Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 02 Mar 2014, at 10:49, LizR wrote: On 2 March 2014 21:33, Bruno Marchal wrote: Because "1+1=2" is elementary math, learned in high school. " "1+1=2" is a fact " is a non trivial philosophical statement, which involved a non trivial notion like "fact". I have seen people discussing ad nauseam on what is a fact, and some philosopher would not agree that elementary arithmetical statement can be considered as fact. (Bp is more "I believe in "1+1=2", or I can justify that 1+1=2). OK, I think I see that. But if you accept the Doctor's offer then you are committing to a "capsule theory of identity" which implies most of what you have said about duplication experiments with delays, VR, and so on. OK. I would say "relative (to universal numbers) capsule theory of identity". I'm not sure I understand, what would be the alternative capsule theory (i.e. one that isn't relative to universal numbers?) Because the state that the doctor put on some disk has a sense only relatively to the possible state of some other universal system. In fact any number might defined your actual state relatively to *some* universal system, itself making sense thanks to the local "physical laws", for example. A number by itself does not refer to a computational state, you need at least two numbers, or you need to fix the base system, or to make precise the UD you work with. The notion of computational state is relative. OK? When everything is reduced to arithmetic, we have to take into account this "relativity of relativity". I think I get this, in an intuitive sort of way. It has seemed to me from the start that numbers of themselves can't do anything - so they must need to do so relative to something. But I probably need to learn more to really understand this. I am thinking about how to explain this. When you say "numbers of themselves can't do anything" you are right. But the point will be that "numbers + addition and multiplication" can do the thing needed. And this in some absolute sense. In particular, numbers +addition+multiplication, can do the universal numbers, from which the relativity of the computational state will emerge. This should be much clear when we will derive machine's physics (and machine's theology) from arithmetic. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 2 March 2014 21:33, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Because "1+1=2" is elementary math, learned in high school. > " "1+1=2" is a fact " is a non trivial philosophical statement, which > involved a non trivial notion like "fact". I have seen people discussing ad > nauseam on what is a fact, and some philosopher would not agree that > elementary arithmetical statement can be considered as fact. > (Bp is more "I believe in "1+1=2", or I can justify that 1+1=2). > OK, I think I see that. > >> But if you accept the Doctor's offer then you are committing to a >> "capsule theory of identity" which implies most of what you have said about >> duplication experiments with delays, VR, and so on. >> >> OK. I would say "relative (to universal numbers) capsule theory of >> identity". >> > > I'm not sure I understand, what would be the alternative capsule theory > (i.e. one that isn't relative to universal numbers?) > > > Because the state that the doctor put on some disk has a sense only > relatively to the possible state of some other universal system. > In fact any number might defined your actual state relatively to *some* > universal system, itself making sense thanks to the local "physical laws", > for example. A number by itself does not refer to a computational state, > you need at least two numbers, or you need to fix the base system, or to > make precise the UD you work with. The notion of computational state is > relative. OK? > When everything is reduced to arithmetic, we have to take into account > this "relativity of relativity". > > I think I get this, in an intuitive sort of way. It has seemed to me from the start that numbers of themselves can't do anything - so they must need to do so relative to something. But I probably need to learn more to really understand this. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 01 Mar 2014, at 10:15, LizR wrote: On 1 March 2014 21:03, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Mar 2014, at 02:06, LizR wrote: On 1 March 2014 03:22, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote: Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept "Yes Doctor" the rest of comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true, ? You might elaborate on this. What is the "rest", and why do you think it does not follow? I mean the rest as I understand it. "Yes Doctor" implies that identity relies on a "capsule memory", and hence that H=M and H=W, and also that H=simulated M / W, H = M+100 years, and so on. That is not so clear to me. OK. That is my take on it, which may be based on intuition or misunderstanding. But it seems to me the idea of "Yes Doctor" - that you could have your brain replaced by a digital equivalent and not know the difference - is only possible if all the other things you mention are, too. How would "Yes Doctor" work? You'd have to have your brain frozen (or something similar), scanned and destroyed, while the digital one was programmed to be a simulation of your brain (below the substitution level). And from your own perspective you would fall asleep on the operating table and wake up with a digital brain (and maybe a robot body). That's only possible (it seems to me) if your continuation of consciousness from day to day is discontinuous in a similar manner. That's correct. Otherwise in "Yes Doctor" you would die, and a replica would be created. So, the time of the reconstitution and the modality of the modus operandi is not relevant. And, so we don't need to make precise the "other hypothesis", and the use of simple "instantaneous" teleportation is valid. But this is explicitly clear in step seven, which "technically" are "step 5" like, which means you don't need to be frozen and annihilated, you need just to be "prepared or reconstituted" in the concrete UD which do the rest automatically, even infinitely often. In longer and more detailed version of the UDA (like the one in 15 steps done on this list at its early beginning) I make this explicit. So you point, even if correct for steps 0-6, does not apply on steps 0-7, and of course still less to step 0-8. Similarly after classical teleportation, where you are destroyed and recreated, you only come out at the other end as the same person if that's what consciousness - if it's "Heralicitean", so to speak. But if that is the case, then you can be teleported, cloned, and so on - not to mention kidnapped (or 50% kidnapped) by someone able to scan your brain at some point without destroying it and recreating you in their own private digital world. OK. That follows again from step 5 and step 7, automatically, and this entails the reversal. That's why it seems if you accept "Yes Doctor", everything else (the other steps) have to follow, because you have already accepted what we might as well call the Heraclitean nature of consciousness. OK. Of course I define comp by "yes doctor" + Church's thesis. That is why I realise it isn't quite true that YD implies everything, because you need CT and AR. But you just said that "1+1=2" is a fact, which is stronger than AR. AR just says that 1+1=2, and nothing more. And CT is not really needed in the math: just add Turing before machine or universal number. But CT makes things smooth and prevent uninteresting critics like "and what if we are not Turing emulable, but still "machines" in some unknonw sense. That was in another thread! I was making a suggestion about "where the maths comes from". I don't necessarily assume that when talking about comp. Well, you were saying that not everything follows from YD, which is comp. CT is just needed to give "comp" a (general) sense, and AR is only the belief that 17 is prime "independent of you". Also, I suspect that you have a stronger meaning of "fact" in mind. What is the difference betwen asserting that 1+1=2 (like AR) and saying that 1+1=2 is a fact, like I did? (I suspect the difference is something like Bp vs p except I beleive B means believing ...) Because "1+1=2" is elementary math, learned in high school. " "1+1=2" is a fact " is a non trivial philosophical statement, which involved a non trivial notion like "fact". I have seen people discussing ad nauseam on what is a fact, and some philosopher would not agree that elementary arithmetical statement can be considered as fact. (Bp is more "I believe in "1+1=2", or I can justify that 1+1=2). But if you accept the Doctor's offer then you are committing to a "capsule theory of identity" which implies most of what you have said about duplication experiments with delays, VR, and so on. OK. I would say "relative (to universal numbers) capsule theory of identity". I'm not sure I understand, what would be the alternative capsule theory (i.e. one
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 1 March 2014 21:03, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 01 Mar 2014, at 02:06, LizR wrote: > > On 1 March 2014 03:22, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote: >> >> Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept "Yes Doctor" the >>> rest of comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true, >>> >> ? You might elaborate on this. What is the "rest", and why do you think >> it does not follow? >> > > I mean the rest as I understand it. "Yes Doctor" implies that identity > relies on a "capsule memory", and hence that H=M and H=W, and also that > H=simulated M / W, H = M+100 years, and so on. > > That is not so clear to me. > OK. That is my take on it, which may be based on intuition or misunderstanding. But it seems to me the idea of "Yes Doctor" - that you could have your brain replaced by a digital equivalent and not know the difference - is only possible if all the other things you mention are, too. How would "Yes Doctor" work? You'd have to have your brain frozen (or something similar), scanned and destroyed, while the digital one was programmed to be a simulation of your brain (below the substitution level). And from your own perspective you would fall asleep on the operating table and wake up with a digital brain (and maybe a robot body). That's only possible (it seems to me) if your continuation of consciousness from day to day is discontinuous in a similar manner. Otherwise in "Yes Doctor" you would die, and a replica would be created. Similarly after classical teleportation, where you are destroyed and recreated, you only come out at the other end as the same person if that's what consciousness - if it's "Heralicitean", so to speak. But if that is the case, then you can be teleported, cloned, and so on - not to mention kidnapped (or 50% kidnapped) by someone able to scan your brain at some point without destroying it and recreating you in their own private digital world. That's why it seems if you accept "Yes Doctor", everything else (the other steps) have to follow, because you have already accepted what we might as well call the Heraclitean nature of consciousness. > >> Of course I define comp by "yes doctor" + Church's thesis. >> > > That is why I realise it isn't quite true that YD implies everything, > because you need CT and AR. > > But you just said that "1+1=2" is a fact, which is stronger than AR. AR > just says that 1+1=2, and nothing more. And CT is not really needed in the > math: just add Turing before machine or universal number. But CT makes > things smooth and prevent uninteresting critics like "and what if we are > not Turing emulable, but still "machines" in some unknonw sense. > That was in another thread! I was making a suggestion about "where the maths comes from". I don't necessarily assume that when talking about comp. Also, I suspect that you have a stronger meaning of "fact" in mind. What is the difference betwen asserting that 1+1=2 (like AR) and saying that 1+1=2 is a fact, like I did? (I suspect the difference is something like Bp vs p except I beleive B means believing ...) > > But if you accept the Doctor's offer then you are committing to a "capsule > theory of identity" which implies most of what you have said about > duplication experiments with delays, VR, and so on. > > OK. I would say "relative (to universal numbers) capsule theory of > identity". > I'm not sure I understand, what would be the alternative capsule theory (i.e. one that isn't relative to universal numbers?) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 01 Mar 2014, at 02:06, LizR wrote: On 1 March 2014 03:22, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote: Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept "Yes Doctor" the rest of comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true, ? You might elaborate on this. What is the "rest", and why do you think it does not follow? I mean the rest as I understand it. "Yes Doctor" implies that identity relies on a "capsule memory", and hence that H=M and H=W, and also that H=simulated M / W, H = M+100 years, and so on. That is not so clear to me. Of course I define comp by "yes doctor" + Church's thesis. That is why I realise it isn't quite true that YD implies everything, because you need CT and AR. But you just said that "1+1=2" is a fact, which is stronger than AR. AR just says that 1+1=2, and nothing more. And CT is not really needed in the math: just add Turing before machine or universal number. But CT makes things smooth and prevent uninteresting critics like "and what if we are not Turing emulable, but still "machines" in some unknonw sense. But if you accept the Doctor's offer then you are committing to a "capsule theory of identity" which implies most of what you have said about duplication experiments with delays, VR, and so on. OK. I would say "relative (to universal numbers) capsule theory of identity". Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 28 Feb 2014, at 19:14, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Feb 28, 2014 at 11:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>Sorry, I was guessing something along the lines of FPI = first person interpretation. > ??? !!! > You are the one describing the FPI as a crazy discovery. No, I'm the one who keeps saying that first person indeterminacy (I dislike homemade acronyms) was discovered not by you but by Mr. Og the caveman. Then he should have published. But no, it did not discovered it, and today, scientists still ignore it, or doesn't take its consequences into account. But all this is not relevant, if you are agree so much with the FPI, then you can aboard the 4th step. > AUDA shows that all lobian numbers can understand "UDA" Google has more information than any human being but even Google doesn't know what "lobian numbers" are. And Google doesn't know what "AUDA" is. And Google doesn't know what "UDA" is. That's 9 words with 4 of them made up and used by nobody in any language except by you. Well, at least 56% were real words. If that is your notion of argumenting ... >> Who is this Mr. them who has "the 1-view"? > We don't need to know that to make the reasoning. We can stay in the usual 3p description, where the 1p are defined by the personal content of the individual diaries. There are no "diaries" there is only a diary and it was written by the Washington Man AND the Moscow Man. That is close to total nonsense. > The *typical* subjective 1p life of a copy is a "WWWMWMMMWMM...M" Finding an infinite regress at the heart of a idea doesn't necessarily mean it's worthless, but it's never a good sign. Which infinite regress? > and in his diary is a refutation of all previews attempt to predict the future of his diary. Two people wrote that diary Mr. Washington and Mr. Moscow, and I don't know who Mr. his is. Not two, 2^n. And in the 3p there are 2^n diaries, and the content of each one defined the first person views. > Hope this helps. It does not. I am afraid you are severely limited on this subject. You seem to be unable to count 3p diaries, which means you need to oppose something like 1+1=2 to make your point. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 28 Feb 2014, at 02:10, LizR wrote: On 28 February 2014 14:03, meekerdb wrote: On 2/27/2014 4:27 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 February 2014 05:29, Bruno Marchal wrote: And Liz-Washington said "I don't know if I am the one from Washington I drunk to much whisky and I lost the diary!" And Liz-Moscow said "I don't know if I am the one from Moscow, I drunk too much vodka and I lost the diary". GASP! How did you know? But losing the diary is no problem, if you're drunk on whisky you're from Washington, if you're drunk on vodka you're the one from Moscow. Waking up the following morning in Washington or Moscow might be a clue, too. OK. Unless you've been kidnapped by philosophers while drunk and had your brain put in a vat, of course. (I suppose the next question is whether it's a vat of whisky or vodka...) But, we might put this in the default hypotheses. We might also ask for sober volunteers, as that is common in scientific experiences involving humans. I think. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 28 Feb 2014, at 02:03, meekerdb wrote: On 2/27/2014 4:27 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 February 2014 05:29, Bruno Marchal wrote: And Liz-Washington said "I don't know if I am the one from Washington I drunk to much whisky and I lost the diary!" And Liz-Moscow said "I don't know if I am the one from Moscow, I drunk too much vodka and I lost the diary". GASP! How did you know? But losing the diary is no problem, if you're drunk on whisky you're from Washington, if you're drunk on vodka you're the one from Moscow. You felt in my trap. There is good whisky in Moscow, and there is good vodka in Washington, today :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 28 Feb 2014, at 01:27, LizR wrote: On 28 February 2014 05:29, Bruno Marchal wrote: And Liz-Washington said "I don't know if I am the one from Washington I drunk to much whisky and I lost the diary!" And Liz-Moscow said "I don't know if I am the one from Moscow, I drunk too much vodka and I lost the diary". GASP! How did you know? I am a scientist. I know nothing, but I can make theories, and my theory here is that you lost easily diaries, and might appreciate good wine and things like that, which is nice as long as you can moderate yourself, and find a way to fix your diary problem, which is needed to get a stable first person view ... :) Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 1 March 2014 03:22, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote: > > Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept "Yes Doctor" the rest >> of comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true, >> > ? You might elaborate on this. What is the "rest", and why do you think it > does not follow? > I mean the rest as I understand it. "Yes Doctor" implies that identity relies on a "capsule memory", and hence that H=M and H=W, and also that H=simulated M / W, H = M+100 years, and so on. > > Of course I define comp by "yes doctor" + Church's thesis. > That is why I realise it isn't quite true that YD implies everything, because you need CT and AR. But if you accept the Doctor's offer then you are committing to a "capsule theory of identity" which implies most of what you have said about duplication experiments with delays, VR, and so on. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 28 Feb 2014, at 15:28, David Nyman wrote: On 26 February 2014 17:04, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi David, On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:32, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck wrote: >>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me, retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome. Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that. Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to be the sole fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a heuristic for collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation onto the perspective of a single, universal observer. From this perspective, the situation of being faced with duplication is just a random selection from the class of all possible observer moments. Well, the "just" might be not that easy to define. If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to get a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable than being me or you. But how would "you" remember that? By noting it in my diary, by inquesting my past, and hacking data banks, or reading book on "my" origin. Well, I'm not sure if it makes sense to say the Hoyle's universal observer is the universal machine. OK, but in this setting, the universal observer was the universal machine from the "observable" points of view. It is not "just" the universal machine. The point is that if we assume comp, it seems there is room only for the indexical self-ordering leading to rational (or over-rational) sort of past. I don't know to what extent his idea is compatible with comp. OK. But to be clear, you suggested above that a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable than being me or you, so I asked you how Bruno, for example, could remember that, meaning to suggest that of course you could not. I suppose it would be some sort of problem for Hoyle's idea if one suspected not simply that certain classes of non-human observer vastly out-numbered human ones, but that they were likely to be asking themselves similar sorts of questions. IOW, what might constitute an appropriate equivalence class for ourselves? It is very complex, and I try to make sense first, then see if it make sense in comp, and from which points of view. I am not sure that the notion of "observer moment" makes sense, without a notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative states. I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a universal (self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p & p), an observer ([]p & <>p), and a feeler ([]p & <>p & p)). But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in arithmetic and is associated with all relatively self-referential correct löbian number) will select among all "observer moment". Well, perhaps "eventually" it will select all of them, if we can give some relevant sense to eventually in this context. Is this not done by simple 3p arithmetical realism? Not, I think, in the 1p sense, without a certain amount of equivocation. Ah... this I don't know. There is a sense "God" select them all, but they inter-relations are indexicals. Yes, but the inner God cannot select them all simultaneously, without the equivocation to which I refer. ? And I suppose Hoyle's point is that if one imagines a logical serialisation of all such moments, its order must be inconsequential because of the intrinsic self-ordering of the moments themselves. That is the mathematical conception of an order, and there are dualities between those ways of considering a structure. You can already see that with the modal logic, where properties of accessibility will characterize modal formula and theories. Essentially he is saying that the panoptic bir
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On Fri, Feb 28, 2014 at 11:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>Sorry, I was guessing something along the lines of FPI = first person > interpretation. > > > ??? > !!! > You are the one describing the FPI as a crazy discovery. > No, I'm the one who keeps saying that first person indeterminacy (I dislike homemade acronyms) was discovered not by you but by Mr. Og the caveman. > AUDA shows that all lobian numbers can understand "UDA" > Google has more information than any human being but even Google doesn't know what "lobian numbers" are. And Google doesn't know what "AUDA" is. And Google doesn't know what "UDA" is. That's 9 words with 4 of them made up and used by nobody in any language except by you. Well, at least 56% were real words. >> Who is this Mr. them who has "the 1-view"? >> > > > We don't need to know that to make the reasoning. We can stay in the > usual 3p description, where the 1p are defined by the personal content of > the individual diaries. > There are no "diaries" there is only a diary and it was written by the Washington Man AND the Moscow Man. > The *typical* subjective 1p life of a copy is a "WWWMWMMMWMM...M" > Finding an infinite regress at the heart of a idea doesn't necessarily mean it's worthless, but it's never a good sign. > and in his diary is a refutation of all previews attempt to predict the > future of his diary. Two people wrote that diary Mr. Washington and Mr. Moscow, and I don't know who Mr. his is. > > Hope this helps. > It does not. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 26 Feb 2014, at 19:37, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Feb 25, 2014 at 1:21 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> provide the algorithm of prediction. >> Why? What does that have to do with the price of eggs? FPI is about the feeling of self and prediction has nothing to do with it. > FPI = first person indeterminacy Sorry, I was guessing something along the lines of FPI = first person interpretation. ??? You are the one describing the FPI as a crazy discovery. You keep seeing ambiguity, but you take not the times to simply focus on the point. Your obscure homemade acronym for something that already has a perfectly good name, uncertainty, has tripped me up yet again. No one is interested in your personal problem. And I'm afraid I can't do as you request, I am unable to provide an algorithm that can correctly predict all external events that could effect me. >> You said that "we have to interview all copies" and I agree. After the interviews this is what we find: W" has not refuted it. "M" has not refuted it. "W & M" have confirmed it. > In the 3-1 views. I guess you're right, after all you invented "the 3-1 views" so you must know what it means. I wish I did. You, sir, are quite a challenge. (AUDA shows that all lobian numbers can understand "UDA") You miss this only by confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-view, >> Who's "the 1-view"? > Each of them. Who is this Mr. them who has "the 1-view"? We don't need to know that to make the reasoning. We can stay in the usual 3p description, where the 1p are defined by the personal content of the individual diaries. Take the iterated WM-self duplication, then, here, at some stage, I can interview one of the 2^n copies, which really means that there are 2^n diaries, that is 2^n 1-views. It is an exercise to show that most get algorithmically incompressible but has a normal distribution. The *typical* subjective 1p life of a copy is a "WWWMWMMMWMM...M" and in his diary is a refutation of all previews attempt to predict the future of his diary. Hope this helps. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 26 February 2014 17:04, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi David, > > On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:32, David Nyman wrote: > > On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote: >> >> On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck wrote: >> >> *>>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures >>> in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of >>> me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me, >>> retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome.* >>> >>> Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is >>> any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the >>> person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should >>> assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity >>> criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and >>> won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what >>> Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I >>> think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments >>> would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated. >>> Certainly for me he doesn't manage that. >> >> >> Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to >> you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful >> way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to >> be the sole fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a >> heuristic for collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation >> onto the perspective of a single, universal observer. From this >> perspective, the situation of being faced with duplication is just a random >> selection from the class of all possible observer moments. >> >> Well, the "just" might be not that easy to define. >> >> If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to >> get a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more >> probable than being me or you. >> > > But how would "you" remember that? > > > By noting it in my diary, by inquesting my past, and hacking data banks, > or reading book on "my" origin. > Well, I'm not sure if it makes sense to say the Hoyle's universal observer is the universal machine. I don't know to what extent his idea is compatible with comp. But to be clear, you suggested above that a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable than being me or you, so I asked you how Bruno, for example, could remember that, meaning to suggest that of course you could not. I suppose it would be some sort of problem for Hoyle's idea if one suspected not simply that certain classes of non-human observer vastly out-numbered human ones, but that they were likely to be asking themselves similar sorts of questions. IOW, what might constitute an appropriate equivalence class for ourselves? > > >> I am not sure that the notion of "observer moment" makes sense, without a >> notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative states. >> >> I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a >> universal (self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p & p), an observer >> ([]p & <>p), and a feeler ([]p & <>p & p)). >> >> But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in arithmetic >> and is associated with all relatively self-referential correct löbian >> number) will select among all "observer moment". >> > > Well, perhaps "eventually" it will select all of them, if we can give some > relevant sense to eventually in this context. > > > Is this not done by simple 3p arithmetical realism? > Not, I think, in the 1p sense, without a certain amount of equivocation. > There is a sense "God" select them all, but they inter-relations are > indexicals. > Yes, but the inner God cannot select them all simultaneously, without the equivocation to which I refer. > > > > And I suppose Hoyle's point is that if one imagines a logical > serialisation of all such moments, its order must be inconsequential > because of the intrinsic self-ordering of the moments themselves. > > > > That is the mathematical conception of an order, and there are dualities > between those ways of considering a structure. > > You can already see that with the modal logic, where properties of > accessibility will characterize modal formula and theories. > > > > Essentially he is saying that the panoptic bird view is somehow preserved > at the frog level, at the price of breaking the simultaneity of the > momentary views. > > > I am not sure I understand. > I think he is saying (as did Schroedinger) that the frog must see every indexical reality, but cannot see them all simultaneously. > > > > > > >> The "hypostatic" universal person is more like a universal baby, which >> can split in a much larger spectrum of future 1p histories, but
