Re: Udio Music generator

[Quentin Anciaux]

Hi, Suno is way better imo .. suno.com

Le ven. 26 avr. 2024, 17:00, John Clark  a écrit :

> *You should check out Udio  , it's free, easy to
> use and reasonably fast, it takes about a minute per song and for the free
> version the songs are only 30 seconds long, but it will generate both
> original lyrics and original music in whatever style you like. I asked it
> to write songs about the same subject, transcendental numbers, in the
> styles of Country, Folk, Punk Rock, Electronic Ethereal, and Gregorian
> Chant. Although the subject was the same the lyrics were different for each
> song and they all made mathematical sense, if you allow for a little poetic
> license, and all of the music sounded very different but they all sounded
> pretty good; although when I asked for a stylistic combination of Punk Rock
> and Gregorian Chant it sounded about as good as you would expect it to.  *
>
> John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
> 
> iou
>
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> 
> .
>

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Re: Intel's Newest $350 Million Machine

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le jeu. 18 avr. 2024 à 23:35, Brent Meeker  a écrit :

>
>
> On 4/18/2024 1:29 PM, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Apr 18, 2024 at 4:00 PM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>
>>
>> * > Or the driving force is hype
>> https://youtu.be/vQChW_jgMMM?si=ZbiTWL1AymA3nhEN
>> *
>>
>
> In my humble opinion it would be impossible to overhype the AI revolution
> that we are currently living through
>
>
>
> You can if it's a 100 Indians using natural intelligence to make your AI
> work.
>
>
>
Well you know it's not... there isn't enough indians to answer correctly
and timely as chatgpt does :D


> Brent
>
> I think it's the most important development this planet has seen since the
> Cambrian Explosion 550 million years ago. But the exponential rate of
> progress would soon stall out without Extreme UltraViolet high numerical
> aperture lithography machines. And ASML is the only one that makes them.
>
>  John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
> 
> mh0
>
>
>
>
>
>> *Intel's Newest $350 Million Machine*
>> 
>>
>>
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> .
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>


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Re: [Extropolis] Re: Irrational mechanics, draft Ch. 14

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le dim. 24 mars 2024, 12:41, John Clark  a écrit :

> On Sat, Mar 23, 2024 at 9:46 PM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
> >> And perhaps a simpler explanation is that ET does not exist because we
>>> are the first, after all the observable universe is finite in both
>>> space and time so somebody's got to be first.
>>
>>
>> *> "It's simpler to suppose that all technological civilizations that
>> could beam EM signals out hundreds of light years (which we can't yet)"*
>>
>
>  The late great Arecibo Observatory wasn't just a radio telescope it was
> also a radar telescope, it was the most powerful radio transmitter the
> world had ever made and had the ability to send a message to a similar
> sized telescope that was anywhere in the Milky Way.
>
>
>> * > are more than hundreds of light years apart*
>>
>
> I agree, but I think advanced technological civilizations are more than
> 13.8 billion light years apart, and thus we will never see them and they
> will never see us.
>
>
>>
>> *> "and having reached that same conclusion decided to pursue knowledge
>> by other means."*
>>
>
> As I've said before, to pursue knowledge you need a brain and to operate a
> brain you need energy; and in this galaxy alone hundreds of billions of
> stars are radiating all their energy uselessly into infinite space. And all
> the other galaxies that we can observe are doing the same thing. Don't you
> find that odd?
>

It depends if it was the only and easiest way to achieve it... who knows
what we don't know, because we don't observe something constrained by our
own knowledge doesn't mean anything, nothing to conclude from this non
observation of an entire universe filled of dyson sphere.

Quentin

>
> See what's on my new list at  Extropolis
> 
> dd0
>
>>
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> 
> .
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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le sam. 14 mai 2022, 04:06, John Clark  a écrit :

> On Fri, May 13, 2022 at 9:46 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> *>>> Explaining the values of the probabilities isn't the problem with
 MWI,  it's explaining that there are probabilities*
>>>
>>>
>>> >> That's easy in MWI. Probabilities exist because until you actually
>>> look at it there is no way to know if you are the Brent Meeker who lives in
>>> a universe where the electron went left or you are the Brent Meeker who
>>> lives in a universe where the electron went right, due to the fact that the
>>> only difference between the two Brent Meekers is what the electron does.
>>>
>>
>> > But you don’t think this applies with non MWI duplication.
>>
>
> That is simply NOT true! After my body has been duplicated but before I
> have open the door of the duplicating chamber to see where I was I won't
> know if I will be the John Clark who has seen Moscow or the John Clark
> who has seen Helsinki, and indeed the distinction between the two would be
> meaningless because the two would be identical until the door is opened and
> they differentiate because then one has the memory of seeing Moscow but
> the other has the memory of seeing Helsinki.  So if both decided to place a
> bet on what they would see after the door was opened (and if one decided to
> place a bet then the other certainly would too because they're identical)
> then, provided they were logical,and I think I am at least most of the
> time, they would both put the odds at 50-50.
>

It has taken almost 20 years, but finally you acknowledge first person
indeterminacy...

藍

Quentin

>
>   John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
> 
> lmt
>
>
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> 
> .
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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 19 avr. 2022 à 11:33, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 6:04 PM Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>
>> Le mar. 19 avr. 2022 à 09:27, Bruce Kellett  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 5:19 PM Quentin Anciaux 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Le mar. 19 avr. 2022 à 09:14, Bruce Kellett  a
>>>> écrit :
>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 4:52 PM Quentin Anciaux 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Le mar. 19 avr. 2022 à 03:20, Bruce Kellett 
>>>>>> a écrit :
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 11:09 AM Brent Meeker 
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2022 1:45 PM, George Kahrimanis wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Just as in Schroedinger's famous example with the cat, you need a
>>>>>>>> "box" and an observer outside, in order to make sense of the cat being 
>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> an entangled superposition. Instead of a superobserver, we can do with 
>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>> impersonal quantum description (in any chosen frame of reference), if 
>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>> prefer.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The only purpose of the box in Schroedinger's thought experiment
>>>>>>>> was to put off the observers perception.  Really the thought 
>>>>>>>> experiment is
>>>>>>>> over when the radioactive decay occurs.  That atom has transitioned to 
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> different nuclear state which is entangled with and recorded in the
>>>>>>>> environment.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yes. Schrodinger had the cat in a box to emphasize the idea that the
>>>>>>> cat was in a macro-superposition of alive/dead. This misled Wigner to 
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> extent that he thought the state collapsed only when the box was opened.
>>>>>>> All of this was made redundant when it was realized that decoherence
>>>>>>>  rendered the state definite almost instantaneously. Saibal makes the 
>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>> mistake when he claims that Alice, after her measurement, is still in a
>>>>>>> superposition until Bob sees her result. The idea that the superposition
>>>>>>> still exists since decoherence is only FAPP is something of a red 
>>>>>>> herring
>>>>>>> -- in MWI, Alice has branched according to her result into up and down
>>>>>>> branches that no longer interfere. There is no macro-superposition.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Bruce
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It's because Saibal sees observers as "machine"... so until anything
>>>>>> is recorded in the machine available memory... it's in a superposed 
>>>>>> state.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think you are referring to consciousness in quantum computers where
>>>>> there is no decoherence. The trouble with this idea is that without
>>>>> decoherence, no permanent memories can be formed, so it is difficult to
>>>>> know what "observe" means in that context. In any ordinary machine,
>>>>> decoherence is everywhere, so no superposition ever endures. Observers
>>>>> cannot be in superposed states (observation requires the formation of
>>>>> records, and that in turn requires decoherence, which destroys
>>>>> superpositions.) Saibal refers to observation as "an algorithm". But
>>>>> without specifying what runs the algorithm, his claim is devoid of 
>>>>> meaning.
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruce
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> No I'm referring to consciousness as a "program" that can run on a
>>>> turing machine... the consciousness is well defined and finite at each
>>>> steps and can be represented as a big integer... and until the information
>>>> from the "outside" reach the memory of that program, it's unique... even if
>>>> the experiments has alrea

Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 19 avr. 2022 à 09:27, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 5:19 PM Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>
>> Le mar. 19 avr. 2022 à 09:14, Bruce Kellett  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 4:52 PM Quentin Anciaux 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Le mar. 19 avr. 2022 à 03:20, Bruce Kellett  a
>>>> écrit :
>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 11:09 AM Brent Meeker 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 4/17/2022 1:45 PM, George Kahrimanis wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Just as in Schroedinger's famous example with the cat, you need a
>>>>>> "box" and an observer outside, in order to make sense of the cat being in
>>>>>> an entangled superposition. Instead of a superobserver, we can do with an
>>>>>> impersonal quantum description (in any chosen frame of reference), if you
>>>>>> prefer.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The only purpose of the box in Schroedinger's thought experiment was
>>>>>> to put off the observers perception.  Really the thought experiment is 
>>>>>> over
>>>>>> when the radioactive decay occurs.  That atom has transitioned to a
>>>>>> different nuclear state which is entangled with and recorded in the
>>>>>> environment.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes. Schrodinger had the cat in a box to emphasize the idea that the
>>>>> cat was in a macro-superposition of alive/dead. This misled Wigner to the
>>>>> extent that he thought the state collapsed only when the box was opened.
>>>>> All of this was made redundant when it was realized that decoherence
>>>>>  rendered the state definite almost instantaneously. Saibal makes the same
>>>>> mistake when he claims that Alice, after her measurement, is still in a
>>>>> superposition until Bob sees her result. The idea that the superposition
>>>>> still exists since decoherence is only FAPP is something of a red herring
>>>>> -- in MWI, Alice has branched according to her result into up and down
>>>>> branches that no longer interfere. There is no macro-superposition.
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruce
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It's because Saibal sees observers as "machine"... so until anything is
>>>> recorded in the machine available memory... it's in a superposed state.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I think you are referring to consciousness in quantum computers where
>>> there is no decoherence. The trouble with this idea is that without
>>> decoherence, no permanent memories can be formed, so it is difficult to
>>> know what "observe" means in that context. In any ordinary machine,
>>> decoherence is everywhere, so no superposition ever endures. Observers
>>> cannot be in superposed states (observation requires the formation of
>>> records, and that in turn requires decoherence, which destroys
>>> superpositions.) Saibal refers to observation as "an algorithm". But
>>> without specifying what runs the algorithm, his claim is devoid of meaning.
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>
>> No I'm referring to consciousness as a "program" that can run on a turing
>> machine... the consciousness is well defined and finite at each steps and
>> can be represented as a big integer... and until the information from the
>> "outside" reach the memory of that program, it's unique... even if the
>> experiments has already been done and splitted the environment, the actual
>> consciousness split occurs once the memory of the "consciousness program"
>> is modified... until it actually records that fact.
>>
>
> What use is that?
>

I'm explaining to you what Saibal is saying... an observer for Saibal is a
machine.


