edge stuffed in this list.
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "John M"
Sent: Monday, August 07, 2006 9:25 PM
Subject: RE: Bruno's argument - Comp
John,
Perhaps I have misunderstood if you were presenting an alter
oes not?
> Best wishes
> John M
> - Original Message -
> From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: "John M"
> Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 7:22 AM
> Subject: RE: Bruno's argument - Comp
>
>
>
> John M writes:
>
W. C. wrote:
>>From: Brent Meeker
>>...
>>But I like to eat. I like to eat steak. A world in which I can't eat
>>steak is not perfect for me.
>>
>>
>>>People with common intelligence can easily *imagine* (or dream) what a
>>
>>PU > will be.
>>
>>I guess I have uncommon intelligence :-) since
>From: Brent Meeker
>...
>But I like to eat. I like to eat steak. A world in which I can't eat
>steak is not perfect for me.
>
> > People with common intelligence can easily *imagine* (or dream) what a
>PU > will be.
>
>I guess I have uncommon intelligence :-) since I can't imagine what a PU
W. C. wrote:
>>From: Brent Meeker
>
>
>>I don't think it's possible, because "perfect" is subjective. Perfect for
>>the lion is bad for the antelope.
>>
>
>
> Such problem doesn't exist in PU.
> In PU, there is no food chain like "A eats B; B eats C; C eats D ... etc.".
> Perfect beings (both
>From: Brent Meeker
>I don't think it's possible, because "perfect" is subjective. Perfect for
>the lion is bad for the antelope.
>
Such problem doesn't exist in PU.
In PU, there is no food chain like "A eats B; B eats C; C eats D ... etc.".
Perfect beings (both living and non-living) mean no u
Norman Samish wrote:
> I read Fabric of Reality several years ago, but didn't understand it well. I
> intuitively agree with Asher Peres that Deutsch's version of MWI
> too-flagrantly violates Occam's Razor. Perhaps I should read it again.
This is diusputed, e.g. in http://www.hedweb.com/manw
e mail I detected my 'original' and "lost" text, it was snatched
away and mailed.
The two are pretty different.
Redface John
- Original Message -
From: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 8:12 AM
Subject: Re: Bruno's ar
t wishes
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "John M"
Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 7:22 AM
Subject: RE: Bruno's argument - Comp
John M writes:
> Earlier we lived in a telephone central switchboard, further ba
Norman Samish wrote:
> I read Fabric of Reality several years ago, but didn't understand it
> well. I intuitively agree with Asher Peres that Deutsch's version of
> MWI too-flagrantly violates Occam's Razor. Perhaps I should read it
> again.
>
> I even attended a lecture by John Wheeler,
John M wrote:
> Stathis:
> "I know that whatever theory I come up with will almost certainly be proved
> wrong given enough
> time, so I won't bother coming up with a theory at all."
> Funny that you of all people come up with such a supposition so different
> from fundamental basic human nature
W. C. wrote:
> I think it's always good to have all different kinds of theories to explain
> our universe.
> Whatever current theories are, our understanding could be always limited by
> our limitations
> (as designed by the so-called Creator if any).
> So I always think it's possible to produce
gain understanding. I sit at the feet of brilliant thinkers and
listen.Norman~~- Original
Message - From: "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: "Everything
List" Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006
11:06 AMSubject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp>
Norman Samish wrote:
> Thanks - with your help plus Wikipedia I now have an hypothesis about your
> statement. It seems to boil down to "Schrodinger's Cat has nothing to do
> with quantum computers other than they both depend on quantum
> superpositions."
Correct.
> Fair enough.
>
> When I rea
From: "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Everything List"
Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 5:35 AM
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
>
>
> Norman Samish wrote:
>> 1Z,
>> I don't know what you mean.
>
> That is unfortunate, because as far a
er's
Cat
was mooted decades before anyone even thought of quantum computaion.
> Norman
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: "Everything List"
> Sent: Saturday, August 05, 2006 2:43 PM
> Subject: Re: Bruno's argu
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "John M"
Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 7:22 AM
Subject: RE: Bruno's argument - Comp
John M writes:
> Earlier we lived in a telephone central switchboard, further back in a
> st
Message -
> > From: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > To:
> > Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2006 2:05 PM
> > Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
> >
> >
> >>
> >> To All:
> >> I know my questions below are beyo
ntum Universe?
