the same basic conclusion
science is structurally flawed and never questions itself - there's never
any science done on science - since when did we earn the right to be one
corner of the natural world immune from scientific method? Is this a club or
a professional discipline? The current state of science - complete failure
to solve the physics of phenomenal consciousness - is a scientific
prediction of the state of science with the current virtual-solipsistic
belief stystem. - that is what science done

Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-24 Thread 1Z


Russell Standish wrote:

 The Nothing itself does not have any properties in itself to speak
 of. Rather it is the PROJECTION postulate that means we can treat it
 as the set of all strings, from which any conscious viewpoint must
 correspond to a subset of strings.

That sounds rather like the Somethingist principle that only certain
possibilites
are selected for the Privilege of Actuallity.


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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-24 Thread jamikes

- Original Message -
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, September 22, 2006 2:16 AM
Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

 (upon Bruno's question)...
To be more precise, I identify Nothing with
 undifferentiated form, a bit like the Chaos of the ancient Greeks.  To be
even more precise, I identify it with the zero information object, or the
set of all strings. Any person's experience is obtained by
differentiating - selecting something from that nothing.

 The relationship between this zero information object, and
 arithmetical platonia is a bit unclear, but I would say that anything
 constructible (Sigma_1) must be extractable from the zero information
object.

In my narrative for a substitute Big Bang I called the originating
zero-info-'object' Plenitude, as I realize from your words (thank you) it is
close to the Old Greek Chaos. In that narrative Universes occur by
'differentiating - selecting something from that nothing
(RSt). Information, observables. I had to give in to critics about the 'zero
information' because it was said that having no information emanating from
it IS information. Also my claims on infinite symmetry - dynamic invariance
and what you say 'the set of all strings' (I called it an unlimited content
of everything) was deemed 'information'. I defended my position by saying
that I want to state as little about this unattainable 'object' as possible,
it is only a starting point with more common sense relevance than the
quantum science related expressionS applied in the narratives of the
physical cosmology.

A silly question:
you wrote: Any person's experience is
obtained by differentiating - selecting
something from that nothing.
What makes 'that nothing' available to persons? is it not also available
to a computer? in which case computers may have unlimited consciousness
(whatever we call under that name).

John M

...
 Cheers

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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-24 Thread 1Z



Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
 
  Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  Brent meeker writes:
   Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
John,
   
Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all
  under the impression that everything is a
construction of his own mind. People willingly suspend disbelief in
  order to indulge in fiction or computer
games, and a solipsist may believe that he is participating in the
  greatest and most perfect of games. I
think that most real solipsists would eventually go mad and start
 to
  believe that the game is reality.
  
   And that would make a difference how?
  
   Brent Meeker
  It wouldn't make any difference: if solipsism were true, people would
 behave exactly as they do behave,
  most of them not giving the idea that there is no external world any
 consideration at all, the rest deciding
  that although it is a theoretical possibility, there is no practical
 purpose served by worrying about it.
 
  Their explanation, if they have any, as to why they behave
  as they do would be peppered with as ifs. Solipisism is
  for people who prefer certainty to understanding.
 

 COLIN HALES:
 Yay! someone 'got' my little dialogue!

 The point is that scientists are actually ALL tacit solipsists.

My point was that scientists *do* prefer understanding
to certainty, and therefore are *not* solipsists. I can't think of
anything I have said, or that you have said, that leads
to the conclusion that scientists ingenreal are solpsitsts.
(I'm still wiating for an example of an instrumetalist
ornithologist...)


 The only
 way a solipsist can exist is to outwardly agree with the massive
 confabulation they appear to inhabit whilst inwardly maintaining the only
 'real truth'.

It isn't a real truth. if it were, it wouldn't matter
how they behave.

  There's no external reality...It's not real!...so being
 duplicitous is OK.

 But to go on being a tacit solipsist affirmed by inaction: not admitting
 consciouness itself of actually caused by something...is equivalent to an
 inward belief of Bishop Berkeley-esque magical intervention on a massive
 scale without actually realising it. The whole delusion is maintained by a
 belief in an 'objective-view' that makes it seem like we're directly
 accessing an external world when we are not - it's all mediated by MIND,

What are we, if we are neither mind nor world ?

 which we deny by not admitting it to be evidence of anything and
 around we go the whole picture is self consistent and inherently
 deluded and ultimately not honest. This is the state of science the
 last 2 paragraphs of the latest version of my little monologue are as
 follows:

 where:
 CASE (a) world: Virtual solipsist world. In this world I accept my mind as
 conclusive proof supporting continued fervent adherence to the belief in a
 magical fabricator.

 CASE (b) world: In this world I let a real external world be responsible
 for all phenomenal mirrors. Concsiousness is held as proof of a separately
 described underlying natural world, totally compatible with normally
 traditional empirical science of appearances _within_ consciousness.

Or we are just conscious OF things ,and they are NOT within
consciousness.

 
 If I am right to be a solipsist scientist I live in the universe of the
 magical fabricator, forced to play a pretend life 'as-if' there is a real
 external world with fictitious scientific colleagues, all doing the same
 thing. What is the reality of my life as a scientist telling me? I look
 around myself and what do I see universal evidence of? The world I
 actually live in is world (a). This evidence acts in support of my
 solipsism. No scientist anywhere has, for any reason other than
 accidentally, ever looked at systems producing worlds with scientists in
 them complete with minds inside it, built of it. The world I actually live
 in is the world of the 'as-if' ficticious objective view where scientist
 believe without justification that they are literally describing the
 natural world, and not how it appears to them. Indeed when someone tries
 to describe an underlying world they the scientific world snaps back,
 declares the attempt irrelevant, empirically unsupportable and therefore
 unscientific metaphysicsconsistent with an implicit outward
 methodological denial of mind.

 But if I am wrong to be a solipsist, then the evidence paints a very odd
 picture of science. In this bizarre world, 'objective' scientists
 outwardly all act 'as-if' an external world exists yet scientists are
 actually virtual solipsists outwardly acting 'as-if' there is no such
 thing as mind whilst being totally reliant on their mind to do science and
 also unaware that is the case. And, like me, being in methodological
 denial of their own mind, are tacitly affirming belief in a magical
 fabricator through a cultural omission of paying due attention to
 reviewing their own scientific evidence system. Scientists

Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test


On Sun, Sep 24, 2006 at 08:05:14AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
 
 Russell Standish wrote:
 
  The Nothing itself does not have any properties in itself to speak
  of. Rather it is the PROJECTION postulate that means we can treat it
  as the set of all strings, from which any conscious viewpoint must
  correspond to a subset of strings.
 
 That sounds rather like the Somethingist principle that only certain
 possibilites
 are selected for the Privilege of Actuallity.
 

