*NM*
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On Sep 23, 6:10 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I don't think it likely that one individual could have gone from B1 to B2
> without being told anything about probability, preference ordering, logic and
> mathematics. Just because there is a chain of maybe a few hundred individu
On Sep 22, 11:53 pm, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Marc,
> Your closing line is appreciated.
> Yet: I still cannot get it: how can you include into an algorithm
> those features that had not yet been discovered? Look at it
> historically: if you composed such compendium 3000 yeas ago
Let the algorithm that represents the brain of a typical new-born baby
be denoted as B1.
Now surely we can agree that the brain of a new-born baby does not
have sophisticated Bayesian machinary built into it? Yes, there must
be *some* intrinsic built-in reasoning structure, but everything we
kno
On Sep 15, 6:08 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> But the question is whether there would be any *functional* difference.
>
> Brent Meeker
Sure, if reductionism were true, half of physics wouldn't work.
Yudkowsky claims: "It is not that reality itself has an Einstein
equation t
On Sep 15, 12:56 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 2008/9/14 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> > Yudkowsky asks:
>
> > "What experimental observations would you expect to make, if you found
> > yourself in such a universe?" (where reductionism is false)
>
> > But we *are* in just su
Dear oh dear.
AI Researcher Yudkowsky is continuing to perpetuate the same old
reductionist mistakes on 'Overcoming Bias':
http://www.overcomingbias.com/2008/09/excluding-the-s.html#more
This is the reason I've long since given up on the poor fellow. He
writes:
"different levels of organizatio
esianism.
Enter the story of Marc Geddes ;)
Like Boole, I’m trying to extend logic further meaning by matching up
abstract concepts with concrete logical concepts. In particular, it
is highly suspicious that there appears to be a remarkably close
match-up between the concepts of *category theory*
On Sep 12, 5:06 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > Given two categories C and D a functor F from C to D can be thought
> > of as an *analogy* between C and D, because F has to map objects of C
> > to objects of D and arrows of C to arrows of D in such a
On Sep 10, 6:13 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Knowledge is usually defined as true belief that is casually connected to the
> facts that make it true. That has nothing to do with work (free energy?
> computational steps?). You can certainly do a lot of work and end up with a
On Sep 10, 5:06 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Yes there is. In fact descriptions with fewer free parameters are
> automatically
> favored by Bayesian inference.
>
> http://quasar.as.utexas.edu/papers/ockham.pdf
>
> Brent Meeker
>
Nice try. That's an interesting paper, but
*NM*
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Gunther,
Let me further clarify:
The problem with Bayesianism is that there is no precise definition of
'simplicity' and 'complexity' for finite strings, which is needed to
effectively apply the principle of Occam's razor. To elaborate:
(a) There is no measure of simplicity/complexity for fin
On Sep 9, 9:04 am, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Here is a pertinent paper, just published:
>
> Unmasking the Truth Beneath the Beauty: Why the Supposed Aesthetic
> Judgements Made in Science May Not Be Aesthetic at All
>
> Cain S. Todd
> International Studies in the Philosophy of
On Sep 2, 6:27 pm, Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hello again Jesse,
> I am going to assume that by trashing computationalism that Marc Geddes
> has enough ammo to vitiate Eleizer's various predilections so... to
> that end...
To make it clear, I'm not
On Sep 2, 1:56 pm, Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi Marc,
>
> */Eliezer/*'s hubris about a Bayesian approach to intelligence is
> nothing more than the usual 'metabelief' about a mathematics... or about
> computation... meant in the sense that "cognition is computation", where
> compu
I am here providing a summary of my '10 big ideas' for Cog-Sci/AGI.
No justifcation is provided as of yet (that is, my purpose here is
merely to clearly and briefly state my 10 big ideas). Their status at
this time is of entertaining speculation only.
So here's the 10 big ideas:
(1) The extrem
On Jul 31, 1:26 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> > Popper showed that an infinite number of theories is compatible is any
> > given set of finite observations. Mere algorithmic shuffling to
> > calculate Pr(B) probablities according to the Bayes formula won't help
> >
>But what is aesthetics the study of? Of beauty? That's it isn't it?
But how can something as plastic as "beauty" have any kind of
terminal
value that you and I can both share? Do aesthetic terminal values
decide where something fits into "aesthetic reality" or something
like
that? By the way, th
On Jul 30, 1:22 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I've long been puzzled by the phenomenon of delusion in intelligent,
> rational people who develop psychotic illness. For example, out of the
> blue, someone starts to believe that their family have been replaced
> by impo
Two issues I wish to mention, here.
