Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Forgive any typos... - Original Message - From: "Jesse Mazer" To: everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 26 May 2005 20:05:49 -0400 > > aet.radal ssg wrote: > > > You're assuming that Einstein came up with those ideas through > > brainstorming. > > To me, "brainstorming" just means any creative attempt to come up > with new tentative speculations about solutions to a problem. Then like I said, you and I have different definitions for "brainstorming". Mine is specific whereas yours seems arbitray as it includes "any creative attempt to come up with new tenative speculations about solutions to a problem". To each his own. >Since Einstein's ideas cannot possibly have been anything but tentative > and speculative before the theory of general relativity was worked > out, then of course he came up with them through brainstorming. How > else would he have come up with them, logical deductions from a set > of axioms whose truth was totally certain? Divine revelation? Perhaps he did, since your definition is so all inconclusive of any attempt at creative thought. Since I never met the man, nor have read any accounts that document how he did his creative thinking that I can accurtately reference right now, I don't have an opinion one way of the other. > > > You're the one that >called the ideas discussed here often as > > "half-formed". > > Yes, and I would define any idea that has not been made into a > fully-worked out, complete theory as "half-formed". And...so what's your point? >Thus, until > Einstein worked out the full tensor equations of general > relativity, his ideas were half-formed, by definition. Perhaps you > woud define the term "half-formed" differently, but that's all I > meant by that. > I think we would agree on the definition of "half-formed". I'm just not making any assumptions on how Einstein did his work or comparing it to what passes for brainstorming on the list...like you are. > > The problem I used to have (I'm too busy to >even give darn > > anymore) is when ideas are put out that >don't seem to any > > thought behind them, prior to being offered. > > What if the person has thought about them, but doesn't know > themselves whether they're any good, and wants feedback from > others? I have no problem with that. Never said I did. >Are you suggesting that before making any proposal, we > should always feel 100% certain in our own minds about whether the > proposal is correct or not? > I usually don't suggest things...I come right out and say them. What I'm saying is that the posts that I usually have a problem with aren't asking for feedback from others because of a particular problem solving issue. They make these statements and they're usually just left there as if completely valid, or worse, expounded on by others in an even more inaccurate direction so that the original issue is never dealt with. I stated that before, I don't know how many times now. > > Like my still unanswered question to Saibal about how people > > who aren't "really" there but exist in >Nash's head can still be > > considered real in "our universe". > > Maybe he didn't know the answer himself--is that a bad thing? He could have said so, is that a bad thing? > Anyway, one could argue that simulations in someone's brain are > just as real as simulations on a computer-- Simulations on a computer aren't real, hence the term "virtual". However, they are more real than a single mental cases' hallucinations. >do you think A.I. > shouldn't be considered real beings in our universe? They should be considered real technologies, not "beings". >Of course, I > don't think the "simulations" of characters in a schizophrenic mind > or in a dream are really being simulated at anything like the same > level of detail as a genuine A.I. would be. OK. > > > That's what I'm talking about. That's a fully formed idea with > > absolutely no basis in the objective world >that was just put out > > there like it meant something, when in fact it's ridiculous. > > Whatever gave you the idea that it was a "fully formed idea"? It was a statement. Close enough for rock 'n' roll. >Do you think Saibal believed he had a complete theory of how the brain > of a schizophrenic simulates the imaginary characters he interacts > with, for example? I don't make a practice of trying to gu
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Nice try, Danny, but as usual what I thought was a simple and direct concept was completely missed, qat least in the beginning (see what I mean Lee?). The key issue was the comment that despite the fact that the people in his brain weren't real, that they could still be considered real in our universe. Your response deals with "those people are real in the sense that his brain is devoting processing power to creating the mental image of the individual, and everything related to this individual's personality", which supports an hypothesis that I shared with Lee privately - that people who are completely immersed in one particular communication style and iconography will default to that style when addressed with a different one, despite its complete inability to accurately express what needs to be communicated. As usual on this list, that communication style is biased heavily toward computer technology. So instead of a subjective vs objective argument, which is where Saibal's idea really falls (along with the one that Stathis dodged), the first concept out of the box from you is a qualitative defense of how real Nash's friends were because of the "processing power" his brain was devoting to creating them. Sounds like you're talking about a Pentium chip or something, never mind that the amount of power that his brain is using is irrelevent. If he hallucinated that he saw one obscure figure for a split second and never saw it again, that obscure figure would be no more real in "our universe" than his hallucinated friends were. However, you do finally get around to "Therefore the person is real to at least one first person perspective, but is not currently real to any third person perspective." which takes us right back to my original question to Saibal, which was how come he said that they *were* real in "our universe"? The key phrase being "our universe" which means the objective reality that we can all agree upon typically because of shared and agreed upon observations which would exclude subjective hallucinations. As usual, the basic, straight forward questions go unaddressed in favor of the usual banter, but that's par for the course here. I'm just playing through. "It is not impossible to conceive of future devices that could display thoughts on a screen, or even materialize the thought (for you Trekkies), making the person real even to the third person perspective." Funny you should mention that - that's part of what I'm working on, 1930s style, of course.- Original Message -From: "danny mayes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: "aet.radal ssg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortalityDate: Thu, 26 May 2005 19:43:52 -0400I'll answer your question (at the risk of incurring your wrath): those people are real in the sense that his brain is devoting processing power to creating the mental image of the individual, and everything related to this individual's personality. So even though the person in his head isn't nearly as substantive or complex as a person in the "real" world, information processing has been devoted to creating this "person", who has a real appearance and personality and behavior to at least one observer. Therefore the person is real to at least one first person perspective, but is not currently real to any third person perspective. It is not impossible to conceive of future devices that could display thoughts on a screen, or even materialize the thought (for you Trekkies), making the person real even to the third person perspective.Danny aet.radal ssg wrote: You're assuming that Einstein came up with those ideas through brainstorming. You're the one that called the ideas discussed here often as "half-formed". The problem I used to have (I'm too busy to even give darn anymore) is when ideas are put out that don't seem to any thought behind them, prior to being offered. Like my still unanswered question to Saibal about how people who aren't "really" there but exist in Nash's head can still be considered real in "our universe". That's what I'm talking about. That's a fully formed idea with absolutely no basis in the objective world that was just put out there like it meant something, when in fact it's ridiculous. I asked simply what he meant by it, to see how possibly he could defend such a statement, and got nothing. Par for the course, I'm sure. - Original Message - From: "Jesse Mazer" To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 26 May 2005 12:29:13 -0400 > > aet.radal ssg wrote: > > > Clearly, the method and definition of brainstorming that you're > > accustomed to is different than mi
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
aet.radal ssg wrote: You're assuming that Einstein came up with those ideas through brainstorming. To me, "brainstorming" just means any creative attempt to come up with new tentative speculations about solutions to a problem. Since Einstein's ideas cannot possibly have been anything but tentative and speculative before the theory of general relativity was worked out, then of course he came up with them through brainstorming. How else would he have come up with them, logical deductions from a set of axioms whose truth was totally certain? Divine revelation? You're the one that >called the ideas discussed here often as "half-formed". Yes, and I would define any idea that has not been made into a fully-worked out, complete theory as "half-formed". Thus, until Einstein worked out the full tensor equations of general relativity, his ideas were half-formed, by definition. Perhaps you woud define the term "half-formed" differently, but that's all I meant by that. The problem I used to have (I'm too busy to >even give darn anymore) is when ideas are put out that >don't seem to any thought behind them, prior to being offered. What if the person has thought about them, but doesn't know themselves whether they're any good, and wants feedback from others? Are you suggesting that before making any proposal, we should always feel 100% certain in our own minds about whether the proposal is correct or not? Like my still unanswered question to Saibal about how people who aren't "really" there but exist in >Nash's head can still be considered real in "our universe". Maybe he didn't know the answer himself--is that a bad thing? Anyway, one could argue that simulations in someone's brain are just as real as simulations on a computer--do you think A.I. shouldn't be considered real beings in our universe? Of course, I don't think the "simulations" of characters in a schizophrenic mind or in a dream are really being simulated at anything like the same level of detail as a genuine A.I. would be. That's what I'm talking about. That's a fully formed idea with absolutely no basis in the objective world >that was just put out there like it meant something, when in fact it's ridiculous. Whatever gave you the idea that it was a "fully formed idea"? Do you think Saibal believed he had a complete theory of how the brain of a schizophrenic simulates the imaginary characters he interacts with, for example? Jesse
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
I'll answer your question (at the risk of incurring your wrath): those people are real in the sense that his brain is devoting processing power to creating the mental image of the individual, and everything related to this individual's personality. So even though the person in his head isn't nearly as substantive or complex as a person in the "real" world, information processing has been devoted to creating this "person", who has a real appearance and personality and behavior to at least one observer. Therefore the person is real to at least one first person perspective, but is not currently real to any third person perspective. It is not impossible to conceive of future devices that could display thoughts on a screen, or even materialize the thought (for you Trekkies), making the person real even to the third person perspective. Danny aet.radal ssg wrote: You're assuming that Einstein came up with those ideas through brainstorming. You're the one that called the ideas discussed here often as "half-formed". The problem I used to have (I'm too busy to even give darn anymore) is when ideas are put out that don't seem to any thought behind them, prior to being offered. Like my still unanswered question to Saibal about how people who aren't "really" there but exist in Nash's head can still be considered real in "our universe". That's what I'm talking about. That's a fully formed idea with absolutely no basis in the objective world that was just put out there like it meant something, when in fact it's ridiculous. I asked simply what he meant by it, to see how possibly he could defend such a statement, and got nothing. Par for the course, I'm sure. - Original Message - From: "Jesse Mazer" To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 26 May 2005 12:29:13 -0400 > > aet.radal ssg wrote: > > > Clearly, the method and definition of brainstorming that you're > > accustomed to is different than mine. >The "half-formed idea" is > > what initiates the brainstorm for me, which is fully formed when > > the storm is >over, ie. the ground is parched and in need of > > rain, the storm comes and when it's over, the ground is >wet and > > crops can grow. Sorry, I just couldn't think of a snappy computer > > metaphor, being as I'm from >the 1930's, as I have been told > > But does this mean you think no one should discuss ideas that are > not fully developed? To use my earlier example, do you think > Einstein should have kept his mouth shut about ideas like the > equivalence principle and curved space until he had the full > equations of general relativity worked out, and that if he did try > to discuss such half-finished ideas with anyone it would be because > he just liked to hear himself talk? > > Jesse -- ___ Sign-up for Ads Free at Mail.com http://www.mail.com/?sr=signup
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
You're assuming that Einstein came up with those ideas through brainstorming. You're the one that called the ideas discussed here often as "half-formed". The problem I used to have (I'm too busy to even give darn anymore) is when ideas are put out that don't seem to any thought behind them, prior to being offered. Like my still unanswered question to Saibal about how people who aren't "really" there but exist in Nash's head can still be considered real in "our universe". That's what I'm talking about. That's a fully formed idea with absolutely no basis in the objective world that was just put out there like it meant something, when in fact it's ridiculous. I asked simply what he meant by it, to see how possibly he could defend such a statement, and got nothing. Par for the course, I'm sure. - Original Message - From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 26 May 2005 12:29:13 -0400 > > aet.radal ssg wrote: > > > Clearly, the method and definition of brainstorming that you're > > accustomed to is different than mine. >The "half-formed idea" is > > what initiates the brainstorm for me, which is fully formed when > > the storm is >over, ie. the ground is parched and in need of > > rain, the storm comes and when it's over, the ground is >wet and > > crops can grow. Sorry, I just couldn't think of a snappy computer > > metaphor, being as I'm from >the 1930's, as I have been told > > But does this mean you think no one should discuss ideas that are > not fully developed? To use my earlier example, do you think > Einstein should have kept his mouth shut about ideas like the > equivalence principle and curved space until he had the full > equations of general relativity worked out, and that if he did try > to discuss such half-finished ideas with anyone it would be because > he just liked to hear himself talk? > > Jesse -- ___Sign-up for Ads Free at Mail.com http://www.mail.com/?sr=signup
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
aet.radal ssg wrote: Clearly, the method and definition of brainstorming that you're accustomed to is different than mine. >The "half-formed idea" is what initiates the brainstorm for me, which is fully formed when the storm is >over, ie. the ground is parched and in need of rain, the storm comes and when it's over, the ground is >wet and crops can grow. Sorry, I just couldn't think of a snappy computer metaphor, being as I'm from >the 1930's, as I have been told But does this mean you think no one should discuss ideas that are not fully developed? To use my earlier example, do you think Einstein should have kept his mouth shut about ideas like the equivalence principle and curved space until he had the full equations of general relativity worked out, and that if he did try to discuss such half-finished ideas with anyone it would be because he just liked to hear himself talk? Jesse
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
- Original Message - From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Tue, 24 May 2005 18:36:51 -0400 > > "aet.radal ssg" wrote: > > >> From: "Jesse Mazer" > >> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com > >> Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality > >> Date: Thu, 12 May 2005 14:48:17 -0400 > >> > >> Generally, unasked-for attempts at armchair psychology to explain > >> the motivations of another poster on an internet forum, like the > >> comment that someone "just wants to hear themself talk", are > >> justly considered flames and tend to have the effect of derailing > >> productive discussion. > > > > I indicated that it wasn't a flame and just an observation. You > > later prove me right. > > My point was that the *type* of comment you made is generally > considered a flame merely because of its form, regardless of > whether your intent was to provoke insult or whether you just saw > it as making an observation. It just isn't very respectful to > speculate about people's hidden motives for making a particular > argument, however flawed, nor does doing so tend to further > productive debate about the actual content of the argument, which > is why ad hominems are usually frowned upon. > > >> but hey, this list is all about > >> rambling speculations about half-formed ideas that probably won't > >> pan out to anything, you could just as easily level the same > >> accusation against anyone here. > > > > If it's not going to pan out anyway, then it's pretty > > meaningless. If it's "rambling" it's fairly incoherent, >and if > > the ideas are half-formed then what's the point to begin with? > > 99% of brainstorms don't pan out to anything, and brainstorms by > definition are usually half-formed, but all interesting new ideas > were at one point just half-formed brainstorms too. Perhaps I > should have left out "rambling", I only meant a sort of informal, > conversational way of presenting a new speculation. > > Jesse Clearly, the method and definition of brainstorming that you're accustomed to is different than mine. The "half-formed idea" is what initiates the brainstorm for me, which is fully formed when the storm is over, ie. the ground is parched and in need of rain, the storm comes and when it's over, the ground is wet and crops can grow. Sorry, I just couldn't think of a snappy computer metaphor, being as I'm from the 1930's, as I have been told. -- ___Sign-up for Ads Free at Mail.com http://www.mail.com/?sr=signup
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
"aet.radal ssg" wrote: From: "Jesse Mazer" To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 12 May 2005 14:48:17 -0400 Generally, unasked-for attempts at armchair psychology to explain the motivations of another poster on an internet forum, like the comment that someone "just wants to hear themself talk", are justly considered flames and tend to have the effect of derailing productive discussion. I indicated that it wasn't a flame and just an observation. You later prove me right. My point was that the *type* of comment you made is generally considered a flame merely because of its form, regardless of whether your intent was to provoke insult or whether you just saw it as making an observation. It just isn't very respectful to speculate about people's hidden motives for making a particular argument, however flawed, nor does doing so tend to further productive debate about the actual content of the argument, which is why ad hominems are usually frowned upon. but hey, this list is all about rambling speculations about half-formed ideas that probably won't pan out to anything, you could just as easily level the same accusation against anyone here. > Jesse And so you reinforce my "flame". "Rambling speculations about half-formed ideas that probably won't >pan out to anything" is a good description of talking to hear ones-self talk. Sometimes, but it's also a good description of brainstorming ideas that aren't fully developed yet. If I had speculated in 1910 that perhaps the force of gravity could be explained in terms of objects taking the shortest path in curved space, but didn't have a full mathematical theory that fleshed out this germ of an idea (and also didn't yet see that the longest path through curved spacetime would be better than the shortest path through curved space), then this would be a "halfed-formed idea that probably wouldn't pan out to anything", but it might still be useful to discuss it with others who found this germ of an idea promising and wanted to develop it further. That's how I see the purpose of this list, a combination of brainstorming ideas about the "everything exists" idea and then criticizing, fleshing out or disposing of these ideas. So certainly criticism of specific ideas that don't make sense is valuable, but I don't think it's helpful to accuse anyone who comes up with an idea that doesn't work out of just wanting to hear themselves talk. If it's not going to pan out anyway, then it's pretty meaningless. If it's "rambling" it's fairly incoherent, >and if the ideas are half-formed then what's the point to begin with? 99% of brainstorms don't pan out to anything, and brainstorms by definition are usually half-formed, but all interesting new ideas were at one point just half-formed brainstorms too. Perhaps I should have left out "rambling", I only meant a sort of informal, conversational way of presenting a new speculation. Jesse
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
> From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com > Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality > Date: Thu, 12 May 2005 14:48:17 -0400 > > Generally, unasked-for attempts at armchair psychology to explain > the motivations of another poster on an internet forum, like the > comment that someone "just wants to hear themself talk", are > justly considered flames and tend to have the effect of derailing > productive discussion. I indicated that it wasn't a flame and just an observation. You later prove me right. > I actually agree with your other comments > about it being implausible that the mentally ill have some sort > of superior insight into reality, Funny, it took my "flame" to get anyone to respond to that point, and the only one was you. > but hey, this list is all about > rambling speculations about half-formed ideas that probably won't > pan out to anything, you could just as easily level the same > accusation against anyone here. > > Jesse > And so you reinforce my "flame". "Rambling speculations about half-formed ideas that probably won't pan out to anything" is a good description of talking to hear ones-self talk. If it's not going to pan out anyway, then it's pretty meaningless. If it's "rambling" it's fairly incoherent, and if the ideas are half-formed then what's the point to begin with? It's not to further any concrete understanding of anything. It's not to create any better models of reality, how could you with rambling, "half-formed" ideas? The pretense of anything serious being discussed or with any kind of serious thought behind it, should be dropped, then. Save people like me the wasted time of even joining in the first place. The only reason I won't quit the list for now is that ,once and a while, somebody actually says something interesting that' worth taking note of. I'll just let all the rambling comments about areas that I actually work in, slide from here on out - since now it's official that the standard here is half-formed ideas that won't pan out. -- ___Sign-up for Ads Free at Mail.com http://www.mail.com/?sr=signup
Re: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Dear Saibal: Could you explain the paradox you've created by saying, "In the film Nash was closelyacquainted to persons that *didn't realy exist*." and "One could argue that the persons that Nash was seeing in fact did exist *(inour universe)*, precisely because Nash's brain was simulating them." What is the definition of "really"? What makes something "exist in our universe" if it only "really" exits in somebody's mind? - Original Message -From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: everything Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortalityDate: Fri, 13 May 2005 03:11:21 +0200 One could say that the brain of some schizophrenic persons simulate otherpersons. I don't know if some of you have seen the film 'A Beautiful mind'about the life of mathematician Nash. In the film Nash was closelyacquainted to persons that didn't realy exist. Only much later when he wastreated for his condition did he realize that some of his close friendsdidn't really exist.One could argue that the persons that Nash was seeing in fact did exist (inour universe), precisely because Nash's brain was simulating them.Saibal -- ___Sign-up for Ads Free at Mail.com http://www.mail.com/?sr=signup
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Why am I not surprised that I disagree with this response?- Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 12 May 2005 23:25:28 +1000 > > The obvious and sensible-sounding response to Jeanne's question > whether it may be possible to access other universes through dreams > or hallucinations is that it is not really any more credible than > speculation that people can contact the dead, or have been > kidnapped by aliens, or any other of the millions of weird things > that so many seem to believe despite the total lack of supporting > evidence. Actually, if a person believes they are perceiving a parallel reality a number of questions must be asked first. 1. Is this supposed to be a branch off of our world or is it a world that is distantly related or not related at all? 2. Having identified what type of world, then as much information should be gathered about it as possible to create a database that can be analyzed for evidence from which determinations can be made as to whether the person really is perceiving a parallel world of some kind of just has mental issues. The easiest case would be one where the person in question claims to have awareness of some other world with different technology. If they can't describe it any more than on a superficial level, then the probability is high that its all just some kind of dellusion. However, if they can, especially to the point of it being reproduced here, and especially if they can describe a number of devices or technologies which don't exist here but can be produced here, then I would say that it warrants a much closer look. The greater the detail a person can obtain from their perceptions, the easier it is to map out a description of the other world. If the detail is great enough, then it might be possible to at least decide that even if it can't be conclusive as to whether or not the information is derived from parallel world perception or a highly detailed hallucination, a better understanding can be had of what it is the person is experiencing. For example, 30 years ago a person walks into a psychiatrist's office and talks about how he keeps having visions of the world and it's all weird. After a number of sessions, the psychiatrist learns that the patient has perceptions of the world where the Soviet Union doesn't exist anymore, there's a major conflict in the Mid East with Iraq, and the World Trade Center doesn't exist anymore. Not enough detail. Could be just wild imagination based on obvious scenarios. However, if the patient starts naming names like George W. Bush, Osama bin Laden, Putin, etc. then the psychiatrist can begin to construct that database and see if any of these people really exist. The more data, the better. Eventually extrapolations can be made as to whether the patient is seeing the future of the world that they're in or perhaps a parallel world. This is an oversimplification of how the process really works, but one that points a direction for how these kinds of questions are actually investigated. BTW, 30 years ago, almost all science fiction written about the near future, had the Soviet Union still in existence. Anyone saying that they had perceptions of a future where it no loner existed, without the use of nuclear war, would truely have been seen as crazy. Yet, they would have been correct. >However, this response is completely wrong if MWI is > correct. If I dream tonight that a big green monster has eaten the > Sydney Opera House, then definitely, in some branch of the MW, a > big green monster will eat the Sydney Opera House. Actually, MWI doesn't mean that just because you think (or dream something) that it happens somewhere. The big green monster that eats the Sydney Opera House could just be some bad vegamite you had. Just like the hallucinations of mentally ill people, or for that matter, drug users, aren't valid observations of reality. >Of course, this > unfortunate event will occur even if I *don't* dream it, The event will only happen if it's a valid perception of another world. Could be other things. Those other things always have to be taken into consideration. >but I'm not saying that my dream caused it, only that I saw it happening. Dreams rarely, if ever, have a causal effect just in and of themselves. Causality usually results from taking action because of the dream. > It might also be argued that I didn't really "receive" this > information from another branch, but that it was just a coincidence > that my dream matched the reality in the other branch. Of course if it happens in another branch you won't have any other form of confirmation of it besides another dream, which is not all that helpful. There exits a crite
