Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Quentin Anciaux]

Hi Bruno,

2009/3/15 Bruno Marchal 

>
>
> Hi Günther,
>
> >
> > Hi Bruno,
> >
> > thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though.
> >
> >> course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by "you". In
> >> case
> >> you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a
> >> state where you "know" you are immortal, because your immortality
> >> is a
> >> "past event".
> >
> >
> > I would equate total amnesia with death (we've been through this
> > before,
> > Stathis has written about this, if I remember correctly).
>
>
> I remember Quentin identifying himself with his memory, and very
> logically, identifying total amnesia with death.
> It is a complex matter. Total amnesia concern only some form of
> declarative knowledge, you cannot loss your "procedural memory",
> because it is part of ... arithmetic, and common to all elementary
> knowers.
>
>
Well I agree that in total amnesia thought experiment... well the amnesia is
not total... the subject still knows his former language and other
knowledge... except all knowledges/memories about *who* he was is lost. And
in this sense IF in one minute I lose these memories about my current ME,
then my current ME is dead for all practical purpose. And IF mwi and/or comp
is true then there must exists a moment which is a successor of current ME
without the current ME memories being lost... so I should end up in this
state and not in the state where my identity was erased because like I can't
be where I'm dead... I can't be where I'm not. The 'I' which is referred is
the one with memories, the one without cannot meaningfully say he is a
successor of me now, except if he sees like in real world "total" amnesia
case that his body was mine and causally connected to mine. But in comp
sense this is not meaningful... If my mind can be copied and transferred in
a "metal" body, this metal body is not causally connected to my biological
body... but that mind is a continuation of current me.

So in this sense, if you say that it is possible that all successor moment
to a moment could lead to a "total" amnesia, then QI is false... or
tautologically true because it means you are everyone (ie: no one). But for
all practical purpose current ME would be dead.

I'll continue to read the rest of the mail.

Regards,
Quentin


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Günther,

>
> Hi Bruno,
>
> thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though.
>
>> course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by "you". In  
>> case
>> you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a
>> state where you "know" you are immortal, because your immortality  
>> is a
>> "past event".
>
>
> I would equate total amnesia with death (we've been through this  
> before,
> Stathis has written about this, if I remember correctly).


I remember Quentin identifying himself with his memory, and very  
logically, identifying total amnesia with death.
It is a complex matter. Total amnesia concern only some form of  
declarative knowledge, you cannot loss your "procedural memory",  
because it is part of ... arithmetic, and common to all elementary  
knowers.



>
>
> I agree with you that you can't have a universal machine stopping
> relatively to all others from it's POV; but I don't see why we can't
> think of it having total amnesia. So, for the time being, let us take
> surviving as meaning to keep (at least large parts) of one's memory.


All right. Comp leads also to that form of immortality, at least for  
awhile (if I can say).
The problem of death is intrinsically difficult, because you will  
survive with amnesia or not according of the level of substitution,  
which we cannot know, but only bet on (or perhaps even choose in some  
circumstances?). Total amnesia seems to lead to the remembering of you  
being the universal person, plausibly Plotinus "Soul-Universe", or the  
arithmetical S4Grz (the third hypostase).
Total amnesia is complete fusing. We "remember" we are all the same  
person. We can lost that memory only by differentiating oneself again.

>
>
>> facts, like the continuum of many-worlds. If Loop Gravity is 100%
>> correct, and if the big bang has a finitely describable origin then
>> comp is false!
>
> Could you elaborate? I don't see why LG should be bad news for comp?
> You mean because LG proposes a fundamental spacetime quantization?
> I don't see how it would falsify comp?

It is obviously an open problem. But taking literally the UDA, and  
making abstraction of some still possible (logically) conspiration of  
the numbers, it seems clear that comp predict that an electron, for  
going from A to B, with respect to you, will be supported by a  
continuum of computational histories. I have no clue how to select a  
finite or countable infinity of subcomputations. But if that is the  
case, the UDA shows that such a conclusion (like LG) has to be derived  
from arithmetic. Otherwise, it would be treachery.



>
>
> And why the finitely describable Big Bang? It seems you have a problem
> when there are some finite limits (outside of the effective  
> computation
> of mind). Is this because you need the continuum in the AUDA to get
> Quantum logic or something like that?


Not at all. That would be treachery too. If the continuum was not  
possibly emerging from AUDA, I would take this as an evidence that  
comp is false. The reason comes really from computer science and the  
(enumerable) redundancy of the computational states, and the non  
enumerable redundancy of the "1-pov" infinite stories.



>
>
>> Our bodies can be considered programmed to stop (by sex and death),
>> our soul just cannot, there is always a consistent continuation (even
>> without amnesia
>
> Why do you believe that latter?


Consider someone who dies, relatively to you. Well, La Palisse was  
found of "tautology": after he died, someone said" 5 minutes avant sa  
mort, Monsieur de La Paice vivait encore". "Fives minutes before he  
died, Sir de La Palice was still alive". Now, from the point of view  
of the dying person, the UD generates 2^aleph_zero histories going  
through that state "where he is is still alive", and which are below  
its computational relevant substitution level. Even with just QM, you  
can see stories which will "repair anything wrong with whatever needed  
to generate a short consistent computation. At his substitution level  
he is finite, and finite machine can always be fixed, and that is all  
the soul need to survive an instant. But this is true for all  
instants, by exactly the repetition of the argument. Perhaps some Gods  
can be mortal, but no souls, as supported by finite entities. That  
would be like my mechanics: "no, you car is definitely broken". It is  
a lie, or a simplification, what it means is "it would be more  
expensive to fix it than to buy a new one". In the ud, the first  
person has unbound-able resources.

I think, and Quentin disagrees, that, would I be dying, I would feel  
myself surviving more probably in the "amnesic stories", probably  
because I tend to believe (those days) that, if comp is true, my  
substitution level could probably be rather high. So I would survive  
in those "normal world" with a "lesser brain". But if Quentin is right  
and all my memory are necessary for being me, I will

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Günther Greindl]

Hi Bruno,

thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though.

 > course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by "you". In case
 > you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a
 > state where you "know" you are immortal, because your immortality is a
 > "past event".


I would equate total amnesia with death (we've been through this before, 
Stathis has written about this, if I remember correctly).

I agree with you that you can't have a universal machine stopping 
relatively to all others from it's POV; but I don't see why we can't 
think of it having total amnesia. So, for the time being, let us take 
surviving as meaning to keep (at least large parts) of one's memory.

> facts, like the continuum of many-worlds. If Loop Gravity is 100%  
> correct, and if the big bang has a finitely describable origin then  
> comp is false!

Could you elaborate? I don't see why LG should be bad news for comp?
You mean because LG proposes a fundamental spacetime quantization?
I don't see how it would falsify comp?

And why the finitely describable Big Bang? It seems you have a problem 
when there are some finite limits (outside of the effective computation 
of mind). Is this because you need the continuum in the AUDA to get 
Quantum logic or something like that?

> Our bodies can be considered programmed to stop (by sex and death),  
> our soul just cannot, there is always a consistent continuation (even  
> without amnesia 

Why do you believe that latter?

> In arithmetic there are even histories where each time your  
> "brain" dysfunction some alien white rabbits give you a new suitable  
> brain, update it with suitable subroutines, and let you continue your  

What continuations are possible in arithmetic? I would like to warn 
against the approach of taking conceivability/ "humand mind" logical 
possibility as a criterion (as you seem to suggest with saying that "the 
transporter failed" is a consistent extension). The criterion for 
continuation must be arithmetic possibility, and here, I don't see any 
formal or even informal way to get to "worlds" in the anthropocentric sense.

> opportunity to go through the UDA (seventh step) again with Kim. I  
> suggest you polish your argument against comp-immortality until then,  
> perhaps.

Will do :-) But I think beforehand we should clear up any mutual 
misunderstandings; you have obviously been thinking about these things 
for a long time, and you have made connections/inferences which may not 
be as obvious as you think.

BTW: thanks for your modal logic post (the Dt explanation), here again 
the above mentioned issue crops up: while the modal logic may be 
elemental, your interpretation of them is certainly not.

Often it is the interpretation that does all the work (consider for 
instance Einstein's SR: the mathematics was there before, he "just" 
suggested a new interpretation by adding postulates (Principle of 
Relativity for electrodynamics, c as constant speed of light)).

These interpretation issues are often played down, but they are in fact 
essential.

Cheers,
Günther


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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Günther,



>> 1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero)  of 3-OMs,
>> themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of
>> computations going trough their corresponding states.
>> Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is
>> already a continuum of stories/computations.
>
> I'm fine up to here.
>
>> The alien should be able to shut down the universal dovetailer. By
>
> No, they need not - see below.
>
>> I think you (momentarily perhaps?) forget the full consequence of the
>> seventh uda step. You, in the next instant, is literally determined  
>> by
>> a continuum of computations+oracles executed by the UD. Thanks to
>
> I am aware of Step 7: but I don't agree that all computations need
> correspond to a continuation of an OM.


I am not saying this, but only that  to compute my "next 1-OM", I have  
to take into account the infinity of computations going through all 3- 
OM corresponding to this 1-OMs.




>
>
> You agree that some "continuations" can actually be a non- 
> continuation,
> don't you?


Yes.



> For instance, in Quantum suicide, there are versions of you
> which die (visibly for other observers) - so there are "continuations"
> of your state which code your termination.

I am a universal machine. No state of myself codes my termination. But  
I can be supported by a stopping computation. At the same time I am  
supported by an infinity of non stopping computations.



>
>
> I do not see following from UDA that all computational continuations
> need correspond to OMs.

All computational continuations are needed for the measure  
corresponding to the 1-indeterminacy. Even more so the more my  
substitution level is low. The indeterminacy itself bears on those  
where I continue, and indeed this corresponds to some subset of "all  
computations", but that subset has still the cardinality of the  
continuum (by "simple counting").
This is a rough reasoning, only the interview of the machine can  
provide the math for treating the "equivalence class aspect" of the  
computations. I argue informally.



> For instance, in step 1 we say "yes doctor", but
> we don't say yes to every doctor, for instance to the one arriving  
> with
> some cogwheels -> "no doctor" ;-)


Indeed :)


>
>
> So, what I am saying is that maybe in some cases (cul de sac) _all_
> (2^aleph_zero) continuations actually code for termination (=the
> teleport fails completely, but annihilation unfortunately succeeds).


But it is just plainly consistent that the annihilation *could* be not  
successful, and given that all consistent computations (computation in  
which *I* remain consistent are defined intrinsically in the  
arithmetical relation, I don't see how such consistent computations  
can be eliminated.
It is a sort of practical problem with comp: you have no way to  
guaranty a self-annihilation (unless you can change the laws of  
arithmetic of course).


>
>
> How can you exclude that? Are you assuming that _every_ computation is
> conscious qua computation?

No. "I" am conscious, only in the computation which supports me. Of  
course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by "you". In case  
you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a  
state where you "know" you are immortal, because your immortality is a  
"past event".



> (then I would agree -> QI; but I don't share
> that assumption, and I don't see it anywhere in UDA)


I have no idea which criteria you could use to be certain that all  
your continuations will stop. If this could be true, your histories  
(going through you actual state) would be enumerable, and in a sense  
you would be already dead. Such computations are of negligible  
measure. This is a part of comp which leads to verifiable physical  
facts, like the continuum of many-worlds. If Loop Gravity is 100%  
correct, and if the big bang has a finitely describable origin then  
comp is false!
Our bodies can be considered programmed to stop (by sex and death),  
our soul just cannot, there is always a consistent continuation (even  
without amnesia (or Mitra's backtracking), but I believe the amnesic  
continuation to be more "normal" than the other, but this of course is  
hard to compute and in fine depend of what you will mean by "you",  
something comp makes only "you" capable of defining or identifying  
yourself with).

I don't like this idea, and I really wish someone find an error, but I  
can't. In arithmetic there are even histories where each time your  
"brain" dysfunction some alien white rabbits give you a new suitable  
brain, update it with suitable subroutines, and let you continue your  
universal computation. Even your current computer is immortal, from  
its own pov (rather poor today). All universal machine have  
2^aleph_zero continuations resilient in arithmetic, and you can feel  
yourself alive in all those who doesn't stop. In the long run amnesia  
makes its office (but this I just hope!).

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[John Mikes]

Gunther wrote:

"...assuming that _every_ computation is conscious qua computation? "
brings up in my mind: thinking in comp (at least: in numbers) translates
'conscious' into 'computed' ??
(That would imply an elevation from the binary embryonic contraption as our
"computer" into more sophisticated systems, if I dare say: 'analogue'?)
 - - -proposal for vocabulary - - -

John M




On Wed, Mar 11, 2009 at 6:12 PM, Günther Greindl  wrote:

>
> Hi Bruno,
>
> > 1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero)  of 3-OMs,
> > themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of
> > computations going trough their corresponding states.
> > Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is
> > already a continuum of stories/computations.
>
> I'm fine up to here.
>
> > The alien should be able to shut down the universal dovetailer. By
>
> No, they need not - see below.
>
> > I think you (momentarily perhaps?) forget the full consequence of the
> > seventh uda step. You, in the next instant, is literally determined by
> > a continuum of computations+oracles executed by the UD. Thanks to
>
> I am aware of Step 7: but I don't agree that all computations need
> correspond to a continuation of an OM.
>
> You agree that some "continuations" can actually be a non-continuation,
> don't you? For instance, in Quantum suicide, there are versions of you
> which die (visibly for other observers) - so there are "continuations"
> of your state which code your termination.
>
> I do not see following from UDA that all computational continuations
> need correspond to OMs. For instance, in step 1 we say "yes doctor", but
> we don't say yes to every doctor, for instance to the one arriving with
> some cogwheels -> "no doctor" ;-)
>
> So, what I am saying is that maybe in some cases (cul de sac) _all_
> (2^aleph_zero) continuations actually code for termination (=the
> teleport fails completely, but annihilation unfortunately succeeds).
>
> How can you exclude that? Are you assuming that _every_ computation is
> conscious qua computation? (then I would agree -> QI; but I don't share
> that assumption, and I don't see it anywhere in UDA)
>
> Best Wishes,
> Günther
>
> >
>

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Günther Greindl]

Hi Bruno,

> 1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero)  of 3-OMs,  
> themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of  
> computations going trough their corresponding states.
> Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is  
> already a continuum of stories/computations.

I'm fine up to here.

> The alien should be able to shut down the universal dovetailer. By  

No, they need not - see below.

> I think you (momentarily perhaps?) forget the full consequence of the  
> seventh uda step. You, in the next instant, is literally determined by  
> a continuum of computations+oracles executed by the UD. Thanks to  

I am aware of Step 7: but I don't agree that all computations need 
correspond to a continuation of an OM.

You agree that some "continuations" can actually be a non-continuation, 
don't you? For instance, in Quantum suicide, there are versions of you 
which die (visibly for other observers) - so there are "continuations" 
of your state which code your termination.

I do not see following from UDA that all computational continuations 
need correspond to OMs. For instance, in step 1 we say "yes doctor", but 
we don't say yes to every doctor, for instance to the one arriving with 
some cogwheels -> "no doctor" ;-)

So, what I am saying is that maybe in some cases (cul de sac) _all_ 
(2^aleph_zero) continuations actually code for termination (=the 
teleport fails completely, but annihilation unfortunately succeeds).

How can you exclude that? Are you assuming that _every_ computation is 
conscious qua computation? (then I would agree -> QI; but I don't share 
that assumption, and I don't see it anywhere in UDA)

Best Wishes,
Günther

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Mar 2009, at 02:25, Günther Greindl wrote:

>
> Hi Bruno,
>
>>> The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have
>>> successors
>>> (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded  
>>> in
>>> numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic
>>> is
>>> consistent).
>>
>> Hmmm (Not to clear for me, I guess I miss something. I can build
>> to much scenario from you say here).
>
> Ok:
>
> if you make OM's correspond to numbers, then QI holds if for all OM's
> (encoded by some n) there are some (at least one) f(n) so that it is a
> continuation.

Only 3-OM correspond to (relative) number. I prefer to call them  
"states" or "worlds".
1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero)  of 3-OMs,  
themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of  
computations going trough their corresponding states.
Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is  
already a continuum of stories/computations.