4) Why is Schrodinger's Cat possible in "quantum universes" without
computational assistance?
Norman
- Original Message -
From: "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Everything List"
Sent: Saturday, August 05, 2006 2:43 PM
Subject: Re:
>From: Quentin Anciaux
>
>Hi, I've checked and I do not see an absolute meaning to perfection.
>
OK. If you want more, I will say perfection in PU is *every being is perfect
and feels perfect (if it has feeling)*.
This doesn't mean that every being is exactly the same. They may have
different s
Norman Samish wrote:
> I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit is may be
> a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat
> simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the quantum
> computer in action.
Quantum computers are only pos
t 04, 2006 9:04 PM
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
>
> I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit is may
> be
> a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat
> simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are obser
t. (Digital that is).
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Saturday, August 05, 2006 9:04 AM
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Le 03-août-06, à 23:05, John M a écrit :
> Are we reinventing the religion?
Yes.
No
OK John, I say more on your post.
Le 03-août-06, à 23:05, John M a écrit :
>
> To All:
> I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read
> (and
> write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask:
>
> is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers req
Le 03-août-06, à 23:05, John M a écrit :
> Are we reinventing the religion?
Yes.
Now, it is not that science is suddenly so clever that it can solve the
problem in religion. It is (justifiably assuming comp) that we can
approach some religion's problem with the modesty inherent in the
sci
Hi, I've checked and I do not see an absolute meaning to perfection.
Le Samedi 5 Août 2006 13:12, W. C. a écrit :
> Good question. But I don't think we need to define "perfect".
> You can check the dictionary to know its meaning.
> Your killing example won't exist in the PU. Otherwise it won't be
Good question. But I don't think we need to define "perfect".
You can check the dictionary to know its meaning.
Your killing example won't exist in the PU. Otherwise it won't be PU.
>From: everything-list@googlegroups.com The problem with perfection is that
>this word has *no* absolute meaning.
Hi,
The problem with perfection is that this word has *no* absolute meaning.
Then depending on your culture/history it can have a different meaning.
Stupid example: Imagine you are a serial killer... perfect world for you would
be a world were you can kill at will ;) But you would say that a s
I think it's always good to have all different kinds of theories to explain
our universe.
Whatever current theories are, our understanding could be always limited by
our limitations
(as designed by the so-called Creator if any).
So I always think it's possible to produce a perfect universe by so
- Original Message -
From: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2006 2:05 PM
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
>
> To All:
> I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read (and
> write) so much about this idea that I f
To All:
I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read (and
write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask:
is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require juice to
work and if unplugged they represent a very expensive paperweight.
What kin
I think if you stack all possible recordings together in the way you
suggest, connected in such as way as to be indistinguishable from a
computation occuring with all its counterfactuals in the Multiverse,
then what you have is a computation.
Cheers
On Fri, Aug 04, 2006 at 02:55:18PM +1000, Stat
Russell Standish writes:
> In the Multiverse, there is a huge difference between a recording and
> the actual computation. Only in one single universe (or history) of
> the ensemble do the two coincide.
>
> The "recording is a computation" issue is only a problem for single
> universe theory IMH
Brent Meeker writes:
> > The brain-with-wires-attached cannot interact with the environment, because
> > all its sense organs have been removed and the stimulation is just coming
> > from
> > a recording. Instead of the wires + recording we could say that there is a
> > special
> > group o
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
>
>
Consider a computer which is doing something (whether it is dreaming or
musing or just running is the point in question). If there is no
interaction between what it's running and the rest of the world I'd
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
> >>Consider a computer which is doing something (whether it is dreaming or
> >>musing or just running is the point in question). If there is no
> >>interaction between what it's running and the rest of the world I'd say
> >>it's not conscious. It doesn't
A useful model of computation is the Turing Machine. A TM has a tape
with symbols on it; a head which moves along the tape and which can read
and write symbols, and a state machine with a fixed number of states
that controls head movement and symbol writing based on the current
state and the symb
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>Consider a computer which is doing something (whether it is dreaming or
>>musing or just running is the point in question). If there is no
>>interaction between what it's running and the rest of the world I'd say
>>it's not conscious
Brent Meeker writes:
> Consider a computer which is doing something (whether it is dreaming or
> musing or just running is the point in question). If there is no
> interaction between what it's running and the rest of the world I'd say
> it's not conscious. It doesn't necessarily need an ex
On Wed, Aug 02, 2006 at 10:05:37AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Another question: I can see why a computer should be able to handle
> counterfactuals if it is to be of practical use, but what is wrong with
> saying that a recording implements a computation, whether that is
> adding tw
Peter Jones writes:
> A computation is not a series of states. A computation is an
> implementation
> of an algorithm, and algorithms include conditional statements which
> must be modelled by something with counterfactual behaviour --
> by something which *could have* execute the other branch.