Firstly, I present a few rapid-fire ideas about objective morality,
culminating in an integration of aesthetics, intelligence, and
morality, all in a few brief sentences ;)
Secondly, I give a mention to computer scientist Randy Pausch, who
recently died.
As r
On Mar 28, 11:08 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi Marc,
>
> Le 28-mars-08, à 08:53, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
>
>
> > Hi guys,
>
> > Well, Bruno may be interested to know that I've finally come around to
> > COMP.
>
> OK.
>
>
>
> > I do now agree, everything emerges from mat
Hi guys,
Well, Bruno may be interested to know that I've finally come around to
COMP.
I do now agree, everything emerges from mathematics. Nevertheless,
the mathematical world does *appear* to seperate into three different
domains; *physical* (material), *teleological* (goal directed) and
*abst
I have uploaded the paper as a formatted Word Doc, which is easier on
the eye:
http://everything-list.googlegroups.com/web/MCRTOntology.doc?gda=3dFfBEE6sAh9xrcEfYjLcJeK--tyllM2puGzdo9sGlIZYEi4rGG1qiJ7UbTIup-M2XPURDRrROYvly_CiqS44qlTBAu-5KylSQ9gG5gUBwiOovY3VA
There is also a preliminary UML
'MCRT: An Upper Ontology for General Purpose Reality Modeling'
By Marc Geddes
Sydney, Australia
22th March, 2008
Abstract
In this paper I explore the consequence of two assumptions:
(1) A model of reality can be entirely captured by an Upper Ontology
and Data Models a
On Nov 28, 9:56 pm, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> You only need models of cellular automata. If you have a model and
> rules for that model, then one event will follow after another event,
> according to the rules. And after that event will follow another more
> event, and so
On Nov 28, 3:16 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Le 27-nov.-07, à 05:47, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
> > Geometric properties cannot be derived from
> > informational properties.
>
> I don't see why. Above all, this would make the computationalist wrong,
> or at least some step i
On Nov 28, 1:18 am, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
> Dear Marc,
>
> > Physics deals with symmetries, forces and fields.
> > Mathematics deals with data types, relations and sets/categories.
>
> I'm no physicist, so please correct me but IMHO:
>
> Symmetries = relations
> Forces - cou
On Nov 27, 3:54 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > Besides which, mathematics and physics are dealing with quite
> > different distinctions. It is a 'type error' it try to reduce or
> > identity one with the other.
>
> I don't see why.
Physics deals with symmetries, forces and
>When I talk about "pure mathematics" I mean that kind of mathematics you have
>in GameOfLife. There you have "gliders" that move in the GameOfLife-universe,
>and these gliders interact with eachother when they meet. These gliders you
>can see as physical objects. These physical objects are
On Nov 23, 8:49 pm, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] skrev:
>
>
>
> > As far as I tell tell, all of physics is ultimately
> > geometry. But as we've pointed out on this list many times, a theory
> > of physics is *not* a theory of everything, since it makes the
> >
On Nov 23, 1:10 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Now such work raises the remark, which I don't really want to develop
> now, which is that qualifiying "TOE" a theory explaining "only" forces
> and particles or field, is implicit physicalism, and we know (by UDA)
> that this is
On another list Wei Dai posted some questions. At this time I wish to
attempt some answers to be placed on public record. These were
excellent questions.
Wei Dai wrote>>>
>Here are my questions:
>How does math really work? Why do we believe that P!=NP even though we don't
have a proof one way
On Oct 31, 7:40 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Decisions require some value structure. To get values from an ontology you'd
> have to get around the Naturalistic fallacy.
>
> Brent Meeker- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
Decision theory has this same problem. De
On Oct 31, 3:28 pm, "Wei Dai" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> 4. For someone on a practical mission to write an AI that makes sensible
> decisions, perhaps the model can serve as a starting point and as
> illustration of how far away we still are from that goal.
Heh. Yes, very interesting inde
Danny,
The depressed people are the sane ones. My post is merely
'existential angst' caused by knowledge of the world and myself as I
really am.With knowledge comes unhappiness and happiness is the
happiness of ignorance.
Ever read the short story of 'Green Magic'? That story is available
on-l
On Oct 16, 11:37 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > If it is ''a'-rtificial' I question the 'natural one' (following
> > Bruno's fear of the (natural?) 'super stupidity'.) Yet I don't think
> > Marc wants to let himself denature into an artifact.