Not at all. You are fundamentally misinterpreting my comments. I won't
try to explain here, but ask you to reread the relevant parts of Why
Occam's razor, or of my book.

Cheers

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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test


On Sun, Sep 24, 2006 at 03:23:44PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 Le 23-sept.-06,  07:01, Russell Standish a crit :
 
 
  Anything provable by a finite set of axioms is necessarily a finite 
  string of
  symbols, and can be found as a subset of my Nothing.
 
 
 You told us that your Nothing contains all strings. So it contains all 
 formula as theorems. But a theory which contains all formulas as 
 theorems is inconsistent.
 I am afraid you confuse some object level (the strings) and 
 theory-level (the theorems about the strings).

Actually, I was wondering if you were making this confusion, owing to
the ontological status you give mathematical statements. The
Nothing, if interpreted in its entirety, must be inconsistent, of course. Our
reasoning about it need not be, and certainly I would be grateful for
anyone pointing out inconsistencies in my writing.

 
 Perhaps the exchange is unfair because I react as a professional 
 logician, and you try to convey something informally. But I think that 
 at some point, in our difficult subject, we need to be entirely clear 
 on what we assume or not especially if you are using formal objects, 
 like strings.
 

I'm not that informal. What I talk about are mathematical objects, and
one can use mathematical reasoning. However, the objects are more
familiar (to a mathematics student) than the ones you discuss (its
just standard sets, standard numbers and so on), so I suspect you read
too many nuances that aren't there...


 
 
  I should note that the PROJECTION postulate is implicit in your UDA
  when you come to speak of the 1-3 distinction. I don't think it can be
  derived explicitly from the three legs of COMP.
 
 
 I'm afraid your are confusing the UDA, which is an informal (but 
 rigorous) argument showing that IF I am digitalisable machine, then 
 physics  or the laws of Nature emerge and are derivable from number 
 theory, and the translation of UDA in arithmetic, alias the interview 
 of a universal chatty machine. The UDA is a reductio ad absurdo.  It 
 assumes explicitly consciousness (or folk psychology or grandma 
 psychology as I use those terms in the SANE paper) and a primitive 
 physical universe. With this, the 1-3 distinction follows from the fact 
 that if am copied at the correct level, the two copies cannot know the 
 existence of each other and their personal discourse will 
 differentiate. This is an illusion of projection like the wave packet 
 *reduction* is an illusion in Everett theory. 

Fair enough, the Yes Doctor is sufficiently informal that perhaps it
contains the seeds of the PROJECTION postulate. When we come to the
discussion of the W-M experiment, there are 3 possible outcomes:

1) We no longer experience anything after annihilation at Brussels
   (contradicts YD)
2) We experience being both in Moscow and Washington simulteously
   (kinda weird, and we dismiss as a reductio, but could also be seen
   as contradicting PROJECTION)
3) We experience being in one of Moscow or Washington, but not both,
   and cannot predict which.

I've noticed a few people on this list arguing that 2) is a possible outcome -
probably as devil's advocates. That would certainly be eliminated by
something like the PROJECTION postulate.

 The UDA reasoning is 
 simple and the conclusion is that there is no primitive physical 
 universe or comp is false. Physics emerges then intuitively from just 
 immaterial dreams with subtle overlappings. The UDA does not need to 
 be formalized to become rigorous. But having that UDA-result, we have a 
 thoroughly precise way to extract physics (and all the other 
 hypostases) from the universal interview. For *this* we need to be 
 entirely specific and formal. That is why in *all* my papers (on this 
 subject) I never separate UDA from the lobian interview. This is hard: 
 I would not have succeed without Godel, Lob and other incompleteness 
 theorems.
 I have a problem with your way of talking because you are mixing 
 informal talk with formal object (like the strings). Like when you 
 write:
 
 
  The Nothing itself does not have any properties in itself to speak
  of. Rather it is the PROJECTION postulate that means we can treat it
  as the set of all strings, from which any conscious viewpoint must
  correspond to a subset of strings.
 
 
 It looks like a mixing of UDA and the lobian UDA. It is too much fuzzy 
 for me.
 

I'm sure you know about mathematical modelling right? Consider
modelling populations of rabbits and foxes with Lotka-Volterra
equations. The real system differs from the equations in a myriad of
ways - there are many effects like drought, the fact that these
animals breed sexually etc. that aren't represented in the
equations. Nevertheless, the two systems, formal LV equations, and
informal real fox/rabbit system will behave concordantly provided the
systems stay within certain limits.

In this case, I would say the Nothing is an informal concept, and
the set of all strings (U say) is a

Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test


On Sun, Sep 24, 2006 at 12:11:54PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 In my narrative for a substitute Big Bang I called the originating
 zero-info-'object' Plenitude, as I realize from your words (thank you) it is
 close to the Old Greek Chaos. In that narrative Universes occur by
 'differentiating - selecting something from that nothing
 (RSt). Information, observables. I had to give in to critics about the 'zero
 information' because it was said that having no information emanating from
 it IS information. Also my claims on infinite symmetry - dynamic invariance
 and what you say 'the set of all strings' (I called it an unlimited content
 of everything) was deemed 'information'. I defended my position by saying
 that I want to state as little about this unattainable 'object' as possible,
 it is only a starting point with more common sense relevance than the
 quantum science related expressionS applied in the narratives of the
 physical cosmology.

Then I would say those critics do not understand information
theory. Actually, it is possible, of course, that it is I who
misunderstand information theory, but at the risk of seeming arrogant
know it all, I would bet on it being the critics, as I've seen a
huge amount of confusion on this subject in the literature.

 
 A silly question:
 you wrote: Any person's experience is
 obtained by differentiating - selecting
 something from that nothing.
 What makes 'that nothing' available to persons? is it not also available
 to a computer? in which case computers may have unlimited consciousness
 (whatever we call under that name).
 
 
 John M
 

Just because computers, or thermometers, or any measure device really
can differentiate between outcomes does not make them conscious. The
argument flows the other way - being conscious necessarily means one
can differentiate outcomes, whatever else consciousness may be about.

-- 
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is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-23 Thread Russell Standish


On Fri, Sep 22, 2006 at 02:59:09PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  Any person's experience is obtained by
  differentiating - selecting something from that nothing.
 
  The relationship between this zero information object, and
  arithmetical platonia is a bit unclear, but I would say that anything
  constructible (Sigma_1) must be extractable from the zero information
  object.
 
 OK then. But this means you are an arithmetical realist, and that an 
 external reality exist, for example your strings, or your set of 
 strings, and I am still more confused by your saying there is not even 
 an immaterial external reality, which would be solipsism with a 
 revenge.
 
 Bruno
 

The set of all strings is the same object, regardless of
interpretation, regardless of alphabet, and is the only object to have
zero information. It is a good candidate for the Everything, but
curiously it has the properties of Nothing.

