t I'mtalking about. That's a fully formed idea with absolutely no basis in the objective world that was just put out there like it meant something, when in fact it's ridiculous.I asked simply what he meant by it, to see howpossibly he could defend such a statement, and got nothing. Par for the course, I'
Forgive any typos...
- Original Message -
From: Jesse Mazer
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Thu, 26 May 2005 20:05:49 -0400
aet.radal ssg wrote:
You're assuming that Einstein came up with those ideas through
- Original Message - From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Tue, 24 May 2005 18:36:51 -0400 "aet.radal ssg" wrote:From: "Jesse Mazer" To
aet.radal ssg wrote:
Clearly, the method and definition of brainstorming that you're accustomed
to is different than mine. The half-formed idea is what initiates the
brainstorm for me, which is fully formed when the storm is over, ie. the
ground is parched and in need of rain, the storm comes
ROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 26 May 2005 12:29:13 -0400 aet.radal ssg wrote:Clearly, the method and definition of brainstorming that you're accustomed to is different than mine. The "half-formed ide
IL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Thu, 26 May 2005 12:29:13 -0400
aet.radal ssg wrote:
Clearly, the method and definition of brainstorming that
you're
accustomed to is different than mine. The "half-formed
idea"
aet.radal ssg wrote:
You're assuming that Einstein came up with those ideas through
brainstorming.
To me, brainstorming just means any creative attempt to come up with new
tentative speculations about solutions to a problem. Since Einstein's ideas
cannot possibly have been anything but
aet.radal ssg wrote:
From: Jesse Mazer
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Thu, 12 May 2005 14:48:17 -0400
Generally, unasked-for attempts at armchair psychology to explain
the motivations of another poster on an internet forum
From: "Jesse Mazer"<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 12 May 2005 14:48:17 -0400 Generally, unasked-for attempts at armchair psychology to explain the motivations of another poste
Dear Saibal:
Could you explain the paradox you've created by saying, "In the film Nash was closelyacquainted to persons that *didn't realy exist*." and "One could argue that the persons that Nash was seeing in fact did exist *(inour universe)*, precisely because Nash's brain was simulating them."
Le 14-mai-05, à 07:44, Lee Corbin a écrit :
No, it is not just erroneous. I know of many thoughtful
people, and include myself as one of them, who believe that
the so-called mind body problem is some sort of verbal or
linguistic problem.
I can agree with that, but then we should solve that
Why am I not surprised that I disagree with this response?- Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 12 May 2005 23:25:28 +1000 The obvious and s
Lee Corbin writes (replying to Bruno Marchal):
I agree the abandoning of vitalism is progress. And it is true that
natural science has explained features like self-reproduction,
animal motion, energy transformation (sun - living matter) and so
on. But it is just erroneous to conclude that the
PROTECTED]
To: everything everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Fri, 13 May 2005 03:11:21 +0200
One could say that the brain of some schizophrenic persons simulate other
persons. I don't know if some of you have seen the film 'A Beautiful mind'
about
Le 13-mai-05, à 05:39, Lee Corbin a écrit :
Brent writes
I think that an observer must be physically instantiated - that seems
well
supported empirically. As it is used a observer moment seems to
mean a unit
of subjective experience. That there is an observer, i.e.
something with
Bruno writes
[Lee writes]
But many here contend that abstract
patterns---mathematical stings, really---can do *so* much cross-
referencing and quoting of each other that a form of paste obtains
that wields them in to something capable of having experiences.
But a familiar abstract
Jonathan Colvin writes:
That's putting it mildly. I was thinking that it is more
likely that a
universe tunnels out of a black hole that just randomly happens to
contain your precise brain state at that moment, and for all
of future
eternity. But the majority of these random universes
: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, May 12, 2005 2:25 PM
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
The obvious and sensible-sounding response to Jeanne's question whether it
may be possible to access other
ith compassion. --Stathis Papaioannou From: "aet.radal ssg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Tue, 10 May 2005 09:41:27 -0500
--
___Sign-up for Ads Free at Mail.com
http://www.mail.com/?sr=signup
I agree with Stathis' answer to Jeanne. Another one which looks a
little bit incompatible with the one by Stathis would be: if QM is
correct no information can travel from one universe to another. So such
an hallucination can only be such a coincidence or a triviality
(whatever I think, there
entally ill in future you will treat them with compassion. --Stathis Papaioannou From: "aet.radal ssg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Tue, 10 May 2005 09:4!