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Le 14-mai-05, à 07:44, Lee Corbin a écrit : No, it is not "just erroneous". I know of many thoughtful people, and include myself as one of them, who believe that the so-called mind body problem is some sort of verbal or linguistic problem. I can agree with that, but then we should solve that linguistic problem. We see it as arising most likely in the minds of people who think there must be a deeper explanation for why highly advanced products of natural selection can report their internal states. No. That's easy to explain. The problem is that any third person explanation suppress the need of the first person and its qualia, etc. And the aforesaid "we" don't think that anything needs explaining. Almost everyone reading this believes that an AI program could be written such that even if you single-step through it, it will report on its feelings, and that they'll be no less genuine than ours. And from this, I conclude that in all likelihood, there really isn't a problem :-) Big discoveries has made by people who sees problems where others take things for granted. Einstein did see Maxwell equations were problematical with galileo relativity. We could have sty in our cavern considering that the only serious problem is finding ways to eat and escaping to be east. You can read the good nook by Michael Tye, which introduces very gently some facets on the mind-body problem: Tye, M. (1995). Ten problems of consciousness. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Lee Corbin writes (replying to Bruno Marchal): > I agree the abandoning of vitalism is progress. And it is true that > natural science has explained features like self-reproduction, > animal motion, energy transformation (sun -> living matter) and so > on. But it is just erroneous to conclude that the mind-body problem > has been solved. No, it is not "just erroneous". I know of many thoughtful people, and include myself as one of them, who believe that the so-called mind body problem is some sort of verbal or linguistic problem. We see it as arising most likely in the minds of people who think there must be a deeper explanation for why highly advanced products of natural selection can report their internal states. > And then if we are really "digital machine", I offer a case > that materialism will be abandoned from purely rational > consideration. Matter? A lasting aristotelian superstition ... Well, you could be right! The jury's still out! :-) > > Observer-moments seems to arise simply from observers, > > Except that nobody has ever succeed in explaining how the 1-person > observer moment can arise from any 3-person description of an observer. And the aforesaid "we" don't think that anything needs explaining. Almost everyone reading this believes that an AI program could be written such that even if you single-step through it, it will report on its feelings, and that they'll be no less genuine than ours. And from this, I conclude that in all likelihood, there really isn't a problem :-) Lee I don't believe there is anything fundamentally mysterious about the human brain, in that it is just a collection of a dozen or so chemical elements organised in a particular way. Some people are offended by this assertion, and believe there is some special ingredient or mysterious process involved in cognition, which is perhaps forever beyond scientific scrutiny. We could call this folk dualism and folk vitalism, and it is very common in the community. Of course, it's nonsense. Having clarified that, I still think there is a real issue when considering consciousness and the 1st person/ 3rd person distinction. The problem is that it is possible, in theory, to collect, record and communicate information about any aspect of the physical universe *except* one's conscious experience. A person who is blind from birth might learn everything about light, how the eye works, how the brain processes sensory data from the optic nerve, and so on, but still have *no idea* of what it actually feels like to see. I don't believe there is some "deeper explanation" for why we have conscious experiences; manifestly, it is something that happens when certain electrochemical reactions occur in our brain, just as travelling down the road at 60 km/h is something that happens when controlled explosions occur in the cylinders of a car's engine. But this does not mean that the unique, private nature of conscious experience should be ignored or denied. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Bruno writes > [Lee writes] > > But many here contend that abstract > > patterns---mathematical stings, really---can do *so* much cross- > > referencing and quoting of each other that a form of paste obtains > > that wields them in to something capable of having experiences. > > But a familiar abstract object, namely the real numbers between zero > > and one, evidently already does all of that (considering the decimal > > or binary expressions), and so I'm not sure what remains for the > > more abstruse inhabitants of Platonia to do. > > Such critics can be addressed to any "block-universe" view of physics, > not just mathematical platonia. I believe that the discussions have established that many people have something broader in mind when they use the term "block universe". But you could be right: best usage may be as you say. > > I can't blame the ancients and moderns up to the 19th century > > for being dualists. It seemed utterly impossible that mere > > atoms in motion could give rise to such as we. But the painful > > ---and painstaking---defeat of vitalism achieved finally in > > the 20th century leaves it the simplest hypothesis by far to > > say that we are machines. Our "souls" and we arise by natural > > means, just as do streams and mountains. > > > Look at my recent posts to the FOR-LIST, which I have cc-send to the > everything-list just two minutes ago. Okay, and under the same Subject, I am writing this to both lists. > I agree the abandoning of vitalism is progress. And it is true that > natural science has explained features like self-reproduction, > animal motion, energy transformation (sun -> living matter) and so > on. But it is just erroneous to conclude that the mind-body problem > has been solved. No, it is not "just erroneous". I know of many thoughtful people, and include myself as one of them, who believe that the so-called mind body problem is some sort of verbal or linguistic problem. We see it as arising most likely in the minds of people who think there must be a deeper explanation for why highly advanced products of natural selection can report their internal states. > And then if we are really "digital machine", I offer a case > that materialism will be abandoned from purely rational > consideration. Matter? A lasting aristotelian superstition ... Well, you could be right! The jury's still out! :-) > > Observer-moments seems to arise simply from observers, > > Except that nobody has ever succeed in explaining how the 1-person > observer moment can arise from any 3-person description of an observer. And the aforesaid "we" don't think that anything needs explaining. Almost everyone reading this believes that an AI program could be written such that even if you single-step through it, it will report on its feelings, and that they'll be no less genuine than ours. And from this, I conclude that in all likelihood, there really isn't a problem :-) Lee
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Le 13-mai-05, à 05:39, Lee Corbin a écrit : Brent writes I think that an observer must be physically instantiated - that seems well supported empirically. As it is used a "observer moment" seems to mean a unit of subjective experience. That there is an "observer", i.e. something with continuity over many such subjective experiences, must be an inference or a construct within the theory. Personally, I would agree. But many here contend that abstract patterns---mathematical stings, really---can do *so* much cross- referencing and quoting of each other that a form of paste obtains that wields them in to something capable of having experiences. But a familiar abstract object, namely the real numbers between zero and one, evidently already does all of that (considering the decimal or binary expressions), and so I'm not sure what remains for the more abstruse inhabitants of Platonia to do. Such critics can be addressed to any "block-universe" view of physics, not just mathematical platonia. Yes, that's the simplest explanation! We have to suppose that physical objects continue to encode previously gained information in the default case. I don't know that "we have to". I've know idealists who suppose that our memories are part of our immaterial spirits. But they have a hard time explaining the limitations of memory. Such idealists have a hard time being credible at all, if you ask me. But what John was perhaps saying---and what I would certainly claim along with all the adherents of "observer-moments", I think---is that any particular version of you at any particular moment is not conscious of the facts encoded in all your memories. Hence the idea that an observer-moment is the net intersection across the multiverse and across other planetary systems of a particular sense-perception experience of a particular person. But if, for each subjective experience, there is no way to uniquely associate it with a sequence of subjective experiences, i.e. every such experience has many predecessors and successors, then I don't see how such sequences can constitute a particular person(s). I agree. That is, freed of memory, just how are all those subjective moments linked in a particular ordered sequence? I also agree with your statement, when *persons* (as you write) are being considered. I'll admit that there is something---but not very much---associated with a person that has nothing to do with the person's memories. It seems in these discussions that the existence of such sequences corresponding to a particular person, an "observer", is taken for granted. It is a natural model given that observers are physical things - but it is problematic if physics is thrown out and you start from nothing but "observer moments". Well said. A natural model does give us that observers are physical things, or at least *necessarily* instantiated in physical things. And I agree that starting from nothing but observer-moments won't take us any further than it took William James http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/james/ I can't blame the ancients and moderns up to the 19th century for being dualists. It seemed utterly impossible that mere atoms in motion could give rise to such as we. But the painful ---and painstaking---defeat of vitalism achieved finally in the 20th century leaves it the simplest hypothesis by far to say that we are machines. Our "souls" and we arise by natural means, just as do streams and mountains. Look at my recent posts to the FOR-LIST, which I have cc-send to the everything-list just two minutes ago. I agree the abandon of vitalism is a progress. And it is true that natural science has explained feature like self-reproduction, animal motion, energy transformation (sun -> living matter) and so one. But it is just erroneous to conclude that the mind-body problem has been solved. And then if we are really "digital machine", I offer a case that materialism will be abandoned from purely rational consideration. Matter? A lasting aristotelian superstition ... Observer-moments seems to arise simply from observers, Except that nobody has ever succeed in explaining how the 1-person observer moment can arise from any 3-person description of an observer. And myself and independently Maudlin has made a strong case why, with the comp hyp it is just impossible to make such a link. Reference can be found here: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/lillethesis/these/ node79.html#SECTION00130 and observers arise simply from highly intelligent mammals (or aliens) who can think about their own thinking. Unless you want (which is probably a good idea) to regard even photographic plates and other matter upon which impressions can be made as *observers*. Lee Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
What is the difference between a simulation and a representation? Is it just that a representation is a rather poor simulation, one that doesn't talk back to you, like a film? Is there a sharp dividing line between the two, or is it a continuum? --Stathis Papaioannou From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "everything" Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Fri, 13 May 2005 03:11:21 +0200 One could say that the brain of some schizophrenic persons simulate other persons. I don't know if some of you have seen the film 'A Beautiful mind' about the life of mathematician Nash. In the film Nash was closely acquainted to persons that didn't realy exist. Only much later when he was treated for his condition did he realize that some of his close friends didn't really exist. One could argue that the persons that Nash was seeing in fact did exist (in our universe), precisely because Nash's brain was simulating them. Saibal Van: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Aan: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> CC: Verzonden: Thursday, May 12, 2005 03:25 PM Onderwerp: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality > The obvious and sensible-sounding response to Jeanne's question whether it > may be possible to access other universes through dreams or hallucinations > is that it is not really any more credible than speculation that people can > contact the dead, or have been kidnapped by aliens, or any other of the > millions of weird things that so many seem to believe despite the total lack > of supporting evidence. However, this response is completely wrong if MWI is > correct. If I dream tonight that a big green monster has eaten the Sydney > Opera House, then definitely, in some branch of the MW, a big green monster > will eat the Sydney Opera House. Of course, this unfortunate event will > occur even if I *don't* dream it, but I'm not saying that my dream caused > it, only that I saw it happening. It might also be argued that I didn't > really "receive" this information from another branch, but that it was just > a coincidence that my dream matched the reality in the other branch. But > seers don't see things by putting two and two together; they just, well, > *see* them. And if I really could, godlike, enter at random another branch > of the MW and return to this branch to report what I saw, how would the > information provided be any different from my dream? The only difference I > can think of is that with the direct method I would be more likely to visit > a branch with greater measure, but I can probably achieve the same thing by > trying not to think about green monsters when I go to sleep tonight. > > --Stathis Papaioannou > > >I once read an article in, I believe, Time Magazine, about the relatively > >new field of "neurotheology" which investigates what goes on in the brain > >during ecstatic states, etc. One suggestion that intrigued me was that it > >may be possible that in such a state, and I believe that schizophrenics > >were > >also mentioned, that the brain is malfunctioning in such a way as to allow > >it to perceive states of reality other than that which the normal brain > >would perceive. In other words, the "antenna" (brain) is picking-up > >signals > >that are usually beyond the scope of the normal brain. I wondered if > >anyone > >could comment on this, and if there was any reason to even entertain the > >thought that perhaps some people have passed through a crack in the > >division > >between our universe or dimension, into perhaps another? I read this > >several years ago and wish that I could recall the details of the article, > >but I don't have it anymore. > > > >Jeanne > > _ > MSN Messenger v7. Download now: http://messenger.ninemsn.com.au/ > - Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites: http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/ _ REALESTATE: biggest buy/rent/share listings http://ninemsn.realestate.com.au
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>-Original Message- >From: Lee Corbin [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >Sent: Friday, May 13, 2005 3:40 AM >To: EverythingList >Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality > > >Brent writes > >> I think that an observer must be physically instantiated - that seems well >> supported empirically. As it is used a "observer moment" seems to >mean a unit >> of subjective experience. That there is an "observer", i.e. something with >> continuity over many such subjective experiences, must be an inference or a >> construct within the theory. > >Personally, I would agree. But many here contend that abstract >patterns---mathematical stings, really---can do *so* much cross- >referencing and quoting of each other that a form of paste obtains >that wields them in to something capable of having experiences. >But a familiar abstract object, namely the real numbers between zero >and one, evidently already does all of that (considering the decimal >or binary expressions), and so I'm not sure what remains for the >more abstruse inhabitants of Platonia to do. > >> >Yes, that's the simplest explanation! We have to suppose that >> >physical objects continue to encode previously gained information >> >in the default case. >> >> I don't know that "we have to". I've know idealists who suppose >> that our memories are part of our immaterial spirits. But they >> have a hard time explaining the limitations of memory. > >Such idealists have a hard time being credible at all, if you >ask me. > >> > But what John was perhaps saying---and what I would certainly >> > claim along with all the adherents of "observer-moments", I >> > think---is that any particular version of you at any particular >> > moment is not conscious of the facts encoded in all your memories. >> > Hence the idea that an observer-moment is the net intersection >> > across the multiverse and across other planetary systems of a >> > particular sense-perception experience of a particular person. >> >> But if, for each subjective experience, there is no way to uniquely >associate >> it with a sequence of subjective experiences, i.e. every such experience has >> many predecessors and successors, then I don't see how such sequences can >> constitute a particular person(s). > >I agree. That is, freed of memory, just how are all those subjective >moments linked in a particular ordered sequence? I also agree with >your statement, when *persons* (as you write) are being considered. >I'll admit that there is something---but not very much---associated >with a person that has nothing to do with the person's memories. > >> It seems in these discussions that the existence of such sequences >> corresponding to a particular person, an "observer", is taken for >> granted. It is a natural model given that observers are physical >> things - but it is problematic if physics is thrown out and you >> start from nothing but "observer moments". > >Well said. A natural model does give us that observers are >physical things, or at least *necessarily* instantiated in >physical things. And I agree that starting from nothing but >observer-moments won't take us any further than it took >William James http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/james/ > >I can't blame the ancients and moderns up to the 19th century >for being dualists. It seemed utterly impossible that mere >atoms in motion could give rise to such as we. But the painful >---and painstaking---defeat of vitalism achieved finally in >the 20th century leaves it the simplest hypothesis by far to >say that we are machines. Our "souls" and we arise by natural >means, just as do streams and mountains. > >Observer-moments seems to arise simply from observers, and >observers arise simply from highly intelligent mammals (or >aliens) who can think about their own thinking. Unless you >want (which is probably a good idea) to regard even >photographic plates and other matter upon which impressions >can be made as *observers*. In considering what it takes to be an observer, I find it useful to think about robots. What would I have to design into a robot in order that it be an observer - and not just a recorder? I think the essential elements are having a goal, the ability to act, and the ability to learn from experience. At a rudimentary level I'd say the Mars rovers qualify as observers. Brent Meeker
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Brent writes > I think that an observer must be physically instantiated - that seems well > supported empirically. As it is used a "observer moment" seems to mean a unit > of subjective experience. That there is an "observer", i.e. something with > continuity over many such subjective experiences, must be an inference or a > construct within the theory. Personally, I would agree. But many here contend that abstract patterns---mathematical stings, really---can do *so* much cross- referencing and quoting of each other that a form of paste obtains that wields them in to something capable of having experiences. But a familiar abstract object, namely the real numbers between zero and one, evidently already does all of that (considering the decimal or binary expressions), and so I'm not sure what remains for the more abstruse inhabitants of Platonia to do. > >Yes, that's the simplest explanation! We have to suppose that > >physical objects continue to encode previously gained information > >in the default case. > > I don't know that "we have to". I've know idealists who suppose > that our memories are part of our immaterial spirits. But they > have a hard time explaining the limitations of memory. Such idealists have a hard time being credible at all, if you ask me. > > But what John was perhaps saying---and what I would certainly > > claim along with all the adherents of "observer-moments", I > > think---is that any particular version of you at any particular > > moment is not conscious of the facts encoded in all your memories. > > Hence the idea that an observer-moment is the net intersection > > across the multiverse and across other planetary systems of a > > particular sense-perception experience of a particular person. > > But if, for each subjective experience, there is no way to uniquely associate > it with a sequence of subjective experiences, i.e. every such experience has > many predecessors and successors, then I don't see how such sequences can > constitute a particular person(s). I agree. That is, freed of memory, just how are all those subjective moments linked in a particular ordered sequence? I also agree with your statement, when *persons* (as you write) are being considered. I'll admit that there is something---but not very much---associated with a person that has nothing to do with the person's memories. > It seems in these discussions that the existence of such sequences > corresponding to a particular person, an "observer", is taken for > granted. It is a natural model given that observers are physical > things - but it is problematic if physics is thrown out and you > start from nothing but "observer moments". Well said. A natural model does give us that observers are physical things, or at least *necessarily* instantiated in physical things. And I agree that starting from nothing but observer-moments won't take us any further than it took William James http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/james/ I can't blame the ancients and moderns up to the 19th century for being dualists. It seemed utterly impossible that mere atoms in motion could give rise to such as we. But the painful ---and painstaking---defeat of vitalism achieved finally in the 20th century leaves it the simplest hypothesis by far to say that we are machines. Our "souls" and we arise by natural means, just as do streams and mountains. Observer-moments seems to arise simply from observers, and observers arise simply from highly intelligent mammals (or aliens) who can think about their own thinking. Unless you want (which is probably a good idea) to regard even photographic plates and other matter upon which impressions can be made as *observers*. Lee
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
One could say that the brain of some schizophrenic persons simulate otherpersons. I don't know if some of you have seen the film 'A Beautiful mind'about the life of mathematician Nash. In the film Nash was closelyacquainted to persons that didn't realy exist. Only much later when he wastreated for his condition did he realize that some of his close friendsdidn't really exist.One could argue that the persons that Nash was seeing in fact did exist (inour universe), precisely because Nash's brain was simulating them.SaibalVan: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Aan: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>CC: <everything-list@eskimo.com>Verzonden: Thursday, May 12, 2005 03:25 PMOnderwerp: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality> The obvious and sensible-sounding response to Jeanne's question whether it> may be possible to access other universes through dreams or hallucinations> is that it is not really any more credible than speculation that peoplecan> contact the dead, or have been kidnapped by aliens, or any other of the> millions of weird things that so many seem to believe despite the totallack> of supporting evidence. However, this response is completely wrong if MWIis> correct. If I dream tonight that a big green monster has eaten the Sydney> Opera House, then definitely, in some branch of the MW, a big greenmonster> will eat the Sydney Opera House. Of course, this unfortunate event will> occur even if I *don't* dream it, but I'm not saying that my dream caused> it, only that I saw it happening. It might also be argued that I didn't> really "receive" this information from another branch, but that it wasjust> a coincidence that my dream matched the reality in the other branch. But> seers don't see things by putting two and two together; they just, well,> *see* them. And if I really could, godlike, enter at random another branch> of the MW and return to this branch to report what I saw, how would the> information provided be any different from my dream? The only difference I> can think of is that with the direct method I would be more likely tovisit> a branch with greater measure, but I can probably achieve the same thingby> trying not to think about green monsters when I go to sleep tonight.>> --Stathis Papaioannou>> >I once read an article in, I believe, Time Magazine, about the relatively> >new field of "neurotheology" which investigates what goes on in the brain> >during ecstatic states, etc. One suggestion that intrigued me was thatit> >may be possible that in such a state, and I believe that schizophrenics> >were> >also mentioned, that the brain is malfunctioning in such a way as toallow> >it to perceive states of reality other than that which the normal brain> >would perceive. In other words, the "antenna" (brain) is picking-up> >signals> >that are usually beyond the scope of the normal brain. I wondered if> >anyone> >could comment on this, and if there was any reason to even entertain the> >thought that perhaps some people have passed through a crack in the> >division> >between our universe or dimension, into perhaps another? I read this> >several years ago and wish that I could recall the details of thearticle,> >but I don't have it anymore.> >> >Jeanne>> _> MSN Messenger v7. Download now: http://messenger.ninemsn.com.au/> -Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites: http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I doubt that there are many people who have known someone with a mental illness and would claim that there is anything positive about the experience. While sometimes the mentally ill themselves claim that they have a superior insight into reality, that's just because they lack insight into the fact that they are unwell. However, what mental illness, or any other disease, does provide is a natural experiment that helps us understand the normal function of the affected organ or system. For just this reason, in medical research, one of the most common experimental tools is to deliberately cause lesions in an experimental animal and observe the resulting effects. Yes, I'd agree with that--and besides intentionally causing lesions in animals, accidental brain injury in people can give insight into the normal function of the corresponding brain areas in uninjured people, and sometimes other types of mental illnesses can provide the same kind of insight. By the way, on the subject of what mental illnesses tell us about the way our brains percieve time, here's a very interesting article by Oliver Sacks on the possibility that our brain strings together a series of "snapshots", in much the same way that movies work, rather than integrating sensory information in a more continous way: http://afr.com/articles/2004/01/22/1074732537267.html This article was originally from the New York Review of Books, and you can also read some letters by other scientists written in response at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17030 Jesse
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
I doubt that there are many people who have known someone with a mental illness and would claim that there is anything positive about the experience. While sometimes the mentally ill themselves claim that they have a superior insight into reality, that's just because they lack insight into the fact that they are unwell. However, what mental illness, or any other disease, does provide is a natural experiment that helps us understand the normal function of the affected organ or system. For just this reason, in medical research, one of the most common experimental tools is to deliberately cause lesions in an experimental animal and observe the resulting effects. --Stathis Papaioannou From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 12 May 2005 14:48:17 -0400 Generally, unasked-for attempts at armchair psychology to explain the motivations of another poster on an internet forum, like the comment that someone "just wants to hear themself talk", are justly considered flames and tend to have the effect of derailing productive discussion. I actually agree with your other comments about it being implausible that the mentally ill have some sort of superior insight into reality, but hey, this list is all about rambling speculations about half-formed ideas that probably won't pan out to anything, you could just as easily level the same accusation against anyone here. Jesse << message3.txt >> _ Are you right for each other? Find out with our Love Calculator: http://fun.mobiledownloads.com.au/191191/index.wl?page=template&groupName=funstuff
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
On Thu, May 12, 2005 at 08:47:09AM -0500, aet.radal ssg wrote:
???
Could I please request that people post only plain text emails to the
everything list, or at very least include a plain text translation?
This is a sending option available on all HTML email clients I've come
across. It's a real bugger trying to read HTML formatted emails. My
brain's HTML module is obviously defective.
Cheers
--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 (")
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
pgpFaeWlrjmkD.pgp
Description: PGP signature
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
On Thu, May 12, 2005 at 02:48:17PM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> Generally, unasked-for attempts at armchair psychology to explain the
> motivations of another poster on an internet forum, like the comment that
> someone "just wants to hear themself talk", are justly considered flames
> and tend to have the effect of derailing productive discussion. I actually
> agree with your other comments about it being implausible that the mentally
> ill have some sort of superior insight into reality, but hey, this list is
> all about rambling speculations about half-formed ideas that probably won't
> pan out to anything, you could just as easily level the same accusation
> against anyone here.
>
> Jesse
>
Furthermore, some people in this are taking quite seriously the
proposition that reality is a whole is derived from the properties of
consciousness. Therefore if some consciousnesses do not experience
time like we experience it, this expands the possible forms time can
have, or may even reduce the TIME (or equivalent) proposition to a
probabilistic rule. The discussion is very relevant.
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to establish consciousness in
other beings - dogs probably are conscious, but insects
probably are not for example. So alas, I really have been unable to
assimilate what this case of mentally ill means for the general theory.