> You don't know that anything has happened until it has decohered and is
> recorded. Being in a superposition is nothing special. everything that can
> be represented as a vector (or ray) in Hilbert space is in an infinite
> number of different superpositions all the time. There are an infinite
> number of possible bases for the Hilbert space, and the state is a
> superposition in all of these bases, except the one basis that is stable
> against environmental decoherence.
>
> Bruce
>
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-- 
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Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 19 avr. 2022 à 09:14, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 4:52 PM Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>
>> Le mar. 19 avr. 2022 à 03:20, Bruce Kellett  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 11:09 AM Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 4/17/2022 1:45 PM, George Kahrimanis wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Just as in Schroedinger's famous example with the cat, you need a "box"
>>>> and an observer outside, in order to make sense of the cat being in an
>>>> entangled superposition. Instead of a superobserver, we can do with an
>>>> impersonal quantum description (in any chosen frame of reference), if you
>>>> prefer.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The only purpose of the box in Schroedinger's thought experiment was to
>>>> put off the observers perception.  Really the thought experiment is over
>>>> when the radioactive decay occurs.  That atom has transitioned to a
>>>> different nuclear state which is entangled with and recorded in the
>>>> environment.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes. Schrodinger had the cat in a box to emphasize the idea that the cat
>>> was in a macro-superposition of alive/dead. This misled Wigner to the
>>> extent that he thought the state collapsed only when the box was opened.
>>> All of this was made redundant when it was realized that decoherence
>>>  rendered the state definite almost instantaneously. Saibal makes the same
>>> mistake when he claims that Alice, after her measurement, is still in a
>>> superposition until Bob sees her result. The idea that the superposition
>>> still exists since decoherence is only FAPP is something of a red herring
>>> -- in MWI, Alice has branched according to her result into up and down
>>> branches that no longer interfere. There is no macro-superposition.
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>
>> It's because Saibal sees observers as "machine"... so until anything is
>> recorded in the machine available memory... it's in a superposed state.
>>
>
> I think you are referring to consciousness in quantum computers where
> there is no decoherence. The trouble with this idea is that without
> decoherence, no permanent memories can be formed, so it is difficult to
> know what "observe" means in that context. In any ordinary machine,
> decoherence is everywhere, so no superposition ever endures. Observers
> cannot be in superposed states (observation requires the formation of
> records, and that in turn requires decoherence, which destroys
> superpositions.) Saibal refers to observation as "an algorithm". But
> without specifying what runs the algorithm, his claim is devoid of meaning.
>
> Bruce
>

No I'm referring to consciousness as a "program" that can run on a turing
machine... the consciousness is well defined and finite at each steps and
can be represented as a big integer... and until the information from the
"outside" reach the memory of that program, it's unique... even if the
experiments has already been done and splitted the environment, the actual
consciousness split occurs once the memory of the "consciousness program"
is modified... until it actually records that fact.


> --
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> .
>


-- 
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Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 19 avr. 2022 à 03:20, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 11:09 AM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>> On 4/17/2022 1:45 PM, George Kahrimanis wrote:
>>
>> Just as in Schroedinger's famous example with the cat, you need a "box"
>> and an observer outside, in order to make sense of the cat being in an
>> entangled superposition. Instead of a superobserver, we can do with an
>> impersonal quantum description (in any chosen frame of reference), if you
>> prefer.
>>
>>
>> The only purpose of the box in Schroedinger's thought experiment was to
>> put off the observers perception.  Really the thought experiment is over
>> when the radioactive decay occurs.  That atom has transitioned to a
>> different nuclear state which is entangled with and recorded in the
>> environment.
>>
>
> Yes. Schrodinger had the cat in a box to emphasize the idea that the cat
> was in a macro-superposition of alive/dead. This misled Wigner to the
> extent that he thought the state collapsed only when the box was opened.
> All of this was made redundant when it was realized that decoherence
>  rendered the state definite almost instantaneously. Saibal makes the same
> mistake when he claims that Alice, after her measurement, is still in a
> superposition until Bob sees her result. The idea that the superposition
> still exists since decoherence is only FAPP is something of a red herring
> -- in MWI, Alice has branched according to her result into up and down
> branches that no longer interfere. There is no macro-superposition.
>
> Bruce
>

It's because Saibal sees observers as "machine"... so until anything is
recorded in the machine available memory... it's in a superposed state.

Quentin

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> 
> .
>


-- 
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Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: AlphaZero

[Quentin Anciaux]

The only thing I hope AI will achieve is to be less condescending... if it
achieves true understanding,  I hope it will be humble... and as far as
John Clark dislikes religions and God,  the singularity will be God...

Quentin

Le sam. 5 févr. 2022, 20:51, Terren Suydam  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Fri, Feb 4, 2022 at 6:18 PM John Clark  wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Feb 4, 2022 at 5:34 PM Terren Suydam 
>> wrote:
>>
>> >> Look at this code for a subprogram and make something that does the
 same thing but is smaller or runs faster or both. And that's not a toy
 problem, that's a real problem.

>>>
>>> > "does the same thing" is problematic for a couple reasons. The first
>>> is that AlphaCode doesn't know how to read code,
>>>
>>
>> Huh? We already know AlphaCode can write code, how can something know
>> how to write but not read? It's easier to read a novel than write a novel.
>>
>
> This is one case where your intuitions fail. I dug a little deeper into
> how AlphaCode works. It generates millions of candidate solutions using a
> model trained on github code. It then filters out 99% of those candidate
> solutions by running them against test cases provided in the problem
> description and removing the ones that fail. It then uses a different
> technique to whittle down the candidate solutions from several thousand to
> just ten. Nobody, neither the AI nor the humans running AlphaCode, know if
> the 10 solutions picked are correct.
>
> AlphaCode is not capable of reading code. It's a clever version of monkeys
> typing on typewriters until they bang out a Shakespeare play. Still counts
> as AI, but cannot be said to understand code.
>
>
>>
>>> *> The other problem is that with that problem description, it won't
>>> evolve except in the very narrow sense of improving its efficiency.*
>>>
>>
>> It seems to me the ability to write code that was smaller and faster than
>> anybody else is not "very narrow", a human could make a very good living
>> indeed from that talent.  And if I was the guy that signed his enormous
>> paycheck and somebody offered me a program that would do the same thing he
>> did I'd jump at it.
>>
>
> This actually already exists in the form of optimizing compilers - which
> are the programs that translate human-readable code like Java into assembly
> language that microprocessors use to manipulate data. Optimizing compilers
> can make human code more efficient. But these gains are only available in
> very well-understood and limited ways. To do what you're suggesting
> requires machine intelligence capable of understanding things in a much
> broader context.
>
>
>>
>>
>>> *> The kind of problem description that might actually lead to a
>>> singularity is something like "Look at this code and make something that
>>> can solve ever more complex problem descriptions". But my hunch there is
>>> that that problem description is too complex for it to recursively
>>> self-improve towards.*
>>>
>>
>> Just adding more input variables would be less complex than figuring out
>> how to make a program smaller and faster.
>>
>
> Think about it this way. There's diminishing returns on the strategy to
> make the program smaller and faster, but potentially unlimited returns on
> being able to respond to ever greater complexity in the problem
> description.
>
>
>>
>> >> I think if Steven Spielberg's movie had been called AGI instead of AI
 some people today would no longer like the acronym AGI because too many
 people would know exactly what it means and thus would lack that certain
 aura of erudition and mystery that they crave . Everybody knows what AI
 means, but only a small select cognoscenti know the meaning of AGI. A
 Classic case of jargon creep.

>>>
>>> >Do you really expect a discipline as technical as AI to not use
>>> jargon?
>>>
>>
>> When totally new concepts come up, as they do occasionally in science,
>> jargon is necessary because there is no previously existing word or short
>> phrase that describes it, but that is not the primary generator of
>> jargon and is not in this case  because a very short word that describes
>> the idea already exists and everybody already knows what AI means, but
>> very few know that AGI means the same thing. And some see that as AGI's
>> great virtue, it's mysterious and sounds brainy.
>>
>>
>>> *> You use physics jargon all the time.*
>>>
>>
>> I do try to keep that to a minimum, perhaps I should try harder.
>>
>
> I don't hold it against you, and I certainly don't think you're trying to
> cultivate an aura of erudition and mystery when you do. I'm not sure why
> you seem to have an axe to grind about the use of AGI, but it is a useful
> distinction to make. It's clear we have AI today. And it's equally clear we
> do not have AGI.
>
> Terren
>
>
>>
>> John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
>> 
>> pjx
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the 

Re: NYTimes.com: A.I. Predicts the Shapes of Molecules to Come

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le dim. 25 juil. 2021 à 23:38, John Clark  a écrit :

> On Sun, Jul 25, 2021 at 4:44 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
> *> And you have no way of knowing what it will feel like to be John K
>> Clark tomorrow, but you have a pretty good theory about it. *
>>
>
> Yes, and tomorrow I will be able to definitively know if yesterday's
> theory about what it will be like to be John K Clark today turned out to be
> correct or not.
>
> * > Similarly, you probably have a better theory about what it would feel
>> like to be Brent Meeker than to be DeepMind. *
>>
>
> No, there's nothing similar at all about it because tomorrow I will STILL have
> absolutely positively no way of knowing if yesterday's theory about what it
> will be like to be Brent Meeker or DeepMind today turned out to be
> correct or not, in fact I will NEVER know if it's correct
>
> > *Consciousness is imagined be an impossibly hard problem because it's
>> posed as being able to predict conscious thoughts from monitoring a brain. *
>>
>
> The hardest part of the "hard problem of consciousness" is clearly
> explaining exactly what "the hard problem of consciousness" is, it's not at
> all clear to me exactly what sort of explanation would satisfy the
> consciousness gurus.
>

You explained it yourself in the preceeding paragraph, let me quote it for
you:
"in fact I will NEVER know if it's correct"

That's the *hard* problem of consciousness, others qualia.

Quentin


>
> *> But that's like saying gravity is a hard problem because we can't
>> predict the motion of all the stars in a galaxy (or even three bodies).*
>>
>
> I can make exact Newtonian predictions in a few very special situations
> but in general you're right, I can't make an exact prediction of the
> motion of 3 particles, but I can make some very good approximations, and by
> using The Virial Theorem I can even make a good approximation for the
> motions of millions of bodies. However I don't know, and will never know,
> if my predictions about a consciousness other than my own is even
> approximately correct. And that's why consciousness theories are so easy
> to dream up, and that's also why they're such a colossal bore.
>
> *> the fact that you can say the consciousness of DeepMind might be so
>> different you have no way of knowing what it would be like implies that
>> there can be qualitatively different kinds of consciousness. *
>>
>
> Yes. I only have experience with my own consciousness but I know for a
> fact that depending on the time of day my consciousness can be
> qualitatively different, and I've known that for a long time. Back when I
> was a student taking a calculus exam my consciousness had reached a
> high-level but later that same night when I was falling asleep it was at a
> much lower level and just a little later it fell all the way to zero, and
> then what seemed instantaneous but actually took 8 hours it started up
> again.
>
>  John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
> 
>
> 0o0o
>
>
> --
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> 
> .
>

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Re: Parallel Worlds Probably Exist. Here’s Why

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le dim. 7 févr. 2021 à 14:43, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Sunday, February 7, 2021 at 4:42:26 AM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Feb 7, 2021 at 2:29 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>> *> At around 5:15 he makes the fundamental error IMO in describing
>>> superposition; namely, that a system can be in different states
>>> simultaneously. It's the myth about QM which is hard to shake. Why not just
>>> assume an ignorance interpretation of superposition; namely, there are
>>> several states a system could be in, often with different probabilities,
>>> but we don't know which one?*
>>>
>>
>> We've been over this before, more than once, more than twice, much more!
>> I hope you don't think you're the first to come up with the Idea that it's
>> all simply a case of our ignorance,
>>
>
> Not my claim. Just your distorting BS. I don't deny interference. AG
>
>
>> that argument was semi-respectable when weird quantum effects first
>> started to show up around the turn of the 20th century but has not been
>> respected among physicists for more than 50 years. Your explanation is
>> rejected because it just doesn't jive with experimental observations.
>>
>
> Try being specific, and stop the hydroelectric BS. In the double slit
> e.g., we can apply DeBroglie's insight, namely, that the entity detected at
> the screen behaves as a wave  before detection, and thus goes through both
> slits and interferes with itself. AG
>
>
>> There is simply no doubt about it, Bell's Inequality is violated.
>>
>
> What has the ignorance interpretation of superposition before measurement
> has to do with Bell's Inequality?
>

Because ignorance means it's hidden variable.