1:27 -0500
--
On Thu, May 12, 2005 at 02:48:17PM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Generally, unasked-for attempts at armchair psychology to explain the
motivations of another poster on an internet forum, like the comment that
someone just wants to hear themself talk, are justly considered flames
and tend to
On Thu, May 12, 2005 at 08:47:09AM -0500, aet.radal ssg wrote:
???
Could I please request that people post only plain text emails to the
everything list, or at very least include a plain text translation?
This is a sending option available on all HTML email clients I've come
across. It's a real
is to
deliberately cause lesions in an experimental animal and observe the
resulting effects.
--Stathis Papaioannou
From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Thu, 12 May 2005 14:48:17 -0400
Generally, unasked
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I doubt that there are many people who have known someone with a mental
illness and would claim that there is anything positive about the
experience. While sometimes the mentally ill themselves claim that they
have a superior insight into reality, that's just because
that if you do have the
opportunity to work with the mentally ill in future you will treat them with
compassion.
--Stathis Papaioannou
From: aet.radal ssg [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Tue, 10 May 2005 09:41:27 -0500
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 19:13, Hal Finney a écrit :
And in terms of your question, I would not act as though I expected to
be guaranteed a very long life span, because the measure of that universe
is so low compared to others where I don't survive.
Hal Finney
Hi,
but
Bruno,
Le 10-mai-05, à 12:25, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are
guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment
concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments where
we are young and living
I agree with you Stathis. That's why I think MWI, QTI and COMPI lead to
the Relative SSA, and relative immortality.
The SSA you mention is the Absolute SSA which does not make sense, imo.
Bruno
Le 11-mai-05, à 14:04, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno,
Le 10-mai-05, à 12:25, Stathis Papaioannou
-Original Message-
From: John Collins [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2005 10:22 AM
To: Quentin Anciaux; everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 19:13, Hal Finney a écrit :
And in terms
John Collins had written
..You [Hal] are working from the assumption that each person has some sort of
transcendental identity that experiences these observer moments, but I would
think it more likely that these would be included in the observer moment,
with memories being distinguished from
Russell,
When I stated in the original reply that pulling information out of
other worlds in the MWI context was prohibited by physics, I was
referring to information about those universes. As I stated, obviously
you can create a superposition to utilize processing power in other
universes,
On Thu, May 12, 2005 at 12:40:10AM -0400, danny mayes wrote:
Russell,
When I stated in the original reply that pulling information out of
other worlds in the MWI context was prohibited by physics, I was
referring to information about those universes. As I stated, obviously
you can
Hal,
I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are
guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment
concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments where
we are young and living within a normal lifespan than ones where we are
at a
don't have it anymore.
Jeanne
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 11:19 PM
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Russell,
To be fair, I should
Le 10-mai-05, à 12:25, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are
guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment
concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments
where
we are young and living within
Le 10-mai-05, à 05:55, Hal Finney a écrit :
I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are
guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment
concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments
where
we are young and living within a normal
objective reality, on. If you do, you really aren't interested in discoveringanything new about objective reality. You really just want to "hear" yourself talk, because nothing else worthwhile is coming from it.Chatter. Just my observation.
--Stathis Papaioannou From: "aet.radal ss
Dear Jeanne:
Message - From: "Jeanne Houston" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Tue, 10 May 2005 07:19:01 -0400
I didn't read the article but I am aware of th
aet.radal ssg wrote:
Dear Jeanne:
Message -
From: "Jeanne Houston"
To: "Stathis Papaioannou" ,
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Tue, 10 May 2005 07:19:01 -0400
I didn't read the article but I am aware of
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
Hal,
I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are
guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment
concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments where
we are young and living within a normal
Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 19:13, Hal Finney a écrit :
And in terms of your question, I would not act as though I expected to
be guaranteed a very long life span, because the measure of that universe
is so low compared to others where I don't survive.