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote: On 26 February 2014 15:16, chris peck wrote: Hi Liz >> In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of "you" has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. Well what definition of 'you' do you suggest we use? What is your criterion for identity over time? Assuming comp it appears to be the state(s) that could follow on from your current brain state via whatever transitions rules are allowed by OK. - I assume - logical necessity. Perhaps Bruno can explain. There is no problem of identity. With comp, we can considered both the W-person and the M-person genuine H-person, and that is why the 1p- identity can be defined by the content of the personal memory, written in the diary that the experiencer takes with him/her/it. But in this case, the "transition" does not follow logic, as the fact that "I am in W", or that "I am in M" is contingent, from the 1p view. They know that they could have been the other one. Bt W and M are consistent with H. Of course "W & M" is inconsistent, as comp makes it impossible (without further transformations) to make H experiencing simultaneously W and M in the 1p view. Again, in the 3-1 view, from an outsider, which attribute politely consciousness and 1p subjective life to the both copies, H does experience W and M simultanepously, yet not from his personal views. He will never open the door of the reconstitution telebox and write "I see W and M". In fact, those saying that H = M and H = W, (despite M ≠ W), should agree that we experience all the experience of all conscious creature simultaneously, wchi might make sense in "God"'s eye, but not in our particular eyes. But this identity point is of no use in the reasoning presented here. With regards to Bruno's steps, at this point I actually don't feel I need a criterion myself. What I have instead is the yes-doctor assumption. In other words, whatever criterion is adopted it must satisfy the condition that whenever I am copied, destroyed and reconstructed somewhere else, the reconstruction IS me. Otherwise, unless suicidal, I would never say yes to the doctor. This is why I used to argue Bruno was hoist by his own petard because its his yes-doctor assumption that forces me to 'accommodate the fact that Ive split'. Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept "Yes Doctor" the rest of comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true, ? You might elaborate on this. What is the "rest", and why do you think it does not follow? Of course I define comp by "yes doctor" + Church's thesis. Bruno but that's the big leap. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 28 February 2014 14:03, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/27/2014 4:27 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 28 February 2014 05:29, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> And Liz-Washington said "I don't know if I am the one from Washington I >> drunk to much whisky and I lost the diary!" >> And Liz-Moscow said "I don't know if I am the one from Moscow, I drunk >> too much vodka and I lost the diary". >> >>GASP! How did you know? > > But losing the diary is no problem, if you're drunk on whisky you're from > Washington, if you're drunk on vodka you're the one from Moscow. > Waking up the following morning in Washington or Moscow might be a clue, too. Unless you've been kidnapped by philosophers while drunk and had your brain put in a vat, of course. (I suppose the next question is whether it's a vat of whisky or vodka...) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 2/27/2014 4:27 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 February 2014 05:29, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: And Liz-Washington said "I don't know if I am the one from Washington I drunk to much whisky and I lost the diary!" And Liz-Moscow said "I don't know if I am the one from Moscow, I drunk too much vodka and I lost the diary". GASP! How did you know? But losing the diary is no problem, if you're drunk on whisky you're from Washington, if you're drunk on vodka you're the one from Moscow. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 28 February 2014 05:29, Bruno Marchal wrote: > And Liz-Washington said "I don't know if I am the one from Washington I > drunk to much whisky and I lost the diary!" > And Liz-Moscow said "I don't know if I am the one from Moscow, I drunk too > much vodka and I lost the diary". > > GASP! How did you know? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 26 Feb 2014, at 07:44, chris peck wrote: Hi Bruno >> Of course, and my point is that comp aggravates that problem, as only extends the indterminacy from a wave to arithmetic. Personally, I don't think it makes a difference what the underlying substrata of reality consists of, So we might work on different subject. No problem. You are the one saying that there was a mistake. be it sums or some fundamental 'matter-esq' substance. What causes the problem is just the fact that in any TofE all outcomes are catered for. In such a theory genuine probabilities just vanish and subjective uncertainty can only exist as an epistemic measure. Very good. That is what happen in arithmetic with comp. In versions of MWI it can exist when a person is unable to locate himself in a particular branch. ie. in earlier versions of Deutsch where infinite numbers of universes run in parallel one might not know whether one is in a spin up or spin down universe. Or in your step 3, subjective uncertainty can exist after duplication but before opening the door. Do you agree that if today, I can be certain that I will find myself in front of something indeterminate, then I am now indeterminate about that future outcome? If you agree, then you are playing with words. If you disagree then explain. These people are unable to locate and that lack of knowledge translates into subjective uncertainty. Which was easily predictable (you just did), and so the guy in H can understand what we are talking about, and in which sense "W v M" is the best prediction, and "W and M" the worst. Even if correct in some different views. They can assign a probability value between 0 and 1 to possible outcomes. And the next step ask if a delay of reconstitution changes the expectations. But crucially, where all relevant facts are known, the only values available must be 1 or 0. Well, after the experience. But the question is asked before. That just follows from the fact that all outcomes are catered for. And it seems to me that H guy in step 3 has all these relevent facts. Indeed, but that is the very reason he can be sure of one thing: he cannot be sure where he will be in an iteration of self-duplication. The epistemic probabilities gives a normal distribution, in that protocols. So, whilst the duplicates before opening the door would assign 0.5 to M or W, prior to duplication H guy would assign 1. 1 to what events? No, that's the shift in the 3-1 again, using a non relevant principle, see above. This is why I have accused you in the past of smuggling probabilities in from the future which strikes me as very fishy. Insulting is not valid argumentation. Up to now, I see play word and hand waving to avoid a simple consequence of logic and mechanism. >> OK, I appreciate the work, but they don't address the mind-body problem. Still less the computationalist form of that problem. But they get the closer view of the physical possible with respect to both comp, and the mathematical theory (comp+Theaetetus). Im not arguing that these people have a complete or even coherent theory. My guess is that they don't, I mean who does? It is the object matter of this list. It seems like everyone but me thinks they are in direct contact with the one and only truth, but its all just hubris. It might well be the case that your theory fairs better than theirs on the mind-body problem and much else besides but so what? They do far better when it comes to probability assignment and subjective uncertainty, imho. My point is that if we assume comp, we have to extend Everett to a larger part, in arithmetic. And by doing this from self-reference, we get the communicable quanta and the non communicable qualia. I think. With their rich mathematics. Bruno All the best Chris From: allco...@gmail.com Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:33:21 +0100 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 2014-02-26 7:31 GMT+01:00 chris peck : Hi Liz >> I meant changed from our everyday definition, in which we normally assume there is only one you, which is (or is at least associated with) your physical structure. Which we generally assume exists in one universe. We lose that definition just by stepping into the realm of MWI don't we? Its not as if we can have use of it in MWI until we want to argue that we will always see 'spin up'. MWI forces upon us either the complete abandonment of any notion of personal identity over time, or the equal distribution of it through all the branches in which 'we' appear. That's where your wrong... that would mean all branches have equal measure, where it must not, if MWI must be in accordance with QM. http://plato.s
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 26 Feb 2014, at 07:21, chris peck wrote: Hi Bruno >> Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these. Read the posts by John Clark. I made clear that the first person expectation are what is confimred or not in the pesronal diaries of the copies, that is the 1-views, and it systematically describes only the 3-1- views, which is nice and correct, but not asked for. >>She should have said: "whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite". But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong! ? I am in H, I predict "I will see something definite, meaning W or M, but not a fuzzy superpostion of both". I push on the button. I open the door, I see Washington. Well defined old Washington. I can only write "W" in my diary, and assess my prediction "I will see something definite, meaning W or M, but not a fuzzy superposition of both"." The same for the "I" opening the door and seeing the well defined old Moscow. he too sees something definite, and assess the prediction. By definition of the 1p, it is on that personal confirmation or refutation that bears the indeterminacy. >> And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome". You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to be seen. But I can only use what is seen, to refute or assess the prediction, that is what can be expected to be see. The 1/3 distinctions makes it possible to handled in 3p description only (making a logical derivation of the argument looking like a play with word). I think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect to see each outcome without being committed to the view that either future self sees both. Of course, but this is the 3-1 view, and we have agreed on that. In that case, she can also consider that from both it will looks like they got freely one bit of information, and that is the FPI. All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen to divert attention from the simple error you make here, isn't it? The contrary. It is needed to avoid the ambiguities. And the 1p/3p relations is really an important part of the computionalist, or not, mind-body problem, so your remark seems awkward. In AUDA, the translation in arithmetic, the 3p and 1p will correspond to different arithmetical modal logic related to self-reference. "The rubbishy smoke screen", is the very subject matter. I submit a problem, and partial solutions, testable, and up to now tested (thanks to both Gödel and QM). Bruno All the best Chris. From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100 On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues: "What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down." That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact. Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should have said: "whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite". And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome". Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group an
Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 24 Feb 2014, at 23:04, LizR wrote:
On 24 February 2014 07:57, Bruno Marchal wrote:
About [](A -> B) -> ([]A -> []B), let me ask you a more precise
exercise.
Convince yourself that this formula is true in all worlds, of all
Kripke multiverses, with any illumination.
Hint: you might try a reductio ad absurdum. try to build a
multiverse in which that law would be violated.
[](A -> B) -> ([]A -> []B)
OK. For a disconnected universe this is t -> (t -> t) or t -> t
which is true.
And for a Leibniz universe, I'm fairly sure this is also true.
So that leaves {alpha R alpha} and {alpha R beta} and so on,
for any number of universes + relations.
Maybe I can come back on this one.
Sure. Me too. (I will myself be plausibly slowed down, as I have two
weeks of teaching, take your time, just try to not forget what you
learn, by having good summary, that you can read from time to time).
Well, does an illuminated Kripke universe effectively act as a
Leibniz universe?
In both you need the notion of "all illuminations" to have the notion
of law for a multiverse.
In the realm of the Kripke multiverse, the Leibnizian one are the much
more particular one characterized by having their relation being
"equivalence relation" (they are reflexive, symmetric, and transitive).
Indeed, in Leibniz, []p is true if true in all universes, no matter
how accessible their are or not. It is like their are all equivalent
with respect to accessibility.
Brent, Liz, here is my gift from the 24th February: an exercise!
Below.
If so this is definitely true (OK I try to jump in quickly here...)
You do good work, but I am not sure if you have good notes. That is
not grave, but not helpful to you.
Yes, I know - about the notes, I mean. (Maybe I just need to search
the list for []p to find some...)
You will get too many, and it is only in writing the information, that
you will maximize the ability to integrate them, and develop some
familiarity.
Never hesitate to ask for any definition or recall.
Thank you, don't worry I will :)
And Liz-Washington said "I don't know if I am the one from Washington
I drunk to much whisky and I lost the diary!"
And Liz-Moscow said "I don't know if I am the one from Moscow, I drunk
too much vodka and I lost the diary".
The modal logic part is not the real thing. The "real thing" will be
the interview of universal and Löbian machines, and some modal
logics will just sum up infinite conversations we can have with
them, notably on predictions and physics.
Yes, that is where it all happens! But I feel like I am quite a way
from that.
I told you we have to empty the ocean with a tea spoon.
Don't worry, modal logic, here, will be a powerful tool.
Take it easy, I know that studying this is time consuming.
I hope you will see the main line. Keep in mind that the reversal
physics/number-theology is justified in UDA, AUDA just translates it
more constructively in arithmetic, and give the "comp" arithmetical
quantizations. It is an open problem if they emulate or not a quantum
computer.
Bruno
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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On Tue, Feb 25, 2014 at 1:21 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> provide the algorithm of prediction. >>> >> >> >> Why? What does that have to do with the price of eggs? FPI is about >> the feeling of self and prediction has nothing to do with it. >> > > > FPI = first person indeterminacy > Sorry, I was guessing something along the lines of FPI = first person interpretation. Your obscure homemade acronym for something that already has a perfectly good name, uncertainty, has tripped me up yet again. And I'm afraid I can't do as you request, I am unable to provide an algorithm that can correctly predict all external events that could effect me. >> You said that "we have to interview all copies" and I agree. After the >> interviews this is what we find: >> W" has not refuted it. >> "M" has not refuted it. >> "W & M" have confirmed it. >> > > > In the 3-1 views. I guess you're right, after all you invented "the 3-1 views" so you must know what it means. I wish I did. You miss this only by confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-view, >>> >> >> >> Who's "the 1-view"? >> > >> > Each of them. Who is this Mr. them who has "the 1-view"? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi David, On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:32, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck wrote: >>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me, retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome. Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that. Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to be the sole fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a heuristic for collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation onto the perspective of a single, universal observer. From this perspective, the situation of being faced with duplication is just a random selection from the class of all possible observer moments. Well, the "just" might be not that easy to define. If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to get a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable than being me or you. But how would "you" remember that? By noting it in my diary, by inquesting my past, and hacking data banks, or reading book on "my" origin. I am not sure that the notion of "observer moment" makes sense, without a notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative states. I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a universal (self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p & p), an observer ([]p & <>p), and a feeler ([]p & <>p & p)). But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in arithmetic and is associated with all relatively self-referential correct löbian number) will select among all "observer moment". Well, perhaps "eventually" it will select all of them, if we can give some relevant sense to eventually in this context. Is this not done by simple 3p arithmetical realism? There is a sense "God" select them all, but they inter-relations are indexicals. And I suppose Hoyle's point is that if one imagines a logical serialisation of all such moments, its order must be inconsequential because of the intrinsic self-ordering of the moments themselves. That is the mathematical conception of an order, and there are dualities between those ways of considering a structure. You can already see that with the modal logic, where properties of accessibility will characterize modal formula and theories. Essentially he is saying that the panoptic bird view is somehow preserved at the frog level, at the price of breaking the simultaneity of the momentary views. I am not sure I understand. The "hypostatic" universal person is more like a universal baby, which can split in a much larger spectrum of future 1p histories, but from its first person perspective it is like it has still to go through the histories to get the right relative statistics on his most probable universal neighbors. Won't this still be effectively satisfied by Hoyle's heuristic? ISTM that "going through the histories" is a notion that splits in the 3p and 1p views. It splits the 1-p views, as in the 3-1 views, the 1-views themselves never split. I suppose this is equivalent to conceiving observer moments as self- ordering monads in terms of which any random serialisation over the entire class must eventually preserve the right relative statistics. Eventually I use only s, 0, +, *, and classical logic. May be you will get the tools to make this enough precise so that I see what you are talking about. This is "my" problem, I have to unravel things in term of numbers relations. The 8 "hypostases", and their multimodal combinations provides means to take into account many nuances. I am not sure about "observer moment", although for the 1p I guided myself through possible semantics for the S4Grz logics. "Eventually" here relies on a similar opacity to delays in continuation as you argue in the UDA, plus the reliance on
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 26 February 2014 19:31, chris peck wrote: > Hi Liz > > *>> I meant changed from our everyday definition, in which we normally > assume there is only one you, which is (or is at least associated with) > your physical structure. Which we generally assume exists in one universe.* > > We lose that definition just by stepping into the realm of MWI don't we? > Its not as if we can have use of it in MWI until we want to argue that we > will always see 'spin up'. > > MWI forces upon us either the complete abandonment of any notion of > personal identity over time, or the equal distribution of it through all > the branches in which 'we' appear. > > Yes indeed. However we do cling on to our "apparent identities" even if we do believe the MWI is correct. For example I expect to go to work tomorrow, rather than unexpectedly being declared Empress of the Universe and never having to lift a finger again. I think we all know what happens once the MWI is assumed. The rest is just arguing over terminology. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Bruno >> Of course, and my point is that comp aggravates that problem, as only >> extends the indterminacy from a wave to arithmetic. Personally, I don't think it makes a difference what the underlying substrata of reality consists of, be it sums or some fundamental 'matter-esq' substance. What causes the problem is just the fact that in any TofE all outcomes are catered for. In such a theory genuine probabilities just vanish and subjective uncertainty can only exist as an epistemic measure. In versions of MWI it can exist when a person is unable to locate himself in a particular branch. ie. in earlier versions of Deutsch where infinite numbers of universes run in parallel one might not know whether one is in a spin up or spin down universe. Or in your step 3, subjective uncertainty can exist after duplication but before opening the door. These people are unable to locate and that lack of knowledge translates into subjective uncertainty. They can assign a probability value between 0 and 1 to possible outcomes. But crucially, where all relevant facts are known, the only values available must be 1 or 0. That just follows from the fact that all outcomes are catered for. And it seems to me that H guy in step 3 has all these relevent facts. So, whilst the duplicates before opening the door would assign 0.5 to M or W, prior to duplication H guy would assign 1. This is why I have accused you in the past of smuggling probabilities in from the future which strikes me as very fishy. >> OK, I appreciate the work, but they don't address the mind-body problem. >> Still less the computationalist form of that problem. But they get the >> closer view of the physical possible with respect to both comp, and the >> mathematical theory (comp+Theaetetus). Im not arguing that these people have a complete or even coherent theory. My guess is that they don't, I mean who does? It seems like everyone but me thinks they are in direct contact with the one and only truth, but its all just hubris. It might well be the case that your theory fairs better than theirs on the mind-body problem and much else besides but so what? They do far better when it comes to probability assignment and subjective uncertainty, imho. All the best Chris From: allco...@gmail.com Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:33:21 +0100 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 2014-02-26 7:31 GMT+01:00 chris peck : Hi Liz >> I meant changed from our everyday definition, in which we normally assume >> there is only one you, which is (or is at least associated with) your >> physical structure. Which we generally assume exists in one universe. We lose that definition just by stepping into the realm of MWI don't we? Its not as if we can have use of it in MWI until we want to argue that we will always see 'spin up'. MWI forces upon us either the complete abandonment of any notion of personal identity over time, or the equal distribution of it through all the branches in which 'we' appear. That's where your wrong... that would mean all branches have equal measure, where it must not, if MWI must be in accordance with QM. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#PRPO All the best Chris. From: allco...@gmail.com Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:28:53 +0100 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 2014-02-26 7:21 GMT+01:00 chris peck : Hi Bruno >> Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these. >>She should have said: "whatever she knows she will see, she should expect >>(with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite". But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong! >> And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome". You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to be seen. I think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect to see each outcome without being committed to the view that either future self sees both. All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen to divert attention from the simple error you make here, isn't it? She can make a probabilistic prediction as you can make in MWI... you're the one wanting to say probability are wrong, but only the interpretation of what is probability change in MWI (and duplication settings)... not the prediction... if you say it is totally useless, then you're ready to make a bet with me (as everything for your has equal probability of happening...) Quentin All the best Chris. From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) D
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