So only non-local hidden variable is compatible with ignorance... Not sure
it's better.

As long as I don't deny the existence of interference, there is nothing
> wrong with what I claim. And it does solve Schroedinger's cat paradox.  AG
>
> You may not like the way the universe is run, but the universe cares even
>> less if you like it or not, that's just the way things are.
>>
>> John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
>> 
>>
>> .
>>
> --
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> 
> .
>

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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 16:04, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 6:26:50 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 13:38, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 5:14:33 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 12:19, Alan Grayson  a
>>>> écrit :
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 3:56:50 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 11:54, Alan Grayson  a
>>>>>> écrit :
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11
>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements,
>>>>>>>>>>> for subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER 
>>>>>>>>>>> worlds as
>>>>>>>>>>> trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. *
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as
>>>>>>>>>> what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron 
>>>>>>>>>> go left,
>>>>>>>>>> in another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go 
>>>>>>>>>> right,
>>>>>>>>>> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which 
>>>>>>>>>> one was
>>>>>>>>>> the "SAME OTHER world"?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee
>>>>>>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with
>>>>>>>>>> probability.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't
>>>>>>>>>>> complicated. *
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can
>>>>>>>>>> have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not
>>>>>>>>>> so much.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into
>>>>>>>>> existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in 
>>>>>>>>> third
>>>>>>>>> trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME 
>>>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>>>> worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these
>>>>>>>>> worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble 
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> measurements exist in these other world. AG
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds.
>>>>>>>> The worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way 
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> one way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different
>>>>

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 13:38, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 5:14:33 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 12:19, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 3:56:50 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 11:54, Alan Grayson  a
>>>> écrit :
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements,
>>>>>>>>> for subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER 
>>>>>>>>> worlds as
>>>>>>>>> trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. *
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as
>>>>>>>> what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go 
>>>>>>>> left,
>>>>>>>> in another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go 
>>>>>>>> right,
>>>>>>>> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one 
>>>>>>>> was
>>>>>>>> the "SAME OTHER world"?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee
>>>>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with
>>>>>>>> probability.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't complicated. *
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can
>>>>>>>> have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not so
>>>>>>>> much.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into
>>>>>>> existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in third
>>>>>>> trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME 
>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>> worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these
>>>>>>> worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble of
>>>>>>> measurements exist in these other world. AG
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The
>>>>>> worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and 
>>>>>> one
>>>>>> way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different
>>>>>> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the
>>>>>> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the different
>>>>>> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply.
>>>>>> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave 
>>>>>> function,
>>>>>> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", and
>>>>>> yes, there is only one measurement in each.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *If there is only one measurement in each other world -- which has
>>>>> been my claim throughout -- how can Born's rule be satisfied in the MWI? 
>>>>> AG*
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 12:19, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, January 27, 2021 at 3:56:50 AM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 11:54, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson 
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements, for
>>>>>>> subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER worlds as
>>>>>>> trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. *
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as what?
>>>>>> In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go left, in
>>>>>> another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go right,
>>>>>> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one was
>>>>>> the "SAME OTHER world"?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee
>>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with
>>>>>> probability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't complicated. *
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can have 2
>>>>>>  meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not so much.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into existence.
>>>>> Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in third trial, etc?
>>>>> Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME other worlds?
>>>>> Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these worlds. No
>>>>> probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble of measurements
>>>>> exist in these other world. AG
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The
>>>> worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and one
>>>> way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different
>>>> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the
>>>> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the different
>>>> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply.
>>>> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave function,
>>>> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", and
>>>> yes, there is only one measurement in each.
>>>>
>>>
>>> *If there is only one measurement in each other world -- which has been
>>> my claim throughout -- how can Born's rule be satisfied in the MWI? AG*
>>>
>>
>> Every world has a past... So if you do n experiments after n trials you
>> have 2^n number of worlds each having a past of n trials.
>>
>
> *On the second trial and another splitting, what is the assurance that the
> new other world is the same as that created on the first splitting, so a
> sequence of measurement history exists? AG*
>
It has the same past, if you say you'll do 9 trials in advance, then most
"worlds" after your 9 trials will have done 9 trials(without considering
ultra low probability worlds) and all nine worlds will share the same past
before any trials.

>
>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum
>>>> experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely per the
>>>> Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two worlds
>>>> are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version knowing
>>>> nothing about the other. So, in the

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 27 janv. 2021 à 11:54, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
 On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson 
 wrote:

 *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements, for
> subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER worlds as
> trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. *


 I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as what? In
 one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go left, in
 another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go right,
 other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one was
 the "SAME OTHER world"?

 > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee [...]


 Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with
 probability.

 *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't complicated. *


 Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can have 2
  meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not so much.

>>>
>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into existence.
>>> Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in third trial, etc?
>>> Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME other worlds?
>>> Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these worlds. No
>>> probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble of measurements
>>> exist in these other world. AG
>>>
>>
>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The
>> worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and one
>> way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different
>> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the
>> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the different
>> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply.
>> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave function,
>> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", and
>> yes, there is only one measurement in each.
>>
>
> *If there is only one measurement in each other world -- which has been my
> claim throughout -- how can Born's rule be satisfied in the MWI*
>
AG*G*
>

Every world has a past... So if you do n experiments after n trials you
have 2^n number of worlds each having a past of n trials.

>
>
>
>
>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum experiment
>> with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely per the Born rule,
>> then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two worlds are created.
>> You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version knowing nothing about
>> the other. So, in the "objective world" (the view from outside the whole
>> wave function as it were), no probability is involved. But if you repeat
>> this experiment many times, each version of you will record an apparently
>> random sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction of what happens in the
>> next experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up between 1 and 0. Objectively
>> there's no randomness, subjectively it appears that way.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
 John K Clark   See my new list at  Extropolis
 

>>> --
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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

[Quentin Anciaux]

If the world *split* (or differentiate) it is self obvious, that before the
split/differntiation, it's the same world.

So if you start at moment t1 with one "world" A... at t2, you have two
"worlds" A1 and A2 *each* having A as common past "world"

Le mer. 20 janv. 2021 à 08:29, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

> On Tuesday, January 19, 2021 at 10:08:21 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 20 Jan 2021 at 4:01 pm, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>> On Tuesday, January 19, 2021 at 11:46:35 AM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, Jan 19, 2021 at 12:54 PM Alan Grayson 
 wrote:

 *> So contrary to some who think I know zilch about the MWI, I DO know
> what world I am in ! It's the world in which I made my bet, and won or
> lost.*
>

 Assuming 30 seconds elapsed between the time you made your bet and the
 time you won or lost your bet, which of those 30 * (5.39 × 10^44) splits
 that occurred during that time interval is the one that "you" are in? And
 even if by some miracle "you" could tell me which one "you" are in "now"
 that still leaves open the question of if  "you" are still in that one
 "now". And if "you" weren't in "that one" how could "you" tell the
 difference?


> *> All other ALLEGED world are DERIVATIVE from this one, and I have
> zero contact*
>

 You keep saying that over and over again, but no matter how many times you
 say it that won't make it true. Every world that exists has had
 contact with each other in the past, they I'll have a common ancestor,
 they just won't have any contact in the future.

>>>
>>> How is this implied by the SWE? Isn't this an additional postulate of
>>> your interpretation? AG
>>>
>>
>> It is absolutely implied. Not merely implied. It is quite explicitly the
>> case. Ask literally anyone who understands MWI and they’ll tell you that.
>>
>
> *You might be right. But all I know about the wf is that it can be
> decomposed into eigenstates of the observed operator, each multiplied by a
> complex parameter whose magnitude squared yields the probability of
> occurrence, aka Born's rule.  Please inform us exactly how the SWE, which
> yields the wf, tell us what Many Worlder's claim? TY, AG*
>
>>
>>>
>>>


> * > Also, since in the race there are exactly 10 possible winners,*
>

>>> No, there are *NOT* exactly 10 winners! There are an astronomical
 number to an astronomical power number horses that won that race with only
 a submicroscopic difference between them, and there are also an
 astronomical number to an astronomical power number of Alan Graysons that
 won his bet on that race.

>>>
>>> So instead of all possible outcomes being measured in some other world,
>>> we get a huge, possibly infinite occurrences of all possibilities being
>>> measured. I can regard this as the extra postulate I have been asking
>>> about. It must be additional since it doesn't seem implied by SWE. AG
>>>
>>
>> Again, JC is absolutely correct, and if you don’t understand that, you’ve
>> never even begun to grasp MWI. It is certainly not an additional postulate.
>> It was what I meant when I said I did not know how to begin to correct your
>> horse race story. The multiverse is absolutely unimaginably vast.
>>
>>>
 *> Why not avoid all this confusion and creation of worlds with zero
> energy sources, and accept that the wf collapses,*


 Because Schrodinger's Equation says nothing about the wave function
 collapsing and nobody, except for Many Worlds, seems to be able to
 come up with consistent coherent rules to tell us exactly when it
 collapses and when it does not. And if you will not be happy until
 there is an explanation for quantum mechanics that is not confusing and
 weird then I'm afraid you're destined to be unhappy. G

>>>
>>> You haven't answered my question; why is this interpretation more
>>> REASONABLE or more CONSISTENT WITH OCCAM'S RAZOR compared to the collapse
>>> hypothesis since gives it gives no clue whatever about the energy sources
>>> required to create these other worlds? It seems to create hugely more
>>> problems than it solves. AG
>>>
>>> Also, how does this interpretation tell us exactly WHEN the SWE
>>> collapses since that occurs when the observer chooses to make the
>>> measurement? Nothing to do with the SWE. All to do with the observer's
>>> behavior or choice. AG
>>>

  John K Clark

>>> --
>>>
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the
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>>> everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
>>>
>> To view this discussion on the web visit
>>> 

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le dim. 17 janv. 2021 à 12:53, Pierz Newton-John  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Sun, 17 Jan 2021 at 10:15 pm, Alan Grayson 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 9:55:50 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, 17 Jan 2021 at 3:10 pm, Alan Grayson 
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On Saturday, January 16, 2021 at 7:28:14 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:

> On Sun, 17 Jan 2021 at 3:49 am, Alan Grayson 
> wrote:
>
>> *What would be the mechanism or process for other worlds to interact
>> with each other, that is to interfere with each other? This is the 
>> gorilla
>> in the room that many MWI enthusiasts ignore; awesome speculation with 
>> zero
>> grounding in empirical evidence. Something definitely awry with this pov.
>> AG*
>
>
> I’m not an “enthusiast”. It’s a physical theory not a football team.
> If anything I dislike the idea of all those alternative variants of me and
> my life. If MWI is disproved I’ll be perfectly happy.
>

 *It can't be disproved because it makes no verifiable predictions! AG*


> It’s just that it unfortunately makes more sense in my assessment than
> any other alternative, so I entertain it as the most likely explanation 
> for
> the observed data. To say it has zero grounding in empirical data is 
> simply
> false  - it’s the theory that simply takes the empirical data to its
> logical conclusion without adding a collapse postulate. The wave function
> is the whole thing. Asking what the mechanism is for worlds to interfere
> with one another is the same as asking what the mechanism is for the
> Schrödinger wave function to interfere with itself. In the dual slit
> experiment it’s an observed fact.
>

 *The SE, when solved, give us the WF, which can be decomposed into a
 superposition of eigenstates in some appropriate vector space. But this
 superposition is not unique. So in what sense does the SE give us "an
 observed fact"? In fact, with numerous distinct possible superpositions,
 the worlds of the MWI seem ill-defined. AG*

