On Mon, Dec 08, 2008 at 09:43:47AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > Michael Lockwood distinguishes between materialism (consciousness
> > supervenes on the physical world) and physicalism (the physical world
> > suffices to explain everything). The difference between the two is
> > that in phys
On Wed, Dec 10, 2008 at 10:39:34AM +, Michael Rosefield wrote:
> This distinction between physicalism and materialism, with materialism
> allowing for features to emerge, it sounds to me like a join-the-dots puzzle
> - the physical substrate provides the dots, but the supervening system also
>
Abram Demski wrote:
> Bruno,
>
> Thanks for the references.
You are welcome.
>
> ps- it is final exam crunch time, so I haven't been checking email so
> much as usual... I may get around to more detailed replies et cetera
> this weekend or next week.
With pleasure.
Best,
Bruno
>
>
> On Su
This distinction between physicalism and materialism, with materialism
allowing for features to emerge, it sounds to me like a join-the-dots puzzle
- the physical substrate provides the dots, but the supervening system also
contains lines - abstract structures implied by but not contained within th
Bruno,
Thanks for the references.
--Abram
ps- it is final exam crunch time, so I haven't been checking email so
much as usual... I may get around to more detailed replies et cetera
this weekend or next week.
On Sun, Dec 7, 2008 at 1:12 PM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> On 07 Dec
On 08 Dec 2008, at 00:59, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Sat, Dec 06, 2008 at 03:32:53PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> I would be pleased if you can give me a version of MAT or MEC to
>> which
>> the argument does not apply. For example, the argument applies to
>> most
>> transfinite var
On Sat, Dec 06, 2008 at 03:32:53PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> I would be pleased if you can give me a version of MAT or MEC to which
> the argument does not apply. For example, the argument applies to most
> transfinite variant of MEC. It does not apply when some "magic" is
> introduced i
On Fri, Dec 05, 2008 at 10:06:30AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Perhaps, but the whole point is that remains to be justify. It is
> *the* problem. If we assume comp, then we have to justify this. No
> doubt little programs play a key role, but the bigger one too, unless
> some destruc
On 07 Dec 2008, at 06:19, Abram Demski wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> Yes, I think there is a big difference between making an argument more
> detailed and making it more understandable. They can go together or be
> opposed. So a version of the argument targeted at my complaint might
> not be good at all
Abram Demski wrote:
> Bruno,
>
> Yes, I think there is a big difference between making an argument more
> detailed and making it more understandable. They can go together or be
> opposed. So a version of the argument targeted at my complaint might
> not be good at all pedagogically...
>
>> I wou
Bruno,
Thanks, I will look up those names. If you have the time to reference
specific papers, I would be grateful.
--Abram
On Sat, Dec 6, 2008 at 9:07 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Le 05-déc.-08, à 20:51, Abram Demski a écrit :
>
>>
>> Bruno,
>>
>> Are you asserting this ba
Bruno,
Yes, I think there is a big difference between making an argument more
detailed and making it more understandable. They can go together or be
opposed. So a version of the argument targeted at my complaint might
not be good at all pedagogically...
> I would be pleased if you can give me a
Stathis,
Yes, you are right. My main point is to show that such a point of view
is possible, not to actually argue for it... but I am largely just
asserting my intuitions nonetheless.
--Abram
On Sat, Dec 6, 2008 at 4:05 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> 2008/12/6 Abram Dems
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2008/12/6 Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>> The causal structure of a recording still looks far different from the
>> causal structure of a person that happens to follow a recording and
>> also happens to be wired to a machine that will kill them if they
>> d
Le 05-déc.-08, à 22:11, Abram Demski a écrit :
>
> Bruno,
>
> Perhaps all I am saying is that you need to state more explicitly the
> assumptions about the connection between 1st and 3rd person, in both
> MEC and MAT. Simply taking them to be the general ideas that you take
> them to be does not
Le 05-déc.-08, à 20:51, Abram Demski a écrit :
>
> Bruno,
>
> Are you asserting this based on published findings concerning
> provability logic? If so, I would be very interested in references. If
> not, then your results obviously seem publishable :).
