http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377
Neil Gershenfeldhttp://www.edge.org/memberbio/neil_gershenfeld
Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB
Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann
So do I.
We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60
http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25336
Rodney A. Brookshttp://www.edge.org/memberbio/rodney_a_brooks
Roboticist; Panasonic Professor of Robotics (emeritus) , MIT; Founder, Chairman
CTO, Rethink Robotics; Author, Flesh and Machines
While we're at it
Lots of good stuff in these
http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289
Daniel C. Dennetthttp://www.edge.org/memberbio/daniel_c_dennett
Philosopher; Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, Co-Director, Center
for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University; Author, Intuition Pumps
And again
Cheers
Niloc
am done
--
You
IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The
Hard Problem
Ah, well, I would expect Dennett to say that!
On 16 January 2014 16:19, Colin Geoffrey Hales
cgha...@unimelb.edu.aumailto:cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote:
http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289
Daniel C. Dennetthttp://www.edge.org/memberbio
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb
Sent: Sunday, 12 January 2014 5:54 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and consciousness
On 1/11/2014 8:12 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1
RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014
Consciousness as a State of Matter
Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014
Hi Folk,
Grrr!
I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science's grapplings with
consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so pervasive and
Religion? There's a Tim Minchin video for that. It'll cure you.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kr1I3mBojc0
or maybe
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IZeWPScnolo
cheers
colin
-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of
Colin's Wackier Version:
Because the space they operate in, at the scale in which the decay operates,
there are far more dimensions than 3. They decay deterministically in 3D and
it appears, to us, to be random because of the collapse of the spatial
dimensions to 3, where we humble observers
Hi,
Hales, C. G. 2012 The modern phlogiston: why 'thinking machines' don't need
computers TheConversation. The Conversation media Group.
http://www.theconversation.edu.au/the-modern-phlogiston-why-thinking-machines-dont-need-computers-7881
Cheers
Colin
P.S. I am done with this issue.
Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course.
Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the sentiments
It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want dinner.
The cooling body
Why didn't you just ask me in the first place? It's easy.
Nothing (noun) is intrinsically unstable. Think about it. It takes an
infinity of energy to maintain a perfect Nothing. So Nothing breaks up into its
components.
There. You can all rest easy now.
Cheers
Colin
-Original
Hi all,
You might be interested in a little article I wrote, published here:
http://theconversation.edu.au/learning-experience-lets-take-consciousness-in-from-the-cold-6739
I am embarked on the long process of getting science to self-review.
Enjoy!
Colin
--
You received this message because
[Col] I've just had a whole bunch of fun at the Melbourne Singularity Summit.
What a 'hoot'!
At the conference I made a somewhat thwarted attempt to introduce physical
replication as a 'roadmap item' for AGI. I tried to show that AGI may be
reached by constructing the actual necessary physics
On 8/15/2011 7:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
just like you can simulate flight if you simulate the
environment you are flying in.
But do we need to simulate the entire atmosphere in order to simulate
flight, or just the atmosphere in the immediate area around the surfaces
of the plane?
Read all your commentscutting/snipping to the chase...
[Jason ]
Your belief that AGI is impossible to achieve through computers depends
on at least one of the following propositions being true:
1. Accurate simulation of the chemistry or physics underlying the brain
is impossible
2. Human
On Mon, Aug 15, 2011 at 2:06 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales
cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote:
Read all your commentscutting/snipping to the chase...
It is a little unfortunate you did not answer all of the questions. I
hope that you will answer both questions (1) and (2) below.
Yeah sorry about
Great video ... a picture of simplicity
Q. 'What is it like to be a Turing Machine? = Hard Problem.
A. It's like being the pile of gear in the video, NO MATTER WHAT IS ON
THE TAPE.
Colin
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf
-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Monday, 15 August 2011 10:07 AM
To: Everything List
Subject: Re: Turing Machines
On Aug 14, 7:29 pm, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au
wrote
Colin and Craig,
Imagine that God has such a machine on his desk, which he uses to
compute the updated positions of each particle in some universe over
each unit of Planck time. Would you agree it is possible for the
following to occur in the simulation:
1. Stars to coalesce due to gravity and
‘THE FUTURE OF TECHNOLOGY’
SINGULARITY SUMMIT 2011
AUGUST 20-21
RMIT UNIVERSITY Melbourne
http://summit.singinst.org.au/
This August, leading scientists, inventors and philosophers will gather in
Melbourne to discuss the upcoming ‘intelligence explosion’ that many now refer
to as ‘The
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jesse Mazer
Sent: Wednesday, 3 August 2011 3:26 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Simulated Brains
On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 1:14 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On
A computed theory of a hurricane is not a hurricane.