--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 (")
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
pgpkX02Y10mYJ.pgp
Description: PGP signature
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Generally, unasked-for attempts at armchair psychology to explain the motivations of another poster on an internet forum, like the comment that someone "just wants to hear themself talk", are justly considered flames and tend to have the effect of derailing productive discussion. I actually agree with your other comments about it being implausible that the mentally ill have some sort of superior insight into reality, but hey, this list is all about rambling speculations about half-formed ideas that probably won't pan out to anything, you could just as easily level the same accusation against anyone here. Jesse --- Begin Message --- Dear Stathis: Your interpretation of my "anger" says more about you than me. I didn't flame you or call you or mentally ill people names. My only point is that if you want to seriously investigate complex concepts scientifically, then it helps to have the most accurate methods available. Even considering that a person with an illness that prevents them from having temporal awareness (or knowing the difference between one moment to the next) could have some significance on understanding the nature of time is folly for the simple reason it is time that being effected in their case, its their brain's ability to percieve it. Their condition is having know objective effect on time at all. It would be diiferent if you put such a person in a room with a bunch of measuring devices and then detected that temporal anomalies were recorded of some kind, but that doesn't happen. Their perceptions are completely subjective, ie inconsequential, unless you're studying their condition. But, if the! purpose of your research is time, like mine is, data based on the perceptions of such an individual is useless, unless, like I suggested, you really just want to jabber about this and that idea, with no criteria for trying to seriously understand the subject at hand. If these comments upset so much that you think I'm angry, that's on you. I'm simply pointing out what should have been painfully obvious at the onset - you don't make measurement with broken instruments. - Original Message -From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.comSubject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortalityDate: Wed, 11 May 2005 17:10:30 +1000> > Dear aet.radal.ssg,> > You make a few interesting points which under normal circumstances > I would be happy to continue discussing with you, but the primary > motivation for your posts seems to be anger that I have raised the > topic of mental illness. I am sorry if I have upset you, and I hope > that if you do have the opportunity to work with the mentally ill > in future you will treat them with compassion.> > --Stathis Papaioannou> > > From: "aet.radal ssg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> > To: everything-list@eskimo.com> > Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality> > Date: Tue, 10 May 2005 09:4! 1:27 -0500> >> -- ___Sign-up for Ads Free at Mail.com http://www.mail.com/?sr=signup --- End Message ---
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
I agree with Stathis' answer to Jeanne. Another one which looks a little bit incompatible with the one by Stathis would be: if QM is correct no information can travel from one universe to another. So such an hallucination can only be such a coincidence or a triviality (whatever I think, there is a universe where ... but that lead to the measure problem, and the fact that we cannot really *stay* in a "Harry Potter" universe). But what if QM is almost correct but *slightly* incorrect? Then, as Weinberg has shown in the case where the SWE (Schroedinger Wave Equation) is changed to be slightly non linear, it becomes possible to travel or communicate between universes. It is quite speculative because it makes also the second principle of thermodynamic wrong in a large part of the multiverse, but it is not inconsistent. I vaguely remember having read that some cosmologist believes that they have some case for the slight non linearity of the SWE. So ... And what happens with comp? I would just say: open problem. Better staying agnostic until more information and results are provided. Of course the real problem of Jeanne's question is that we cannot give much 3-person weight to "rare" first person narration. We can give 1-weight, but it's probably better to stay mute on this in a 3-list. Bruno Le 12-mai-05, à 15:25, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : The obvious and sensible-sounding response to Jeanne's question whether it may be possible to access other universes through dreams or hallucinations is that it is not really any more credible than speculation that people can contact the dead, or have been kidnapped by aliens, or any other of the millions of weird things that so many seem to believe despite the total lack of supporting evidence. However, this response is completely wrong if MWI is correct. If I dream tonight that a big green monster has eaten the Sydney Opera House, then definitely, in some branch of the MW, a big green monster will eat the Sydney Opera House. Of course, this unfortunate event will occur even if I *don't* dream it, but I'm not saying that my dream caused it, only that I saw it happening. It might also be argued that I didn't really "receive" this information from another branch, but that it was just a coincidence that my dream matched the reality in the other branch. But seers don't see things by putting two and two together; they just, well, *see* them. And if I really could, godlike, enter at random another branch of the MW and return to this branch to report what I saw, how would the information provided be any different from my dream? The only difference I can think of is that with the direct method I would be more likely to visit a branch with greater measure, but I can probably achieve the same thing by trying not to think about green monsters when I go to sleep tonight. --Stathis Papaioannou I once read an article in, I believe, Time Magazine, about the relatively new field of "neurotheology" which investigates what goes on in the brain during ecstatic states, etc. One suggestion that intrigued me was that it may be possible that in such a state, and I believe that schizophrenics were also mentioned, that the brain is malfunctioning in such a way as to allow it to perceive states of reality other than that which the normal brain would perceive. In other words, the "antenna" (brain) is picking-up signals that are usually beyond the scope of the normal brain. I wondered if anyone could comment on this, and if there was any reason to even entertain the thought that perhaps some people have passed through a crack in the division between our universe or dimension, into perhaps another? I read this several years ago and wish that I could recall the details of the article, but I don't have it anymore. Jeanne _ MSN Messenger v7. Download now: http://messenger.ninemsn.com.au/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Dear Stathis: Your interpretation of my "anger" says more about you than me. I didn't flame you or call you or mentally ill people names. My only point is that if you want to seriously investigate complex concepts scientifically, then it helps to have the most accurate methods available. Even considering that a person with an illness that prevents them from having temporal awareness (or knowing the difference between one moment to the next) could have some significance on understanding the nature of time is folly for the simple reason it is time that being effected in their case, its their brain's ability to percieve it. Their condition is having know objective effect on time at all. It would be diiferent if you put such a person in a room with a bunch of measuring devices and then detected that temporal anomalies were recorded of some kind, but that doesn't happen. Their perceptions are completely subjective, ie inconsequential, unless you're studying their condition. But, if the purpose of your research is time, like mine is, data based on the perceptions of such an individual is useless, unless, like I suggested, you really just want to jabber about this and that idea, with no criteria for trying to seriously understand the subject at hand. If these comments upset so much that you think I'm angry, that's on you. I'm simply pointing out what should have been painfully obvious at the onset - you don't make measurement with broken instruments. - Original Message -From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.comSubject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortalityDate: Wed, 11 May 2005 17:10:30 +1000> > Dear aet.radal.ssg,> > You make a few interesting points which under normal circumstances > I would be happy to continue discussing with you, but the primary > motivation for your posts seems to be anger that I have raised the > topic of mental illness. I am sorry if I have upset you, and I hope > that if you do have the opportunity to work with the mentally ill > in future you will treat them with compassion.> > --Stathis Papaioannou> > > From: "aet.radal ssg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> > To: everything-list@eskimo.com> > Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality> > Date: Tue, 10 May 2005 09:41:27 -0500> >> -- ___Sign-up for Ads Free at Mail.com http://www.mail.com/?sr=signup
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Dear Stathis, This ties in with the subject header of this series of posts, which is a rare occurence: Many Wolrds Immortality, according to which there will be some branch of the multiverse in which I hit enough crows and pigeons on the way down to form a lifesaving mushy matress (mattress?), is a special case of a 'many-worlds-absurdity theorem' in which in some branch of the multiverse I will look down and find my leg be a peg and my ass a giraffe. But these will only happen if there are infinitely many, rather than just many, worlds. If you believe in some finite or countable discrete structure underlying physics, then you could ultimately identify definite events in which the universe branches off into a finite number of different cases (which would grow exponentially in time, but would after any given time be finite). -Chris Collins - Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: Sent: Thursday, May 12, 2005 2:25 PM Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality > The obvious and sensible-sounding response to Jeanne's question whether it > may be possible to access other universes through dreams or hallucinations > is that it is not really any more credible than speculation that people can > contact the dead, or have been kidnapped by aliens, or any other of the > millions of weird things that so many seem to believe despite the total lack > of supporting evidence. However, this response is completely wrong if MWI is > correct. If I dream tonight that a big green monster has eaten the Sydney > Opera House, then definitely, in some branch of the MW, a big green monster > will eat the Sydney Opera House. Of course, this unfortunate event will > occur even if I *don't* dream it, but I'm not saying that my dream caused > it, only that I saw it happening. It might also be argued that I didn't > really "receive" this information from another branch, but that it was just > a coincidence that my dream matched the reality in the other branch. But > seers don't see things by putting two and two together; they just, well, > *see* them. And if I really could, godlike, enter at random another branch > of the MW and return to this branch to report what I saw, how would the > information provided be any different from my dream? The only difference I > can think of is that with the direct method I would be more likely to visit > a branch with greater measure, but I can probably achieve the same thing by > trying not to think about green monsters when I go to sleep tonight. > > --Stathis Papaioannou > > >I once read an article in, I believe, Time Magazine, about the relatively > >new field of "neurotheology" which investigates what goes on in the brain > >during ecstatic states, etc. One suggestion that intrigued me was that it > >may be possible that in such a state, and I believe that schizophrenics > >were > >also mentioned, that the brain is malfunctioning in such a way as to allow > >it to perceive states of reality other than that which the normal brain > >would perceive. In other words, the "antenna" (brain) is picking-up > >signals > >that are usually beyond the scope of the normal brain. I wondered if > >anyone > >could comment on this, and if there was any reason to even entertain the > >thought that perhaps some people have passed through a crack in the > >division > >between our universe or dimension, into perhaps another? I read this > >several years ago and wish that I could recall the details of the article, > >but I don't have it anymore. > > > >Jeanne > > _ > MSN Messenger v7. Download now: http://messenger.ninemsn.com.au/ > >
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
The obvious and sensible-sounding response to Jeanne's question whether it may be possible to access other universes through dreams or hallucinations is that it is not really any more credible than speculation that people can contact the dead, or have been kidnapped by aliens, or any other of the millions of weird things that so many seem to believe despite the total lack of supporting evidence. However, this response is completely wrong if MWI is correct. If I dream tonight that a big green monster has eaten the Sydney Opera House, then definitely, in some branch of the MW, a big green monster will eat the Sydney Opera House. Of course, this unfortunate event will occur even if I *don't* dream it, but I'm not saying that my dream caused it, only that I saw it happening. It might also be argued that I didn't really "receive" this information from another branch, but that it was just a coincidence that my dream matched the reality in the other branch. But seers don't see things by putting two and two together; they just, well, *see* them. And if I really could, godlike, enter at random another branch of the MW and return to this branch to report what I saw, how would the information provided be any different from my dream? The only difference I can think of is that with the direct method I would be more likely to visit a branch with greater measure, but I can probably achieve the same thing by trying not to think about green monsters when I go to sleep tonight. --Stathis Papaioannou I once read an article in, I believe, Time Magazine, about the relatively new field of "neurotheology" which investigates what goes on in the brain during ecstatic states, etc. One suggestion that intrigued me was that it may be possible that in such a state, and I believe that schizophrenics were also mentioned, that the brain is malfunctioning in such a way as to allow it to perceive states of reality other than that which the normal brain would perceive. In other words, the "antenna" (brain) is picking-up signals that are usually beyond the scope of the normal brain. I wondered if anyone could comment on this, and if there was any reason to even entertain the thought that perhaps some people have passed through a crack in the division between our universe or dimension, into perhaps another? I read this several years ago and wish that I could recall the details of the article, but I don't have it anymore. Jeanne _ MSN Messenger v7. Download now: http://messenger.ninemsn.com.au/
Re: [Fwd: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality]
I read "Why Occam's Razor" tonight after posting my last response
(despite having a Federal court brief begging for attention). I didn't
have time to wade through the technical parts very thoroughly, but in
general I found it a very good summary of many of the topics we have
been frequently discussing on this list.
I also re-read (skimmed) Nick Bostrom's "are you living in a
simulation" paper tonight, and it occurs to me if you add his argument
to MWI, you get the inevitable conclusion that we are simulated, which
I guess is actually a similar concept to Marchal (though Marchal goes
much further in attempting to derive QM, etc. from this). One
difference being that Marchal argues the UTM does not need to actually
exist physically, but as you state in your paper if I read/remember
correctly, the UTM would exist both as mathematical and physical
structure.
This then leads back to questions about the differences between the
mathematical and physical structure; if any. With consideration that
any given area of the multiverse is inevitably and eternally being
simulated by another area, I thereby come full circle and see what
Marchal is saying - there is no need to even consider what we refer to
as the physical. I wonder if, considering Godel, we are forever doomed
to walk around in circles like this
Danny Mayes
many seem to bend over backwards to say you do not actually have to
have the UTM exist physically
Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, May 12, 2005 at 12:40:10AM -0400, danny mayes wrote:
Russell,
When I stated in the original reply that pulling information out of
other worlds in the MWI context was prohibited by physics, I was
referring to information about those universes. As I stated, obviously
you can create a superposition to utilize processing power in other
universes, but you can't take from this information about the
universes/worlds you are utilizing. Therefore, the original concept of
people "seeing" into other universes seems to be prohibited by the laws
of physics.
As I understand it, the mathematics of Hilbert space prohibits
inter-world communications because the attempt to remove information
from Hilbert space causes decoherence, destroying reversibility. "Any
Hilbert space accessible from more than one world line must be a
timeless place, in which we can leave no permanent mark." - Colin Bruce
Part of the problem is in assuming that all quantum worlds are
disjoint from each other, when it is clear this is not the case. Take
an example Multiverse that has one spin 1/2 particle in it. Clearly,
it consists of two worlds, one which has spin +1/2\hbar, the other
with spin -1/2\hbar in the z-direction. However, this Multiverse also
has another two worlds in it, one with spin +1/2\hbar and one with
-1/2\hbar, however this time in the x-direction. And so on. All these
worlds exist. By choosing to measure the particle in the x-direction,
I get information from both of the "+1/2-" and "-1/2 in the
z-direction" worlds, hence there is a form of information flow between
worlds.
Nevertheless, there is, as you say, no information flow between
decohered worlds.
Also, I'm interested in your TIME hypothesis. Could you refer me to a
source for information, or summarize for me?
I initially raised it my paper "Why Occam's Razor", and have discussed
it a few times on the everything list. Try doing a search on
time+russell+standish on the everything list archive.
As a summary, it states that an observer must experience a time
dimension, within which e can process information, and bring disparate
facts together for comparison. About the only requirement of this time
object is that it must have topological dimension at least 1. I
usually assume that it is at least a "time scale" - see the Nohner and
Peterson's book:
@Book{Bohner-Peterson01,
author = {Martin Bohner and Allan Peterson},
title = {Dynamic Equations on Time Scales},
publisher = {Birkh\"auser},
year = 2001,
address = {Boston}
}
Cheers
Danny Mayes
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>Jonathan Colvin writes: >> That's putting it mildly. I was thinking that it is more >likely that a >> universe tunnels out of a black hole that "just randomly" happens to >> contain your precise brain state at that moment, and for all >of future >> eternity. But the majority of these random universes will be >precisely >> that; random. In most cases you will then find that your immortal >> experience is of a purely random universe, which is likely a >good definition of "hell". > >But it's not all that unlikely that someone in the world, >unbeknownst to you, has invented a cure; whereas for a >universe with your exact mind in it to be created purely de >novo is astronomically unlikely. > >Look at the number of atoms in your brain, 10^25 or some such, >and imagine how many arrangments there are of those atoms that >aren't you, compared to the relative few which are you. The >odds against that happening by chance are beyond >comprehension. Whereas the odds of some lucky accident saving >you as you are about to die are more like lottery-winner long, >like one in a billion, not astronomically long, like one in a >googleplex. I'd say considerably more than one in a billion for a lifespan of even a thousand years. But we are talking *immortality* here (surviving even the heat death of our local universe). At that point the odds must be getting googleplexian... >Especially if you accept that it is possible in principle for >medicine to give us an unlimited healthy lifespan, then all >you really need to do is to live in a universe where that >medical technology is discovered, and then avoid accidents. >Neither one seems all that improbable from the perspective of >people living in our circumstances today. It's harder to see >how a cave man could look forward to a long life span. I thought QTI applied to *any* observer, cave men included. I suppose even a cave man can look forward to long life if a UFO lands and gifts him the technology for life extension. >I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that >we are guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the >observer-moment concept in which we are more likely to >experience observer-moments where we are young and living >within a normal lifespan than ones where we are at a very >advanced age due to miraculous luck. Agreed. Jonathan Colvin
Re: [Fwd: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality]
On Thu, May 12, 2005 at 12:40:10AM -0400, danny mayes wrote:
> Russell,
>
> When I stated in the original reply that pulling information out of
> other worlds in the MWI context was prohibited by physics, I was
> referring to information about those universes. As I stated, obviously
> you can create a superposition to utilize processing power in other
> universes, but you can't take from this information about the
> universes/worlds you are utilizing. Therefore, the original concept of
> people "seeing" into other universes seems to be prohibited by the laws
> of physics.
>
> As I understand it, the mathematics of Hilbert space prohibits
> inter-world communications because the attempt to remove information
> from Hilbert space causes decoherence, destroying reversibility. "Any
> Hilbert space accessible from more than one world line must be a
> timeless place, in which we can leave no permanent mark." - Colin Bruce
Part of the problem is in assuming that all quantum worlds are
disjoint from each other, when it is clear this is not the case. Take
an example Multiverse that has one spin 1/2 particle in it. Clearly,
it consists of two worlds, one which has spin +1/2\hbar, the other
with spin -1/2\hbar in the z-direction. However, this Multiverse also
has another two worlds in it, one with spin +1/2\hbar and one with
-1/2\hbar, however this time in the x-direction. And so on. All these
worlds exist. By choosing to measure the particle in the x-direction,
I get information from both of the "+1/2-" and "-1/2 in the
z-direction" worlds, hence there is a form of information flow between
worlds.
Nevertheless, there is, as you say, no information flow between
decohered worlds.
>
> Also, I'm interested in your TIME hypothesis. Could you refer me to a
> source for information, or summarize for me?
>
I initially raised it my paper "Why Occam's Razor", and have discussed
it a few times on the everything list. Try doing a search on
time+russell+standish on the everything list archive.
As a summary, it states that an observer must experience a time
dimension, within which e can process information, and bring disparate
facts together for comparison. About the only requirement of this time
object is that it must have topological dimension at least 1. I
usually assume that it is at least a "time scale" - see the Nohner and
Peterson's book:
@Book{Bohner-Peterson01,
author = {Martin Bohner and Allan Peterson},
title ={Dynamic Equations on Time Scales},
publisher ={Birkh\"auser},
year = 2001,
address = {Boston}
}
Cheers
> Danny Mayes
>
--
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is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
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Re: [Fwd: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality]
Russell, When I stated in the original reply that pulling information out of other worlds in the MWI context was prohibited by physics, I was referring to information about those universes. As I stated, obviously you can create a superposition to utilize processing power in other universes, but you can't take from this information about the universes/worlds you are utilizing. Therefore, the original concept of people "seeing" into other universes seems to be prohibited by the laws of physics. As I understand it, the mathematics of Hilbert space prohibits inter-world communications because the attempt to remove information from Hilbert space causes decoherence, destroying reversibility. "Any Hilbert space accessible from more than one world line must be a timeless place, in which we can leave no permanent mark." - Colin Bruce Also, I'm interested in your TIME hypothesis. Could you refer me to a source for information, or summarize for me? Danny Mayes Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, May 11, 2005 at 09:13:33AM -0400, John M wrote: Russell wrote to Danny: The Grover algorithm is a form of accessing information from other worlds. Of course the worlds need to be prepared in just the right way, of course...< I suppose these "other worlds" are potential life-form carrying bodies of this (our) universe, because as far as I know we have no way(s) to access any information from other universes (that MAY be) - unless we take our speculations for 'real'. Does the "prepared" mean some adjustment to understand the diverse situations in terms familiar to us here? that would mean a humanization (anthropomorphization) of the non-human. Would that be productive in the scientific sense? Communication between worlds takes place within the confines of quantum superposition. Setting up the superposed states is what I mean by "prepared".
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
John Collins had written > >..You [Hal] are working from the assumption that each person has some sort of > >transcendental identity that experiences these observer moments, but I would > >think it more likely that these would be included in the observer moment, > >with memories being distinguished from "instantaneous" thoughts just by > >their being repeated several (or even millions of) times. You reject the reified notion of a "transcendental identity" that experiences diverse observer moments. But I don't quite see why. > >As an illustration, try and remember what you had for dinner on your fifth > >birthday. Whether you remember or not, you only know if you remember when > >you try to recall it, so you can't really pretend the piece of information > >is continuously present. An important point! Every so often I have to remember that I studied the clarinet as a boy; but that doesn't ever seem to affect me except on the very rare occasions that something reminds me of it. So at any given moment "I" am that which is perceiving thus- and-such, and is having a certain reaction to it. (There is another equally important but separate way---almost along another axis, as it were---that I *am* my memories, and that it is my memories, my values, and all the rest of my baggage that I strive to get more runtime for.) Brent comments on John's statements: > I agree there is reason to postulate a transcendent observer; I'm content > with a > physical observer. That's one of the things that bothers me about "observer > moments", but I think it's just English grammar that pushes us to have a > subject. I'm sorry. Could you elaborate a bit on that? Firstly, a *physical* observer is just one, or one of a class of, observers. Do you mean that every observer must have a physical substrate of some kind? I'd readily agree! A person may indeed be a program (I personally believe it), but until it gets instanced, i.e., instantiated in some piece of hardware, it's got no more life than a book on a shelf. So criticizing "observer-moment" as a noun, you are cautioning us against unnecessary reification; that we might keep out ideas clearer if take the trouble to write out more meaningful phrases and sentences? I could believe it. Perhaps you meant, "I agree that there is *no* reason to postulate a transcendent observer". It would fit better with what you wrote next. > If you're going to reconstruct physics from discrete subjective > experiences you need to be able to collect and order experiences > according from [that] viewpoint - which corresponds to an "observer" - > and according to intersubjective agreement among observers - > which corresponds to the physical world. Evidently that program appeals to some! > But just because the subjective observer is a construct, doesn't > justify the pejorative "pretend". I think I have considerable > evidence for information, such as what I ate for breakfast, being > persistently encoded in my brain. Yes, that's the simplest explanation! We have to suppose that physical objects continue to encode previously gained information in the default case. But what John was perhaps saying---and what I would certainly claim along with all the adherents of "observer-moments", I think---is that any particular version of you at any particular moment is not conscious of the facts encoded in all your memories. Hence the idea that an observer-moment is the net intersection across the multiverse and across other planetary systems of a particular sense-perception experience of a particular person. Lee
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>-Original Message- >From: John Collins [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2005 10:22 AM >To: Quentin Anciaux; everything-list@eskimo.com >Subject: Re: many worlds theory of immortality > > > >Quentin Anciaux wrote: >" >>Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 19:13, "Hal Finney" a écrit : >>> And in terms of your question, I would not act as though I expected to >> >be guaranteed a very long life span, because the measure of that universe >> >is so low compared to others where I don't survive. >>> >> >Hal Finney >> >>Hi, >> >>but by definition of what being alive means (or being conscious), which is >to >>experience observer moments, even if the difference of the measure where >you >>have a long life compared to where you don't survive is enormous, you can >>only experience world where you are alive... And to continue, I find it >very >>difficult to imagine what could mean being unconscious forever (what you >>suggest to be likely). > >>Quentin Anciaux >" >..You are working from the assumtion that each person has some sort of >transcendental identity that experiences these observer moments, but I would >think it more likely that these would be included in the observer moment, >with memories being distinguished from "instantaneous" thoughts just by >their being repeated several (or even millions of) times. As an >illustration, try and remember what you had for dinner on your fifth >birthday. Whether you remember or not, tou only know if you remember when >you try to recall it, so you can't really pretend the piece of information >is continuously present. I agree there is reason to postulate a transcedent observer; I'm content with a physical observer. That's one of the things that bothers me about "observer moments", but I think it's just English grammar that pushes us to have a subject. If you're going to reconstruct physics from discrete subjective experiences you need to be able to collect and order experiences according from viewpoint - which corresponds to an "observer" - and according to intersubjective agreement among observers - which corresponds to the physical world. But just because the subjective observer is a construct, doesn't justify the pejorative "pretend". I think I have considerable evidence for information, such as what I ate for breakfast, being persistently encoded in my brain. No only the fact that I can recall such information, but also that my ability to do so diminishes with time and may be lost due to disease or injury. Brent Meeker
Re: [Fwd: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality]
Russell wrote to Danny: >The Grover algorithm is a form of accessing information from other worlds. Of course the worlds need to be prepared in just the right way, of course...< I suppose these "other worlds" are potential life-form carrying bodies of this (our) universe, because as far as I know we have no way(s) to access any information from other universes (that MAY be) - unless we take our speculations for 'real'. Does the "prepared" mean some adjustment to understand the diverse situations in terms familiar to us here? that would mean a humanization (anthropomorphization) of the non-human. Would that be productive in the scientific sense? -- to Jeanne: >My own comment is that there are pure 1st person phenomena, and there re 1st person phenomena shared with other conscious beings. The first variety should not be accorded with any real significance, beyond that of a dream, or whatever. The latter shared type is the basis of objective science. With my TIME and PROJECTION postulates, or with COMP, there are 1st person phenomena shared by _all_ conscious beings. This last type we can truly label objective. < The word "share"...I find it OK as 'communicate to', not as making it a common experience. The 2nd part startled me a bit, the reference to 'objective science' may suppose that the 'time' etc. experiences would be common and identical to all conscious beings. First off: objective science is a model, inherited evolutionarily from learning similar stuff from reports of those who earlier constructed them as their 1st pers. explanations. Secondly: even in this case every 'conscious being' makes up his own 1st person mindstuff from such reports and not two may be completely identical. Not even in clones. Machines: yes. We can try to share it, but the result will be personnified by the acceptor into 'his' 1st pers.mindcontent. Unless we introduce some "objective knowledge" to ourselves, exempt from the minds interpretation. That is what I would label 'truly objective'. And once we are at you attachments, you remarked to Hal: >...Whether eternal life in "heaven" or "hell" is your experience will depend very much on your own actions.< Do you consider 'eternal' a "long long time"? Does e.g.infinite mean very much or very long? (or a small circle? G. Cantor's problem...). I think 'eternal' is atemporal, cannot be measured 'in time', or expressed by a timespan, so why not consider it really as timeless: when it starts it immediately also ends instantaneously. So heaven or hell may not last at all (ha ha). Cheers John Mikes ----- Original Message - From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "danny mayes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: "everything list" Sent: Tuesday, May 10, 2005 7:44 PM Subject: Re: [Fwd: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality]