One simply cannot observe this zero information object, one can only
observe somethings, descriptions in my terminology. Anything in
Sigma_1 is such a something. Anything you can possibly to convey to me about
any mathematical object must also be extractable. However, there are
possibly mathematical things not within the zero information objects,
but they are inherently noncommunicable (shades of you G*\G perhaps?).

I think all that I say is that external reality is Nothing. It is not
quite the same as saying there is no external reality, but not far
off.

But solipsism is really about other minds, in any case, so its hardly
solipsism.

Cheers

-- 
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-23 Thread Russell Standish


On Fri, Sep 22, 2006 at 12:18:37PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

...

 
 It is really the key to understand that if my 3-person I is a machine, 
 then the I, (the 1-person I) is not! This can be used to explain why 
 the 1-person is solipsist, although the 1-person does not need to be 
 doctrinaire about that (fortunately enough).
 
 
 Bruno
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 

I think this comment is most interesting, and perhaps you are finally
laying to rest my confusion. By 3-person, we really mean my extended
brain, which is quantum mechanically dstributed across the Multiverse
(see previous comments to Stathis et al.) By 1-person, we mean the
projection of ourselves that we are (self-) aware of. This includes
that lump of grey porridge we call a brain.

The 3 person could be something relatively complex like a computer,
but it could just as easily be Stathis's rock actually. What matters
is the 1-person, which is inherently non-computable.

If I can just see why the anthropic principle follows in an obvious way
from this, I'll be even happier!

Cheers

-- 
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is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.


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Mathematics  
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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-23 Thread jamikes


True, I may go a step further:
In those terms as I defined an 'earlier solipsism' in another post, there is
NO real solipsist.
Maybe in the nuthouse. Or on his way to one.

Game-playing is human and many fall into substituting their game for the
real world. From Hitler to a nun.
I was not thinking on the intermittent solips as pointed to by some
(reasonable) list-colleagues.
John
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, September 22, 2006 10:59 PM
Subject: RE: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test



John,

Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all under the
impression that everything is a
construction of his own mind. People willingly suspend disbelief in order to
indulge in fiction or computer
games, and a solipsist may believe that he is participating in the greatest
and most perfect of games. I
think that most real solipsists would eventually go mad and start to believe
that the game is reality. Maybe
that's why there aren't that many of them around.

Stathis Papaioannou


 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
 Date: Thu, 21 Sep 2006 09:51:28 -0400


 Stathis:
 wouod a real solipsist even talk to you?
 John M
 - Original Message -
 From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: Bruno Marchal everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2006 7:21 PM
 Subject: RE: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test



 Bruno Marchal writes:

  About solipsism I am not sure why you introduce the subject. It seems
  to me nobody defend it in the list.

 Is anyone out there really a solipsist? Has anyone ever met or talked to a
 real solipsist?

 Stathis Papaioannou


 

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RE: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-23 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


Brent meeker writes:

 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  John,
  
  Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all under the 
  impression that everything is a 
  construction of his own mind. People willingly suspend disbelief in order 
  to indulge in fiction or computer 
  games, and a solipsist may believe that he is participating in the greatest 
  and most perfect of games. I 
  think that most real solipsists would eventually go mad and start to 
  believe that the game is reality. 
 
 And that would make a difference how?
 
 Brent Meeker

It wouldn't make any difference: if solipsism were true, people would behave 
exactly as they do behave, 
most of them not giving the idea that there is no external world any 
consideration at all, the rest deciding 
that although it is a theoretical possibility, there is no practical purpose 
served by worrying about it. Perhaps 
mad is not the right word, implying as it does dysfunction, although 
sometimes we use the term happily mad.

Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-23 Thread Stathis Papaioannou



But a solipsist would appear mad in his self-generated world at the very point 
where he sees through his delusion. The tragedy is that he could never prove 
solipsism true even if it were true, and it would be irrational to believe it 
true 
even if it were true.

Stathis Papaioannou

 True, I may go a step further:
 In those terms as I defined an 'earlier solipsism' in another post, there is
 NO real solipsist.
 Maybe in the nuthouse. Or on his way to one.
 
 Game-playing is human and many fall into substituting their game for the
 real world. From Hitler to a nun.
 I was not thinking on the intermittent solips as pointed to by some
 (reasonable) list-colleagues.
 John
 - Original Message -
 From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Sent: Friday, September 22, 2006 10:59 PM
 Subject: RE: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
 
 
 
 John,
 
 Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all under the
 impression that everything is a
 construction of his own mind. People willingly suspend disbelief in order to
 indulge in fiction or computer
 games, and a solipsist may believe that he is participating in the greatest
 and most perfect of games. I
 think that most real solipsists would eventually go mad and start to believe
 that the game is reality. Maybe
 that's why there aren't that many of them around.
 
 Stathis Papaioannou
 
 
  From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
  Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
  Date: Thu, 21 Sep 2006 09:51:28 -0400
 
 
  Stathis:
  wouod a real solipsist even talk to you?
  John M
  - Original Message -
  From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  To: Bruno Marchal everything-list@googlegroups.com
  Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2006 7:21 PM
  Subject: RE: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
 
 
 
  Bruno Marchal writes:
 
   About solipsism I am not sure why you introduce the subject. It seems
   to me nobody defend it in the list.
 
  Is anyone out there really a solipsist? Has anyone ever met or talked to a
  real solipsist?
 
  Stathis Papaioannou
 
 
  
 
 _
 Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
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 1fb2b2e6d
 
 
 
 
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 No virus found in this incoming message.
 Checked by AVG Free Edition.
 Version: 7.1.405 / Virus Database: 268.12.6/453 - Release Date: 09/20/06
 
 
 
  

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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-23 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 22-sept.-06, à 19:10, Russell Standish a écrit :


 On Fri, Sep 22, 2006 at 02:59:09PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Any person's experience is obtained by
 differentiating - selecting something from that nothing.

 The relationship between this zero information object, and
 arithmetical platonia is a bit unclear, but I would say that anything
 constructible (Sigma_1) must be extractable from the zero information
 object.

 OK then. But this means you are an arithmetical realist, and that an
 external reality exist, for example your strings, or your set of
 strings, and I am still more confused by your saying there is not even
 an immaterial external reality, which would be solipsism with a
 revenge.

 Bruno


 The set of all strings is the same object, regardless of
 interpretation, regardless of alphabet, and is the only object to have
 zero information. It is a good candidate for the Everything, but
 curiously it has the properties of Nothing.