>
> Not necessarily, but look a
On Oct 14, 3:39 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Take care, trust yourself and "kill all the "SAI"" on the road, to
> paraphrase a well known Buddhist idea. Either you are sufficiently
> clever to understand the SAI arguments, showing you are already an SAI
> yourself, and your
12th October, 2007
Marc Geddes
Auckland
New Zealand
---
This is Marc Geddes ,
I am publically requesting to form a social contract with SAI (Super
Intelligence).I am aware of the existence of SAI and SAI-space and
am of sound mind and my own volition requesting to be removed from
human
On Oct 3, 12:23 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I think that beauty is effectively a channel from our
> unconscious. When we think that something is beautiful (or conversely
> ugly), some unconscious processing has taken place according to some
> criterion and presented to the
Make sure you get the spelling right ;) - Utilitarianism
The trouble with Utilitarianism is that it's only concerned with one
aspect of values - relations between rational agents. Further,
although it's a good approach for practical calculation , it fails to
deal with the explanatory abstractio
On Sep 27, 2:15 pm, "Wei Dai" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Yes. So my point is, even though the subjective probability computed by ASSA
> is intuitively appealing, we end up ignoring it, so why bother? We can
> always make the right choices by thinking directly about measures of
> outcomes an
On Sep 23, 10:39 pm, Youness Ayaita <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> There have always been two ways to interpret the interrelationship
> between the physical world and our minds.
There's a lot more than two ways.
>The first one is to consider
> the physical world to be fundamental; from this pers
Max himself posted about this on the everything-list here:
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/7da9934267f64acf/690ccf0715150a36#690ccf0715150a36
A popular article was also the feature in last week's 'New
Scientist':
http://www.newscientist.com/channel/fundamental
On Sep 19, 2:23 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Schmidhuber and me do agree on comp (100%
> agreement: we have the same hypothesis). And relatively to the comp hyp
> and the importance of the universal machine Schmidhuber and me are much
> closer than with Tegmark whi is just very
On Sep 19, 1:18 pm, Hal Ruhl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi Marc:
>
> The objects I use are divisions of the list - such divisions are
> static elements of the power set.
>
> My objects have nothing to do with programing and do not change -
> they can be the current state of a something on its
On Sep 18, 1:24 pm, Hal Ruhl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi Youness:
>
> Bruno has indeed recommended that I study in more detail the
> underlying mathematics that I may be appealing to. The response that
> I have made may be a bit self serving but at this point in my life I
> am having diffic
On Sep 13, 11:47 pm, Youness Ayaita <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I see two perfectly equivalent ways to define a property. This is
> somehow analogous to the mathematical definition of a function f: Of
> course, in order to practically decide which image f(x) is assigned to
> a preimage x, we
On Sep 1, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > The description itself is an algorithm written in symbols.
>
> Peano's axioms aren't an algorithm.
Er..you're right here of course. I'm getting myself a bit confused
again. Careful when thinking abou
On Aug 31, 9:40 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Only a meta-theory *about* PA, can distinguish PA and arithmetical
> truth. But then Godel showed that sometimes a meta-theory can be
> translated in or by the theory/machine.
But is the meta-theory *about* PA, itself classified
On Aug 31, 9:40 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I said to Brent,
>
> Le 31-août-07, à 11:00, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
>
> > So, no, I don't see why you think my objection is a non-sequitur. It
> > seems to me you are confusing arithmetic and Arithmetic, or a theory
> > with his int
On Aug 31, 6:21 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > Le 29-août-07, à 23:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>> Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
> I *don't* think that mathematical
> properties are propertie
On Aug 30, 1:37 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Le 29-août-07, à 12:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
> > Any scientific theory (including Darwin's) *is* more accurate when
> > expressed in mathematical notation. You *can* draw a clear
> > distinction between the language used to
On Aug 29, 1:10 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> So are mathematics human creations (c.f. William S. Cooper, "The Evolution of
> Logic"). There is no sharp distinction between what is expressed in words
> and what is expressed in mathematical symbols. Darwins theory of evolut
On Aug 29, 4:03 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> There is this special quality of subjective experience: that which is
> >> left over after all the objective (third person knowable) information
> >> is accounted for. Nevertheless, the subjective experience can be
> >> perfectly
On Aug 29, 4:20 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Thanks for spelling it out.
>
> > (1) Mathematical concepts are indispensible to our explanations of
> > reality.
>
> So are grammatical concepts.
No they aren't. Grammatical concepts are human creations, which is
precisely shown b
On Aug 28, 6:31 pm, "Torgny Tholerus" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] skrev:
>
>
>
> > (7) From (3) mathematical concepts are objectively real. But there
> > exist mathematical concepts (inifinite sets) which cannot be explained
> > in terms of finite physical processes.