>>>
>>> I have wondered myself whether basis selection is a problem for MWI. I’m
>>> less sure now that it is. Environmental einselection may resolve the basis
>>> problem. We set up an experimental apparatus to select some basis, but
>>> that’s just a special case of what happens naturally, whereby the
>>> characteristics of the environment select the basis.
>>>


> It makes no sense for it to behave that way if we stick to the old
> view of matter as little hard balls, but there you go. When we talk of
> “worlds”, it just refers to a ramifying quantum state, and it is in the
> nature of quantum states to interfere with themselves per the dual slit
> experiment, even if they become large and complex. Interference ceases 
> when
> two branches of the universal quantum state diverge far enough that they
> completely decohere. When you say “what is the mechanism?” that really
> means “what is the mathematical description?” in physics. Anything else is
> just imprecise circumlocution like the word “world” in this context. So 
> the
> mechanism for interference is the Schrödinger equation, which predicts 
> such
> interference. MWI adds precisely nothing to that mathematical description.
>

 *The problem, of course, is that the MWI offers no concept of the
 process of interference among OTHER worlds, so it's no surprise that it
 adds nothing to the mathematical description. AG  (More at end of this
 confusing file.)*

>>>
>>> there you go with “of course” again as if your argument were self
>>> evident. Theres no distinction between worlds (this or other) so of course
>>> there is interference on and among the other branches too. I don’t know
>>> what you’re talking about.
>>>
>>
>> *I strongly disagree. IMO, it is self-evident. My response is at end of
>> this file. AG *
>>
>>>
 *The ontological status of those OTHER worlds is problem, but that's
 not exactly what I am saying. Rather, I am saying is that the MW hypothesis
 leads nowhere. It has no predictive value that I can discern. It's just a
 form of possibly consistent ideology. Compare it to Einstein's postulate of
 the invariance of the SoL. It's really quite paradoxical when you think
 about; that the SoL does not depend on the motion of source or recipient.
 But from it we get the LT and a host of verifiable predictions. SR is a
 scientific theory since it can be disproven. I don't see that anything
 verifiable is predicted by the MWI. As such, it shouldn't be regarded as a
 scientific theory. It can't be so considered since it offer no path for
 being disproven. AG *

>>>
>>> That is not what you said in your initial argument at all.
>>>
>>
>> * It was about Born's rule failing in the MWI because the OTHER 

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

[Quentin Anciaux]

Obviously I'm blocked by AG for whatever reason, because that's what I've
been telling him since and got no answer... I even bother to take the time
to make a schematics (well a ugly one but still) :D

Le ven. 15 janv. 2021 à 07:36, Pierz Newton-John  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Fri, 15 Jan 2021 at 4:01 pm, Alan Grayson 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 3:15:47 PM UTC-7, Pierz wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 11:07:59 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:26:42 AM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:

> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 2:42:43 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>
>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11
>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
 On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:

> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11
> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11
>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
 On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7
 johnk...@gmail.com wrote:

> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson <
> agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent
>> measurements, for subsequent horse races say, are occurring in 
>> the SAME
>> OTHER worlds as trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER 
>> worlds. *
>
>
> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as
> what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the 
> electron go left,
> in another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron 
> go right,
> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which 
> one was
> the "SAME OTHER world"?
>
> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI
>> guarantee [...]
>
>
> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals
> with probability.
>
> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't
>> complicated. *
>
>
> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple
> can have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and the
> other not so much.
>

 In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into
 existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in 
 third
 trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the 
 SAME other
 worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of 
 these
 worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds since no 
 ensemble of
 measurements exist in these other world. AG

>>>
>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds.
>>> The worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one 
>>> way and
>>> one way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The 
>>> different
>>> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as 
>>> the
>>> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the 
>>> different
>>> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to 
>>> multiply.
>>> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave 
>>> function,
>>> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same 
>>> world", and
>>> yes, there is only one measurement in each.
>>>
>>
>> This is what I have been saying all along! AG
>>
> No it isn't. I agree you have been saying there is only one
> measurement outcome in each world. However this business about "same 
> other
> worlds" betrays your lack of comprehension. It's not that MWI "doesn't
> guarantee" that the the worlds at each trial are the same world. It's 
> that
> the whole notion of "same other worlds" means nothing in this context 
> and
> has no bearing on anything. A bit like arguing when we add 1 and 1 
> twice
> whether we are guaranteed that the ones we add each time are the "SAME
> ones" at each addition. If mathematics can't guarantee that then how 
> can we

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le jeu. 14 janv. 2021 à 07:21, Quentin Anciaux  a
écrit :

>
>
> Le jeu. 14 janv. 2021 à 04:42, Alan Grayson  a
> écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>
>>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11
>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements,
>>>>>>>>>> for subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER 
>>>>>>>>>> worlds as
>>>>>>>>>> trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. *
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as
>>>>>>>>> what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go 
>>>>>>>>> left,
>>>>>>>>> in another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go 
>>>>>>>>> right,
>>>>>>>>> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one 
>>>>>>>>> was
>>>>>>>>> the "SAME OTHER world"?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee
>>>>>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with
>>>>>>>>> probability.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't
>>>>>>>>>> complicated. *
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can
>>>>>>>>> have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not
>>>>>>>>> so much.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into
>>>>>>>> existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in 
>>>>>>>> third
>>>>>>>> trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME 
>>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>>> worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these
>>>>>>>> worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble 
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> measurements exist in these other world. AG
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The
>>>>>>> worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and 
>>>>>>> one
>>>>>>> way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different
>>>>>>> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the
>>>>>>> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the different
>>>>>>> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply.
>>>>>>> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave 
>>>>>>> function,
>>>>>>> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", 
>>

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le jeu. 14 janv. 2021 à 04:42, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 8:29:16 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>
>> On Thursday, January 14, 2021 at 1:23:11 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 4:33:20 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>>>
 On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com
 wrote:

> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson 
 wrote:

 *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements,
> for subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER 
> worlds as
> trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. *


 I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as
 what? In one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go 
 left,
 in another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go 
 right,
 other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one 
 was
 the "SAME OTHER world"?

 > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee
> [...]


 Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with
 probability.

 *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't complicated. *


 Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can
 have 2 meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not so
 much.

>>>
>>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into
>>> existence. Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in third
>>> trial, etc? Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME 
>>> other
>>> worlds? Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these
>>> worlds. No probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble of
>>> measurements exist in these other world. AG
>>>
>>
>> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The
>> worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and 
>> one
>> way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different
>> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the
>> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the different
>> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply.
>> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave 
>> function,
>> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", and
>> yes, there is only one measurement in each.
>>
>
> This is what I have been saying all along! AG
>
 No it isn't. I agree you have been saying there is only one measurement
 outcome in each world. However this business about "same other worlds"
 betrays your lack of comprehension. It's not that MWI "doesn't guarantee"
 that the the worlds at each trial are the same world. It's that the whole
 notion of "same other worlds" means nothing in this context and has no
 bearing on anything. A bit like arguing when we add 1 and 1 twice whether
 we are guaranteed that the ones we add each time are the "SAME ones" at
 each addition. If mathematics can't guarantee that then how can we be sure
 the answer is the same? Basically the only answer to that is "WTF?"

>
>
>> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum
>> experiment with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely per 
>> the
>> Born rule, then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two worlds
>> are created. You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version knowing
>> nothing about the other.
>>
>
> Again, what I have been saying all along! AG
>
 If you get that, then the next bit follows.

>
>
>> So, in the "objective world" (the view from outside the whole wave
>> function as it were), no probability is involved. But if you repeat this
>> experiment many times, each version of you will record an apparently 
>> random
>> sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction of what happens in the next
>> experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up between 1 and 0. Objectively
>> there's no randomness, subjectively it appears that way.
>>
>
> Here's where you go astray. AG
>

 So you say! Without justifying yourself in any way. You *seem* to be
 saying that probability can't describe QM experiments because in 

Re: Re[2]: Born's rule from almost nothing

[Quentin Anciaux]

I think there is no split, but continuous differentiation. So there is
always an infinity of worlds. Or there is no world at all and only
consciousness differentiation.

Quentin

Le mer. 6 janv. 2021 à 14:17, scerir via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

> Worlds, worlds. What are these worlds? When a pig observes a Young
> interferometer does this pig create worlds? Does this pig split worlds? Or
> not, because there is not full consciousness? And in Alpha Centauri,  where
> there are no pigs, no humans, no consciousness, no Young interferometers?
> No Franson interferometers either ...
>
> --
> Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
> Mercoledì, 06 Gennaio 2021, 01:28PM +01:00 da Quentin Anciaux
> allco...@gmail.com:
>
> Here a schema:
> [image: image.png]
>
> After 3 experiments, you have *8* worlds... each with the memory of the
> initial experiment, 4 of the 2nd version A and for of the 2nd version B...
> etc
>
> Every *worlds* has a past which is linked directly with the previous
> experiment and to the initial experiment... in each world there is an
> ensemble of 3 results.
>
> Quentin
>
> Le mer. 6 janv. 2021 à 13:01, Alan Grayson  a
> écrit :
>
> I should have been more explicit; since the trials are independent, the
> other worlds implied by the MWI for any particular trial, are unrelated to
> the other worlds created for any OTHER particular trial. Thus, each other
> world has an ensemble with one element, insufficient for the existence of
> probabilities. AG
>
> On Wednesday, January 6, 2021 at 4:41:57 AM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, January 6, 2021 at 3:33:52 AM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jan 5, 2021 at 10:05 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>
> >> One world contains an Alan Grayson that sees the electron go left,
> another world is absolutely identical in every way except that it contains
> a  Alan Grayson that sees the electron go right. So you tell me, which of
> those 2 worlds is "THIS WORLD"?
>
>
> *> It's the world where a living being can observe the trials being
> measured. The other world is in your imagination (if you believe in the
> MWI). AG *
>
>
> From that response I take it you have abandoned your attempt to poke logical
> holes in the Many Worlds Interpretation and instead have resorted to a
> pure emotional appeal; namely that there must be a fundamental law of
> physics that says anything Alan Grayson finds to be odd cannot exist, and Alan
> Grayson finds many Worlds to be odd. Personally I find Many Worlds to be
> odd too, although it's the least odd of all the quantum interpretations,
> however I don't think nature cares very much if you or I approve of it or
> not. From experimentation it's clear to me that if Many Worlds is not true
> then something even stranger is.
>
>
> I have no idea whatsoever, how you reached your conclusions above. There
> are things called laboratories, where physicists conduct experiments, some
> of which are quantum experiments with probabilistic outcomes. The world in
> which such things exist, I call THIS world. Worlds postulated to exist
> based on the claim that any possible measurement, must be a realized
> measurement in another world, I call OTHER worlds. Those OTHER worlds are
> imagined to exist based on the MWI. These are simple facts. I am not making
> any emotional appeals to anything. The possible oddness of the Cosmos is
> not affirmed or denied here. I agree the Cosmos might be odd, possibly very
> odd, but this has nothing to do with our discussion. The core of my
> argument is that since the trial outcomes in quantum experiments are
> independent of one another, there's no reason to claim that each of the
> OTHER worlds accumulates ensembles, as an ensemble is created in THIS
> world. Without ensembles in those OTHER worlds, the MWI fails to affirm the
> existence of probability in any of those OTHER worlds. AG
>
>
>  See my new list at  Extropolis <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis>
>
> John K Clark
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/55a83617-d49c-403c-a679-02025441ef6fn%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email_source=footer>
> .
>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
> Batty/Rutger 

Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

[Quentin Anciaux]

There are no this world... Every world is a world with a past. To simplify
we will assume with start with one world at t, at t1, we have two worlds,
at t2, 4 and so on... Each of these worlds are direct continuation of the
unique world at time t, at t3, there is no *this worlds*, every alan in
each worlds point to it saying this world... But there is no This world, it
makes no sense.