1Z wrote:
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>>John M writes:
>>
>>
>>>Peter Jones writes:
>>>
>>>
Hmm. Including limitations in time?
>>>
>>>Yes, if an infinite number of finite computations are run simultaneously on
>>>a system with a finite number of physical states.
>>>
>>>Stathis Papaioan
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> John M writes:
>
>
>>Peter Jones writes:
>>
>>
>>>Hmm. Including limitations in time?
>>
>>Yes, if an infinite number of finite computations are run simultaneously on
>>a system with a finite number of physical states.
>>
>>Stathis Papaioannou
>>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>>Would you allow that one machine or computation may be emulated by another
>>>following some sort of mapping rule, and that consciousness may be preserved
>>>in this process? This would seem to be an assumption at the basis of
>>>functi
I wanted to point to the 'flipside of it' which was not addressed in your
reply: mixing finite and infinite. Those >>>>> marks drive me crazy. too.
John
- Original Message -
From: "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Everything List"
Sent: Tue
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> John M writes:
>
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> > >
> > > Hmm. Including limitations in time?
> >
> > Yes, if an infinite number of finite computations are run simultaneously on
> > a system with a finite number of physical states.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
> > -
John M writes:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> >
> > Hmm. Including limitations in time?
>
> Yes, if an infinite number of finite computations are run simultaneously on
> a system with a finite number of physical states.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
> -
> So if I ha
Brent Meeker wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> > Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >>1Z wrote:
> >>
> >>>Brent Meeker wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be
> distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the
> computation. I don't think
Brent Meeker wrote:
> And evolution constructs brains to be essentially deterministic for the
> same reason. So is it your theory that any deterministic sequence of
> states constitutes computation and the reason a rock doesn't instantiate
> computation is that, at the microscopic level its sta
Brent Meeker writes:
> > Would you allow that one machine or computation may be emulated by another
> > following some sort of mapping rule, and that consciousness may be
> > preserved
> > in this process? This would seem to be an assumption at the basis of
> > functionalism
> > and computat
>
>
> Brent Meeker wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> > >
> > > Brent Meeker wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > >>I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be
> > >>distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the
> > >>computation. I don't think you can make the idea of "information
> h
1Z wrote:
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>1Z wrote:
>>
>>>Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>>>The underlying physics of the thing will tell youwhether
>>>it is capable of supporting countefactuals without
>>>running a programme at all. There is something objectively
>>>machine-like about machines -- complex ,
Stathis,
excuse my naive ignorance: (below your reply)
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "1Z"
Sent: Sunday, July 30, 2006 5:12 AM
Subject: RE: Bruno's argument
Peter Jones writes:
>
> Hmm. Including limi
Brent Meeker wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> > Brent Meeker wrote:
> > The underlying physics of the thing will tell youwhether
> > it is capable of supporting countefactuals without
> > running a programme at all. There is something objectively
> > machine-like about machines -- complex , but predictab
1Z wrote:
>
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>>>Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>>Yes, that's roughly my idea. Of course you can't insist that a
>>computation interact continuously to count as computation, only that it
>>does occasionally or potentially.
>
>
> Most of the counterfactuals that make up a comp
Brent Meeker wrote:
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> Yes, that's roughly my idea. Of course you can't insist that a
> computation interact continuously to count as computation, only that it
> does occasionally or potentially.
Most of the counterfactuals that make up a computation
are internal. Ther
1Z wrote:
>
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>1Z wrote:
>>
>>>Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be
distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the
computation. I don't think you can make the idea of "information hidden
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> Brent meeker writes:
>
>
[If] a computatation only "dreams" then how could you know whether it was
intelligence, or just noise?