>
>
> If the aliens destroy all the reconstitution machines (and the person
> beaming over does not find the beaming to have failed), this would  
> mean
> that there exists a number n (=OM) for which there is no f(n) which
> encodes a continuation.



The alien should be able to shut down the universal dovetailer. By  
step 8, they have to shut down elementary arithmetic. If they can do  
that from inside elementary arithmetic, it means elementary arithmetic  
is inconsistent. Robinson arithmetic would be inconsistent.



>
>
>
> So there can't both be a continuation OM (f(n) for n) _and_ aliens
> destroying _all_ the machines in the multiverse - which would say  
> there
> is _no_ such f(n), for some given n (the teleportation n).
>
> Maybe the confusion arises because we are talking on 2 levels: the
> platonic view (numbers) and the inside view (OMs). What is  
> determined in
> the one (platonic relations) decides what is possible in the OMs.


The 3-OM are determined in the little arithmetical Platonia. The 1-OM  
of the humans lives in the first person plenitude, which escapes  
provably (assuming the humans to be machine) the humans mathematics.
But the 1-OM of a simpler (than us) Lobian machine, like "Peano  
Arithmetic" is still tractable by a much richer Lobian machine like  
"Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory".

I think you (momentarily perhaps?) forget the full consequence of the  
seventh uda step. You, in the next instant, is literally determined by  
a continuum of computations+oracles executed by the UD. Thanks to  
empirical QM, we have good "objective" (sharable) reason we share most  
of those histories.

Best regards,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Günther Greindl]

Hi Bruno,

>> The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have  
>> successors
>> (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in
>> numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic  
>> is
>> consistent).
> 
> Hmmm (Not to clear for me, I guess I miss something. I can build  
> to much scenario from you say here).

Ok:

if you make OM's correspond to numbers, then QI holds if for all OM's 
(encoded by some n) there are some (at least one) f(n) so that it is a 
continuation.

If the aliens destroy all the reconstitution machines (and the person
beaming over does not find the beaming to have failed), this would mean
that there exists a number n (=OM) for which there is no f(n) which
encodes a continuation.


So there can't both be a continuation OM (f(n) for n) _and_ aliens 
destroying _all_ the machines in the multiverse - which would say there 
is _no_ such f(n), for some given n (the teleportation n).

Maybe the confusion arises because we are talking on 2 levels: the
platonic view (numbers) and the inside view (OMs). What is determined in 
the one (platonic relations) decides what is possible in the OMs.


Cheers,
Günther




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[John Mikes]

Bruno, - again the bartender...
*
Initial remark:
I like Gunther's parenthetical condition of arithmetic consistency - which I
find not assured in DIFFERENT universes. As I said axioms (2+2=4) are
in my opinion *thought - conditions* to make one's theory workable and so
they are  conditioned by the circumstances.
*
What I try to add is the *'mind-body' problem*. While I have no definition
for *"mind",* we 'all' think to know what it means: *a non-material
mentality* which encompasses the tool's (brain(function)) *genetic
built differences* - i.e. enhanced  or reduced ease of connectivity-building
in select topical domains - plus the *sum of previous experience* helping
one's personal interpretation (and maybe more) including one's faith in a
"soul" as well, while the* 'body'* is the formulation of a* **figment* in
the 'physical world' upon phenomena that are (mis/poorly) understood when
received and *both *are parts of the *complexity of us*.
I cannot figure a 'separation' of substantial parts of a complexity without
destruction of the complexity in its entirety, so a "transport" can be only
the entire complexity - or none.
Aristotle had it easy with his simple cognitive level of the 'physical
world' so there was an easy possibility of thinking separately about the
physical body and the rest of it not fitting into such.

In brief: *I se no 'mind-body' problem*, only when we try the ancient (I may
say: obsolete) ways of separating the *'physical world figment'* from the
total (complexity).
*
((you promised an explanatory post to my askings - I am in a hurry to write
down these remarks, because MAYBE after your explanations these would not
make sense))

John M

On Sun, Mar 8, 2009 at 3:16 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:06, Günther Greindl wrote:
>
> > The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have
> > successors
> > (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in
> > numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic
> > is
> > consistent).
>
> Hmmm (Not to clear for me, I guess I miss something. I can build
> to much scenario from you say here).
>
> Of course we are in complex matter. It is good to recall that UDA is
> essentially a question. It is an rgument of the kind; "did you see
> that taking comp seriously the mind-body problem is two times more
> complex that in the usual Aristotelian version of it. We have not only
> to find a theory of mind/consciousness/psyche:soul/first-person; but
> we have to extract the physical laws (laws of the observable), if
> there exists any, from that theory of mind.
>
> But now it happens that the theory of mind already exists, if we
> continue to take the comp hyp seriously. Indeed, it is computer
> science, alias intensional and extensional number theory (or
> combinators ...). here there are the "bombs" (creative bomb) of Post
> Turing ... discover of the mathemaical concept of "universal machine",
> and of Gödel' Bernay Hilbert Löb's discovery of the formal probability
> predicate, expressible in arithmetic, and some of its key and stable
> properties, leter capture completely (at some level) by Solovay.
> Roughly speaking Universal Machine + induction axioms gives Löbian
> Machine, and this is the treshold she remains Lobian in all its
> correct extension. It is the ultimate modest machine.
>
> The discovery if the universal machine is a discovery is one of the
> very rare "absolute" notion. It makes "computable" an absolute notion.
> Now, is the universal machine really universal? That is the content,
> in the digital realm, of Church Thesis.
> Gödel discovery is that there is no corresponding notion of
> provability. If you are interested in just arithmetical truth, truth
> concerning relations between natural numbers, you cannot have a theory
> or a machine enumerating all the true propositions. You will have with
> chance a succession of theories: like Robinson Arithmetic, Peano
> Arithmetic, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, ZF+there is an inaccessible
> cardinal, whatever ... Each of them will prove vaster and vaster
> portion of arithmetical truth, but none will get the complete picture;
> like us, obviously today at least.
> >
> >
> >
> >> If a successor state requires something impossible, *that* successor
> >> state will be impossible, but it does not mean there will not be
> >> other
> >> successor states, indeed, for mind corresponding on machine's
> >> state, a
> >> continuum of successor states exists.
> >
> > This is the issue at stake: from what do you gather that all machine
> > states have a continuum of successor states (the aleph_0/aleph_1 is
> > not
> > at issue now; it suffices to say: at least one successor state)?
> >
> > After all, there are halting computations.
>
> By step seven.
> A machine halt only relatively to a universal machine which executes
> it. The whole problem for *us* is that we cannot not know which
> univerrsal machine we are, nor really which un

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:09, Günther Greindl wrote:

>
> Hi Bruno,
>
>>> With COMP it is not so clear.
>>
>> explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp & Dt;  
>> the
>> "Dt" suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next
>> instant or in a successor state is already based on an act of faith.
>
> Please bear in mind that I have not yet studied the AUDA in detail.  
> How
> does Dt suppress cul-de-sac?

By Kripke semantics. A Kripke frame is given by a set of "worlds",  
together with an accessibility relation between those worlds.
For a mathematical logician a kripke frame is just a set with a binary  
relation. By definition a world is just an element of that set, and  
the accessibility relation is just that binary relation.

Those Kripke frames are used to provide a mathematical tools to reason  
on formal modal logical systems.  They provide models of modal theory,  
that is mathematical structure which satisfy, in a mathematical sense,  
the theorems of the modal logical system.

The idea is that a modal theorem in a modal system should be a formula  
true in a ll the worlds of some frame. the hope, indeed realized for  
many theories including G (but not G*), is that there is a binary  
relation on a type of frame which characterized all and only all the  
theorem of the modal system.

We do logic here, meaning we dispose of a set of propositional  
variables p, q, r, ...
A frame become a model when you assign on each world a function from  
{p, q, r, ...} to {0, 1} (a valuation). If v() = 1 in world alpha, we  
say that p is true at world alpha. You make each world obeying  
classical logic (for exemple if p is true in alpha, and if q is true  
in alpha, you make (p & q) true in alpha, etc.

The key of Kripke semantics is that Bp iis true alpha if and only if p  
is true in all worlds beta which are accessible (cf the binary  
relation of the frame) from alpha.

Now, what does mean to say that Dp is true in alpha? We have no  
choice, given that Dp is really an abbreviation of ~B~p, which means  
that it is false (in alpha) that B~p, which means that it is false (by  
Kripke key point) that ~p is true in all worlds accessible from alpha,  
which means (using "false -> false" is a tautology) there is a world,  
with p true, accessible from alpha.

So if Dp, or even just Dt is true in alpha, then there is necessarily  
a world beta, with p true, or even just t, accessible from alpha.  
alpha cannot be a culd-de-sac.

You can note that in cul-de-sac, Dt is false, so Bf is true. Bf is  
true because trivially if a world beta is accessible from alpha then f  
(false) is true in beta. This is trivially true because the  
proposition "beta is accessible from alpha" is never met, so the  
condition is always false, and the propositions have the shape f -> f  
(a tautology).

To sum up: the Kripke semantics of Bf is "I am dead" or "I am in a cul- 
de-sac world".
The Kripke semantics of Dt is "I am alive" or "I am in world able to  
access some other world".

World, or moment, or whatever. It is said that Artemov would have  
interpret jokingly Dt as "I am in country which provides visa".

Günther, I will be frank, this is just elementary modal logic, and  
even advanced modal logic is considered "easy" compared to the  
provability logic. Solovay theorem made one precise modal logic, G, an  
incredible tools for simplifying the provability logic field. The  
modal logic G is to provability logic, what tensor calculus is to  
general relativity theory. G is just one modal logic among an ocean of  
possible modal logics.
Somehow modal logic is the abstract theory of the multimultiverses.

It is just a wonderful result that the formula of Löb, B(Bp->p)->Bp,   
the only axiom of G, (really), formalizes completely the whole field  
(at the propositional level). It gives, with the intensional variants,  
the whole propositional theology of the honest or correct, or sound,  
universal machine. (Universal machine believing some effective  
induction principle, they are automatically Löbian).

It is an ideal case, of course, in our lives we are far from lobian.  
But it is what we need, by UDA, to get the correct, assuming comp, big  
picture, including physics, first and third and first plural physics.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:06, Günther Greindl wrote:





> The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have  
> successors
> (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in
> numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic  
> is
> consistent).

Hmmm (Not to clear for me, I guess I miss something. I can build  
to much scenario from you say here).

Of course we are in complex matter. It is good to recall that UDA is  
essentially a question. It is an rgument of the kind; "did you see  
that taking comp seriously the mind-body problem is two times more  
complex that in the usual Aristotelian version of it. We have not only  
to find a theory of mind/consciousness/psyche:soul/first-person; but  
we have to extract the physical laws (laws of the observable), if  
there exists any, from that theory of mind.

But now it happens that the theory of mind already exists, if we  
continue to take the comp hyp seriously. Indeed, it is computer  
science, alias intensional and extensional number theory (or  
combinators ...). here there are the "bombs" (creative bomb) of Post  
Turing ... discover of the mathemaical concept of "universal machine",  
and of Gödel' Bernay Hilbert Löb's discovery of the formal probability  
predicate, expressible in arithmetic, and some of its key and stable  
properties, leter capture completely (at some level) by Solovay.  
Roughly speaking Universal Machine + induction axioms gives Löbian  
Machine, and this is the treshold she remains Lobian in all its  
correct extension. It is the ultimate modest machine.

The discovery if the universal machine is a discovery is one of the  
very rare "absolute" notion. It makes "computable" an absolute notion.
Now, is the universal machine really universal? That is the content,  
in the digital realm, of Church Thesis.
Gödel discovery is that there is no corresponding notion of  
provability. If you are interested in just arithmetical truth, truth  
concerning relations between natural numbers, you cannot have a theory  
or a machine enumerating all the true propositions. You will have with  
chance a succession of theories: like Robinson Arithmetic, Peano  
Arithmetic, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, ZF+there is an inaccessible  
cardinal, whatever ... Each of them will prove vaster and vaster  
portion of arithmetical truth, but none will get the complete picture;  
like us, obviously today at least.









>
>
>
>> If a successor state requires something impossible, *that* successor
>> state will be impossible, but it does not mean there will not be  
>> other
>> successor states, indeed, for mind corresponding on machine's  
>> state, a
>> continuum of successor states exists.
>
> This is the issue at stake: from what do you gather that all machine
> states have a continuum of successor states (the aleph_0/aleph_1 is  
> not
> at issue now; it suffices to say: at least one successor state)?
>
> After all, there are halting computations.

By step seven.
A machine halt only relatively to a universal machine which executes  
it. The whole problem for *us* is that we cannot not know which  
univerrsal machine we are, nor really which universal machine supports  
us. The UD generates your state S again, and again, and again an  
infinity of time (UD-step time) in many similar and less similar  
computational histories. The first person expectations have to be  
defined (by UDA(1-6) on *all* computational histories. If only due to  
those stupid histories dovetailing on the reals while generating your  
state S, makes the cardinal of the set of all (infinite) computational  
histories going through that state S a continuum.

That the "UDA" informal view.

In AUDA, the first person view is given by the conjunction of  
provability with truth. We lose kripke accessibility, but we get a  
richer topology, close to histories with continuous angles in between;  
but it is heavily technical. Each hypostases has its own mathematics.

Surely more later,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Günther Greindl]

Hi Bruno,

>> With COMP it is not so clear.
> 
> explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp & Dt; the 
> "Dt" suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next 
> instant or in a successor state is already based on an act of faith. 

Please bear in mind that I have not yet studied the AUDA in detail. How 
does Dt suppress cul-de-sac?


Cheers,
Günther

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Günther Greindl]

Bruno,

>> My idea was rather that the instantiations would not correspond to
>> numbers in the first place
> 
> But that would violate the comp assumption.

No, you still misunderstand me ;-) not correspond in the sense of 
non-existing, not in the sense of existing but not number.

>> - that is why the aliens could destroy the
>> machine (it follows from 3-det that something _had_ to happen to 
>> prevent
>> successor states which wouldn't correspond to numbers).
> 
> 
> But machines are secondary. The "physical machines" are pattern 
> emerging in the mind of persons themselves emerging from the relation 
> between numbers. I don't see how aliens could manage a machine not to 
> have successors.

The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have successors 
(the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in 
numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic is 
consistent).


> If a successor state requires something impossible, *that* successor 
> state will be impossible, but it does not mean there will not be other 
> successor states, indeed, for mind corresponding on machine's state, a 
> continuum of successor states exists.

This is the issue at stake: from what do you gather that all machine 
states have a continuum of successor states (the aleph_0/aleph_1 is not 
at issue now; it suffices to say: at least one successor state)?

After all, there are halting computations.

Cheers,
Günther

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 05 Mar 2009, at 12:43, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
>> 2009/3/5 Bruno Marchal :
>>
>>> Sure. But note that "a lot of things happens", including the white
>>> rabbits and aberrant histories. Quantum intefrence and decoherence
>>> explains why those aberrant histories are relatively rare.
>> Could it be that some things which seem physically possible, like the
>> matter in my keyboard spontaneously rearranging itself into a
>> miniature fire-breathing dragon, are actually impossible under MWI,
>> i.e. don't occur in any branch of the multiverse?
> 
> 
> If we take seriously *classical* quantum mechanics into account, or  
> even *special relativistic quantum mechanics* into account, I don't  
> see how we could prevent such happening (your keyboard becoming a  
> dragon) in the multiverse. It just follows from the math. Of course  
> the probability that your keyboard become a firing dragon in your  
> branch is much little than winning the big lottery every nanosecond  
> during 100^100 millennia. The main reason is that in such theories  
> position and momentum are described by continuous variables, and the  
> quantum splitting or observers differentiation operate on the  
> continuum. They are even a continuum of variant among your possible  
> dragons, but this remains relatively rare.
> 
> Of course we have good reason to dismiss both classical quantum  
> mechanics and special relativistic mechanics as the "real theory",  
> given that they "forget" the unavoidable problem of quantization of  
> gravitation, and thus of space-time.
> 
> If we take into account gravitation, we have a choice of theories on  
> which physicists are still debating a lot. I would say that with the  
> "superstring" sort of theories, the multiverse generates still a  
> continuum of differentiation of stories, and that keyboard-dragon  
> transformation will still happen in many branches (but will still be  
> very rare, for the same reason as above). If we take the Loop-Gravity  
> kind of theories, then gravitation (which curves space-time) is  
> properly quantized, and we get eventually a discrete space-time. In  
> that case, if we add the assumption that the physical universe is  
> sufficiently little, it may be that the keyboard-dragon transformation  
> does not occur, in the resulting finite or enumerable multiverse. 