Hal Finney
Hi,
but by definition of what
Quentin Anciaux writes:
but by definition of what being alive means (or being conscious), which is to
experience observer moments, even if the difference of the measure where you
have a long life compared to where you don't survive is enormous, you can
only experience world where you are
Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 20:14, Hal Finney a écrit :
Yet you have already been unconscious forever, before your birth (if we
pretend/assume that the universe is infinite in both time directions).
It can't be forever... I'm conscious now... so it was not forever. But I
know you'll say infinity and
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I happen to be a believer in the observer-moment as
fundamental, and the only thing one can be sure of from the first
person perspective. "I think, therefore I am" is taking it too far in
deducing the existence of an observer; "I think, therefore there is a
Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 20:14, Hal Finney a écrit :
And what do you think of life insurance? Suppose you have young children
whom you love dearly, for whom you are the sole support, and who will
suffer greatly if you die without insurance?
Do you agree with this ?
1- whenever there is a
not died out.
--Stathis Papaioannou
From: Jeanne Houston [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stathis Papaioannou
[EMAIL PROTECTED],[EMAIL PROTECTED]
CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED],everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Tue, 10 May 2005 07:19:01 -0400
I once read an article in, I
On Tue, May 10, 2005 at 07:19:01AM -0400, Jeanne Houston wrote:
I once read an article in, I believe, Time Magazine, about the relatively
new field of neurotheology which investigates what goes on in the brain
during ecstatic states, etc. One suggestion that intrigued me was that it
may be
The Grover algorithm is a form of accessing information from other
worlds. Of course the worlds need to be prepared in just the right
way, of course...
On Tue, May 10, 2005 at 01:01:32PM -0400, danny mayes wrote:
I'm not one to shy away from what others would perceive to be unbridled
Picking up a thread from a little while ago:
Jonathan Colvin: That's a good question. I can think of a chess position
that is
a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex it is far
from obvious what is allowed and what is forbidden.
Jesse Mazer: So what if some chess position is
t; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Wed, 04 May 2005 22:40:46 +1000 snip I don't see how you could get anywhere if you disregard the relationship between observer moments. It is this relationship which allows grouping of different
-
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 2:02 PM
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Dear aet.radal ssg,
I think you missed my point about the amnesic and psychotic patients,
which
]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 9:02 AM
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Dear aet.radal ssg,
I think you missed my point about the amnesic and psychotic patients,
which
is not that they are clear thinkers, but that they are conscious despite
Jonathan Colvin writes:
Pondering on this, it raises an interesting question. Can we differentiate
between worlds that are (or appear to be) rule-based, and those that are
purely random?
The usual approach is that a system which is algorithmically compressible
is defined as random. A
t; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 10:51 AM
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of
immortality
Dear Stathis, I would like to thank you for
pointing this out, even thought it should be obvious to anyone that has
any thoughts about consciousness. Any mode
I think you meant algorithmically *in*compressible.
The relevance was, I was thinking that those universes where we become
immortal under MWI are not the conventional rule-based universes such as we
appear to live in, but a different class of stochastic random ones (which
require very unlikely
to ANY entity, not justhumans.I amhappy with the
possibility of being wrong.
Stephen
- Original Message -
From:
John M
To: Stephen Paul King ; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 5:29 PM
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of
immortality
Stephen
On Mon, May 09, 2005 at 11:02:18PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Dear aet.radal ssg,
I think you missed my point about the amnesic and psychotic patients, which
is not that they are clear thinkers, but that they are conscious despite a
disability which impairs their perception of time.
I don't know why you think QTI experienced worlds will be random. They
will still be law abiding, but the laws will gradually get more
complex, with more exceptions to the rule as time goes on.
Cheers
On Mon, May 09, 2005 at 04:09:26PM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
I think you meant
Did you mean to say a system *not* algorithmically compressible is defined
as random?
--Stathis Papaioannou
Jonathan Colvin writes:
Pondering on this, it raises an interesting question. Can we
differentiate
between worlds that are (or appear to be) rule-based, and those that are
purely
The usual approach is that a system which is algorithmically
compressible is defined as random. A rule-based universe has
a short program that determines its evolution, or creates its
state. A random universe has no program much smaller than
itself which can encode its information.