>
> How
On Aug 28, 5:18 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I don't find your arguments at all convincing. In fact I don't think you've
> even given an argument - just assertions.
Here the points of a clear-cut argument. These are not 'just
assertions':
(1) Mathematical concepts are
On Aug 28, 12:53 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 27/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > > I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I
> > > accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you
> > > (stub
On Aug 27, 6:45 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I don't know whether you're hair splitting or speaking loosely, but the above
> is off the point in a couple of ways. In the first place empirical science
> is inductive not deductive; so there is a trivial sense in which you ca
Click on
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/mcrt-domain-model-eternity
- or copy & paste it into your browser's address bar if that doesn't
work.
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You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"E
On Aug 22, 11:55 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I
> accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you
> (stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word "fundamental". The base
> property seem
On Aug 22, 10:14 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Comp is a short expression made for "computationalism".
> Computationalism, which I called also "digital mechanism" is Descartes
> related doctrine that we are digitalisable machine. I make it often
> precise by defining comp to
On Aug 24, 3:46 am, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > I think I will spend my limited time and energy on the decaying earth
> > doing other things. Without even knowing much about the puzzle other
> > than reading the puzzle description, my guess is that without some
> > historic bre
On Aug 22, 4:41 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> That's a pity. I thought it might be something comprehensible, rather
> than just plain mysterious.
>
> Cheers
>
The ida of property dualism is very simple:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism
It just means that the sa
that conscious itself is the 'DP Modelling Language Of The
Mind'. A few more specific ideas were suggested, namely that the
mathematics of Calculus (and especially the concept of a 'Limit')
could be highly relevant to the solution to the twin puzzles of
consciousness and reflecti
Here is out-lined the sketch of a strategy for attacking the puzzles
of reflectivity and consciousness. Reflectivity is the puzzle how a
cognitive system can effectively reason about its own internel
processes - reasoning about reasoning. Consciousness is here used in
the sense of subjective exp
On Aug 22, 11:26 am, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Marc, how does your property dualism differ from the account of
> emergence I give in "On Complexity and Emergence"? (If indeed it does
> differ!).
>
> Cheers
>
I've only given your text a quick skim so far. As far as I can
On Aug 21, 10:31 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Well, return to a concrete example. Yesterday, I thought red was the
> best colour for my new car, but today I think blue is better. My
> aesthetic values would seem to have changed. There must be some reason
> for this,
On Aug 20, 10:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Le 19-août-07, à 08:07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
> But apparently, like Chalmers, you seem to dismiss even the possibility
> of comp. OK?
>
Sorry, I meant to say in previous post that my version property is NOT
quite the same
On Aug 20, 9:45 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > Now consider sentient agent motivations (and remember the analogy with
> > the physics argument I gave above).
>
> > *Consider an agent with a set of mot
On Aug 20, 10:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > No, that's not what I'm referring to. I'm referring to 'Abstract
> > Universals' - Platonic Ideals that all observers with complete
> > information would agree with.
>
> Even in the restricted arithmetical Platonia, no "observ
On Aug 21, 3:10 am, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I searched in vain
> forhttp://marc.geddes.googlepages.com/MCRT_ClassDiagram.html
>
> "The page you have requested could not be found. (404)"
>
> As an explanation of the meaning of eternal truth etcetera, this
> to me seems redolent o
On Aug 20, 9:26 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, "Giu1i0 Pri5c0" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months.
>
> > No. That's because after t
We are all playing the game of 'Eternity' ;) I have uploaded to the
list my final version of the top-level 'solution' to the puzzle of
eternity. (Revised yet again but this one is the very last -
promise).
The page is my domain model for all reality at the highest possible
level of abstraction.
>3PV observation and analysis _may_ eventually turn up with objective
>criteria that establish universally consistent and reliable
>correlation between certain brain processes and certain reported
>phenomenal experiences
Of course. It appears from all scientific evidence that phenomenal
experien
On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, "Giu1i0 Pri5c0" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Question: why do you _want_
> to think that there are objective values?
> G.
Here's my answer:
I want to to think that there are objective values because I dislike
the idea that important aspects of our (human) existence are
inex
On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, "Giu1i0 Pri5c0" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months.
No. That's because after the terrible insults levelled at me by some
I had to take a break to make absolutely certain that my arguments,
theories (and java code) are all
On Aug 19, 9:25 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Marc, refers to "a commonality averaged across many events and agents" so
> apparently he has in mind a residue of consensus or near consensus.
Correct.