2014-02-26 7:31 GMT+01:00 chris peck : > Hi Liz > > > *>> I meant changed from our everyday definition, in which we normally > assume there is only one you, which is (or is at least associated with) > your physical structure. Which we generally assume exists in one universe.* > > We lose that definition just by stepping into the realm of MWI don't we? > Its not as if we can have use of it in MWI until we want to argue that we > will always see 'spin up'. > > MWI forces upon us either the complete abandonment of any notion of > personal identity over time, or the equal distribution of it through all > the branches in which 'we' appear. > That's where your wrong... that would mean all branches have equal measure, where it must not, if MWI must be in accordance with QM. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#PRPO > > All the best > > Chris. > > -- > From: allco...@gmail.com > Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:28:53 +0100 > > Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > > > > > 2014-02-26 7:21 GMT+01:00 chris peck : > > Hi Bruno > > > >> Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. > > There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these. > > > >>She should have said: "whatever she knows she will see, she should > expect (with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite". > > But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong! > > >> And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome". > > You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to be > seen. I think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect to > see each outcome without being committed to the view that either future > self sees both. All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen > to divert attention from the simple error you make here, isn't it? > > > She can make a probabilistic prediction as you can make in MWI... you're > the one wanting to say probability are wrong, but only the interpretation > of what is probability change in MWI (and duplication settings)... not the > prediction... if you say it is totally useless, then you're ready to make a > bet with me (as everything for your has equal probability of happening...) > > Quentin > > > All the best > > Chris. > > -- > From: marc...@ulb.ac.be > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) > Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100 > > > > On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin > down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion > of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues: > > *"What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following > premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with > certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, > and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down."* > > That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact. > > > > Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should have > said: > > > "whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to > see SOMETHING definite". And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see > both outcome". > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Liz >> I meant changed from our everyday definition, in which we normally assume >> there is only one you, which is (or is at least associated with) your >> physical structure. Which we generally assume exists in one universe. We lose that definition just by stepping into the realm of MWI don't we? Its not as if we can have use of it in MWI until we want to argue that we will always see 'spin up'. MWI forces upon us either the complete abandonment of any notion of personal identity over time, or the equal distribution of it through all the branches in which 'we' appear. All the best Chris. From: allco...@gmail.com Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:28:53 +0100 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 2014-02-26 7:21 GMT+01:00 chris peck : Hi Bruno >> Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these. >>She should have said: "whatever she knows she will see, she should expect >>(with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite". But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong! >> And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome". You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to be seen. I think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect to see each outcome without being committed to the view that either future self sees both. All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen to divert attention from the simple error you make here, isn't it? She can make a probabilistic prediction as you can make in MWI... you're the one wanting to say probability are wrong, but only the interpretation of what is probability change in MWI (and duplication settings)... not the prediction... if you say it is totally useless, then you're ready to make a bet with me (as everything for your has equal probability of happening...) Quentin All the best Chris. From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100 On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues: "What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down." That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact. Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should have said: "whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite". And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome". Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. T
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
2014-02-26 7:28 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux : > > > > 2014-02-26 7:21 GMT+01:00 chris peck : > > Hi Bruno >> >> >> >> Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. >> >> There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these. >> >> >> >>She should have said: "whatever she knows she will see, she should >> expect (with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite". >> >> But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong! >> >> >> And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome". >> >> You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to be >> seen. I think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect to >> see each outcome without being committed to the view that either future >> self sees both. All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen >> to divert attention from the simple error you make here, isn't it? >> > And so your error come from the no probability smoke screen you use as defense... Don't say Deutsch follows you, he accept probabilistic prediction, he even explains at length how a rational agent in MWI would follow the probabilistic distribution when making a choice. Quentin > > She can make a probabilistic prediction as you can make in MWI... you're > the one wanting to say probability are wrong, but only the interpretation > of what is probability change in MWI (and duplication settings)... not the > prediction... if you say it is totally useless, then you're ready to make a > bet with me (as everything for your has equal probability of happening...) > > Quentin > >> >> All the best >> >> Chris. >> >> -- >> From: marc...@ulb.ac.be >> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com >> >> Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) >> Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100 >> >> >> >> On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin >> down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion >> of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues: >> >> *"What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following >> premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with >> certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, >> and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down."* >> >> That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact. >> >> >> >> Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should have >> said: >> >> >> "whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to >> see SOMETHING definite". And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see >> both outcome". >> >> Bruno >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
2014-02-26 7:21 GMT+01:00 chris peck : > Hi Bruno > > > >> Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. > > There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these. > > > >>She should have said: "whatever she knows she will see, she should > expect (with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite". > > But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong! > > >> And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome". > > You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to be > seen. I think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect to > see each outcome without being committed to the view that either future > self sees both. All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen > to divert attention from the simple error you make here, isn't it? > She can make a probabilistic prediction as you can make in MWI... you're the one wanting to say probability are wrong, but only the interpretation of what is probability change in MWI (and duplication settings)... not the prediction... if you say it is totally useless, then you're ready to make a bet with me (as everything for your has equal probability of happening...) Quentin > > All the best > > Chris. > > ---------- > From: marc...@ulb.ac.be > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) > Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100 > > > > On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin > down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion > of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues: > > *"What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following > premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with > certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, > and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down."* > > That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact. > > > > Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should have > said: > > > "whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to > see SOMETHING definite". And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see > both outcome". > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Bruno >> Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these. >>She should have said: "whatever she knows she will see, she should expect >>(with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite". But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong! >> And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome". You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to be seen. I think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect to see each outcome without being committed to the view that either future self sees both. All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen to divert attention from the simple error you make here, isn't it? All the best Chris. From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100 On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues: "What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down." That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact. Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should have said: "whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite". And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome". Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues: "What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down." That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact. Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should have said: "whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite". And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome". Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Chris, I wait your answer to my post. The one I re-explained and ask "what is wrong above". Please use the 1-p distinction, which is the key precision to get things right (which is why Clark systematically forget it to "refute" step 3). Bruno On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:16, chris peck wrote: Hi Liz >> In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of "you" has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. Well what definition of 'you' do you suggest we use? What is your criterion for identity over time? With regards to Bruno's steps, at this point I actually don't feel I need a criterion myself. What I have instead is the yes-doctor assumption. In other words, whatever criterion is adopted it must satisfy the condition that whenever I am copied, destroyed and reconstructed somewhere else, the reconstruction IS me. Otherwise, unless suicidal, I would never say yes to the doctor. This is why I used to argue Bruno was hoisted by his own petard because its his yes-doctor assumption that forces me to 'accommodate the fact that Ive split'. All the best Chris. > From: marc...@ulb.ac.be > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) > Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 19:21:00 +0100 > > > On 25 Feb 2014, at 18:35, John Clark wrote: > > > > > > > > provide the algorithm of prediction. > > > > Why? What does that have to do with the price of eggs? FPI is about > > the feeling of self and prediction has nothing to do with it. > > FPI = first person indeterminacy of result of experience having two > outcome due to digital self-duplication. > > > > > > > > "W & M" has been refuted. > > > > You said that "we have to interview all copies" and I agree. After > > the interviews this is what we find: > > > > W" has not refuted it. > > "M" has not refuted it. > > "W & M" have confirmed it. > > In the 3-1 views. > > > > > > > > > You miss this only by confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-view, > > > > Who's "the 1-view"? > > Each of them. > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 26 February 2014 15:53, chris peck wrote: > Hi Liz > > *>>Assuming comp it appears to be the state(s) that could follow on from > your current brain state via whatever transitions rules are allowed by - I > assume - logical necessity. Perhaps Bruno can explain.* > > let me ask a more round about question: > > you say that we see spin up every time 'if the definition of "you" has > been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split' > > Changed from which definition? > I meant changed from our everyday definition, in which we normally assume there is only one you, which is (or is at least associated with) your physical structure. Which we generally assume exists in one universe. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Liz >>Assuming comp it appears to be the state(s) that could follow on from your current brain state via whatever transitions rules are allowed by - I assume - logical necessity. Perhaps Bruno can explain. let me ask a more round about question: you say that we see spin up every time 'if the definition of "you" has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split' Changed from which definition? All the best Chris. Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 15:31:01 +1300 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 26 February 2014 15:16, chris peck wrote: Hi Liz >> In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of "you" has >> been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. Well what definition of 'you' do you suggest we use? What is your criterion for identity over time? Assuming comp it appears to be the state(s) that could follow on from your current brain state via whatever transitions rules are allowed by - I assume - logical necessity. Perhaps Bruno can explain. With regards to Bruno's steps, at this point I actually don't feel I need a criterion myself. What I have instead is the yes-doctor assumption. In other words, whatever criterion is adopted it must satisfy the condition that whenever I am copied, destroyed and reconstructed somewhere else, the reconstruction IS me. Otherwise, unless suicidal, I would never say yes to the doctor. This is why I used to argue Bruno was hoist by his own petard because its his yes-doctor assumption that forces me to 'accommodate the fact that Ive split'. Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept "Yes Doctor" the rest of comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true, but that's the big leap. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 26 February 2014 15:16, chris peck wrote: > Hi Liz > > *>> In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of > "you" has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. * > > Well what definition of 'you' do you suggest we use? What is your > criterion for identity over time? > Assuming comp it appears to be the state(s) that could follow on from your current brain state via whatever transitions rules are allowed by - I assume - logical necessity. Perhaps Bruno can explain. > > With regards to Bruno's steps, at this point I actually don't feel I need > a criterion myself. What I have instead is the yes-doctor assumption. In > other words, whatever criterion is adopted it must satisfy the condition > that whenever I am copied, destroyed and reconstructed somewhere else, the > reconstruction IS me. Otherwise, unless suicidal, I would never say yes to > the doctor. > > This is why I used to argue Bruno was hoist by his own petard because its > his yes-doctor assumption that forces me to 'accommodate the fact that Ive > split'. > > Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept "Yes Doctor" the rest of comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true, but that's the big leap. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Liz >> In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of "you" has >> been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. Well what definition of 'you' do you suggest we use? What is your criterion for identity over time? With regards to Bruno's steps, at this point I actually don't feel I need a criterion myself. What I have instead is the yes-doctor assumption. In other words, whatever criterion is adopted it must satisfy the condition that whenever I am copied, destroyed and reconstructed somewhere else, the reconstruction IS me. Otherwise, unless suicidal, I would never say yes to the doctor. This is why I used to argue Bruno was hoisted by his own petard because its his yes-doctor assumption that forces me to 'accommodate the fact that Ive split'. All the best Chris. > From: marc...@ulb.ac.be > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) > Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 19:21:00 +0100 > > > On 25 Feb 2014, at 18:35, John Clark wrote: > > > > > > > > provide the algorithm of prediction. > > > > Why? What does that have to do with the price of eggs? FPI is about > > the feeling of self and prediction has nothing to do with it. > > FPI = first person indeterminacy of result of experience having two > outcome due to digital self-duplication. > > > > > > > > "W & M" has been refuted. > > > > You said that "we have to interview all copies" and I agree. After > > the interviews this is what we find: > > > > W" has not refuted it. > > "M" has not refuted it. > > "W & M" have confirmed it. > > In the 3-1 views. > > > > > > > > > You miss this only by confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-view, > > > > Who's "the 1-view"? > > Each of them. > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 25 Feb 2014, at 18:35, John Clark wrote: > provide the algorithm of prediction. Why? What does that have to do with the price of eggs? FPI is about the feeling of self and prediction has nothing to do with it. FPI = first person indeterminacy of result of experience having two outcome due to digital self-duplication. > "W & M" has been refuted. You said that "we have to interview all copies" and I agree. After the interviews this is what we find: W" has not refuted it. "M" has not refuted it. "W & M" have confirmed it. In the 3-1 views. > You miss this only by confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-view, Who's "the 1-view"? Each of them. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 25 Feb 2014, at 10:43, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> David Deutsch does not reject probability... Sure he does, he swaps out the Born rule for rational decision theory (+ amendments to make it compatible with MWI). There isn't probability, but we should act 'as if' there was. Its what he's famous for, Quentin. I think Deustch is more famous for the quantum universal Turing machine. To say "There isn't probability, but we should act 'as if' there was." seems to me to oversimplify what he says, as it is close to non sense to me. With comp this would extends into there is no physical reality, but we should act as if. It is still better than "there is no consciousness, but we must act as if". Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 25 Feb 2014, at 01:05, chris peck wrote: The point is that how probability fits into MWI's determinist framework, or any TofE really, is still an open question. Of course, and my point is that comp aggravates that problem, as only extends the indterminacy from a wave to arithmetic. But then I show that comp+theaetetus provides the means to test the theory. And to argue that must reject MWI if they reject Brunos probability sums is plain wrong. Im happy to find myself in the company of Oxford Dons like Deutsch and Greaves. OK, I appreciate the work, but they don't address the mind-body problem. Still less the computationalist form of that problem. But they get the closer view of the physical possible with respect to both comp, and the mathematical theory (comp+Theaetetus). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On Sun, Feb 23, 2014 at 1:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Did the Helsinki Man see Washington and Moscow? Yes. >>> >>> >>> In the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view. >>> >> >> > >> In who's "1-1 view"? You'll probably say in "The Helsinki Man's" >> > > > No. The W-man and the M-m > But that's 2 not one, so if Bruno Marchal wishes to be logical then Bruno Marchal is going to have to stop saying "the" 1-1 view and start saying "a" 1-1 view. > >> but his view is just of Helsinki. Perhaps you mean the future "1 view" > of the Helsinki Man. If so then anybody who can remember having the past "1 > view" of the Helsinki Man would fit that description; so the Helsinki Man > will see both Washington and Moscow. > > > In the 3-1 views. Not in the 1-1 views. > In who's 1-1 view? > >>> I said that we have to interview all copies. >> > > >> Good, then I never want to hear you say again that the Washington Man > saying that he didn't see Moscow contradicts the claim that the Helsinki > man will see both Washington AND Moscow. > > > In the 3-1 views. Not in the 1-1 view. > In who's 1-1 view? > > this looks like wordplay > The reason it's so childishly easy to play with your words and tie them into logical knots is because they are so self contradictory; if your words made sense I couldn't do that. > If the FPI does not exist > I never said it does not exist, what I said is that in a world with duplicating chambers great care must be taken in explaining exactly who the "P" in the FPI is, and you have been anything but careful. > provide the algorithm of prediction. > Why? What does that have to do with the price of eggs? FPI is about the feeling of self and prediction has nothing to do with it. > "W & M" has been refuted. > You said that "we have to interview all copies" and I agree. After the interviews this is what we find: W" has not refuted it. "M" has not refuted it. "W & M" have confirmed it. > You miss this only by confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-view, > Who's "the 1-view"? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
2014-02-25 15:02 GMT+01:00 chris peck : > Hi Quentin > > > *>> I don't refuse to read them. You've cited *one* paper, I didn't have > time to read it, I will this week.* > > Ah so you dismiss things that you havent read then? Impressive! > > I don't... I've said it's about the abstract, and I didn't *dismiss* it. > > > *>> The abstract though did not reject probability calculus, only the > interpretation of what it means. It is clear that in MWI setting > probability is not about what happen and what does not,* > > If I say that x will happen with 50% probability I certainly am talking > about things happening or not happening and if it is "clear" that > probability is not about that in MWI, then it is clear that probability in > MWI is not about probability. > WTF ?? Do you claim people when they are taking MWI seriously say that 0.5 probability to see spin up, means if you see spin up, the spin down version of the observer does not exists ? Do you really claim that ? because with MWI, both version do exist, so sure probability in MWI settings is not about what exists and what doesn't... it's about measure and frequency, what else could it be ? > > *>> but about frequency and measure... that doesn't render probability > meaningless... proof is, as you always are in *one* world, your measure > will follow the predicted distribution.* > > > So you're strategy is to try and semantically wriggle out of the claims > you make? Pretend the words you use have a different meaning than they > really do? > > So your strategy is to troll ? Have I got it right ? > > > *>> f you want to assert thing and not back them up, well...* > > But I did back up what I said. > No you didn't. > You couldn't be arsed to read the paper about Deutsch I offered, remember? > Which paper ? > You're the only one here refusing to back up claims. Perhaps you should > give up on yourself? > I do. > > > Here's Deutsh from the abstract of his paper: "Quantum Theory of > Probability and Decisions" > > > > > > *"The probabilistic predictions of quantum theory are conventionally > obtainedfrom a special probabilistic axiom. But that is unnecessary because > all the practical consequences of such predictions follow from the > remaining, non-probabilistic, axioms of quantum theory, together with the > non-probabilisticpart of classical decision theory"* > > Read it carefully. It makes clear that he believes that all relevent > predictions can be made from "non probabilistic axioms". You're not going > to turn around and argue that he meant 'probabilistic axioms' are you? > He didn't reject "*The probabilistic predictions" *he's just saying as I do... that it doesn't mean some things happens or not... as with MWI clearly every non zero probability do happen... what else could it mean ? > > > And from the conclusion: > > > > > > *"No probabilistic axiom is required in quantum theory. A decision maker > who believes only the non-probabilistic part of the theory, and is > ‘rational’ in the sensedefined by a strictly non-probabilistic restriction > of classical decision theory, willmake all decisions that depend on > predicting the outcomes of measurements as if those outcomes were > determined by stochastic processes, * > > ***with probabilities given by axiom (1). *** > Wait ? what ? he's talking about probabilities or what ? Quentin > > > > *(However, in other respects he will not behave as if he believed > thatstochastic processes occur. For instance if asked whether they occur he > will certainly reply ‘no’, because the non-probabilistic axioms of quantum > theory require the stateto evolve in a continuous and deterministic way.)"* > > Now if you want to make the case that Deutsch 'does not reject > probability' whilst he is insisting, indeed founding his reputation on the > claim that 'no probabilistic axiom is required in quantum theory' be my > guest. Im always up for a laugh. > > All the best > > Chris. > > -- > From: allco...@gmail.com > Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 10:43:33 +0100 > > Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > > > > > 2014-02-25 8:43 GMT+01:00 chris peck : > > Hi Quentin > > *>>That's nonsense, * > > The point wasn't whether you think its nonsense or not. I couldn't care > less about that. we were arguing about whether there are Oxford Dons who
RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Quentin >> I don't refuse to read them. You've cited *one* paper, I didn't have time to >> read it, I will this week. Ah so you dismiss things that you havent read then? Impressive! >> The abstract though did not reject probability calculus, only the >> interpretation of what it means. It is clear that in MWI setting probability >> is not about what happen and what does not, If I say that x will happen with 50% probability I certainly am talking about things happening or not happening and if it is "clear" that probability is not about that in MWI, then it is clear that probability in MWI is not about probability. >> but about frequency and measure... that doesn't render probability >> meaningless... proof is, as you always are in *one* world, your measure will >> follow the predicted distribution. So you're strategy is to try and semantically wriggle out of the claims you make? Pretend the words you use have a different meaning than they really do? >> f you want to assert thing and not back them up, well... But I did back up what I said. You couldn't be arsed to read the paper about Deutsch I offered, remember? You're the only one here refusing to back up claims. Perhaps you should give up on yourself? Here's Deutsh from the abstract of his paper: "Quantum Theory of Probability and Decisions" "The probabilistic predictions of quantum theory are conventionally obtained from a special probabilistic axiom. But that is unnecessary because all the practical consequences of such predictions follow from the remaining, non- probabilistic, axioms of quantum theory, together with the non-probabilistic part of classical decision theory" Read it carefully. It makes clear that he believes that all relevent predictions can be made from "non probabilistic axioms". You're not going to turn around and argue that he meant 'probabilistic axioms' are you? And from the conclusion: "No probabilistic axiom is required in quantum theory. A decision maker who believes only the non-probabilistic part of the theory, and is 'rational' in the sense defined by a strictly non-probabilistic restriction of classical decision theory, will make all decisions that depend on predicting the outcomes of measurements as if those outcomes were determined by stochastic processes, with probabilities given by axiom (1). (However, in other respects he will not behave as if he believed that stochastic processes occur. For instance if asked whether they occur he will certainly reply 'no', because the non-probabilistic axioms of quantum theory require the state to evolve in a continuous and deterministic way.)" Now if you want to make the case that Deutsch 'does not reject probability' whilst he is insisting, indeed founding his reputation on the claim that 'no probabilistic axiom is required in quantum theory' be my guest. Im always up for a laugh. All the best Chris. From: allco...@gmail.com Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 10:43:33 +0100 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 2014-02-25 8:43 GMT+01:00 chris peck : Hi Quentin >>That's nonsense, The point wasn't whether you think its nonsense or not. I couldn't care less about that. we were arguing about whether there are Oxford Dons who adopt the same standpoint as me, and given your little outburst above I think you've just discovered that there are. And that they are publishing these ideas in respected and peer reviewed journals. Just to recap then: It is perfectly respectable to reject the notion of subjective uncertainty without abandoning MWI. Just as I said. >> and contrary to observed fact. I always wince when you throw that one out. How does one break it to the angriest member of a list that they are continually begging the question? >> David Deutsch does not reject probability... Sure he does, he swaps out the Born rule for rational decision theory (+ amendments to make it compatible with MWI). There isn't probability, but we should act 'as if' there was. Its what he's famous for, Quentin. o_O... he doesn't reject probability usage. >>or could you please show a quote where he does. Do your own homework, mate. I'm not your little quote monkey. Ok, I give up talking to you, if you want to assert thing and not back them up, well... I've kindly described to you what I think people like Deutsch and Wallace argue, I've supplied papers which you've refused to read. I don't refuse to read them. You've cited *one* paper, I didn't have time to read it, I will this week. The abstract though did not reject probability calculus, only the interpretation of