This is what I've suggested before.  There may be a smallest non-zero 
probability, so quantum evolution is not strictly unitary and after sufficient 
decoherence the off diagonal terms of the reduced density matrix become 
strictly 
zero.

Brent

>Now,  
> *this* would be a problem for comp, because comp implies indeed that  
> everything consistent happens somewhere indeed (unless Günther is  
> right and that some comp super-selection rule applies, but I don't see  
> where such super-selection could come from).
> 
> Of course keyboard-dragon types of transformations are utterly NOT  
> verifiable, even in the ironical first person way of quantum or comp  
> suicide. If you decide to kill yourself until your keyboard transforms  
> itself into a firing dragon, a "simple" evaluation of the  
> probabilities will show that you have 99,... % of chance of  
> surviving only with a brain making you believing that such a  
> transformation has occurred, when it has not. It is the general  
> practical weakness of comp or quantum suicide: if you ask for  
> something *near-impossible",  suicide will send you in dreamland (1  
> person view), and probably in a asylum (3 person view).
> 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> 


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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[russell standish]

On Thu, Mar 05, 2009 at 04:10:15PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Of course keyboard-dragon types of transformations are utterly NOT  
> verifiable, even in the ironical first person way of quantum or comp  
> suicide. If you decide to kill yourself until your keyboard transforms  
> itself into a firing dragon, a "simple" evaluation of the  
> probabilities will show that you have 99,... % of chance of  
> surviving only with a brain making you believing that such a  
> transformation has occurred, when it has not. It is the general  
> practical weakness of comp or quantum suicide: if you ask for  
> something *near-impossible",  suicide will send you in dreamland (1  
> person view), and probably in a asylum (3 person view).
> 

Excellent point! 

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Mar 2009, at 12:43, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/3/5 Bruno Marchal :
>
>> Sure. But note that "a lot of things happens", including the white
>> rabbits and aberrant histories. Quantum intefrence and decoherence
>> explains why those aberrant histories are relatively rare.
>
> Could it be that some things which seem physically possible, like the
> matter in my keyboard spontaneously rearranging itself into a
> miniature fire-breathing dragon, are actually impossible under MWI,
> i.e. don't occur in any branch of the multiverse?


If we take seriously *classical* quantum mechanics into account, or  
even *special relativistic quantum mechanics* into account, I don't  
see how we could prevent such happening (your keyboard becoming a  
dragon) in the multiverse. It just follows from the math. Of course  
the probability that your keyboard become a firing dragon in your  
branch is much little than winning the big lottery every nanosecond  
during 100^100 millennia. The main reason is that in such theories  
position and momentum are described by continuous variables, and the  
quantum splitting or observers differentiation operate on the  
continuum. They are even a continuum of variant among your possible  
dragons, but this remains relatively rare.

Of course we have good reason to dismiss both classical quantum  
mechanics and special relativistic mechanics as the "real theory",  
given that they "forget" the unavoidable problem of quantization of  
gravitation, and thus of space-time.

If we take into account gravitation, we have a choice of theories on  
which physicists are still debating a lot. I would say that with the  
"superstring" sort of theories, the multiverse generates still a  
continuum of differentiation of stories, and that keyboard-dragon  
transformation will still happen in many branches (but will still be  
very rare, for the same reason as above). If we take the Loop-Gravity  
kind of theories, then gravitation (which curves space-time) is  
properly quantized, and we get eventually a discrete space-time. In  
that case, if we add the assumption that the physical universe is  
sufficiently little, it may be that the keyboard-dragon transformation  
does not occur, in the resulting finite or enumerable multiverse. Now,  
*this* would be a problem for comp, because comp implies indeed that  
everything consistent happens somewhere indeed (unless Günther is  
right and that some comp super-selection rule applies, but I don't see  
where such super-selection could come from).

Of course keyboard-dragon types of transformations are utterly NOT  
verifiable, even in the ironical first person way of quantum or comp  
suicide. If you decide to kill yourself until your keyboard transforms  
itself into a firing dragon, a "simple" evaluation of the  
probabilities will show that you have 99,... % of chance of  
surviving only with a brain making you believing that such a  
transformation has occurred, when it has not. It is the general  
practical weakness of comp or quantum suicide: if you ask for  
something *near-impossible",  suicide will send you in dreamland (1  
person view), and probably in a asylum (3 person view).


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/3/5 Bruno Marchal :

> Sure. But note that "a lot of things happens", including the white
> rabbits and aberrant histories. Quantum intefrence and decoherence
> explains why those aberrant histories are relatively rare.

Could it be that some things which seem physically possible, like the
matter in my keyboard spontaneously rearranging itself into a
miniature fire-breathing dragon, are actually impossible under MWI,
i.e. don't occur in any branch of the multiverse?



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 05-mars-09, à 11:15, Günther Greindl a écrit :

>
> Hi Stathis,
>
>>> It is at least conceivable that the collection of particles that is 
>>> me
>>> could undergo some environmental interaction such that *all* the
>>> following entangled branches decohere into states that do *not* map 
>>> to
>>> the emergent class of "me, being conscious."  Then I would be dead.
>>
>> It seems possible, but in that case the QTI would be wrong. Also, it
>> isn't clear that the MWI says that everything that can happen, does
>> happen, even though that is how it is sometimes characterised.
>
> Indeed, that is what Jonathan (I guess) and I (definitely) have been
> arguing.


We agree. The MWI does forbid world in which 1 = 0. Many things remains 
impossible in the MWI.


>
> In fact, I am quite sure that MWI in it's current form implies that not
> everything (a priori physically plausible) happens - interference of
> histories is (I think) showing us that.

Sure. But note that "a lot of things happens", including the white 
rabbits and aberrant histories. Quantum intefrence and decoherence 
explains why those aberrant histories are relatively rare.

>
> With COMP it is not so clear.

Something subtle happens with comp. The "scientist" cannot prevent the 
apparition of cul-de-sac everywhere, but this is the reason that he has 
to abandon science for theology once he decide to compute 
probabilities. he will does that by defining the probability by an 
explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp & Dt; the 
"Dt" suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next 
instant or in a successor state is already based on an act of faith. 
But this makes a strong restriction of what is possible, and harder to 
eliminate the white rabbits. Cf, with comp we have to derive QM. We 
just cannot assume it.

Bruno





http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 05-mars-09, à 11:10, Günther Greindl a écrit :

>
> HI Bruno,
>
 Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another
 number. Even a God cannot do that!
>>> The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond
>>> to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural number between 3 and
>>> 4.
>>
>> I am not sure I understand. If the continuation uses non existent
>> numbers, the continuation does not exist, or it is an inconsistent
>> continuation, that is a cul-de-sac world. I can prove that 0 = 1, if
>> there is a natural number between 3 and 4.
>> A god cannot make disappear a natural number, nor introduce a natural
>> number where there is none. It seems to me.
>
> We are just talking a little past each other. To recap:
>
> I initially meant that it would be possible, in a teleportation
> experiment, that aliens prevent any copies from being instantiated.
>
> You then said that that would be equivalent to making disappear a
> number, which is not possible.
>
> My idea was rather that the instantiations would not correspond to
> numbers in the first place

But that would violate the comp assumption.



> - that is why the aliens could destroy the
> machine (it follows from 3-det that something _had_ to happen to 
> prevent
> successor states which wouldn't correspond to numbers).


But machines are secondary. The "physical machines" are pattern 
emerging in the mind of persons themselves emerging from the relation 
between numbers. I don't see how aliens could manage a machine not to 
have successors.



>
> So, of course nobody can introduce new numbers - but if there were
> successor states which would require new numbers, that would mean that
> QI is false - there a cul de sacs (modus tollens).

If a successor state requires something impossible, *that* successor 
state will be impossible, but it does not mean there will not be other 
successor states, indeed, for mind corresponding on machine's state, a 
continuum of successor states exists.

Best,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Günther Greindl]

Hi Stathis,

>> It is at least conceivable that the collection of particles that is me
>> could undergo some environmental interaction such that *all* the
>> following entangled branches decohere into states that do *not* map to
>> the emergent class of "me, being conscious."  Then I would be dead.
> 
> It seems possible, but in that case the QTI would be wrong. Also, it
> isn't clear that the MWI says that everything that can happen, does
> happen, even though that is how it is sometimes characterised.

Indeed, that is what Jonathan (I guess) and I (definitely) have been 
arguing.

In fact, I am quite sure that MWI in it's current form implies that not 
everything (a priori physically plausible) happens - interference of 
histories is (I think) showing us that.

With COMP it is not so clear.

Best Wishes,
Günther

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Günther Greindl]

HI Bruno,

>>> Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another
>>> number. Even a God cannot do that!
>> The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond
>> to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural number between 3 and  
>> 4.
> 
> I am not sure I understand. If the continuation uses non existent  
> numbers, the continuation does not exist, or it is an inconsistent  
> continuation, that is a cul-de-sac world. I can prove that 0 = 1, if  
> there is a natural number between 3 and 4.
> A god cannot make disappear a natural number, nor introduce a natural  
> number where there is none. It seems to me.

We are just talking a little past each other. To recap:

I initially meant that it would be possible, in a teleportation 
experiment, that aliens prevent any copies from being instantiated.

You then said that that would be equivalent to making disappear a 
number, which is not possible.

My idea was rather that the instantiations would not correspond to 
numbers in the first place - that is why the aliens could destroy the 
machine (it follows from 3-det that something _had_ to happen to prevent 
successor states which wouldn't correspond to numbers).

So, of course nobody can introduce new numbers - but if there were 
successor states which would require new numbers, that would mean that 
QI is false - there a cul de sacs (modus tollens).

Best Wishes,
Günther

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Günther,

On 05 Mar 2009, at 00:50, Günther Greindl wrote:

>
> Bruno,
>
>> Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another
>> number. Even a God cannot do that!
>
> The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond
> to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural number between 3 and  
> 4.

I am not sure I understand. If the continuation uses non existent  
numbers, the continuation does not exist, or it is an inconsistent  
continuation, that is a cul-de-sac world. I can prove that 0 = 1, if  
there is a natural number between 3 and 4.
A god cannot make disappear a natural number, nor introduce a natural  
number where there is none. It seems to me.

Best,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/3/5 Johnathan Corgan :

> It is at least conceivable that the collection of particles that is me
> could undergo some environmental interaction such that *all* the
> following entangled branches decohere into states that do *not* map to
> the emergent class of "me, being conscious."  Then I would be dead.

It seems possible, but in that case the QTI would be wrong. Also, it
isn't clear that the MWI says that everything that can happen, does
happen, even though that is how it is sometimes characterised.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Günther Greindl]

Bruno,

> Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another  
> number. Even a God cannot do that!

The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond
to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural number between 3 and 4.

Cheers,
Günther



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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Günther Greindl]

Stathis,

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> Imagine the sequence:
>>
>> Scan - Annihilate - Signal - Reconstitute

> The no-cul-de-sac hypothesis is false if you allow that there is some
> means of destroying all copies in the multiverse. But there is
> probably no such means, no matter how advanced the aliens.

Assuming COMP you are probably right, but with standard MWI I'm with 
Jonathan - it suffices that the aliens would make sure that no 
decoherent branch contains a successor macrostate; considering that the 
reconstitution machine and the incoming beam are (localized) 
macrostates, this seems plausible. Maybe we would have to modify the 
scenario a bit (not 100 000 lightyears distance, which would open up 
possibilites for very different histories) but the minimal distance to 
ensure that annihilation has finished before reconstitution "would" 
begin (without tampering).

Cheers,
Günther

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Johnathan Corgan]

On Wed, 2009-03-04 at 12:25 +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

> > The no-cul-de-sac hypothesis is false if you allow that there is some
> > means of destroying all copies in the multiverse. But there is
> > probably no such means, no matter how advanced the aliens.
>
> Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another  
> number. Even a God cannot do that!

We are a collection of particles, though the exact arrangement and
constitution of such is constantly changing.  Yet, under most
circumstances, from moment to moment our instantaneous state follows a
trajectory such that this state continues to be a member of the larger
class that is "me, being conscious".  

It is again the situation of many microstates mapping to one higher
level, emergent macrostate according to some membership function, the
exact nature of which depends on your specific theory of identity.

The no cul-de-sac conjecture, more precisely, states that as the
wavefunction of our present collection of particles unitarily evolves
there will always be at least one decoherent branch of it that continues
to satisfy the macrostate membership function that is "me, being
conscious", delays and copies notwithstanding.

It is at least conceivable that the collection of particles that is me
could undergo some environmental interaction such that *all* the
following entangled branches decohere into states that do *not* map to
the emergent class of "me, being conscious."  Then I would be dead.

There are many questions/assumptions in the above line of reasoning.
What is the "macrostate membership function" that defines a set of
particles as me? As the set becomes entangled with its environment, how
and when does one decoherent branch then decohere into one or more new
branches (that are still me)? Presumably, our "digital level of
substitution" is much higher than the exact quantum state of this
collection of particles.  What microstate changes don't make a
difference, which do?

Johnathan Corgan



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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 04 Mar 2009, at 07:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/3/4 Bruno Marchal :
>
>> That is why the B people made a law, for helping those who
>> misunderstand the probability. If you decide (before duplication) to
>> kill the copy, the choice of victim/torturer is still decided through
>> a throw of a fair coin. This makes the decision unbiased by fake
>> protocols based on a bad understanding of what the comp probabilities
>> are.
>
> Yes, deciding which copy will take on which role by a coin toss would
> probably eliminate dynasties of torturers. This is an interesting
> point, since the fact that the coin toss is introduced does not
> actually do anything ta change the probability that you will end up
> being tortured, its effect being mainly psychological.

Absolutely so.
That is why, fundamentally, the B people illustrate a higher moral  
ethic. By allowing overlap, and delayed self-annihalation, they force  
the teleporter user to have a better idea of what he is going to do,  
even if they know they cannot have a complete knowledge or any  
certainties of what will happen. The A people, who disallow overlaps  
between copies and original, are more like: "let us use the comp  
theory without trying to think about what we are really doing". It is  
a bit the difference between those who say "yes" to the doctor after  
many explanations, and those who say "yes" to the doctor, but doesn't  
want to know what the doctor will precisely do. Of course I respect  
the two attitudes. I disrespect only the C people, who doesn't care  
about any person they feel different. The A people are ignorant, but  
does not ignore their ignorance. The C people are ignorant and ignore  
their ignorance. The B people, note, are ignorant, but try to be less  
ignorant.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 04 Mar 2009, at 07:13, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/3/4 Günther Greindl :
>
>> Imagine the sequence:
>>
>> Scan - Annihilate - Signal - Reconstitute
>>
>> Now consider that the Signal travels for 100 000 lightyears
>> before it hits the reconstitution chamber (just to
>> have a big distance, the concern is causal disconnection in  
>> spacetime).
>>
>> Now, in the meantime, the reconstitution chamber has been overtaken  
>> by
>> aliens (coming from the other side of the galaxy) who have advanced
>> technology and can control the multiverse - they decide the tweak the
>> multiverse that the reconstitution happens in _no_ multiverse at  
>> all (by
>> destroying all chambers).
>>
>> This would suggest that the no cul de sac conjecture implies that
>> annihilation in the above sequence fails.
>>
>> But surely this can not depend on the decision of the aliens, who  
>> were
>> nowhere near the causal lightcone of the annihilation event.
>>
>> This would imply one of three things (in my view in decreasing  
>> degree of
>> plausibility):
>>
>> .) no cul-de-sac is false; no QI, even in RSSA scenarios.
>> .) annihilation always fails. That is, if a copying machine exists,
>> there will always be a version of you which feels that copying has  
>> not
>> succeeded and "nothing happened" (even if you said you wanted to be
>> annihilated after the duplication).
>> .) COMP obeys global super-selection rules, akin to pre-determinism;
>> that is, in scenarios where aliens destroy the chambers, annihilation
>> fails, else not. Analogously for other scenarios.
>
> The no-cul-de-sac hypothesis is false if you allow that there is some
> means of destroying all copies in the multiverse. But there is
> probably no such means, no matter how advanced the aliens.



Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another  
number. Even a God cannot do that!

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/3/4 Günther Greindl :

> Imagine the sequence:
>
> Scan - Annihilate - Signal - Reconstitute
>
> Now consider that the Signal travels for 100 000 lightyears
> before it hits the reconstitution chamber (just to
> have a big distance, the concern is causal disconnection in spacetime).
>
> Now, in the meantime, the reconstitution chamber has been overtaken by
> aliens (coming from the other side of the galaxy) who have advanced
> technology and can control the multiverse - they decide the tweak the
> multiverse that the reconstitution happens in _no_ multiverse at all (by
> destroying all chambers).
>
> This would suggest that the no cul de sac conjecture implies that
> annihilation in the above sequence fails.
>
> But surely this can not depend on the decision of the aliens, who were
> nowhere near the causal lightcone of the annihilation event.
>
> This would imply one of three things (in my view in decreasing degree of
> plausibility):
>
> .) no cul-de-sac is false; no QI, even in RSSA scenarios.
> .) annihilation always fails. That is, if a copying machine exists,
> there will always be a version of you which feels that copying has not
> succeeded and "nothing happened" (even if you said you wanted to be
> annihilated after the duplication).
> .) COMP obeys global super-selection rules, akin to pre-determinism;
> that is, in scenarios where aliens destroy the chambers, annihilation
> fails, else not. Analogously for other scenarios.

The no-cul-de-sac hypothesis is false if you allow that there is some
means of destroying all copies in the multiverse. But there is
probably no such means, no matter how advanced the aliens.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/3/4 Bruno Marchal :

> That is why the B people made a law, for helping those who
> misunderstand the probability. If you decide (before duplication) to
> kill the copy, the choice of victim/torturer is still decided through
> a throw of a fair coin. This makes the decision unbiased by fake
> protocols based on a bad understanding of what the comp probabilities
> are.

Yes, deciding which copy will take on which role by a coin toss would
probably eliminate dynasties of torturers. This is an interesting
point, since the fact that the coin toss is introduced does not
actually do anything ta change the probability that you will end up
being tortured, its effect being mainly psychological.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Günther Greindl]

Hi,

> better: this is just the "usual" comp-suicide self-selection (assuming  
> of course we can really kill the copies, which is in itself not an  
> obvious proposition).


I have been thinking along these lines lately, in a somewhat different
context: the teleportation with annihilation experiment together with
the no cul de sac conjecture and RSSA (that is, a case not covered by
Jack's paper).

Imagine the sequence:

Scan - Annihilate - Signal - Reconstitute

Now consider that the Signal travels for 100 000 lightyears
before it hits the reconstitution chamber (just to
have a big distance, the concern is causal disconnection in spacetime).

Now, in the meantime, the reconstitution chamber has been overtaken by
aliens (coming from the other side of the galaxy) who have advanced
technology and can control the multiverse - they decide the tweak the
multiverse that the reconstitution happens in _no_ multiverse at all (by
destroying all chambers).

This would suggest that the no cul de sac conjecture implies that
annihilation in the above sequence fails.

But surely this can not depend on the decision of the aliens, who were
nowhere near the causal lightcone of the annihilation event.

This would imply one of three things (in my view in decreasing degree of
plausibility):

.) no cul-de-sac is false; no QI, even in RSSA scenarios.
.) annihilation always fails. That is, if a copying machine exists,
there will always be a version of you which feels that copying has not
succeeded and "nothing happened" (even if you said you wanted to be 
annihilated after the duplication).
.) COMP obeys global super-selection rules, akin to pre-determinism;
that is, in scenarios where aliens destroy the chambers, annihilation
fails, else not. Analogously for other scenarios.


Cheers,
Günther


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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 03 Mar 2009, at 13:40, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/3/3 Bruno Marchal :
>
>> I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run,  along
>> three classes:
>>
>> A:  majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of
>> "individuals": annihilation first, reconstitution after. No right to
>> self-infliction. In case of accidental or exceptional self-
>> multiplication, consent is asked at any time.
>> B: a stable minority (in the long run). Accept teleportation but do
>> allow overlap of individuals. Some will fight for the right of self-
>> infliction including the consent made before the duplication, but  
>> with
>> precise protocol. You know the problem of the masochist: I say no,
>> continue, I say "no no", stop!
>> C:  the bandits. They violates protocols and don't ask for consents.
>> They should normally be wanted, I mean researched by all the polices
>> of the universe, or already be in jail or in asylum.
>
> I think B might work, since it is more or less like the present
> situation, where our decisions are based on a rough risk-benefit
> analysis, i.e. we decide on a course of action if as a result
> gain*Pr(gain) >= loss*Pr(loss). So we decide to smoke, for example, if
> we judge the pleasure of smoking (or the suffering caused by trying to
> give it up) to outweigh the suffering that may result from
> smoking-related illnesses. However, there are also differences if the
> copies are allowed to overlap. If I make a decision that has an
> adverse effect on my future self I may regret the decision, but it's
> not possible to ask my past self to reverse it. On the other hand, if
> I agree for one of my copies to torture the other it is always
> possible for the victim to ask the torturer to release him. Also, it
> is possible for the torturer to come to believe that he is never at
> risk himself after repeated duplications: I've done this many times
> and it's always the *other* guy who suffers, not me, so there is no
> reason for me not to repeat the process. This would be so even if the
> agreement was for 100 copies to be made and 99 of them enslaved: the
> one who does the enslaving may come to believe that he is never at
> risk, and continue creating copies 100 at a time.


You can then imagine the surprise of the copy or copies:  "- I did  
this often and thought there are no risk, but here I am enslaved, and  
I will suffer and die".

That is why the B people made a law, for helping those who  
misunderstand the probability. If you decide (before duplication) to  
kill the copy, the choice of victim/torturer is still decided through  
a throw of a fair coin. This makes the decision unbiased by fake  
protocols based on a bad understanding of what the comp probabilities  
are.

Iterating the procedure, with the throwing of the coin, could make you  
believe you are incredibly lucky, but the computationalist should know  
better: this is just the "usual" comp-suicide self-selection (assuming  
of course we can really kill the copies, which is in itself not an  
obvious proposition).

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[ronaldheld]

Stathis
  This was mentioned in the TNG technical manual. I do not recall,
right, now, which post TOS episodes mentioned it.
  Ronald

On Mar 2, 8:42 am, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> 2009/3/2 ronaldheld :
>
>
>
> > Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain,
> > wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at
> > one time to "quantum resolution" (TNG transporter term).
>
> The question is what level of resolution is needed in order to copy
> the memories, personality etc. You may not need quantum resolution,
> since in that case it is hard to see how you could avoid drastic
> mental state changes while just sitting still. Also, in which TNG
> episode does it mention quantum resolution for the transporter?
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/3/3 Bruno Marchal :

> I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run,  along
> three classes:
>
> A:  majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of
> "individuals": annihilation first, reconstitution after. No right to
> self-infliction. In case of accidental or exceptional self-
> multiplication, consent is asked at any time.
> B: a stable minority (in the long run). Accept teleportation but do
> allow overlap of individuals. Some will fight for the right of self-
> infliction including the consent made before the duplication, but with
> precise protocol. You know the problem of the masochist: I say no,
> continue, I say "no no", stop!
> C:  the bandits. They violates protocols and don't ask for consents.
> They should normally be wanted, I mean researched by all the polices
> of the universe, or already be in jail or in asylum.

I think B might work, since it is more or less like the present
situation, where our decisions are based on a rough risk-benefit
analysis, i.e. we decide on a course of action if as a result
gain*Pr(gain) >= loss*Pr(loss). So we decide to smoke, for example, if
we judge the pleasure of smoking (or the suffering caused by trying to
give it up) to outweigh the suffering that may result from
smoking-related illnesses. However, there are also differences if the
copies are allowed to overlap. If I make a decision that has an
adverse effect on my future self I may regret the decision, but it's
not possible to ask my past self to reverse it. On the other hand, if
I agree for one of my copies to torture the other it is always
possible for the victim to ask the torturer to release him. Also, it
is possible for the torturer to come to believe that he is never at
risk himself after repeated duplications: I've done this many times
and it's always the *other* guy who suffers, not me, so there is no
reason for me not to repeat the process. This would be so even if the
agreement was for 100 copies to be made and 99 of them enslaved: the
one who does the enslaving may come to believe that he is never at
risk, and continue creating copies 100 at a time.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/3/3 Bruno Marchal :

> I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run,  along
> three classes:
>
> A:  majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of
> "individuals": annihilation first, reconstitution after. No right to
> self-infliction. In case of accidental or exceptional self-
> multiplication, consent is asked at any time.
> B: a stable minority (in the long run). Accept teleportation but do
> allow overlap of individuals. Some will fight for the right of self-
> infliction including the consent made before the duplication, but with
> precise protocol. You know the problem of the masochist: I say no,
> continue, I say "no no", stop!
> C:  the bandits. They violates protocols and don't ask for consents.
> They should normally be wanted, I mean researched by all the polices
> of the universe, or already be in jail or in asylum.

I think B might work, since it is more or less like the present
situation, where our decisions are based on a rough risk-benefit
analysis, i.e. we decide on a course of action if as a result
gain*Pr(gain) >= loss*Pr(loss). So we decide to smoke, for example, if
we judge the pleasure of smoking (or the suffering caused by trying to
give it up) to outweigh the suffering that may result from
smoking-related illnesses. However, there are also differences if the
copies are allowed to overlap. If I make a decision that has an
adverse effect on my future self I may regret the decision, but it's
not possible to ask my past self to reverse it. On the other hand, if
I agree for one of my copies to torture the other it is always
possible for the victim to ask the torturer to release him. Also, it
is possible for the torturer to come to believe that he is never at
risk himself after repeated duplications: I've done this many times
and it's always the *other* guy who suffers, not me, so there is no
reason for me not to repeat the process. This would be so even if the
agreement was for 100 copies to be made and 99 of them enslaved: the
one who does the enslaving may come to believe that he is never at
risk, and continue creating copies 100 at a time.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Brent Meeker]

To have strict continuity you would certainly need the state, but not 
at the quantum level, see Tegmark's paper.  But you could probably do 
without most of the state information if you were willing to accept a 
gap - as in anesthesia.

Brent


ronaldheld wrote:
> Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain,
> wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at
> one time to "quantum resolution" (TNG transporter term).
> Ronald
> 
> On Feb 23, 9:04 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>> 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker :
>>
>>> I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of
>>> personal identity.  But that also raises a problem with ideas like
>>> "observer moments" and "continuity".  Almost all my memories are not
>>> being remembered at an given time.  Some I may not recall for years at a
>>> time.  I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously
>>> recalling any memories.  So then how can memories and continuity be
>>> essential?  I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask,
>>> "Does this body have (some) appropriate memories?"
>> The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant memories
>> as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the
>> music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent
>> parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same way, if
>> you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment, then
>> during that moment you might be a generic human having such a similar
>> experience.
>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
> > 
> 


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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 Mar 2009, at 23:48, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/3/2 Bruno Marchal :
>
>> All right, I understand. The question now is: are you sure it is in
>> "your" interest to be that selfish. It is not a moral question: can
>> you be coherent, take the full piece of botter "dead is not big deal"
>> of the midazolam argument, and keep that sort of selfishness.
>>
>> Do you prefer to live in a country 1 where "self-torture" is allowed
>> but only when the decision is made before the duplication (and yes  
>> you
>> could be the victim indeed), or in a country 2 where "self-torture"  
>> is
>> allowed after the duplication. It seems to me that your midazolam-
>> argument (I re-quote below(*)) should in fine relativize the very
>> notion of selfishness.
>>
>> I think it is preferable to live in the first country: yes I could be
>> the victim, but I can remember my consent. In the second type of
>> country, I could even more so be the tortured one ... eventually; and
>> without my consent. OK?
>
> Living in the first country is equivalent to allowing a contract where
> you agree to a gain today at the cost of suffering tomorrow, like
> selling your soul to the devil.


I would say that it  is more like selling your soul to yourself, but I  
admit this could be the same, in some case. You better have to know  
yourself.

I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run,  along  
three classes:

A:  majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of  
"individuals": annihilation first, reconstitution after. No right to  
self-infliction. In case of accidental or exceptional self- 
multiplication, consent is asked at any time.
B: a stable minority (in the long run). Accept teleportation but do  
allow overlap of individuals. Some will fight for the right of self- 
infliction including the consent made before the duplication, but with  
precise protocol. You know the problem of the masochist: I say no,  
continue, I say "no no", stop!
C:  the bandits. They violates protocols and don't ask for consents.  
They should normally be wanted, I mean researched by all the polices  
of the universe, or already be in jail or in asylum.

Legend for the future: the A and B people will fight with each other  
until the A people realize that only the B people can help them to  
lessen the pain inflicted by the C people. A little bit like Orpheus  
going to hell for saving the soul of his love Eurydice.

The case of the B people is an interesting case, if only because it  
shows the richness of the hardly definable notion of self-consent.
With comp you can't build a paradise without building an hell. The  
existence of B people can make hell partially controllable. I think.  
This points to harm reduction strategies in the politics of health.  
The very existence of the B people makes the C people transparently  
cowards.

A masochist has much in common with a Godelian sentence, which asserts  
their (true) unprovability or their (false but consistent) refutability.
They are quite different from the Löbian sentences which asserts  
positively their (true) provability.

The genuine pain is not in the intensity of the flame, but in the  
unfairness of the violation of the consents and protocols. Amnesia of  
consent is equivalent to no consent at all. Except for ...

Masochism could be a self-referential type of Trojan Horse concept for  
developing, as far as it is comp-possible, a mechanist theory of pain.  
And the first easy thing you can deduce are of the negative type: pain  
is not definable, pain is unavoidable (for consistent entities), but  
also pain can be limited, and this even in the transfinite.

Indulge my thinking aloud. This is not published material. Yet I did  
wrote, for myself, a long time ago a "A Refutation of Sade". Sade, in  
his own way, showed already the danger of confusing Mechanism and  
Materialism. He took Mechanism and Materialism from La Mettrie, who  
already builded the seeds of person elimination philosophies.

Best,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/3/2 ronaldheld :
>
> Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain,
> wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at
> one time to "quantum resolution" (TNG transporter term).

The question is what level of resolution is needed in order to copy
the memories, personality etc. You may not need quantum resolution,
since in that case it is hard to see how you could avoid drastic
mental state changes while just sitting still. Also, in which TNG
episode does it mention quantum resolution for the transporter?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[ronaldheld]

Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain,
wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at
one time to "quantum resolution" (TNG transporter term).
Ronald

On Feb 23, 9:04 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker :
>
> > I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of
> > personal identity.  But that also raises a problem with ideas like
> > "observer moments" and "continuity".  Almost all my memories are not
> > being remembered at an given time.  Some I may not recall for years at a
> > time.  I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously
> > recalling any memories.  So then how can memories and continuity be
> > essential?  I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask,
> > "Does this body have (some) appropriate memories?"
>
> The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant memories
> as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the
> music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent
> parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same way, if
> you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment, then
> during that moment you might be a generic human having such a similar
> experience.
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/3/2 Bruno Marchal :

> All right, I understand. The question now is: are you sure it is in
> "your" interest to be that selfish. It is not a moral question: can
> you be coherent, take the full piece of botter "dead is not big deal"
> of the midazolam argument, and keep that sort of selfishness.
>
> Do you prefer to live in a country 1 where "self-torture" is allowed
> but only when the decision is made before the duplication (and yes you
> could be the victim indeed), or in a country 2 where "self-torture" is
> allowed after the duplication. It seems to me that your midazolam-
> argument (I re-quote below(*)) should in fine relativize the very
> notion of selfishness.
>
> I think it is preferable to live in the first country: yes I could be
> the victim, but I can remember my consent. In the second type of
> country, I could even more so be the tortured one ... eventually; and
> without my consent. OK?

Living in the first country is equivalent to allowing a contract where
you agree to a gain today at the cost of suffering tomorrow, like
selling your soul to the devil.



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Günther Greindl]

Stathis, Bruno,

>> It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture
>> their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of
>> course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule
>> with comp is "don't do to the other what the other does not want you
>> to do on him/her (except to save your soul)". 

