sorts of
complications and convoluted explanations. So why come up with it in the
first place?
I find the idea of a multiverse elegant and simple, and despite what
you say I think it is consistent with observation.
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mentioned.
I meant multiverse, not specifically the MWI of QM.
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, then time MUST flow...
You, yourself demonstrate my point...
The point was that I, now am no more privileged in time compared to
other versions of myself than I am privileged in space compared to
other people.
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motion would be
maintained for the observer in the computation. If running time were
needed to connect them how could mangling it in this way have no
effect?
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the other versions of me in a block universe
feel special to themselves in the same way. No spotlight from the
universe in the form of the present moment or the present location
is needed to create this effect.
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universe is consistent with our experience.
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consciousness.
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circuitry
it affects consciousness. If you fix the lesion such that the
circuitry works properly but the consciousness is affected (keeping
the environmental input constant) then that implies that consciousness
is generated by something other than the brain.
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immortality was a new and mindblowing idea for me, James Higgo
was still alive, and Jacques Mallah was calling everyone a crackpot.
Fond memories!
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I don't know why you distinguish between a function such as moving the
hand and identifying the hand as your own. Both of these depend on
correctly working brain circuitry, which is why a brain lesion can
cause paralysis but can also cause alien hand syndrome.
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You
you consider mysterious consciousness stuff is actually
dependent on well defined physical processes. The alternative which would
have made your point would be if the consciousness changed but the brain
did not.
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that even
mysterious-seeming behaviours such as those displayed in ALH are generated
by neural circuitry which can be easily disrupted.
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that it doesn't feel like his hand. This happens because the neural
circuits between the hand and the language centres are disrupted. If they
were not disrupted the language centres would get normal input and the
subject would say everything was normal.
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could not.
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will be
favoured if both hands are at risk of being lost, or whatever else you
want to make non-self mean.
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replicating its behaviour under all circumstances, or to put it
differently ensuring the outputs are the same for all inputs.
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On 2 March 2014 22:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be javascript:;
wrote:
On 02 Mar 2014, at 08:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 1 March 2014 01:40, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be javascript:;
wrote:
If you start with the assumption that the physics relevant to brain
function
implicitly, as it uses terms like state as
that was a simple notion, which it is, but only with comp. Your
functionalism is just mechanism. I think, with the option of being perhaps
non digital.
Bruno
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to show that it's not
obvious, but we know it's not obvious. However, it's true. You don't
address the arguments showing it to be true. It's like focussing on how we
would fall off the earth if it were round but failing to explain the photos
from space.
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that self-awareness should develop as a
result of some such complex behaviour than because the VCR is made out of
meat.
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, then why can't the same
natural effect happen with the computer?
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, and the matter in it is no more meaningful than
the matter in a computer.
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our body is the relevant picture. It is the patterns which
we feel directly which are important as far as consciousness is concerned.
So why do you think the meaningless patterns and matter in a brain but not
in a computer can be associated with consciousness?
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You
a shared human experience. If you
only look at the public side, there is no private phenomena anyways, so it
is not surprising that we would assume that the public side should be
sufficient.
How do you know that a private computer life is not possible?
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On 25 March 2014 07:36, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness-is-not-a-computation-2
He could make similar arguments claiming consciousness is not chemistry.
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such as computers
in the same way that it is associated with chemical systems such as brains.
This is even consistent with theories claiming that consciousness is
primary or that consciousness exists as a separate non-physical entity.
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On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness
flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are
immortal, so it does
something that can be measured.
It's a pretty significant dodgy metaphysical consequence if you actually
live forever.
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in the stream of
consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams.
An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your
consciousness will continue in the other.
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On 26 March 2014 12:40, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 26 March 2014 13:37, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1
On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our
consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another
On 26 March 2014 12:55, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 26 March 2014 14:50, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 26 Mar 2014, at 1:46 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/25/2014 6:50 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 26 Mar 2014, at 1:56 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/25/2014 6:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 March 2014 12:55, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 26 March 2014 14:50, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb meeke
On 26 Mar 2014, at 2:22 pm, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
It's a pretty significant dodgy metaphysical consequence if you actually
live forever.
Its many things. Interesting, strange, wonderful and so on but the one thing
it isn't is significant.