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
2014-02-25 8:43 GMT+01:00 chris peck : > Hi Quentin > > *>>That's nonsense, * > > The point wasn't whether you think its nonsense or not. I couldn't care > less about that. we were arguing about whether there are Oxford Dons who > adopt the same standpoint as me, and given your little outburst above I > think you've just discovered that there are. And that they are publishing > these ideas in respected and peer reviewed journals. > > Just to recap then: It is perfectly respectable to reject the notion of > subjective uncertainty without abandoning MWI. Just as I said. > > > *>> and contrary to observed fact. * > > I always wince when you throw that one out. How does one break it to the > angriest member of a list that they are continually begging the question? > > > > *>> David Deutsch does not reject probability... * > > Sure he does, he swaps out the Born rule for rational decision theory (+ > amendments to make it compatible with MWI). There isn't probability, but we > should act 'as if' there was. Its what he's famous for, Quentin. > o_O... he doesn't reject probability usage. > > > > *>>or could you please show a quote where he does.* > Do your own homework, mate. I'm not your little quote monkey. > Ok, I give up talking to you, if you want to assert thing and not back them up, well... > I've kindly described to you what I think people like Deutsch and Wallace > argue, I've supplied papers which you've refused to read. > I don't refuse to read them. You've cited *one* paper, I didn't have time to read it, I will this week. The abstract though did not reject probability calculus, only the interpretation of what it means. It is clear that in MWI setting probability is not about what happen and what does not, but about frequency and measure... that doesn't render probability meaningless... proof is, as you always are in *one* world, your measure will follow the predicted distribution... so what's your point ? > if you disagree you need display the same generosity and explain to me > what you think they are arguing and how that is different. > See upper Quentin > Waving your hands in the air demanding more and more to unceremoniously > and uncritically ditch is no-ones idea of fun. > > All the best > > Chris. > > -- > Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 20:26:52 +1300 > > Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) > From: lizj...@gmail.com > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > > In the MWI you *do* see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of > "you" has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. Or to put > it another way, you (now) will become you (who sees spin up) and you (who > sees spin down), which by then will be two different people. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Quentin >>That's nonsense, The point wasn't whether you think its nonsense or not. I couldn't care less about that. we were arguing about whether there are Oxford Dons who adopt the same standpoint as me, and given your little outburst above I think you've just discovered that there are. And that they are publishing these ideas in respected and peer reviewed journals. Just to recap then: It is perfectly respectable to reject the notion of subjective uncertainty without abandoning MWI. Just as I said. >> and contrary to observed fact. I always wince when you throw that one out. How does one break it to the angriest member of a list that they are continually begging the question? >> David Deutsch does not reject probability... Sure he does, he swaps out the Born rule for rational decision theory (+ amendments to make it compatible with MWI). There isn't probability, but we should act 'as if' there was. Its what he's famous for, Quentin. >>or could you please show a quote where he does. Do your own homework, mate. I'm not your little quote monkey. I've kindly described to you what I think people like Deutsch and Wallace argue, I've supplied papers which you've refused to read. if you disagree you need display the same generosity and explain to me what you think they are arguing and how that is different. Waving your hands in the air demanding more and more to unceremoniously and uncritically ditch is no-ones idea of fun. All the best Chris. Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 20:26:52 +1300 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of "you" has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. Or to put it another way, you (now) will become you (who sees spin up) and you (who sees spin down), which by then will be two different people. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
In the MWI you *do* see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of "you" has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. Or to put it another way, you (now) will become you (who sees spin up) and you (who sees spin down), which by then will be two different people. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
2014-02-25 1:05 GMT+01:00 chris peck : > Hi Quentin > > > > *>>As I see from the abstract, he doesn't reject probability calculus, > only the interpretation of it... I'll read the article later. * > > Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin > down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion > of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues: > > *"What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following > premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with > certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, > and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down."* > > That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact. > > *>> One reason for MWI, is to explain the observed QM probabilities... * > > No, MWI was devised in response to the measurement problem but in > abandoning wave function collapse Everett ends up with a theory which is > very parsimonious but entirely deterministic. How to then account for > probability in a determinist framework has become the Achilles heel of MWI > not its raison d'être. > > Since Everett there have been numerous attempts to smuggle an account of > probability back into the theory, and more recent attempts: Deutsch, > Wallace, Greaves etc., do that by abandoning the concept of subjective > uncertainty altogether and replacing it with some kind of rational action > principle. In otherwords, you can expect to see spin up and spin down, but > you should act as if there was some objective bias towards one or the > other. The approach comes complete with its own set of philosophical > problems. > > The point is that how probability fits into MWI's determinist framework, > or any TofE really, is still an open question. And to argue that must > reject MWI if they reject Brunos probability sums is plain wrong. Im happy > to find myself in the company of Oxford Dons like Deutsch and Greaves. > David Deutsch does not reject probability... or could you please show a quote where he does. > > > *>> your theory is disproven by fact... you never see constant spin up... > which should be the case if the probability to measure spin up was one.* > > See above. > Well what I see does not seem to make sense. Regards, Quentin > > All the best > > Chris. > > -- > From: da...@davidnyman.com > Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 16:32:01 + > > Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > > On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote: > > On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck wrote: > > *>>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures > in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of > me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me, > retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome.* > > Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is > any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the > person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should > assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity > criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and > won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what > Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I > think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments > would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated. > Certainly for me he doesn't manage that. > > > Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to > you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful > way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to > be the sole fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a > heuristic for collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation > onto the perspective of a single, universal observer. From this > perspective, the situation of being faced with duplication is just a random > selection from the class of all possible observer moments. > > Well, the "just" might be not that easy to define. > > If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to get > a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable > than being me or you. > > > But how would "you" remember that? >
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 25 February 2014 16:54, chris peck wrote: > Hi Liz > > *>> I can't see why the MWI's existing explanation of probability needs to > have anything added.* > > I can't see that MWI has an explanation of probability. > > > > > *>>Probability in the MWI is deduced from the results of measurements by > an experimenter. Effectively, if they assume that they inhabit a > non-branching universe, they will regard the proportion of times a > measurement comes out one way (spin up say) as the probability of that > result occurring. If they assume an MWI perspective, however, the > probabilty of that outcome is a measure of the proportion of experimenters > who will be found in the spin-up branch.Is there something wrong with that?* > > It doesn't really address the issue. It doesn't address the question 'what > can I expect to see'. Of course, I can say this set of future mes will > inhabit a spin up branch and this set of future mes will inhabit a spin > down branch. So, this proportion of future mes will see spin up and this > portion will see spin down. > > Asked what I (present me) can expect to see: well I can expect to see spin > up and spin down Asked to assign a probability to seeing either result > I assign 1 to both. > You should assign 1 to seeing both in your "multiversal form" - you will split. This is basically a misuse of the term probability because it's a deterministic outcome (but appears probabilistic). > > Theirs is a method of calculating frequencies of me seeing ups and downs > but not probabilities of seeing up or down. > So what's wrong with that? As I said our "expectation of probability" in the MWI is based on what happens after the measurement. There is no actual probability from the MWI perspective, only certainty. We only think there is if we don't take an MWI view (similar to the 1p vs 3p distinction in comp). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Liz >> I can't see why the MWI's existing explanation of probability needs to have >> anything added. I can't see that MWI has an explanation of probability. >>Probability in the MWI is deduced from the results of measurements by an >>experimenter. Effectively, if they assume that they inhabit a non-branching >>universe, they will regard the proportion of times a measurement comes out >>one way (spin up say) as the probability of that result occurring. If they >>assume an MWI perspective, however, the probabilty of that outcome is a >>measure of the proportion of experimenters who will be found in the spin-up >>branch. Is there something wrong with that? It doesn't really address the issue. It doesn't address the question 'what can I expect to see'. Of course, I can say this set of future mes will inhabit a spin up branch and this set of future mes will inhabit a spin down branch. So, this proportion of future mes will see spin up and this portion will see spin down. Asked what I (present me) can expect to see: well I can expect to see spin up and spin down Asked to assign a probability to seeing either result I assign 1 to both. Theirs is a method of calculating frequencies of me seeing ups and downs but not probabilities of seeing up or down. All the best Chris. Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 13:30:48 +1300 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 25 February 2014 13:05, chris peck wrote: Since Everett there have been numerous attempts to smuggle an account of probability back into the theory, and more recent attempts: Deutsch, Wallace, Greaves etc., do that by abandoning the concept of subjective uncertainty altogether and replacing it with some kind of rational action principle. In otherwords, you can expect to see spin up and spin down, but you should act as if there was some objective bias towards one or the other. The approach comes complete with its own set of philosophical problems. I can't see why the MWI's existing explanation of probability needs to have anything added. Probability in the MWI is deduced from the results of measurements by an experimenter. Effectively, if they assume that they inhabit a non-branching universe, they will regard the proportion of times a measurement comes out one way (spin up say) as the probability of that result occurring. If they assume an MWI perspective, however, the probabilty of that outcome is a measure of the proportion of experimenters who will be found in the spin-up branch. Is there something wrong with that? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 25 February 2014 13:05, chris peck wrote: > Since Everett there have been numerous attempts to smuggle an account of > probability back into the theory, and more recent attempts: Deutsch, > Wallace, Greaves etc., do that by abandoning the concept of subjective > uncertainty altogether and replacing it with some kind of rational action > principle. In otherwords, you can expect to see spin up and spin down, but > you should act as if there was some objective bias towards one or the > other. The approach comes complete with its own set of philosophical > problems. > I can't see why the MWI's existing explanation of probability needs to have anything added. Probability in the MWI is deduced from the results of measurements by an experimenter. Effectively, if they assume that they inhabit a non-branching universe, they will regard the proportion of times a measurement comes out one way (spin up say) as the probability of that result occurring. If they assume an MWI perspective, however, the probabilty of that outcome is a measure of the proportion of experimenters who will be found in the spin-up branch. Is there something wrong with that? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Quentin >>As I see from the abstract, he doesn't reject probability calculus, only the >>interpretation of it... I'll read the article later. Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues: "What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down." >> One reason for MWI, is to explain the observed QM probabilities... No, MWI was devised in response to the measurement problem but in abandoning wave function collapse Everett ends up with a theory which is very parsimonious but entirely deterministic. How to then account for probability in a determinist framework has become the Achilles heel of MWI not its raison d'être. Since Everett there have been numerous attempts to smuggle an account of probability back into the theory, and more recent attempts: Deutsch, Wallace, Greaves etc., do that by abandoning the concept of subjective uncertainty altogether and replacing it with some kind of rational action principle. In otherwords, you can expect to see spin up and spin down, but you should act as if there was some objective bias towards one or the other. The approach comes complete with its own set of philosophical problems. The point is that how probability fits into MWI's determinist framework, or any TofE really, is still an open question. And to argue that must reject MWI if they reject Brunos probability sums is plain wrong. Im happy to find myself in the company of Oxford Dons like Deutsch and Greaves. >> your theory is disproven by fact... you never see constant spin up... which >> should be the case if the probability to measure spin up was one. See above. All the best Chris. From: da...@davidnyman.com Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 16:32:01 +0000 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck wrote: >>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the >>MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each >>branch will be different, and it always seems to me, retrospectively, as >>though I only experienced one outcome. Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that. Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to be the sole fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a heuristic for collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation onto the perspective of a single, universal observer. From this perspective, the situation of being faced with duplication is just a random selection from the class of all possible observer moments. Well, the "just" might be not that easy to define. If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to get a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable than being me or you. But how would "you" remember that? I am not sure that the notion of "observer moment" makes sense, without a notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative states. I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a universal (self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p & p), an observer ([]p & <>p), and a feeler ([]p & <>p & p)). But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in arithmetic and is associated with all relatively self-referential correct löbian number) will select among all "observer moment". Well, perhaps "eventually" it will select all of them, if we can give some relevant sense to even
Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 24 February 2014 07:57, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> About [](A -> B) -> ([]A -> []B), let me ask you a more precise exercise.
>
>
>> Convince yourself that this formula is true in all worlds, of all Kripke
>> multiverses, with any illumination.
>> Hint: you might try a reductio ad absurdum. try to build a multiverse in
>> which that law would be violated.
>>
>
> [](A -> B) -> ([]A -> []B)
>
> OK. For a disconnected universe this is t -> (t -> t) or t -> t which is
> true.
>
> And for a Leibniz universe, I'm fairly sure this is also true.
>
> So that leaves {alpha R alpha} and {alpha R beta} and so on, for any
> number of universes + relations.
>
> Maybe I can come back on this one.
>
>
> Sure. Me too. (I will myself be plausibly slowed down, as I have two weeks
> of teaching, take your time, just try to not forget what you learn, by
> having good summary, that you can read from time to time).
>
Well, does an illuminated Kripke universe effectively act as a Leibniz
universe? If so this is definitely true (OK I try to jump in quickly
here...)
>
> You do good work, but I am not sure if you have good notes. That is not
> grave, but not helpful to you.
>
Yes, I know - about the notes, I mean. (Maybe I just need to search the
list for []p to find some...)
> Never hesitate to ask for any definition or recall.
>
> Thank you, don't worry I will :)
> The modal logic part is not the real thing. The "real thing" will be the
> interview of universal and Löbian machines, and some modal logics will just
> sum up infinite conversations we can have with them, notably on predictions
> and physics.
>
> Yes, that is where it all happens! But I feel like I am quite a way from
that.
--
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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote: > > On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck wrote: > > *>>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures >> in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of >> me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me, >> retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome.* >> >> Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is >> any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the >> person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should >> assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity >> criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and >> won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what >> Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I >> think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments >> would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated. >> Certainly for me he doesn't manage that. > > > Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to > you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful > way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to > be the sole fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a > heuristic for collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation > onto the perspective of a single, universal observer. From this > perspective, the situation of being faced with duplication is just a random > selection from the class of all possible observer moments. > > Well, the "just" might be not that easy to define. > > If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to get > a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable > than being me or you. > But how would "you" remember that? > > I am not sure that the notion of "observer moment" makes sense, without a > notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative states. > > I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a > universal (self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p & p), an observer > ([]p & <>p), and a feeler ([]p & <>p & p)). > > But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in arithmetic > and is associated with all relatively self-referential correct löbian > number) will select among all "observer moment". > Well, perhaps "eventually" it will select all of them, if we can give some relevant sense to eventually in this context. And I suppose Hoyle's point is that if one imagines a logical serialisation of all such moments, its order must be inconsequential because of the intrinsic self-ordering of the moments themselves. Essentially he is saying that the panoptic bird view is somehow preserved at the frog level, at the price of breaking the simultaneity of the momentary views. > The "hypostatic" universal person is more like a universal baby, which can > split in a much larger spectrum of future 1p histories, but from its first > person perspective it is like it has still to go through the histories to > get the right relative statistics on his most probable universal neighbors. > Won't this still be effectively satisfied by Hoyle's heuristic? ISTM that "going through the histories" is a notion that splits in the 3p and 1p views. I suppose this is equivalent to conceiving observer moments as self-ordering monads in terms of which any random serialisation over the entire class must eventually preserve the right relative statistics. "Eventually" here relies on a similar opacity to delays in continuation as you argue in the UDA, plus the reliance on prior relativisation to some specific spatial-temporal orientation, to get a 1p notion of temporal order. But perhaps this formulation of a discrete observer moment is incompatible with comp? Of course, in the arithmetical reality, it don't get it, it is an indexical > internal point of view. > Perhaps it gets it "eventually", in the sense I outline above? > > The situations of having been duplicated one or more times are then just > non-simultaneous selections from the same class. This gives us a consistent > way of considering the 3p and 1p (or bird and frog) probabilities > symmetrically. That is, it is now certain that I will confront each and > every 3p continuation from a unique 1p perspective, just not simultaneously. > > That said, this approach retains a quasi-frequency interpretation of > probability in the case that there are fungible or equivalent > continuations. For example, if the protocol mandates that I will be > duplicated 100 times and 99 of my copies will be sent to a red room and one > to a blue room, it would be rational to anticipate a higher "probability" > of continuation associated with the larger class, even though ea
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck wrote: >>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me, retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome. Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that. Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to be the sole fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a heuristic for collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation onto the perspective of a single, universal observer. From this perspective, the situation of being faced with duplication is just a random selection from the class of all possible observer moments. Well, the "just" might be not that easy to define. If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to get a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable than being me or you. I am not sure that the notion of "observer moment" makes sense, without a notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative states. I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a universal (self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p & p), an observer ([]p & <>p), and a feeler ([]p & <>p & p)). But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in arithmetic and is associated with all relatively self-referential correct löbian number) will select among all "observer moment". The "hypostatic" universal person is more like a universal baby, which can split in a much larger spectrum of future 1p histories, but from its first person perspective it is like it has still to go through the histories to get the right relative statistics on his most probable universal neighbors. Of course, in the arithmetical reality, it don't get it, it is an indexical internal point of view. The situations of having been duplicated one or more times are then just non-simultaneous selections from the same class. This gives us a consistent way of considering the 3p and 1p (or bird and frog) probabilities symmetrically. That is, it is now certain that I will confront each and every 3p continuation from a unique 1p perspective, just not simultaneously. That said, this approach retains a quasi-frequency interpretation of probability in the case that there are fungible or equivalent continuations. For example, if the protocol mandates that I will be duplicated 100 times and 99 of my copies will be sent to a red room and one to a blue room, it would be rational to anticipate a higher "probability" of continuation associated with the larger class, even though each continuation is individually certain in a different underlying sense. This is just to say that subjective uncertainty (or the expectation of probabilistic outcomes) is a function of incomplete knowledge at any given point in the sequence. OK. I know that Bruno quarrels with Hoyle's idea as being superfluous to, or possibly even incompatible with, comp I think about it. I try to make sense of it. That might have sense, but then it remains to look at it in arithmetic. I mean the relations between a person and the universal person "in her" is complex, and the splitting between []p and []p & p is part of it. but personally I still find it a neat heuristic for pumping one's intuition on the indeterminacy of first-personal expectations. OK. It is just that I expect platonism to be counter-intuitive and so intuition pump must be handled with care. But you know that. I just try to understand the point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.g
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
= 0.
Similarly, P("W") ≠ 1, P("M") ≠ 1, and P("W v M") = 1.
from the stand point of the person duplicated. Certainly for me he
doesn't manage that.
What is wrong with above?
Bruno
All the best
Chris.
> From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
> Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 07:56:14 +0100
>
>
> On 22 Feb 2014, at 21:09, LizR wrote to Clark (with the "above
pap" =
> the FPI of step 3):
>
> > The "above pap" is only a small step in an argument (and it only
> > reproduces a result obtained in the MWI, anyway).
>
>
> OK, but the MWI is a "big" thing, relying on another big thing: QM.
>
> The FPI assumes only the comp theory of mind, and extracts, as PGC
> indicates, a strong form of indeterminacy in a purely deterministic
> framework. That makes QM confirming a simple, (even according to
> Clark) but startling and counter-intuitive consequence of
> computationalism.