>>>
>>>
>>>We wouldn't know, but the computation itself would know if it were
>>>conscious,
>>>creating its own observe
Brent Meeker wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> > Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >
> >>I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be
> >>distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the
> >>computation. I don't think you can make the idea of "information hidden
> >>in noise" well
1Z wrote:
>
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>>I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be
>>distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the
>>computation. I don't think you can make the idea of "information hidden
>>in noise" well defined. By Shannon's measure noise
Brent Meeker wrote:
> I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be
> distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the
> computation. I don't think you can make the idea of "information hidden
> in noise" well defined. By Shannon's measure noise is information.
Y
Brent Meeker wrote:
> I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be
> distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the
> computation. I don't think you can make the idea of "information hidden
> in noise" well defined. By Shannon's measure noise is information.
Y
WC writes:
> In multiverses, I think it's possible to say there exists one universe
> which could include
> only one (super) being with nothing else.
> I mean this (super) being is the universe itself.
> So this super being knows everything right at the beginning of this
> universe.
> No need
Brent meeker writes:
> >>[If] a computatation only "dreams" then how could you know whether it was
> >>intelligence, or just noise?
> >
> >
> > We wouldn't know, but the computation itself would know if it were
> > conscious,
> > creating its own observer. If we say that noise contains hi
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent meeker writes:
>
>
I don't think "intelligence" is meaningful without an environment with
which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes
computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its
environment.
>>>
July 31, 2006 12:14 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>I don't think "intelligence" is meaningful without an environment with
>>which it can interact. The same
Brent meeker writes:
> >>I don't think "intelligence" is meaningful without an environment with
> >>which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes
> >>computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its
> >>environment.
> >
> >
> > What about an intelligen
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>I don't think "intelligence" is meaningful without an environment with
>>which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes
>>computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its
>>environment.
>
>
> What
Brent Meeker writes:
> I don't think "intelligence" is meaningful without an environment with
> which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes
> computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its
> environment.
What about an intelligent, conscious being sp
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>>Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
>>>
>>>
>>>
>The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an
>unnecessary complication. Suppose Klingon computers change their
>internal code every cloc
Peter Jones writes:
> > > I can say that a hydrogen atom can't compute an entire virtual
> > > universe,
> > > because there isn't enough "room".
> >
> > If you can map multiple computation states to one physical state, then all
> > the requisite computations can be run in parallel on a very lim
Brent Meeker writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> >
> >
> >>> The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an
> >>> unnecessary complication. Suppose Klingon computers change their
> >>> internal code every clock cycle according to the well-docum
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
>
> > > The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an unnecessary
> > > complication. Suppose Klingon
> > > computers change their internal code every clock cycle according to the
> > > well-documented radioactive
> > > d
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
>
>
>>> The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an
>>> unnecessary complication. Suppose Klingon computers change their
>>> internal code every clock cycle according to the well-documented
>>> radioactive decay pattern
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> > The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an unnecessary
> > complication. Suppose Klingon
> > computers change their internal code every clock cycle according to the
> > well-documented radioactive
> > decay pattern of a sacred stone 2000 years
>
> Thanks, Colin,
> I feel we also agree in your last sentence statement, however I could
not
> decide whether "abstraction" is reductionist model forming or a
> generalization into wider horizons? Patterns - I feel - are IMO
definitely reductive.
Abstraction I would characterise as a mapping i
t;as-if" changes that and I felt lost. Why use a word
with 'other' meaning 'as - if'? It is a cheap excuse that we have no better
one .
Sorry for just "multiplying the words" in this exchange.
John M
----- Original Message -
From: "Colin Hales"
Please see after your remark/question at the end
John
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Friday, July 28, 2006 10:48 AM
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument
Le 28-juil.-06, à 02:52, John M a écrit :
> Then again is the '
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
>
> > > There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do
> > > > not require a physical basis" and "computations do not
> > > > require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be
> > > > physical
> > > > im
Le 28-juil.-06, à 02:52, John M a écrit :
> Then again is the 'as - if' really a computation as in our today's
> vocabulary? Or, if you insist (and Bruno as well, that it IS) is it
> conceivable as our digital process, that embryonic first approach, or
> we
> may hope to understand later on a
John M
>
> Colin,
> the entire discussion is too much for me, I pick some remarks of yours and
> ask only about them. I am glad to see that others are also struggling to
> find better and more fitting words...