I have published this in french a long tim
2008/12/6 Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> The causal structure of a recording still looks far different from the
> causal structure of a person that happens to follow a recording and
> also happens to be wired to a machine that will kill them if they
> deviate. Or, even, correct them if they
Bruno,
Could you possibly link to the conversation with George Levy you refer
to? I did not find it looking on my own.
--Abram
On Fri, Dec 5, 2008 at 4:20 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> On 05 Dec 2008, at 03:56, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 03, 2008 at 04:53:1
Hi Stathis,
> This seems to be getting away from the simple requirement that the
> computer be able to handle counterfactuals. What if the device were
> not easy to disarm, but almost impossible to disarm? What if it had
> tentacles in every neurone, ready to destroy it if it fired at the
> wrong
2008/12/6 Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> Stathis,
>
> I think I can get around your objection by pointing out that the
> structure of counterfactuals is quite different for a recording vs. a
> full human who is wired to be killed if they deviate from a recording.
> Someone could fairly easi
Bruno,
Perhaps all I am saying is that you need to state more explicitly the
assumptions about the connection between 1st and 3rd person, in both
MEC and MAT. Simply taking them to be the general ideas that you take
them to be does not obviously justify the argument.
Furthermore, stating the ass
Bruno,
Are you asserting this based on published findings concerning
provability logic? If so, I would be very interested in references. If
not, then your results obviously seem publishable :). That is, if you
can show that huge amounts of set theory beyond ZFC emerge from
provability logic in so
Stathis,
I think I can get around your objection by pointing out that the
structure of counterfactuals is quite different for a recording vs. a
full human who is wired to be killed if they deviate from a recording.
Someone could fairly easily disarm the killing device, whereas it
would be quite d
On 04 Dec 2008, at 15:58, Abram Demski wrote:
>
>> PS Abram. I think I will have to meditate a bit longer on your
>> (difficult) post. You may have a point (hopefully only pedagogical :)
>
> A little bit more commentary may be in order then... I think my point
> may be halfway between pedagogica
On 05 Dec 2008, at 03:56, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 03, 2008 at 04:53:11PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> I really don't know. I expect that the mathematical structure, as
>> seen
>> from inside, is so big that Platonia cannot have it neither as
>> element
>> nor as subpart.
On 05 Dec 2008, at 03:50, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 4, 2008 at 5:19 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> wrote:
>
>
> Hmmm... It means you have still a little problem with step seven. I
> wish we share a computable environment, but we cannot decide this at
> will. I agree we have
2008/12/1 Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> "Yes, consciousness supervenes on computation, but that computation
> needs to actually take place (meaning, physically). Otherwise, how
> could consciousness supervene on it? Now, in order for a computation
> to be physically instantiated, the physic
On Wed, Dec 03, 2008 at 04:53:11PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> I really don't know. I expect that the mathematical structure, as seen
> from inside, is so big that Platonia cannot have it neither as element
> nor as subpart. (Ah, well, I am aware that this is counter-intuitive,
> but he
On Thu, Dec 4, 2008 at 5:19 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Hmmm... It means you have still a little problem with step seven. I
> wish we share a computable environment, but we cannot decide this at
> will. I agree we have empirical evidence that here is such (partially)
> comp
> PS Abram. I think I will have to meditate a bit longer on your
> (difficult) post. You may have a point (hopefully only pedagogical :)
A little bit more commentary may be in order then... I think my point
may be halfway between pedagogical and serious...
What I am saying is that people will co
Brent,
I try to single out where you depart from the comp hyp, to focus on the
essential. I could add comments later on other paragraphs of your
posts.