>
> That was new, and broke the common brain-mind identity thesis, and
is
> basically still ignored by everyone, except on this list and my
> papers, 'course.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> --
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
As I see from the abstract, he doesn't reject probability calculus, only the interpretation of it... I'll read the article later. One reason for MWI, is to explain the observed QM probabilities... so if you reject that, MWI is useless IMHO... and your theory is disproven by fact... you never see constant spin up... which should be the case if the probability to measure spin up was one. Quentin 2014-02-24 2:36 GMT+01:00 chris peck : > Hi Quentin > > > >> then I can't see how you could still agree with many world > interpretation and reject probability, that's not consistent... unless of > course, you reject MWI. > > I definitely wouldn't say I accept MWI. But even so, not everyone who does > accept it agrees that there is subjective uncertainty. So, I can accept MWI > and reject the probability sums Bruno derives and be in good company. > > See here: > > http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 > > All the best > > Chris. > > -- > From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) > Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 01:04:53 + > > > Hi Liz > > *>> Let's also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be sent > to, and that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send you to A or > B with equal probability based on some "quantum coin flip". But by accident > it duplicates you, and sends you to both. This effectively conflates the > comp and MWI versions IMHO, so you can't easily disentangle them in this > thought experiment.* > > An important aspect of step 3's experiment is that it depicts a determined > result from 3p which is, allegedly, subject to uncertainty from 1p. Thats > the big result right? That seems to get lost in your revision. You get 1p > uncertainty but at the expense of 3p certainty. By introducing a 'quantum > coin flip' you're loading the dice towards uncertainty. So I can't really > say you shown an equivalence between step 3 and MWI. > > *>>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures > in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of > me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me, > retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome.* > > Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is > any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the > person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should > assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity > criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and > won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what > Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I > think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments > would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated. > Certainly for me he doesn't manage that. > > All the best > > Chris. > > > From: marc...@ulb.ac.be > > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) > > Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 07:56:14 +0100 > > > > > > On 22 Feb 2014, at 21:09, LizR wrote to Clark (with the "above pap" = > > the FPI of step 3): > > > > > The "above pap" is only a small step in an argument (and it only > > > reproduces a result obtained in the MWI, anyway). > > > > > > OK, but the MWI is a "big" thing, relying on another big thing: QM. > > > > The FPI assumes only the comp theory of mind, and extracts, as PGC > > indicates, a strong form of indeterminacy in a purely deterministic > > framework. That makes QM confirming a simple, (even according to > > Clark) but startling and counter-intuitive consequence of > > computationalism. > > > > That was new, and broke the common brain-mind identity thesis, and is > > basically still ignored by everyone, except on this list and my > > papers, 'course. > > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > Visit
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 24 February 2014 14:04, chris peck wrote: > Hi Liz > > *>> Let's also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be sent > to, and that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send you to A or > B with equal probability based on some "quantum coin flip". But by accident > it duplicates you, and sends you to both. This effectively conflates the > comp and MWI versions IMHO, so you can't easily disentangle them in this > thought experiment.* > > An important aspect of step 3's experiment is that it depicts a determined > result from 3p which is, allegedly, subject to uncertainty from 1p. Thats > the big result right? That seems to get lost in your revision. You get 1p > uncertainty but at the expense of 3p certainty. By introducing a 'quantum > coin flip' you're loading the dice towards uncertainty. So I can't really > say you shown an equivalence between step 3 and MWI. > Yes, maybe. My idea was that the person thought the outcome was random, but in this particular case it was completely determined - he was duplicated, and sent to both places. The idea was to split out the 1p probability view from the 3p determined view (which might not be realised for a long time, say, until someone eventually worked out what had happened). *>>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me, retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome.* Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any > disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the > person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should > assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity > criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and > won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what > Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I > think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments > would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated. > Certainly for me he doesn't manage that. > Hmm. This was why I was trying to make the 3p certainty unknown to the 1p concerned (though reconstructable at a later date, so one can eventually see that there was a 3p certainty involved). I can't see how Bruno fails to show that probability assignments work in an equivalent manner to to Everett's. If one doesn't know about the duplication then it appears that there is, say, a 50% chance of each outcome; if one does know, there is a 100% chance of the outcome, which involves duplication. Which is how it's supposed to work in the MWI, surely? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck wrote: *>>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures > in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of > me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me, > retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome.* > > Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is > any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the > person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should > assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity > criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and > won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what > Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I > think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments > would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated. > Certainly for me he doesn't manage that. Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to be the sole fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a heuristic for collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation onto the perspective of a single, universal observer. From this perspective, the situation of being faced with duplication is just a random selection from the class of all possible observer moments. The situations of having been duplicated one or more times are then just non-simultaneous selections from the same class. This gives us a consistent way of considering the 3p and 1p (or bird and frog) probabilities symmetrically. That is, it is now certain that I will confront each and every 3p continuation from a unique 1p perspective, just not simultaneously. That said, this approach retains a quasi-frequency interpretation of probability in the case that there are fungible or equivalent continuations. For example, if the protocol mandates that I will be duplicated 100 times and 99 of my copies will be sent to a red room and one to a blue room, it would be rational to anticipate a higher "probability" of continuation associated with the larger class, even though each continuation is individually certain in a different underlying sense. This is just to say that subjective uncertainty (or the expectation of probabilistic outcomes) is a function of incomplete knowledge at any given point in the sequence. I know that Bruno quarrels with Hoyle's idea as being superfluous to, or possibly even incompatible with, comp but personally I still find it a neat heuristic for pumping one's intuition on the indeterminacy of first-personal expectations. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Quentin >> then I can't see how you could still agree with many world interpretation >> and reject probability, that's not consistent... unless of course, you >> reject MWI. I definitely wouldn't say I accept MWI. But even so, not everyone who does accept it agrees that there is subjective uncertainty. So, I can accept MWI and reject the probability sums Bruno derives and be in good company. See here: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 All the best Chris. From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 01:04:53 + Hi Liz >> Let's also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be sent to, >> and that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send you to A or B >> with equal probability based on some "quantum coin flip". But by accident it >> duplicates you, and sends you to both. This effectively conflates the comp >> and MWI versions IMHO, so you can't easily disentangle them in this thought >> experiment. An important aspect of step 3's experiment is that it depicts a determined result from 3p which is, allegedly, subject to uncertainty from 1p. Thats the big result right? That seems to get lost in your revision. You get 1p uncertainty but at the expense of 3p certainty. By introducing a 'quantum coin flip' you're loading the dice towards uncertainty. So I can't really say you shown an equivalence between step 3 and MWI. >>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the >>MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each >>branch will be different, and it always seems to me, retrospectively, as >>though I only experienced one outcome. Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that. All the best Chris. > From: marc...@ulb.ac.be > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) > Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 07:56:14 +0100 > > > On 22 Feb 2014, at 21:09, LizR wrote to Clark (with the "above pap" = > the FPI of step 3): > > > The "above pap" is only a small step in an argument (and it only > > reproduces a result obtained in the MWI, anyway). > > > OK, but the MWI is a "big" thing, relying on another big thing: QM. > > The FPI assumes only the comp theory of mind, and extracts, as PGC > indicates, a strong form of indeterminacy in a purely deterministic > framework. That makes QM confirming a simple, (even according to > Clark) but startling and counter-intuitive consequence of > computationalism. > > That was new, and broke the common brain-mind identity thesis, and is > basically still ignored by everyone, except on this list and my > papers, 'course. > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Liz >> Let's also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be sent to, >> and that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send you to A or B >> with equal probability based on some "quantum coin flip". But by accident it >> duplicates you, and sends you to both. This effectively conflates the comp >> and MWI versions IMHO, so you can't easily disentangle them in this thought >> experiment. An important aspect of step 3's experiment is that it depicts a determined result from 3p which is, allegedly, subject to uncertainty from 1p. Thats the big result right? That seems to get lost in your revision. You get 1p uncertainty but at the expense of 3p certainty. By introducing a 'quantum coin flip' you're loading the dice towards uncertainty. So I can't really say you shown an equivalence between step 3 and MWI. >>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the >>MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each >>branch will be different, and it always seems to me, retrospectively, as >>though I only experienced one outcome. Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that. All the best Chris. > From: marc...@ulb.ac.be > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) > Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 07:56:14 +0100 > > > On 22 Feb 2014, at 21:09, LizR wrote to Clark (with the "above pap" = > the FPI of step 3): > > > The "above pap" is only a small step in an argument (and it only > > reproduces a result obtained in the MWI, anyway). > > > OK, but the MWI is a "big" thing, relying on another big thing: QM. > > The FPI assumes only the comp theory of mind, and extracts, as PGC > indicates, a strong form of indeterminacy in a purely deterministic > framework. That makes QM confirming a simple, (even according to > Clark) but startling and counter-intuitive consequence of > computationalism. > > That was new, and broke the common brain-mind identity thesis, and is > basically still ignored by everyone, except on this list and my > papers, 'course. > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On Sunday, February 23, 2014 10:48:57 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: > > On 23 February 2014 00:18, Craig Weinberg > > wrote: > > The body's recognition of foreign protein markers is a lower level >> manifestation of the mismatch of higher level zoological history. It is a >> sign that on this level of description, tissue is not naively exchangeable. > > > One would have to concede though that it seems to be naively exchangeable > between identical twins. > If you know that the tissue is from your identical twin then it is not what I meant by naively (generically, blindly) exchangeable. Craig > > David > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 23 February 2014 12:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Sunday, February 23, 2014 12:53:00 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > >> >> >> On Sunday, February 23, 2014, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 2:05:47 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, February 22, 2014, Craig Weinberg >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 12:29:04 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >> >> On 20 February 2014 09:24, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >>> You're assuming that precise molecular assembly will necessarily >> yield a >> >>> coherent dynamic process, but that may not be the case at all. If you >> put >> >>> random people in the proper places in a baseball diamond, and give >> the one >> >>> in the middle a baseball, they don't necessarily play a baseball >> game. >> >> >> >> >> >> If you're right then there would be something missing, something >> >> mysterious, and there would be evidence for it much simpler >> experiments than >> >> complete assembly of a human body. For example, you might be able to >> >> substitute some chemical on a cell for an equivalent chemical and >> observe >> >> the cell stop functioning even though everything seems to be >> biochemically >> >> in order. That would be direct evidence for your theory. It's >> scientifically >> >> testable. >> > >> > >> > What's missing is the entire history of experiences which relate to >> whatever >> > it is that you think you're copying. >> > >> > We don't exist on the levels of cells or molecules. If there were no >> human >> > looking down at cells in a microscope, and we had only the microcosmic >> > perspective to go from, there would be nothing that could be done to >> build a >> > human experience. No configuration of proteins and ion channels is >> going to >> > taste like strawberries to any of the molecules or cells. All of these >> > structures relate only to a particular level of description. If you >> copy the >> > sheet music of "I Can't Get No Satisfaction" you don't know if it is >> the >> > Rolling Stones version or the Devo version, and neither could be >> predicted >> > or generated purely from the notes. >> >> That's your theory, but the theory should have some straightforward >> observational consequences. For example, if some of the matter in a >> cell is replaced in a laboratory, then the cell would stop >> functioning. This would confound the scientists because according to >> current theories it ought to function normally provided all the matter >> is there in the right configuration. >> >> >> We don't see it at the sub-cellular level, we see it beginning at the >> biological level as tissue-rejection. The richer the experience, the longer >> the history, and the more important it is in defining itself exclusively. >> Biology is more proprietary than chemistry, zoology is more proprietary >> than biology, anthropology is more proprietary than zoology, etc. It's not >> that some material fragment of a cell should be irreplaceable, it's that >> living cells should be easily created from primordial soup. Your theory >> misses the whole other half of the universe which coheres from the top down. >> >> We can take out small words or skip letters of a sentence and still be >> understood, but we can't understand a sentence as a whole if we don't know >> what the bigger words in it mean. >> >> >> Tissue rejection is caused by well understood mechanisms whereby the body >> recognises foreign protein markers on the transplanted tissue. That's the >> only thing you have said above which is close to an observational >> consequence of your theory, and it doesn't support it. >> >> >> The body's recognition of foreign protein markers is a lower level >> manifestation of the mismatch of higher level zoological history. It is a >> sign that on this level of description, tissue is not naively exchangeable. >> The public side is a spatial story about bodies nested within bodies >> performing repeating functions. The private side is completely orthogonal. >> It is an phenomenal story about tension and release, identity, etc. The >> public side is a closed circuit, but it is closed by the narrowness of the >> private perspective. The universe fills in the appearance of closure and >> mechanism, just as our visual perception fills in repeating patterns. >> >> >> The body's recognition of foreign tissue is well understood: the >> mechanism, the reasons for it, and how to bypass it for the purpose of >> organ transplant. Your theory doesn't add anything to that explanatio >> > > My theory is not supposed to add anything to that, or any other physical > explanation other than to place it in a much larger context. > Then why did you raise the issue of tissue rejection? > Knowing that automobiles are actually driven by human beings with lives > that last for decades doesn't change the civil engineer's explanation of > the mechanism of traffic, the reasons for it, and how to bypass it for the > purpose of efficient c
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 23 February 2014 00:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: The body's recognition of foreign protein markers is a lower level > manifestation of the mismatch of higher level zoological history. It is a > sign that on this level of description, tissue is not naively exchangeable. One would have to concede though that it seems to be naively exchangeable between identical twins. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On Sunday, February 23, 2014 12:53:00 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > > > > On Sunday, February 23, 2014, Craig Weinberg > > > wrote: > > > > On Saturday, February 22, 2014 2:05:47 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > > > > On Saturday, February 22, 2014, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Saturday, February 22, 2014 12:29:04 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > > On 20 February 2014 09:24, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > >>> You're assuming that precise molecular assembly will necessarily yield > a > >>> coherent dynamic process, but that may not be the case at all. If you > put > >>> random people in the proper places in a baseball diamond, and give the > one > >>> in the middle a baseball, they don't necessarily play a baseball game. > >> > >> > >> If you're right then there would be something missing, something > >> mysterious, and there would be evidence for it much simpler experiments > than > >> complete assembly of a human body. For example, you might be able to > >> substitute some chemical on a cell for an equivalent chemical and > observe > >> the cell stop functioning even though everything seems to be > biochemically > >> in order. That would be direct evidence for your theory. It's > scientifically > >> testable. > > > > > > What's missing is the entire history of experiences which relate to > whatever > > it is that you think you're copying. > > > > We don't exist on the levels of cells or molecules. If there were no > human > > looking down at cells in a microscope, and we had only the microcosmic > > perspective to go from, there would be nothing that could be done to > build a > > human experience. No configuration of proteins and ion channels is going > to > > taste like strawberries to any of the molecules or cells. All of these > > structures relate only to a particular level of description. If you copy > the > > sheet music of "I Can't Get No Satisfaction" you don't know if it is the > > Rolling Stones version or the Devo version, and neither could be > predicted > > or generated purely from the notes. > > That's your theory, but the theory should have some straightforward > observational consequences. For example, if some of the matter in a > cell is replaced in a laboratory, then the cell would stop > functioning. This would confound the scientists because according to > current theories it ought to function normally provided all the matter > is there in the right configuration. > > > We don't see it at the sub-cellular level, we see it beginning at the > biological level as tissue-rejection. The richer the experience, the longer > the history, and the more important it is in defining itself exclusively. > Biology is more proprietary than chemistry, zoology is more proprietary > than biology, anthropology is more proprietary than zoology, etc. It's not > that some material fragment of a cell should be irreplaceable, it's that > living cells should be easily created from primordial soup. Your theory > misses the whole other half of the universe which coheres from the top down. > > We can take out small words or skip letters of a sentence and still be > understood, but we can't understand a sentence as a whole if we don't know > what the bigger words in it mean. > > > Tissue rejection is caused by well understood mechanisms whereby the body > recognises foreign protein markers on the transplanted tissue. That's the > only thing you have said above which is close to an observational > consequence of your theory, and it doesn't support it. > > > The body's recognition of foreign protein markers is a lower level > manifestation of the mismatch of higher level zoological history. It is a > sign that on this level of description, tissue is not naively exchangeable. > The public side is a spatial story about bodies nested within bodies > performing repeating functions. The private side is completely orthogonal. > It is an phenomenal story about tension and release, identity, etc. The > public side is a closed circuit, but it is closed by the narrowness of the > private perspective. The universe fills in the appearance of closure and > mechanism, just as our visual perception fills in repeating patterns. > > > The body's recognition of foreign tissue is well understood: the > mechanism, the reasons for it, and how to bypass it for the purpose of > organ transplant. Your theory doesn't add anything to that explanatio > My theory is not supposed to add anything to that, or any other physical explanation other than to place it in a much larger context. Knowing that automobiles are actually driven by human beings with lives that last for decades doesn't change the civil engineer's explanation of the mechanism of traffic, the reasons for it, and how to bypass it for the purpose of efficient commuting. If we decided to replace someone's brain, however, with the driver of a Google car, the result would be that we have a dead person and a comput
Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 19 February 2014 23:00, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Liz, Others,
>
> I was waiting for you to answer the last questions to proceed. Any problem?
>
> I give the correction of the last exercise.
>
>
> On 14 Feb 2014, at 19:18, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On 13 Feb 2014, at 22:23, LizR wrote:
>
> On 14 February 2014 07:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Liz, and others,
>>
>>
>> On 13 Feb 2014, at 10:04, LizR wrote:
>>
>
>>
> Well, we get { p=t } and { p=f } regardless of the accessibility
> relations. (If that's how you write it)
>
>
> Well ... OK.
>
> More precisely we get
>
> 1) {alpha}, with R = { } with p=t in alpha
> 2) {alpha}, with R = { } with p=f in alpha
>
> and
>
> 3) {alpha}, with R = {(alpha R alpha) } with p=t in alpha
> 4) {alpha}, with R = {(alpha R alpha) } with p=f in alpha
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> Which of those propositions are true of false in alpha, in the
>> illuminated simplest multiverses.
>> And which one are law (meaning true in all worlds, but true for all
>> valuation of p, that is valid with A = p, but also with A = ~p)
>>
>> 1) []A -> A
>>
>
> This is true in alpha R alpha (because it's just a Leibniz type world)
>
>
> Very good. It is a law there.
>
>
> . []p is "vacuously true" in "alpha" (the disconnected multiverse) - as
> you said above - so []p -> p is false, because []p is true regardless of p.
>
>
> OK. It is not a law, but it might still be true in some circumstances.
> Give me which among 1), 2), 3), 4), above.
>
> Any problem with this?
>
OK, let me see. []A -> A is true in 3 and 4, I think we established that.
So it depends on []p in the disconnected multiverses...
[]p is true if p is true in all worlds connected to alpha. Or to put it
another way, it isn't true that there are worlds connected to alpha in
which p is false, which I think would be ~<>~p. Oh dear. I'm afraid I can't
get my head around this again. If no worlds are accessible, then it seems
that p can't be true or false in all worlds accessible from alpha! I think
I have missed the point somehow. So I think yes there is a problem with
this.
> 2) []A -> [][]A
>>
>
> This is true in alpha R alpha, and in alpha I guess it's true too, because
> vacuously true implies vacuously true?
>
> Exact.
>
> 3) <>A -> []<>A
>>
>
> true in alpha R alpha again, because there's only one world to consider so
> <>A is equivalent to []A in this case (isn't it?)
>
> Well seen!
>
> not true in alpha because []<>A is vacuously true regardless of <>A - I
> think
>
> Not correct. You jump to hastily.
>
> in your language the answer is:
>
> true in alpha, because []<>A is vacuously true, so that <>A -> []<>A is
> vacuously true too (as "p -> q" is false only if q is false and p is true).
> The type of <>A -> []<>A is really f -> t, which is as much tautological
> than f -> A, and A -> f, for any A.
>
> Are you OK with this?
>
> OK, let me see. <>A -> []<>A in alpha. You say []<>A is vacuously true, I
think we established that []X is true for all X in {alpha}, so ... I think
whatever the left hand side is, it can imply true. If left side is false,
then right side is true - if I have a pet unicorn then I am the Queen of
France. And if left side is true that can also imply true...isn't it???
>
>
>> 4) []A -> <>A
>>
>
> Well I think this is true for reason given above.
>
>
> You begin to try to go to quickly. I have some doubt that []A -> <>A can
> be a law in a cul-de-sac world, like poor alpha, with R = { }.
>
> OK?
>
Yes I probably go too quickly. I find that I have no time and so I rush
through, and it turns out there are a lot more questions than I thought...
(Then at the end you say "one at a time!" :)
So []A is always true in alpha, but t -> f isn't true, so is <>A false in
alpha for some A? I'm not sure, it's quite hard to think about this for a
disconnected world. <>A is "there is some world connected to alpha in which
A is true" but there are no worlds connected to alpha, so...help! How does
one think about this?
5)A -> []<>A
>>
>
> True in alpha R alpha.
>
> OK.
>
> In alpha not true because []<>A is always true and A isn't
>
> Not a law. OK. Again there are case where it is true, like when A is true.
>
> Ah, so we're back to X -> t being true in all cases of X.
So in fact X -> []A is always true in {alpha}
>
>
>> 6) <>A -> ~[]<>A
>>
>
> False in alpha R alpha, surely? With one world, <>A -> []<>A (above)
>
> Correct.
>
> Phew :-)
> Not true in alpha because ~{}<>A is vacuously false regardless of <>A
>
> OK, this seems wrong, looking ahead so...
~[]X is f is {alpha}
So if <>A can be t we get t -> f which is itself false.
This comes back to how <>A works in {alpha} again, which I'm not sure
about. If say <>A is the same as A this would give t -> f in one case, and
that's false.
> Unfortunately as much as ~{}<>A is vacuously false regardless of <>A, as
> you say, we are interested in
> <>A -> ~[]<>A and in poor alpha (case 1) 2)) <>A is *also vacuously
> false, so that we are in the f -> f, case, which is, vacuously o