> (I search for better fitting concepts as well to be expressed by those
> better fitti
eivable as our digital process, that embryonic first approach, or we
may hope to understand later on a higher level (I have no better word for
it): the analog computation of qualia and meaning? Certainly not the Turing
or Church ways and not on Intel etc. processors.
John M
---
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> > There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do
> > > not require a physical basis" and "computations do not
> > > require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be
> > > physical
> > > implemented by a wide variety of systems)
Brent Meeker writes:
> > Yes, but any physical system can be seen as implementing any computation
> > with the appropriate
> > rule mapping physical states to computational states.
>
> I think this is doubtful. For one thing there must be enough distinct
> states. It's all very well
> to i
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> Well, I think I have a better understanding now of the ideas leading me
to start this thread - thanks to Bruno, Quentin and the other
>> contributors. Moreover, I am leaning towards fundamentally changing my
views on the implementation problem: if computationali
Brent Meeker wrote:
> d the computations are implemented
> > anyway by virtue of their status as mathematical objects.
>
> Or by virtue of there being universes.
Something, anyway. You don't get implementation for free.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this me
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do
> > not require a physical basis" and "computations do not
> > require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be
> > physical
> > implemented by a wide variety of s
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>>There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do
>>not require a physical basis" and "computations do not
>>require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be
>>physical
>>implemented by a wide variety of systems)
Peter Jones writes:
> There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do
> not require a physical basis" and "computations do not
> require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be
> physical
> implemented by a wide variety of systems)
Yes, but any physical system can
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Well, I think I have a better understanding now of the ideas leading me to
> start this thread - thanks to Bruno, Quentin and the other contributors.
> Moreover, I am leaning towards fundamentally changing my views on the
> implementation problem: if computationali
ether this preserves
computationalism either.
Stathis Papaioannou
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: Bruno's argument
> Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2006 16:32:03 +0200
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
>
>
> Le 26-juil.-0
Le 26-juil.-06, à 07:55, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
>
>>> But certain computations are selected out through being isomorphic
>>> with physical structures and processes (or simulations thereof):
>>
>>
>> I would have said that certain computations are se
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
> > But certain computations are selected out through being isomorphic
> > with physical structures and processes (or simulations thereof):
>
>
> I would have said that certain computations are selected out by giving
> high relative measure for locally stabl
Le 24-juil.-06, à 09:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
It's only a coincidence in the literal sense of the word, i.e. two things happening simultaneously. My point was to explore the idea of supervenience, which (to me, at any rate) at first glance seems a mysterious process, and we should cut m
Russell Standish writes (quoting SP):
> > What if we just say that there is no more to the supervenience of the> > mental on the physical than there is to the supervenience of a> > parabola on the trajectory of a projectile under gravity? The> > projectile doesn't "create" the parabola, which e
On Mon, Jul 24, 2006 at 12:35:02PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> What if we just say that there is no more to the supervenience of the
> mental on the physical than there is to the supervenience of a
> parabola on the trajectory of a projectile under gravity? The
> projectile doesn't "crea
Russell Standish writes:
> But why does our consciousness supervene on any physical object (which we> conventionally label "heads")?> > > One answer is that only those computations which> >supervene on physical processes in a brain which exists in a universe> >with orderly physical laws (which
Le 22-juil.-06, à 22:02, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>> No bigger than the "assumption" that "other" minds exists (a key
>> assumption in comp if only through the trust to the doctor).
>
> Aren't those two propositions independent - that there are other minds
> and that we cannot possibly
> know
Russell Standish wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 23, 2006 at 06:53:50PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Russell Standish writes:
> >
> > > To refine the problem a little further - we see a brain in our> observed
> > > reality on which our mind supervenes. And we see other> brains, for which
> > > we
Brent Meeker wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> > Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >
> >>In other words it is not justified, based on our limited understanding of
> >>brains, to say we'll never
> >>be able to know how another feels based on observation of their brain.
> >
> >
> >
> > We don't know how insects or
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