Le 03-déc.-08, à 19:22, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> But there is causality. The sequence of events in the movie are
> directly caused
> by the
Hi Jason,
Le 03-déc.-08, à 17:20, Jason Resch a écrit :
> On Wed, Dec 3, 2008 at 9:53 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> wrote:
>>
>>> and that by virtue of this imposed order, defines relations between
>>> particles. Computation depends on relations, be it electrons in
>>> silicon, Chi
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 02 Dec 2008, at 22:24, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>>>
>>>
>>> Alice's brain and body are "just" local stable artifacts belonging to
>>> our (most probable) computational history, and making possible for
>>> Alice consciousness to differentiate through interacti
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Abram,
>
> On 02 Dec 2008, at 20:33, Abram Demski wrote:
>
>> Bruno,
>>
>> I am a bit confused. To me, you said
>>
>>> Or, you are weakening the physical supervenience
>>> thesis by appeal to a notion of causality which seems to me a bit
>>> magical, and contrary to the
Bruno,
I think I see better now. Here is my explanation of why the causality
I am invoking is not "magical" (and why it may not be an objection to
your argument after all).
Generally, the way I was viewing your argument was in terms of a
hypothetical definition of consciousness, X, that is to be
On Wed, Dec 3, 2008 at 9:53 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> and that by virtue of this imposed order, defines relations between
> particles. Computation depends on relations, be it electrons in silicon,
> Chinese with radios or a system of beer cans and ping-pong balls;
>
>
>
> H
On 03 Dec 2008, at 05:58, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
> On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 11:33 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> wrote:
>
>
> All this is a bit complex because we have to take well into account
> the distinction between
>
> A computation in the "real" world,
> A description of a computa
On 02 Dec 2008, at 22:24, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>
>> Alice's brain and body are "just" local stable artifacts belonging to
>> our (most probable) computational history, and making possible for
>> Alice consciousness to differentiate through interactions with us,
>> relatively to us.
>>
>>
Hi Abram,
On 02 Dec 2008, at 20:33, Abram Demski wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> I am a bit confused. To me, you said
>
>> Or, you are weakening the physical supervenience
>> thesis by appeal to a notion of causality which seems to me a bit
>> magical, and contrary to the local functionalism of the
>> com
On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 11:33 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> All this is a bit complex because we have to take well into account
> the distinction between
>
> A computation in the "real" world,
> A description of a computation in the "real" world,
>
> And then most importantly:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 02 Dec 2008, at 03:33, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 01 Dec 2008, at 03:25, Russell Standish wrote:
>>>
On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 07:10:43PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> I am speaking as someone unconvinced that MGA2 implies an
>> a
Günther,
Why does MGA 2 show that SMAT + MEC is inconsistent?
The way I see it, SMAT + MEC should say that a recording of Alice does
not count as conscious, because it lacks the proper causal structure
(or equivalently, the proper counterfactual behavior).
--Abram
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:53 P
Bruno,
I am a bit confused. To me, you said
>Or, you are weakening the physical supervenience
> thesis by appeal to a notion of causality which seems to me a bit
> magical, and contrary to the local functionalism of the
> computationalist.
This seems to say that the version of MAT that MGA is t
Hi Günther,
On 01 Dec 2008, at 22:53, Günther Greindl wrote:
>
> Hi Bruno,
>
>>> but no! Then we wouldn't have a substrate anymore.
>> Oh( That is not true! We still have the projector and the film. We
>> can
>> project the movie in the air or directly in your eyes.
>
> Ok I see now where our
On 02 Dec 2008, at 03:33, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 01 Dec 2008, at 03:25, Russell Standish wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 07:10:43PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I am speaking as someone unconvinced that MGA2 implies an
> absurdity. MGA2 implies that
On 02 Dec 2008, at 01:05, Abram Demski wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> It sounds like what you are saying in this reply is that my version of
> COMP+MAT is consistent, but counter to your intuition (because you
> cannot see how consciousness could be attached to physical stuff).
I have no problem a prior
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 01 Dec 2008, at 03:25, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 07:10:43PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am speaking as someone unconvinced that MGA2 implies an
absurdity. MGA2 implies that the consciousness is supervening on the
stationary
Bruno,
It sounds like what you are saying in this reply is that my version of
COMP+MAT is consistent, but counter to your intuition (because you
cannot see how consciousness could be attached to physical stuff). If
this is the case, then it sounds like MGA only works for specific
versions of MAT-
Hi Bruno,
>> but no! Then we wouldn't have a substrate anymore.
> Oh( That is not true! We still have the projector and the film. We can
> project the movie in the air or directly in your eyes.