You have already answered your question in the first two sentences with 
the last two sentences.

>But could someone makes
>> the decision before the duplication? This is an advanced question
>> which will make sense when we will all be virtual (with respect of the
>> physical layer). Comp is consistent with a variety of answers.

In law it is usual that with personal rights, consent can be withdrawn
anytime. Why should it be different with duplicates? So, if a duplicate
withdraws consent, every prior consent is nullified.

>> Less provocative, a similar question is: do I have the right to
>> reconstitute an army of "Bruno" to extinguish a nuclear energy source
>> which is on fire?

Bruno_[n] can decide for himself if he goes on the mission or
not. It they decide not to (some or all of them), you have to cope with 
an army of Brunos though. Maybe they could translate your book into 
english? ;-))

> made, since I might end up being the copy. But after the copying this
> would no longer be a consideration, and I would not hesitate to hurt
> the copy or the original (depending on which one I was) no matter how
> short the time since differentiation.

That would lead to terrible consequences. You would have slaves! How
long would your willingness to hurt them last, after differentiation?
Assuming duplication technologies, these guys can stick around for very
long, so maybe after a 1000 years they are more similar to 'me in a 1000
years' than to you. Why should you have the right to hurt people like me?

In case of availability of duplication technology, there can be only one
rule, without exemption: every duplicate has the same rights as the
original (it is as the original in any sense that matters), immediately. 
You have no more rights over your duplicates as I have over mine; 
duplicates are not things to be owned, but persons.

(There is only one right where one should have priority over one's own 
code: the decision to make duplicates in the first place.)

Cheers,
Günther


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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 Mar 2009, at 09:54, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/2/28 Bruno Marchal :
>
>> It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to  
>> torture
>> their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of
>> course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule
>> with comp is "don't do to the other what the other does not want you
>> to do on him/her (except to save your soul)". But could someone makes
>> the decision before the duplication? This is an advanced question
>> which will make sense when we will all be virtual (with respect of  
>> the
>> physical layer). Comp is consistent with a variety of answers.
>> Less provocative, a similar question is: do I have the right to
>> reconstitute an army of "Bruno" to extinguish a nuclear energy source
>> which is on fire?
>
> Assuming I were completely selfish and ruthless, I would not agree in
> advance to do anything that would hurt my copy before the copy was
> made, since I might end up being the copy. But after the copying this
> would no longer be a consideration, and I would not hesitate to hurt
> the copy or the original (depending on which one I was) no matter how
> short the time since differentiation.


All right, I understand. The question now is: are you sure it is in  
"your" interest to be that selfish. It is not a moral question: can  
you be coherent, take the full piece of botter "dead is not big deal"  
of the midazolam argument, and keep that sort of selfishness.

Do you prefer to live in a country 1 where "self-torture" is allowed  
but only when the decision is made before the duplication (and yes you  
could be the victim indeed), or in a country 2 where "self-torture" is  
allowed after the duplication. It seems to me that your midazolam- 
argument (I re-quote below(*)) should in fine relativize the very  
notion of selfishness.

I think it is preferable to live in the first country: yes I could be  
the victim, but I can remember my consent. In the second type of  
country, I could even more so be the tortured one ... eventually; and  
without my consent. OK?

I guess you did see this, because of your terrible assumption:  
"Assuming I were completely selfish and ruthless, ...". The "real"  
question is: let us suppose you are not selfish ... can you sympathize  
with those who will propose some right of self-torture?

Note that in  "The prestige", the self-inflicting decision is taken  
before, by Angier. Borden had less choice, and it is as he got the  
full secret that nobody really can both remember and stay alive.   
(Here I am inconsistent or really near inconsistency, as "the  
prestige").

With comp, selfishness is not a problem. It is selfishness +  
ignorance: this mix can generate suffering.

Bruno

(*) Stathis wrote (2009/2/27):


> This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for
> personal identity. If I am facing death it is little consolation to me
> if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I)
> will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there
> exists some copy who will have a memory of my present experiences
> would I not object to dying, and this would require a backup updated
> every moment. In that case, I should also object to an hour of memory
> loss, due to a medication like midazolam. But I don't think that
> taking midazolam is tantamount to dying. Inconsistency! Either I have
> to agree that taking midazolam is like dying, or I have to agree that
> dying while leaving an old (how old?) backup behind does not matter.
> If I agree to the latter, then I give up worrying about the thing I
> don't like about dying, which is the fact that I won't be able to
> anticipate any future experiences. And if I give up worrying about
> that, then there isn't anything else that worries me about dying. So
> if I think that taking midazolam is no big deal (which I do), to be
> consistent I should also think that death is no big deal.



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/2/28 Bruno Marchal :

> It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture
> their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of
> course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule
> with comp is "don't do to the other what the other does not want you
> to do on him/her (except to save your soul)". But could someone makes
> the decision before the duplication? This is an advanced question
> which will make sense when we will all be virtual (with respect of the
> physical layer). Comp is consistent with a variety of answers.
> Less provocative, a similar question is: do I have the right to
> reconstitute an army of "Bruno" to extinguish a nuclear energy source
> which is on fire?

Assuming I were completely selfish and ruthless, I would not agree in
advance to do anything that would hurt my copy before the copy was
made, since I might end up being the copy. But after the copying this
would no longer be a consideration, and I would not hesitate to hurt
the copy or the original (depending on which one I was) no matter how
short the time since differentiation.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Feb 2009, at 03:02, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/2/28 Günther Greindl :
>
>> The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten  
>> years
>> old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply
>> the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten  
>> years
>> we often change so much that we indeed become a very _different_  
>> person.
>>
>> So, what counts is change, not "objective" time.
>>
>> What we _are_ is I think more about what we (can) _become_, rather  
>> than
>> a single snapshot at time t_0. And if this becoming is lost, that  
>> is the
>> true tragedy.
>
> The problem with this explanation is that fear of death is only
> partly, if at all, attenuated by rational considerations. I could
> probably make my hour old backup do anything I want by holding a gun
> to his head.


Darwinian evolution did not prepare us to duplication and the like.
This happens all the time. Our cortex contradicts some instincts wired  
in the limbic system and in the cerebral stem.

In discussions about duplication with amnesia, it is important to  
distinguish the quasi academical or conceptual question "do we  
survive?", and the practical question "Are we happy surviving in this  
or that way". I would say "no" in practice to a doctor who proposes me  
an artificial brain and warning me on a possible amnesia, yet, if I  
have no choice, I believe that comp forces me to say that I will  
survive (yet unhappily wounded). Of course we are then lead to the  
idea that we always survive no matter what. In practice we want keep  
what we like, be it books, programs, friends, memories, sure.

Stathis, you post which I quote below was very good:

<>

It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture  
their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of  
course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule  
with comp is "don't do to the other what the other does not want you  
to do on him/her (except to save your soul)". But could someone makes  
the decision before the duplication? This is an advanced question  
which will make sense when we will all be virtual (with respect of the  
physical layer). Comp is consistent with a variety of answers.
Less provocative, a similar question is: do I have the right to  
reconstitute an army of "Bruno" to extinguish a nuclear energy source  
which is on fire?

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/2/28 Günther Greindl :
>
>   
>> The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years
>> old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply
>> the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten years
>> we often change so much that we indeed become a very _different_ person.
>>
>> So, what counts is change, not "objective" time.
>>
>> What we _are_ is I think more about what we (can) _become_, rather than
>> a single snapshot at time t_0. And if this becoming is lost, that is the
>> true tragedy.
>> 
>
> The problem with this explanation is that fear of death is only
> partly, if at all, attenuated by rational considerations. 

Well mine is pretty attenuated - but whether it was strictly rational 
considerations or just getting older I couldn't say.

> I could
> probably make my hour old backup do anything I want by holding a gun
> to his head.
>   
But would you shoot him?  ;-)

Brent
Indeed, I would personally find the idea of clones of myself that I 
could run into quite disturbing, and the more like me they were, the 
worse it would be.
--- Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/2/28 Günther Greindl :

> The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years
> old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply
> the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten years
> we often change so much that we indeed become a very _different_ person.
>
> So, what counts is change, not "objective" time.
>
> What we _are_ is I think more about what we (can) _become_, rather than
> a single snapshot at time t_0. And if this becoming is lost, that is the
> true tragedy.

The problem with this explanation is that fear of death is only
partly, if at all, attenuated by rational considerations. I could
probably make my hour old backup do anything I want by holding a gun
to his head.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[russell standish]

On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 08:34:48PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal :
> 
> > Gosh!  And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I
> > will be dead too? Less dead?
> 
> This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for
> personal identity. If I am facing death it is little consolation to me
> if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I)
> will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there
> exists some copy who will have a memory of my present experiences
> would I not object to dying, and this would require a backup updated
> every moment. In that case, I should also object to an hour of memory
> loss, due to a medication like midazolam. But I don't think that
> taking midazolam is tantamount to dying. Inconsistency! Either I have
> to agree that taking midazolam is like dying, or I have to agree that
> dying while leaving an old (how old?) backup behind does not matter.
> If I agree to the latter, then I give up worrying about the thing I
> don't like about dying, which is the fact that I won't be able to
> anticipate any future experiences. And if I give up worrying about
> that, then there isn't anything else that worries me about dying. So
> if I think that taking midazolam is no big deal (which I do), to be
> consistent I should also think that death is no big deal.
> 

If Multiverse (or COMP), and no cul-de-sacs is true, then the backups
are actually irrelevant. There will always be next OM to
experience. If "no cul-de-sacs" is false, however, then true death is
possible, and I'm not convinced that the presence of backups will help
much.

Either way, there is little to be concerned about :)

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Günther Greindl]

> John Mikes wrote:
>> Brent:
>> who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why?

It is only a thought experiment to make clear what we care about
regarding personal identity.

And if computationalism is true, this thought experiment will be 
practically quite relevant in the near(?) future (as in mind uploading 
etc) (see Bostrom and Sandberg; Whole Brain emulation roadmap 
http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/Reports/2008-3.pdf)

And as regards COMP, the duplications occur all the time.

Cheers,
Günther

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Brent Meeker]

John Mikes wrote:
> Brent:
> who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why?

Ask Bruno, he's the one who brought it up.

Brent


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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Günther Greindl]

Stathis, List,

> if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I)
> will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there

As Bruno said in a previous post, what we should care about in personal 
survival is not concrete memories (although memories are essential to 
anchor a person in reality) but rather something else (values, insights etc)

In your example, living for an hour will not necessarily accrete much
experience or new insights which you would like to share with your 
future self or others. So, indeed, death does not matter (apart from 
ethical considerations which are not at issue now, but only personal 
identity) for the one hour duplicate, and you can also take the 
amnesia-inducing medication.

On the other hand, if you had an insight in exactly that hour: let's 
say, you've been working on a scientific problem for ten years, and in 
that hour you (the duplicate) saw something which sparked something in 
your brain that led you to a solution (and you know it was due to the 
extreme situation, and the other you will not have this insight), then 
you should worry very much. If you are annihilated, something important 
is lost (for yourself, for others).

The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years
old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply 
the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten years 
we often change so much that we indeed become a very _different_ person.

So, what counts is change, not "objective" time.

What we _are_ is I think more about what we (can) _become_, rather than 
a single snapshot at time t_0. And if this becoming is lost, that is the 
true tragedy.

Best Wishes,
Günther


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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Günther Greindl]

Bruno, List,

> in awaked state. Yet I do distinguish dying and forgetting.

Let us say that we have a measure of continuation (of psychological)
identity from 1 to 0, where 1=full continuation and 0=death, and we 
apply this measure from one OM to the next.

Then forgetting would be everything between 0 and 1. O, extreme
forgetting, is death.

Oliver Sacks's book "The Man who mistook his wife for a hat" comes to 
mind, where he also describes a patient, Jimmie, who has severe 
retrograde amnesia which started when he was around 60 or so and which 
"erased" his memories up to 40 years prior.

An especially chilling episode occurs in the book when Sacks mentions 
that, on the first interview with the patient, he gives him a mirror 
(which Sacks regrets) and the patient gets a panic attack, because he 
sees a 65 year old when he expects to be 19. Fortunately, he forgets a 
few moments later. He lives in an "eternal now" being reset every few 
minutes, because (through alcohol abuse) he can't develop new memories 
(and in his severe case many past ones where erased).

This person has lived up to 65, but, through losing his memories, from 
65 onwards one could say that he "died" with 19 (relative to his 65+ 
states).


>I think "I" is a logical construction (we will come back on this).
>Memories have a big values, but "I" don't put it in my identity, nor

Hmm, I do think that memories constitutes your identity (in the wide 
sense, also muscle memory as Brent mentioned). If not that,
what then?

Drescher (in Good and Real, 2006, MIT Press) for instance likens qualia
to gensyms in LISP

http://www.cs.utah.edu/dept/old/texinfo/emacs19/cl_6.html:
QUOTE:
Creating Symbols

These functions create unique symbols, typically for use as temporary
variables.

Function: gensym &optional x
This function creates a new, uninterned symbol (using make-symbol) with
a unique name.
ENDQUOTE

I am not so sure about qualia, but I think the "I" symbol fits this
description nicely: a unique symbol for use as temporary variable,
around which memories (filters on histories) gather. This "I" variable 
is not really essential, what is essential is the memories (relating one 
to the world). Indeed, Susan Blackmore (english naturalist 
philosopher/psychologist) describes having eliminating any feeling of 
"I" through meditation. To be more precise, I think she has simply 
eliminated the I symbol but it is still present subsymbolically as an 
anchor for memories (see also papers by Aaron Sloman and John Pollock 
describing persons as virtual machines).

Plotinus Universal Soul (less mystically: the first person view) could
never die (as in: there will always be an experience in Platonia,
somewhere, somewhen (better: nowhere, nowhen); but your _personal
identity_ here on Earth in this Universe etc. ceases to exist without
your memories.

Less and less memories -> means more and more histories pass through you 
(assuming COMP), until, when you have lost all memories (including the 
"memory" of your brain organization which leads you to be able to 
process visual stimuli, same holds for other senses) which equals death 
all histories pass through that state, and as Russell nicely points out 
in his book (he uses bitstrings) all histories are as good as no 
histories - all differences get lost, there is no person left to 
appreciate (that is then indeed the true view from nowhen and nowhere - 
nothing).

To put up the above paragraph another way: you need memories to _be_ 
_someone_. To be someone is to be someone relatively to possible 
histories, which gets mediated by memories.

Best Wishes,
Günther



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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Feb 2009, at 15:57, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

>
>
> 2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal 
>
> On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me.
>
> I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to  
> surviving. Personal identity, I think is more and less than personal  
> memories.
> By loosing memory "I" would be wounded, not dead.
>
> By loosing your memory, the resulting 'I' is no more the previous  
> 'I' and in this settings it makes no sense to talk about 'I', the  
> subject is not the same.

So you die with Stathis' Midazolam.



>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>> If "I" with my memories happen to have no next moment with my  
>> memories... I will be dead, and no cul-de-sac is false... a next  
>> moment where none of your memories is left is no more a next moment.
>
> No memories at all? In that case some month ago I would have agreed  
> with you, but I have lost any certainties here.
>
> What is you ? By what you say, I'm as you as you are... But I can  
> assure you, I'm not you, and if tomorrow you wake up without your  
> memories but mine instead you'll be me not you anymore (and If you  
> have my memories you'll be rightly believe so).

If I wake up with your mind correctly uploaded in my brain (if that  
can be made), that "I" is you, I agree. But memories here include the  
interpreter of those memories, in part build by those memories, but  
also a part which reflects the constraint "reality" leading to  
consistency and truth, and most probable histories.






>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> You know it was you because you did wake up as you...
>
>
> How could I know that?
>
> Because now you remember it and you are fully self aware and know  
> who you are.


My brain can fool me completely. Like many, when training myself in  
lucid dream technic, I got long sequences of 'false awakenings',  
dreaming to wake up in cascad, each time sure to be fully aware, and  
"knowing who I am".
Each time I think I know who I am, I realize I am wrong, yet  
something, never definable, survive in such changes.
Now I have an identity cart, and a body, but this kind of notions will  
not tell you who I am really, in the sense or surviving per se,  
including amnesia experiences.
If I lost my life memories, in the street, probably my identity cart  
will help a lot for surviving in practice, but it will not tell me who  
I am unless it happens I got the memory back.
Memories are not always good, and it seems that for surviving, some  
people have to forget, to develop partial amnesia. Collectivity can  
develop amnesia. The "I" is the "I" which survives those possible  
amnesia, as difficult as such an idea can be. In the second season of  
"the heroes", amnesia is used as torture, indeed.