Please allows me at this stage to be the most precise as possible. From 
a logical point of view, your theory of Nothing is equivalent to
Q1 + Q2 + Q3. It is a very weaker subtheory of RA. It is not sigma1 
complete, you don't get the the UTM, nor all partial recursive 
functions FI or all r.e. set Wi. Actually you cannot recover addition 
and multiplication.
But it is neither nothing. It is the natural numbers without addition 
and multiplication, the countable order, + non standard models.
Or you have an implicit second order axiom in mind perhaps, but then 
you need to express it; and then you have a much richer ontology than 
the one expressed through RA.





 One simply cannot observe this zero information object, one can only
 observe somethings, descriptions in my terminology. Anything in
 Sigma_1 is such a something.

Sigma_1 is far richer. There are many sigma_1 true arithmetical 
sentences (provable by RA, PA, ZF, ...) not provable in your system.


 Anything you can possibly to convey to me about
 any mathematical object must also be extractable.

Again, strictly speaking this is not true. (Unless your implicit axioms 
obviously ...)


 However, there are
 possibly mathematical things not within the zero information objects,
 but they are inherently noncommunicable (shades of you G*\G perhaps?).

You are very well below. You cannot even prove the existence of a prime 
number in your theory.



 I think all that I say is that external reality is Nothing.

No. Even your very weak theory as infinite models, and models of all 
cardinality. But it has no finite models, still less the empty model 
(which logicians avoid).



 It is not
 quite the same as saying there is no external reality, but not far
 off.

This is too ambiguous. And too much sounding solipsistic.




 But solipsism is really about other minds, in any case, so its hardly
 solipsism.

Which again show the external reality is very rich, but your ontic 
theory cannot prove the most elementary thing about it.
I guess you are using some implicit supplementary axiom.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-23 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 22-sept.-06, à 19:18, Russell Standish a écrit :


 On Fri, Sep 22, 2006 at 12:18:37PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 ...


 It is really the key to understand that if my 3-person I is a machine,
 then the I, (the 1-person I) is not! This can be used to explain why
 the 1-person is solipsist, although the 1-person does not need to be
 doctrinaire about that (fortunately enough).


 Bruno

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


 I think this comment is most interesting, and perhaps you are finally
 laying to rest my confusion. By 3-person, we really mean my extended
 brain, which is quantum mechanically dstributed across the Multiverse
 (see previous comments to Stathis et al.)


Now I am completely confused. here you seem to assume the quantum 
multiverse like if you were abandoning your own theory.
You are free to redefine the term I am using, but I thought have making 
clear that the 3-person is just the finite code the doctor is using to 
build a copy of yourself like in the duplication WM. The 3-person 
description is just a finite natural number, the one which at least you 
can already prove the existence in your theory (which I identify to Q1 
Q2 Q3).

I recall for this other in french: Q1 says that zero is not a 
successor of any number = for all x NOT(0 = s(x)). Q2 says that the 
successor operation is injective, i.e. if for all x and y, if x is 
equal to y, then s(x) = s(y). Q3 says that all numbers are successor, 
except 0, i.e. for all x, if x is different from zero then there is a y 
such x = s(y).

The intended (standard) model is the mathematical structure N = {0, 
s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), ...} = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ...}, but without 
means for adding and multiplying the numbers.



 By 1-person, we mean the
 projection of ourselves that we are (self-) aware of. This includes
 that lump of grey porridge we call a brain.

This would be the first person plural (intelligible matter).



 The 3 person could be something relatively complex like a computer,
 but it could just as easily be Stathis's rock actually. What matters
 is the 1-person, which is inherently non-computable.

... from its own point of view! Also I think all hypostases matters


 If I can just see why the anthropic principle follows in an obvious way
 from this, I'll be even happier!

It seems to me that comp assumes at the start a form of turing-tropic 
or universal-tropic (with Church Thesis) principle.
 From it we can derive all hypostases (n-person point of view, 
terrestrial (G viewed) or divine (G* viewed)) including the fourth one 
which should give physics, making comp testable.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-23 Thread 1Z



Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 Brent meeker writes:

  Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
   John,
  
   Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all under 
   the impression that everything is a
   construction of his own mind. People willingly suspend disbelief in order 
   to indulge in fiction or computer
   games, and a solipsist may believe that he is participating in the 
   greatest and most perfect of games. I
   think that most real solipsists would eventually go mad and start to 
   believe that the game is reality.
 
  And that would make a difference how?
 
  Brent Meeker

 It wouldn't make any difference: if solipsism were true, people would behave 
 exactly as they do behave,
 most of them not giving the idea that there is no external world any 
 consideration at all, the rest deciding
 that although it is a theoretical possibility, there is no practical purpose 
 served by worrying about it.

Their explanation, if they have any, as to why they behave
as they do would be peppered with as ifs. Solipisism is
for people who prefer certainty to understanding.


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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-23 Thread Colin Geoffrey Hales




 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 Brent meeker writes:
  Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
   John,
  
   Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all
 under the impression that everything is a
   construction of his own mind. People willingly suspend disbelief in
 order to indulge in fiction or computer
   games, and a solipsist may believe that he is participating in the
 greatest and most perfect of games. I
   think that most real solipsists would eventually go mad and start
to
 believe that the game is reality.
 
  And that would make a difference how?
 
  Brent Meeker
 It wouldn't make any difference: if solipsism were true, people would
behave exactly as they do behave,
 most of them not giving the idea that there is no external world any
consideration at all, the rest deciding
 that although it is a theoretical possibility, there is no practical
purpose served by worrying about it.

 Their explanation, if they have any, as to why they behave
 as they do would be peppered with as ifs. Solipisism is
 for people who prefer certainty to understanding.


COLIN HALES:
Yay! someone 'got' my little dialogue!

The point is that scientists are actually ALL tacit solipsists. The only
way a solipsist can exist is to outwardly agree with the massive
confabulation they appear to inhabit whilst inwardly maintaining the only
'real truth'. There's no external reality...It's not real!...so being
duplicitous is OK.

But to go on being a tacit solipsist affirmed by inaction: not admitting
consciouness itself of actually caused by something...is equivalent to an
inward belief of Bishop Berkeley-esque magical intervention on a massive
scale without actually realising it. The whole delusion is maintained by a
belief in an 'objective-view' that makes it seem like we're directly
accessing an external world when we are not - it's all mediated by MIND,
which we deny by not admitting it to be evidence of anything and
around we go the whole picture is self consistent and inherently
deluded and ultimately not honest. This is the state of science the
last 2 paragraphs of the latest version of my little monologue are as
follows:

where:
CASE (a) world: Virtual solipsist world. In this world I accept my mind as
conclusive proof supporting continued fervent adherence to the belief in a
magical fabricator.

CASE (b) world: In this world I let a real external world be responsible
for all phenomenal mirrors. Concsiousness is held as proof of a separately
described underlying natural world, totally compatible with normally
traditional empirical science of appearances _within_ consciousness.