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 22 Feb 2014, at 21:09, LizR wrote to Clark (with the "above pap" = the FPI of step 3): The "above pap" is only a small step in an argument (and it only reproduces a result obtained in the MWI, anyway). OK, but the MWI is a "big" thing, relying on another big thing: QM. The FPI assumes only the comp theory of mind, and extracts, as PGC indicates, a strong form of indeterminacy in a purely deterministic framework. That makes QM confirming a simple, (even according to Clark) but startling and counter-intuitive consequence of computationalism. That was new, and broke the common brain-mind identity thesis, and is basically still ignored by everyone, except on this list and my papers, 'course. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 22 Feb 2014, at 19:45, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 1:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Did the Helsinki Man see Washington and Moscow? Yes. > In the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view. In who's "1-1 view"? You'll probably say in "The Helsinki Man's", No. The W-man and the M-man. but his view is just of Helsinki. Perhaps you mean the future "1 view" of the Helsinki Man. If so then anybody who can remember having the past "1 view" of the Helsinki Man would fit that description; so the Helsinki Man will see both Washington and Moscow. In the 3-1 views. Not in the 1-1 views. > I said that we have to interview all copies. Good, then I never want to hear you say again that the Washington Man saying that he didn't see Moscow contradicts the claim that the Helsinki man will see both Washington AND Moscow. In the 3-1 views. Not in the 1-1 view. I think that with that way or arguing, you don't even convince yourself. You continue to play with words, and ignore the details of the question, based on the 1-3 distinction. If the FPI does not exist, provide the algorithm of prediction. "W & M" has been refuted. You miss this only by confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-view, systematically, in a boring repetition. Bruno I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves math and it is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2 to the number 3 and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't predict if it will end up as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery is just as profound as yours. Not very. >>> So you accept that step 3 is a discovery? >> I think my "discovery" is virtually identical to yours and is just as profound. Not very. > So that's it. You blow the candle of another because you are jealous he published it and exploit to get something What the hell!!? Did you really think I was serious? Did you really think I believed the above pap was a major discovery?! John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 7:45 PM, John Clark wrote: > > On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 1:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >> Did the Helsinki Man see Washington and Moscow? Yes. >>> >> >> > In the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view. >> > > In who's "1-1 view"? You'll probably say in "The Helsinki Man's", but his > view is just of Helsinki. Perhaps you mean the future "1 view" of the > Helsinki Man. If so then anybody who can remember having the past "1 view" > of the Helsinki Man would fit that description; so the Helsinki Man will > see both Washington and Moscow. > > > I said that we have to interview all copies. >> > > Good, then I never want to hear you say again that the Washington Man > saying that he didn't see Moscow contradicts the claim that the Helsinki > man will see both Washington AND Moscow. > > I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves math and it is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2 to the number 3 and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't predict if it will end up as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery is just as profound as yours. Not very. >>> >> > >>> So you accept that step 3 is a discovery? >>> >> >> I think my "discovery" is virtually identical to yours and is just as >>> profound. Not very. >>> >> >> > So that's it. You blow the candle of another because you are jealous he >> published it and exploit to get something >> > > What the hell!!? Did you really think I was serious? Did you really think > I believed the above pap was a major discovery?! > > Concerning FPI and step 3, yes its "just a step" but to me it is not trivial, especially when UDA is followed through to its concluding implications and problems in conjunction with steps 7 and 8. A non-trivial fundamental point here for yours truly, is that determinism in the mechanist setting of the protocol entails strong form of first-person subjective indeterminacy. P(Washington) = P(Tokio) =1/2 is just set out to fix the damn question to explore further implications of comp, eventually including the search of such distributions of probability bearing on observable physics given backdrop of a lot of redundant UD work. The objective probability asserted here at step 3 seems fundamental; applied to first person subjective outcomes in a deterministic UD setting providing a foundation for examining self-reference observation constraints of various types of reasoning machines arising from something as general as arithmetic/possible logics, and comparing this with our observable physics, appears as a valid, if overlooked move. This might be trivial pap to you, but then I'd like to know clearly: why would such a comparison be trivial or bogus? In other words: how do you know? Things are obviously not all unexplainable magic, when arithmetic is effectively applied, nor is everything computable. For now, I see no reason to not keep trying to grasp at both ends and keep comparing. If this is trivial to you then I'll grant you my low standards and taste for "pap". But then why further concern yourself with these questions; being patronizing and insulting? Waste of time by your own standards of pap it would seem. Go preach elsewhere whatever it is you want to preach with such furious ambition, maybe? PGC John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On Sunday, February 23, 2014, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Saturday, February 22, 2014 2:05:47 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, February 22, 2014, Craig Weinberg >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 12:29:04 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On 20 February 2014 09:24, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> You're assuming that precise molecular assembly will necessarily yield a >>> coherent dynamic process, but that may not be the case at all. If you put >>> random people in the proper places in a baseball diamond, and give the one >>> in the middle a baseball, they don't necessarily play a baseball game. >> >> >> If you're right then there would be something missing, something >> mysterious, and there would be evidence for it much simpler experiments than >> complete assembly of a human body. For example, you might be able to >> substitute some chemical on a cell for an equivalent chemical and observe >> the cell stop functioning even though everything seems to be biochemically >> in order. That would be direct evidence for your theory. It's scientifically >> testable. > > > What's missing is the entire history of experiences which relate to whatever > it is that you think you're copying. > > We don't exist on the levels of cells or molecules. If there were no human > looking down at cells in a microscope, and we had only the microcosmic > perspective to go from, there would be nothing that could be done to build a > human experience. No configuration of proteins and ion channels is going to > taste like strawberries to any of the molecules or cells. All of these > structures relate only to a particular level of description. If you copy the > sheet music of "I Can't Get No Satisfaction" you don't know if it is the > Rolling Stones version or the Devo version, and neither could be predicted > or generated purely from the notes. That's your theory, but the theory should have some straightforward observational consequences. For example, if some of the matter in a cell is replaced in a laboratory, then the cell would stop functioning. This would confound the scientists because according to current theories it ought to function normally provided all the matter is there in the right configuration. >>> >>> We don't see it at the sub-cellular level, we see it beginning at the >>> biological level as tissue-rejection. The richer the experience, the longer >>> the history, and the more important it is in defining itself exclusively. >>> Biology is more proprietary than chemistry, zoology is more proprietary >>> than biology, anthropology is more proprietary than zoology, etc. It's not >>> that some material fragment of a cell should be irreplaceable, it's that >>> living cells should be easily created from primordial soup. Your theory >>> misses the whole other half of the universe which coheres from the top down. >>> >>> We can take out small words or skip letters of a sentence and still be >>> understood, but we can't understand a sentence as a whole if we don't know >>> what the bigger words in it mean. >>> >> >> Tissue rejection is caused by well understood mechanisms whereby the body >> recognises foreign protein markers on the transplanted tissue. That's the >> only thing you have said above which is close to an observational >> consequence of your theory, and it doesn't support it. >> > > The body's recognition of foreign protein markers is a lower level > manifestation of the mismatch of higher level zoological history. It is a > sign that on this level of description, tissue is not naively exchangeable. > The public side is a spatial story about bodies nested within bodies > performing repeating functions. The private side is completely orthogonal. > It is an phenomenal story about tension and release, identity, etc. The > public side is a closed circuit, but it is closed by the narrowness of the > private perspective. The universe fills in the appearance of closure and > mechanism, just as our visual perception fills in repeating patterns. > The body's recognition of foreign tissue is well understood: the mechanism, the reasons for it, and how to bypass it for the purpose of organ transplant. Your theory doesn't add anything to that explanation. Find an experimental result not consistent with mere biochemistry. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On Saturday, February 22, 2014 2:05:47 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > > > > On Saturday, February 22, 2014, Craig Weinberg > > > wrote: > >> >> >> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 12:29:04 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >>> >>> On 20 February 2014 09:24, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> >>> You're assuming that precise molecular assembly will necessarily >>> yield a >>> >>> coherent dynamic process, but that may not be the case at all. If >>> you put >>> >>> random people in the proper places in a baseball diamond, and give >>> the one >>> >>> in the middle a baseball, they don't necessarily play a baseball >>> game. >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> If you're right then there would be something missing, something >>> >> mysterious, and there would be evidence for it much simpler >>> experiments than >>> >> complete assembly of a human body. For example, you might be able to >>> >> substitute some chemical on a cell for an equivalent chemical and >>> observe >>> >> the cell stop functioning even though everything seems to be >>> biochemically >>> >> in order. That would be direct evidence for your theory. It's >>> scientifically >>> >> testable. >>> > >>> > >>> > What's missing is the entire history of experiences which relate to >>> whatever >>> > it is that you think you're copying. >>> > >>> > We don't exist on the levels of cells or molecules. If there were no >>> human >>> > looking down at cells in a microscope, and we had only the microcosmic >>> > perspective to go from, there would be nothing that could be done to >>> build a >>> > human experience. No configuration of proteins and ion channels is >>> going to >>> > taste like strawberries to any of the molecules or cells. All of these >>> > structures relate only to a particular level of description. If you >>> copy the >>> > sheet music of "I Can't Get No Satisfaction" you don't know if it is >>> the >>> > Rolling Stones version or the Devo version, and neither could be >>> predicted >>> > or generated purely from the notes. >>> >>> That's your theory, but the theory should have some straightforward >>> observational consequences. For example, if some of the matter in a >>> cell is replaced in a laboratory, then the cell would stop >>> functioning. This would confound the scientists because according to >>> current theories it ought to function normally provided all the matter >>> is there in the right configuration. >>> >> >> We don't see it at the sub-cellular level, we see it beginning at the >> biological level as tissue-rejection. The richer the experience, the longer >> the history, and the more important it is in defining itself exclusively. >> Biology is more proprietary than chemistry, zoology is more proprietary >> than biology, anthropology is more proprietary than zoology, etc. It's not >> that some material fragment of a cell should be irreplaceable, it's that >> living cells should be easily created from primordial soup. Your theory >> misses the whole other half of the universe which coheres from the top down. >> >> We can take out small words or skip letters of a sentence and still be >> understood, but we can't understand a sentence as a whole if we don't know >> what the bigger words in it mean. >> > > Tissue rejection is caused by well understood mechanisms whereby the body > recognises foreign protein markers on the transplanted tissue. That's the > only thing you have said above which is close to an observational > consequence of your theory, and it doesn't support it. > The body's recognition of foreign protein markers is a lower level manifestation of the mismatch of higher level zoological history. It is a sign that on this level of description, tissue is not naively exchangeable. The public side is a spatial story about bodies nested within bodies performing repeating functions. The private side is completely orthogonal. It is an phenomenal story about tension and release, identity, etc. The public side is a closed circuit, but it is closed by the narrowness of the private perspective. The universe fills in the appearance of closure and mechanism, just as our visual perception fills in repeating patterns. Craig > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
The "above pap" is only a small step in an argument (and it only reproduces a result obtained in the MWI, anyway). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On Saturday, February 22, 2014, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Saturday, February 22, 2014 12:29:04 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >> >> On 20 February 2014 09:24, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >>> You're assuming that precise molecular assembly will necessarily >> yield a >> >>> coherent dynamic process, but that may not be the case at all. If you >> put >> >>> random people in the proper places in a baseball diamond, and give >> the one >> >>> in the middle a baseball, they don't necessarily play a baseball >> game. >> >> >> >> >> >> If you're right then there would be something missing, something >> >> mysterious, and there would be evidence for it much simpler >> experiments than >> >> complete assembly of a human body. For example, you might be able to >> >> substitute some chemical on a cell for an equivalent chemical and >> observe >> >> the cell stop functioning even though everything seems to be >> biochemically >> >> in order. That would be direct evidence for your theory. It's >> scientifically >> >> testable. >> > >> > >> > What's missing is the entire history of experiences which relate to >> whatever >> > it is that you think you're copying. >> > >> > We don't exist on the levels of cells or molecules. If there were no >> human >> > looking down at cells in a microscope, and we had only the microcosmic >> > perspective to go from, there would be nothing that could be done to >> build a >> > human experience. No configuration of proteins and ion channels is >> going to >> > taste like strawberries to any of the molecules or cells. All of these >> > structures relate only to a particular level of description. If you >> copy the >> > sheet music of "I Can't Get No Satisfaction" you don't know if it is >> the >> > Rolling Stones version or the Devo version, and neither could be >> predicted >> > or generated purely from the notes. >> >> That's your theory, but the theory should have some straightforward >> observational consequences. For example, if some of the matter in a >> cell is replaced in a laboratory, then the cell would stop >> functioning. This would confound the scientists because according to >> current theories it ought to function normally provided all the matter >> is there in the right configuration. >> > > We don't see it at the sub-cellular level, we see it beginning at the > biological level as tissue-rejection. The richer the experience, the longer > the history, and the more important it is in defining itself exclusively. > Biology is more proprietary than chemistry, zoology is more proprietary > than biology, anthropology is more proprietary than zoology, etc. It's not > that some material fragment of a cell should be irreplaceable, it's that > living cells should be easily created from primordial soup. Your theory > misses the whole other half of the universe which coheres from the top down. > > We can take out small words or skip letters of a sentence and still be > understood, but we can't understand a sentence as a whole if we don't know > what the bigger words in it mean. > Tissue rejection is caused by well understood mechanisms whereby the body recognises foreign protein markers on the transplanted tissue. That's the only thing you have said above which is close to an observational consequence of your theory, and it doesn't support it. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 1:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Did the Helsinki Man see Washington and Moscow? Yes. >> > > > In the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view. > In who's "1-1 view"? You'll probably say in "The Helsinki Man's", but his view is just of Helsinki. Perhaps you mean the future "1 view" of the Helsinki Man. If so then anybody who can remember having the past "1 view" of the Helsinki Man would fit that description; so the Helsinki Man will see both Washington and Moscow. > I said that we have to interview all copies. > Good, then I never want to hear you say again that the Washington Man saying that he didn't see Moscow contradicts the claim that the Helsinki man will see both Washington AND Moscow. I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves math >>> and it is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2 to the >>> number 3 and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't predict if it will >>> end up as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery is just as profound as >>> yours. Not very. >>> >> > >>> So you accept that step 3 is a discovery? >>> >> > >> I think my "discovery" is virtually identical to yours and is just as >> profound. Not very. >> > > > So that's it. You blow the candle of another because you are jealous he > published it and exploit to get something > What the hell!!? Did you really think I was serious? Did you really think I believed the above pap was a major discovery?! John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On Saturday, February 22, 2014 12:29:04 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > > On 20 February 2014 09:24, Craig Weinberg > > wrote: > > >>> You're assuming that precise molecular assembly will necessarily yield > a > >>> coherent dynamic process, but that may not be the case at all. If you > put > >>> random people in the proper places in a baseball diamond, and give the > one > >>> in the middle a baseball, they don't necessarily play a baseball game. > >> > >> > >> If you're right then there would be something missing, something > >> mysterious, and there would be evidence for it much simpler experiments > than > >> complete assembly of a human body. For example, you might be able to > >> substitute some chemical on a cell for an equivalent chemical and > observe > >> the cell stop functioning even though everything seems to be > biochemically > >> in order. That would be direct evidence for your theory. It's > scientifically > >> testable. > > > > > > What's missing is the entire history of experiences which relate to > whatever > > it is that you think you're copying. > > > > We don't exist on the levels of cells or molecules. If there were no > human > > looking down at cells in a microscope, and we had only the microcosmic > > perspective to go from, there would be nothing that could be done to > build a > > human experience. No configuration of proteins and ion channels is going > to > > taste like strawberries to any of the molecules or cells. All of these > > structures relate only to a particular level of description. If you copy > the > > sheet music of "I Can't Get No Satisfaction" you don't know if it is the > > Rolling Stones version or the Devo version, and neither could be > predicted > > or generated purely from the notes. > > That's your theory, but the theory should have some straightforward > observational consequences. For example, if some of the matter in a > cell is replaced in a laboratory, then the cell would stop > functioning. This would confound the scientists because according to > current theories it ought to function normally provided all the matter > is there in the right configuration. > We don't see it at the sub-cellular level, we see it beginning at the biological level as tissue-rejection. The richer the experience, the longer the history, and the more important it is in defining itself exclusively. Biology is more proprietary than chemistry, zoology is more proprietary than biology, anthropology is more proprietary than zoology, etc. It's not that some material fragment of a cell should be irreplaceable, it's that living cells should be easily created from primordial soup. Your theory misses the whole other half of the universe which coheres from the top down. We can take out small words or skip letters of a sentence and still be understood, but we can't understand a sentence as a whole if we don't know what the bigger words in it mean. Craig > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 22 Feb 2014, at 07:19, meekerdb wrote: On 2/21/2014 9:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: What could that mean? The diary of the M-guy and of the W-guy do > differentiate, and are different from the memory and records of the observer > which does not enter in the telebox. > I am not sure what sense to give to your statement. > Likewise, the math 3p ([]p) and 1p ([]p & p) *does* obey different logic. > And, yes, it is due to a failure of the machine to see that they are > equivalent (as seen by G*), but it is not a failure of imagination, it is a > requirement to remain consistent. That the diary is different and that the observer will experience only M or W and not both is a 3p describable phenomenon. The essentially different thing about 1p is that it is private: I can read your diary, but even then I don't really know how you feel. I can only know how you feel by *being* you, or so it goes. But suppose you M-brain and your W-brain were connected by RF in such a way that your consciousness shifted between M and W like you shift your attention from one sense to another? This must be what the Borg are like. :-) A precise answer here would need a precise description of how you related the two brains. Of course this is not relevant for step 3 where the protocol makes clear that the two brains are reconstituted in an independent way, at their correct substitution level. I guess you know that, and you were not suggesting this as a refutation of the FPI. Bruno Brent "We are the Dyslexic of Borg. Futility is persistent. Your ass will be laminated." -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 22 Feb 2014, at 06:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 20 February 2014 20:43, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Feb 2014, at 22:50, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thursday, February 20, 2014, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Feb 2014, at 17:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18/02/2014, David Nyman wrote: I think if I say consciousness is an epiphenomenon of biochemistry I should also say that life is. And should you not go on to say that biochemistry is an epiphenomenon of physics and physics is an epiphenomenon of well, something that is not itself epiphenomenal, I guess? The way you formulate the problem seems to tend to the conclusion that any and all appearances should strictly be considered an epiphenomenon of something more fundamental that cannot possibly be encountered directly. And, moreover, there is no entailment that any such something be straightforwardly isomorphic with any of those appearances. I'm not saying that this view is incoherent, by the way, but do you agree that something like this is entailed by what you say? I'm making a case for reductionism. If biochemistry necessarily leads to consciousness Biochemistry or anything Turing universal. then I don't think this is any different to the situation where biochemistry necessarily leads to life. Ah! But then life is clearly a 3p phenomenon, so why make consciousness an epiphenomenon? Of course consciousness is "only" a 1p phenomenon, but it can make sense (indeed as a sense maker or receptor). Bruno Maybe the 1p/3p distinction is a failure of imagination. What could that mean? The diary of the M-guy and of the W-guy do differentiate, and are different from the memory and records of the observer which does not enter in the telebox. I am not sure what sense to give to your statement. Likewise, the math 3p ([]p) and 1p ([]p & p) *does* obey different logic. And, yes, it is due to a failure of the machine to see that they are equivalent (as seen by G*), but it is not a failure of imagination, it is a requirement to remain consistent. That the diary is different and that the observer will experience only M or W and not both is a 3p describable phenomenon. Yes. That is why there is nothing controversial in the FPI, as it needs only a very crude 3p definition of 1p, illustrated with personal memories or diaries accompanying the experiencer in the telebox. The essentially different thing about 1p is that it is private: I can read your diary, but even then I don't really know how you feel. I can only know how you feel by *being* you, or so it goes. Yes. But distinguishing 1p and 3p, by outside/inside a teleportation box already gives the gist why we cannot experience the private experience of someone else, as the threads "WWMM..." will be particular for each individual, even for a consciousness eliminativist. Two observers get entangled, and share the same indeterminacies, when going both in the same telebox. That's the first person plural. It's obvious that the phenomenon of life is "no more" than the biochemistry, Actually I disagree with this. Life can be implemented in biochemistry, but is much more than biochemistry, for the same reason that Deep blue chess abilities is much more than the logic of NAND used to implement it. Life and chess ability can be implemented by other means, and *are* implemented by infinitely many other means in arithmetic. Eventually we face the problem of justifying biochemistry, and matter appearance, from a statistic on arithmetic, and this can explain where matter appearance come from. To say hat life is no more than biochemistry makes local sense, but if taken too much seriously, you will condemn yourself to say that biochemistry is no more than addition and multiplication of integers, or is no more than reduction and application of combinators. Yes, that's what I would say that life and biochemistry are if a TOE can generate all of reality from something basic. OK. Normally, UDA shows already that if comp is correct such a TOE *has to* to be like that. I think. but maybe if we could simulate the biochemistry in our heads we would intuitively see any 1p aspect it has as well. Are you not doing "Searle" error? A person can simulate the chinese person does not entail that the person can experience the chinese person feeling. Robinson Arithmetic can simulate Peano Arithmetic, but this does not entail that Robinson Arithmetic can prove what Peano Arithmetic can prove. And all the points of view will depend on proof, not on computation or imitation, even if they play a big role. I hope I will be able to clarify this important point in the modal thread. You seem to push reductionism too far (too far with respect to computationalism). Yes, you can simulate something without really understanding it, That is a key point. It is what Searle miss in the "chinese room". Later,
Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 21 Feb 2014, at 23:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thursday, February 20, 2014, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Liz, On 20 Feb 2014, at 08:49, LizR wrote: On 19 February 2014 23:00, Bruno Marchal wrote: Liz, Others, I was waiting for you to answer the last questions to proceed. Any problem? Well, nothing apart from going on a mini holiday with an old friend for the last 4 days. Sadly she hasn't changed over the last 30 years, so it wasn't much fun, but she'd flown all the way from the UK to NZ so I couldn't really refuse. Actually my brain has died after all the nonsense I have been through over the last few days. It may take a little while to come back. I will try to answer this post properly, maybe tomorrow. Thanks for letting me know. Take your time, as the fun is what matter the most. Feel free to do meta-remarks, or to suggest that I change the pedagogy, or that I sum up better where we are going. You have no problem in understanding logical (modal or not) semantics, but I know, from older posts, that you do have some weakness in deducibility. "deducing" is usually not an easy task, but you will never been obliged to deduce, only to understand what is a deduction, why they can be automated, and checked mechanically, and above all, what are their relation with semantics. Then we will be able to begin the interview of the Löbian machine in arithmetic, and the derivation of physics. that's the real thing, and eventually you will see that modal logic is what make possible to be quite short on this. Take the time needed for your brain to recover. Thanks for telling me, so that I avoid any paranoia, like "did I say something impolite or what ...". Kind regards, Bruno You're one of the most patient and polite people on the Internet, Bruno. Thanks Stathis. You are the one who focus always directly on the point, without any rhetorical tricks and that is quite appreciated. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