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
I agree with you Stathis. That's why I think MWI, QTI and COMPI lead to the Relative SSA, and relative immortality. The SSA you mention is the Absolute SSA which does not make sense, imo. Bruno Le 11-mai-05, à 14:04, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Bruno, Le 10-mai-05, à 12:25, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments where we are young and living within a normal lifespan than ones where we are at a very advanced age due to miraculous luck. Aren't the above two sentences contradictory? If it is guaranteed that somewhere in the multiverse there will be a million year old Hal observer-moment, doesn't that mean that you are guaranteed to experience life as a million year old? With some ASSA perhaps, but with the RSSA it makes sense only if those "old Hal OM." have the right relative proportion to the young one. where: SSA self-sampling assumption (by Nick Bolstrom) ASSA idem but conceived as absolute RSSA idem but conceived as relative OM = Observer Moment Is the SSA even relevant here? The SSA says that I should consider each OM as if randomly sampled from the set of all possible OM's. In the MWI, although it is certain that there will be a million year old version of me, the distribution of OM's is greatly skewed towards younger versions of me, so that the measure of million year old versions is very close to zero; in fact, it should have the same numerical value as the probability of my reaching this advanced age in a single world interpretation of QM. Therefore, if I pick an OM at random from my life, it is extremely unlikely that it will be one where I find myself to be a million years old. I accept the above reasoning as sound, but I don't think it disproves QTI. The probability that a randomly chosen OM from all possible OM's available to me will be experienced as a million year old version of me is *not* the same as the probability that I will experience life as a million year old at some point. The former probability may be very close to zero, but the latter probability, if MWI is true, should be exactly one. Here is a somewhat analogous example to show the difference. Suppose that there is only one universe and that my life expectancy in this universe is about one hundred years. Consider the one second time interval between August 10 2005, 10:00:00 AM and August 10 2005, 10:00:01 AM. Counting all the one second intervals available to me in a one century lifespan, assuming I sleep eight hours a day, gives about 2 billion. The probability that a random one second long OM in my life coincides with the above interval on August 10 is therefore about 1/2 billion. The probability that I will live through this time interval, on the other hand, is hopefully very close to one. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Bruno, Le 10-mai-05, à 12:25, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments where we are young and living within a normal lifespan than ones where we are at a very advanced age due to miraculous luck. Aren't the above two sentences contradictory? If it is guaranteed that somewhere in the multiverse there will be a million year old Hal observer-moment, doesn't that mean that you are guaranteed to experience life as a million year old? With some ASSA perhaps, but with the RSSA it makes sense only if those "old Hal OM." have the right relative proportion to the young one. where: SSA self-sampling assumption (by Nick Bolstrom) ASSA idem but conceived as absolute RSSA idem but conceived as relative OM = Observer Moment Is the SSA even relevant here? The SSA says that I should consider each OM as if randomly sampled from the set of all possible OM's. In the MWI, although it is certain that there will be a million year old version of me, the distribution of OM's is greatly skewed towards younger versions of me, so that the measure of million year old versions is very close to zero; in fact, it should have the same numerical value as the probability of my reaching this advanced age in a single world interpretation of QM. Therefore, if I pick an OM at random from my life, it is extremely unlikely that it will be one where I find myself to be a million years old. I accept the above reasoning as sound, but I don't think it disproves QTI. The probability that a randomly chosen OM from all possible OM's available to me will be experienced as a million year old version of me is *not* the same as the probability that I will experience life as a million year old at some point. The former probability may be very close to zero, but the latter probability, if MWI is true, should be exactly one. Here is a somewhat analogous example to show the difference. Suppose that there is only one universe and that my life expectancy in this universe is about one hundred years. Consider the one second time interval between August 10 2005, 10:00:00 AM and August 10 2005, 10:00:01 AM. Counting all the one second intervals available to me in a one century lifespan, assuming I sleep eight hours a day, gives about 2 billion. The probability that a random one second long OM in my life coincides with the above interval on August 10 is therefore about 1/2 billion. The probability that I will live through this time interval, on the other hand, is hopefully very close to one. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Quentin Anciaux wrote: " >Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 19:13, "Hal Finney" a écrit : >> And in terms of your question, I would not act as though I expected to > >be guaranteed a very long life span, because the measure of that universe > >is so low compared to others where I don't survive. >> > >Hal Finney > >Hi, > >but by definition of what being alive means (or being conscious), which is to >experience observer moments, even if the difference of the measure where you >have a long life compared to where you don't survive is enormous, you can >only experience world where you are alive... And to continue, I find it very >difficult to imagine what could mean being unconscious forever (what you >suggest to be likely). >Quentin Anciaux " ..You are working from the assumtion that each person has some sort of transcendental identity that experiences these observer moments, but I would think it more likely that these would be included in the observer moment, with memories being distinguished from "instantaneous" thoughts just by their being repeated several (or even millions of) times. As an illustration, try and remember what you had for dinner on your fifth birthday. Whether you remember or not, tou only know if you remember when you try to recall it, so you can't really pretend the piece of information is continuously present. Even the "knowledge" of your own name (which I suspect is made up, anyway) will have only a finite (or countable, if you live forever) number of instantiations. Chris Collins
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Dear aet.radal.ssg, You make a few interesting points which under normal circumstances I would be happy to continue discussing with you, but the primary motivation for your posts seems to be anger that I have raised the topic of mental illness. I am sorry if I have upset you, and I hope that if you do have the opportunity to work with the mentally ill in future you will treat them with compassion. --Stathis Papaioannou From: "aet.radal ssg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Tue, 10 May 2005 09:41:27 -0500 _ Sell your car for $9 on carpoint.com.au http://www.carpoint.com.au/sellyourcar --- Begin Message --- Dear Stathis:- Original Message -From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.comSubject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortalityDate: Mon, 09 May 2005 23:02:18 +1000> > Dear aet.radal ssg,> > I think you missed my point about the amnesic and psychotic > patients, which is not that they are clear thinkers, but that they > are conscious despite a disability which impairs their perception > of time. OK, let me take what you just said there, "conscious despite a disability which impairs their perception of time". A person can be conscious and have any number of disabilities that impair their perception of reality. Doesn't mean that their perception is accurate, valid, or even mildly interesting. The word "impair" should have been a clue. >Your post raises an interesting question in that you seem > to assume that normally functioning human minds have a correct > model of reality, as opposed to the "broken" minds of the mentally > ill. This is really very far from the truth. If the mentally ill had a correct perception of reality, they wouldn't be mentally ill. Hello? Simultaneously, not all sane people have a "correct model of reality" (whatever that means) but they usually know what they're doing on a basic level and function without taking medication to keep them tuned into reality and not the psycho channel. It doesn't mean that they can't be motivated by wrong ideas or misconceptions or even manipulated by somebody smater or with political power, but we're talking apples and oranges now. > Human brains evolved > in a specific environment, often identified as the African > savannah, so the model of the world constructed by the human mind > need only match "reality" to the extent that this promoted survival > in that environment. And if their perception of that reality environment hadn't been correct, they wouldn't have survived. Simultaneously, other creatures, in that same environment, developed other ways other perceiving it. The point you're missing is that the environment is the same. If I take an array of sophisticated measuring and recording devices into that environment, I should be able to detect all of the aspects that most of the non-insect creatures do, and in some cases, a lot of the insect perceptions. However, if I introduce a paranoid schizophrenic into the equation, I will probably not detect the hallucinations that he will see, though I may be able to identify possible external causes. >As a result, we humans are only able to > directly perceive and grasp a tiny, tiny slice of physical reality. Which doesn't make the hallucinations of the mentally ill or those with cognitive disabilities, any more valid. > Furthermore, although we are proud of our thinking abilities, the > theories about physical reality that humans have come up with over > the centuries have in general been ridiculously bad. I think part of the problem here is the use of the term "reality" when something else would be better. Since you failed to give any examples of what you meant by "theories about physical reality" I will assume that you mean the matters dealing with the nature of the Earth and its place in the solar system, etc. If not, please be specific. In any case, much of those errors in perception had to do with physical limitations in the ability to conduct accurate observations, further crippled by various philosophical dogma. >I have spent the last ten years treating patients with schizophrenia, and I can > assure you that however bizarre the delusional beliefs these people > come up with, there are multiple historical examples of apparently > "sane" people holding even more bizarre beliefs, and often > insisting on pain of death or torture that everyone else agree with > them. Hallucinations aren't the same as religious or philosophical dogmatic beliefs and usually don't operate the same way, no matter how destructive or misguided the latter might be. I think
Re: [Fwd: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality]
The Grover algorithm is a form of accessing information from other
worlds. Of course the worlds need to be prepared in just the right
way, of course...
On Tue, May 10, 2005 at 01:01:32PM -0400, danny mayes wrote:
> >
> I'm not one to shy away from what others would perceive to be "unbridled
> speculation," however there are a few fundamental problems with the idea
> set forth by Jeanne. First, to the best that I understand, there is no
> evidence that we will ever be able to access the information of the
> parallel outcomes (worlds) in question. We can access the processing
> power of the other worlds, but the laws of physics seem to prevent our
> pulling information from another "world" into our world given the
> collapse that happens at the end of a computation (when we get our
> result from a quantum computer). So the idea seems to be prohibited by
> the laws of physics. And lets not even get into the proof problem.
> It's sort of like UFO's. Is it easier to believe that someone is
> crazy/seeing things/misinterpreting stimuli, or that they really are
> seeing other worlds/aliens? Spectacular claims require spectacular
> proof, and I don't see how this idea presents the prospect of any
> proof. Perhaps, if someone could in a statistically significant way
> predict future events or the location of hidden items, like remote
> viewing, could provide evidence, but there would still have to be some
> way to establish the link between that phenomena and other worlds.
>
> Danny
>
>
>
>
>
--
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Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
On Tue, May 10, 2005 at 07:19:01AM -0400, Jeanne Houston wrote:
> I once read an article in, I believe, Time Magazine, about the relatively
> new field of "neurotheology" which investigates what goes on in the brain
> during ecstatic states, etc. One suggestion that intrigued me was that it
> may be possible that in such a state, and I believe that schizophrenics were
> also mentioned, that the brain is malfunctioning in such a way as to allow
> it to perceive states of reality other than that which the normal brain
> would perceive. In other words, the "antenna" (brain) is picking-up signals
> that are usually beyond the scope of the normal brain. I wondered if anyone
> could comment on this, and if there was any reason to even entertain the
> thought that perhaps some people have passed through a crack in the division
> between our universe or dimension, into perhaps another? I read this
> several years ago and wish that I could recall the details of the article,
> but I don't have it anymore.
>
> Jeanne
My own comment is that there are pure 1st person phenomena, and there
are 1st person phenomena shared with other conscious beings. The first
variety should not be accorded with any real significance, beyond that
of a dream, or whatever. The latter shared type is the basis of
objective science. With my TIME and PROJECTION postulates, or with
COMP, there are 1st person phenomena shared by _all_ conscious
beings. This last type we can truly label objective.
Cheers
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Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
I vaguely recollect the phenomenon you mention, if I am thinking of the same thing. The problem is that when something "goes wrong", either in a brain or in another machine, in the vast majority of cases it will result in some sort of dysfunction. If you took to your computer with a hammer, there is a *tiny* chance that you will somehow improve it, or give it some new ability, but most likely you will damage it. Having said that, the process of evolution works in exactly this way: random errors occur, and that tiny proportion which results in survival advantage is selected for. I have heard of a much older theory about schizophrenia, that the kind of weird/lateral thinking that occurs in subclinical cases (who are perhaps carriers of the SZ gene or genes) may be responsible for the great intellectual innovations in human history, which is why this devastating disease has not died out. --Stathis Papaioannou From: "Jeanne Houston" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> CC: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Tue, 10 May 2005 07:19:01 -0400 I once read an article in, I believe, Time Magazine, about the relatively new field of "neurotheology" which investigates what goes on in the brain during ecstatic states, etc. One suggestion that intrigued me was that it may be possible that in such a state, and I believe that schizophrenics were also mentioned, that the brain is malfunctioning in such a way as to allow it to perceive states of reality other than that which the normal brain would perceive. In other words, the "antenna" (brain) is picking-up signals that are usually beyond the scope of the normal brain. I wondered if anyone could comment on this, and if there was any reason to even entertain the thought that perhaps some people have passed through a crack in the division between our universe or dimension, into perhaps another? I read this several years ago and wish that I could recall the details of the article, but I don't have it anymore. Jeanne - Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 11:19 PM Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality > Russell, > > To be fair, I should elaborate on my earlier post about amnesics and > psychotics. If I consider the actual cases I have seen, arguably they do > have *some* sense of the passage of time. Taking the first example, people > with severe Korsakoff Syndrome (due to chronic alcohol abuse) appear to be > completely incapable of laying down new memories. If you enter their room to > perform some uncomfortable medical procedure and they become annoyed with > you, all you have to do is step outside for a moment, then step back inside, > and they are all smiles again, so you can have another go at the procedure, > and repeat this as many times as you want. While you are actually in their > sight, however, they do recognise that you are the same person from moment > to moment, and they do make the connection between the needle you are > sticking into them and the subsequent pain, causing them to become annoyed > at you. So they do have a sense of time, even if only for a few seconds. > > The second example, the disorganised schizophrenic, is somewhat more > complex. There is a continuum from mild to extreme disorganisation, and at > the extreme end, it can be very difficult to get any sense of what the > person is thinking, although it is quite easy to get a sense of what they > are feeling and it would be very difficult to maintain a belief that they > are not actually conscious (you really have to see this for yourself to > understand it). Usually, even the most unwell of these patients give some > indirect indication that they maintain some sense of time. For example, if > you hold out a glass of water, they will reach for it and drink from it, > which suggests that they may have a theory about the future, and how they > might influence it to their advantage. Occasionally, however - and I have to > confess I have not actually tried the experiment - there are patients who > seem incapable of even as simple (one could say near-reflexive) a task as > grabbing a glass of water. With treatment, almost all these people improve, > and it is interesting to ask them what was happening during these periods. > Firstly, it is interesting that they actually have any recollection. It is > as if the CPU was defective, but the data was still written to the hard > drive, to be analysed later. They might explain that everything seemed > fragmented, so that although they could see and hear things, the visual > stimuli did not for
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
On Mon, May 09, 2005 at 08:55:00PM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
>
> But it's not all that unlikely that someone in the world, unbeknownst
> to you, has invented a cure; whereas for a universe with your exact
> mind in it to be created purely de novo is astronomically unlikely.
>
That's the wrong way of putting it. With the RSSA (necessary for QTI),
one doesn't get to be ancient by being created "de novo", but by
living a very long life.
The idea is that we must experience increasingly bizarre happenings to
keep us alive - however I don't think this will necessarily be a
descent into hell, or of randomness. Whether eternal life in "heaven"
or "hell" is your experience will depend very much on your own
actions.
Cheers
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Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 20:14, "Hal Finney" a écrit : >> And what do you think of life insurance? Suppose you have young children >> whom you love dearly, for whom you are the sole support, and who will >> suffer greatly if you die without insurance? Do you agree with this ? 1- whenever there is a choice to be made, the universe split (each outcome has a probabilty p). 2- So some outcome are more probable than other. >> Would you suggest that QTI >> means that you should not care about their lives in universe branches >> where you do not survive, that you should act as though those branches >> don't exist? By point 1 and 2, imagine the following : There is 0.5% chance that you go crazy and go killing some friends, and 99.5% that you do not. Now, the split is done, so imagine it splits in 1000 (for convenience :)), in 5 next observer moments on 1000 you go killing some friends, whatever the actual feelings of the 995 others you are, the event happening to these 5 you and people surrounding them is equally real... So why do you care of the fate of your family in the 995 others universe than of the 5 where the things turn bad (not strange, not magic, just bad), which are equally real for the observers living in it ? Quentin Anciaux
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I happen to be a believer in the observer-moment as fundamental, and the only thing one can be sure of from the first person perspective. "I think, therefore I am" is taking it too far in deducing the existence of an observer; "I think, therefore there is a thought" is all that I can be absolutely certain of. Hi Stathis, I also believe that the observer moment is fundamental, but I don't think there is anything wrong with "I think therefore I am" as long as this statement is taken as a definition of "being" rather than as an explanation: Look at it as "I think, this means 'I am.' " I you accept that the observer-moment is fundamental, and nothing else is, then "being" cannot be defined using any physical substrate since, at this point of the argument, physics has not been defined yet. You are left only with a definition of "being:" To be is to think. To paraphrase Erdos, "To be is to do math." ;-) George
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 20:14, "Hal Finney" a écrit : > Yet you have already been unconscious forever, before your birth (if we > pretend/assume that the universe is infinite in both time directions). It can't be forever... I'm conscious now... so it was not "forever". But I know you'll say infinity and all. So the meaning of forever before (me/you) and after (me/you) is not quite the same. > Can you imagine that? Why can it happen in one direction but not > the other? Don't know, I just say I had a lot of difficulties to imagine being unconscious forever. > And what do you think of life insurance? Suppose you have young children > whom you love dearly, for whom you are the sole support, and who will > suffer greatly if you die without insurance? Would you suggest that QTI > means that you should not care about their lives in universe branches > where you do not survive, that you should act as though those branches > don't exist? > > Hal Finney I do not see the other branches, nor do I feel them. So I don't know how it is supposed to be taken in account. And for the other hand, if all the universes exists, and at whatever moments it splits into new branches for each possible outcome, whatever I do, there will be branches where it turns bad (for me, my friends, whatever)... Why put you high measure on universe where all is good for your friend if you've done good in your life (or think about a life insurance) compared to those were you didn't ? Quentin Anciaux
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Quentin Anciaux writes: > but by definition of what being alive means (or being conscious), which is to > experience observer moments, even if the difference of the measure where you > have a long life compared to where you don't survive is enormous, you can > only experience world where you are alive... The way I would say it is that you can only experience worlds where you are conscious. Being alive is not enough. But really, this is a tautology: you can only be conscious in worlds where you are conscious. It sheds exactly zero light on any interesting questions IMO. > And to continue, I find it very > difficult to imagine what could mean being unconscious forever (what you > suggest to be likely). Yet you have already been unconscious forever, before your birth (if we pretend/assume that the universe is infinite in both time directions). Can you imagine that? Why can it happen in one direction but not the other? And what do you think of life insurance? Suppose you have young children whom you love dearly, for whom you are the sole support, and who will suffer greatly if you die without insurance? Would you suggest that QTI means that you should not care about their lives in universe branches where you do not survive, that you should act as though those branches don't exist? Hal Finney
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 19:13, "Hal Finney" a écrit : > And in terms of your question, I would not act as though I expected to > be guaranteed a very long life span, because the measure of that universe > is so low compared to others where I don't survive. > > Hal Finney Hi, but by definition of what being alive means (or being conscious), which is to experience observer moments, even if the difference of the measure where you have a long life compared to where you don't survive is enormous, you can only experience world where you are alive... And to continue, I find it very difficult to imagine what could mean being unconscious forever (what you suggest to be likely). Quentin Anciaux
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis Papaioannou writes: > Hal, > >I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are > >guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment > >concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments where > >we are young and living within a normal lifespan than ones where we are > >at a very advanced age due to miraculous luck. > > Aren't the above two sentences contradictory? If it is guaranteed that > somewhere in the multiverse there will be a million year old Hal > observer-moment, doesn't that mean that you are guaranteed to experience > life as a million year old? I don't think there are any guarantees in life! I don't see a well defined meaning about anything I am guaranteed to experience. I am influenced by Wei Dai's approach to the fundamental problem of what our expectations should be in the multiverse. He focused not on knowledge and belief, but on action. That is, he did not ask what we expect, he asked what we should do. How should we behave? What are the optimal and rational actions to take in any given circumstances? These questions are the domain of a field which, like game theory, is a cross between mathematics, philosophy and economics: decision theory. Classical decision theory is uninformed by the AUP, but it does include similar concepts. You consider that you inhabit one of a virtually infinite number of possible worlds, which in this theory are not real but rather represent your uncertainty about your situtation. For example, in one possible world Bigfoot has sneaked up behind you but you don't know it, and in other worlds he's not there. You then use this world concept to set up a probability distribution, and make your decision based on optimal expected outcome over all possible worlds. Incorporating the multiverse can be done in a couple of ways. I think Wei proposed just to add the entire multiverse as among the possible worlds. Maybe we live in a multiverse, maybe we don't. The hard part is then, supposing that we do, how do we rank the expected outcomes of our actions? Each action affects the multiverse in a complex way, being beneficial in some branches and harmful in others. How do we weight the different branches? Wei proposed to treat that weighting as an arbitrary part of the user's utility function; in effect, making it a matter of taste and personal preference how to weight the multiverse branches. I would aim to get a little more guidance from the theory than that. I would first try to incorporate the measure of the various branches which my actions influence, and pay more attention to the branches with higher measure. Then, I think I would pay more attention to the effects in those branches on observers (or observer-moments) which are relatively similar to me. However, that does not mean I would ignore the effects of my actions on high-measure branches where there are no observers similar to me (i.e. branches where I have died). I might still take measures such as buying life insurance for my children, because I care about their welfare even in branches where I don't exist. Similarly, if I were a philanthropist, I might take care to donate my estate to good causes if I die. These considerations suggest to me an optimal course of action in a multiverse, or even in a world where we are not sure if we live in a single universe or a multiverse, which is arguably the situation we all face. It rejects the simplicity of the RSSA and QTI by recognizing that our actions influence even multiverse branches where we die, and taking into consideration the effects of what we do on such worlds. There is still an element of personal preference in terms of how much we care about observers who are very similar to ourselves vs those who are more different, which gives room for various philosphical views along these lines. And in terms of your question, I would not act as though I expected to be guaranteed a very long life span, because the measure of that universe is so low compared to others where I don't survive. Hal Finney
[Fwd: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality]
aet.radal ssg wrote: Dear Jeanne: Message - From: "Jeanne Houston" To: "Stathis Papaioannou" , [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Tue, 10 May 2005 07:19:01 -0400 I didn't read the article but I am aware of the conceptual basis for this idea. To answer your question, it is possible that altered states, including those caused by mental illness, can allow the brain to pick-up information from elsewhere. However, the differentiation must be made between such elsewhere (or elsewhen) awarenesses and true hallucinations (the same goes for dreams. Some people postulate that some dreams could be awarenesses of other realities but then use lucid dreaming as an example. Right idea, wrong type of dream). Many of the hallucinations common to schizophrenics are based on outside stimuli triggering a preconvieved viewpoint which is then externalized as a hallucination. For example, such a patient may be on his way to the pharmacy to get a prescription filled and see a billboard for an auto body repair shop that features a close-up shot of a man cowering in fear that says "Watch Out! The Morons are Out There!" (a true advertisement). This billboard could stimulate a reaction in the patient based upon the apprehension that the doctor may not know what he's doing and prescribed the wrong medication. This reaction could manifest itself as a merely a thought, "Yeah. And I bet my shrink's a moron too!" or it could extend into the outside world if the patient looks back at the sign. Suddenly the sign could have its own response to this sudden thought that the patient's psychiatrist is a moron and could read something like "Yes! Your shrink's a moron and he's out to get you!" This is based on research done by Janssen Pharmaceutica http://www.npr.org/programs/atc/features/2002/aug/schizophrenia/ in the development of a simulator of the schizophrenic experience. The simulator was created with the input of actual patients to make it as realistic as possible, and I have used it before, as part of my research. In this case, the hallucinations of the schizophrenic are based on internal apprehensions and are not observations of some parallel reality. The tendency should be resisted to simply assume that just because someone is perceiving something that we aren't, that what they're are perceiving is somehow linked to some interdimensional knowledge or higher reality. If one wants to take that tact, then they must also engage in the very real hard work of substantiating exactly what the nature of these perceptions are and if they have any kind of objective basis. To do that takes a considerable amount of work. Otherwise the question goes unanswered and any consideration of what is or isn't going on is simply unbridled speculation. Hope that helps. I'm not one to shy away from what others would perceive to be "unbridled speculation," however there are a few fundamental problems with the idea set forth by Jeanne. First, to the best that I understand, there is no evidence that we will ever be able to access the information of the parallel outcomes (worlds) in question. We can access the processing power of the other worlds, but the laws of physics seem to prevent our pulling information from another "world" into our world given the collapse that happens at the end of a computation (when we get our result from a quantum computer). So the idea seems to be prohibited by the laws of physics. And lets not even get into the proof problem. It's sort of like UFO's. Is it easier to believe that someone is crazy/seeing things/misinterpreting stimuli, or that they really are seeing other worlds/aliens? Spectacular claims require spectacular proof, and I don't see how this idea presents the prospect of any proof. Perhaps, if someone could in a statistically significant way predict future events or the location of hidden items, like remote viewing, could provide evidence, but there would still have to be some way to establish the link between that phenomena and other worlds. Danny