The continuation of
On 26 Mar 2014, at 2:23 pm, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 26 March 2014 14:57, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
I agree but I don't think you need to refer to QM at all. The conclusion
would still follow in a classical infinite universe.
I don't see that, because you
On 26 March 2014 17:13, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/25/2014 9:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
You don't need an *exact* copy, just a good enough copy. If an exact copy
were needed, either at the quantum level or to an infinite number of
decimal places, then we could
On Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR
lizj...@gmail.comjavascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','lizj...@gmail.com');
wrote:
On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou
stath
On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher
than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment
On 27 March 2014 18:48, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 26 Mar 2014, at 13:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR lizj
On 27 March 2014 19:11, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 26 Mar 2014, at 22:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The engineering
On 28 Mar 2014, at 1:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 27 Mar 2014, at 11:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 March 2014 18:48, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 26 Mar 2014, at 13:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, March 26, 2014
. But then the potential
he used provides the best fit to BICEP2 gravitational-wave data. Perhaps it
is the multiverse that is falsified?
2 x multiverse = multiverse
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On 28 March 2014 09:37, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 27 March 2014 23:42, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On 27 March 2014 19:11, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 26 Mar 2014, at 22:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish li
On 28 March 2014 09:51, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 28 March 2014 11:46, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
I would say there is only a finite number of possible biological human
minds,
Because the number is limited by the Beckenstein bound if we assume
physical
On 28 March 2014 10:16, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 28 March 2014 12:00, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On 28 March 2014 09:51, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 28 March 2014 11:46, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
I would say there is only a finite number
On 29 March 2014 03:24, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
A functionalist could agree that a computer can replicate his
consciousness but it would not really be him. There is no explicit or
implicit position on personal identity
On 29 March 2014 05:15, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Mar 2014, at 00:00, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 28 March 2014 09:51, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 28 March 2014 11:46, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
I would say there is only a finite number
On 29 March 2014 19:27, Bruno Marchal
marc...@ulb.ac.bejavascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','marc...@ulb.ac.be');
wrote:
On 28 Mar 2014, at 23:41, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 29 March 2014 03:24, Bruno Marchal
marc...@ulb.ac.bejavascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','marc...@ulb.ac.be');
wrote:
On 27
On 1 April 2014 12:24, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/31/2014 5:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 1 April 2014 04:04, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/31/2014 12:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically observed
On 1 April 2014 13:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/31/2014 6:41 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Are you saying that the fact that we don't see many worlds is
evidence against many worlds?
No, the fact that whatever our instrument reads our *theory* says
is contrary to faith and therefore bad.
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On 4 April 2014 20:33, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Apr 4, 2014 at 1:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote:
On 4 April 2014 15:59, Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote:
I suggest we study and evaluate it for its literal merit, rather than
'what
importance that we base
our beliefs and actions upon critical inquiry and honest understanding.
So are you saying that if a scientific error is pointed out to you in the
Bible or the Quran you will accept that they are not the word of God?
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the same behaviour, but does it have the same experience?
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effectively swallowed all the implcations of
comp.
The required substitution level cannot be the quantum level since we
know that people can survive with their cognitive faculties intact
even with gross brain changes, such as after a stroke or head injury.
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proponents claim
cryptocurrencies may eventually partly supplant.
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On 19 December 2013 08:32, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
If this is a proof of the falsity of mechanism, is there any chance of a
precis? :-)
The argument has been restated with elaboration by Penrose, and has
been extensively criticised.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/
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and
unpredictable effects, accounting for most natural phenomena.
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!
I'm a lump of dumb matter arranged in a special way and I am
conscious, so I don't see why another lump of dumb matter arranged in
a special way might not also be conscious. What is it about that idea
that you see as not only wrong, but ridiculous?
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of the anti-computationalists. And even if there
is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.
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On 16 January 2014 23:08, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 16 Jan 2014, at 09:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the Intel
CPU inside the box on your desk
On 17 January 2014 01:17, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jan 16, 2014, at 2:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the Intel
CPU
that it is not possible to create a living
cell by arranging atoms.
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On 13 January 2014 02:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 12 Jan 2014, at 06:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I'm a lump of dumb matter arranged in a special way and I am
conscious,
I think this is misleading. Are you really a dumb of matter? I think that
your body can be a lump
actually disagree with?