>
>
>
>
>
>> you didn't know inside the dream...
>
>
> This is Maury's conception of dream. I doubt it a lot, and consider  
> it refuted by the work of Laberge and Dement (and Hearne) on lucid  
> dreaming.
>
>
> Well... I had once what is call a "lucid" dream... but I knew I was  
> somehow "conscious" only when I was able to recollect it (when I  
> woke up)... I don't know if I could ascribe meaning to say I was  
> really conscious during the dream.
>
>
>
>
>> note that I'm not even sure we have of sense of self while dreaming,
>
>
> OK, here I disagree rather strongly.
>
>
> What could prove that wrong ?


In the state of dream you are paralyzed and hallucinating, except for  
your eyes muscles. When well prepared in specific lucid state  
dreaming, having the REM waves and being paralyzed, some lucid  
dreamers can communicate with the people in the environment (of the  
bed). The activity in the cortex is mainly the same as in the one of a  
brain by someone being awake, except from cerebral stem perturbation  
providing inputs to the dream (making sometimes hard for the subject  
to maintain the lucidity.
I would say the experience of Dement, Laberge and followers makes you,  
not wrong, but hardly plausible. In "conscience and méchanism" I show  
that Malcolm's argument against mechanism are deeply related to his  
arguments against consciousness in dreams.
(All references are in the general bibliography of C & M.)



>
>
>
>
>
>> I accept we have it during a recollection of the dream.
>
>
> Personal identity is indeed related to recollection of some memory,  
> even in awaked state. Yet I do distinguish dying and forgetting.
>
>
> Well I don't differentiate forgetting everything and dying... result  
> is the same.


I am not sure. It could depend on the forgetting path.

>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this  
>> means, I think, that we can still survive without them.
>>
>> I think not.
>>
>>
>> Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find  
>> a backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted  
>> from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I  
>> have sur

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[John Mikes]

Brent:
who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why?
you people take it for granted that a (supernatural???) authority has
nothing else to do except making replicas of members of the Everything List.
And you observe, how good - or bad - "its" work is.
Some teleological view of pantheism Ha Ha).

Otherwise where would the replicas come from and where would they go?
(Probably the notion comes from the "backup" mode of your computer and the
file "backup" updated every Sunday).
John M

On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 12:43 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:

>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > 2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal :
> >
> >> Gosh!  And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute
> ago? I
> >> will be dead too? Less dead?
> >
> > This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for
> > personal identity. If I am facing death it is little consolation to me
> > if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I)
> > will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there
> > exists some copy who will have a memory of my present experiences
> > would I not object to dying, and this would require a backup updated
> > every moment. In that case, I should also object to an hour of memory
> > loss, due to a medication like midazolam. But I don't think that
> > taking midazolam is tantamount to dying. Inconsistency! Either I have
> > to agree that taking midazolam is like dying, or I have to agree that
> > dying while leaving an old (how old?) backup behind does not matter.
> > If I agree to the latter, then I give up worrying about the thing I
> > don't like about dying, which is the fact that I won't be able to
> > anticipate any future experiences. And if I give up worrying about
> > that, then there isn't anything else that worries me about dying. So
> > if I think that taking midazolam is no big deal (which I do), to be
> > consistent I should also think that death is no big deal.
> >
> >
>
> But isnt' there a range here.  I would certainly feel less anxious
> about dying if there were a backup of me made an hour ago than if it
> were made months or years ago or if there were no backup at all. On
> the other hand, an hour of memory loss from taking midazolam may be
> less worrisome simply because we, as a culture, have a lot of
> experience with loss of consciousness and memory from anesthesia, etc.
>
> Brent
>
>
> >
>

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Quentin Anciaux]

2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal 

>
> On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
> There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me.
>
>
> I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to surviving.
> Personal identity, I think is more and less than personal memories.
> By loosing memory "I" would be wounded, not dead.
>

By loosing your memory, the resulting 'I' is no more the previous 'I' and in
this settings it makes no sense to talk about 'I', the subject is not the
same.


>
>
>
>
> If "I" with my memories happen to have no next moment with my memories... I
> will be dead, and no cul-de-sac is false... a next moment where none of your
> memories is left is no more a next moment.
>
>
> No memories at all? In that case some month ago I would have agreed with
> you, but I have lost any certainties here.
>

What is you ? By what you say, I'm as you as you are... But I can assure
you, I'm not you, and if tomorrow you wake up without your memories but mine
instead you'll be me not you anymore (and If you have my memories you'll be
rightly believe so).



>
>
>
> You know it was you because you did wake up as you...
>
>
>
> How could I know that?
>

Because now you remember it and you are fully self aware and know who you
are.


>
>
>
> you didn't know inside the dream...
>
>
>
> This is Maury's conception of dream. I doubt it a lot, and consider it
> refuted by the work of Laberge and Dement (and Hearne) on lucid dreaming.
>
>
Well... I had once what is call a "lucid" dream... but I knew I was somehow
"conscious" only when I was able to recollect it (when I woke up)... I don't
know if I could ascribe meaning to say I was really conscious during the
dream.


>
>
>
> note that I'm not even sure we have of sense of self while dreaming,
>
>
>
> OK, here I disagree rather strongly.
>
>
What could prove that wrong ?


>
>
>
> I accept we have it during a recollection of the dream.
>
>
>
> Personal identity is indeed related to recollection of some memory, even in
> awaked state. Yet I do distinguish dying and forgetting.
>
>
Well I don't differentiate forgetting everything and dying... result is the
same.


>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I
>> think, that we can still survive without them.
>>
>
> I think not.
>
>
>>
>> Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a
>> backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from that
>> backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only
>> with a severe sort of amnesy ?
>>
>
> You will be dead.
>
>
> Gosh!  And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I
> will be dead too? Less dead?
>
> Best regards,
>
> Bruno
>

Well a backup of one minute ago is nearer to your you now... And in a sense
I could say you survive 'at least a very actual near you did'.

My current 'I' is the past of an "infinity" of futur 'I' where all these 'I'
having as past my current 'I' have all the right to say they were me... But
one of these 'I' which was differentiated of the others 'I' cannot claim
that the others 'I's are valid continuation... They are not.

What I care to continue is 'I', meaning my knowledge, my memories, my name,
what I've done, who I did know... If it dissappears then it's plain death.

Regards,
Quentin



-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal :

> Gosh!  And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I
> will be dead too? Less dead?

This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for
personal identity. If I am facing death it is little consolation to me
if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I)
will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there
exists some copy who will have a memory of my present experiences
would I not object to dying, and this would require a backup updated
every moment. In that case, I should also object to an hour of memory
loss, due to a medication like midazolam. But I don't think that
taking midazolam is tantamount to dying. Inconsistency! Either I have
to agree that taking midazolam is like dying, or I have to agree that
dying while leaving an old (how old?) backup behind does not matter.
If I agree to the latter, then I give up worrying about the thing I
don't like about dying, which is the fact that I won't be able to
anticipate any future experiences. And if I give up worrying about
that, then there isn't anything else that worries me about dying. So
if I think that taking midazolam is no big deal (which I do), to be
consistent I should also think that death is no big deal.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote:
> 
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>

 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal >>> >



The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you  
 even in
the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case  
 he got
new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in  
 the
movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads  
 to the
idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being  
 the
other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is  
 needed for
the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



 If the "copy" has no memory of being me then It's not me...
>>>
>>> Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to
>>> have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is  
>>> not
>>> a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all,
>>> when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a
>>> person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory.
>> Because of continuity of the body.  If we knew the person's body was
>> destroyed and now someone who looked the same and had the same traits
>> of character, but different memories, appeared we would say it was a
>> different person who just happened to be similar - and the person
>> would agree with us.
> 
> I am not sure.
>>>
 or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is "me"
 (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?
>>>
>>> I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp.
>>> Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe
>>> that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify
>>> myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with  
>>> memories,
>>> which are useful for many practical things, indeed  capable of
>>> implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their
>>> relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation.
>> But those values were learned and so are that sense memories, even if
>> not conscious memories.  So were perhaps "hard-wired" by evolution;
>> but that too is a form of memory.
>>
>>

 It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what
 can be ascribe to "you" then "you/I/..." doesn't mean anything... in
 that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I
 don't see this as a theory of self identity.
>>>
>>>
>>> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living.  
>>> Here
>>> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
>>> conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to  
>>> itself.
>>> Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that  
>>> unique
>>> person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.
>>>
>>> In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet "I" was there,  
>>> and
>>> "I" was me.
>> Isn't that because "you" remember the dream when you are awake and can
>> compare the memories?
> 
> That would be a reason to doubt I was me.

When you were dreaming you might have dreamed you were somebody else. 
  Once when I took some medication, which didn't seem to have any 
psychotropic effects when I was awake, I found that my dreams seemed 
to be someone else's dreams.  That is they had people in them which my 
dream self seemed to know and they knew "me", but which in waking life 
I either had never met or didn't recall.  Additionally the 
circumstances and events, while being realistic, were completely 
foreign to me - I drove a different car, wore different clothes, lived 
in a different place,...

> 
> 
>>
>>> To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it
>>> is a big  impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided,  
>>> unless
>>> it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the
>>> main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since  
>>> recently, in
>>> salvia reports).
>>>
>>> Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this  
>>> means, I
>>> think, that we can still survive without them.
>> I'm doubtful.  I suspect that "I" is a construct of the brain, part of
>> how it makes sensible story of the world.  You call it a useful
>> fiction - but just because it's a story, doesn't mean it's fiction.
> 
> I think "I" is a logical construction (we will come back on this).  
> Memories have a big values, but "I" don't put it in m

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote:
> 
>> Hi,
>>
>>> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living.  
>>> Here
>>> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
>>> conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to  
>>> itself.
>>> Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that  
>>> unique
>>> person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.
>> I think I agree with this view. At least, in mystic mode ;-)
>>
>>> Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this  
>>> means, I
>>> think, that we can still survive without them.
>>>
>>> Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a
>>> backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from
>>> that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have
>>> survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?
>> We should be careful here: the "mystic I" survives, but I don't think
>> that that is what most people have in mind when they talk of personal
>> identity/survival. Here, the concern is clearly continuity of memory.
>>
>> In normal discourse, the 5 year old Bruno is clearly not an amnesic
>> survivor; the older Bruno (with his unique experiences) would be dead.
> 
> I am that five years Bruno, but just older. If I am promised having a  
> different life, I could accept such a backup. It would be refreshing.
> If I die through amnesia, I die all the time since infinity. 

It was only *complete amnesia* that was equated with death.

>Yet I am  
> still feeling to be here. Rossler is right, consciousness is a prison.

Consciousness, or self-awareness?

Brent

> 
> Have a good day,
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> 


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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote:

>
> Hi,
>
>> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living.  
>> Here
>> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
>> conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to  
>> itself.
>> Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that  
>> unique
>> person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.
>
> I think I agree with this view. At least, in mystic mode ;-)
>
>> Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this  
>> means, I
>> think, that we can still survive without them.
>>
>> Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a
>> backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from
>> that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have
>> survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?
>
> We should be careful here: the "mystic I" survives, but I don't think
> that that is what most people have in mind when they talk of personal
> identity/survival. Here, the concern is clearly continuity of memory.
>
> In normal discourse, the 5 year old Bruno is clearly not an amnesic
> survivor; the older Bruno (with his unique experiences) would be dead.

I am that five years Bruno, but just older. If I am promised having a  
different life, I could accept such a backup. It would be refreshing.
If I die through amnesia, I die all the time since infinity. Yet I am  
still feeling to be here. Rossler is right, consciousness is a prison.

Have a good day,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote:

>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal >> >
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you  
>>> even in
>>>the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case  
>>> he got
>>>new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in  
>>> the
>>>movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads  
>>> to the
>>>idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being  
>>> the
>>>other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
>>>because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
>>>everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is  
>>> needed for
>>>the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.
>>>
>>>Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If the "copy" has no memory of being me then It's not me...
>>
>>
>> Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to
>> have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is  
>> not
>> a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all,
>> when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a
>> person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory.
>
> Because of continuity of the body.  If we knew the person's body was
> destroyed and now someone who looked the same and had the same traits
> of character, but different memories, appeared we would say it was a
> different person who just happened to be similar - and the person
> would agree with us.

I am not sure.




>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is "me"
>>> (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?
>>
>>
>> I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp.
>> Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe
>> that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify
>> myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with  
>> memories,
>> which are useful for many practical things, indeed  capable of
>> implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their
>> relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation.
>
> But those values were learned and so are that sense memories, even if
> not conscious memories.  So were perhaps "hard-wired" by evolution;
> but that too is a form of memory.
>
>
>>>
>>>
>>> It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what
>>> can be ascribe to "you" then "you/I/..." doesn't mean anything... in
>>> that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I
>>> don't see this as a theory of self identity.
>>
>>
>>
>> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living.  
>> Here
>> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
>> conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to  
>> itself.
>> Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that  
>> unique
>> person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.
>>
>> In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet "I" was there,  
>> and
>> "I" was me.
>
> Isn't that because "you" remember the dream when you are awake and can
> compare the memories?

That would be a reason to doubt I was me.


>
>
>> To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it
>> is a big  impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided,  
>> unless
>> it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the
>> main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since  
>> recently, in
>> salvia reports).
>>
>> Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this  
>> means, I
>> think, that we can still survive without them.
>
> I'm doubtful.  I suspect that "I" is a construct of the brain, part of
> how it makes sensible story of the world.  You call it a useful
> fiction - but just because it's a story, doesn't mean it's fiction.

I think "I" is a logical construction (we will come back on this).  
Memories have a big values, but "I" don't put it in my identity, nor  
would I put the content of my books in my identity. But as I say, this  
could be personal stuff.



>
>
>>
>> Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a
>> backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from
>> that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have
>> survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?
>
> Dead.

I ask what I just asked to Quentin: what if the backup has been done  
last year or a minute ago, or a second ago?
Did I died this night, given that I don't remember the dreams I made?

We are in the subtle à-la "The prestige" water ...

Best,

Bruno

http://iridia.ul

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me.

I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to  
surviving. Personal identity, I think is more and less than personal  
memories.
By loosing memory "I" would be wounded, not dead.


>
>
> If "I" with my memories happen to have no next moment with my  
> memories... I will be dead, and no cul-de-sac is false... a next  
> moment where none of your memories is left is no more a next moment.

No memories at all? In that case some month ago I would have agreed  
with you, but I have lost any certainties here.


>
> You know it was you because you did wake up as you...


How could I know that?



> you didn't know inside the dream...


This is Maury's conception of dream. I doubt it a lot, and consider it  
refuted by the work of Laberge and Dement (and Hearne) on lucid  
dreaming.




> note that I'm not even sure we have of sense of self while dreaming,


OK, here I disagree rather strongly.




> I accept we have it during a recollection of the dream.


Personal identity is indeed related to recollection of some memory,  
even in awaked state. Yet I do distinguish dying and forgetting.




>
>
>
> Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means,  
> I think, that we can still survive without them.
>
> I think not.
>
>
> Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a  
> backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from  
> that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have  
> survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?
>
> You will be dead.

Gosh!  And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute  
ago? I will be dead too? Less dead?

Best regards,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Günther Greindl]

Hi,

> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here 
> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me 
> conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. 
> Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique 
> person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.

I think I agree with this view. At least, in mystic mode ;-)

> Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I 
> think, that we can still survive without them.
> 
> Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a 
> backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from 
> that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have 
> survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?

We should be careful here: the "mystic I" survives, but I don't think 
that that is what most people have in mind when they talk of personal 
identity/survival. Here, the concern is clearly continuity of memory.

In normal discourse, the 5 year old Bruno is clearly not an amnesic 
survivor; the older Bruno (with his unique experiences) would be dead.