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Dear Jeanne: Message - From: "Jeanne Houston" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Tue, 10 May 2005 07:19:01 -0400 I didn't read the article but I am aware of the conceptual basis for this idea. To answer your question, it is possible that altered states, including those caused by mental illness, can allow the brain to pick-up information from elsewhere. However, the differentiation must be made between such elsewhere (or elsewhen) awarenesses and true hallucinations (the same goes for dreams. Some people postulate that some dreams could be awarenesses of other realities but then use lucid dreaming as an example. Right idea, wrong type of dream). Many of the hallucinations common to schizophrenics are based on outside stimuli triggering a preconvieved viewpoint which is then externalized as a hallucination. For example, such a patient may be on his way to the pharmacy to get a prescription filled and see a billboard for an auto body repair shop that features a close-up shot of a man cowering in fear that says "Watch Out! The Morons are Out There!" (a true advertisement). This billboard could stimulate a reaction in the patient based upon the apprehension that the doctor may not know what he's doing and prescribed the wrong medication. This reaction could manifest itself as a merely a thought, "Yeah. And I bet my shrink's a moron too!" or it could extend into the outside world if the patient looks back at the sign. Suddenly the sign could have its own response to this sudden thought that the patient's psychiatrist is a moron and could read something like "Yes! Your shrink's a moron and he's out to get you!" This is based on research done by Janssen Pharmaceutica http://www.npr.org/programs/atc/features/2002/aug/schizophrenia/ in the development of a simulator of the schizophrenic experience. The simulator was created with the input of actual patients to make it as realistic as possible, and I have used it before, as part of my research. In this case, the hallucinations of the schizophrenic are based on internal apprehensions and are not observations of some parallel reality. The tendency should be resisted to simply assume that just because someone is perceiving something that we aren't, that what they're are perceiving is somehow linked to some interdimensional knowledge or higher reality. If one wants to take that tact, then they must also engage in the very real hard work of substantiating exactly what the nature of these perceptions are and if they have any kind of objective basis. To do that takes a considerable amount of work. Otherwise the question goes unanswered and any consideration of what is or isn't going on is simply unbridled speculation. Hope that helps. > > I once read an article in, I believe, Time Magazine, about the relatively > new field of "neurotheology" which investigates what goes on in the brain > during ecstatic states, etc. One suggestion that intrigued me was that it > may be possible that in such a state, and I believe that schizophrenics were > also mentioned, that the brain is malfunctioning in such a way as to allow > it to perceive states of reality other than that which the normal brain > would perceive. In other words, the "antenna" (brain) is picking-up signals > that are usually beyond the scope of the normal brain. I wondered if anyone > could comment on this, and if there was any reason to even entertain the > thought that perhaps some people have passed through a crack in the division > between our universe or dimension, into perhaps another? I read this > several years ago and wish that I could recall the details of the article, > but I don't have it anymore. > > Jeanne -- ___Sign-up for Ads Free at Mail.com http://www.mail.com/?sr=signup
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
round these issues and I'm just saying that you haven't made your case. > > You might point out that despite the above, science has made great > progress. Actually, I didn't and don't have to. >This is true, but it has taken the cumulative efforts of > millions of people over thousands of years to get to our current > level of knowledge, which in any case is still very far from > complete in any field. Scientific progress of our species a s a > whole is mirrored in the efforts of a psychotic patient who > gradually develops insight into his illness, recognising that there > is a difference between real voices and auditory hallucinations, > and learning to reason through delusional beliefs despite the > visceral conviction that "they really are out to get me". You just made my point for me. There's a difference between hallucination and objective reality. People with mental illness have a problem with objective reality. Whether they are conscious or not is irrelevent because even if they are conscious, they still can't observe and process objective reality accurately. People with temporal perception disorders, etc. are not what we should be basing our concepts of time in physical objective reality, on. If you do, you really aren't interested in discovering anything new about objective reality. You really just want to "hear" yourself talk, because nothing else worthwhile is coming from it. Chatter. Just my observation. > --Stathis Papaioannou> > > From: "aet.radal ssg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> > To: everything-list@eskimo.com> > Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality> > Date: Sat, 07 May 2005 10:44:25 -0500> >> > _> REALESTATE: biggest buy/rent/share listings http://ninemsn.realestate.com.au -- ___Sign-up for Ads Free at Mail.com http://www.mail.com/?sr=signup
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Le 10-mai-05, à 05:55, Hal Finney a écrit : I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments where we are young and living within a normal lifespan than ones where we are at a very advanced age due to miraculous luck. To be honest I prefer that too. Now I'm not sure reality will take into account my preference, unless the Loebian placebo effect I talked about last year is really at the root of everything. But that's remain to be developed. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Le 10-mai-05, à 12:25, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments where we are young and living within a normal lifespan than ones where we are at a very advanced age due to miraculous luck. Aren't the above two sentences contradictory? If it is guaranteed that somewhere in the multiverse there will be a million year old Hal observer-moment, doesn't that mean that you are guaranteed to experience life as a million year old? With some ASSA perhaps, but with the RSSA it makes sense only if those "old Hal OM." have the right relative proportion to the young one. where: SSA self-sampling assumption (by Nick Bolstrom) ASSA idem but conceived as absolute RSSA idem but conceived as relative OM = Observer Moment Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
I once read an article in, I believe, Time Magazine, about the relatively new field of "neurotheology" which investigates what goes on in the brain during ecstatic states, etc. One suggestion that intrigued me was that it may be possible that in such a state, and I believe that schizophrenics were also mentioned, that the brain is malfunctioning in such a way as to allow it to perceive states of reality other than that which the normal brain would perceive. In other words, the "antenna" (brain) is picking-up signals that are usually beyond the scope of the normal brain. I wondered if anyone could comment on this, and if there was any reason to even entertain the thought that perhaps some people have passed through a crack in the division between our universe or dimension, into perhaps another? I read this several years ago and wish that I could recall the details of the article, but I don't have it anymore. Jeanne - Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 11:19 PM Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality > Russell, > > To be fair, I should elaborate on my earlier post about amnesics and > psychotics. If I consider the actual cases I have seen, arguably they do > have *some* sense of the passage of time. Taking the first example, people > with severe Korsakoff Syndrome (due to chronic alcohol abuse) appear to be > completely incapable of laying down new memories. If you enter their room to > perform some uncomfortable medical procedure and they become annoyed with > you, all you have to do is step outside for a moment, then step back inside, > and they are all smiles again, so you can have another go at the procedure, > and repeat this as many times as you want. While you are actually in their > sight, however, they do recognise that you are the same person from moment > to moment, and they do make the connection between the needle you are > sticking into them and the subsequent pain, causing them to become annoyed > at you. So they do have a sense of time, even if only for a few seconds. > > The second example, the disorganised schizophrenic, is somewhat more > complex. There is a continuum from mild to extreme disorganisation, and at > the extreme end, it can be very difficult to get any sense of what the > person is thinking, although it is quite easy to get a sense of what they > are feeling and it would be very difficult to maintain a belief that they > are not actually conscious (you really have to see this for yourself to > understand it). Usually, even the most unwell of these patients give some > indirect indication that they maintain some sense of time. For example, if > you hold out a glass of water, they will reach for it and drink from it, > which suggests that they may have a theory about the future, and how they > might influence it to their advantage. Occasionally, however - and I have to > confess I have not actually tried the experiment - there are patients who > seem incapable of even as simple (one could say near-reflexive) a task as > grabbing a glass of water. With treatment, almost all these people improve, > and it is interesting to ask them what was happening during these periods. > Firstly, it is interesting that they actually have any recollection. It is > as if the CPU was defective, but the data was still written to the hard > drive, to be analysed later. They might explain that everything seemed > fragmented, so that although they could see and hear things, the visual > stimuli did not form recognisable objects and the auditory stimuli did not > form recognisable words or other sounds. Furthermore, the various perceptual > data seemed to run into each other spatially, so that it was not possible to > distinguish background from foreground, significant from insignificant. > Catatonic patients, on the other hand, may (later, when better) describe a > state of total inertia, being stuck in the present moment, unable to move > either physically or mentally, unable to even imagine a possibility of > change from the present state, aware of everything going on around them as a > kind of extended simultaneity. > > --Stathis Papaioannou > > >On Mon, May 09, 2005 at 11:02:18PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > Dear aet.radal ssg, > > > > > > I think you missed my point about the amnesic and psychotic patients, > >which > > > is not that they are clear thinkers, but that they are conscious despite > >a > > > disability which impairs their perception of time. Your post raises an > >... > > > >As I said before, I think this is a valuable contribution, but not > >something I know ho
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Hal, I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments where we are young and living within a normal lifespan than ones where we are at a very advanced age due to miraculous luck. Aren't the above two sentences contradictory? If it is guaranteed that somewhere in the multiverse there will be a million year old Hal observer-moment, doesn't that mean that you are guaranteed to experience life as a million year old? --Stathis Papaioannou _ SEEK: Over 80,000 jobs across all industries at Australia's #1 job site. http://ninemsn.seek.com.au?hotmail
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Norman Samish writes: > If the multiverse is truly infinite in space-time, then all possible > universes must eventually appear in it, including an infinite number with > all 10^80 particles in it identical to those in our universe. Yes, Tegmark calls this the "Level I" concept of a multiverse. It's not so much that the multiverse is truly infinite, it is enough if our own mundane universe that we see around us is spatially infinite, as predicted by inflation theory. See http://it.arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0302131 for a slightly more technical version of Tegmark's Scientific American article on the topic. Or the SciAm cover story, "Infinite Earths in PARALLEL UNIVERSES Really Exist", May 2003. Hal Finney
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
If the multiverse is truly infinite in space-time, then all possible universes must eventually appear in it, including an infinite number with all 10^80 particles in it identical to those in our universe. Norman Samish ~ - Original Message - From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 8:55 PM Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality Jonathan Colvin writes: > That's putting it mildly. I was thinking that it is more likely that a > universe tunnels out of a black hole that "just randomly" happens to > contain > your precise brain state at that moment, and for all of future eternity. > But > the majority of these random universes will be precisely that; random. In > most cases you will then find that your immortal experience is of a purely > random universe, which is likely a good definition of "hell". But it's not all that unlikely that someone in the world, unbeknownst to you, has invented a cure; whereas for a universe with your exact mind in it to be created purely de novo is astronomically unlikely. Look at the number of atoms in your brain, 10^25 or some such, and imagine how many arrangments there are of those atoms that aren't you, compared to the relative few which are you. The odds against that happening by chance are beyond comprehension. Whereas the odds of some lucky accident saving you as you are about to die are more like lottery-winner long, like one in a billion, not astronomically long, like one in a googleplex. Especially if you accept that it is possible in principle for medicine to give us an unlimited healthy lifespan, then all you really need to do is to live in a universe where that medical technology is discovered, and then avoid accidents. Neither one seems all that improbable from the perspective of people living in our circumstances today. It's harder to see how a cave man could look forward to a long life span. I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments where we are young and living within a normal lifespan than ones where we are at a very advanced age due to miraculous luck. Hal Finney
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin writes: > That's putting it mildly. I was thinking that it is more likely that a > universe tunnels out of a black hole that "just randomly" happens to contain > your precise brain state at that moment, and for all of future eternity. But > the majority of these random universes will be precisely that; random. In > most cases you will then find that your immortal experience is of a purely > random universe, which is likely a good definition of "hell". But it's not all that unlikely that someone in the world, unbeknownst to you, has invented a cure; whereas for a universe with your exact mind in it to be created purely de novo is astronomically unlikely. Look at the number of atoms in your brain, 10^25 or some such, and imagine how many arrangments there are of those atoms that aren't you, compared to the relative few which are you. The odds against that happening by chance are beyond comprehension. Whereas the odds of some lucky accident saving you as you are about to die are more like lottery-winner long, like one in a billion, not astronomically long, like one in a googleplex. Especially if you accept that it is possible in principle for medicine to give us an unlimited healthy lifespan, then all you really need to do is to live in a universe where that medical technology is discovered, and then avoid accidents. Neither one seems all that improbable from the perspective of people living in our circumstances today. It's harder to see how a cave man could look forward to a long life span. I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments where we are young and living within a normal lifespan than ones where we are at a very advanced age due to miraculous luck. Hal Finney
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
While it is likely that some version of you will end up in a hellishly random universe as a result of QTI, you probably won't stay there very long, since if your particular brain pattern arose randomly, it will probably become disrupted randomly as well. Failing that, you can always kill yourself, and keep doing this until you arrive at a universe to your liking. --Stathis Papaioannou >>The usual approach is that a system which is algorithmically >>compressible is defined as random. A rule-based universe has a short >>program that determines its evolution, or creates its state. >A random >>universe has no program much smaller than itself which can encode its >>information. >> >>Hal Finney > >Jonathan Colvin replies: >> I think you meant "algorithmically *in*compressible". > >Yes, I did. > >> The relevance was, I was thinking that those universes where >we become >> immortal under MWI are not the conventional rule-based >universes such >> as we appear to live in, but a different class of stochastic random >> ones (which require very unlikely strings of random coincidences to >> instantiate). The majority of such universes, being essentially >> random, are probably not very pleasant places to live. > >You could look at it from the point of view of >observer-moments. Among all observer-moments which remember >your present situation and which also remember very long >lifetimes, which ones have the greatest measure? >It should be those which have the simplest explanations possible. >As time goes on, the explanations will presumably have to be >more and more complex, but it doesn't necessarily have to be >extreme. It could just be, "great scientist invents >immortality in the year 2006". Then, next year, it will be >"great scientist invents immortality in the year 2007", etc. > >Once you're lying on your death bed and each breath could be >your last, it starts to get a little more difficult. Maybe it >will be like those movies where the condemned man is in the >death chamber and they are about to throw the switch, as the >lawyer rushes to the prison with news from the governor of a >last-minute pardon. You'll be taking your last breath, and >someone will rush in with a miraculous cure that was just >discovered, or some such. That's putting it mildly. I was thinking that it is more likely that a universe tunnels out of a black hole that "just randomly" happens to contain your precise brain state at that moment, and for all of future eternity. But the majority of these random universes will be precisely that; random. In most cases you will then find that your immortal experience is of a purely random universe, which is likely a good definition of "hell". Jonathan Colvin _ MSN Messenger v7. Download now: http://messenger.ninemsn.com.au/
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Russell,
To be fair, I should elaborate on my earlier post about amnesics and
psychotics. If I consider the actual cases I have seen, arguably they do
have *some* sense of the passage of time. Taking the first example, people
with severe Korsakoff Syndrome (due to chronic alcohol abuse) appear to be
completely incapable of laying down new memories. If you enter their room to
perform some uncomfortable medical procedure and they become annoyed with
you, all you have to do is step outside for a moment, then step back inside,
and they are all smiles again, so you can have another go at the procedure,
and repeat this as many times as you want. While you are actually in their
sight, however, they do recognise that you are the same person from moment
to moment, and they do make the connection between the needle you are
sticking into them and the subsequent pain, causing them to become annoyed
at you. So they do have a sense of time, even if only for a few seconds.
The second example, the disorganised schizophrenic, is somewhat more
complex. There is a continuum from mild to extreme disorganisation, and at
the extreme end, it can be very difficult to get any sense of what the
person is thinking, although it is quite easy to get a sense of what they
are feeling and it would be very difficult to maintain a belief that they
are not actually conscious (you really have to see this for yourself to
understand it). Usually, even the most unwell of these patients give some
indirect indication that they maintain some sense of time. For example, if
you hold out a glass of water, they will reach for it and drink from it,
which suggests that they may have a theory about the future, and how they
might influence it to their advantage. Occasionally, however - and I have to
confess I have not actually tried the experiment - there are patients who
seem incapable of even as simple (one could say near-reflexive) a task as
grabbing a glass of water. With treatment, almost all these people improve,
and it is interesting to ask them what was happening during these periods.
Firstly, it is interesting that they actually have any recollection. It is
as if the CPU was defective, but the data was still written to the hard
drive, to be analysed later. They might explain that everything seemed
fragmented, so that although they could see and hear things, the visual
stimuli did not form recognisable objects and the auditory stimuli did not
form recognisable words or other sounds. Furthermore, the various perceptual
data seemed to run into each other spatially, so that it was not possible to
distinguish background from foreground, significant from insignificant.
Catatonic patients, on the other hand, may (later, when better) describe a
state of total inertia, being stuck in the present moment, unable to move
either physically or mentally, unable to even imagine a possibility of
change from the present state, aware of everything going on around them as a
kind of extended simultaneity.
--Stathis Papaioannou
On Mon, May 09, 2005 at 11:02:18PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Dear aet.radal ssg,
>
> I think you missed my point about the amnesic and psychotic patients,
which
> is not that they are clear thinkers, but that they are conscious despite
a
> disability which impairs their perception of time. Your post raises an
...
As I said before, I think this is a valuable contribution, but not
something I know how to deal with at this point in time. Presently,
these psychotic patients account for only a fraction of conscious
observers (assuming they are conscious as you say they are). Quantum
Mechanics only requires that most observers have their own time like
domain, not that all of them do. I'm still not convinced that TIME
isn't a necessary property of observerhood, as opposed to a likely
contingent one, but there the debate stagnates, as I'm not an expert
in psychiatry.
I did want to throw one more po thought. Even though standard QM is
based on continuous time, nowhere does TIME require time to be experienced
continuously. It could just as easily be the Cantor set, say. Might not
the time experienced by these psychotic people be a fractal set like
that, or are you saying they have absolutely no sense of time at all?
Cheers
--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics 0425 253119 (")
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australia
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Inte
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>>The usual approach is that a system which is algorithmically >>compressible is defined as random. A rule-based universe has a short >>program that determines its evolution, or creates its state. >A random >>universe has no program much smaller than itself which can encode its >>information. >> >>Hal Finney > >Jonathan Colvin replies: >> I think you meant "algorithmically *in*compressible". > >Yes, I did. > >> The relevance was, I was thinking that those universes where >we become >> immortal under MWI are not the conventional rule-based >universes such >> as we appear to live in, but a different class of stochastic random >> ones (which require very unlikely strings of random coincidences to >> instantiate). The majority of such universes, being essentially >> random, are probably not very pleasant places to live. > >You could look at it from the point of view of >observer-moments. Among all observer-moments which remember >your present situation and which also remember very long >lifetimes, which ones have the greatest measure? >It should be those which have the simplest explanations possible. >As time goes on, the explanations will presumably have to be >more and more complex, but it doesn't necessarily have to be >extreme. It could just be, "great scientist invents >immortality in the year 2006". Then, next year, it will be >"great scientist invents immortality in the year 2007", etc. > >Once you're lying on your death bed and each breath could be >your last, it starts to get a little more difficult. Maybe it >will be like those movies where the condemned man is in the >death chamber and they are about to throw the switch, as the >lawyer rushes to the prison with news from the governor of a >last-minute pardon. You'll be taking your last breath, and >someone will rush in with a miraculous cure that was just >discovered, or some such. That's putting it mildly. I was thinking that it is more likely that a universe tunnels out of a black hole that "just randomly" happens to contain your precise brain state at that moment, and for all of future eternity. But the majority of these random universes will be precisely that; random. In most cases you will then find that your immortal experience is of a purely random universe, which is likely a good definition of "hell". Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>The usual approach is that a system which is algorithmically >compressible is defined as random. A rule-based universe has >a short program that determines its evolution, or creates its >state. A random universe has no program much smaller than >itself which can encode its information. > >Hal Finney Jonathan Colvin replies: > I think you meant "algorithmically *in*compressible". Yes, I did. > The relevance was, I was thinking that those universes where we become > immortal under MWI are not the conventional rule-based universes such as we > appear to live in, but a different class of stochastic random ones (which > require very unlikely strings of random coincidences to instantiate). The > majority of such universes, being essentially random, are probably not very > pleasant places to live. You could look at it from the point of view of observer-moments. Among all observer-moments which remember your present situation and which also remember very long lifetimes, which ones have the greatest measure? It should be those which have the simplest explanations possible. As time goes on, the explanations will presumably have to be more and more complex, but it doesn't necessarily have to be extreme. It could just be, "great scientist invents immortality in the year 2006". Then, next year, it will be "great scientist invents immortality in the year 2007", etc. Once you're lying on your death bed and each breath could be your last, it starts to get a little more difficult. Maybe it will be like those movies where the condemned man is in the death chamber and they are about to throw the switch, as the lawyer rushes to the prison with news from the governor of a last-minute pardon. You'll be taking your last breath, and someone will rush in with a miraculous cure that was just discovered, or some such. Hal Finney
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Did you mean to say a system *not* algorithmically compressible is defined as random? --Stathis Papaioannou Jonathan Colvin writes: > Pondering on this, it raises an interesting question. Can we differentiate > between worlds that are (or appear to be) rule-based, and those that are > purely random? The usual approach is that a system which is algorithmically compressible is defined as random. A rule-based universe has a short program that determines its evolution, or creates its state. A random universe has no program much smaller than itself which can encode its information. Hal Finney _ MSN Messenger v7. Download now: http://messenger.ninemsn.com.au/
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Dear Chris, I happen to be a believer in the observer-moment as fundamental, and the only thing one can be sure of from the first person perspective. "I think, therefore I am" is taking it too far in deducing the existence of an observer; "I think, therefore there is a thought" is all that I can be absolutely certain of. Having said that, however, I don't actually believe that my thoughts are all independent of each other. The simplest and most likely explanation is that my thoughts are generated by my brain in the usual manner. The point is that this is not *logically* necessary, and if we are talking about consciousness persisting over billions or trillions of years, the "usual manner" won't be the most practical. Your second point is something I have often thought about. I am pretty sure that dogs experience observer-moments, but I am not sure that worms do; if they do, then maybe our present day computers are not far off from being conscious, unless there is some non-computational aspect of biological nervous systems that has so far remained obscure. I would class viruses as being on a par with inanimate objects as far as conscious experience is concerned, but who knows, maybe inanimate objects have a rich but utterly alien subjective life from which we are as completely excluded as if we were in separate universes. --Stathis Papaioannou Dear Stathis, This was an interesting post. You're right in that, until quite recently, we've understood the world only as well as we've needed to, in order to survive. But if you believe, as some people on this list do, that instantaneous 'observer moments' are the only fundamentally real objects in the universe, (and that the reasoning, 'I think therefore I am' runs primarily in that direction) then it is the logical struture of our thopughts that is at each moment retrospectively generating a history in which there evolved a creature intelligient enough to think them. From this perspective, there is then a difference when someone becomes too mentally disfunctional to survive by themselves; then their incoherent patterns of thought will have to go one better and retrospectively generate a history in which a successful species evolved, of which they are a defective variant (we might all belong in this category, and keep each other sane..) But really, here we have to be more specific about what constitutes an observer moment, and what does not. Do dogs, worms, viruses have observer moments, or did they just coevolve in the history we might claim to have created by thinking and being? I would suggest that they are as real as we are, and that human consciousness is only distinguished from the animal sort in matters of quantity and capacity, and believe that the sorts of thoughts thatcan be taken as the fundamental objects of the universe are those that appear in the context of an organism successful response to its surrounding environment. This could be seen as a compromise between taking thoughts as fundamental, and a more old-fashioned 'physicalist' perspective, but I would see it more as observer moments being associated with the observer and his/her/its environment. After all, the distinction between these is pretty vague: Does the apple I just ate count as me or my environment? What if I made myself sick? What if I cut off my appendage? Don't worry; I will do neither of these things. Yours Sincerely, Chris Collins. - Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 2:02 PM Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality > Dear aet.radal ssg, > > I think you missed my point about the amnesic and psychotic patients, which > is not that they are clear thinkers, but that they are conscious despite a > disability which impairs their perception of time. Your post raises an > interesting question in that you seem to assume that normally functioning > human minds have a correct model of reality, as opposed to the "broken" > minds of the mentally ill. This is really very far from the truth. Human > brains evolved in a specific environment, often identified as the African > savannah, so the model of the world constructed by the human mind need only > match "reality" to the extent that this promoted survival in that > environment. As a result, we humans are only able to directly perceive and > grasp a tiny, tiny slice of physical reality. Furthermore, although we are > proud of our thinking abilities, the theories about physical reality that > humans have come up with over the centuries have in general been > ridiculously bad. I have spent the last ten years treating patients with > schizophrenia, and I can assure you that however bizarre the delusional > beliefs these peo
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
I don't know why you think QTI experienced worlds will be random. They
will still be law abiding, but the laws will gradually get more
complex, with more "exceptions to the rule" as time goes on.
Cheers
On Mon, May 09, 2005 at 04:09:26PM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
> I think you meant "algorithmically *in*compressible".
>
> The relevance was, I was thinking that those universes where we become
> immortal under MWI are not the conventional rule-based universes such as we
> appear to live in, but a different class of stochastic random ones (which
> require very unlikely strings of random coincidences to instantiate). The
> majority of such universes, being essentially random, are probably not very
> pleasant places to live.
>
> Jonathan Colvin
>
--
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Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
On Mon, May 09, 2005 at 11:02:18PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Dear aet.radal ssg,
>
> I think you missed my point about the amnesic and psychotic patients, which
> is not that they are clear thinkers, but that they are conscious despite a
> disability which impairs their perception of time. Your post raises an ...