A computed theory of cognition is not cognition.
We don't want a simulation of the thing.
We want an instance of the thing.
-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf
@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Monday, 25 July 2011 11:31 AM
To: Everything List
Subject: Re: bruno list
On Jul 24, 9:02 pm, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au
wrote:
artificially. i.e. REPLICATE. Not emulate. Not simulate. You master the
natural version, make
-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com on behalf of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Sat 7/9/2011 10:14 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
On 09 Jul 2011, at 07:07, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Down the bottom if you
-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Monday, 11 July 2011 1:16 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: COMP refutation GAME OVER
On 10 Jul 2011, at 09:37, Colin Geoffrey Hales
Hi,
You have missed the point. When you feel pain in your hand your are
feeling it because the physics of specific specialized small regions of
the cranial central nervous system are doing things.
Yes, they are passing signals back and forth, performing additions,
multiplications, and
Hi,
You have missed the point. When you feel pain in your hand your are
feeling it because the physics of specific specialized small regions of
the cranial central nervous system are doing things. This includes (1)
action potentials mutually resonating with (2) a gigantic EM field
system in
AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au
wrote:
Hi,
You have missed the point. When you feel pain in your hand your are feeling
it because the physics of specific specialized small regions of the cranial
central nervous system are doing things. This includes (1) action
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jason Resch
Sent: Thursday, 7 July 2011 4:16 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 10:22 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales
-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Rex Allen
Sent: Monday, 27 June 2011 5:59 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
On Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Bruno
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Rex Allen
Sent: Monday, 27 June 2011 1:58 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
On Sun, Jun 26, 2011 at 11:29 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales
I'm not sure of the details of your experiments, but wouldn't the most
direct way to prove what you are saying be to isolate just
that physical process
which cannot be modelled? For example, if it is EM fields, set up an
appropriately
brain-like configuration of EM fields, introduce some
Stathis said
I'll let Colin answer, but it seems to me he must say that some aspect of
brain
physics deviates from what the equations tell us (and deviates in an
unpredictable
way, otherwise it would just mean that different equations are required)
to be
consistent. If not, then it
Stathis said
SNIP
and Colin has said that he does not believe that philosophical zombies
can exist.
Hence, he has to show not only that the computer model will lack the 1st
person
experience, but also lack the 3rd person observable behaviour of the
real thing;
and the latter can only be
Stahis said:
snip
If you present an object with identical sensory measurements but get
different results in the chip, then that means what you took as sensory
measurements was incomplete. For example, blind people might be able to
sense the presense of someone who silently walks into the room
Colin,
You have described a way in which our perception may be more than can
be explained by the sense data. However, how does this explain the
response
to novelty? I can come up with a plan or theory to deal with a novel
situation
if it is simply described to me. I don't have to
So the EM fields account for the experiences that accompany the brain
processes. A kind of epiphenomena.
So why don't my experiences change when I'm in an MRI?
I haven't been through the detail - I hope to verify this in my
simulations to come but...
As far as I am aware MRI magnets
I understand your conclusion, that a model of a brain
won't be able to handle novelty like a real brain,
but I am trying to understand the nuts and
bolts of how the model is going to fail. For
example, you can say that perpetual motion
machines are impossible because they disobey
the
So you are saying the special something which causes
consciousness and which functionalism has ignored
is the electric field around the neuron/astrocyte.
But electric fields were well understood even a
hundred years ago, weren't they? Why couldn't
a neuron be simulated by something like a
Brent said:
snip
Of course they describe things - they aren't the things themselves.
But the question is whether the description is complete. Is there
anything about EM fields that is not described by QED?
Absolutely HEAPS! Everything that they are made of and how the components
inteact to
Stathis wrote:
I can understand that, for example, a computer simulation of a storm is
not a storm, because only a storm is a storm and will get you wet. But
perhaps counterintuitively, a model of a brain can be closer to the real
thing than a model of a storm. We don't normally see inside a
So your theory is that the electromagnetic field has an ability to learn
which is not reflected in QED - it's some hitherto unknown aspect of the
field and it doesn't show up in the field violating Maxwell's equations
or
QED predictions? And further this aspect of the EM field is able to
Hi Stathis,
RE: Zombie Room
The zombie room is now in a paper on solipsism and is in review and I
expect will be rejected in due course! :-) Over XMAS I hope to catch up on
all my mail. It's proven to be a really useful cross-modal thought
experiment because it renders a human 'methodologically
Hi Stathis/Jamie et al.