If I am right to be a solipsist scientist I live in the universe of the
magical fabricator, forced to play a pretend life ‘as-if’ there is a real
external world with fictitious scientific colleagues, all doing the same
thing. What is the reality of my life as a scientist telling me? I look
around myself and what do I see universal evidence of? The world I
actually live in is world (a). This evidence acts in support of my
solipsism. No scientist anywhere has, for any reason other than
accidentally, ever looked at systems producing worlds with scientists in
them complete with minds inside it, built of it. The world I actually live
in is the world of the 'as-if' ficticious objective view where scientist
believe without justification that they are literally describing the
natural world, and not how it appears to them. Indeed when someone tries
to describe an underlying world they the scientific world snaps back,
declares the attempt irrelevant, empirically unsupportable and therefore
unscientific metaphysicsconsistent with an implicit outward
methodological denial of mind.

But if I am wrong to be a solipsist, then the evidence paints a very odd
picture of science. In this bizarre world, ‘objective’ scientists
outwardly all act ‘as-if’ an external world exists yet scientists are
actually virtual solipsists outwardly acting ‘as-if’ there is no such
thing as mind whilst being totally reliant on their mind to do science and
also unaware that is the case. And, like me, being in methodological
denial of their own mind, are tacitly affirming belief in a magical
fabricator through a cultural omission of paying due attention to
reviewing their own scientific evidence system. Scientists in this world
will go on forever correlating appearances within their denied phenomenal
mirrors and never get to do science on phenomenal mirrors. Which one to
choose? Perhaps I’ll stay where the fictitious money is… in the land of
the virtual magical fabricator…and keep quiet.
==

I'm done with yet another paper. This ..place... I have reached in
depicting science I have reached from so many different perspectives now
it's almost mundane... So many I don't know where to submit them any more!
.each different approach results in the same basic conclusion
science is structurally flawed and

Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-22 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 20-sept.-06, à 21:06, Brent Meeker a écrit :


 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :


 This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
 matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
 while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of 
 comp,
 it doesn't prove the existence of actual infintities.


 If matter exists, and if consciousness is dependent on it, and if 
 there
 is no actual infinities on which my consciousness can depend, then 
 that
 piece of matter is turing emulable, and so by turing-emulating it, it
 would lead to a zombie.

 I don't understand that.  Computations are Turing emulable - not 
 material objects.


Only if you *assume* primary matter. But the uda shows you can't do 
that unless you postulate NOT-COMP.




 OK then.
 But now I have still less understanding of your notion of primitive
 matter. You could define it by anything making comp false without 
 using
 actual infinities, and this would lead to ad hoc theories.
 Again, from a strictly logical point of view you are correct, but then
 we have to ask you what you mean by matter. It is no more something
 describable by physics,

 I don't see that point either.  Perhaps you only mean that the 
 mathematical
 descriptions used by physics would not *completely* constitute matter?


No. I am just asking to Peter what is primary matter.





 and it is above anything imaginable to link
 that stuff to consciousness.
 Unless you present some axiomatic of your notion of matter, I am 
 afraid
 we will not make progress.

 That seems backwards.  Physics works with matter which is defined 
 ostensively and by
 operational definitions.


About matter yes, but you can't define primary matter in any ostensive 
or operational definition.
Aristotelian reification of primary matter has led to some 
methodological materialism which has eased the mind for physicists 
for some time, but which does no more work for the quantum, and is 
epistemologically contradictory with comp.


 To insist on an axiomatization seems to me to beg the
 question of whether reality is a purely mathematical object.

I ask for this to Peter because I try to understand what he means by 
his notion of primary matter. That's all.

Now with comp, reality cannot be defined by a mathematical object. 
More: it cannot be defined by any object. This has been understood by 
Plato, Plotinus, and all the neoplatonist. It is the root of my (old) 
critics of Tegmark: if I am mathematical (which is the case with comp 
and I = the 3 person I) then the 1-person I and the whole relaity are 
not mathematical. I am just taking into account the moadl nuancce 
introduced by the incompleteness phenomenon.



  It is only descriptions
   that can be axiomatized.

Sure.

BTW, I know you know a bit of logic. Have you understand the nuance 
between Bp and Bp  p ? (where B is the godel provability predicate, 
and p is any arithmetical sentence)?

It is really the key to understand that if my 3-person I is a machine, 
then the I, (the 1-person I) is not! This can be used to explain why 
the 1-person is solipsist, although the 1-person does not need to be 
doctrinaire about that (fortunately enough).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-22 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 22-sept.-06, à 08:16, Russell Standish a écrit :


 On Thu, Sep 21, 2006 at 04:16:53PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Russell, when you say nothing external exist, do you mean nothing
 primitively material exist, or do you mean there is no independent
 reality at all, not even an immaterial one?  (I ordered your book but 
 I
 am still waiting :)

 Bruno

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


 The latter.


I am not sure this makes sense for me.



 To be more precise, I identify Nothing with
 undifferentiated form, a bit like the Chaos of the ancient Greeks.

OK but that is a big Nothing.


 To
 be even more precise, I identify it with the zero information object, 
 or
 the set of all strings.


That is bigger and bigger. This confirms my feeling that we should use 
the axiomatic method, because terminology is confusing.



 Any person's experience is obtained by
 differentiating - selecting something from that nothing.

 The relationship between this zero information object, and
 arithmetical platonia is a bit unclear, but I would say that anything
 constructible (Sigma_1) must be extractable from the zero information
 object.

OK then. But this means you are an arithmetical realist, and that an 
external reality exist, for example your strings, or your set of 
strings, and I am still more confused by your saying there is not even 
an immaterial external reality, which would be solipsism with a 
revenge.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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RE: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-22 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


John,

Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all under the 
impression that everything is a 
construction of his own mind. People willingly suspend disbelief in order to 
indulge in fiction or computer 
games, and a solipsist may believe that he is participating in the greatest and 
most perfect of games. I 
think that most real solipsists would eventually go mad and start to believe 
that the game is reality. Maybe 
that's why there aren't that many of them around.

Stathis Papaioannou


 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
 Date: Thu, 21 Sep 2006 09:51:28 -0400
 
 
 Stathis:
 wouod a real solipsist even talk to you?
 John M
 - Original Message - 
 From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: Bruno Marchal everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2006 7:21 PM
 Subject: RE: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
 
 
 
 Bruno Marchal writes:
 
  About solipsism I am not sure why you introduce the subject. It seems 
  to me nobody defend it in the list.
 
 Is anyone out there really a solipsist? Has anyone ever met or talked to a 
 real solipsist?
 