As I said before, I think this is a valuable contribution, but not
something I know how to deal with at this point in time. Presently,
these psychotic patients account for only a fraction of conscious
observers (assuming they are conscious as you say they are). Quantum
Mechanics only requires that most observers have their own time like
domain, not that all of them do. I'm still not convinced that TIME
isn't a necessary property of observerhood, as opposed to a likely
contingent one, but there the debate stagnates, as I'm not an expert
in psychiatry.
I did want to throw one more po thought. Even though standard QM is
based on continuous time, nowhere does TIME require time to be experienced
continuously. It could just as easily be the Cantor set, say. Might not
the time experienced by these psychotic people be a fractal set like
that, or are you saying they have absolutely no sense of time at all?
Cheers
--
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Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Dear John,
Thank you for an excellent statement of the
obvious. ;-) All I am trying to do is to make some modicum of sense of this
strange symptom that I have, the ability to perceive myself in the universe.
I expect that my explanations of what consciousness could be should be
applicable to ANY entity, not just humans. I am happy with the
possibility of being wrong.
Stephen
- Original Message -
From:
John M
To: Stephen Paul King ; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 5:29 PM
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of
immortality
Stephen, you seem to have a clear idea
about YOUR meaning of "consciousness". The discussion skewed
pretty much into "human consciousness", which restricts a general idea of it.
I wonder if your "Any model that we propose" refers to models of Ccness,
or the 'bearer' of such? I couldn't agree more with your 'model' view,
no matter in which sense, - we can speak only in terms of ('our', cut,
limited) models. I.e. our 1st person interpretation of whatever we 'get' from
3rd person (or mind-interpreted observation) at all. (What is this
'mind'?)
I volunteered on a 'psych-related' list in
1992 to identify that "thing" (or not 'thing') Ccness generalized from 'human'
down (or up") to the inanimate (stupid word) and ideational items, as:
"acknowledgement of and response
to information"
(where of course information was not 'the
bit', rather some (mentally OR physically) recognized difference). E.g. the
attraction of an anion to a positive charge. Or: a perplexing maxim by G. B.
Shaw .
You ARE asking for too much, the thousands of
psych etc. scientists at the yearly Tucson conferences since the eary 90s
could not agree in an acceptable identification of ccness,
because they needed different meanings to fit their own work. Most
of them thinking about human ccness only.
I like Stathis's doubts about "who is sane and
who not"
> > ...human minds have a correct model
of reality, as opposed to the "broken" minds of the mentally ill. This is
really very far from the truth. < <
because our image of mentally illness is just
'unfitting' our 'sanity'-image. ("Our" reality? as seen from this
universe?)
Cheers
John Mikes
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
I think you meant "algorithmically *in*compressible". The relevance was, I was thinking that those universes where we become immortal under MWI are not the conventional rule-based universes such as we appear to live in, but a different class of stochastic random ones (which require very unlikely strings of random coincidences to instantiate). The majority of such universes, being essentially random, are probably not very pleasant places to live. Jonathan Colvin >Jonathan Colvin writes: >> Pondering on this, it raises an interesting question. Can we >> differentiate between worlds that are (or appear to be) rule-based, >> and those that are purely random? > >The usual approach is that a system which is algorithmically >compressible is defined as random. A rule-based universe has >a short program that determines its evolution, or creates its >state. A random universe has no program much smaller than >itself which can encode its information. > >Hal Finney > >
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Stephen, you seem to have a clear idea
about YOUR meaning of "consciousness". The discussion skewed pretty
much into "human consciousness", which restricts a general idea of it. I wonder
if your "Any model that we propose" refers to models of Ccness, or the
'bearer' of such? I couldn't agree more with your 'model' view, no matter
in which sense, - we can speak only in terms of ('our', cut, limited) models.
I.e. our 1st person interpretation of whatever we 'get' from 3rd person (or
mind-interpreted observation) at all. (What is this 'mind'?)
I volunteered on a 'psych-related' list in 1992
to identify that "thing" (or not 'thing') Ccness generalized from 'human' down
(or up") to the inanimate (stupid word) and ideational items, as:
"acknowledgement of and response
to information"
(where of course information was not 'the bit',
rather some (mentally OR physically) recognized difference). E.g. the attraction
of an anion to a positive charge. Or: a perplexing maxim by G. B. Shaw .
You ARE asking for too much, the thousands of
psych etc. scientists at the yearly Tucson conferences since the eary 90s could
not agree in an acceptable identification of ccness, because they
needed different meanings to fit their own work. Most of them thinking
about human ccness only.
I like Stathis's doubts about "who is sane and
who not"
> > ...human minds have a correct model of
reality, as opposed to the "broken" minds of the mentally ill. This is really
very far from the truth. < <
because our image of mentally illness is just
'unfitting' our 'sanity'-image. ("Our" reality? as seen from this
universe?)
Cheers
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <everything-list@eskimo.com>
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 10:51 AM
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of
immortality
>
Dear Stathis,> > I would like to thank you for
pointing this out, even thought it should > be obvious to anyone that has
any thoughts about consciousness. Any model > that we propose must
consider a very wide range of consciousness, including > the insanities,
and maybe, just maybe, it might make some predictions about > what the
upper and lower bounds on consciousness. Additionally, maybe we > could
require, of a theory of consciousness, some explanation of qualia...>
Maybe I am asking for too much. ;-)> >
Stephen> > > - Original Message - > From:
"Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <everything-list@eskimo.com>> Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 9:02 AM>
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality> > > >
Dear aet.radal ssg,> >> > I think you missed my point about
the amnesic and psychotic patients, > > which> > is not that
they are clear thinkers, but that they are conscious despite a> >
disability which impairs their perception of time. Your post raises an>
> interesting question in that you seem to assume that normally
functioning> > human minds have a correct model of reality, as opposed
to the "broken"> > minds of the mentally ill. This is really very far
from the truth. Human> > brains evolved in a specific environment,
often identified as the African> > savannah, so the model of the world
constructed by the human mind need > > only> > match
"reality" to the extent that this promoted survival in that> >
environment. As a result, we humans are only able to directly perceive
and> > grasp a tiny, tiny slice of physical reality. Furthermore,
although we are> > proud of our thinking abilities, the theories about
physical reality that> > humans have come up with over the centuries
have in general been> > ridiculously bad. I have spent the last ten
years treating patients with> > schizophrenia, and I can assure you
that however bizarre the delusional> > beliefs these people come up
with, there are multiple historical examples > > of> >
apparently "sane" people holding even more bizarre beliefs, and often>
> insisting on pain of death or torture that everyone else agree with
them.> >> > You might point out that despite the above,
science has made great > > progress.> > This is true, but it
has taken the cumulative efforts of millions of > > people>
> over thousands of years to get to our current level of knowledge, which
in> > any case is still very far from complete in any field.
Scientific progress> > of our species as a whole is mirrored in the
efforts of a psychotic > > patient> > who gradually develops
insight into his illness, recognising that there is > > a> >
difference between real voices and auditory hallucinations, and learning
> > to> > reason through delusional beliefs despite the
visceral conviction that > > "they> > really are out to get
me".> >> > --Stathis Papaioannou> >>
>>From: "aet.radal ssg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> >>To: everything-list@eskimo.com> >>Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of
immortality> >>Date: Sat, 07 May 2005 10:44:25 -0500>
>>
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin writes: > Pondering on this, it raises an interesting question. Can we differentiate > between worlds that are (or appear to be) rule-based, and those that are > purely random? The usual approach is that a system which is algorithmically compressible is defined as random. A rule-based universe has a short program that determines its evolution, or creates its state. A random universe has no program much smaller than itself which can encode its information. Hal Finney
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Dear Stathis, I would like to thank you for pointing this out, even thought it should be obvious to anyone that has any thoughts about consciousness. Any model that we propose must consider a very wide range of consciousness, including the insanities, and maybe, just maybe, it might make some predictions about what the upper and lower bounds on consciousness. Additionally, maybe we could require, of a theory of consciousness, some explanation of qualia... Maybe I am asking for too much. ;-) Stephen - Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 9:02 AM Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Dear aet.radal ssg, I think you missed my point about the amnesic and psychotic patients, which is not that they are clear thinkers, but that they are conscious despite a disability which impairs their perception of time. Your post raises an interesting question in that you seem to assume that normally functioning human minds have a correct model of reality, as opposed to the "broken" minds of the mentally ill. This is really very far from the truth. Human brains evolved in a specific environment, often identified as the African savannah, so the model of the world constructed by the human mind need only match "reality" to the extent that this promoted survival in that environment. As a result, we humans are only able to directly perceive and grasp a tiny, tiny slice of physical reality. Furthermore, although we are proud of our thinking abilities, the theories about physical reality that humans have come up with over the centuries have in general been ridiculously bad. I have spent the last ten years treating patients with schizophrenia, and I can assure you that however bizarre the delusional beliefs these people come up with, there are multiple historical examples of apparently "sane" people holding even more bizarre beliefs, and often insisting on pain of death or torture that everyone else agree with them. You might point out that despite the above, science has made great progress. This is true, but it has taken the cumulative efforts of millions of people over thousands of years to get to our current level of knowledge, which in any case is still very far from complete in any field. Scientific progress of our species as a whole is mirrored in the efforts of a psychotic patient who gradually develops insight into his illness, recognising that there is a difference between real voices and auditory hallucinations, and learning to reason through delusional beliefs despite the visceral conviction that "they really are out to get me". --Stathis Papaioannou From: "aet.radal ssg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Sat, 07 May 2005 10:44:25 -0500 _ REALESTATE: biggest buy/rent/share listings http://ninemsn.realestate.com.au
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Dear Stathis, This was an interesting post. You're right in that, until quite recently, we've understood the world only as well as we've needed to, in order to survive. But if you believe, as some people on this list do, that instantaneous 'observer moments' are the only fundamentally real objects in the universe, (and that the reasoning, 'I think therefore I am' runs primarily in that direction) then it is the logical struture of our thopughts that is at each moment retrospectively generating a history in which there evolved a creature intelligient enough to think them. From this perspective, there is then a difference when someone becomes too mentally disfunctional to survive by themselves; then their incoherent patterns of thought will have to go one better and retrospectively generate a history in which a successful species evolved, of which they are a defective variant (we might all belong in this category, and keep each other sane..) But really, here we have to be more specific about what constitutes an observer moment, and what does not. Do dogs, worms, viruses have observer moments, or did they just coevolve in the history we might claim to have created by thinking and being? I would suggest that they are as real as we are, and that human consciousness is only distinguished from the animal sort in matters of quantity and capacity, and believe that the sorts of thoughts thatcan be taken as the fundamental objects of the universe are those that appear in the context of an organism successful response to its surrounding environment. This could be seen as a compromise between taking thoughts as fundamental, and a more old-fashioned 'physicalist' perspective, but I would see it more as observer moments being associated with the observer and his/her/its environment. After all, the distinction between these is pretty vague: Does the apple I just ate count as me or my environment? What if I made myself sick? What if I cut off my appendage? Don't worry; I will do neither of these things. Yours Sincerely, Chris Collins. - Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 2:02 PM Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality > Dear aet.radal ssg, > > I think you missed my point about the amnesic and psychotic patients, which > is not that they are clear thinkers, but that they are conscious despite a > disability which impairs their perception of time. Your post raises an > interesting question in that you seem to assume that normally functioning > human minds have a correct model of reality, as opposed to the "broken" > minds of the mentally ill. This is really very far from the truth. Human > brains evolved in a specific environment, often identified as the African > savannah, so the model of the world constructed by the human mind need only > match "reality" to the extent that this promoted survival in that > environment. As a result, we humans are only able to directly perceive and > grasp a tiny, tiny slice of physical reality. Furthermore, although we are > proud of our thinking abilities, the theories about physical reality that > humans have come up with over the centuries have in general been > ridiculously bad. I have spent the last ten years treating patients with > schizophrenia, and I can assure you that however bizarre the delusional > beliefs these people come up with, there are multiple historical examples of > apparently "sane" people holding even more bizarre beliefs, and often > insisting on pain of death or torture that everyone else agree with them. > > You might point out that despite the above, science has made great progress. > This is true, but it has taken the cumulative efforts of millions of people > over thousands of years to get to our current level of knowledge, which in > any case is still very far from complete in any field. Scientific progress > of our species as a whole is mirrored in the efforts of a psychotic patient > who gradually develops insight into his illness, recognising that there is a > difference between real voices and auditory hallucinations, and learning to > reason through delusional beliefs despite the visceral conviction that "they > really are out to get me". > > --Stathis Papaioannou > > >From: "aet.radal ssg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >To: everything-list@eskimo.com > >Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality > >Date: Sat, 07 May 2005 10:44:25 -0500 > > > > _ > REALESTATE: biggest buy/rent/share listings > http://ninemsn.realestate.com.au >
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Dear aet.radal ssg, I think you missed my point about the amnesic and psychotic patients, which is not that they are clear thinkers, but that they are conscious despite a disability which impairs their perception of time. Your post raises an interesting question in that you seem to assume that normally functioning human minds have a correct model of reality, as opposed to the "broken" minds of the mentally ill. This is really very far from the truth. Human brains evolved in a specific environment, often identified as the African savannah, so the model of the world constructed by the human mind need only match "reality" to the extent that this promoted survival in that environment. As a result, we humans are only able to directly perceive and grasp a tiny, tiny slice of physical reality. Furthermore, although we are proud of our thinking abilities, the theories about physical reality that humans have come up with over the centuries have in general been ridiculously bad. I have spent the last ten years treating patients with schizophrenia, and I can assure you that however bizarre the delusional beliefs these people come up with, there are multiple historical examples of apparently "sane" people holding even more bizarre beliefs, and often insisting on pain of death or torture that everyone else agree with them. You might point out that despite the above, science has made great progress. This is true, but it has taken the cumulative efforts of millions of people over thousands of years to get to our current level of knowledge, which in any case is still very far from complete in any field. Scientific progress of our species as a whole is mirrored in the efforts of a psychotic patient who gradually develops insight into his illness, recognising that there is a difference between real voices and auditory hallucinations, and learning to reason through delusional beliefs despite the visceral conviction that "they really are out to get me". --Stathis Papaioannou From: "aet.radal ssg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Sat, 07 May 2005 10:44:25 -0500 _ REALESTATE: biggest buy/rent/share listings http://ninemsn.realestate.com.au --- Begin Message --- - Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Wed, 04 May 2005 22:40:46 +1000 > snip<> I don't see how you could get anywhere if you disregard the > relationship between observer moments. It is this relationship > which allows grouping of different observer moments to give the > effect of a continuous stream of consciousness. The human brain is > a machine which produces just such a sequence of observer moments, > which bear a temporal relationship with each other consistent with > your TIME postulate. But I would still say that these related > observer moments are independent of each other in that they are not > necessarily physically or causally connected. I base this on real > life experience (the fact that I feel I am the same person as I wa! s > 10 years ago even though I am now made up of different atoms, in an > only approximately similar configuration, giving rise to only > approximately similar memories and other mental properties), I would question whether you really "feel" that you are the same person you were 10 years ago. 10 years ago you were 10 years younger. Do you "feel" like you are that age now? 10 years ago there were things that you had no knowledge of, that you do now. Just as you are made up of different atoms, etc now, you also have different experiences, and expanded knowledge base, etc. In other words, you are not the same person and you really don't "feel" like you're the same person. However, you are the sentient human entity that was born however many years ago and have accumulated the sum total of knowledge, experience, etc, that you have so far. That said, the observer moments that you have are connected because they're your observer moments and are compared against your base of past experience, etc. They are casually connected if they are moments that are observed in the first place. You're at bat in a ball game and the pitcher throws the ball and you swing and miss and th! e ball hits you. Each moment in that sequence is related casually and temporally with the other. The moments can be recalled separately but there is still a casual link. >and on > thought experiments where continuity of identity persists despite > disruption of the physical and causal link between the earlier and > the later set of observer moments (teleportation etc.). We don't have teleportation yet, especially
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Picking up a thread from a little while ago: >>Jonathan Colvin: That's a good question. I can think of a chess position that is >>a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex it is far >>from obvious what is allowed and what is forbidden. > >Jesse Mazer: So what if some chess position is illegal? They are only >illegal according to the rules of chess, but the point of the >"all logically possible worlds exist" idea is not just that >all possible worlds consistent with a given set of rules (such >as our universe's laws of physics) exist, but that all >possible worlds consistent with all logically possible *rules* >exist. So the only configurations that would be forbidden >would be logically impossible ones like "square A4 both does >and does not contain a pawn". Pondering on this, it raises an interesting question. Can we differentiate between worlds that are (or appear to be) rule-based, and those that are purely random? I think it is suggested that any non-contradictory universe (or world-history) has a finite chance of appearing by chance (randomly tunneling out of a black hole for instance). But can we call a purely random universe "rule based"? What is the rule? Randomness is non rule-based by definition, so the idea of a rule-based random universe seems a contradiction. Jonathan Colvin
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
- Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Wed, 04 May 2005 22:40:46 +1000 > snip<> I don't see how you could get anywhere if you disregard the > relationship between observer moments. It is this relationship > which allows grouping of different observer moments to give the > effect of a continuous stream of consciousness. The human brain is > a machine which produces just such a sequence of observer moments, > which bear a temporal relationship with each other consistent with > your TIME postulate. But I would still say that these related > observer moments are independent of each other in that they are not > necessarily physically or causally connected. I base this on real > life experience (the fact that I feel I am the same person as I was > 10 years ago even though I am now made up of different atoms, in an > only approximately similar configuration, giving rise to only > approximately similar memories and other mental properties),
I would question whether you really "feel" that you are the same person you were 10 years ago. 10 years ago you were 10 years younger. Do you "feel" like you are that age now? 10 years ago there were things that you had no knowledge of, that you do now. Just as you are made up of different atoms, etc now, you also have different experiences, and expanded knowledge base, etc. In other words, you are not the same person and you really don't "feel" like you're the same person. However, you are the sentient human entity that was born however many years ago and have accumulated the sum total of knowledge, experience, etc, that you have so far. That said, the observer moments that you have are connected because they're your observer moments and are compared against your base of past experience, etc. They are casually connected if they are moments that are observed in the first place. You're at bat in a ball game and the pitcher throws the ball and you swing and miss and the ball hits you. Each moment in that sequence is related casually and temporally with the other. The moments can be recalled separately but there is still a casual link.
>and on > thought experiments where continuity of identity persists despite > disruption of the physical and causal link between the earlier and > the later set of observer moments (teleportation etc.).
We don't have teleportation yet, especially the demat/remat type (which IMHO is impossible), so I don't see how invoking that is reasonable. Taking a chance to interpret your intent otherwise, I would say that disruption of so-called physical and casual links can happen anytime consciousness is lost, ie sleep, blow to the head, anesthesia, etc. It doesn't support your argument about observer moments being separate in any case.
> > Another question: what are the implications for the TIME postulate > raised by certain mental illnesses, such as cerebral lesions > leading to total loss of short term memory, so that each observer > moment does indeed seem to be unrelated to the previous ones from > the patient's point of view?
The implication is obvious: the "machine" is broken. Therefore the conclusions based on the information that it gathers and processes is defective.
>Or, in psychotic illnesses the patient > can display what is known as "formal thought disorder", which in > the most extreme cases can present as total fragmentation of all > cognitive processes, so that the patient speaks gibberish ("word > salad" is actually the technical term), cannot reason at all, > appears unable to learn from the past or anticipate the future, and > reacts to internal stimuli which seem to vary randomly from moment > to moment. In both these cases, the normal subjective sense of time > is severely disrupted, but the patient is still fully conscious, > and often bewildered and distressed.
Exactly. Broken. No more capable of accurate determination of what is casual, temporal or anything else than a computer is capable of accurate functioning after its been damaged by a virus or some other disruptive event. I had a pocket calculator get wet once and all I could get out of it when I attempted calculations were wrong numbers and sometimes abstract partial digital displays. I no more considered what I was getting from the calculator as valid than I do the perceptions of a patient with "formal thought disorder". The point is their perceptions are wrong, not just different, they're inaccurate and can be demonstrated to be so. It's not good science to base ideas of temporal reality, and other related issues, on someone who's mentally deficient.
> > --Stathis Papaioannou > > _ > REALESTATE: biggest buy/rent/share listings http://ninemsn.realestate.com.au
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Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
On 4 May 2005 George Levy wrote: I believe that according to some or most participants in this list, transitions between observer moments is representing "Time." I have also been talking about observer moments in the past but I have always skirted around the issue of defining them. The concept of observer moment is not clear. For example, you could compare each observer moment to the node of a graph and the transitions from one observer moment to the links of the graph. However, it is well known that a graph can be transformed by changing each node into a polygon. Each link then becomes a node. In this new format, you could view "Time" as being represented by the nodes. We are left with two representations of consciousness: the first is a feeling of becoming (the first representation in which the links represent time) and the second is a feeling of being (the second representation in which the nodes represent time). Ultimately observer-moments are the stuff that makes up the plenitude. They are more fundamental than any physical object and more basic than time and space. If we are to assume some fundamental entity, I think that observer-moments qualify. Descartes came up with "I think, therefore I am" when he asked himself if there was anything in the world that was safe from extreme scepticism. Modest though his conclusion sounds, it can be argued that he went too far in assuming that a thought implies a thinker. If he had stopped at "I think", then that would really have been the one thing that was beyond all doubt: the observer-moment. --Stathis Papaioannou _ MSN Messenger v7. Download now: http://messenger.ninemsn.com.au/
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
I believe that according to some or most participants in this list, transitions between observer moments is representing "Time." I have also been talking about observer moments in the past but I have always skirted around the issue of defining them. The concept of observer moment is not clear. For example, you could compare each observer moment to the node of a graph and the transitions from one observer moment to the links of the graph. However, it is well known that a graph can be transformed by changing each node into a polygon. Each link then becomes a node. In this new format, you could view "Time" as being represented by the nodes. We are left with two representations of consciousness: the first is a feeling of becoming (the first representation in which the links represent time) and the second is a feeling of being (the second representation in which the nodes represent time). Ultimately observer-moments are the stuff that makes up the plenitude. They are more fundamental than any physical object and more basic than time and space. If we are to assume some fundamental entity, I think that observer-moments qualify. George
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
On Wed, May 04, 2005 at 10:40:46PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> I don't see how you could get anywhere if you disregard the relationship
> between observer moments. It is this relationship which allows grouping of
> different observer moments to give the effect of a continuous stream of
> consciousness. The human brain is a machine which produces just such a
> sequence of observer moments, which bear a temporal relationship with each
> other consistent with your TIME postulate. But I would still say that these
> related observer moments are independent of each other in that they are not
> necessarily physically or causally connected. I base this on real life
> experience (the fact that I feel I am the same person as I was 10 years ago
> even though I am now made up of different atoms, in an only approximately
> similar configuration, giving rise to only approximately similar memories
> and other mental properties), and on thought experiments where continuity
> of identity persists despite disruption of the physical and causal link
> between the earlier and the later set of observer moments (teleportation
> etc.).
>
Causality is very much a 1st person emergent phenomenon, governed as
it were by conditional probabilities that evolve according to the
Schroedinger equation. The latter equation is a consequence of 1st
person emergent concepts, such as TIME.
> Another question: what are the implications for the TIME postulate raised
> by certain mental illnesses, such as cerebral lesions leading to total loss
> of short term memory, so that each observer moment does indeed seem to be
> unrelated to the previous ones from the patient's point of view? Or, in
> psychotic illnesses the patient can display what is known as "formal
> thought disorder", which in the most extreme cases can present as total
> fragmentation of all cognitive processes, so that the patient speaks
> gibberish ("word salad" is actually the technical term), cannot reason at
> all, appears unable to learn from the past or anticipate the future, and
> reacts to internal stimuli which seem to vary randomly from moment to
> moment. In both these cases, the normal subjective sense of time is
> severely disrupted, but the patient is still fully conscious, and often
> bewildered and distressed.
>
These cases are very interesting to examine. The difficulty would be in
establishing whether a sufficiently mentally ill person is in fact
conscious. Since consciousness is a 1st person phenomenon, we only
infer consciousness in others by means of a mental model of the mind
based on our own consciousness. When the other individual departs too
much from our mental model, we would be tempted to discount the other
person as being conscious. Certainly, I would regard a reasonably
ordered version of TIME as a prerequisite for consciousness, but that
includes things like Cantor sets just as much as more conventional
notions of continuous time.