Quentin

Le mer. 6 janv. 2021 à 13:55, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, January 6, 2021 at 5:35:44 AM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Jan 6, 2021 at 6:42 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>> > There are things called laboratories, where physicists conduct
>>> experiments, some of which are quantum experiments with probabilistic
>>> outcomes.
>>>
>>
>> If Many Worlds is correct then there are an astronomically large number,
>> and possibly an infinitely large number, of worlds where physicists
>> conduct experiments, some of which are quantum experiments with
>> probabilistic outcomes.
>>
>>
>>> * The world in which such things exist, I call THIS world. *
>>>
>>
>> So there are an astronomically large number and possibly an infinitely
>> large number of "THIS" worlds.
>>
>> *> Worlds postulated to exist based on the claim that any possible
>>> measurement, must be a realized measurement in another world, I call OTHER
>>> worlds.*
>>>
>>
>> Alan Grayson decides that tomorrow Alan Grayson will conduct an
>> experiment to determine if an electron goes left or right. If Many
>> Worlds is correct then the day after tomorrow one Alan Grayson will
>> remember having seen the electron go left and one Alan Grayson will
>> remember having seen the electron go right. Which Alan Grayson lives in
>> "THIS" world.
>>
>> *> The core of my argument is that since the trial outcomes in quantum
>>> experiments are independent of one another, there's no reason to claim that
>>> each of the OTHER worlds accumulates ensembles, as an ensemble is created
>>> in THIS world.*
>>>
>>
>> That is just untrue. When one Alan Grayson has observed 1000 photons
>> there is another Alan Grayson that agrees with 999 of the observations and
>> disagrees only about #1000. All the 2^1000 Alan Graysons have made1000
>> observations, most Alan Graysons saw the electron go left about 500 times
>> and go right about 500 times, but a few were quite different, one Alan
>> Grayson out of  2^1000  saw the electron go left 1000 times in a row and
>> one Alan Grayson out of 2^1000 saw the electron go right 1000 times in a
>> row.
>>
>
> If you don't know what THIS world is, I can't help. AG
>
>>
>>  See my new list at  Extropolis 
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
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> 
> .
>

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Re: Born's rule from almost nothing

[Quentin Anciaux]

Here a schema:
[image: image.png]

After 3 experiments, you have *8* worlds... each with the memory of the
initial experiment, 4 of the 2nd version A and for of the 2nd version B...
etc

Every *worlds* has a past which is linked directly with the previous
experiment and to the initial experiment... in each world there is an
ensemble of 3 results.

Quentin

Le mer. 6 janv. 2021 à 13:01, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

> I should have been more explicit; since the trials are independent, the
> other worlds implied by the MWI for any particular trial, are unrelated to
> the other worlds created for any OTHER particular trial. Thus, each other
> world has an ensemble with one element, insufficient for the existence of
> probabilities. AG
>
> On Wednesday, January 6, 2021 at 4:41:57 AM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, January 6, 2021 at 3:33:52 AM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Jan 5, 2021 at 10:05 PM Alan Grayson 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> >> One world contains an Alan Grayson that sees the electron go left,
> another world is absolutely identical in every way except that it contains
> a  Alan Grayson that sees the electron go right. So you tell me, which of
> those 2 worlds is "THIS WORLD"?
>

 *> It's the world where a living being can observe the trials being
 measured. The other world is in your imagination (if you believe in the
 MWI). AG *

>>>
>>> From that response I take it you have abandoned your attempt to poke logical
>>> holes in the Many Worlds Interpretation and instead have resorted to a
>>> pure emotional appeal; namely that there must be a fundamental law of
>>> physics that says anything Alan Grayson finds to be odd cannot exist,
>>> and Alan Grayson finds many Worlds to be odd. Personally I find Many
>>> Worlds to be odd too, although it's the least odd of all the quantum
>>> interpretations, however I don't think nature cares very much if you or I
>>> approve of it or not. From experimentation it's clear to me that if Many
>>> Worlds is not true then something even stranger is.
>>>
>>
>> I have no idea whatsoever, how you reached your conclusions above. There
>> are things called laboratories, where physicists conduct experiments, some
>> of which are quantum experiments with probabilistic outcomes. The world in
>> which such things exist, I call THIS world. Worlds postulated to exist
>> based on the claim that any possible measurement, must be a realized
>> measurement in another world, I call OTHER worlds. Those OTHER worlds are
>> imagined to exist based on the MWI. These are simple facts. I am not making
>> any emotional appeals to anything. The possible oddness of the Cosmos is
>> not affirmed or denied here. I agree the Cosmos might be odd, possibly very
>> odd, but this has nothing to do with our discussion. The core of my
>> argument is that since the trial outcomes in quantum experiments are
>> independent of one another, there's no reason to claim that each of the
>> OTHER worlds accumulates ensembles, as an ensemble is created in THIS
>> world. Without ensembles in those OTHER worlds, the MWI fails to affirm the
>> existence of probability in any of those OTHER worlds. AG
>>
>>>
>>>  See my new list at  Extropolis 
>>>
>>> John K Clark
>>>
>>>
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 9 sept. 2020 à 09:46, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 5:29 PM Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
>> Le mer. 9 sept. 2020 à 09:14, Bruce Kellett  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:50 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 9/8/2020 10:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a
>>>>> convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of
>>>>> personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not
>>>>> as satisfactory.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for
>>>> continuity of identity, it is just a psychological construct.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Realistically (sort of) in the duplication of Bruce there will be
>>>> millions of errors in each copy.  There would be no point in trying to make
>>>> them any more accurate.  That would certainly be good enough to fool his
>>>> closest friends and family.  So at the molecular level there will certainly
>>>> be a unique closest continuer.  But I can't see that it makes any
>>>> difference.  That's just as arbitrary as denominating the first one to open
>>>> his door the REAL Bruce.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The importance of copying errors depends on the metric used to assess
>>> closeness of continuation. If and when actual duplication becomes possible,
>>> we can worry about the fine details of this. But if you think in terms of
>>> AI, duplication might involve no more than running the same program on
>>> multiple computers. Duplication errors are then eliminated.
>>>
>>> I think the point of taking more into account in terms of personal
>>> identity than just psychological continuity is that psychological
>>> continuity makes little sense when you are asleep, under anaesthesia, or
>>> otherwise unconscious. Do you cease to be a person when unconscious? The
>>> same person? Does your family recognize you then or not? Since we do not
>>> doubt continuity of personal existence even though our bodies change
>>> continuously at the molecular level, copying errors at that level are not
>>> relevant for bodily continuity. Our memories and emotions change every bit
>>> as much, if not more, on these time scales. So the metric to determine
>>> continuity of personal identity is not clear cut. It is the sort of thing
>>> that can be sorted out if and when we can actually duplicate persons and
>>> their bodies.
>>>
>>
>> The only thing for a person to take into account if she is the same
>> person as yesterday, one second ago, one year ago.. is feeling she is and
>> is the only true thing, what you're talking about could have meaning in a
>> law court but nowhere else... it has nothing to do with personal identity.
>>
>
>
> Tell that to the parents grieving over their son who is in a coma
> following an accident.
>

This has nothing to do with *personal* identity... personal identity is a
first person concept... if you're not conscious (coma, dead, whatever) if
there is no 'I' talking into your head, it has no meaning... now for law,
inheritance and other persons acting towards you, it can have meaning, but
it's not "personal identity" and for knowing if you're alive or not, you're
the only source of truth about that... no one can tell you you're not what
you think you are.

Quentin

>
> Bruce
>
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 9 sept. 2020 à 09:14, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:50 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> On 9/8/2020 10:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a
>>> convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of
>>> personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not
>>> as satisfactory.
>>>
>>
>> I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity
>> of identity, it is just a psychological construct.
>>
>>
>> Realistically (sort of) in the duplication of Bruce there will be
>> millions of errors in each copy.  There would be no point in trying to make
>> them any more accurate.  That would certainly be good enough to fool his
>> closest friends and family.  So at the molecular level there will certainly
>> be a unique closest continuer.  But I can't see that it makes any
>> difference.  That's just as arbitrary as denominating the first one to open
>> his door the REAL Bruce.
>>
>
>
> The importance of copying errors depends on the metric used to assess
> closeness of continuation. If and when actual duplication becomes possible,
> we can worry about the fine details of this. But if you think in terms of
> AI, duplication might involve no more than running the same program on
> multiple computers. Duplication errors are then eliminated.
>
> I think the point of taking more into account in terms of personal
> identity than just psychological continuity is that psychological
> continuity makes little sense when you are asleep, under anaesthesia, or
> otherwise unconscious. Do you cease to be a person when unconscious? The
> same person? Does your family recognize you then or not? Since we do not
> doubt continuity of personal existence even though our bodies change
> continuously at the molecular level, copying errors at that level are not
> relevant for bodily continuity. Our memories and emotions change every bit
> as much, if not more, on these time scales. So the metric to determine
> continuity of personal identity is not clear cut. It is the sort of thing
> that can be sorted out if and when we can actually duplicate persons and
> their bodies.
>

The only thing for a person to take into account if she is the same person
as yesterday, one second ago, one year ago.. is feeling she is and is the
only true thing, what you're talking about could have meaning in a law
court but nowhere else... it has nothing to do with personal identity.

Quentin

>
> Bruce
>
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le ven. 4 sept. 2020 à 00:01, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

> Sure.  But Albert's argument is that in a single, probabilistic world that
> implements Born's rule, the number of scientist who find something contrary
> to Born's rule goes to zero as the number of repetitions increases.  But in
> the multiverse there are always contrary worlds and, while their fraction
> decreases, their number increases with repetitions.
>

That's an interpretation... because I think there is no increasing or
decreasing of numbers of worlds there are an infinity of them always,
similar / identical "world" differentiate but there is no increase or
decrease, there is no meaningfull way of "counting"... The frequency is all
there is.

Quentin

>
> Brent
>
> On 9/3/2020 12:02 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Hi,
> as there will be persons in self duplicate experiment who'll see WWW...WW.
>
> But most should converge on 50%.
>
> Quentin
>
> Le jeu. 3 sept. 2020 à 20:48, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a
> écrit :
>
>> Albert makes an interesting argument against Everettian QM, i.e. that
>> repeated experiments will not produce statistics that converge to the Born
>> rule, i.e. there will necessarily (not just probabilistically) be
>> experimenters in worlds supporting every possible probability value.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>> On 9/3/2020 10:59 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>> This sort of way of approaching physics is no different really from
>> theological debates about some esoteric Christian doctrine.
>>
>> The last of Carroll's The Biggest Ideas in the Universe series is
>> actually interesting at the end:
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZqphkIO7yt4
>>
>> He has nowhere to go asn has no idea what to do.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>> On Thursday, September 3, 2020 at 1:02:21 AM UTC-5 Brent wrote:
>>
>>> An interesting discussion of Everettian QM in two parts.  The first part
>>>
>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FyvgBe9VV70
>>>
>>> is just David Albert and Sean Carroll.  It's quite reminiscent of JKC
>>> and Bruno, using the same thought experiments (but more civil).
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

[Quentin Anciaux]

Hi,
as there will be persons in self duplicate experiment who'll see WWW...WW.

But most should converge on 50%.