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On 17 January 2014 11:43, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:42 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 17 January 2014 13:34, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
I meant that if the physics of the brain is computable it follows as a
straighforward
implies. It also doesn't require any explicit theory of
consciousness.It is just a consequence of the fact that you, now,
consider yourself a continuation of you, yesterday, even though the
matter in your body is different and in a different configuration.
--
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--
You
.
I think you have a problem with the idea that a system could display
properties that are not obvious from examining its parts. There's no
way to argue around this, you just believe it and that's that.
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I got this wrong?
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the keys around a bit it would be obvious
that there is no real understanding, while with the Chinese Room would
be able to pass any test that a Chinese speaker could pass.
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.
You still haven't come up with any reason better than a vague
prejudice why, for example, the AI in the movie Her could not be
conscious.
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could not possibly be conscious?
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To post
of blancmange, decorate with sense organs and throw in
a body.
Et voila!
Voila, a cadaver.
Unless it's all set up to function properly.
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are irreversible, but people who have themselves
cryonically preserved hope that future technology will allow what is
currently thought to be irreversible to become reversible.
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considered brain dead who will be able to be revived.
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if comp explains
them both.
I don't think there is a problem if consciousness is an epiphenomenon.
If you start looking for consciousness being an extra thing with
(perhaps) its own separate causal efficacy, that's where problems
arise.
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explanation.
That statement assumes the possibility of zombies. If consciousness is
epiphenomenal, zombies are impossible.
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with what is currently defined as brain death.
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primitively
physical brains and other interacting molecules like galaxies foam.
Bruno
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to
preserve a consciousness: making an arbitrarily close copy won't do. From what
you have said before, this is what you think, but it goes against any widely
accepted biological or physical scientific theory.
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, such as a
different isotope, leaves brain function unchanged and leaves
consciousness unchanged. This is because the brain works using
chemical rather than nuclear reactions. It is an assumption but it is
consistent with every observation ever made.
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consciousness unchanged?
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-preserving about switching isotopes,
it's just that switching isotopes is an example of part replacement
that makes no functional difference, like replacing a part in your car
with a new part that is 0.001 mm bigger.
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recently for the first time,
Scottsdale Arizona and NYC, and other than Christmas decorations I
can't recall seeing much evidence of religion at all. This is perhaps
a superficial impression but I was a bit surprised nevertheless.
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but in
the last few months the range of discussion topics has changed
radically. The Internet is large and there are plenty of other forums
in which to discuss politics and religion. Could we return to the old
list please?
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.
So you're saying that we can somehow sense the reality of other minds,
beyond any reasoning? Would you agree then that if someone sensed that
a computer had a mind it would have a mind?
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by a human
being.
Which contradicts your original claim that we can just sense that
other people are conscious without any logical analysis.
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doesn't mean that we can't authentically tell
when something natural is 3D.
You're saying that a robot behaving like a human may fool you, but how do
you know that your apparently fellow humans are not robots? You're going by
their behaviour.
-- Stathis Papaioannou
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say that logically there's no reason for anything to
exist, but it does.
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universe necessarily rather than contingently
exists.
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is, and your computer might be conscious
despite your feeling that it is not.
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. You talk with authority on what
can and can't have consciousness but it seems you don't have even an
operational definition of the word. I am not asking for an explanation
or theory of consciousness, just for a test to indicate its presence,
which is a much weaker requirement.
--
Stathis
is a much weaker requirement.
That is too much to ask, since all tests supervene upon the consciousness to
evaluate results.
It's the case for any test that you will use your consciousness to
evaluate the results.
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Stathis Papaioannou
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to anyone as a robot - it would in fact be a slave.
You don't think it would happen, but would you be prepared to say that
if a robot did pass the test, as tough as you want to make it, it
would be conscious?
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Stathis Papaioannou
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to be and
blink a lot.
So you accept the possibility of zombies, beings which could live
among us and consistently fool everyone into thinking they were
conscious?
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Stathis Papaioannou
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) over the
course of months with the matter in the food he eats.
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Stathis Papaioannou
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experiments are equivalent. Rationally, you should not have a
preference for either - though both are bad in that you experience
pain but then forget it.
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Stathis Papaioannou
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