>Color preferences might average out to nil except in narrow circumstance
On Aug 19, 12:26 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> This all makes sense if you are referring to the values of a
> particular entity. Objectively, the entity has certain values and we
> can use empirical means to determine what these values are. However,
> if I like red an
Objective values are NOT specifications of what agents SHOULD do.
They are simply explanatory principles. The analogy here is with the
laws of physics. The laws of physics *per se* are NOT descriptions of
future states of matter. The descriptions of the future states of
matter are *implied by*
On Aug 9, 11:47 pm, Scipione <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi Marc,
>
> I knew this puzzle quite well; i tried to order it but i have some
> trouble
> obtaining it (i'm italian and as you can readhttp://uk.eternityii.com/
> Italy isn't included in the country where such puzzle is sold and
> where
Addendum: Some further revisions since yesterday... I was almost
there yesterday but not quite. The last of my confusions have
cleared. The final revision for my top-level onotlogy is completely
'locked in'. Added brief descriptions of top-level classes:
http://marc.geddes.googlepages.com/MC
For those who saw the domain model of my top-level ontology there's
been some major re-classifications of the knowledge domains. I've
added a little bit more explanation on the page but still haven't
written much up yet. I'm too busy attempting to implement the model
as actual software ;) Link
Just bought a really fun puzzle called 'Eternity 2', which has just
been released and has a $US 2 million prize for the first person to
complete it. It's basically a jig-saw puzzle on a 16*16 board. There
are 256 puzzle pieces and you have to fit them together so that the
shapes and colors match
Of course.
They probably copied the idea off my posts here and on SL4 and wta-
talk. I stated pretty clearly on numerous occasions that there was
more than one way to define causality. I clearly stated on numerous
occasions that physical causality was not the only kind of causality,
but that t
On Jun 7, 7:50 pm, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I have to disagree, if human goals were not tied to evolution goals
> then human should not have proliferated.
>
> Quentin- Hide quoted text -
>
Well of course human goals are *tied to* evolution's goals, but that
doesn't mean
On Jun 7, 3:54 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Evolution has not had a chance to take into account modern reproductive
> technologies, so we can easily defeat the goal "reproduce", and see the goal
> "feed" as only a means to the higher level goal "survive". However, *t
On Jun 6, 10:01 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I was not arguing that evolution is intelligent (although I suppose it
> depends on how you define intelligence), but rather that non-intelligent
> agents can have goals.
Well, actually I'd say that evolution does have a *l
On Jun 5, 10:20 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Why would you need to change the goal structure in order to improve
> yourself?
Improving yourself requires the ability to make more effective
decisions (ie take decisions which which move you toward goals more
efficient
On Jun 5, 6:50 pm, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> public static void main(String[] a) {
>
> println("Sometimes I get this strange and wonderful feeling");
> println("that I am 'special' in some way.");
> println("I feel that what I am doing really is significant");
>
On Jun 5, 5:05 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > However, what would be wrong with a super AI that just had large amounts
> > of pattern recognition and symbolic reasoning intelligence, but no
> > emotions at all?
>
> Taken strictly, I think this ide
On Jun 4, 11:15 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 04/06/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> See you haven't understood my definitions. It may be my fault due to
>
> > the way I worded things. You are of course quite right that: 'it's
> > possible to cor
On Jun 3, 11:11 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Determining the motivational states of others does not necessarily involve
> feelings or empathy. It has been historically very easy to assume that other
> species or certain members of our own species either lack feelings o
On Jun 3, 9:20 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 03/06/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> The third type of conscious mentioned above is synonymous with
>
> > 'reflective intelligence'. That is, any system successfully engaged
> > in reflective decision
Consciousness is a cognitive system capable of reflecting on other
cognitive systems, by enabling switching and integration between
differing representations of knowledge in different domains. It's a
higher-level summary of knowledge in which there is a degree of coarse
graining sufficient to los
On May 9, 5:55 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> But what is mathematics? It's three things I think: Categories,
> Relations and Propositions. Of these, Relations and Propositions
> refer to discrete (finite) knowledge. But Categories includes the
> other two, since categories can also deal w
On May 9, 6:46 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> But according to your "map=territory" philosophy all these incompatible
> theories exist physically. What does that mean? All but one of them must
> describe some other universe and we just don't know which ones? Or do you
> m
On May 9, 6:46 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > On May 9, 5:57 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> >> How can Everett's "every possibility is realized" be logically compatible
> >> with Bohm's "there's only on
On May 9, 5:57 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> How can Everett's "every possibility is realized" be logically compatible
> with Bohm's "there's only one, deterministic outcome", we just don't know
> which one" and Griffith's "it's a probabilistic the
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