I've been busy else where in self-preservation mode deleting emails
madly .frustrating, with so many threads left hanging...oh well...but
I couldn't go past this particular dialog.
I am having trouble that you actually believe the below to be the case!
Lines of
I thought I'd pass this on from another group
Maybe one of us who is local can go along?
Damn I wish I was there... :-)
--
Here is a debate this Thursday at MIT on a really big question:
Creativity: the mind, machines, and mathematics
A
Le Mardi 28 Novembre 2006 21:47, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
All your comments are shooting from hip without actually reading and
thinking. They are all of the class colin has assumed X but what if it
isn;t like that when the point is that the circumstances are needed to
demonstrate
If the mind is what the brain does, then what exactly is a coffee cup
doing?
It's not mind-ing.
For that question is just as valid and has just as complex an
answer...
Of course not.
.yet we do not ask it. Every object in the universe is like this.
This is the mother of all
Except that in time, as people realise what I just said above, the
hypothesis has some emprical support: If the universe were made of
appearances when we opened up a cranium we'd see them. We don't.
Or appearances don't appear to be appearances to a third party.
Precisely. Now ask
Absolutely! But the humans have phenomenal consciousness in lieu of ESP,
which the zombies do not.
PC doesn't magically solve the problem.It just involves a more
sophisticated form of guesswork. It can be fooled.
We been here before and I'll say it again if I have to
Yes! It can be
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Scientific behaviour demanded of the zombie condition is a clearly
identifiable behavioural benchmark where we can definitely claim that
phenomenality is necessary...see below...
It is all to easy to consider scientific behaviour without
phenomenality
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
SNIP
No confusion at all. The zombie is behaving. 'Wide awake'
in the sense that it is fully functional.
Well, adaptive behaviour -- dealing with novelty --- is functioning.
Yes - but I'm not talking about merely functioning. I am talking about
Le Dimanche 26 Novembre 2006 22:54, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
SNIP
What point is there in bothering with it. The philosophical zombie is
ASSUMED to be equivalent! This is failure before you even start! It's
wrong and it's proven wrong because there is a conclusively logically
That's it. Half the laws of physics are going neglected merely because
we
won't accept phenomenal consciousness ITSELF as evidence of anything.
We accept it as evidence of extremely complex neural activity - can you
demonstrate it is not?
You have missed the point again.
a) We demand
The discussion has run its course. It has taught me a lot about the sorts
of issues and mindsets involved.
It has also given me the idea for the methodological-zombie-room, which I
will now write up. Maybe it will depict the circumstances and role of
phenomenality better than I have thus far.
Of course they are analogue devices, but their analogue nature makes no
difference to the computation. If the ripple in the power supply of a TTL
circuit were 4 volts then the computer's true analogue nature would
intrude and it would malfunction.
Stathis Papaioannou
Of course you are
If all you have is a bunch of numbers (or 4-20mA current loop
signals or 1-5V signals) dancing away, and you have no
a-priori knowledge of the external world, how are you to
create any sort of model of the external world in the first
place? You don't even know it is there. That is the world
Hereby named by yours truly in honour of Huxley's similar canine
representation of Darwin.
Richard Dawkins radio program:
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/backgroundbriefing/default.htm
see also...
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/encounter/default.htm
on the design argument.
cheers
Colin Hales
Hi,
Le Vendredi 24 Novembre 2006 22:54, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
Now that there is a definite role of consciousness (access to novelty),
the statement 'functional equivalent' makes the original 'philosophical
zombie' an oxymoron...
But functionnal equivalence is a requisite
Stathis wrote:
It still isn't clear to me whether you believe it is possible
for a digital computer to be conscious or not.
Digital computers of the type we currently have?
In any/all combinations, including the whole internet?
No... that they have the consciousness of the kind we have.
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
In-Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Hi Brent,
Please see the post/replies to Quentin/LZ.
I am trying to understand the context in which I can be wrong and how
other people view the proposition. There can be a mixture of mistakes and
poor
Colin Hales writes:
So, I have my zombie scientist and my human scientist and
I ask them to do science on exquisite novelty. What happens?
The novelty is invisible to the zombie, who has the internal
life of a dreamless sleep. The reason it is invisible is
because there is no phenomenal
You don't think paramecium behaviour could be modelled on a computer?