Quentin

Le jeu. 3 sept. 2020 à 20:48, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

> Albert makes an interesting argument against Everettian QM, i.e. that
> repeated experiments will not produce statistics that converge to the Born
> rule, i.e. there will necessarily (not just probabilistically) be
> experimenters in worlds supporting every possible probability value.
>
> Brent
>
> On 9/3/2020 10:59 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
> This sort of way of approaching physics is no different really from
> theological debates about some esoteric Christian doctrine.
>
> The last of Carroll's The Biggest Ideas in the Universe series is actually
> interesting at the end:
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZqphkIO7yt4
>
> He has nowhere to go asn has no idea what to do.
>
> @philipthrift
>
> On Thursday, September 3, 2020 at 1:02:21 AM UTC-5 Brent wrote:
>
>> An interesting discussion of Everettian QM in two parts.  The first part
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FyvgBe9VV70
>>
>> is just David Albert and Sean Carroll.  It's quite reminiscent of JKC and
>> Bruno, using the same thought experiments (but more civil).
>>
>> Brent
>>
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Re: Universe as a simulated strange loop

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le lun. 4 mai 2020 à 14:15, Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> a écrit :

> On Sunday, May 3, 2020 at 10:14:10 PM UTC-5, smitra wrote:
>>
>> On 03-05-2020 23:09, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> > The SSH
>> >
>> >   https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/22/2/247
>> >
>> > still lies in the "information turn" that plays in physics today.(IT
>> > FROM QUBIT, etc.) - a rejection pf materialism in favor of idealism.
>> >
>> > It is more interesting to me to stick to the vocabulary of
>> > materialist* physics - particles, fields, interactions, forces - but
>> > to approach CONSCIOUSNESS AS PURELY MATERIAL - adding a new
>> > force/interaction/particle/field as needed (like a sixth force/field).
>> >
>> > http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Field_theories_of_consciousness
>> >
>> > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_theories_of_consciousness
>> >
>> > etc.
>> >
>> > * or physicalist
>> >
>> > @philipthrift
>>
>> Physicalism is a dead end. The hard problem of consciousness and other
>> philosophical problems can be considered to be no-go theorems against
>> physicalism. Abandoning physicalism solves all these problems in one
>> fell swoop. But that also opens the door to wrong theories as people
>> engaging with non-physicalist theories can too easily advertise their
>> pet theories because they don't suffer from all the diseases physicalist
>> theories suffer from. The bar has to be set higher, I would like to see
>> a derivation of the laws of physics, not some vague argument that it is
>> consistent with QM and unitary evolution but a lot more detail than just
>> that.
>>
>> Saibal
>
>
> I think more likely this mean the hard problem or qualia are illusions. I
> have far more confidence in physics than I do in hopeful ideas about
> qualia, which are psychological form of elan vital thought in previous
> centuries to underlie biology.
>

Either you have no quale, and then as a zombie... it could mean something
(but not to you), or you have, and if a theory cannot account for that, it
miss the things it purpose to explain.

When you say "psychological form" you're talking about a quale... I don't
see how that could be explained away...

Quentin


> LC
>
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Re: Inflation and the total size of the universe

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le jeu. 16 avr. 2020 à 03:43, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, April 15, 2020 at 7:25:50 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 4:27 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>> *> If you solve Schroedinger's equation for the wf, you get a solution
>>> for all space and time. If it's physical, or shall we say ontological, how
>>> can it propagate infinitely? *
>>
>>
>> If it started out infinite
>>
>
>
> I don't think you understand the implication of your supposition. It MEANS
> spatially infinite space came about at some INSTANT!
>

But going *from nothing* to *anything* is problematic, there is
*absolutely* no known *physical process* that creates anything out of pure
absolute nothing... so creating "something" or "everything" from nothing is
as much non physical and impossible, and so talking about physical process
to constrain finite or infinite is dubious at best.


> Your unstated inference is that it took a time duration of ZERO for that
> to happen. Do you really think any physical processes can occur in a time
> duration of zero? But let's suppose it happened in finite time, or possibly
> with an infinite past. If so, the age of the universe could be much larger
> than 13.8 BLY, depending on how long it took to create that infinite
> spatial extent. It can't be spontaneously generated in a time duration of
> zero. However, if it occurred, it would have existed BEFORE the creation
> INSTANT of OUR universe. If so, it's not really part of OUR universe, but
> part of the "substratum" from which the BB arose. AG
>
> the universe wouldn't have to propagate at all to be infinite. And finite
>> or infinite it makes no difference, Schrodinger's equation breaks down
>> at Big Bang time zero and so does every other known equation. That
>> situation won't change until somebody finds a quantum theory for gravity.
>>
>>  John K Clark
>>
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Re: Inflation and the total size of the universe

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 14 avr. 2020 à 16:20, Quentin Anciaux  a écrit :

>
>
> Le mar. 14 avr. 2020 à 16:14, Alan Grayson  a
> écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, April 14, 2020 at 7:54:19 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, April 14, 2020 at 5:28:07 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Apr 13, 2020 at 5:11 PM Alan Grayson 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> *>>> if you accept the measured age, it can't be finite or infinite in
>>>>>>> spatial extent when it began*
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> >> If something isn't finite or infinite what is the third
>>>>>> alternative?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> > *It doesn't exist;*
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> OK, but then what is "it"?
>>>>
>>>> > *that is, your hypothesis that that when the universe began it was
>>>>> already infinite, or possibly finite, is false.*
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So I ask again, if the universe isn't finite and it isn't infinite what
>>>> is your third alternative? And why would creating a finite amount of
>>>> something from nothing be easier than creating a infinite amount of
>>>> something from nothing? In my previous post I gave reasons for thinking the
>>>> infinite case might actually be simpler. And if creation was not involved
>>>> because a finite universe always existed then why couldn't a infinite
>>>> universe just as easily always have existed too?
>>>>
>>>>   John K Clark
>>>>
>>>
>>> This is getting tedious. If the universe began at some instant (having
>>> zero time duration), and assuming physical processes require time, there
>>> was insufficient time to create anything, finite or infinite, *at that
>>> instant*. It's like a volcano erupting, and you're claiming that when
>>> the eruption began, the cone was existing at that point in time. AG
>>>
>>
>> You want to claim the universe began, presumably at some instant, and
>> also claim it was infinite in extent at that point in time. But if physical
>> processes require time, your claim makes no sense. AG
>>
>
> You want to claim the universe began, presumably at some instant, and also
> claim it was finite in extent at that point in time. But if physical
> processes require time, your claim makes no sense
>

IOW nothing to finite, nothing to infinite... same fight.

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>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> To view this discussion on the web visit
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/12ac7c1a-9c59-4529-84e0-85acc76f81f1%40googlegroups.com
>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/12ac7c1a-9c59-4529-84e0-85acc76f81f1%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email_source=footer>
>> .
>>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

-- 
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Re: Inflation and the total size of the universe

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 14 avr. 2020 à 16:14, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Tuesday, April 14, 2020 at 7:54:19 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, April 14, 2020 at 5:28:07 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Mon, Apr 13, 2020 at 5:11 PM Alan Grayson 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> *>>> if you accept the measured age, it can't be finite or infinite in
>> spatial extent when it began*
>
>
> >> If something isn't finite or infinite what is the third
> alternative?
>

 > *It doesn't exist;*

>>>
>>> OK, but then what is "it"?
>>>
>>> > *that is, your hypothesis that that when the universe began it was
 already infinite, or possibly finite, is false.*

>>>
>>> So I ask again, if the universe isn't finite and it isn't infinite what
>>> is your third alternative? And why would creating a finite amount of
>>> something from nothing be easier than creating a infinite amount of
>>> something from nothing? In my previous post I gave reasons for thinking the
>>> infinite case might actually be simpler. And if creation was not involved
>>> because a finite universe always existed then why couldn't a infinite
>>> universe just as easily always have existed too?
>>>
>>>   John K Clark
>>>
>>
>> This is getting tedious. If the universe began at some instant (having
>> zero time duration), and assuming physical processes require time, there
>> was insufficient time to create anything, finite or infinite, *at that
>> instant*. It's like a volcano erupting, and you're claiming that when
>> the eruption began, the cone was existing at that point in time. AG
>>
>
> You want to claim the universe began, presumably at some instant, and also
> claim it was infinite in extent at that point in time. But if physical
> processes require time, your claim makes no sense. AG
>

You want to claim the universe began, presumably at some instant, and also
claim it was finite in extent at that point in time. But if physical
processes require time, your claim makes no sense

> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/12ac7c1a-9c59-4529-84e0-85acc76f81f1%40googlegroups.com
> 
> .
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le sam. 29 févr. 2020 à 06:35, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Thursday, February 27, 2020 at 5:41:57 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 26 Feb 2020, at 18:06, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, February 26, 2020 at 4:35:54 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 25 Feb 2020, at 12:43, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 10:26 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
 On 24 Feb 2020, at 23:22, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

 On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 12:10 AM Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:

> On 23 Feb 2020, at 23:49, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 12:21 AM Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
>
>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 04:11, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>>
>> I don't really understand your comment. I was thinking of Bruno's
>> WM-duplication. You could impose the idea that each duplication at each
>> branch point on every branch is an independent Bernoulli trial with p = 
>> 0.5
>> on this (success being defined arbitrarily as W or M). Then, if these
>> probabilities carry over from trial to trial, you end up with every 
>> binary
>> sequence, each with weight 1/2^N. Summing sequences with the same number 
>> of
>> 0s and 1s, you get the Pascal Triangle distribution that Bruno wants.
>>
>> The trouble is that such a procedure is entirely arbitrary. The only
>> probability that one could objectively assign to say, W, on each 
>> Bernoulli
>> trial is one,
>>
>>
>> That is certainly wrong. If you are correct, then P(W) = 1 is written
>> in the personal diary,
>>
>
> I did say "objectively assign". In other words, this was a 3p comment.
> You confuse 1p with 3p yet again.
>
>
> Well, if you “objectively” assign P(W) = 1, the guy in M will
> subjectively refute that prediction, and as the question was about the
> subjective accessible experience, he objectively, and predictably, refute
> your statement.
>


 And if you objectively assign p(W) = p(M) = 0.5, then with the W-guy
 and the M-guy will both say that your theory is refuted, since they both
 see only one city: W-guy, W with p = 1.0, and the M-guy, M with p =1.0..


 That is *very* weird. That works for the coin tossing experience too,
 even for the lottery. I predicted that I have 1/10^6 to win the lottery,
 but I was wrong, after the gale was played I won, so the probability was
 one!

 In Helsinki, the guy write P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. That means he does not
 yet know what outcome he will feel to live. Once the experience is done,
 one copy will see W, and that is coherent with his prediction, same for the
 others. He would have written P(W) = 1, that would have been felt as
 refuted by the M guy, and vice-versa.

>>>
>>> But if he wrote p(W) = 0.9 and p(M) = 0.1 he would get exactly the same
>>> result. The proposed probabilities are here without effect.
>>>
>>>
>>> If I toss a perfect coin too.
>>>
>>> Of course, that would lead directly to some problem with the iterated
>>> case scenario.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If not, tell me what is your prediction in Helsinki again, by keeping in
> mind that it concerns your future subjective experience only.
>


 In Helsinki I can offer no value for the probability since, given the
 protocol, I know that all probabilities will be realized on repetitions of
 the duplication.


 In the 3p picture. Indeed, that is, by definition, the protocol. But
 the question is not about where you will live after the experience (we know
 that it will be in both cities), but what do you expect to live from the
 first person perspective, and here P(W & M) is null, as nobody will ever
 *feel to live* in both city at once with this protocole.