Best Wishes,
Günther

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Quentin Anciaux]

Hi,

2009/2/26 Bruno Marchal 

>
> On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal 
>
>>
>>
>> The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
>> the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
>> new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the
>> movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads to the
>> idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being the
>> other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
>> because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
>> everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for
>> the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>>
>>
> If the "copy" has no memory of being me then It's not me...
>
>
>
> Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to have
> a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is not a
> necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all, when
> someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a person has
> died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory.
>
>
>
>From my current point of view... Well I would be dead... the "me/I" which is
writing this.


>
>
>
> or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is "me" (and
> render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?
>
>
>
> I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp. Comp
> is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe that
> personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify myself more
> with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories, which are useful
> for many practical things, indeed  capable of implementing those values, but
> the values are more eternal than their relative local and contingent
> incarnation or implementation.
>
>
There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me.


>
>
>
>
>
> It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be
> ascribe to "you" then "you/I/..." doesn't mean anything... in that sense you
> are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a
> theory of self identity.
>
>
>
>
> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I
> was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive
> that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our
> bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the
> ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.
>

If "I" with my memories happen to have no next moment with my memories... I
will be dead, and no cul-de-sac is false... a next moment where none of your
memories is left is no more a next moment.



>
> In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet "I" was there, and "I"
> was me. To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it is a big
>  impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided, unless it is
> reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the main reason i
> am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since recently, in  salvia reports).
>

You know it was you because you did wake up as you... you didn't know inside
the dream... note that I'm not even sure we have of sense of self while
dreaming, I accept we have it during a recollection of the dream.


>
> Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I
> think, that we can still survive without them.
>

I think not.


>
> Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup
> of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from that backup.
> Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a
> severe sort of amnesy ?
>

You will be dead.


>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
> Regards,
Quentin
-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
>> the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
>> new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the
>> movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads to the
>> idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being the
>> other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
>> because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
>> everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for
>> the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>> 
>>
>>
>> If the "copy" has no memory of being me then It's not me... 
> 
> 
> Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to 
> have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is not 
> a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all, 
> when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a 
> person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory.

Because of continuity of the body.  If we knew the person's body was 
destroyed and now someone who looked the same and had the same traits 
of character, but different memories, appeared we would say it was a 
different person who just happened to be similar - and the person 
would agree with us.

> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is "me" 
>> (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?
> 
> 
> I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp. 
> Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe 
> that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify 
> myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories, 
> which are useful for many practical things, indeed  capable of 
> implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their 
> relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation.

But those values were learned and so are that sense memories, even if 
not conscious memories.  So were perhaps "hard-wired" by evolution; 
but that too is a form of memory.


>>
>>
>> It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what 
>> can be ascribe to "you" then "you/I/..." doesn't mean anything... in 
>> that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I 
>> don't see this as a theory of self identity.
> 
> 
> 
> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here 
> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me 
> conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. 
> Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique 
> person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.
> 
> In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet "I" was there, and 
> "I" was me. 

Isn't that because "you" remember the dream when you are awake and can 
compare the memories?

>To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it 
> is a big  impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided, unless 
> it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the 
> main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since recently, in 
>  salvia reports).
> 
> Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I 
> think, that we can still survive without them.

I'm doubtful.  I suspect that "I" is a construct of the brain, part of 
how it makes sensible story of the world.  You call it a useful 
fiction - but just because it's a story, doesn't mean it's fiction.

> 
> Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a 
> backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from 
> that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have 
> survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?

Dead.

Brent

> 
> Best,
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > 


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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

>
>
> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal 
>
>
> The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
> the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
> new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the
> movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads to the
> idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being the
> other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
> because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
> everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for
> the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
> If the "copy" has no memory of being me then It's not me...


Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to  
have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is  
not a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After  
all, when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that  
such a person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory.





> or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is  
> "me" (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?


I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp.  
Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe  
that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify  
myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories,  
which are useful for many practical things, indeed  capable of  
implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their  
relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation.




>
>
> It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what  
> can be ascribe to "you" then "you/I/..." doesn't mean anything... in  
> that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I  
> don't see this as a theory of self identity.



Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living.  
Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes  
me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to  
itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to  
that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on  
reality.

In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet "I" was there, and  
"I" was me. To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if  
it is a big  impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided,  
unless it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience  
(the main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since  
recently, in  salvia reports).

Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I  
think, that we can still survive without them.

Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a  
backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from  
that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have  
survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?

Best,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/2/26 Brent Meeker :

> If they are all distinct, then in what sense does S1-S2-S3 form a stream
> of consciousness, rather than S1-S2-B3 or even S1-B1-S3-B2.  Supposedly
> it is that S3 includes some memory of S1 (or earlier Si), but in that
> case why couldn't B3 also include some memory of both S1 and B1?  Why
> wouldn't that be as close a continuation as B3 containing only B1 memories?

B3 in the example given only has memories of B1. If B3 did have
memories of S1 then there would indeed be fusion of S and B. But I am
thinking in terms of observer moments (or observer minutes in this
case): S1, S2, S3, B1, B2, B3 as essentially self-contained, not
necessarily causally connected, and forming a stream of consciousness
only by virtue of their information content. If they were different,
then of course the streams of consciousness would be difference. The
only change that would leave the two streams of consciousness intact
is if either S2 or B2 were missing.

Incidentally, the observer minutes would have to have the right sort
of information content even if they were causally connected, or they
wouldn't form a stream of consciousness. If I receive a brain injury
which causes complete amnesia for my pat, there is a break in my
stream of consciousness despite the fact that there is a clear causal
connection and physical continuity between my pre- and post-injury
self. Physical continuity and causal connectivity are only useful for
subjective continuity because they generate observer moments with the
right sort of information content.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/2/25 meekerdb @dslextreme.com :
>
>   
>> It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to imply that
>> after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our
>> "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories
>> belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me.  But this doesn't seem to
>> occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the
>> brain.
>> 
>
> I don't see why periods of shared consciousness should result in
> fusion. Suppose S and B experience 3 consecutive minutes of
> consciousness, S1-S2-S3 and B1-B2-B3. The first and third minutes are
> distinct, but the second minute consists of staring at a blank wall
> with only minimal self-awareness and has identical subjective content
> in each case. What this means is that S2 and B2 are interchangeable,
> and when S3 or B3 is recalling the previous minute, it doesn't make
> sense to sense to say he definitely experienced S2 or B2 respectively.
> In other words, it would make no difference to the stream of
> consciousness of either S or B if one or other of S2 or B2 did not
> occur. And yet, even though S2 and B2 could be one and the same, there
> is no fusion of of consciousness, since B1, B3, S1 and S3 are all
> distinct.
>
>
>   
If they are all distinct, then in what sense does S1-S2-S3 form a stream 
of consciousness, rather than S1-S2-B3 or even S1-B1-S3-B2.  Supposedly 
it is that S3 includes some memory of S1 (or earlier Si), but in that 
case why couldn't B3 also include some memory of both S1 and B1?  Why 
wouldn't that be as close a continuation as B3 containing only B1 memories?

Brent

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Brent Meeker]

russell standish wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 07:00:39PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:
>   
>> I think I am often *not* self-aware.  But aside from that, I have definitely
>> been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though
>> probably not Stathis) were unconscious at the same time.  So an closest
>> continuation of observer moments theory of personal identity would predict
>> that I would regain consciousness as a mixture of those others who shared my
>> unconscious period.
>>
>> 
>
> I don't think so. The only way you notice the periods of
> unconsciousness is by virtue of the discontinuity between two observer
> moments that you recall (as evidenced by a clock or some other
> irreversible process). The moments of unconsciousness are not observer
> moments.
>
>   
A fair objection (maybe).  But still it seems that I could easily share 
an OM with someone else and then end up in an observerer "superposition".

Brent

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Feb 2009, at 03:39, russell standish wrote:

>
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com  
> wrote:
>> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal   
>> wrote:
>>> Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led
>>> to fusion of first persons.
>>> And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person
>>> plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in
>>> "nature" a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is
>>> the normal candidate.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >
>>>
>>
>> It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to  
>> imply that
>> after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of  
>> nothing our
>> "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories
>> belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me.  But this doesn't  
>> seem to
>> occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity  
>> of the
>> brain.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Perhaps you're not really thinking nothing after all. I have already
> stated that we must be self-aware to be conscious, otherwise we suffer
> the Occam catastrophe. The sense of ego would be enough to explain why
> you don't merge with Stathis.
>
> Not being a Salvia user though, I'd like to ask the question - does  
> the
> ensuing amnensia (whilst remaining conscious) extend to erasure of the
> ego?

It depends of course of what you mean by the "ego". "Ego Death" is a  
well discussed topic in Entheogen Forums, especially on Salvia, but  
also DMT.
If by "ego" you mean the "terrestrial self" I would say yes.

I think we do similar experiences in the "deep sleep" (= the non REM  
sleep), but like with Salvia, it seems we have to forget the main  
point to "come back on Earth". Even the part which we don't forget is  
"ineffable", probably of the type G* minus G, or more accurately Z*  
minus Z, or even more accurately: X1* minus X1 (cf your Nothing book  
page 129)

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/2/25 meekerdb @dslextreme.com :

> It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to imply that
> after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our
> "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories
> belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me.  But this doesn't seem to
> occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the
> brain.

I don't see why periods of shared consciousness should result in
fusion. Suppose S and B experience 3 consecutive minutes of
consciousness, S1-S2-S3 and B1-B2-B3. The first and third minutes are
distinct, but the second minute consists of staring at a blank wall
with only minimal self-awareness and has identical subjective content
in each case. What this means is that S2 and B2 are interchangeable,
and when S3 or B3 is recalling the previous minute, it doesn't make
sense to sense to say he definitely experienced S2 or B2 respectively.
In other words, it would make no difference to the stream of
consciousness of either S or B if one or other of S2 or B2 did not
occur. And yet, even though S2 and B2 could be one and the same, there
is no fusion of of consciousness, since B1, B3, S1 and S3 are all
distinct.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Feb 2009, at 02:51, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal   
> wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >
> > 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker :
> >
> >> I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential
> >> component of
> >> personal identity.  But that also raises a problem with ideas like
> >> "observer moments" and "continuity".  Almost all my memories are  
> not
> >> being remembered at an given time.  Some I may not recall for years
> >> at a
> >> time.  I may significant periods of time in which I am not
> >> consciously
> >> recalling any memories.  So then how can memories and continuity be
> >> essential?  I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then
> >> ask,
> >> "Does this body have (some) appropriate memories?"
> >
> > The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant  
> memories
> > as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the
> > music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent
> > parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same  
> way, if
> > you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment,  
> then
> > during that moment you might be a generic human having such a  
> similar
> > experience.
>
> Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led
> to fusion of first persons.
> And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person
> plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in
> "nature" a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is
> the normal candidate.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to  
> imply that after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of  
> thinking of nothing our "closest continuations" might be mixtures,  
> each having some memories belonging to Stathis and some belonging to  
> me.


I don't see why. But Brent with amnesia could become Stathis if we put  
Stathis memories in Brent's brain. That's all. After complete amnesia  
you are potentially anyone, but there is no reason to become both  
Stathis and Brent simultaneously, no more that you could feel to be in  
both Washington and Moscow after a duplication experience.



> But this doesn't seem to occur - which we easily explain in terms of  
> the causal continuity of the brain.

I agree. UDA just shows that if you assume comp you have to explain  
the causal continuity of the brain in term of addition and  
multiplication of numbers.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[russell standish]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 07:00:39PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:
> 
> I think I am often *not* self-aware.  But aside from that, I have definitely
> been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though
> probably not Stathis) were unconscious at the same time.  So an closest
> continuation of observer moments theory of personal identity would predict
> that I would regain consciousness as a mixture of those others who shared my
> unconscious period.
> 

I don't think so. The only way you notice the periods of
unconsciousness is by virtue of the discontinuity between two observer
moments that you recall (as evidenced by a clock or some other
irreversible process). The moments of unconsciousness are not observer
moments.


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[meekerdb @dslextreme.com]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 6:39 PM, russell standish wrote:

>
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:
> > On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
> > > Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led
> > > to fusion of first persons.
> > > And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person
> > > plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in
> > > "nature" a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is
> > > the normal candidate.
> > >
> > > Bruno
> > >
> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/<
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
> > >
> >
> > It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to imply
> that
> > after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our
> > "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories
> > belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me.  But this doesn't seem to
> > occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the
> > brain.
> >
> > Brent
> >
>
> Perhaps you're not really thinking nothing after all. I have already
> stated that we must be self-aware to be conscious, otherwise we suffer
> the Occam catastrophe.


I think I am often *not* self-aware.  But aside from that, I have definitely
been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though
probably not Stathis) were unconscious at the same time.  So an closest
continuation of observer moments theory of personal identity would predict
that I would regain consciousness as a mixture of those others who shared my
unconscious period.

Brent


> The sense of ego would be enough to explain why
> you don't merge with Stathis.
>
> Not being a Silvia user though, I'd like to ask the question - does the
> ensuing amnensia (whilst remaining conscious) extend to erasure of the
> ego?
>
>
> --
>
>
> 
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Mathematics
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
> 
>
> >
>

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[russell standish]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led
> > to fusion of first persons.
> > And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person
> > plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in
> > "nature" a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is
> > the normal candidate.
> >
> > Bruno
> >
> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
> >
> 
> It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to imply that
> after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our
> "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories
> belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me.  But this doesn't seem to
> occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the
> brain.
> 
> Brent
> 

Perhaps you're not really thinking nothing after all. I have already
stated that we must be self-aware to be conscious, otherwise we suffer
the Occam catastrophe. The sense of ego would be enough to explain why
you don't merge with Stathis.

Not being a Silvia user though, I'd like to ask the question - does the
ensuing amnensia (whilst remaining conscious) extend to erasure of the
ego?  


--


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[meekerdb @dslextreme.com]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
>
> On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >
> > 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker :
> >
> >> I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential
> >> component of
> >> personal identity.  But that also raises a problem with ideas like
> >> "observer moments" and "continuity".  Almost all my memories are not
> >> being remembered at an given time.  Some I may not recall for years
> >> at a
> >> time.  I may significant periods of time in which I am not
> >> consciously
> >> recalling any memories.  So then how can memories and continuity be
> >> essential?  I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then
> >> ask,
> >> "Does this body have (some) appropriate memories?"
> >
> > The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant memories
> > as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the
> > music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent
> > parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same way, if
> > you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment, then
> > during that moment you might be a generic human having such a similar
> > experience.
>
> Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led
> to fusion of first persons.
> And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person
> plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in
> "nature" a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is
> the normal candidate.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>

It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to imply that
after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our
"closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories
belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me.  But this doesn't seem to
occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the
brain.

Brent

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker :
>
>> I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential  
>> component of
>> personal identity.  But that also raises a problem with ideas like
>> "observer moments" and "continuity".  Almost all my memories are not
>> being remembered at an given time.  Some I may not recall for years  
>> at a
>> time.  I may significant periods of time in which I am not  
>> consciously
>> recalling any memories.  So then how can memories and continuity be
>> essential?  I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then  
>> ask,
>> "Does this body have (some) appropriate memories?"
>
> The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant memories
> as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the
> music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent
> parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same way, if
> you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment, then
> during that moment you might be a generic human having such a similar
> experience.

Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led  
to fusion of first persons.
And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first person  
plural, with duplication of collection of people, there must be in  
"nature" a similar fusion process, and quantum erasing phenomenon is  
the normal candidate.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Feb 2009, at 13:22, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/2/24 Bruno Marchal :
>
 From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say "no"  
 for
 many reasons to the doctor.
 The copy will not even behave as you.
 The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie.
 The copy behaves like you and as a soul/personality/consciousness,
 but
 yet is not you (and you are dead)
>>>
>>> This last is the problematic one. If it is valid, then it is also
>>> valid to say that I only live for a moment and continuity of  
>>> identity
>>> is only an illusion.
>>
>> I don't think so. Unless you assume comp, but then to say the copy is
>> not you has no meaning at all.
>> This last is not really problematic, it is just equivalent with the
>> negation of comp.
>> It is brought by non-comp-people who, on the contrary insist a notion
>> of continuity which is broken by digital substitution.
>> For a computationalist, the "continuity" is given by the comp  
>> history,
>> and is not broken by teleportation and the like, not even self-
>> differentiation through self-duplication.
>
> As I see it, to say that the copy has all your important mental
> qualities but still isn't you because it lacks your soul - the
> significant thing about the soul here being that it is something over
> and above mental qualities - is equivalent to saying you assume comp,
> but the copy still isn't you.