Cheers
> --Stathis Papaioannou
>
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Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
I would add another point with regard to observer-moments and continuity: probably there is no unique "next" or "previous" relationship among observer-moments. The case of non-unique "next" observer-moments is uncontroversial, as it relates to the universe splitting predicted by the MWI or the analogous effect in more general multiverse theories. Non-unique "previous" observer-moments can probably happen as well due to the finite precision of memory. Any time information is forgotten we would have mental states merge. This requires a general multiverse theory, or at least a model of mental states that span MWI branches; the conventional MWI does not merge branches which have diverged through irreversible measurements. In this view, then, we can chain observer-moments together to form observer-paths, or more simply, observers. But the chains are non-unique; obervers can intersect (share observer-moments and then diverge), or even braid together in interesting ways. That means that there is no unique sense in which you are a particular observer, at any moment; rather, you can be thought of as any of the observers who share your current observer-moment. Hal Finney
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
On 4 May 2005 Russell Standish wrote:
On this list, we seem to have two fairly clear camps: those who
identify observer moments as the fundamental concept, and those who
regard relationships between observer moments with equal ontological
status.
With my TIME postulate, I say that a conscious observer necessarily
experiences a sequence of related observer moments (or even a
continuum of them). To argue that observer moments are independent of
each other is to argue the negation of TIME. With TIME, the measure of
each observer moment is relative to the predecessor state, or the RSSA
is the appropriate principle to use. With not-TIME, each observer
moment has an absolute measure, the ASSA.
On this postulate (which admittedly still fails rigourous statement,
and is not as intuitive as one would like axioms to be), hinges the
whole QTI debate, and many other things besides. With TIME, one has
the RSSA and the possibility of QTI. With not-TIME, one has the
ASSA,and Jacques Mallah's doomsday argument against QTI is valid. See
the great "RSSA vs ASSA debate" on the everything list a few years ago.
Now I claim that TIME is implied by computationalism. Time is needed
for machines to pass from one state to another, ie to actually compute
something. Bruno apparently disagrees, but I haven't heard his
disagreement yet.
I don't see how you could get anywhere if you disregard the relationship
between observer moments. It is this relationship which allows grouping of
different observer moments to give the effect of a continuous stream of
consciousness. The human brain is a machine which produces just such a
sequence of observer moments, which bear a temporal relationship with each
other consistent with your TIME postulate. But I would still say that these
related observer moments are independent of each other in that they are not
necessarily physically or causally connected. I base this on real life
experience (the fact that I feel I am the same person as I was 10 years ago
even though I am now made up of different atoms, in an only approximately
similar configuration, giving rise to only approximately similar memories
and other mental properties), and on thought experiments where continuity of
identity persists despite disruption of the physical and causal link between
the earlier and the later set of observer moments (teleportation etc.).
Another question: what are the implications for the TIME postulate raised by
certain mental illnesses, such as cerebral lesions leading to total loss of
short term memory, so that each observer moment does indeed seem to be
unrelated to the previous ones from the patient's point of view? Or, in
psychotic illnesses the patient can display what is known as "formal thought
disorder", which in the most extreme cases can present as total
fragmentation of all cognitive processes, so that the patient speaks
gibberish ("word salad" is actually the technical term), cannot reason at
all, appears unable to learn from the past or anticipate the future, and
reacts to internal stimuli which seem to vary randomly from moment to
moment. In both these cases, the normal subjective sense of time is severely
disrupted, but the patient is still fully conscious, and often bewildered
and distressed.
--Stathis Papaioannou
_
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Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Reading your responses here, I don't think we have much to disagree
on. Like you, I don't need a concrete universe, with concrete time
etc. It was largely your thesis that convinced me of that. Perhaps you
confuse me with Schmidhuber too much !
I wouldn't say that time is illusionary. Illusionary means that
something either not real, or is not what it seems.
I'd prefer to say that time (psychological) is an emergent property of
the 1st person description. (Emergent wrt the 3rd person). If you want
to know what I mean by emergence, please read my paper "On complexity
and emergence" - its fairly short.
By way of analogy, I remember from high school physics that
centrifugal force was called "imaginary". At the time I thought this
was bizarre - the force is real enough, its really a question of
reference frames. In the rotating reference frame, centrifugal force
is real, balancing centripetal force to make the orbiting body
motionless. In the non-rotating reference frame the centripetal force
causes the body to orbit (constant acceleration). Emergence has
something to do with reference frames...
Of course psychological time differs from coordinate time, which is a
3rd person concept, and quite possibly emergent as well (wrt a deeper
description of reality)
The correlation of psychological and coordinate time is interesting,
and I don't feel I understand it fully, but is probably not worth
delving into in this email.
Cheers
On Wed, May 04, 2005 at 09:14:13AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 04-mai-05, ? 01:53, Russell Standish a ?crit :
>
> >On this list, we seem to have two fairly clear camps: those who
> >identify observer moments as the fundamental concept, and those who
> >regard relationships between observer moments with equal ontological
> >status.
>
> OK. As you know I take the relationship into account.
>
>
> >
> >With my TIME postulate, I say that a conscious observer necessarily
> >experiences a sequence of related observer moments (or even a
> >continuum of them).
>
> With my COMP postulate I say the same. The purely mathematically state
> transition function plays the role of your TIME. We do experience a
> continuum of observer moments simultaneously (provably with comp) but
> just because we are related to a continuum of execution in the
> "mathematical" execution of the UD.
>
>
> >To argue that observer moments are independent of
> >each other is to argue the negation of TIME. With TIME, the measure of
> >each observer moment is relative to the predecessor state, or the RSSA
> >is the appropriate principle to use. With not-TIME, each observer
> >moment has an absolute measure, the ASSA.
>
> OK. You know I "belong" to the RSSA.
>
> >
> >On this postulate (which admittedly still fails rigourous statement,
> >and is not as intuitive as one would like axioms to be), hinges the
> >whole QTI debate, and many other things besides. With TIME, one has
> >the RSSA and the possibility of QTI. With not-TIME, one has the
> >ASSA,and Jacques Mallah's doomsday argument against QTI is valid. See
> >the great "RSSA vs ASSA debate" on the everything list a few years
> >ago.
> >
> >Now I claim that TIME is implied by computationalism.
>
> The "illusion" of time (and even of different sort of time like
> 1-person subjective duration to local 3-person parameter-time) is
> implied by comp.
>
> >Time is needed
> >for machines to pass from one state to another, ie to actually compute
> >something.
>
> I guess our divergence relies on the word "actually". If you need such
> a "concrete time" then you need even a "universe". Such actuality is an
> indexical. The only time I need is contained in arithmetical truth, in
> which I can embed all the block-space of all computational histories.
>
>
> >Bruno apparently disagrees, but I haven't heard his
> >disagreement yet.
>
> I am not sure I understand your TIME. Is it physical or mathematical?
>
> Cheers,
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Le 04-mai-05, à 01:53, Russell Standish a écrit : On this list, we seem to have two fairly clear camps: those who identify observer moments as the fundamental concept, and those who regard relationships between observer moments with equal ontological status. OK. As you know I take the relationship into account. With my TIME postulate, I say that a conscious observer necessarily experiences a sequence of related observer moments (or even a continuum of them). With my COMP postulate I say the same. The purely mathematically state transition function plays the role of your TIME. We do experience a continuum of observer moments simultaneously (provably with comp) but just because we are related to a continuum of execution in the "mathematical" execution of the UD. To argue that observer moments are independent of each other is to argue the negation of TIME. With TIME, the measure of each observer moment is relative to the predecessor state, or the RSSA is the appropriate principle to use. With not-TIME, each observer moment has an absolute measure, the ASSA. OK. You know I "belong" to the RSSA. On this postulate (which admittedly still fails rigourous statement, and is not as intuitive as one would like axioms to be), hinges the whole QTI debate, and many other things besides. With TIME, one has the RSSA and the possibility of QTI. With not-TIME, one has the ASSA,and Jacques Mallah's doomsday argument against QTI is valid. See the great "RSSA vs ASSA debate" on the everything list a few years ago. Now I claim that TIME is implied by computationalism. The "illusion" of time (and even of different sort of time like 1-person subjective duration to local 3-person parameter-time) is implied by comp. Time is needed for machines to pass from one state to another, ie to actually compute something. I guess our divergence relies on the word "actually". If you need such a "concrete time" then you need even a "universe". Such actuality is an indexical. The only time I need is contained in arithmetical truth, in which I can embed all the block-space of all computational histories. Bruno apparently disagrees, but I haven't heard his disagreement yet. I am not sure I understand your TIME. Is it physical or mathematical? Cheers, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
On this list, we seem to have two fairly clear camps: those who identify observer moments as the fundamental concept, and those who regard relationships between observer moments with equal ontological status. With my TIME postulate, I say that a conscious observer necessarily experiences a sequence of related observer moments (or even a continuum of them). To argue that observer moments are independent of each other is to argue the negation of TIME. With TIME, the measure of each observer moment is relative to the predecessor state, or the RSSA is the appropriate principle to use. With not-TIME, each observer moment has an absolute measure, the ASSA. On this postulate (which admittedly still fails rigourous statement, and is not as intuitive as one would like axioms to be), hinges the whole QTI debate, and many other things besides. With TIME, one has the RSSA and the possibility of QTI. With not-TIME, one has the ASSA,and Jacques Mallah's doomsday argument against QTI is valid. See the great "RSSA vs ASSA debate" on the everything list a few years ago. Now I claim that TIME is implied by computationalism. Time is needed for machines to pass from one state to another, ie to actually compute something. Bruno apparently disagrees, but I haven't heard his disagreement yet. Cheers On Tue, May 03, 2005 at 11:47:30PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > ...and despite reading the last paragraph several times slowly, I'm afraid > I don't understand it. Are you saying there may never be a "next moment" at > the point where you are facing near-certain death? It seems to me that all > that is required is an observer moment in which (a) you believe that you > are you, however this may be defined (it's problematic even in "normal" > life what constitutes continuity of identity), and (b) you remember facing > the said episode of near-certain death (ncd), and it will seem to you that > you have miraculously escaped, even if there is no actual physical > connection between the pre-ncd and the post-ncd observer moment. Or, > another way to escape is as you have suggested in a more recent post, that > there is an observer moment somewhere in the multiverse in which the ncd > episode has been somehow deleted from your memory. Perhaps the latter is > more likely, in which case you can look forward to never, or extremely > rarely, facing ncd in your life. > > It all gets very muddled. If we try to ruthlessly dispense with every > derivative, ill-defined, superfluous concept and assumption in an effort to > simplify the discussion, the one thing we are left with is the individual > observer-moments. We then try to sort these observer-moments into sets > which constitute lives, identities, birth, death, amnesia, mind > duplication, mind melding, multiple world branchings, and essentially every > possible variation on these and other themes. No wonder it's confusing! And > who is to judge where a particular individual's identity/life/body/memory > begins and ends when even the most detailed, passed by committee of > philosophers set of rules fails, as it inevitably will? > > The radical solution is to accept that only the observer-moments are real, > and how we sort them then is seen for what it is: essentially arbitrary, a > matter of convention. You can dismiss the question of immortality, quantum > or otherwise, by observing that the only non-problematic definition of an > individual is identification with a single observer-moment, so that no > individual can ever "really" live for longer than a moment. Certainly, this > goes against intuition, because I feel that I was alive a few minutes ago > as well as ten years ago, but *of course* I feel that; this is simply > reporting on my current thought processes, like saying I feel hungry or > tired, and beyond this cannot be taken as a falsifiable statement about the > state of affairs in the real world unless recourse is taken to some > arbitrary definition of personal identity, such as would satisfy a court, > for example. > > Let me put it a different way. Situation (a) life as usual: I die every > moment and a peson is reborn every moment complete with (most) memories and > other attributes of the individual who has just died. Situation (b) I am > killed instantly, painlessly, with an axe every moment, and a person is > reconstituted the next moment complete with (most) memories and other > attributes of the individual who has just died, such that he experiences no > discontinuity. Aside from the blood and mess in (b), is there a difference? > Should I worry more about (b) than (a)? This is of course a commonplace > thought experiment on this list, but I draw from it a slightly different > conclusion: we all die all the time; death doesn't really matter, otherwise > we should all be in a constant panic. > > --Stathis Papaioannou > > _ > Express yourself instan
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
2 weeks ago Saibal Mitra wrote: I don't think that the MW immortality is correct at all! In a certain sense we are immortal, because the enseble of all possible worlds is a fixed static entity. So, you ''always'' find yourselve alive in one state or another. However, you won't experience youself evolving in the infinite far future. If you encounter a ''branching'' in which one of the possibilities is death, that branch cannot be said to be nonexistent relative to you. Quantum mechanics doesn't imply that you can never become unconscious, otherwise you could never fall asleep! Of course, you can never experience being unconscious. So, what to do with the branch leading to (almost) certain death? The more information your brain contains, the smaller the set of branches is in which you are alive (and consistent with your experiences stored in your brain). The set of all branches in which you could be alive doesn't contain any information at all. Since death involves complete memory loss, the branch leading to death should be replaced by the complete set of all possibilities. ...and despite reading the last paragraph several times slowly, I'm afraid I don't understand it. Are you saying there may never be a "next moment" at the point where you are facing near-certain death? It seems to me that all that is required is an observer moment in which (a) you believe that you are you, however this may be defined (it's problematic even in "normal" life what constitutes continuity of identity), and (b) you remember facing the said episode of near-certain death (ncd), and it will seem to you that you have miraculously escaped, even if there is no actual physical connection between the pre-ncd and the post-ncd observer moment. Or, another way to escape is as you have suggested in a more recent post, that there is an observer moment somewhere in the multiverse in which the ncd episode has been somehow deleted from your memory. Perhaps the latter is more likely, in which case you can look forward to never, or extremely rarely, facing ncd in your life. It all gets very muddled. If we try to ruthlessly dispense with every derivative, ill-defined, superfluous concept and assumption in an effort to simplify the discussion, the one thing we are left with is the individual observer-moments. We then try to sort these observer-moments into sets which constitute lives, identities, birth, death, amnesia, mind duplication, mind melding, multiple world branchings, and essentially every possible variation on these and other themes. No wonder it's confusing! And who is to judge where a particular individual's identity/life/body/memory begins and ends when even the most detailed, passed by committee of philosophers set of rules fails, as it inevitably will? The radical solution is to accept that only the observer-moments are real, and how we sort them then is seen for what it is: essentially arbitrary, a matter of convention. You can dismiss the question of immortality, quantum or otherwise, by observing that the only non-problematic definition of an individual is identification with a single observer-moment, so that no individual can ever "really" live for longer than a moment. Certainly, this goes against intuition, because I feel that I was alive a few minutes ago as well as ten years ago, but *of course* I feel that; this is simply reporting on my current thought processes, like saying I feel hungry or tired, and beyond this cannot be taken as a falsifiable statement about the state of affairs in the real world unless recourse is taken to some arbitrary definition of personal identity, such as would satisfy a court, for example. Let me put it a different way. Situation (a) life as usual: I die every moment and a peson is reborn every moment complete with (most) memories and other attributes of the individual who has just died. Situation (b) I am killed instantly, painlessly, with an axe every moment, and a person is reconstituted the next moment complete with (most) memories and other attributes of the individual who has just died, such that he experiences no discontinuity. Aside from the blood and mess in (b), is there a difference? Should I worry more about (b) than (a)? This is of course a commonplace thought experiment on this list, but I draw from it a slightly different conclusion: we all die all the time; death doesn't really matter, otherwise we should all be in a constant panic. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/
RE: Many worlds theory of immortality
Saibal, Does your conclusion about conditional probability also apply to complex-valued probabilities a la Youssef? http://physics.bu.edu/~youssef/quantum/quantum_refs.html http://www.goertzel.org/papers/ChaoQM.htm -- Ben Goertzel -Original Message-From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2005 4:20 AMTo: Saibal MitraCc: everything-list@eskimo.comSubject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortalityLe 16-avr.-05, à 02:45, Saibal Mitra a écrit : Both the suicide and copying thought experiments have convinced me that thenotion of a conditional probability is fundamentally flawed. It can bedefined under ''normal'' circumstances but it will break down precisely whenconsidering copying or suicide.This is a quite remarkable remark. I can related it to the COMBINATORS thread.In a nutshell: in the *empirical* FOREST there are no kestrels (no eliminators at all),nor Mockingbird, warblers or any duplicators. Quantum information behaveslike incompressible fluid. Universes differentiate, they never multiplies. Deutsch is right on that point. I use Hardegree (ref in my thesis(*)) He did show thatquantum logic can be seen as a conditional probability logic. We will come back on this (it's necessarily a little bit technical). I am finishing atechnical paper on that. The COMBINATORS can help to simplify considerablythe mathematical conjectures of my thesis.Bruno(*) Hardegree, G. M. (1976). The Conditional in Quantum Logic. In Suppes, P., editor, Logic and Probability in Quantum Mechanics, volume 78 of Synthese Library, pages 55-72. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Le 16-avr.-05, à 02:45, Saibal Mitra a écrit : Both the suicide and copying thought experiments have convinced me that the notion of a conditional probability is fundamentally flawed. It can be defined under ''normal'' circumstances but it will break down precisely when considering copying or suicide. This is a quite remarkable remark. I can related it to the COMBINATORS thread. In a nutshell: in the *empirical* FOREST there are no kestrels (no eliminators at all), nor Mockingbird, warblers or any duplicators. Quantum information behaves like incompressible fluid. Universes differentiate, they never multiplies. Deutsch is right on that point. I use Hardegree (ref in my thesis(*)) He did show that quantum logic can be seen as a conditional probability logic. We will come back on this (it's necessarily a little bit technical). I am finishing a technical paper on that. The COMBINATORS can help to simplify considerably the mathematical conjectures of my thesis. Bruno (*) Hardegree, G. M. (1976). The Conditional in Quantum Logic. In Suppes, P., editor, Logic and Probability in Quantum Mechanics, volume 78 of Synthese Library, pages 55-72. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: many worlds theory of immortality: May only be the Anthropic Principle
Dear Lee, Interleaving. - Original Message - From: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2005 11:00 PM Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality: May only be the Anthropic Principle Stephen writes you seem to be making a case of the Anthropic Principle, but I am not sure if this is your intension. (I am ignoring my own allergy to the idea that 1st person aspects can be faithfully represented by Turing algorithms.) Well, I myself had no clue that these ideas could be connected to the Anthropic Principle. [SPK] ;-) You wrote "...the vast winnowing of branches that people find themselves in..." Isn't this exactly what we would expect if we assume that any slice of the Multiverse that an observer finds itself in will be restricted to necessarily allowing for some measure of "being alive" such that a meaningful notion of "observation" can obtain? [Are we inadvertently assuming some kind of "outside of the multiverse" point of view to define this???] [LC] Could you possibly expand on this notion? Maybe with shorter sentences? :-) As for me, trying to keep the ideas simple, I often read in literature how some character is surprised to find himself alive. There have been parallels (perhaps weak ones) in my own life where I am surprised to find myself still employed. [SPK] I will try, but as often is the case these ideas are not easily explained in small sound byte size morsels, especially by someone like myself that is dislexic. ;-) There are, at least, two seperate issues here: the multiplicity of relative states of an observer and the notion of continuity of the 1st person aspect (subjective experience), i.e., that for any given notion of an observer and the possible choices that they could make of that causally impact upon them there exists one universe within which that observer could find itself. The former is easily seen to follow the notion that any universe that an observer finds itself "in" will have conditions that, at least, allow for the existence of that observer. This, for example, would exclude universes that do not have some form of gravity that would give rise to stars, planets, etc. The latter notion is not very obvious and as Bruno has pointed out we have strong reasons to believe that the 1st person aspect is not reducible to some 3rd person aspect. As an aside, I do believe that the converse is the case: any 3rd person aspect can be constructed from 1st person aspects. Another way of putting the second notion out there is to refere to the rubric, whose origin escapes me, "I am what I remember myself to be". [LC] It hasn't occurred to me that this warrants any revision, but I guess the adherents of the strong no-cul-de-sac theory should be incapable of being surprised that they were still alive. I can just hear them saying to themselves "Well, OF COURSE I'm still alive...what else could I expect? To find myself dead? Duh!" [SPK] If the observer is incapable of making an observation of a given universe, it easily follows that there is some strong reason why. One simple reason could be that that observer can not have any 1st person aspects consistent with that particular universe. To say that one is dead in such and such a universe is the same thing, unless we are going to postulate some kind of disembodied "consciousness", like a self-aware ghost. [SPK] The idea of immortality seems to assume some means by which a given observer's 1st person aspect can be continuously traced through the Multiverse. Right? Would not such a "trace" obey topological rules such as not allowing for the 1st person awareness of the effects of "cutting", "pasting", "tearing" and other kinds of topological surgery? [LC] I'm not sure that I follow. It seems to me that I experience a certain (probably mundane) discontinuity when I sleep and then wake. Other people, especially amnesiacs, or those involved in very severe injuries to the head, report discontinuities. Later on, if/when we have "learning pills", one might suddenly remember that he knew French. Since it's not so difficult to imagine this, it seems to me that all of the kinds of surgery you list above can be experienced. [SPK] Again, this is captures by: I am what I remember myself to be", or in Vaughan Pratt's terms: "I think, therefore I was". [SPK] Would these global rules not fall under the AP as well or is this outside of the AP? [LC] Perhaps you should also expand on the Anthropic Principle. I'm very hazy on it. The Weak anthropic principle seemed only to be common sense, and the Strong and Final forms, as I recall, were pretty dubious so far as I was concerned. Lee [SPK] See: http://www.answers.com/topic/anthropic-principle I am
Re: many worlds theory of immortality: May only be the Anthropic Principle
Hi Stephen, You wrote: > >can be faithfully represented by Turing algorithms.) ...> I take the opportunity of that statement to insist on a key point which is admittedly not obvious. The fact is that I am also totally allergic to the idea that 1st person aspects can be represented. Comma. And that is the main reason I appreciate the computational hypothesis; it prevents the existence of any such representation. This is a consequence of two things: 1) The first person possesses an unbreakable umbilical chord with truth (it is related to what is called "knowledge incorrigibility"); 2) by Tarski theorem the concept of truth on a machine cannot be represented in any way in the machine. In particular if we define (a little bit contra Rafe Champion(for-list) knowledge of p by [provability of p] + [truth of p] (more or less Theaetetus' definition), although provability and knowledge can be shown to be "third person" equivalent, they can also be shown first person NOT equivalent. I even think that the comp hyp, thanks to incompleteness, is the most powerful vaccine ever find against any attempt to reduce a first person to any third person notion, and this in a third person communicable way. This makes me optimistic for the long run ... Best regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jesse, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Now, look at p(n) again. This time, let's say it is not k, but a random real number greater than zero, smaller than 1, with k being the mean of the distribution. At first glance, it may appear that not much has changed, since the probabilities will "on average" be the same, over a long time period. However, this is not correct. In the above product, p(n) can go arbitrarily close to 1 for an arbitrarily long run of n, thus reducing the product value arbitrarily close to zero up to that point, which cannot subsequently be "made up" by a compensating fall of p(n) close to zero, since the factor 1-p(n)^(2^n) can never be greater than 1. (Sorry I haven't put this very elegantly.) p(n) *can* go arbitrarily close to 1 for an arbitrarily long period of time, but you're not taking into the account the fact that the larger the population already is, the more arbitrarily close to 1 p(n) would have to get to wipe out the population completely--and the more arbitrarily close a value to 1 you pick, the less probable it is that p(n) will be greater than or equal to this value in a given generation. So it's still true that the probability of the population being wiped out is continually decreasing as the population gets larger, which means it's still plausible there could be a nonzero probability the population would never be wiped out--you'd have to do the math to test this (and you might get different answers depending on what probability distribution you pick for p(n)). It also seems unrealistic to say that in a given generation, all 2^n members will have the *same* probability p(n) of being erased--if you're going to have random variations in p(n), wouldn't it make more sense for each individual to independently pick a value of p(n) from the probability distribution you're using? And if you do that, then the larger the population is, the smaller the average deviation from the expected mean value of p(n) given by that distribution. The conclusion is therefore that if p(n) is allowed to vary randomly, Real Death becomes a certainty over time, even with continuous exponential growth forever. I think you have any basis for being sure that "Real Death becomes a certainty over time" in the model you suggest (or the modified version I suggested above), not unless you've actually done the math, which would likely be pretty hairy. Jesse Jesse, It would be stubborn of me not to admit at this point that you have defended your position better than I have mine. I'm still not quite convinced that what I have called p(n) won't ultimately ruin the model you have proposed, and I'm still not quite convinced that, even if it works, this model will not constitute a smaller and smaller proportion of worlds where you remain alive, over time; but as you say, I would have to do the maths before making such claims. I may try out some of these ideas with Mathematica, but I expect that the maths is beyond me. Anyway, thank-you for a most interesting and edifying discussion! --Stathis Papaioannou _ SEEK: Now with over 80,000 dream jobs! Click here: http://ninemsn.seek.com.au?hotmail
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Now, look at p(n) again. This time, let's say it is not k, but a random real number greater than zero, smaller than 1, with k being the mean of the distribution. At first glance, it may appear that not much has changed, since the probabilities will "on average" be the same, over a long time period. However, this is not correct. In the above product, p(n) can go arbitrarily close to 1 for an arbitrarily long run of n, thus reducing the product value arbitrarily close to zero up to that point, which cannot subsequently be "made up" by a compensating fall of p(n) close to zero, since the factor 1-p(n)^(2^n) can never be greater than 1. (Sorry I haven't put this very elegantly.) p(n) *can* go arbitrarily close to 1 for an arbitrarily long period of time, but you're not taking into the account the fact that the larger the population already is, the more arbitrarily close to 1 p(n) would have to get to wipe out the population completely--and the more arbitrarily close a value to 1 you pick, the less probable it is that p(n) will be greater than or equal to this value in a given generation. So it's still true that the probability of the population being wiped out is continually decreasing as the population gets larger, which means it's still plausible there could be a nonzero probability the population would never be wiped out--you'd have to do the math to test this (and you might get different answers depending on what probability distribution you pick for p(n)). It also seems unrealistic to say that in a given generation, all 2^n members will have the *same* probability p(n) of being erased--if you're going to have random variations in p(n), wouldn't it make more sense for each individual to independently pick a value of p(n) from the probability distribution you're using? And if you do that, then the larger the population is, the smaller the average deviation from the expected mean value of p(n) given by that distribution. The conclusion is therefore that if p(n) is allowed to vary randomly, Real Death becomes a certainty over time, even with continuous exponential growth forever. I think you have any basis for being sure that "Real Death becomes a certainty over time" in the model you suggest (or the modified version I suggested above), not unless you've actually done the math, which would likely be pretty hairy. Jesse