Hal
The usual approach is that a system which is algorithmically
compressible is defined as random. A rule-based universe has a short
program that determines its evolution, or creates its state.
A random
universe has no program much smaller than itself which can encode its
information.
Hal
Russell,
To be fair, I should elaborate on my earlier post about amnesics and
psychotics. If I consider the actual cases I have seen, arguably they do
have *some* sense of the passage of time. Taking the first example, people
with severe Korsakoff Syndrome (due to chronic alcohol abuse) appear
While it is likely that some version of you will end up in a hellishly
random universe as a result of QTI, you probably won't stay there very long,
since if your particular brain pattern arose randomly, it will probably
become disrupted randomly as well. Failing that, you can always kill
Jonathan Colvin writes:
That's putting it mildly. I was thinking that it is more likely that a
universe tunnels out of a black hole that just randomly happens to contain
your precise brain state at that moment, and for all of future eternity. But
the majority of these random universes will be
-
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 8:55 PM
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin writes:
That's putting it mildly. I was thinking that it is more likely that a
universe tunnels out of a black hole that just randomly
Norman Samish writes:
If the multiverse is truly infinite in space-time, then all possible
universes must eventually appear in it, including an infinite number with
all 10^80 particles in it identical to those in our universe.
Yes, Tegmark calls this the Level I concept of a multiverse.
- Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Wed, 04 May 2005 22:40:46 +1000 snip I don't see how you could get anywhere if you disregard the relationship between
On Wed, May 04, 2005 at 10:40:46PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I don't see how you could get anywhere if you disregard the relationship
between observer moments. It is this relationship which allows grouping of
different observer moments to give the effect of a continuous stream of
I believe that according to some or most participants in this list,
transitions between observer moments is representing Time. I have also
been talking about observer moments in the past but I have always
skirted around the issue of defining them.
The concept of observer moment is not clear.
, 2005 02:11
PM
Onderwerp: RE: Many worlds theory of
immortality
Saibal,
Does
your conclusion about conditional probability also apply to complex-valued
probabilities a la Youssef?
http://physics.bu.edu/~youssef/quantum/quantum_refs.html
http://www.goertzel.org
Verzonden: Tuesday, May 03, 2005 03:47 PM
Onderwerp: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
2 weeks ago Saibal Mitra wrote:
I don't think that the MW immortality is correct at all! In a certain
sense
we are
immortal, because the enseble of all possible worlds is a fixed
static
Russell Standish
wrote: With my TIME postulate, I say that a conscious
observer necessarily experiences a sequence of related observer moments
(or even a continuum of them). To argue that observer moments are
independent of each other is to argue the negation of TIME. With TIME,
the
Reading your responses here, I don't think we have much to disagree
on. Like you, I don't need a concrete universe, with concrete time
etc. It was largely your thesis that convinced me of that. Perhaps you
confuse me with Schmidhuber too much !
I wouldn't say that time is illusionary. Illusionary
On 4 May 2005 Russell Standish wrote:
On this list, we seem to have two fairly clear camps: those who
identify observer moments as the fundamental concept, and those who
regard relationships between observer moments with equal ontological
status.
With my TIME postulate, I say that a conscious
I would add another point with regard to observer-moments and continuity:
probably there is no unique next or previous relationship among
observer-moments.
The case of non-unique next observer-moments is uncontroversial, as it
relates to the universe splitting predicted by the MWI or the
Le 16-avr.-05, à 02:45, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
Both the suicide and copying thought experiments have convinced me that the
notion of a conditional probability is fundamentally flawed. It can be
defined under ''normal'' circumstances but it will break down precisely when
considering copying or
Saibal,
Does
your conclusion about conditional probability also apply to complex-valued
probabilities a la Youssef?
http://physics.bu.edu/~youssef/quantum/quantum_refs.html
http://www.goertzel.org/papers/ChaoQM.htm
-- Ben
Goertzel
-Original Message-From: Bruno Marchal
2 weeks ago Saibal Mitra wrote:
I don't think that the MW immortality is correct at all! In a certain
sense
we are
immortal, because the enseble of all possible worlds is a fixed static
entity. So,
you ''always'' find yourselve alive in one state or another. However, you
won't
experience
On this list, we seem to have two fairly clear camps: those who
identify observer moments as the fundamental concept, and those who
regard relationships between observer moments with equal ontological
status.