Stathis Papaiaonnou
A paramecium can behave like it's perceiving something. I haven't observed
it myself but I have spoken to people who have and they say they have
behaviours which betray some sort of awareness beyond the
Colin:
When you take away phenomenal consciousness what can't you do?
Brent:
I don't know, because I don't know what it is.
What it is?
..is what changes radically when you close your eyes.
..is what you lose when you have a dreamless sleep.
..is what totally stops you doing science when it's
Colin
I am not talking about the creative process. I am talking about the
perception of a natural world phenomena that has never before been
encountered. There can be no a-priori scientific knowledge in such
situations. It is as far from a metaphor as you can get. I mean literal
Colin
That is the invisibility I claim at the center of
the zombie's difficulty.
Brent
But it will also present the same difficulty to the human scientist. An
in fact it is easy to build a robot that detects and responds to radio
waves that are completely invisible to a human scientist.
Colin
The PHENOMENAL
Colin
What I have done is try to figure out a valid test for phenomenal
consciousness.
Brent
What is the functional definition of phenomenal?
Is there non-phenomenal consciousness?
Colin
Phenomena are things that happen in the universe.
Those things are perceived by humans.
I understand that there is a difference between sensing and perception.
Perception includes sensing and also interpreting the sensations in a
model of the world. Which is why unusual appearances can literally be
difficult to perceive. But you still have not said why a digital computer
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
In-Reply-To:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
au
With reference to the other thread
Re: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
The other problem is how all
of this logic connects to Everything. That is why I am trying to
understand the 0-person. I think
On Fri, Nov 24, 2006 at 12:12:07PM +1100, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
My paper proves zombies can't do science. You have all said that the UD
is
not conscious. This is another way of saying that any creatures within
(computed by) a UD have no consciousness. The UD is therefore a zombie
I assume by the universe you mean ours. Understanding human
consciousness properly means we will eventually be able to prescribe
what
level of consciousness applies to the rest of the universe that is 'not
humans'. Including animals ...I predict 'not as much'rocks, fridges
etc. I
Fair enough, but this is a direct contradiction with the assumption of
computationalism.
This is a 'assume comp' playground only? I am up for not assuming
anything.but if computationalism is actually false then it becomes a
religion or a club or something.
Not at all. I don't even
Bruno wrote:
In yet another post you say:
When talking about minds, the self/other boundary need not occur on the
biological boundary (skin). I would say that when dreaming, or
hallucinating, the random firing we perceive as coming from our input
centres (visual cortex for instance) is coming
snip
Since it makes no difference in any observable respect whether we are
living in a computer simulation running on a bare substrate, as one that
is incidently computated as part of a universal dovetailer, or an
infinite chain of dovetailers, we really can make use of Laplace's ripost
to
I'm curious: how many people on this list are theists?
Stathis Papaioannou
I don't believe in any theistic garbage.
As a scientist the truth or otherwise of the proposition X = There is a
god and he did this sits forever perched on the verge of disproof through
lack of evidence in the most
I'll take that as a 'no'.
Meanwhile I have gone far enough that I think I want to take it elsewhere
and publish something. I'll find a local logician and infect them with
EC/lambda calc. It's oing to look basically the same:
(()()()())
etc
There is no end product computation. The act of
As I stuff my head with the bird menagerie, and try to see if I need to
breed a new bird, I find that EC is best thought of as a form of
combinatorics (as you thought, Bruno!).
Is there anyone out there who has any intuitions as to which bird(s) would
correspond to 'coherence' or 'symmetry
Le 10-nov.-06, ࠰5:53, Colin Geoffrey Hales a 飲it :
The brackets I have used to date are not the brackets of the lambda
calculus. I think physically, not symbolically. I find the jargon
really
hard to relate to.
I thought you were referring to Alonzo Church's original book on
lambda
See below
See below, please
John
- Original Message -
From: Colin Geoffrey Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2006 12:58 AM
Subject: Re: Zuse Symposium: Is the universe a computer? Berlin Nov 6-7
Addition to my lost
See below
See below, please
John
- Original Message -
From: Colin Geoffrey Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2006 12:58 AM
Subject: Re: Zuse Symposium: Is the universe a computer? Berlin Nov 6-7
Addition to my lost
see below..
See below, please
John
- Original Message -
From: Colin Geoffrey Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2006 12:58 AM
Subject: Re: Zuse Symposium: Is the universe a computer? Berlin Nov 6-7
Addition to my lost
sorry about all the posts.
something weird going on.
see below..