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jesse, I've deleted everything, it was getting too messy. I hope this (semi-)mathematical formulation captures your argument correctly: Suppose you start with one individual, your friend, on a computer network which has infinite resources and will grow exponentially forever. This individual will be duplicated every unit time period, so that after n generations, there will be 2^n copies. Suppose there is a probability p(n) that, during a unit time period, any single individual in the nth generation will be effectively deleted, whether through suicide, murder, local hardware failure, or whatever. To simplify the maths, assume that if at least one copy survives, the rest of the 2^n copies in that generation will be restored from memory; but if all the copies are deleted, then that will be Real Death for your friend. Now, the probability of Real Death in the nth generation, given the above, is p(n)^(2^n). If p(n) is a constant, call it k, this probability will clearly decrease with each generation. The probability that your friend will never suffer Real Death is then given by the infinite product: (1-p(0)^(2^0))*(1-p(1)^(2^1))*(1-p(2)^(2^2))*... which I believe converges to a value between 0 and 1 (too lazy to work it out now) and is another way of making your point, with the geometric series, that even with an always-nonzero probability that a given individual will die, if this probability is always decreasing due to exponential growth of copies of the individual, the probability that at least some copies will survive indefinitely does not limit to zero. Now, look at p(n) again. This time, let's say it is not k, but a random real number greater than zero, smaller than 1, with k being the mean of the distribution. At first glance, it may appear that not much has changed, since the probabilities will "on average" be the same, over a long time period. However, this is not correct. In the above product, p(n) can go arbitrarily close to 1 for an arbitrarily long run of n, thus reducing the product value arbitrarily close to zero up to that point, which cannot subsequently be "made up" by a compensating fall of p(n) close to zero, since the factor 1-p(n)^(2^n) can never be greater than 1. (Sorry I haven't put this very elegantly.) The conclusion is therefore that if p(n) is allowed to vary randomly, Real Death becomes a certainty over time, even with continuous exponential growth forever. If you have a real world network, or simulated sentient beings, I don't believe it is possible eliminate the random lement in this parameter. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Update your mobile with a hot polyphonic ringtone: http://fun.mobiledownloads.com.au/191191/index.wl?page=191191polyphonicringtone
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Jesse Mazer wrote: [Quoting Stathis:] However, let us agree that the scenario you describe occurs in a non-negligible proportion of MW branches in which sentient life survives into the indefinite future, and return to Nick Prince's original question which spawned this thread. How will you ensure that your friends in this super-civilization running on this super-network will not disappear due to suicide, homicide, indefinite suspension or transformation into something completely unrecognizable? How will you ensure that *you* won't suicide, and end up in some other branch of the MW? If it possible that one of these things will happen, then over time, it will become a certainty, and you will be left alone. If there are constraints in place to make antisocial, self-destructive or simply perverse behaviour impossible, then (a) that would constitute more severe limits on freedom than the worst fascist state in our time, and (b) all fascist states fall, given time. As I said earlier, my idea about seeing friends around is that A.I.'s in a giant computer network would periodically make copies of themselves, so even if a given copy commits suicide or is erased by accident or murder, there may be other copies in the network, and if the number of copies stemming from a single "common ancestor" (the number of copies belonging to a common 'clade') tends to increase geometrically, then the same logic about a finite total probability could apply here. Even so, with a friend you made fairly recently it may be that all copies descended from the common ancestor that you first met will end up getting erased, and of course none of the copies descended from earlier common ancestors would remember you, and they might be fairly different from the individual you knew. But if you have known someone for long enough that there are now a huge number of copies of the common ancestor you first met, spread throughout the network, then there might be a good chance that there'd be at least some copies descended from that common ancestor somewhere in the network until the end of time, no matter how many individual copies are erased. Jesse If the rate of duplication of individuals always matches or surpasses the rate of destruction, then there will always be at least some individuals left. You can change "destruction" to "change beyond recognition" and the same argument applies. However, in a real world situation, all these paramaters will vary; most especially if we are talking about the decisions of sentient beings. In fact, even if the running average of these parameters were consistent over a sufficiently long time period (and I don't know that this is possible to guarantee: the average will vary over time, and the rate of change of the average will vary, and the second and third time derivative of the average will vary, and so on), given infinite time, there will be periods of negative overall growth which must result in extinction of any individual entity, or any group of entities, or the entire population. You could be right, but I don't think you have good justification for being so confident that you're right. It seems plausible to me that the larger the number of copies that exist already, the smaller the variations in the doubling rate, the smaller the fluctuations in those derivatives you mention, and the smaller the probability that a temporary period of negative growth will continue for a given amount of time. Are you 100% certain this is wrong? Do you disagree that the average actions of a googolplex copies will probably be less uncertain than the average actions of 50 copies, for example? It is analogous to the gambler's fallacy: given long enough, the gambler will lose everything, and then he won't have any funds to attempt to recover his losses. If the odds are slightly in his favor on each individual bet (say, for each dollar he bets there is a 50% chance he'll lose it and a 50% chance he'll win $2.01), this isn't true; the larger the amount of money he has already, the more predictable his total winnings on each round of betting, so you could prove that there is some finite probability his money will never go to zero in an infinite number of rounds of betting. This applies also to the casino, despite the odds being on average stacked in its favour: if it operates long enough, someone will break the bank. And in biology, even when a population is still well into the exponential phase of its growth, there is always the possibility that it will become extinct. Yes, there is always the possibility, but as long as the resources for continued population growth exist, the probability of extinction in any given time interval should decrease the larger the population. Jesse
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jesse Mazer wrote: [Quoting Stathis:] However, let us agree that the scenario you describe occurs in a non-negligible proportion of MW branches in which sentient life survives into the indefinite future, and return to Nick Prince's original question which spawned this thread. How will you ensure that your friends in this super-civilization running on this super-network will not disappear due to suicide, homicide, indefinite suspension or transformation into something completely unrecognizable? How will you ensure that *you* won't suicide, and end up in some other branch of the MW? If it possible that one of these things will happen, then over time, it will become a certainty, and you will be left alone. If there are constraints in place to make antisocial, self-destructive or simply perverse behaviour impossible, then (a) that would constitute more severe limits on freedom than the worst fascist state in our time, and (b) all fascist states fall, given time. As I said earlier, my idea about seeing friends around is that A.I.'s in a giant computer network would periodically make copies of themselves, so even if a given copy commits suicide or is erased by accident or murder, there may be other copies in the network, and if the number of copies stemming from a single "common ancestor" (the number of copies belonging to a common 'clade') tends to increase geometrically, then the same logic about a finite total probability could apply here. Even so, with a friend you made fairly recently it may be that all copies descended from the common ancestor that you first met will end up getting erased, and of course none of the copies descended from earlier common ancestors would remember you, and they might be fairly different from the individual you knew. But if you have known someone for long enough that there are now a huge number of copies of the common ancestor you first met, spread throughout the network, then there might be a good chance that there'd be at least some copies descended from that common ancestor somewhere in the network until the end of time, no matter how many individual copies are erased. Jesse If the rate of duplication of individuals always matches or surpasses the rate of destruction, then there will always be at least some individuals left. You can change "destruction" to "change beyond recognition" and the same argument applies. However, in a real world situation, all these paramaters will vary; most especially if we are talking about the decisions of sentient beings. In fact, even if the running average of these parameters were consistent over a sufficiently long time period (and I don't know that this is possible to guarantee: the average will vary over time, and the rate of change of the average will vary, and the second and third time derivative of the average will vary, and so on), given infinite time, there will be periods of negative overall growth which must result in extinction of any individual entity, or any group of entities, or the entire population. It is analogous to the gambler's fallacy: given long enough, the gambler will lose everything, and then he won't have any funds to attempt to recover his losses. This applies also to the casino, despite the odds being on average stacked in its favour: if it operates long enough, someone will break the bank. And in biology, even when a population is still well into the exponential phase of its growth, there is always the possibility that it will become extinct. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Jesse Mazer writes: [Stathis] There are two separate probabilities to consider here. One is the probability (3/4, as you show) that civilization will never break down if implemented on a computer with behaviour as specified above. The other is the probability that the actual hardware will work according to specification. I don't think you should conflate the two, effectively arguing that the hardware will work to specification because that is part of the specification! [Jesse] I don't think I ever said anything about the probability involving software only. If you have a distributed computing network (such that destroying any part of it won't cause a global breakdown), and more and more of the universe is constantly being gobbled up and converted into computing power, then perhaps the probability of all the hardware in the universe breaking down would decrease geometrically as well, on average. Assume that when I talk about the probability of all copies of you being destroyed decreasing like 1/8+1/16+1/32+..., this probability takes into account all possible causes of failure, including software problems, destruction of hardware, and even stuff like the possibility that some other enemy groups of A.I.'s will attempt to erase all copies of you. [Stathis] Returning to the original question, once you have settled into your new home, what is to stop all your friends disappearing, as before? The computer will try to prevent this from happening, and you could probably try the geometric series trick again (i.e. decreasing probability that your friends disappear), but in this case there will be nothing tying you to those ever-rarer branches where the hardware works as it is supposed to. [Jesse] But my point is that it doesn't necessarily have to be a matter of "ever-rarer" branches--even aside from quantum immortality, it might be true that in 3/4 (or whatever) of all branches stemming from a given point in time, any A.I. around at that time will have at least some copies around in the giant computing network forever. You seem to be treating the proposed ever-decreasing failure rate per clock cycle as if it is something that will just happen inexorably once the denizens of the far future decide to build this computer. No, I'm just suggesting that it's possible that once these far future people have gotten a good start on building this ever-increasing *network* of computers, the probability of every single computer in the system breaking down may, in an average world, be decreasing geometrically, perhaps for no other reason that the number of computers is increasing geometrically as more and more of the universe is converted into computing machines (which in a way would be no more surprising than the idea that the population tends to increase geometrically when resources are unlimited and death rates are low). This need not happen "inexorably" since it wouldn't be true in every single history, I'm just suggesting the average pattern if you look at all possible futures stemming from a given time may involve such a geometric decrease in failure probability. Are you suggesting it is somehow logically impossible that the *average* pattern would be a geometric one? You may as well say that in the future, there will be computers with a mean time between failure of 10^10^100 years, or whatever arbitrarily large number you choose. Sure, if you have a decentralized network of computers like the internet, then no matter what the average failure rate of an individual computer in the network, you can keep the failure rate of the entire network as arbitrarily low as you want by making the number of computers in the network sufficiently large. The problem is not in conceiving of such super-machines, it is in the details of design and implementation. Again, it need not be a question of super-machines, just a question of sheer numbers. I imagine that in the future there may be multiple attempts to build computers which will squeeze an infinite period of subjective time into a finite period of real time, in the way you have described, I wasn't necessarily suggesting an infinite number of computations in a finite physical time a la Tipler...an infinite number of computations in an infinite physical time a la Dyson would be fine too (to inhabitants of the simulation it wouldn't make any difference). and like any other engineering project, the success rate will increase with increasing experience and resources, but even the "last gasp" effort in the moment before the big crunch will only succeed in an infinitesimally small proportion of multiverse branches. I don't see why it is logically impossible that it could succeed in a non-infinitesimal proportion of multiverse branches, due to an on-average geometric decrease in the probability of the whole system breaking down. Jesse You are relying on the availability of infinite resources for this
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jesse Mazer writes: [Stathis] There are two separate probabilities to consider here. One is the probability (3/4, as you show) that civilization will never break down if implemented on a computer with behaviour as specified above. The other is the probability that the actual hardware will work according to specification. I don't think you should conflate the two, effectively arguing that the hardware will work to specification because that is part of the specification! [Jesse] I don't think I ever said anything about the probability involving software only. If you have a distributed computing network (such that destroying any part of it won't cause a global breakdown), and more and more of the universe is constantly being gobbled up and converted into computing power, then perhaps the probability of all the hardware in the universe breaking down would decrease geometrically as well, on average. Assume that when I talk about the probability of all copies of you being destroyed decreasing like 1/8+1/16+1/32+..., this probability takes into account all possible causes of failure, including software problems, destruction of hardware, and even stuff like the possibility that some other enemy groups of A.I.'s will attempt to erase all copies of you. [Stathis] Returning to the original question, once you have settled into your new home, what is to stop all your friends disappearing, as before? The computer will try to prevent this from happening, and you could probably try the geometric series trick again (i.e. decreasing probability that your friends disappear), but in this case there will be nothing tying you to those ever-rarer branches where the hardware works as it is supposed to. [Jesse] But my point is that it doesn't necessarily have to be a matter of "ever-rarer" branches--even aside from quantum immortality, it might be true that in 3/4 (or whatever) of all branches stemming from a given point in time, any A.I. around at that time will have at least some copies around in the giant computing network forever. You seem to be treating the proposed ever-decreasing failure rate per clock cycle as if it is something that will just happen inexorably once the denizens of the far future decide to build this computer. No, I'm just suggesting that it's possible that once these far future people have gotten a good start on building this ever-increasing *network* of computers, the probability of every single computer in the system breaking down may, in an average world, be decreasing geometrically, perhaps for no other reason that the number of computers is increasing geometrically as more and more of the universe is converted into computing machines (which in a way would be no more surprising than the idea that the population tends to increase geometrically when resources are unlimited and death rates are low). This need not happen "inexorably" since it wouldn't be true in every single history, I'm just suggesting the average pattern if you look at all possible futures stemming from a given time may involve such a geometric decrease in failure probability. Are you suggesting it is somehow logically impossible that the *average* pattern would be a geometric one? You may as well say that in the future, there will be computers with a mean time between failure of 10^10^100 years, or whatever arbitrarily large number you choose. Sure, if you have a decentralized network of computers like the internet, then no matter what the average failure rate of an individual computer in the network, you can keep the failure rate of the entire network as arbitrarily low as you want by making the number of computers in the network sufficiently large. The problem is not in conceiving of such super-machines, it is in the details of design and implementation. Again, it need not be a question of super-machines, just a question of sheer numbers. I imagine that in the future there may be multiple attempts to build computers which will squeeze an infinite period of subjective time into a finite period of real time, in the way you have described, I wasn't necessarily suggesting an infinite number of computations in a finite physical time a la Tipler...an infinite number of computations in an infinite physical time a la Dyson would be fine too (to inhabitants of the simulation it wouldn't make any difference). and like any other engineering project, the success rate will increase with increasing experience and resources, but even the "last gasp" effort in the moment before the big crunch will only succeed in an infinitesimally small proportion of multiverse branches. I don't see why it is logically impossible that it could succeed in a non-infinitesimal proportion of multiverse branches, due to an on-average geometric decrease in the probability of the whole system breaking down. Jesse You are relying on the availability of infinite resources for this ever-growing network, and
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Jesse Mazer writes: [Stathis] There are two separate probabilities to consider here. One is the probability (3/4, as you show) that civilization will never break down if implemented on a computer with behaviour as specified above. The other is the probability that the actual hardware will work according to specification. I don't think you should conflate the two, effectively arguing that the hardware will work to specification because that is part of the specification! [Jesse] I don't think I ever said anything about the probability involving software only. If you have a distributed computing network (such that destroying any part of it won't cause a global breakdown), and more and more of the universe is constantly being gobbled up and converted into computing power, then perhaps the probability of all the hardware in the universe breaking down would decrease geometrically as well, on average. Assume that when I talk about the probability of all copies of you being destroyed decreasing like 1/8+1/16+1/32+..., this probability takes into account all possible causes of failure, including software problems, destruction of hardware, and even stuff like the possibility that some other enemy groups of A.I.'s will attempt to erase all copies of you. [Stathis] Returning to the original question, once you have settled into your new home, what is to stop all your friends disappearing, as before? The computer will try to prevent this from happening, and you could probably try the geometric series trick again (i.e. decreasing probability that your friends disappear), but in this case there will be nothing tying you to those ever-rarer branches where the hardware works as it is supposed to. [Jesse] But my point is that it doesn't necessarily have to be a matter of "ever-rarer" branches--even aside from quantum immortality, it might be true that in 3/4 (or whatever) of all branches stemming from a given point in time, any A.I. around at that time will have at least some copies around in the giant computing network forever. You seem to be treating the proposed ever-decreasing failure rate per clock cycle as if it is something that will just happen inexorably once the denizens of the far future decide to build this computer. No, I'm just suggesting that it's possible that once these far future people have gotten a good start on building this ever-increasing *network* of computers, the probability of every single computer in the system breaking down may, in an average world, be decreasing geometrically, perhaps for no other reason that the number of computers is increasing geometrically as more and more of the universe is converted into computing machines (which in a way would be no more surprising than the idea that the population tends to increase geometrically when resources are unlimited and death rates are low). This need not happen "inexorably" since it wouldn't be true in every single history, I'm just suggesting the average pattern if you look at all possible futures stemming from a given time may involve such a geometric decrease in failure probability. Are you suggesting it is somehow logically impossible that the *average* pattern would be a geometric one? You may as well say that in the future, there will be computers with a mean time between failure of 10^10^100 years, or whatever arbitrarily large number you choose. Sure, if you have a decentralized network of computers like the internet, then no matter what the average failure rate of an individual computer in the network, you can keep the failure rate of the entire network as arbitrarily low as you want by making the number of computers in the network sufficiently large. The problem is not in conceiving of such super-machines, it is in the details of design and implementation. Again, it need not be a question of super-machines, just a question of sheer numbers. I imagine that in the future there may be multiple attempts to build computers which will squeeze an infinite period of subjective time into a finite period of real time, in the way you have described, I wasn't necessarily suggesting an infinite number of computations in a finite physical time a la Tipler...an infinite number of computations in an infinite physical time a la Dyson would be fine too (to inhabitants of the simulation it wouldn't make any difference). and like any other engineering project, the success rate will increase with increasing experience and resources, but even the "last gasp" effort in the moment before the big crunch will only succeed in an infinitesimally small proportion of multiverse branches. I don't see why it is logically impossible that it could succeed in a non-infinitesimal proportion of multiverse branches, due to an on-average geometric decrease in the probability of the whole system breaking down. Jesse
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: "... It will not do to say straight out, "I don't like ABC, therefore I will say ABC does not exist"-" It was wrong that I entered this type of discussion about superstitious fables, unsubstantiated 3rd pers. statements, like e.g. religious belief systems. However Stathis's statement is reversed in my case, it should read: "ABC does not exist AND I don't even like it". Maybe this wouldn't do either. In the name of just reconfirming my sanity. John M - Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sent: Tuesday, April 19, 2005 12:33 AM Subject: Re: many worlds theory of immortality
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Brent Meeker wrote: [Stathis] >Your body slowly disintegrates and is (approximately) reconstructed atom by >atom, so you don't notice a discontinuity, and it doesn't hurt. If the >timing and order of the process were changed, so that your body is destroyed >in one operation and a copy reconstructed at a different place and time in >another operation, all you would notice is a period of unconsciousness, like >being knocked out and waking up later in hospital. [Brent] Actually you don't notice a period of unconsciousness. You infer it. There is an implicit assumption in this talk about copying brains and final results that we do not directly experience the passage of time; that our conscious states are independent entities that can then be ordered along an inferred time line. I wonder if that is true? The brain is small in extent, but it is not unitary. It apparently consists of different modules or processes only one of which is the internal narrative we call consciousness. [Stathis] >As for where your consciousness "goes" when you are unconscious, that is my >point: it doesn't "go" anywhere. Consciousness (and the associated sense of >personal identity) is a process, not a material object. You can still make >the point that we have no evidence that human-level consciousness can be >implemented outside of a human brain, but I believe the above considerations >show that it is not tied to a particular brain. [Brent] I agree. But you seemed to be supporting Hal's statement "Your consciousness should be able to jump between branches, between physical locations and across long periods of time." And you refer to it as "mobile". That seemed to me to be reifying a process into an object that could "move" and "jump". I agree that one should be able to implement brain processes, including perception, in some other medium (e.g. silicon) and realize consciousness. But most of what a brain does is not consciousness. I don't think you could implement just the consciousness without the other processes. Brent Meeker "Ignorance is preferable to error, and he is less remote from the truth who believes nothing than he who believes what is wrong," --- Thomas Jefferson. It seems we basically agree but issues arise due to terminology. When I say consciouness can "move" and "jump", I mean it in the same way that I am "sending" you this email. The term is from regular mail through the post, but obviously I am not sending you paper with ink on it, and I am not even sending you the actual electrons I cause to flow in the circuitry of my computer when I use the keyboard. what I am "sending" is information: encoded instructions which you can decode at your end if you have the appropriate protocols and hardware. The information can lie dormant for years, be transmitted over long distances, and be implemented on one or more computers which may be very different from the one on which it was generated. --Stathis Papaioannou _ $60,000 prize pool to be won. Three winners. Apply now! http://www.healthe.com.au/competition.do
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jesse Mazer writes: [Stathis] There are two separate probabilities to consider here. One is the probability (3/4, as you show) that civilization will never break down if implemented on a computer with behaviour as specified above. The other is the probability that the actual hardware will work according to specification. I don't think you should conflate the two, effectively arguing that the hardware will work to specification because that is part of the specification! [Jesse] I don't think I ever said anything about the probability involving software only. If you have a distributed computing network (such that destroying any part of it won't cause a global breakdown), and more and more of the universe is constantly being gobbled up and converted into computing power, then perhaps the probability of all the hardware in the universe breaking down would decrease geometrically as well, on average. Assume that when I talk about the probability of all copies of you being destroyed decreasing like 1/8+1/16+1/32+..., this probability takes into account all possible causes of failure, including software problems, destruction of hardware, and even stuff like the possibility that some other enemy groups of A.I.'s will attempt to erase all copies of you. [Stathis] Returning to the original question, once you have settled into your new home, what is to stop all your friends disappearing, as before? The computer will try to prevent this from happening, and you could probably try the geometric series trick again (i.e. decreasing probability that your friends disappear), but in this case there will be nothing tying you to those ever-rarer branches where the hardware works as it is supposed to. [Jesse] But my point is that it doesn't necessarily have to be a matter of "ever-rarer" branches--even aside from quantum immortality, it might be true that in 3/4 (or whatever) of all branches stemming from a given point in time, any A.I. around at that time will have at least some copies around in the giant computing network forever. You seem to be treating the proposed ever-decreasing failure rate per clock cycle as if it is something that will just happen inexorably once the denizens of the far future decide to build this computer. You may as well say that in the future, there will be computers with a mean time between failure of 10^10^100 years, or whatever arbitrarily large number you choose. The problem is not in conceiving of such super-machines, it is in the details of design and implementation. I imagine that in the future there may be multiple attempts to build computers which will squeeze an infinite period of subjective time into a finite period of real time, in the way you have described, and like any other engineering project, the success rate will increase with increasing experience and resources, but even the "last gasp" effort in the moment before the big crunch will only succeed in an infinitesimally small proportion of multiverse branches. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Buy want you really want - sell what you don't on eBay: http://adfarm.mediaplex.com/ad/ck/705-10129-5668-323?ID=2