 Stathis Papaioannou
 
 
  

_
Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d

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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-22 Thread Brent Meeker


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 John,
 
 Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all under the 
 impression that everything is a 
 construction of his own mind. People willingly suspend disbelief in order to 
 indulge in fiction or computer 
 games, and a solipsist may believe that he is participating in the greatest 
 and most perfect of games. I 
 think that most real solipsists would eventually go mad and start to believe 
 that the game is reality. 

And that would make a difference how?

Brent Meeker


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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-21 Thread David Nyman


Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:

 This paradoxical situation I have analysed out and, I hope, straightened
 out. The answer lies not in adopting/rejecting solipsism per se (although
 solipsism is logically untenable for subtle reasons) , but in merely
 recognising what scientific evidence is actually there and what it is
 evidence of. At least then scientists will have a consistent position and
 will no longer need to think one way and behave another. At the moment
 they are 'having it both ways' and have no awareness of it. ...if you talk
 to mainstream neuroscientists, to whom this matters the most (in terms of
 understanding the available evidence) they have no clue what you are on
 about...but they go right on doing it without question...staring down the
 microscope with their phenomenal consciouess at the external world they
 assume they are directly characterising without phenomenal consciousness,
 correlating the appearances of test and control..day in, day out...

It's precisely this issue that was my motivation for first posting to
this list on what has unfortunately been termed '1st-person primacy'.
In fact, all and any terms for what I've been attempting to point to
seem to be unfortunate because *all* our language is steeped in an
implicit assumption of an ontic dichotomy that does not in fact exist.
To repeat my original assertion (and I believe that this is valid
regardless of one's commitment to comp or materialism or whatever
else): whatever exists does so within a single ontic domain within
which distinctions of 'point of view' are merely contingent on which
side of an otherwise arbitrarily drawn line of distinction happens to
be making the report. What follows from this is that 'what appears to
exist' and 'what appearances refer to' are equally real (i.e. real in
the same sense) and equally aspects of this single domain.

'What appears to exist' is that part of the domain that is playing the
role (at a given point) of a picture or model (or mirror, in your
terms) of another part to which it is informationally connected, and
with which it co-varies. 'What appearances refer to' - or as we usually
say 'what exists' - is then merely our term for the co-varying part. In
the special case where 'you' are one part, and 'I' am the other, it is
easier to see that the terms '1st'-' and '3rd-person' - or 'subjective'
and 'objective' - can be used alternatively in an analysis of the
situation, and that clearly no change in ontic status could logically
follow from this.

I think we will never be able to engage with the issues you describe
until we realise that what we are faced with is a view from the inside
of a situation that has no outside. Our characterisation of 'what
exists' as 'outside' of 'what appears to exist' is the
sleight-of-intuition that introduces the fatal ontic duality. But there
is no such duality. We simply *are* this situation, and its
multifarious forms of differentiation comprise the structures from
which 'we', our 'experiences' and their 'referents' seamlessly emerge.
Our challenge as scientists is never to forget that our observations
and theories all point back at ourselves (there is no other direction).
If they don't account for 'what appears to exist' this is as great a
failing as inconsistency with 'what appearance refers to', since these
attributions are merely distinctions of emphasis in the analysis of any
given situation.

You could call this the solipsism of the whole, because there is
nothing else. I know this is as clear as mud, because the language just
doesn't exist, and I lack the inspiration to introduce it, and my
hackneyed old terms just get hijacked into familiar and misleading
connotations. Oh well

David

 1Z wrote:
  Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  It would be a problem if the actual infinities or infinitesimals were
 thrid person describable *and* playing some role in the process of
 individuating consciousness. In that case comp is false.
  About solipsism I am not sure why you introduce the subject. It seems
 to me nobody defend it in the list.
 
  Explainning matter as a pattern of experiences , rather than in
  a stuffy way, is methodological solipsism.
 

 I am doing a detailed look at the relationship between solipsism and
 science. I am writing it up...will post it on the list (if that's
 OK...it's not too big!) when it's Ok to read.. I am surprised at what I
 found. The feedback on solipsism is interesting...

 Russel is right in the sense that 'as-if' instrumentalism seems to
 characterise scientific behaviour...where scientists act 'as-if' the
 external world existed. At the same time, the facts of neuroscience tell
 us that scientific evidence arrives as contents of phenomenal
 consciousness, so science is, in fact, all about correlated appearances...
 and it is an 'as-if' solipsism. That is, science is also acting 'as-if'
 solipsism ( as per 1Z 'methodological solipsism) defines the route to
 knowledge but is actually in denial of solipsism!

 The

Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-21 Thread Russell Standish


On Thu, Sep 21, 2006 at 10:36:00AM -, David Nyman wrote:
 
 I think we will never be able to engage with the issues you describe
 until we realise that what we are faced with is a view from the inside
 of a situation that has no outside. Our characterisation of 'what
 exists' as 'outside' of 'what appears to exist' is the
 sleight-of-intuition that introduces the fatal ontic duality. But there
 is no such duality. We simply *are* this situation, and its
 multifarious forms of differentiation comprise the structures from
 which 'we', our 'experiences' and their 'referents' seamlessly emerge.
 Our challenge as scientists is never to forget that our observations
 and theories all point back at ourselves (there is no other direction).
 If they don't account for 'what appears to exist' this is as great a
 failing as inconsistency with 'what appearance refers to', since these
 attributions are merely distinctions of emphasis in the analysis of any
 given situation.
 
 You could call this the solipsism of the whole, because there is
 nothing else. I know this is as clear as mud, because the language just
 doesn't exist, and I lack the inspiration to introduce it, and my
 hackneyed old terms just get hijacked into familiar and misleading
 connotations. Oh well
 
 David
 

It makes absolute sense to me, and it is really one of the central
themes of my book Theory of Nothing. The only points of view are
interior ones, because what is external is just nothing.

But I know that Colin comes from a different ontological bias, since
we had a long debate last year where he tried to convince there really
was something out there independent of us.

Cheers

-- 
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02



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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-21 Thread jamikes


And another quote:
A solopist is like the man who gave up turning around because whatever he
saw was always in front of him.
--- Ernst Mach
John M

PS: but it is so entertaining to chat about it! JM
- Original Message -
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2006 7:51 PM
Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test



 Colin Hales wrote:
 
 
 -Original Message-
 From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brent Meeker
 Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2006 9:31 AM
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
 
 
 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 Bruno Marchal writes:
 
 
 
 About solipsism I am not sure why you introduce the subject. It seems
 to me nobody defend it in the list.
 
 
 Is anyone out there really a solipsist? Has anyone ever met or talked
to
 
 a
 
 real solipsist?
 
 Stathis Papaioannou
 
 Will all those who believe I don't exist contact me immediately.  :-)
 
 Brent
 
 
 
  I don't think anyone actually believes they are, but scientists
certainly
  act as-if they are! (all except me, of course!)

 Then why do they collaborate, argue, and publish?  Exactly how would they
act as-if
 they weren't?