>>>
>>> And, as I have repeated shown, the first person perspective does not
>>> give you any expectations at all.
>>>
>>>
>>> If I am duplicated like in the 2^(16180 * 1) * (60 * 90) * 24
>>> “movie” scenario, I do expect seeing white noise, and I certainly don’t
>>> expect to see “2001, Space Odyssey” with Tibetan subtitle.
>>>
>>> I am not sure what you mean by “the first person perspective does not
>>> give any expectations”.
>>>
>>> Do you agree that if you are promised, in Helsinki, that a cup of coffee
>>> will be offered to you, both in M and W, you can expect, with probability
>>> one, to get a cup of coffee after pushing the button in Helsinki? (Assuming
>>> Mechanism, of course).
>>>
>>> I would expect, in Helsinki,  to drink a cup of coffee with probability
>>> one (using this protocole and all default hypotheses, like no asteroids
>>> hurt the planet in the meantime, etc.).
>>>
>>> And I would consider myself maximally ignorant if that coffee will be
>>> Russian or American coffee.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The experience is totally symmetrical in the 3p picture, 

Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le ven. 21 févr. 2020 à 14:04, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Friday, February 21, 2020 at 3:41:29 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 21, 2020 at 9:30 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>> On 21 Feb 2020, at 04:40, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>>
>>> From: Brent Meeker 
>>>
>>> Of course that's true.  But the more relevant value is the fraction of
>>> sequences with the proportion of 1s within some narrow range of 0.5.  For
>>> large N, the distribution is Gaussian with std deviation ~sqrt(N) so almost
>>> equal numbers of 1s and 0s do predominate.
>>>
>>>
>>> I was aware of that, but they only dominate in a narrow range when p =
>>> 0.5. My thinking was that since the confidence interval around the
>>> estimated probability shrinks as 1/sqrt(N) for large N, outside a small
>>> range of small deviations from equal numbers of zeros and ones, the
>>> confidence interval on the probability estimates would no longer capture p
>>> = 0.5. Also, looking at numbers of zeros within +- a small number of N/2
>>> would give results for the asymptotic proportion similar to those for N/2
>>> zeros. Since my calculation systematically ignores factors of the order of
>>> one, I doubt that including such bit strings with close to equal numbers of
>>> zeros and ones would make any significant difference to the conclusion that
>>> such strings do not dominate in the limit. In other words, I think my
>>> conclusion that the majority of the 2^N observers would not estimate
>>> probabilities close to 0.5 is secure. (Ignoring factors of order one in the
>>> calculation!)
>>>
>>>
>>> But that argument would work for coin tossing too. That eliminate
>>> basically all probabilistic inference, it seems to me. A dwarf and a giant
>>> would not accept the Gaussian distribution of height.
>>>
>>
>>
>> You still don't get it, do you? The argument applies to all possible bit
>> strings of length N. You do not get that from coin tosses in a single
>> world. It is only when you claim that all possible results exist in
>> separate branching worlds that the problem arises. So it is a problem for
>> your WM-duplication, and for Everett. But not for single world theories.
>> Statistical inference is perfectly intact as it is used in this world.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> Bruce; is WM the same as MW, as in Many Worlds, and if not, what's the
> distinction? TIA, AG
>

Washington / Moscow duplication.

> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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> 
> .
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 10:18, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, February 19, 2020 at 12:35:28 AM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 08:30, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, February 19, 2020 at 12:10:54 AM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux
>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 08:03, Quentin Anciaux  a
>>>> écrit :
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 07:36, Alan Grayson  a
>>>>> écrit :
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 11:25:59 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 01:24, Alan Grayson  a
>>>>>>> écrit :
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 4:13:03 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 23:36, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>> a écrit :
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 3:07:07 PM UTC-7, Quentin
>>>>>>>>>> Anciaux wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 22:54, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>>>> a écrit :
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 2:22:46 PM UTC-7, Quentin
>>>>>>>>>>>> Anciaux wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 22:15, Alan Grayson <
>>>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com> a écrit :
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 1:17:59 PM UTC-7, Quentin
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Anciaux wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 16:43, Alan Grayson <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com> a écrit :
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 6:59:11 AM UTC-7, Bruno
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 18 Feb 2020, at 07:28, Alan Grayson <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Monday, February 17, 2020 at 6:21:47 AM UTC-7, Bruno
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 Feb 2020, at 17:54, Alan Grayson <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 08:30, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, February 19, 2020 at 12:10:54 AM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 08:03, Quentin Anciaux  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 07:36, Alan Grayson  a
>>> écrit :
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 11:25:59 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 01:24, Alan Grayson  a
>>>>> écrit :
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 4:13:03 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 23:36, Alan Grayson  a
>>>>>>> écrit :
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 3:07:07 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 22:54, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>> a écrit :
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 2:22:46 PM UTC-7, Quentin
>>>>>>>>>> Anciaux wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 22:15, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>>>> a écrit :
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 1:17:59 PM UTC-7, Quentin
>>>>>>>>>>>> Anciaux wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 16:43, Alan Grayson <
>>>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com> a écrit :
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 6:59:11 AM UTC-7, Bruno
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 18 Feb 2020, at 07:28, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Monday, February 17, 2020 at 6:21:47 AM UTC-7, Bruno
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 Feb 2020, at 17:54, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 5:49:38 AM UTC-7, Philip
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thrift wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 6:19:36 AM UTC-6, Alan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Grayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>

Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 08:03, Quentin Anciaux  a
écrit :

>
>
> Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 07:36, Alan Grayson  a
> écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 11:25:59 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 01:24, Alan Grayson  a
>>> écrit :
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 4:13:03 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 23:36, Alan Grayson  a
>>>>> écrit :
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 3:07:07 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 22:54, Alan Grayson  a
>>>>>>> écrit :
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 2:22:46 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 22:15, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>> a écrit :
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 1:17:59 PM UTC-7, Quentin
>>>>>>>>>> Anciaux wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 16:43, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>>>> a écrit :
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 6:59:11 AM UTC-7, Bruno
>>>>>>>>>>>> Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 18 Feb 2020, at 07:28, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Monday, February 17, 2020 at 6:21:47 AM UTC-7, Bruno
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 Feb 2020, at 17:54, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 5:49:38 AM UTC-7, Philip
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thrift wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 6:19:36 AM UTC-6, Alan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Grayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 4:58:33 AM UTC-7, Philip
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thrift wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 2:51:53 AM UTC-6, Alan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Grayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>

Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 07:36, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 11:25:59 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 01:24, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 4:13:03 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 23:36, Alan Grayson  a
>>>> écrit :
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 3:07:07 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 22:54, Alan Grayson  a
>>>>>> écrit :
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 2:22:46 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 22:15, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>> a écrit :
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 1:17:59 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 16:43, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>>> a écrit :
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 6:59:11 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 18 Feb 2020, at 07:28, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Monday, February 17, 2020 at 6:21:47 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal
>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 Feb 2020, at 17:54, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 5:49:38 AM UTC-7, Philip
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thrift wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 6:19:36 AM UTC-6, Alan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Grayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 4:58:33 AM UTC-7, Philip
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thrift wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 2:51:53 AM UTC-6, Alan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Grayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 1:45:50 AM UTC-7, Philip
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thrift wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>&g

Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 01:24, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 4:13:03 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 23:36, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 3:07:07 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 22:54, Alan Grayson  a
>>>> écrit :
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 2:22:46 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 22:15, Alan Grayson  a
>>>>>> écrit :
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 1:17:59 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 16:43, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>> a écrit :
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 6:59:11 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 18 Feb 2020, at 07:28, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Monday, February 17, 2020 at 6:21:47 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 Feb 2020, at 17:54, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 5:49:38 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 6:19:36 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 4:58:33 AM UTC-7, Philip
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thrift wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 2:51:53 AM UTC-6, Alan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Grayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 1:45:50 AM UTC-7, Philip
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thrift wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 4:29:11 PM UTC-6, Alan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Grayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I posted what MWI means. No need to repeat it. It doesn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean THIS world doesn't exist, or somehow disappears in the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> measurement. AG
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>

Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 23:36, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 3:07:07 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 22:54, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 2:22:46 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 22:15, Alan Grayson  a
>>>> écrit :
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 1:17:59 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 16:43, Alan Grayson  a
>>>>>> écrit :
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 6:59:11 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 18 Feb 2020, at 07:28, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Monday, February 17, 2020 at 6:21:47 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 16 Feb 2020, at 17:54, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 5:49:38 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 6:19:36 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 4:58:33 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 2:51:53 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 1:45:50 AM UTC-7, Philip
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thrift wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 4:29:11 PM UTC-6, Alan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Grayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I posted what MWI means. No need to repeat it. It doesn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean THIS world doesn't exist, or somehow disappears in the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> measurement. AG
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's nice.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nice how? Bruce seems to think when a binary measurement is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> done in this world, it splits into two worlds, each with one of 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> possible measurements. I see only one world being created, with 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> this world
>>>>>>&

Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 22:54, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 2:22:46 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 22:15, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 1:17:59 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 16:43, Alan Grayson  a
>>>> écrit :
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 6:59:11 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 18 Feb 2020, at 07:28, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Monday, February 17, 2020 at 6:21:47 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 16 Feb 2020, at 17:54, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 5:49:38 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 6:19:36 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 4:58:33 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 2:51:53 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 1:45:50 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 4:29:11 PM UTC-6, Alan
>>>>>>>>>>>> Grayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I posted what MWI means. No need to repeat it. It doesn't mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>> THIS world doesn't exist, or somehow disappears in the process of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> measurement. AG
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> That's nice.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Nice how? Bruce seems to think when a binary measurement is done
>>>>>>>>>>> in this world, it splits into two worlds, each with one of the 
>>>>>>>>>>> possible
>>>>>>>>>>> measurements. I see only one world being created, with this world 
>>>>>>>>>>> remaining
>>>>>>>>>>> intact, and then comes the second measurement, with its opposite 
>>>>>>>>>>> occurring
>>>>>>>>>>> in another world, or perhaps in the same world created by the first
>>>>>>>>>>> measurement. So for N trials, the number of worlds created is N, or 
>>>>>>>>>>> less.
>>>>>>>>>>> Isn't this what the MWI means? AG
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There is one measurement M in world w, with two possible
>>>>>>>>>> outcomes: O1 and O2.
>>>>>>>>>> There are not two measurements M1 and M2.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Of the two worlds w-O1 and w

Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 22:15, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 1:17:59 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 16:43, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 6:59:11 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 18 Feb 2020, at 07:28, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Monday, February 17, 2020 at 6:21:47 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 16 Feb 2020, at 17:54, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 5:49:38 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 6:19:36 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 4:58:33 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 2:51:53 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 1:45:50 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 4:29:11 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I posted what MWI means. No need to repeat it. It doesn't mean
>>>>>>>>>>> THIS world doesn't exist, or somehow disappears in the process of
>>>>>>>>>>> measurement. AG
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That's nice.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Nice how? Bruce seems to think when a binary measurement is done
>>>>>>>>> in this world, it splits into two worlds, each with one of the 
>>>>>>>>> possible
>>>>>>>>> measurements. I see only one world being created, with this world 
>>>>>>>>> remaining
>>>>>>>>> intact, and then comes the second measurement, with its opposite 
>>>>>>>>> occurring
>>>>>>>>> in another world, or perhaps in the same world created by the first
>>>>>>>>> measurement. So for N trials, the number of worlds created is N, or 
>>>>>>>>> less.
>>>>>>>>> Isn't this what the MWI means? AG
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> There is one measurement M in world w, with two possible outcomes:
>>>>>>>> O1 and O2.
>>>>>>>> There are not two measurements M1 and M2.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Of the two worlds w-O1 and w-O2 post world w, one is not assigned
>>>>>>>> "this" and the other assigned "that", They have equal status in MWI
>>>>>>>> reality. One is not privileged over the other in any way.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is hopeless. It's like you don't understand what I wrote, which
>>>>>>> is pretty simple. AG
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What you wrote has* nothing to do with MWI*. You created something
>>>>>> different from MWI (in the Carroll sense).
>>>>>> But's OK to have your own interpretation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It's *your own "interpretat

Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 16:43, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 6:59:11 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18 Feb 2020, at 07:28, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 17, 2020 at 6:21:47 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 16 Feb 2020, at 17:54, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 5:49:38 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 6:19:36 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 4:58:33 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 2:51:53 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 1:45:50 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift
>>> wrote:



 On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 4:29:11 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
 wrote:
>
>
> I posted what MWI means. No need to repeat it. It doesn't mean
> THIS world doesn't exist, or somehow disappears in the process of
> measurement. AG
>


 That's nice.