With my TIME postulate, I say that a conscious observer necessarily
experiences a
Hi Stephen,
You wrote:
snip ... (I am ignoring my own allergy to the idea that 1st
person aspects
can be faithfully represented by Turing algorithms.) ...
I take the opportunity of that statement to insist on a key point which
is admittedly not obvious.
The fact is that I am also
Jesse,
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Now, look at p(n) again. This time, let's say it is not k, but a random
real number greater than zero, smaller than 1, with k being the mean of
the distribution. At first glance, it may appear that not much has
changed, since the probabilities will on average
Jesse Mazer wrote:
[Quoting Stathis:]
However, let us agree that the scenario you describe occurs in a
non-negligible proportion of MW branches in which sentient life survives
into the indefinite future, and return to Nick Prince's original question
which spawned this thread. How will you
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
[Quoting Stathis:]
However, let us agree that the scenario you describe occurs in a
non-negligible proportion of MW branches in which sentient life survives
into the indefinite future, and return to Nick Prince's original question
which spawned this
Jesse,
I've deleted everything, it was getting too messy. I hope this
(semi-)mathematical formulation captures your argument correctly:
Suppose you start with one individual, your friend, on a computer network
which has infinite resources and will grow exponentially forever. This
individual
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Now, look at p(n) again. This time, let's say it is not k, but a random
real number greater than zero, smaller than 1, with k being the mean of the
distribution. At first glance, it may appear that not much has changed,
since the probabilities will on average be the
Jesse Mazer writes:
[Stathis]
There are two separate probabilities to consider here. One is the
probability (3/4, as you show) that civilization will never break down
if implemented on a computer with behaviour as specified above. The
other is the probability that the actual hardware will work
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
[Stathis]
There are two separate probabilities to consider here. One is the
probability (3/4, as you show) that civilization will never break down
if implemented on a computer with behaviour as specified above. The
other is the probability that the
Brent Meeker wrote:
[Stathis]
Your body slowly disintegrates and is (approximately) reconstructed atom
by
atom, so you don't notice a discontinuity, and it doesn't hurt. If the
timing and order of the process were changed, so that your body is
destroyed
in one operation and a copy reconstructed
@eskimo.com
Sent: Tuesday, April 19, 2005 12:33 AM
Subject: Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
[Stathis]
There are two separate probabilities to consider here. One is the
probability (3/4, as you show) that civilization will never break down if
implemented on a computer with behaviour as specified above. The other is
the probability that the
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Hal Finney)
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2005 15:27:25 -0700 (PDT)
Jesse Mazer writes:
Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single
universe
that you would to the splitting of worlds
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes (after quoting Stathis Papaioannou):
No doubt, common implementations of your mind will predominate over more
bizarre ones at any given point in time. It is also possible to imagine
some scenarios where you survive indefinitely with all of your
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds (maximal
consistent set of propositions) of a FS are not computable;
that even
given infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to
generate a complete world. This suggests to me that it is *not*
Le 18-avr.-05, à 09:04, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
I was asking the question in the context of Tegmark's UE (by which all
and
only structures that exist mathematically exist physically), and
whether it
has relevance to the existence of all possible things. Frankly I'm not
sure
that Godel is
Le 18-avr.-05, à 02:39, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds (maximal
consistent set of propositions) of a FS are not computable; that even
given
infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to generate a
complete world. This suggests to
Sent: Sunday, April 17, 2005 9:28 PM
Subject: Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Brent Meeker wrote:
I feel that I am the same person as I was five years ago even though
hardly
any of the atoms in my body are the same now as then. The body and brain
of
the younger me have disintegrated as completely as if I had died and been
cremated. Certainly, the change has been gradual
I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run
concurrently.
If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for immortality is
to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility inherent in
that branch.
Hal Ruhl
too constructive, but alas, so are considetrations
on shaky grounds (and their conclusions) as well. Excuse my intrusion
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, April 17, 2005 1:07 AM
Subject: RE: many worlds
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