If you assume comp, I would say the copy is "you", and got your  
"soul", by definition.
Those who argue that the copy has all your mental attributes but is  
not you are in general arguing against comp.
Sometimes they say that (classical) teleportation will just kill them,  
and that the copy is an impostor.
They argue that, would the "original" not have been destroyed, by  
continuity (or by Nozick closer continuation criteria for personal  
identity) they would have seen the copy being "another people", and so  
retrospectively, they think that when the original is destroyed they  
just die, even if they agree that the copy will believe that she has  
survived.




>
>
>>> Actually, I have no objection to this way of
>>> speaking, but we would then just have to say that this illusion of
>>> continuity is just as good as what we hitherto thought was real
>>> continuity.
>>
>>
>> I think we agree. Just note that when I don't write "assuming comp" I
>> consider also the case when comp is false. Perhaps I shouldn't.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
 The copy is you (in Parfit sense: that it is as better than you).
 And,
 the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking  
 up
 to the unspeakable "you = ONE").
 I talk here on the first person "you". It is infinite and  
 unnameable.
 Here computer science can makes those term (like "unnameable") much
 more precise.
>>>
>>> I don't see how the copy could be me in a deeper sense than having  
>>> all
>>> my thoughts, memories etc. It would be like saying that if I wave my
>>> magic wand over you you will become specially blessed, even though
>>> nothing will actually change either subjectively or objectively.
>>
>> The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even  
>> in
>> the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
>> new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the
>> movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads to the
>> idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being the
>> other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
>> because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
>> everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for
>> the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.
>
> I still don't understand your point. Assume that the copy is
> arbitrarily close to the original me



OK, but this is not the case in the quote. You are back on the case  
where the copy has the same mental attributes (memory, ...). In this  
case I agree with you, when we assume comp.



> in every mental quality: is there
> still some sense in which it might not really be me?


Yes, by assuming that comp is false. See my answer above, relating an  
argument against comp, or against the use of teleportation.




> If you can come
> up with an answer, then it could equally well be applied to walking
> across the room, which none of us do worrying that we won't survive
> the experience.


I agree with you, and that is why I find comp very natural. But we  
cannot prove that comp is right. The argument above (against comp)  
show that the negation of comp is consistent, even if it seems poorly  
rational.

Sorry for confusing things by taking into account non-computationalist  
theory of mind.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/2/24 Bruno Marchal :

>>> From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say "no" for
>>> many reasons to the doctor.
>>> The copy will not even behave as you.
>>> The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie.
>>> The copy behaves like you and as a soul/personality/consciousness,
>>> but
>>> yet is not you (and you are dead)
>>
>> This last is the problematic one. If it is valid, then it is also
>> valid to say that I only live for a moment and continuity of identity
>> is only an illusion.
>
> I don't think so. Unless you assume comp, but then to say the copy is
> not you has no meaning at all.
> This last is not really problematic, it is just equivalent with the
> negation of comp.
> It is brought by non-comp-people who, on the contrary insist a notion
> of continuity which is broken by digital substitution.
> For a computationalist, the "continuity" is given by the comp history,
> and is not broken by teleportation and the like, not even self-
> differentiation through self-duplication.

As I see it, to say that the copy has all your important mental
qualities but still isn't you because it lacks your soul - the
significant thing about the soul here being that it is something over
and above mental qualities - is equivalent to saying you assume comp,
but the copy still isn't you.

>> Actually, I have no objection to this way of
>> speaking, but we would then just have to say that this illusion of
>> continuity is just as good as what we hitherto thought was real
>> continuity.
>
>
> I think we agree. Just note that when I don't write "assuming comp" I
> consider also the case when comp is false. Perhaps I shouldn't.
>
>
>>
>>
>>> The copy is you (in Parfit sense: that it is as better than you).
>>> And,
>>> the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up
>>> to the unspeakable "you = ONE").
>>> I talk here on the first person "you". It is infinite and unnameable.
>>> Here computer science can makes those term (like "unnameable") much
>>> more precise.
>>
>> I don't see how the copy could be me in a deeper sense than having all
>> my thoughts, memories etc. It would be like saying that if I wave my
>> magic wand over you you will become specially blessed, even though
>> nothing will actually change either subjectively or objectively.
>
> The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
> the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
> new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the
> movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads to the
> idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being the
> other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
> because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
> everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for
> the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.

I still don't understand your point. Assume that the copy is
arbitrarily close to the original me in every mental quality: is there
still some sense in which it might not really be me? If you can come
up with an answer, then it could equally well be applied to walking
across the room, which none of us do worrying that we won't survive
the experience.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/2/24 Brent Meeker :

> I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of
> personal identity.  But that also raises a problem with ideas like
> "observer moments" and "continuity".  Almost all my memories are not
> being remembered at an given time.  Some I may not recall for years at a
> time.  I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously
> recalling any memories.  So then how can memories and continuity be
> essential?  I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask,
> "Does this body have (some) appropriate memories?"

The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant memories
as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the
music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent
parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same way, if
you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment, then
during that moment you might be a generic human having such a similar
experience.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Brent Meeker]

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>
>
>
> The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
> the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
> new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the
> movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads to the
> idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being the
> other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
> because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
> everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for
> the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
>
>
> If the "copy" has no memory of being me then It's not me... or you 
> mean there is something which is not memory but which is "me" (and 
> render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?
>
> It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what 
> can be ascribe to "you" then "you/I/..." doesn't mean anything... in 
> that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I 
> don't see this as a theory of self identity.
>
> Regards,
> Quentin
I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of 
personal identity.  But that also raises a problem with ideas like 
"observer moments" and "continuity".  Almost all my memories are not 
being remembered at an given time.  Some I may not recall for years at a 
time.  I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously 
recalling any memories.  So then how can memories and continuity be 
essential?  I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask, 
"Does this body have (some) appropriate memories?"

Brent

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Quentin Anciaux]

2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal 

>
>
> The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
> the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
> new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the
> movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads to the
> idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being the
> other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
> because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
> everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for
> the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
If the "copy" has no memory of being me then It's not me... or you mean
there is something which is not memory but which is "me" (and render memory
useless as primary property of the self) ?

It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be
ascribe to "you" then "you/I/..." doesn't mean anything... in that sense you
are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a
theory of self identity.

Regards,
Quentin



>
>
>
> >
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Feb 2009, at 00:39, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal :
>
>> From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say "no" for
>> many reasons to the doctor.
>> The copy will not even behave as you.
>> The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie.
>> The copy behaves like you and as a soul/personality/consciousness,  
>> but
>> yet is not you (and you are dead)
>
> This last is the problematic one. If it is valid, then it is also
> valid to say that I only live for a moment and continuity of identity
> is only an illusion.

I don't think so. Unless you assume comp, but then to say the copy is  
not you has no meaning at all.
This last is not really problematic, it is just equivalent with the  
negation of comp.
It is brought by non-comp-people who, on the contrary insist a notion  
of continuity which is broken by digital substitution.
For a computationalist, the "continuity" is given by the comp history,  
and is not broken by teleportation and the like, not even self- 
differentiation through self-duplication.






> Actually, I have no objection to this way of
> speaking, but we would then just have to say that this illusion of
> continuity is just as good as what we hitherto thought was real
> continuity.


I think we agree. Just note that when I don't write "assuming comp" I  
consider also the case when comp is false. Perhaps I shouldn't.


>
>
>> The copy is you (in Parfit sense: that it is as better than you).
>> And,
>> the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up
>> to the unspeakable "you = ONE").
>> I talk here on the first person "you". It is infinite and unnameable.
>> Here computer science can makes those term (like "unnameable") much
>> more precise.
>
> I don't see how the copy could be me in a deeper sense than having all
> my thoughts, memories etc. It would be like saying that if I wave my
> magic wand over you you will become specially blessed, even though
> nothing will actually change either subjectively or objectively.

The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in  
the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got  
new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the  
movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads to the  
idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being the  
other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this  
because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of  
everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for  
the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Günther Greindl]

Hi Stathis, Bruno, List,

>> the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up
>> to the unspeakable "you = ONE").
>> I talk here on the first person "you". It is infinite and unnameable.
>> Here computer science can makes those term (like "unnameable") much
>> more precise.
> 
> I don't see how the copy could be me in a deeper sense than having all
> my thoughts, memories etc. It would be like saying that if I wave my
> magic wand over you you will become specially blessed, even though
> nothing will actually change either subjectively or objectively.

You must take into account Bruno's Plotinian interpretation: the One, 
the Intellect, and the Universal Soul. In this sense, you can become 
more "you" in that you penetrate false knowledge "Maya" and realize your 
true nature (the Dao, if you like, roughly the ONE in Plotinus).

@Bruno:
What I have come to wonder: you take the Löbian Machine to be the model 
of a person - say, a human. But what if the Löbian Machine is actually 
(and only) the ultimate person - the universal soul, in Plotinus' 
terminology.

This would account for the infinite (continuum!) histories (lived 
through the lives of all beings in the multiverse), the "universal soul" 
forgetting itself in a cosmic play, sort of -  but also for COMP 
immortality - immortal would be the _universal soul_, but not 
necessarily "concrete" persons (as we conceive them, which requires at 
least some continuity of memory etc)

Cheers,
Günther

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal :

>  From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say "no" for
> many reasons to the doctor.
> The copy will not even behave as you.
> The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie.
> The copy behaves like you and as a soul/personality/consciousness, but
> yet is not you (and you are dead)

This last is the problematic one. If it is valid, then it is also
valid to say that I only live for a moment and continuity of identity
is only an illusion. Actually, I have no objection to this way of
speaking, but we would then just have to say that this illusion of
continuity is just as good as what we hitherto thought was real
continuity.

> The copy is you (in Parfit sense: that it is as better than you).
> And,
> the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up
> to the unspeakable "you = ONE").
> I talk here on the first person "you". It is infinite and unnameable.
> Here computer science can makes those term (like "unnameable") much
> more precise.

I don't see how the copy could be me in a deeper sense than having all
my thoughts, memories etc. It would be like saying that if I wave my
magic wand over you you will become specially blessed, even though
nothing will actually change either subjectively or objectively.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Feb 2009, at 14:01, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/2/20 Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>> Review of a book that may be of interest to the list.
>>
>> Brent Meeker
>>
>>  Original Message 
>>
>> Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
>>
>> 2009-02-26 : View this Review Online
>>  : View Other NDPR Reviews
>> 
>>
>> David Shoemaker, /Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief  
>> Introduction/,
>> Broadview Press, 2009, 296pp., $26.95 (pbk), ISBN 9781551118826.
>>
>> *Reviewed by Amy Kind, Claremont McKenna College*
>
> Thank-you for alerting us to this book. I'll pick out just one passage
> from the review for comment:
>
>> Though Shoemaker argues that the last three views suffer from serious
>> problems that prevent them from being plausible accounts of our  
>> identity
>> over time, he offers a different sort of argument against the Soul
>> Criterion: There are good practical reasons to "insist on a tight
>> connection between the nature of personal identity and our practical
>> concerns, and thus reject any theory of personal identity -- like the
>> Soul Criterion -- that denies this connection." (33) Even if souls
>> exist, we lack any kind of epistemic access to them; rather, we
>> reidentify individuals in terms of their bodies and/or their
>> psychologies. Thus, souls are irrelevant to the practical issues  
>> under
>> consideration, and this irrelevance is taken to justify the  
>> rejection of
>> the Soul Criterion.
>
> Predominantly on this list we use the psychological criterion of
> personal identity, originated by Locke and developed using various SF
> thought experiments by Derek Parfit.


See also Dennet and Hofstadter's Mind'I for further references.


> This criterion is assumed true if
> you are to agree to teleportation or replacement of your brain with a
> functionally equivalent electronic analogue, and is contrasted with
> non-reductionist theories involving the existence of a soul.

This "constrast" is misleading. Parfit believes in Token and tokens  
identity. He overlooked the subjective indeterminacy and the reversal  
consequence. That is why he finds natural to call his teleportation  
preserving identity a "reductionist" thesis like if it were reducing  
the notions of "souls" and consciousness to organized piece of matter.  
But the idea of betting we can survive digital substitution is really  
reductionist in the other way round. This view, (at least that is was  
the UDA is supposed to explain) leads to a reduction of matter to soul/ 
consciousness and eventually to machine-nameable and machine- 
unnameable relations.
Concerning "soul" the comp idea is even antireductionist; it prevents  
any theory (third person communicable) to give a name to it, without  
eliminating it.




> If I have
> a soul, it might not be transferred in the copying process even though
> the copy acts the same as the original. I can understand this if the
> copy is a philosophical zombie for lack of a soul, but it seems that
> according to Shoemaker's usage the soul is not identical with the mind
> or consciousness.




 From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say "no" for  
many reasons to the doctor.
The copy will not even behave as you.
The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie.
The copy behaves like you and as a soul/personality/consciousness, but  
yet is not you (and you are dead)
The copy is you (in Parfit sense: that it is as better than you).
And,
the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up  
to the unspeakable "you = ONE").
I talk here on the first person "you". It is infinite and unnameable.
Here computer science can makes those term (like "unnameable") much  
more precise.



> This leaves open the possibility that my copy might
> both behave *and* think the same way I do but still not be the same
> person. But if that is so, then as Shoemaker says, that would make the
> soul irrelevant.

The word "soul" is charged with history. I use it usually in the sense  
of the knowing first person, and assuming the comp hyp, or weaker  
hypothesis with similar self-copying quality, you cannot dispense from  
the existence of such a soul. In arithmetic this will be related to  
the fact that the theaetetical idea of defining knowledge of P by  
justification of P when P is true lead to a modality which acts like  
"pure justification" but reasons like a knower. It is the same  
arithmetical part of truth, but it is "seen" differently, necessarily  
so by incompleteness(*). Eventually this is important because it  
justifies a purely scientific (third person communicable) notion of  
soul, and matter will be generated by that soul.
Note that such a theory of soul is verifiable.

I appreciate Parfit, but he remains stuck by  its "Aristotelian  
Theology" (like so many, of course), and that is why, I guess, he  
calls "comp" (or weaker a-like) a reductionist view, where I woul

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/2/20 Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
> Review of a book that may be of interest to the list.
>
> Brent Meeker
>
>  Original Message 
>
> Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
>
> 2009-02-26 : View this Review Online
>  : View Other NDPR Reviews
> 
>
> David Shoemaker, /Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction/,
> Broadview Press, 2009, 296pp., $26.95 (pbk), ISBN 9781551118826.
>
> *Reviewed by Amy Kind, Claremont McKenna College*

Thank-you for alerting us to this book. I'll pick out just one passage
from the review for comment:

> Though Shoemaker argues that the last three views suffer from serious
> problems that prevent them from being plausible accounts of our identity
> over time, he offers a different sort of argument against the Soul
> Criterion: There are good practical reasons to "insist on a tight
> connection between the nature of personal identity and our practical
> concerns, and thus reject any theory of personal identity -- like the
> Soul Criterion -- that denies this connection." (33) Even if souls
> exist, we lack any kind of epistemic access to them; rather, we
> reidentify individuals in terms of their bodies and/or their
> psychologies. Thus, souls are irrelevant to the practical issues under
> consideration, and this irrelevance is taken to justify the rejection of
> the Soul Criterion.

Predominantly on this list we use the psychological criterion of
personal identity, originated by Locke and developed using various SF
thought experiments by Derek Parfit. This criterion is assumed true if
you are to agree to teleportation or replacement of your brain with a
functionally equivalent electronic analogue, and is contrasted with
non-reductionist theories involving the existence of a soul. If I have
a soul, it might not be transferred in the copying process even though
the copy acts the same as the original. I can understand this if the
copy is a philosophical zombie for lack of a soul, but it seems that
according to Shoemaker's usage the soul is not identical with the mind
or consciousness. This leaves open the possibility that my copy might
both behave *and* think the same way I do but still not be the same
person. But if that is so, then as Shoemaker says, that would make the
soul irrelevant.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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