What is it like to be Daniel Dennett? On 22 February 2014 19:19, meekerdb wrote: > On 2/21/2014 9:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > What could that mean? The diary of the M-guy and of the W-guy do> > differentiate, and are different from the memory and records of the observer> > which does not enter in the telebox.> I am not sure what sense to give to > your statement.> Likewise, the math 3p ([]p) and 1p ([]p & p) **does** obey > different logic.> And, yes, it is due to a failure of the machine to see that > they are> equivalent (as seen by G*), but it is not a failure of imagination, > it is a> requirement to remain consistent. > > That the diary is different and that the observer will experience only > M or W and not both is a 3p describable phenomenon. The essentially > different thing about 1p is that it is private: I can read your diary, > but even then I don't really know how you feel. I can only know how > you feel by **being** you, or so it goes. > > > > But suppose you M-brain and your W-brain were connected by RF in such a > way that your consciousness shifted between M and W like you shift your > attention from one sense to another? This must be what the Borg are like. > :-) > > Brent > "We are the Dyslexic of Borg. Futility is persistent. Your ass will be > laminated." > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 21 Feb 2014, at 19:07, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 Bruno Marchal wrote: > if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we have to interview all the copies. Then don't just talk to the Moscow Man and say that is enough to disprove the prediction that the Helsinki Man will see Moscow AND Washington because the Moscow Man, the one and only person you talked to, says he didn't see Washington. I said that we have to interview all copies. Not that predictions have any relevance to matters of self identity. Self-identity is not what we talk about. >> I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of ideas you call "comp" is false or not. The word is your invention not mine and you're the only one who seems to know exactly what it means. > You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times. I've told you a billion times don't exaggerate! > Comp is the quite standard hypothesis [...] "Comp" is NOBODY'S standard hypothesis, I have never in my life heard a scientist use the word "comp". Not once. And don't tell me that it means Computationalism It is. I have used so often computationalism on this list that I called it "comp", but I call it indexical mechanism in "conscience & mécanisme", and "computationalism" in most other text. and you're just too lazy to type the extra letters, if it were just that then after I had complained about it "an infinite" number of times I think you would have stopped being so lazy. I think there is much more to it than that, there must be because I agree with Computationalism but I sure as hell don't agree with "comp". Computationalism is what we assume. What you don't admit are the consequence. tell what do add or retrieve for comp to get the consequence, if you think we don't get them from comp. But we know why you don't get the consequence: you confuse, or deliberately ignore the 1-3 p distinctions. >> you once said something abut "the future 1p" of the Helsinki man, well that description would fit 2 people because both remember being the Helsinki man. > yes, and that is why the confirmation is asked to the 2 people. Exactly, there are 2 people not just 1 who will inhabit "the future 1p" , or more precisely "a future 1p" of the Helsinki Man, so interviewing just one man would not provide enough information to know if the prediction "John Clark will see both Moscow and Washington" was correct or not, but after interviewing both you would know enough to be able to judge the truth or falsehood of the prediction, and in this case you'd know that the prediction was correct. Which one? Yours "W & M"? Not at all. You have already agreed that both feel to be in one city. So if I interview both, they will both confirm "W v M", and they will both refute "W & M". Not that predictions, good or bad, would matter in the slightest, not if you're talking about consciousness and the nature of self identity. But I am not. I talk about prediction. It is the main notion to understand that physics has to be redefined as a probability calculus on first person view associated to computation. So to sum up, did the Washington Man see Moscow? No. Did the Moscow Man see Washington? No. Was the Washington Man once the Helsinki Man? Yes. Was the Moscow Man once the Helsinki Man? Yes. Is the Moscow Man the Washington Man? No. Is the Washington Man the Moscow Man? No. Good. Did the Helsinki Man see Washington and Moscow? Yes. In the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view. Your persistent 1-3 confusion again. >> I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves math and it is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2 to the number 3 and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't predict if it will end up as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery is just as profound as yours. Not very. > So you accept that step 3 is a discovery? I think my "discovery" is virtually identical to yours and is just as profound. Not very. So that's it. You blow the candle of another because you are jealous he published it and exploit to get something, and you don't even look at that something? You know, to discover something is not enough. The real discovery is in the understanding that something apparently "not deep" is actually very deep. In this case it shows that Aristotle theology must be replaced by Plato's theology, when assuming computationalism, and that, consequently, physics, or physics' core non geographical truth, must be retrieved from the logic of self-reference, which is done in the Arithmetical UDA (AUDA, once for all). Again, if you accept the point (even have discovered it) please tell us if you agree with the step 4, and then 5 and 6. And 7. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Group
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 2/21/2014 9:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: What could that mean? The diary of the M-guy and of the W-guy do >differentiate, and are different from the memory and records of the observer >which does not enter in the telebox. >I am not sure what sense to give to your statement. >Likewise, the math 3p ([]p) and 1p ([]p & p)*does* obey different logic. >And, yes, it is due to a failure of the machine to see that they are >equivalent (as seen by G*), but it is not a failure of imagination, it is a >requirement to remain consistent. That the diary is different and that the observer will experience only M or W and not both is a 3p describable phenomenon. The essentially different thing about 1p is that it is private: I can read your diary, but even then I don't really know how you feel. I can only know how you feel by*being* you, or so it goes. But suppose you M-brain and your W-brain were connected by RF in such a way that your consciousness shifted between M and W like you shift your attention from one sense to another? This must be what the Borg are like. :-) Brent "We are the Dyslexic of Borg. Futility is persistent. Your ass will be laminated." -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 20 February 2014 20:43, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 19 Feb 2014, at 22:50, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Thursday, February 20, 2014, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 19 Feb 2014, at 17:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On 18/02/2014, David Nyman wrote: >> >> >> I think if I say consciousness is an epiphenomenon of biochemistry I >> >> should also say that life is. >> > >> > >> > And should you not go on to say that biochemistry is an epiphenomenon of >> > physics and physics is an epiphenomenon of well, something that is >> > not >> > itself epiphenomenal, I guess? The way you formulate the problem seems >> > to >> > tend to the conclusion that any and all appearances should strictly be >> > considered an epiphenomenon of something more fundamental that cannot >> > possibly be encountered directly. And, moreover, there is no entailment >> > that any such something be straightforwardly isomorphic with any of >> > those >> > appearances. I'm not saying that this view is incoherent, by the way, >> > but >> > do you agree that something like this is entailed by what you say? >> >> I'm making a case for reductionism. If biochemistry necessarily leads to >> consciousness >> >> >> Biochemistry or anything Turing universal. >> >> >> >> then I don't think this is any different to the situation where >> biochemistry necessarily leads to life. >> >> >> Ah! >> But then life is clearly a 3p phenomenon, so why make consciousness an >> epiphenomenon? Of course consciousness is "only" a 1p phenomenon, but it can >> make sense (indeed as a sense maker or receptor). >> >> Bruno > > > Maybe the 1p/3p distinction is a failure of imagination. > > > What could that mean? The diary of the M-guy and of the W-guy do > differentiate, and are different from the memory and records of the observer > which does not enter in the telebox. > I am not sure what sense to give to your statement. > Likewise, the math 3p ([]p) and 1p ([]p & p) *does* obey different logic. > And, yes, it is due to a failure of the machine to see that they are > equivalent (as seen by G*), but it is not a failure of imagination, it is a > requirement to remain consistent. That the diary is different and that the observer will experience only M or W and not both is a 3p describable phenomenon. The essentially different thing about 1p is that it is private: I can read your diary, but even then I don't really know how you feel. I can only know how you feel by *being* you, or so it goes. > It's obvious that the phenomenon of life is "no more" than the biochemistry, > > > Actually I disagree with this. Life can be implemented in biochemistry, but > is much more than biochemistry, for the same reason that Deep blue chess > abilities is much more than the logic of NAND used to implement it. Life and > chess ability can be implemented by other means, and *are* implemented by > infinitely many other means in arithmetic. Eventually we face the problem of > justifying biochemistry, and matter appearance, from a statistic on > arithmetic, and this can explain where matter appearance come from. > To say hat life is no more than biochemistry makes local sense, but if taken > too much seriously, you will condemn yourself to say that biochemistry is no > more than addition and multiplication of integers, or is no more than > reduction and application of combinators. Yes, that's what I would say that life and biochemistry are if a TOE can generate all of reality from something basic. > but maybe if we could simulate the biochemistry in our heads we would > intuitively see any 1p aspect it has as well. > > > Are you not doing "Searle" error? A person can simulate the chinese person > does not entail that the person can experience the chinese person feeling. > Robinson Arithmetic can simulate Peano Arithmetic, but this does not entail > that Robinson Arithmetic can prove what Peano Arithmetic can prove. And all > the points of view will depend on proof, not on computation or imitation, > even if they play a big role. I hope I will be able to clarify this > important point in the modal thread. > You seem to push reductionism too far (too far with respect to > computationalism). Yes, you can simulate something without really understanding it, like the Chinese Room. But maybe if we had godlike cognitive abilities we could simulate another mind and literally see things from their point of view. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 20 February 2014 09:24, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> You're assuming that precise molecular assembly will necessarily yield a >>> coherent dynamic process, but that may not be the case at all. If you put >>> random people in the proper places in a baseball diamond, and give the one >>> in the middle a baseball, they don't necessarily play a baseball game. >> >> >> If you're right then there would be something missing, something >> mysterious, and there would be evidence for it much simpler experiments than >> complete assembly of a human body. For example, you might be able to >> substitute some chemical on a cell for an equivalent chemical and observe >> the cell stop functioning even though everything seems to be biochemically >> in order. That would be direct evidence for your theory. It's scientifically >> testable. > > > What's missing is the entire history of experiences which relate to whatever > it is that you think you're copying. > > We don't exist on the levels of cells or molecules. If there were no human > looking down at cells in a microscope, and we had only the microcosmic > perspective to go from, there would be nothing that could be done to build a > human experience. No configuration of proteins and ion channels is going to > taste like strawberries to any of the molecules or cells. All of these > structures relate only to a particular level of description. If you copy the > sheet music of "I Can't Get No Satisfaction" you don't know if it is the > Rolling Stones version or the Devo version, and neither could be predicted > or generated purely from the notes. That's your theory, but the theory should have some straightforward observational consequences. For example, if some of the matter in a cell is replaced in a laboratory, then the cell would stop functioning. This would confound the scientists because according to current theories it ought to function normally provided all the matter is there in the right configuration. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 21 February 2014 14:48, chris peck wrote: > Hi Liz > > >>>Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you to >>> another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life. >>> Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be >>> "transported" :) A malfunction causes you to be duplicated and sent to both >>> destinations, but you will never meet your doppelganger in the other solar >>> system, or find out that he exists. > > Does this make any difference to how you assign probabilities? If so, why? > > My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar > system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I > don't know about the possibility of accidents. But, > If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then the > probabilities end up: > > Solar System A : 1 > Solar System B : small chance. > > Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small > chance) as far as I am concerned. > > Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of > their own, the probabilities end up: > > Solar System A : 1 > Solar System B : 1. > > So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an > unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up > to 1 in MWI scenarios. > > All the best Since in the world we live in probabilities for everything don't seem to be 1, is this evidence that the MWI is false? Is it even logically possible to be an observer in a multiverse where everything happens with probability 1, and if so, what would it be like? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On Thursday, February 20, 2014, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Hi Liz, > > On 20 Feb 2014, at 08:49, LizR wrote: > > On 19 February 2014 23:00, Bruno Marchal > > > wrote: > >> Liz, Others, >> >> I was waiting for you to answer the last questions to proceed. Any >> problem? >> > > Well, nothing apart from going on a mini holiday with an old friend for > the last 4 days. Sadly she hasn't changed over the last 30 years, so it > wasn't much fun, but she'd flown all the way from the UK to NZ so I > couldn't really refuse. > > Actually my brain has died after all the nonsense I have been through over > the last few days. It may take a little while to come back. I will try to > answer this post properly, maybe tomorrow. > > > > Thanks for letting me know. Take your time, as the fun is what matter the > most. > Feel free to do meta-remarks, or to suggest that I change the pedagogy, or > that I sum up better where we are going. > > You have no problem in understanding logical (modal or not) semantics, but > I know, from older posts, that you do have some weakness in deducibility. > "deducing" is usually not an easy task, but you will never been obliged to > deduce, only to understand what is a deduction, why they can be automated, > and checked mechanically, and above all, what are their relation with > semantics. > > Then we will be able to begin the interview of the Löbian machine in > arithmetic, and the derivation of physics. that's the real thing, and > eventually you will see that modal logic is what make possible to be quite > short on this. > > Take the time needed for your brain to recover. Thanks for telling me, so > that I avoid any paranoia, like "did I say something impolite or what ...". > > Kind regards, > > Bruno > You're one of the most patient and polite people on the Internet, Bruno. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
2014-02-21 19:07 GMT+01:00 John Clark : > On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we >> have to interview all the copies. >> > > Then don't just talk to the Moscow Man and say that is enough to disprove > the prediction that the Helsinki Man will see Moscow AND Washington because > the Moscow Man, the one and only person you talked to, says he didn't see > Washington. Not that predictions have any relevance to matters of self > identity. > > >> >> I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of ideas you >>> call "comp" is false or not. The word is your invention not mine and you're >>> the only one who seems to know exactly what it means. >>> >> >> > You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times. >> > > I've told you a billion times don't exaggerate! > > > Comp is the quite standard hypothesis [...] >> > > "Comp" is NOBODY'S standard hypothesis, I have never in my life heard a > scientist use the word "comp". Not once. And don't tell me that it means > Computationalism and you're just too lazy to type the extra letters, if it > were just that then after I had complained about it "an infinite" number of > times I think you would have stopped being so lazy. I think there is much > more to it than that, there must be because I agree with Computationalism > but I sure as hell don't agree with "comp". > > >> you once said something abut "the future 1p" of the Helsinki man, well >>> that description would fit 2 people because both remember being the >>> Helsinki man. >>> >> >> > > yes, and that is why the confirmation is asked to the 2 people. >> > > Exactly, there are 2 people not just 1 who will inhabit "the future 1p" , > or more precisely "a future 1p" of the Helsinki Man, so interviewing just > one man would not provide enough information to know if the prediction > "John Clark will see both Moscow and Washington" was correct or not, but > after interviewing both you would know enough to be able to judge the truth > or falsehood of the prediction, and in this case you'd know that the > prediction was correct. Not that predictions, good or bad, would matter in > the slightest, not if you're talking about consciousness and the nature of > self identity. > > So to sum up, did the Washington Man see Moscow? No. Did the Moscow Man > see Washington? No. Was the Washington Man once the Helsinki Man? Yes. Was > the Moscow Man once the Helsinki Man? Yes. Is the Moscow Man the Washington > Man? No. Is the Washington Man the Moscow Man? No. Did the Helsinki Man see > Washington and Moscow? Yes. > > >> I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves math >>> and it is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2 to the >>> number 3 and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't predict if it will >>> end up as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery is just as profound as >>> yours. Not very. >>> >> >> > > So you accept that step 3 is a discovery? >> > > I think my "discovery" is virtually identical to yours and is just as > profound. Not very. > > As usual, you go from denial, to not "profound"... you know why it is called *step* three ? I'll tell you a real discovery your big brain still didn't found... it is a step because *that's not the discovery*. Anyway, you've decided long ago to dismiss anything coming from Bruno, Bruno is too patient with you, you'll never accept continuing reading/discussing the argument, it would be an admittance that you lost your game. So keep your belief in probability and MWI and dismiss anything else with all your heart even when it's obviously inconsistent (I await your theory explaining how meeting a doppelganger render the probabilty calculus null) , everybody knows that if you repeat a lie enough, it becomes truth... or maybe not. Quentin > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 Bruno Marchal wrote: > if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we > have to interview all the copies. > Then don't just talk to the Moscow Man and say that is enough to disprove the prediction that the Helsinki Man will see Moscow AND Washington because the Moscow Man, the one and only person you talked to, says he didn't see Washington. Not that predictions have any relevance to matters of self identity. > >> I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of ideas you >> call "comp" is false or not. The word is your invention not mine and you're >> the only one who seems to know exactly what it means. >> > > > You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times. > I've told you a billion times don't exaggerate! > Comp is the quite standard hypothesis [...] > "Comp" is NOBODY'S standard hypothesis, I have never in my life heard a scientist use the word "comp". Not once. And don't tell me that it means Computationalism and you're just too lazy to type the extra letters, if it were just that then after I had complained about it "an infinite" number of times I think you would have stopped being so lazy. I think there is much more to it than that, there must be because I agree with Computationalism but I sure as hell don't agree with "comp". >> you once said something abut "the future 1p" of the Helsinki man, well >> that description would fit 2 people because both remember being the >> Helsinki man. >> > > > yes, and that is why the confirmation is asked to the 2 people. > Exactly, there are 2 people not just 1 who will inhabit "the future 1p" , or more precisely "a future 1p" of the Helsinki Man, so interviewing just one man would not provide enough information to know if the prediction "John Clark will see both Moscow and Washington" was correct or not, but after interviewing both you would know enough to be able to judge the truth or falsehood of the prediction, and in this case you'd know that the prediction was correct. Not that predictions, good or bad, would matter in the slightest, not if you're talking about consciousness and the nature of self identity. So to sum up, did the Washington Man see Moscow? No. Did the Moscow Man see Washington? No. Was the Washington Man once the Helsinki Man? Yes. Was the Moscow Man once the Helsinki Man? Yes. Is the Moscow Man the Washington Man? No. Is the Washington Man the Moscow Man? No. Did the Helsinki Man see Washington and Moscow? Yes. >> I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves math and >> it is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2 to the number 3 >> and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't predict if it will end up >> as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery is just as profound as yours. Not >> very. >> > > > So you accept that step 3 is a discovery? > I think my "discovery" is virtually identical to yours and is just as profound. Not very. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 21 February 2014 16:48, chris peck wrote: > Hi Liz > > > > *>>Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you > to another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life. > Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be > "transported" :) A malfunction causes you to be duplicated and sent to both > destinations, but you will never meet your doppelganger in the other solar > system, or find out that he exists. Does this make any difference to how > you assign probabilities? If so, why?* > > My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar > system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I > don't know about the possibility of accidents. > OK, Fair enough. I didn't quite phrase my scenario as I intended. Let's also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be sent to, and that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send you to A or B with equal probability based on some "quantum coin flip". But by accident it duplicates you, and sends you to both. This effectively conflates the comp and MWI versions IMHO, so you can't easily disentangle them in this thought experiment. > But, > If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then > the probabilities end up: > > Solar System A : 1 > Solar System B : small chance. > > Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small > chance) as far as I am concerned. > > Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of > their own, the probabilities end up: > > Solar System A : 1 > Solar System B : 1. > > So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an > unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up > to 1 in MWI scenarios. > This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each branch will be different, and it always *seems* to me, retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome. So even if you believe the MWI to give the correct explanation of probability, you will still tend to say something like "there is a 50% chance of rain tomorrow" rather than "it will both rain and not rain tomorrow". Which is I think what Bruno is getting at with the FPI. > > All the best > > Chris. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Ok, then you simply reject probability usage in both scenario... then you're consistent unlike John... but if you reject such usage, that's throwing an axe on MWI explanation... then I can't see how you could still agree with many world interpretation and reject probability, that's not consistent... unless of course, you reject MWI. Quentin 2014-02-21 4:48 GMT+01:00 chris peck : > Hi Liz > > > > > *>>Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you > to another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life. > Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be > "transported" :) A malfunction causes you to be duplicated and sent to both > destinations, but you will never meet your doppelganger in the other solar > system, or find out that he exists. Does this make any difference to how > you assign probabilities? If so, why?* > > My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar > system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I > don't know about the possibility of accidents. But, > If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then > the probabilities end up: > > Solar System A : 1 > Solar System B : small chance. > > Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small > chance) as far as I am concerned. > > Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of > their own, the probabilities end up: > > Solar System A : 1 > Solar System B : 1. > > So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an > unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up > to 1 in MWI scenarios. > > All the best > > Chris. > > > > > > -- > From: marc...@ulb.ac.be > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) > Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 20:45:39 +0100 > > > > On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote: > > On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last > week. > > > But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could > say exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed. > > > Well, if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: > we have to interview all the copies. > > > > > > >> and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he sees > neither Washington nor Moscow. > > > > So, this is my first post to you, > > > Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if > duplicating chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is. > > > On the contrary. It is always clear. In the 3p we are all copies, and in > the 1p we are one of them. > That is what they all say. They have they own permanent atomic memories > like "WWMWMM". Say. > > > > > > > > despite I remember having sent other post? > > > The question is ambiguous because lots and lots of people in addition to > Mr. I remember the exact same thing. > > > Obviously. We agree. But there is no ambiguity. By definition of 1p and > comp, we have to take all the copies 1p view into account. That is why if > the H-guy predicted "W v M", all its copies win the bet, and if he > predicted "W & M", all the copies admits this was wrong (even if correct > for the 3-1 view, but clearly false from their 1-views). > > > > > > > If Mr he sees neither W or M, then he died, > > > If Bruno Marchal wants to invent a new language and that's what the words > "death" and "he" are decreed to mean then fine, but to be consistent John > Clark and Bruno Marchal of yesterday would have to be dead too. And it > should be noted that invented languages make communication with others > difficult, just look at Esperanto, and John Clark thinks that deep > philosophical discussions are difficult enough as they are even if > conducted in a mutually agreed upon language, so more obstacles to > understanding are not needed. > > > You quote and comment yourself! > > > > > > > > and then comp is false. > > > That's fine, I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of > ideas you call "comp" is false or not. The word is your invention not mine > and you're the only one who seems to know exactly what it means. > > > You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times. Comp is t
Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 21 Feb 2014, at 00:30, LizR wrote: On 21 February 2014 00:06, Bruno Marchal wrote: Thanks for telling me, so that I avoid any paranoia, like "did I say something impolite or what ...". Never that! OK, thanks. Best, Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 21 Feb 2014, at 05:36, chris peck wrote: Hi Bruno By and large you didn't get my response to Quentin and largely the comments you made didn't actually address the comments I was making, or the questions I was asking Quentin. It seems more as if you were addressing comments you hoped I was making but didn't. With respect then I've just passed all that stuff by. Without specific comment, this looks like wordplay. I thought this was worth commenting on though: >> So from the FPI, you can infer which "you" notion was involved. It is asked to the 1-you in Helsinki, coexistencial with the 3-you in Helsinki. And the question bears on which next 1-you H-you will feel to be, or equivalently, which city you will feel to be reconstituted in. The 3-you == 1-you in Helsinki knows that there will be only one, from his future pov. No, (3-you == 1-you) knows he has 2 future povs. He knows he will feel to be in both Washington and Moscow. He knows that, after pushing the button, he will be in both W and M in the third person pov. But he knows about comp, and so he knows that what will actually be the case, is that in the 3-1 view, he will feel to be unique in W and he will feel to be unique in M. But those feeling correspond to incompatible event, and indeed each diary will contain only W or only M, from both 1-view. As the question bears on those 1-views, the answer has to be be: "W or M", with an exclusive "or". How can I make this clear for you that this is a 1-p expectancy? Because I think you have things completely the wrong way around. You say that it takes an act of intellectual and 3-p reasoning to draw the conclusion that I will be in both W and M, and that more naturally from the 1-p perspective I will only expect to see 1 city. I say, no. Before the trip to both M and W I will day dream about walking through the corridors of the white house in Washington AND day dream about walking through the corridors of the Kremlin in moscow. OK, you can do that. I will imagine meeting and talking to Obama but also dream of meeting and talking to Putin. OK. But unless you ignore comp, you will not daydream that you will meet both Obama and Putin, together. I'll sit at my work desk planning what I would say to each of them if we actually did meet. At night I wil dream of doing these things and wake up surprised that I am not actually in Moscow and not actually in Washington yet. And these dreams will be as 1-p as any common-all-garden dream. If I stop and think about things, if I intellectualize the matter from a 3-p perspective, then I will realize that my two future selves will be unique and separate and therefore will only see one or the other, but from my current non- duplicated perspective this will seem odd and hard to imagine. when I relax and let my mind wander I will expect to see both and dream of seeing both. Not simultaneously. That is the point. Or you are just wrong on computationalism. If you write "W and M", you can, in Helsinki, know in advance that both copies will have to admit having been wrong. So, when you ask me where I will expect to be, of course I will answer that i expect to be in Moscow and Washington. So you write "W and M" in the diary. And after pushing the button, both copies will realize they were wrong, or not answering the question asked. It is very simple to see that the prediction "W v M" will be verified by both copies. And if you tell me that I will in fact only experience one or the other, I will demand my money back or at least half of it. Then if you predict the spin of an electron that we will both see in some experience that we do together, in the MWI, you should predict that we will see both. We do the experience, and we see spin up. You were wrong and if you bet something on this, you lose. You are just using the pronouns in the ambiguous way of Clark, and like him, just describe the 3-1 views, instead of the 1-1 views asked. Best, Bruno All the best Chris. From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 03:48:43 + Hi Liz >>Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you to another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life. Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be "transported" :) A malfunction causes you to be duplicated and sent to both destinations, but you will never meet your doppelganger in the other solar system, or find out that he exists. Does this make any difference to how you assign probabilities? If so, why? My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar system A is 1.
RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Russel >> This contradicts Kolmogorov's 4th axiom of probability, namely that the probability of the certain event = 1. Yes it does doesnt it. But thats ok. Im not convinced Kolmogorov had MWI in view when he dreamt up his axioms and Im too green behind the ears vis a vis probability axioms to know whether it matters much. But that 4th axiom does look like it might need revising. >>So maybe you can give meaning to your measure, but it aint probability as we known it. sure and thats fine by me. Particularly if these thought experiments are intended as analogies for MWI then I think probability loses meaning from both frog and bird's eye views. In fact, for any TofE where all possibilities are catered for probability is the first casualty. Its the logic of the situation that does violence to the concept of probability not the manner in which the plenitude is realized. What i think is unusual about my position is that I stand fast against uncertainty in frogs as well as birds. Thank goodness there are academics out there like Hilary Graves who think in tune with me, its an unusual position but not a unique one. All the best Chris. > Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 16:19:47 +1100 > From: li...@hpcoders.com.au > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) > > On Fri, Feb 21, 2014 at 03:48:43AM +, chris peck wrote: > > > > My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar > > system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I > > don't know about the possibility of accidents. But, > > If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then > > the probabilities end up: > > > > Solar System A : 1 > > Solar System B : small chance. > > > > Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small > > chance) as far as I am concerned. > > > > Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of > > their own, the probabilities end up: > > > > Solar System A : 1 > > Solar System B : 1. > > > > So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an > unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get > rounded up to 1 in MWI scenarios. > > This contradicts Kolmogorov's 4th axiom of probability, namely that the > probability of the certain event = 1. > > In your probabilities, the probability of the certain event of seeing > either solar system A or seeing solar system B, or something else > entirely different again ends up being greater than or equal to 2. > > So maybe you can give meaning to your measure, but it aint probability > as we known it. > > > -- > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On Fri, Feb 21, 2014 at 03:48:43AM +, chris peck wrote: > > My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar > system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I > don't know about the possibility of accidents. But, > If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then the > probabilities end up: > > Solar System A : 1 > Solar System B : small chance. > > Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small > chance) as far as I am concerned. > > Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of > their own, the probabilities end up: > > Solar System A : 1 > Solar System B : 1. > > So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up to 1 in MWI scenarios. This contradicts Kolmogorov's 4th axiom of probability, namely that the probability of the certain event = 1. In your probabilities, the probability of the certain event of seeing either solar system A or seeing solar system B, or something else entirely different again ends up being greater than or equal to 2. So maybe you can give meaning to your measure, but it aint probability as we known it. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Bruno By and large you didn't get my response to Quentin and largely the comments you made didn't actually address the comments I was making, or the questions I was asking Quentin. It seems more as if you were addressing comments you hoped I was making but didn't. With respect then I've just passed all that stuff by. I thought this was worth commenting on though: >> So from the FPI, you can infer which "you" notion was involved. It is asked >> to the 1-you in Helsinki, coexistencial with the 3-you in Helsinki. And the >> question bears on which next 1-you H-you will feel to be, or equivalently, >> which city you will feel to be reconstituted in. The 3-you == 1-you in >> Helsinki knows that there will be only one, from his future pov. No, (3-you == 1-you) knows he has 2 future povs. He knows he will feel to be in both Washington and Moscow. How can I make this clear for you that this is a 1-p expectancy? Because I think you have things completely the wrong way around. You say that it takes an act of intellectual and 3-p reasoning to draw the conclusion that I will be in both W and M, and that more naturally from the 1-p perspective I will only expect to see 1 city. I say, no. Before the trip to both M and W I will day dream about walking through the corridors of the white house in Washington AND day dream about walking through the corridors of the Kremlin in moscow. I will imagine meeting and talking to Obama but also dream of meeting and talking to Putin. I'll sit at my work desk planning what I would say to each of them if we actually did meet. At night I wil dream of doing these things and wake up surprised that I am not actually in Moscow and not actually in Washington yet. And these dreams will be as 1-p as any common-all-garden dream. If I stop and think about things, if I intellectualize the matter from a 3-p perspective, then I will realize that my two future selves will be unique and separate and therefore will only see one or the other, but from my current non-duplicated perspective this will seem odd and hard to imagine. when I relax and let my mind wander I will expect to see both and dream of seeing both. So, when you ask me where I will expect to be, of course I will answer that i expect to be in Moscow and Washington. And if you tell me that I will in fact only experience one or the other, I will demand my money back or at least half of it. All the best Chris. From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 03:48:43 + Hi Liz >>Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you to another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life. Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be "transported" :) A malfunction causes you to be duplicated and sent to both destinations, but you will never meet your doppelganger in the other solar system, or find out that he exists. Does this make any difference to how you assign probabilities? If so, why? My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I don't know about the possibility of accidents. But, If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then the probabilities end up: Solar System A : 1 Solar System B : small chance. Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small chance) as far as I am concerned. Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of their own, the probabilities end up: Solar System A : 1 Solar System B : 1. So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up to 1 in MWI scenarios. All the best Chris. From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 20:45:39 +0100 On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote:On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last week. But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could say exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed. Well, if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we have to interview all the copies. >> and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he sees >> neither Washington nor Moscow. > So, this is my first post to you, Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if duplicating chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is. On the contrary. It is always clear. In the 3p w
RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Liz >>Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you to another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life. Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be "transported" :) A malfunction causes you to be duplicated and sent to both destinations, but you will never meet your doppelganger in the other solar system, or find out that he exists. Does this make any difference to how you assign probabilities? If so, why? My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I don't know about the possibility of accidents. But, If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then the probabilities end up: Solar System A : 1 Solar System B : small chance. Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small chance) as far as I am concerned. Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of their own, the probabilities end up: Solar System A : 1 Solar System B : 1. So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up to 1 in MWI scenarios. All the best Chris. From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 20:45:39 +0100 On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote:On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last week. But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could say exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed. Well, if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we have to interview all the copies. >> and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he sees >> neither Washington nor Moscow. > So, this is my first post to you, Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if duplicating chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is. On the contrary. It is always clear. In the 3p we are all copies, and in the 1p we are one of them.That is what they all say. They have they own permanent atomic memories like "WWMWMM". Say. > despite I remember having sent other post? The question is ambiguous because lots and lots of people in addition to Mr. I remember the exact same thing. Obviously. We agree. But there is no ambiguity. By definition of 1p and comp, we have to take all the copies 1p view into account. That is why if the H-guy predicted "W v M", all its copies win the bet, and if he predicted "W & M", all the copies admits this was wrong (even if correct for the 3-1 view, but clearly false from their 1-views). > If Mr he sees neither W or M, then he died, If Bruno Marchal wants to invent a new language and that's what the words "death" and "he" are decreed to mean then fine, but to be consistent John Clark and Bruno Marchal of yesterday would have to be dead too. And it should be noted that invented languages make communication with others difficult, just look at Esperanto, and John Clark thinks that deep philosophical discussions are difficult enough as they are even if conducted in a mutually agreed upon language, so more obstacles to understanding are not needed. You quote and comment yourself! > and then comp is false. That's fine, I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of ideas you call "comp" is false or not. The word is your invention not mine and you're the only one who seems to know exactly what it means. You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times. Comp is the quite standard hypothesis that the brain, or whatever responsible for my consciousness manifestation here and now, is Turing emulable.It is not my invention. "comp" abbreviates computationalism. I show the consequence, and you stop at step 3 for reason that you do not succeed to communicate. > We also died each time we measure a spin, or anything. Then the word "died" doesn't mean much. That was a consequence of your saying. > In AUDA this is a confusion You have forgotten IHA. I told you more than five times what AUDA means. Stop joking, and try to be serious. AUDA is the Arithmetical UDA, also called "interview of the universal machine" in sane04. It is the main part of the thesis in computer science.If you doubt that it means that you do repeat hearsay. > between []p and []p & <>t. How in the world could anybody be confused between []p and []p & <>t especially if they had a nice low mileage AUDA convertibl
Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 21 February 2014 00:06, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Thanks for telling me, so that I avoid any paranoia, like "did I say > something impolite or what ...". > > Never that! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last week. But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could say exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed. Well, if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we have to interview all the copies. >> and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he sees neither Washington nor Moscow. > So, this is my first post to you, Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if duplicating chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is. On the contrary. It is always clear. In the 3p we are all copies, and in the 1p we are one of them. That is what they all say. They have they own permanent atomic memories like "WWMWMM". Say. > despite I remember having sent other post? The question is ambiguous because lots and lots of people in addition to Mr. I remember the exact same thing. Obviously. We agree. But there is no ambiguity. By definition of 1p and comp, we have to take all the copies 1p view into account. That is why if the H-guy predicted "W v M", all its copies win the bet, and if he predicted "W & M", all the copies admits this was wrong (even if correct for the 3-1 view, but clearly false from their 1-views). > If Mr he sees neither W or M, then he died, If Bruno Marchal wants to invent a new language and that's what the words "death" and "he" are decreed to mean then fine, but to be consistent John Clark and Bruno Marchal of yesterday would have to be dead too. And it should be noted that invented languages make communication with others difficult, just look at Esperanto, and John Clark thinks that deep philosophical discussions are difficult enough as they are even if conducted in a mutually agreed upon language, so more obstacles to understanding are not needed. You quote and comment yourself! > and then comp is false. That's fine, I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of ideas you call "comp" is false or not. The word is your invention not mine and you're the only one who seems to know exactly what it means. You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times. Comp is the quite standard hypothesis that the brain, or whatever responsible for my consciousness manifestation here and now, is Turing emulable. It is not my invention. "comp" abbreviates computationalism. I show the consequence, and you stop at step 3 for reason that you do not succeed to communicate. > We also died each time we measure a spin, or anything. Then the word "died" doesn't mean much. That was a consequence of your saying. > In AUDA this is a confusion You have forgotten IHA. I told you more than five times what AUDA means. Stop joking, and try to be serious. AUDA is the Arithmetical UDA, also called "interview of the universal machine" in sane04. It is the main part of the thesis in computer science. If you doubt that it means that you do repeat hearsay. > between []p and []p & <>t. How in the world could anybody be confused between []p and []p & <>t especially if they had a nice low mileage AUDA convertible to help them get around town? Mocking does not help you. > you believe we have refuted comp. That would be a gigantic discovery Not to me it wouldn't! I don't care if "comp" is true or false because I don't believe "comp" is worth a bucket of warm spit. That contradicts your saying yes to step 0, 1 and 2. > Pronouns does not introduce any problem, Personal pronouns like all pronouns are just a sort of shorthand that were invented to save time and for no other reason, they generally cause no trouble as long as the referent is clear. And yet it is a fact that Bruno Marchal is simply incapable of expressing ideas about the unique nature of personal identity without using personal pronouns. I did it, but you are the one caming back with ambiguous pronouns in your "refutation". There is no ambiguity at all. Just keep the 1-3 distinction in all the uses. Why? Could it be because by using them and the assumption of uniqueness of identity they engender it makes it much easier to prove the uniqueness of identity? After all it is well known that proofs become somewhat easier to write if Bruno Marchal just assumes what Bruno Marchal is trying to prove. And if ideas are unclear the language should be too; a bad idea clearly expressed is easy to identify as bad, but a bad idea expressed in murky language can sometimes sound impressive if it's murky enough. Stop doing irrelevant meta-remarks to hide your absence of arguments. Focus on your point, if there is one, of move top step 4, if only to get the idea. > when you agree that after the duplication we are both copies in
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last week. > But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could say exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed. > >> and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he sees >> neither Washington nor Moscow. >> > > > So, this is my first post to you, > Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if duplicating chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is. > > despite I remember having sent other post? > The question is ambiguous because lots and lots of people in addition to Mr. I remember the exact same thing. > > If Mr he sees neither W or M, then he died, > If Bruno Marchal wants to invent a new language and that's what the words "death" and "he" are decreed to mean then fine, but to be consistent John Clark and Bruno Marchal of yesterday would have to be dead too. And it should be noted that invented languages make communication with others difficult, just look at Esperanto, and John Clark thinks that deep philosophical discussions are difficult enough as they are even if conducted in a mutually agreed upon language, so more obstacles to understanding are not needed. > > and then comp is false. > That's fine, I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of ideas you call "comp" is false or not. The word is your invention not mine and you're the only one who seems to know exactly what it means. > > We also died each time we measure a spin, or anything. > Then the word "died" doesn't mean much. > > In AUDA this is a confusion > You have forgotten IHA. > > between []p and []p & <>t. > How in the world could anybody be confused between []p and []p & <>t especially if they had a nice low mileage AUDA convertible to help them get around town? > > you believe we have refuted comp. That would be a gigantic discovery > Not to me it wouldn't! I don't care if "comp" is true or false because I don't believe "comp" is worth a bucket of warm spit. > > Pronouns does not introduce any problem, > Personal pronouns like all pronouns are just a sort of shorthand that were invented to save time and for no other reason, they generally cause no trouble as long as the referent is clear. And yet it is a fact that Bruno Marchal is simply incapable of expressing ideas about the unique nature of personal identity without using personal pronouns. Why? Could it be because by using them and the assumption of uniqueness of identity they engender it makes it much easier to prove the uniqueness of identity? After all it is well known that proofs become somewhat easier to write if Bruno Marchal just assumes what Bruno Marchal is trying to prove. And if ideas are unclear the language should be too; a bad idea clearly expressed is easy to identify as bad, but a bad idea expressed in murky language can sometimes sound impressive if it's murky enough. > > when you agree that after the duplication we are both copies in the 3p > view > Yes. And you once said something abut "the future 1p" of the Helsinki man, well that description would fit 2 people because both remember being the Helsinki man. > > and only one of them, in the 1p view. > Only one? So which one is the phony, the Washington Man or the Moscow Man? > > I am happy you think it is a world class discovery, but let us be > modest, it is a reminder that the mind-body problem is not solved, and that > "science" has not decided between Aristotle and Plato. The discovery (the > thesis) is in the math part > I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves math and it is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2 to the number 3 and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't predict if it will end up as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery is just as profound as yours. Not very. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Hi Liz, On 20 Feb 2014, at 08:49, LizR wrote: On 19 February 2014 23:00, Bruno Marchal wrote: Liz, Others, I was waiting for you to answer the last questions to proceed. Any problem? Well, nothing apart from going on a mini holiday with an old friend for the last 4 days. Sadly she hasn't changed over the last 30 years, so it wasn't much fun, but she'd flown all the way from the UK to NZ so I couldn't really refuse. Actually my brain has died after all the nonsense I have been through over the last few days. It may take a little while to come back. I will try to answer this post properly, maybe tomorrow. Thanks for letting me know. Take your time, as the fun is what matter the most. Feel free to do meta-remarks, or to suggest that I change the pedagogy, or that I sum up better where we are going. You have no problem in understanding logical (modal or not) semantics, but I know, from older posts, that you do have some weakness in deducibility. "deducing" is usually not an easy task, but you will never been obliged to deduce, only to understand what is a deduction, why they can be automated, and checked mechanically, and above all, what are their relation with semantics. Then we will be able to begin the interview of the Löbian machine in arithmetic, and the derivation of physics. that's the real thing, and eventually you will see that modal logic is what make possible to be quite short on this. Take the time needed for your brain to recover. Thanks for telling me, so that I avoid any paranoia, like "did I say something impolite or what ...". Kind regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
simply not duplicable *from his 1p perspective". Like in Everett, we can't feel the split. '*you*' has to bear in mind that both 'you' and 'you' are '*you*' in some sense. Exactly. 'you' and 'you' don't need to worry about that. And infact to get any other result than zero from the sum, this identity relation between '*you*', 'you' and 'you' must stand, which brings us to another point: as Clark points out, preservation of identity is central to this thought experiment. OK. But only the notion of identity already clarified when comp is assumed. This involves only the personal content of the diaries, entering, or not, in the teleboxes. The other point that Clark often makes is that step 3 is worthless, and if the intention of step 3 is to hammer home that duplicated people would only ever have a single POV, then step 3 is indeed worthless. But of course, that is not the point of step 3, as this is the point of step 2. Step 3 is the FPI point. It shows that in a context of pure 3p comp determinacy, the 1p are confronted to a string form of indeterminacy, and this without invoking QM. Does Bruno really need to advertise an inability to conduct simple probability sums to convince you that individuals only have a single pov? I do the contrary. By definition of the 1p, it is just obvious that individuals only have a single pov, and this is used to lead to the probabilities. But I don't think that is all step 3 is really about. Good, as you put it in the wrong direction. Its also about trying to maintain 'indeterminacy' in the mistaken belief that it has a legitimate place in Everettian MWI. In the Everettian MWI, the probabilities are the same as in the non- everett setting, but are reduced implicitly to the comp FPI, although this could be the object of another debate, as UDA importantly does not assume QM. Bruno From: allco...@gmail.com Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 20:53:46 +0100 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark : On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding the argument that you can't meet your doppelganger, So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use logic in doing so. No can do. That's not what I was asking, I was asking that if you use your meet doppelganger argument, ==> read the next quote. > or you have to explain why the possibility of meeting render probability calculus meaningless. If Everett's probability calculus produced figures that didn't agree with both experiment and Quantum Mechanics then the MWI would indeed be meaningless because the entire point of the MWI is to explain why Quantum Mechanics works as well as it does. The thing is to devise a though experiment matching MWI, in the MWI case you accept probability calculus. But Bruno isn't trying to explain why Quantum Mechanics works, that's already been done, he's trying to explain the nature of self, He does not, and certainly does not at step 3. and so I don't care if Bruno's probability calculus works He does, that's what is showing FPI (which *of course* also exists under MWI) or not because probability and prediction have nothing to do with that; It has all to do with that because it is specifically the question asked. as I have said before, you feel like Quentin Anciaux today because you remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday and for no other reason. As I have said before and before and before, that's not the question. And despite what you say above the situations are not equivalent. They are from the probability POV. According to Everett the very laws of physics forbid you from ever interacting with your doppelganger And what does it have to do with frequency and probability ? and so Bruno's favorite type of words, personal pronouns, cause no problem; They don't pose problem in this experiment and in the question asked. So I'll try one last time, and will try à la Jesse, with simple yes/no questions and explanation from your part. So I will first describe the setup and will suppose for the argument that what we will do (duplicating you) is possible. So you (John Clark reading this email or the one from tomorrow or whatever, so I'll use *you*) are in front of a button that is in a room with two doors. When *you* will press the button, *you* will be duplicated (by destroying you in the room and recreating you two times in two exactly identical room), the only difference in each room is that one has the left door open and one has the right door op
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 19 Feb 2014, at 22:50, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thursday, February 20, 2014, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Feb 2014, at 17:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18/02/2014, David Nyman wrote: >> I think if I say consciousness is an epiphenomenon of biochemistry I >> should also say that life is. > > > And should you not go on to say that biochemistry is an epiphenomenon of > physics and physics is an epiphenomenon of well, something that is not > itself epiphenomenal, I guess? The way you formulate the problem seems to > tend to the conclusion that any and all appearances should strictly be > considered an epiphenomenon of something more fundamental that cannot > possibly be encountered directly. And, moreover, there is no entailment > that any such something be straightforwardly isomorphic with any of those > appearances. I'm not saying that this view is incoherent, by the way, but > do you agree that something like this is entailed by what you say? I'm making a case for reductionism. If biochemistry necessarily leads to consciousness Biochemistry or anything Turing universal. then I don't think this is any different to the situation where biochemistry necessarily leads to life. Ah! But then life is clearly a 3p phenomenon, so why make consciousness an epiphenomenon? Of course consciousness is "only" a 1p phenomenon, but it can make sense (indeed as a sense maker or receptor). Bruno Maybe the 1p/3p distinction is a failure of imagination. What could that mean? The diary of the M-guy and of the W-guy do differentiate, and are different from the memory and records of the observer which does not enter in the telebox. I am not sure what sense to give to your statement. Likewise, the math 3p ([]p) and 1p ([]p & p) *does* obey different logic. And, yes, it is due to a failure of the machine to see that they are equivalent (as seen by G*), but it is not a failure of imagination, it is a requirement to remain consistent. It's obvious that the phenomenon of life is "no more" than the biochemistry, Actually I disagree with this. Life can be implemented in biochemistry, but is much more than biochemistry, for the same reason that Deep blue chess abilities is much more than the logic of NAND used to implement it. Life and chess ability can be implemented by other means, and *are* implemented by infinitely many other means in arithmetic. Eventually we face the problem of justifying biochemistry, and matter appearance, from a statistic on arithmetic, and this can explain where matter appearance come from. To say hat life is no more than biochemistry makes local sense, but if taken too much seriously, you will condemn yourself to say that biochemistry is no more than addition and multiplication of integers, or is no more than reduction and application of combinators. but maybe if we could simulate the biochemistry in our heads we would intuitively see any 1p aspect it has as well. Are you not doing "Searle" error? A person can simulate the chinese person does not entail that the person can experience the chinese person feeling. Robinson Arithmetic can simulate Peano Arithmetic, but this does not entail that Robinson Arithmetic can prove what Peano Arithmetic can prove. And all the points of view will depend on proof, not on computation or imitation, even if they play a big role. I hope I will be able to clarify this important point in the modal thread. You seem to push reductionism too far (too far with respect to computationalism). Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 19 Feb 2014, at 20:53, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark : On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding the argument that you can't meet your doppelganger, So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use logic in doing so. No can do. That's not what I was asking, John seems to dialog with himself. He very often do that trick. I was asking that if you use your meet doppelganger argument, ==> read the next quote. > or you have to explain why the possibility of meeting render probability calculus meaningless. If Everett's probability calculus produced figures that didn't agree with both experiment and Quantum Mechanics then the MWI would indeed be meaningless because the entire point of the MWI is to explain why Quantum Mechanics works as well as it does. The thing is to devise a though experiment matching MWI, in the MWI case you accept probability calculus. Yes. But Bruno isn't trying to explain why Quantum Mechanics works, that's already been done, he's trying to explain the nature of self, He does not, and certainly does not at step 3. Step 3 is just a simple step toward this. but I know we have to come back on this. and so I don't care if Bruno's probability calculus works He does, that's what is showing FPI (which *of course* also exists under MWI) or not because probability and prediction have nothing to do with that; It has all to do with that because it is specifically the question asked. yes. there is no problem with the notion of self in which I use simple definitions in UDA, and the standard notions in AUDA. Computer science, thanks to the Dx = "xx" method, excels on the notion of self. That is why I decide to be mathematicians, instead of biologist. as I have said before, you feel like Quentin Anciaux today because you remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday and for no other reason. As I have said before and before and before, that's not the question. It is the not the question, and in fact, here John gives the minimal correct account of the 1p-identity (memory, diary content) which leads directly to the FPI. And despite what you say above the situations are not equivalent. They are from the probability POV. Exactly. John fails completely in showing how possibly meeting the doppelganger has any relevance on the probabilities. It is a well known rhetorical trick. Introduce something non relevant and accusing someone to not take it into account, without showing the relevance. But it is just plainly obvious that it cannot be relevant without adding magic connections between the doppelgangers, which are already sufficiently well separated in Moscow and Washington. According to Everett the very laws of physics forbid you from ever interacting with your doppelganger And what does it have to do with frequency and probability ? and so Bruno's favorite type of words, personal pronouns, cause no problem; They don't pose problem in this experiment and in the question asked. So I'll try one last time, and will try à la Jesse, with simple yes/no questions and explanation from your part. So I will first describe the setup and will suppose for the argument that what we will do (duplicating you) is possible. So you (John Clark reading this email or the one from tomorrow or whatever, so I'll use *you*) are in front of a button that is in a room with two doors. When *you* will press the button, *you* will be duplicated (by destroying you in the room and recreating you two times in two exactly identical room), the only difference in each room is that one has the left door open and one has the right door open... what do *you* expect to see when you'll press the button ? 1- Do you expect to see the left and the right doors opened ? Yes/No 2- Do you expect to see the left or the right doors opened ? Yes/No If you answer 'Yes' at the 1st question, do you really mean *you* expect to see both event simultaneously ? If you answer 'Yes' at the 2nd question, do you think you can put a probability to see the left door opened (or reversely the right door) ? Yes/No If you answer 'No', why can't you assign a probability to see each door ? As I see it, there are 2 possible events, so each as a 0.5 probability of occurence... If not why not ? Why in the MWI case, you accept the 0.5 probability ? If you follow strictly the protocol, MWI and this experiment are equivalent, and are not about your personal identity... If you answer both No to the 1st and 2nd question, please develop what you will expect to see when you press the button ? The worst is that we can imagine easily the type of rhetoric that John will use to evade the questioning. Bruno Quentin but in Bruno's thought experiment you can interact wit