 Brent
 Nobody believes a theory, except the guy who thought of it.
 Everbody believes an experiment, except the guy who did it.
   --- Leon Lederman, on physics



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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-21 Thread Bruno Marchal



About solipsism I think it is useful to distinguish:

- the (ridiculous) *doctrine* of solipsism. It says that I exist and 
you don't.

- the quasi trivial fact that any pure first person view is 
solipsistic. This makes the doctrine of solipsism non refutable, and 
thus non scientific in Popper sense. But it gives a genuine sense to 
the adjective solipsistic (as opposed to the ridiculous doctrine). 
This is related to methodological solipsism (cf Peter's post). Of 
course methodological solipsism is not the same as the doctrine of 
solipsism.
Rumors say that Brouwer was really solipsistic. he would have said to 
its students that he did not understand how they could be interested in 
its solipsistic philosophy which makes only personal sense ...

Russell, when you say nothing external exist, do you mean nothing 
primitively material exist, or do you mean there is no independent 
reality at all, not even an immaterial one?  (I ordered your book but I 
am still waiting :)

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-21 Thread David Nyman


Russell Standish wrote:

 It makes absolute sense to me, and it is really one of the central
 themes of my book Theory of Nothing. The only points of view are
 interior ones, because what is external is just nothing.

 But I know that Colin comes from a different ontological bias, since
 we had a long debate last year where he tried to convince there really
 was something out there independent of us.

I'm glad you agree Russell, and as I've said, I found your book an
excellent exposition of this overall position. But it seems as though,
if one has somehow been able to think oneself into this position, that
one can find agreement with those who have done something similar, and
perhaps the rest is then down to the long pursuit of the details (those
little devils). But your debate with Colin exemplifies my point about
the language. I think our vocabulary in general is so hopelessly
fraught with implicit 'inside/outside' ontic dualism that, failing such
prior agreement, it's almost impossible to convince someone starting
from a different position, because each assumes that the other is
implying something different with his terminology.

My own insight, if such it was, didn't come from mathematics or comp,
it just came as I was meditating on how 'I' and 'what I saw in the
mirror' could somehow be the same thing. A picture just came to me in
which 'I', my mirror-image, what-was-reflected, and all the rest
appeared as a network of information embedded in - what? -
something-that-exists. And that this something encompassed all the
insides and outsides, which were merely contingent aspects of the
structure of information. Nature doesn't draw lines around things -
rather 'things' and their 'boundaries' self-select from a network of
(what appears to the 'things' to be) information. And the varieties of
'what it's like to be' are precisely what it *is* to be some aspect of
this ontically unique situation.

David

 On Thu, Sep 21, 2006 at 10:36:00AM -, David Nyman wrote:
 
  I think we will never be able to engage with the issues you describe
  until we realise that what we are faced with is a view from the inside
  of a situation that has no outside. Our characterisation of 'what
  exists' as 'outside' of 'what appears to exist' is the
  sleight-of-intuition that introduces the fatal ontic duality. But there
  is no such duality. We simply *are* this situation, and its
  multifarious forms of differentiation comprise the structures from
  which 'we', our 'experiences' and their 'referents' seamlessly emerge.
  Our challenge as scientists is never to forget that our observations
  and theories all point back at ourselves (there is no other direction).
  If they don't account for 'what appears to exist' this is as great a
  failing as inconsistency with 'what appearance refers to', since these
  attributions are merely distinctions of emphasis in the analysis of any
  given situation.
 
  You could call this the solipsism of the whole, because there is
  nothing else. I know this is as clear as mud, because the language just
  doesn't exist, and I lack the inspiration to introduce it, and my
  hackneyed old terms just get hijacked into familiar and misleading
  connotations. Oh well
 
  David
 

 It makes absolute sense to me, and it is really one of the central
 themes of my book Theory of Nothing. The only points of view are
 interior ones, because what is external is just nothing.

 But I know that Colin comes from a different ontological bias, since
 we had a long debate last year where he tried to convince there really
 was something out there independent of us.

 Cheers

 --
 *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
 is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
 virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
 email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
 may safely ignore this attachment.

 
 A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Mathematics
 UNSW SYDNEY 2052   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
 International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02
 


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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 19-sept.-06, à 08:02, Colin Hales a écrit :

x-tad-biggerHi,/x-tad-bigger
x-tad-biggerI/x-tad-biggerx-tad-bigger’/x-tad-biggerx-tad-biggerm overrun with stuff at uni, but I have this one issue /x-tad-biggerx-tad-bigger–/x-tad-biggerx-tad-bigger solipsism- which is hot and we seem to be touching on, so I thought you may help me collect my thoughts before I run off/x-tad-biggerx-tad-bigger…/x-tad-biggerx-tad-bigger gotta leave all those threads hanging there/x-tad-biggerx-tad-bigger…/x-tad-biggerx-tad-biggerand I left them in an awfully under engineered state/x-tad-biggerx-tad-bigger…/x-tad-biggerx-tad-biggersorry!/x-tad-bigger
x-tad-bigger /x-tad-bigger
x-tad-biggerSIDE ISSUE (infinity and the UDA)/x-tad-bigger
x-tad-biggerFromthe UDA you can show that to make comp false you need to introduce actual infinities in the subject./x-tad-bigger
x-tad-biggerThe infinitely small and infinitely large are two sides of the same thing. One can construct an infinitesimal as an identity = the difference between two very nearly cancelling infinities (type A and type B) or from a single infinity consisting of an infinite number of random simple transitory events (changes from state A to B and back) that acts as an effective average ‘NOTHING’./x-tad-bigger
x-tad-bigger /x-tad-bigger
x-tad-biggerFrom this ‘change based’ model of infinity, based on mere statistical happenstance, an infinitesimal’s existence (albeit transitory) is predictable logically by the nature of the impossibility of infinity (a perfect NOTHING requires infinite cancellation of all A with all B under all circumstances). Indeed, rarely, you will get extraordinarily large (not very infinitesimal!) collections of transitory events as temporary coherence of massive quantities of simultaneous state A or state B./x-tad-bigger
x-tad-bigger /x-tad-bigger
x-tad-biggerThe infinitesimal is therefore evidence of actual infinities, but in an ‘as-if’ sense. Whether this constitutes the introduction of ‘actual infinities’ in the context of disproof of the UDA you can work out yoursel/x-tad-biggerx-tad-biggerf/x-tad-biggerx-tad-bigger
/x-tad-bigger

It would be a problem if the actual infinities or infinitesimals were thrid person describable *and* playing some role in the process of individuating consciousness. In that case comp is false.