Ok I see now where our intuitions differ (always the problem with
thought experiment) - but maybe w
On 01 Dec 2008, at 03:25, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 07:10:43PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> I am speaking as someone unconvinced that MGA2 implies an
>>> absurdity. MGA2 implies that the consciousness is supervening on the
>>> stationary film.
>>
>>
>> ? I could
Hi Abram,
On 30 Nov 2008, at 19:17, Abram Demski wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> No, she cannot be conscious that she is partially conscious in this
> case, because the scenario is set up such that she does everything as
> if she were fully conscious-- only the counterfactuals change. But, if
> someone t
On 30 Nov 2008, at 19:14, Günther Greindl wrote:
>
> Hello Bruno,
>
> I must admit you have completely lost me with MGA 3.
>
> With MGA 1 and 2, I would say that, with MEC+MAT, also the the
> projection of the movie (and Lucky Alice in 1) are conscious - because
> it supervenes on the physical a
On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 07:10:43PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > I am speaking as someone unconvinced that MGA2 implies an
> > absurdity. MGA2 implies that the consciousness is supervening on the
> > stationary film.
>
>
> ? I could agree, but is this not absurd enough, given MEC and the
On Nov 30, 2008, at 10:14 AM, Günther Greindl wrote:
> I must admit you have completely lost me with MGA 3.
I still find the whole thing easier to grasp when presented in terms
of cellular automata.
Let's say we have a computer program that starts with a large but
finite 2D grid of bits, an
Bruno,
I have reread MGA 2 and would like to add the following:
We have the
optical boolean graph: OBG -> this computes alice's dream.
we make a movie of this computation.
Now we run again, but in OBG some nodes do not make the computation
correctly, BUT the movie _triggers_ the nodes, so in
Bruno,
No, she cannot be conscious that she is partially conscious in this
case, because the scenario is set up such that she does everything as
if she were fully conscious-- only the counterfactuals change. But, if
someone tested those counterfactuals by doing something that the
recording didn't
Hello Bruno,
I must admit you have completely lost me with MGA 3.
With MGA 1 and 2, I would say that, with MEC+MAT, also the the
projection of the movie (and Lucky Alice in 1) are conscious - because
it supervenes on the physical activity.
MEC says: it's the computation that counts, not the s
On 30 Nov 2008, at 11:57, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Sat, Nov 29, 2008 at 10:11:30AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 28 Nov 2008, at 10:46, Russell Standish wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 10:09:01AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
MGA 3
>>>
>>> ...
>>>
But this reason
Abram,
>
> My answer would have to be, no, she lacks the necessary counterfactual
> behaviors during that time.
? The film of the graph lacks also the counterfactuals.
> And, moreover, if only part of the brain
> were being run by a recording
... which lacks the counterfactual, ...
> then
On 30 Nov 2008, at 04:23, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 29 Nov 2008, at 15:56, Abram Demski wrote:
>>
>>> Bruno,
>>>
The argument was more of the type : "removal of unnecessay and
unconscious or unintelligent parts. Those parts have just no
perspective. If
On Sat, Nov 29, 2008 at 10:11:30AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Nov 2008, at 10:46, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >
> > On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 10:09:01AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> MGA 3
> >
> > ...
> >
> >> But this reasoning goes through if we make the hole in the film
> >> it
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 29 Nov 2008, at 15:56, Abram Demski wrote:
>
>> Bruno,
>>
>>> The argument was more of the type : "removal of unnecessay and
>>> unconscious or unintelligent parts. Those parts have just no
>>> perspective. If they have some perpective playing arole in Alice's
>>> con
Bruno,
My answer would have to be, no, she lacks the necessary counterfactual
behaviors during that time. And, moreover, if only part of the brain
were being run by a recording then she would lack only some
counterfactuals, and so she would count as partially conscious.