See below, please
John
- Original Message -
From: Colin Geoffrey Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2006 12:58 AM
Subject: Re: Zuse Symposium
snip
Are you saying that you disallow lambda expression having the shape:
(LAMBDA (X) F)
with no occurrence of X in F?
The brackets I have used to date are not the brackets of the lambda
calculus. I think physically, not symbolically. I find the jargon really
hard to relate to.
Put
Hi,
Being a clunky autodidact in these things, I have trouble finding my way
thru the various mathematical genres. I was wondering if there is a name
for the sort of calulus that has no left/right associative/precedence
one that performs reductions that are built into the calculus itself.
It makes sense (I have to translate YOUR vocabujlaryh
into mine, of course).
It ramifies into SELF and Not-SELF and into the
relational view of the totality.
Also: it leads into my old beef that everything is
consckious at its own level.
What to include into 'everything' is of course a
Hi,
Having got deeper into the analysis, what I have found is that EC is
literally an instantated lamba calculus by Church. So all I have to do is
roughly axiomatise EC in Church's form and I'm done. So that is what I am
doing. I'll be directly referring to church's original work. Once that is
TEST: resend...some sort of bounce thing happened with the mailer
Hi,
Having got deeper into the analysis, what I have found is that EC is
literally an instantated lamba calculus by Church. So all I have to do is
roughly axiomatise EC in Church's form and I'm done. So that is what I am
doing.
Addition to my lost and found 1st post in this topic to
Marc:
I wonder how would you define besides 'universe' and 'computer' the
IS
?
*
I agree that 'existence' is more than a definitional question.
Any suggestion yet of an (insufficient?) definition?
(Not Descartes' s I
===
STEP 7: Something from nothing. (the big bang)
U(.) = (*) from previous STEP.
= (()()()()()()()()()()...()()()()())
There is some need to deal with this issue because it leads to the
mathematical drive of EC that we inside see as the
=
STEP 5: The rolling proof
NOTES:
1) There is only 1 proof in EC. (Symbolically it has been designated U(.)
above)
2) It consists of 1 collection of basic EC primitives (axioms)
3) The current state of the proof is 'now' the thin slice of the
I posted the next installment of EC yesterday from the google group.
No sign of it anywhere, anyone?
Colin
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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To post to this group, send email
That'd be it am doing it again! :(
I posted the next installment of EC yesterday from the google group.
No sign of it anywhere, anyone?
Colin
Colin, did you post it using the Beta version? I've stopped using this
because it lost two of my posts permanently (it said 'your post was
David Nyman:
Point taken. The EC 'axioms' may be better conceived as primitive
computations (like the UD), not theorems. In terms of comp, is there any
necessary distinction between a UD and a parallel distributed
'architecture'?
I am not sure what the EC axioms are. The UD is both
[Scene: Night-time. Fathers Ted and Dougal are in bed.
Ted: Dougal, that's a great idea! Can you tell me more?
Dougal: Whoa, Ted - I want out! I can't take the pressure.]
..However, purely on the understanding that I'm a mere COMP
kibbitzer, and of course -
This is to be FUN.
Not
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
In-Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[Colin]
a) assume that there is an 'objective reality in the Bruno sense: a
reality exists. _any_ sort of reality will do.
b) draw a purely notional boundary around any portion of it at any
spatiotemporal
Ok David,
Let's start afresh and do this. At least give it a go. This is to be FUN.
Not work.
I know enough about EC. You know enough about COMP. The goal is to get to
a more concrete formal understanding of the difference between reality and
computation, physics, logic, maths and 'being'
[Colin]
snip
Indeed I would hold that our subjective experience (subjectivity)is our
one and only intimate and complete connection to the underlying reality
and it is the existence of it (subjectivity) 'at all' which is most
telling/instructive of the true nature/structure of the underlying
snip
[Colin Hales]
No, it's better visualised as 'being a not-mirror' :-)
Imagine you embedded a mirror in your head, but you were only interested
in everything the mirror was not. That is, the image in the mirror is
manipulating the space intimately adjacent to the reflecting surface.
Keep the
On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are
conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that
we don't know how?
It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is
ex-hypothesi
[EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
George and List:
a very naive question (even more than my other posts) since I miss lots
of
posts that have been exuded on this list (since a decade or so of my
incompletely reading it):
Has it been ever formulated (and accepted on this list!) what we mean by
the verb
LZ:
Colin Hales wrote:
I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I
can't help what I see... is there something wrong with this way of thinking?
I don't see what you think a non-ideal number is.
This deficit of mine includes having trouble with ALL numbers. :-)
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