About solipsism I am not sure why you introduce the subject. It seems to me nobody defend it in the list. 
Perhaps we should abandon both the term solipsism and the term platonism, and use instead the terms 
subjective 1-personal idealism for solipsism
and objective 3-personal idealism for platonism,

But I am not sure either. Change of terminology hardly solves problem, but it can help in some context.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test



Colin Hales wrote:
 Hi,

 I'm overrun with stuff at uni, but I have this one issue - solipsism- which
 is hot and we seem to be touching on, so I thought you may help me collect
 my thoughts before I run off. gotta leave all those threads hanging
 there.and I left them in an awfully under engineered state.sorry!



 SIDE ISSUE (infinity and the UDA)

 From the UDA you can show that to make comp false you need to introduce
 actual infinities in the subject.

This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp,
it doesn't prove the existence of actual infintities.

 The infinitely small and infinitely large are two sides of the same thing.
 One can construct an infinitesimal as an identity = the difference between
 two very nearly cancelling infinities (type A and type B) or from a single
 infinity consisting of an infinite number of random simple transitory events
 (changes from state A to B and back) that acts as an effective average
 'NOTHING'.

You can construct infinitessimals in a purely mathematical way.

http://mathworld.wolfram.com/NonstandardAnalysis.html


 Q1. As a solipsist, if you say 'belief in self as the only reality' does
 this entail the disbelief in anything else other than 'self' (=experiential
 reality of the observer)? .i.e. ...the active denial of any reality other
 than your experience?

yes. Not that I am a solipsist.



 This denial seems a tad optional from the definitions. That denial would
 necessitate magical intervention in the provision of phenomenal
 consciousness (Berkeley-esque beliefs) that constitute a mass-delusion of
 relentless detail.. a belief which is also bereft of empirical parsimony..

Not a mass delusion, a personal one.


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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test



Bruno Marchal wrote:

 It would be a problem if the actual infinities or infinitesimals were
 thrid person describable *and* playing some role in the process of
 individuating consciousness. In that case comp is false.


 About solipsism I am not sure why you introduce the subject. It seems
 to me nobody defend it in the list.

Epxlainning matter as a pattern of experiences , rather than in
a stuffy way, is methodological solipsism.


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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-20 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :

 This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
 matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
 while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp,
 it doesn't prove the existence of actual infintities.

If matter exists, and if consciousness is dependent on it, and if there 
is no actual infinities on which my consciousness can depend, then that 
piece of matter is turing emulable, and so by turing-emulating it, it 
would lead to a zombie.
OK then.
But now I have still less understanding of your notion of primitive 
matter. You could define it by anything making comp false without using 
actual infinities, and this would lead to ad hoc theories.
Again, from a strictly logical point of view you are correct, but then 
we have to ask you what you mean by matter. It is no more something 
describable by physics, and it is above anything imaginable to link 
that stuff to consciousness.
Unless you present some axiomatic of your notion of matter, I am afraid 
we will not make progress.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test



Bruno Marchal wrote:
 Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :

  This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
  matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
  while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp,
  it doesn't prove the existence of actual infintities.

 If matter exists, and if consciousness is dependent on it, and if there
 is no actual infinities on which my consciousness can depend, then that
 piece of matter is turing emulable, and so by turing-emulating it, it
 would lead to a zombie.


The matter isn't emulable at all. Only its behaviour. if there is prime
matteriality, and not just material behaviour, it is necessarily
non-emulable.

 OK then.
 But now I have still less understanding of your notion of primitive
 matter. You could define it by anything making comp false without using
 actual infinities, and this would lead to ad hoc theories.

Only something with no properties is necessarily non-emulable,
and there can be only one such something.

 Again, from a strictly logical point

As opposed to ?

 of view you are correct, but then
 we have to ask you what you mean by matter. It is no more something
 describable by physics, and it is above anything imaginable to link
 that stuff to consciousness.

What is immaterial doesn't exist, and what doesn't exist isn't
conscious.

The link between mental properties and the bare substrate need be no
different
to the link between physical properties and the substrate.

 Unless you present some axiomatic of your notion of matter, I am afraid
 we will not make progress.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-20 Thread Brent Meeker


Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
 1Z wrote:
 
Bruno Marchal wrote:


It would be a problem if the actual infinities or infinitesimals were
 
 thrid person describable *and* playing some role in the process of
 individuating consciousness. In that case comp is false.
 
About solipsism I am not sure why you introduce the subject. It seems
 
 to me nobody defend it in the list.
 
Explainning matter as a pattern of experiences , rather than in
a stuffy way, is methodological solipsism.

 
 
 I am doing a detailed look at the relationship between solipsism and
 science. I am writing it up...will post it on the list (if that's
 OK...it's not too big!) when it's Ok to read.. I am surprised at what I
 found. The feedback on solipsism is interesting...
 
 Russel is right in the sense that 'as-if' instrumentalism seems to
 characterise scientific behaviour...where scientists act 'as-if' the
 external world existed. At the same time, the facts of neuroscience tell
 us that scientific evidence arrives as contents of phenomenal
 consciousness, so science is, in fact, all about correlated appearances...
 and it is an 'as-if' solipsism. That is, science is also acting 'as-if'
 solipsism ( as per 1Z 'methodological solipsism) defines the route to
 knowledge but is actually in denial of solipsism!

You talk about as-if as though it had no empirical support and was a mere 
assumption.  I see other people.  When I sleep and wake up I see the same 
people. 
Denial of solipism is as well supported empirically as my own historical 
existence - 
which I know of only through memory and some artifacts.  I'm afraid you are 
slipping 
into radical skepticism which if applied consistently will leave you with no 
knowledge of anything.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

2006-09-20 Thread Brent Meeker


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
 
 
This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp,
it doesn't prove the existence of actual infintities.
 
 
 If matter exists, and if consciousness is dependent on it, and if there 
 is no actual infinities on which my consciousness can depend, then that 
 piece of matter is turing emulable, and so by turing-emulating it, it 
 would lead to a zombie.

I don't understand that.  Computations are Turing emulable - not material 
objects.

 OK then.
 But now I have still less understanding of your notion of primitive 
 matter. You could define it by anything making comp false without using 
 actual infinities, and this would lead to ad hoc theories.
 Again, from a strictly logical point of view you are correct, but then 
 we have to ask you what you mean by matter. It is no more something 
 describable by physics, 

I don't see that point either.  Perhaps you only mean that the mathematical 
descriptions used by physics would not *completely* constitute matter?

and it is above anything imaginable to link 
 that stuff to consciousness.
 Unless you present some axiomatic of your notion of matter, I am afraid 
 we will not make progress.

That seems backwards.  Physics works with matter which is defined ostensively 
and by 
operational definitions.  To insist on an axiomatization seems to me to beg the 
question of whether reality is a purely mathematical object.  It is only 
descriptions 
  that can be axiomatized.

Brent Meeker


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Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test