--Abram
On Sat, Nov 29,
On 29 Nov 2008, at 18:49, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> This, I don't understand. And, btw, if that is true, then the
>> physical
>> supervenience thesis is already wrong. The
>> physical supervenience thesis asks that consciousness is associated
>> in
>> real time and space with the activity of so
On 29 Nov 2008, at 15:56, Abram Demski wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
>> The argument was more of the type : "removal of unnecessay and
>> unconscious or unintelligent parts. Those parts have just no
>> perspective. If they have some perpective playing arole in Alice's
>> consciousness, it would mean we ha
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 28 Nov 2008, at 10:46, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 10:09:01AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> MGA 3
>> ...
>>
>>> But this reasoning goes through if we make the hole in the film
>>> itself. Reconsider the image on the screen: with a hole in th
Bruno,
> The argument was more of the type : "removal of unnecessay and
> unconscious or unintelligent parts. Those parts have just no
> perspective. If they have some perpective playing arole in Alice's
> consciousness, it would mean we have not well chosen the substitution
> level. You are rein
On 28 Nov 2008, at 10:46, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 10:09:01AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> MGA 3
>
> ...
>
>> But this reasoning goes through if we make the hole in the film
>> itself. Reconsider the image on the screen: with a hole in the film
>> itself, you get a "
On 28 Nov 2008, at 23:20, Abram Demski wrote:
>
> Hi Bruno,
>
>>> So, basically, you are saying that I'm offering an alternative
>>> argument against materialism, correct?
>>
>> It seems to me you were going in that direction, yes.
>>
>
> Well, *I* was suggesting that we run up against the probl
Abram,
On 29 Nov 2008, at 04:49, Abram Demski wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> I have done some thinking, and decided that I don't think this last
> step of the argument works for me. You provided two arguments, and so
> I provide two refutations.
>
> 1. (argument by removal of unnecessary parts): Suppose
Bruno,
I have done some thinking, and decided that I don't think this last
step of the argument works for me. You provided two arguments, and so
I provide two refutations.
1. (argument by removal of unnecessary parts): Suppose Alice lives in
a cave all her life, with bread and water tossed down
On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 10:09:01AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> MGA 3
...
> But this reasoning goes through if we make the hole in the film
> itself. Reconsider the image on the screen: with a hole in the film
> itself, you get a "hole" in the movie, but everything which enters and
> go o
Hi Bruno,
>> So, basically, you are saying that I'm offering an alternative
>> argument against materialism, correct?
>
> It seems to me you were going in that direction, yes.
>
Well, *I* was suggesting that we run up against the problem of time in
*either* direction (physical reality / mathemat
Hi Abram,
>
> Bruno,
>
> So, basically, you are saying that I'm offering an alternative
> argument against materialism, correct?
It seems to me you were going in that direction, yes.
> Supposing that reality has a
> purely mathematical basis eliminates the problem, because removing the
> pas
Brent,
>> The connection between moments doesn't seem like a physical
>> connection; the notion is non-explanatory, since if there were such a
>> physical connection we could remove it without altering the individual
>> moments, therefore not altering our memories, and our subjective
>> experienc
Bruno,
So, basically, you are saying that I'm offering an alternative
argument against materialism, correct? Supposing that reality has a
purely mathematical basis eliminates the problem, because removing the
past is like removing the number 13.
You say that the argument by counterfactuals won't
Hi Abram,
On 27 Nov 2008, at 20:02, Abram Demski wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> It seems to me that this runs head-on into the problem of the
> definition of time...
>
>
> Here is my argument; I am sure there will be disagreement with it.
>
> Supposing that Alice's consciousness is spread out over the mo
Abram Demski wrote:
> Bruno,
>
> It seems to me that this runs head-on into the problem of the
> definition of time...
>
> Here is my argument; I am sure there will be disagreement with it.
>
> Supposing that Alice's consciousness is spread out over the movie
> billboards next to the train trac
Bruno,
It seems to me that this runs head-on into the problem of the
definition of time...
Here is my argument; I am sure there will be disagreement with it.
Supposing that Alice's consciousness is spread out over the movie
billboards next to the train track, there is no longer a normal
tempora
There's a quote you might like, by Korzybski: "That which makes no
difference _is_ no difference."
--
- Did you ever hear of "The Seattle Seven"?
- Mmm.
- That was me... and six other guys.
2008/11/26 Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> MGA 3
>
> It is the last MGA !
>
>
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