 @philipthrift

>>>
>>> Nice how? Bruce seems to think when a binary measurement is done in
>>> this world, it splits into two worlds, each with one of the possible
>>> measurements. I see only one world being created, with this world 
>>> remaining
>>> intact, and then comes the second measurement, with its opposite 
>>> occurring
>>> in another world, or perhaps in the same world created by the first
>>> measurement. So for N trials, the number of worlds created is N, or 
>>> less.
>>> Isn't this what the MWI means? AG
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> There is one measurement M in world w, with two possible outcomes: O1
>> and O2.
>> There are not two measurements M1 and M2.
>>
>> Of the two worlds w-O1 and w-O2 post world w, one is not assigned
>> "this" and the other assigned "that", They have equal status in MWI
>> reality. One is not privileged over the other in any way.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> This is hopeless. It's like you don't understand what I wrote, which
> is pretty simple. AG
>


 What you wrote has* nothing to do with MWI*. You created something
 different from MWI (in the Carroll sense).
 But's OK to have your own interpretation.

 It's *your own "interpretation"*, not MWI.  Publish it and call it
 something else.

 @philipthrift

>>>
>>> I suppose I'm just following Tegmark; everything that CAN happen, MUST
>>> happen.  So, when an observer measures UP (or DN) in THIS world, another
>>> world comes into existence wherein an observer MUST measure DN (or UP).
>>> From this I get N or less worlds for N trials where the results of
>>> measurements are binary, such as spin. Maybe not precisely MWI, but
>>> definitely less stupid -- but still egregiously stupid. How could MWI be
>>> remotely correctly if it alleges THIS world splits when it's never
>>> observed?
>>>
>>>
>>> Everett explains this entirely in his long text. The observer cannot
>>> feel the split, nor observe it directly. But if QM (without collapse) is
>>> correct, it is up to the Uni-World to provide explanation of how “nature”
>>> makes some terms in the superposition disappear.
>>>
>>> Also, the MW is also a consequence of Descartes (mechanism) +
>>> Turing-Church-Post-Kleene (i.e. the discovery of the computer … in the
>>> elementary arithmetical reality).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But now you say that for Everett there's no such thing as THIS world.
>>> All this stuff, including Bruno's BS, is so profoundly dumb, I can't
>>> believe we're even discussing it! Was it Brent on another thread who
>>> claimed many physicists have become cultists? Whoever made that claim
>>> qualifies for sanity. AG
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Are you saying that the brain is not Turing emulable? Or what? All what
>>> I say follows from this “intuitively”, but is also recovered by the
>>> Platonician’s definition used in epistemology, when modelling  “rational
>>> belief” by “provability”, which is suggested by incompleteness. I do know
>>> philosophers who are not convinced, by I don’t do philosophy, I prefer to
>>> show a theory and its testability, and indeed I show exactly how to test
>>> experimentally between Mechanism and (Weak) Materialism (physicalism), and
>>> I show that quantum mechanics confirms Mechanism.
>>>
>>> I am not the guy who comes with a new theory. I am just showing that the
>>> old and venerable Mechanist theory (in biology, psychology) is
>>> experimentally testable, and that QM without-collapse confirms it, like I
>>> show also that quantum logic confirms it.
>>>
>>> What is your take on the WM-duplication?
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>> PS if you could avoid the insults, and reason instead, that would be
>>> nice. Leave the 

Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le ven. 14 févr. 2020 à 22:57, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Sat, Feb 15, 2020 at 8:50 AM Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>
>> Le ven. 14 févr. 2020 à 22:48, Bruce Kellett  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>> On Sat, Feb 15, 2020 at 1:35 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Just to be clear, are you OK with P(W) = 1/2 in the WM-duplicatipon,
>>>> when “W” refers to the first person experience?
>>>>
>>>
>>> No. As I have said before, the H-man has no basis on which to assign any
>>> probability at all to the possibility that he will see W (or M) tomorrow,
>>> The trouble is that probabilities tend to be defined by the limit of
>>> relative frequencies over a large number of trials. If you perform the
>>> WM-duplication N times, there will be 2^N "first person experiences" and
>>> many of them will assign probabilities greatly different from 0.5.
>>>
>>
>> That's false, most of them will infer the correct probability...
>>
>
> Wrong again. Respond to Kent's argument if you disagree. (arxiv:0905.0624)
>

I disagree, that's called statistics.


> Bruce
>
>>
>>> There is no "intrinsic probability" in your scenario. This is also
>>> Adrian Kent's objection to MWI, and it will also nullify any benefit you
>>> might seek to gain from the "frequency operator" -- every "first person"
>>> will get a different eigenvalue in the limit of infinite trials..
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>> --
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> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSRF47M9TdmKScCgtE4vv2iy0G3Nx95zUwhZik8_ywohw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email_source=footer>
> .
>

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Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le ven. 14 févr. 2020 à 22:48, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Sat, Feb 15, 2020 at 1:35 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> Just to be clear, are you OK with P(W) = 1/2 in the WM-duplicatipon, when
>> “W” refers to the first person experience?
>>
>
> No. As I have said before, the H-man has no basis on which to assign any
> probability at all to the possibility that he will see W (or M) tomorrow,
> The trouble is that probabilities tend to be defined by the limit of
> relative frequencies over a large number of trials. If you perform the
> WM-duplication N times, there will be 2^N "first person experiences" and
> many of them will assign probabilities greatly different from 0.5.
>

That's false, most of them will infer the correct probability...


> There is no "intrinsic probability" in your scenario. This is also Adrian
> Kent's objection to MWI, and it will also nullify any benefit you might
> seek to gain from the "frequency operator" -- every "first person" will get
> a different eigenvalue in the limit of infinite trials..
>
> Bruce
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLT7XucAw9EGuTCtUaGfcQL%3DoFPmXpD6bbVTznaGRThAWw%40mail.gmail.com
> 
> .
>

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Re: Unhappiness with the universe

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 21 janv. 2020 à 08:44, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Tuesday, January 21, 2020 at 12:33:26 AM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le mar. 21 janv. 2020 à 08:29, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, January 21, 2020 at 12:00:22 AM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 1/20/2020 10:09 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *Maybe I can summarize it this way; if it had a beginning, which I will
>>>> label as T = 0, and was finite in spatial extent, including zero spatial
>>>> extent, it has remained finite in spatial extent since all expansion rates
>>>> are finite, and have been going on for finite time. Thus, if it started as
>>>> finite, it must remain finite to avoid a singularity; namely, an infinite
>>>> expansion rate.This is really easy, and shouldn't present a problem. OTOH,
>>>> if it had a beginning and was spatially infinite at that time, it's not
>>>> null at that time, the beginning. *
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But it's simply your prejudice that it can't be null at T<0 and
>>>> infinite at T=0.
>>>>
>>>
>>> *At its beginning it's null. This is my definition, if you will, of what
>>> exists at "the beginning" for our universe, nothing. You can call that a
>>> prejudice but it's much more logical than positing a creation event with
>>> something already in existence, or infinite at T > 0. It seems you're the
>>> one with illogical prejudices. AG *
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Above you explicitly allow that a finite space might come into
>>>> existence at T=0, i.e. one that was null at T<0 and finite at T=0.  You
>>>> wrote, "*if it had a beginning, which I will label as T = 0, and was
>>>> finite in spatial extent". * But that is just as much a discontinuity
>>>> or "singularity" that you consider a logical contradiction, as the coming
>>>> into existence of an infinite space at T=0.
>>>>
>>>
>>> *Yes it is, but I was just allowing the possibility of finite spatial
>>> extent at T = 0, as a way to emphasize the fact that once finite, always
>>> finite. In any event, for consistency and what I believe, it had zero
>>> spatial extent at the time of creation AG *
>>>
>>
>> Then it is a singularity, any finite amount of matter in a zero volume,
>> has infinite density ==> singularity.
>>
>
> *Firstly, there was no matter at T = 0, but you can argue infinite energy
> density. I'm fine with that; no BB. AG *
>

So that's not a singularity... no matter, then matter... arf

>
>> Also zero to finite, or zero to infinite; are both as magical... it's
>> your prejudice not to see it.
>>
>
> *I have no idea why space-time expands, no one does, but if it does, it
> goes from zero volume to increasingly larger finite volumes*
>

You talk as such volume had any meaning before expansion started...
expansion is about space. There was no space, then there was space, if the
matter content was infinite it is still infinite after expansion started,
just matter is now separated with expanding space... and we only see our
small part, because speed of light is limited... that doesn't mean anything
about finite universe... just because we can only see what's causally
connected.

Anyway, you can convolute it the way you like, any starting is a
singularity, weither to explain it you go a level below needing a
substratum in which our universe is created, not answering where this
substratum come from and why that one, doesn't need turtle and elephant
below.

Quentin




> *, unless zero volume was never it's state, in which case you've falsified
> the BB.  Time to publish? Also, it can't go from finite to infinite volumes
> when the expansion rates are finite. Why is this so hard to see? AG *
>
>>
>>> Offenses to your intuition are not necessarily logical contradictions.
>>>>
>>>> Brent
>>>>
>>>> *So the assumption that it's spatially infinite at the beginning when
>>>> it should be null (at the beginning) is a contradiction. (Proof by
>>>> contradiction). AG*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>>> an email to everyth...@googlegroups.co

Re: Unhappiness with the universe

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 21 janv. 2020 à 08:29, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Tuesday, January 21, 2020 at 12:00:22 AM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 1/20/2020 10:09 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>> *Maybe I can summarize it this way; if it had a beginning, which I will
>> label as T = 0, and was finite in spatial extent, including zero spatial
>> extent, it has remained finite in spatial extent since all expansion rates
>> are finite, and have been going on for finite time. Thus, if it started as
>> finite, it must remain finite to avoid a singularity; namely, an infinite
>> expansion rate.This is really easy, and shouldn't present a problem. OTOH,
>> if it had a beginning and was spatially infinite at that time, it's not
>> null at that time, the beginning. *
>>
>>
>> But it's simply your prejudice that it can't be null at T<0 and infinite
>> at T=0.
>>
>
> *At its beginning it's null. This is my definition, if you will, of what
> exists at "the beginning" for our universe, nothing. You can call that a
> prejudice but it's much more logical than positing a creation event with
> something already in existence, or infinite at T > 0. It seems you're the
> one with illogical prejudices. AG *
>
>>
>>
>> Above you explicitly allow that a finite space might come into existence
>> at T=0, i.e. one that was null at T<0 and finite at T=0.  You wrote, "*if
>> it had a beginning, which I will label as T = 0, and was finite in spatial
>> extent". * But that is just as much a discontinuity or "singularity"
>> that you consider a logical contradiction, as the coming into existence of
>> an infinite space at T=0.
>>
>
> *Yes it is, but I was just allowing the possibility of finite spatial
> extent at T = 0, as a way to emphasize the fact that once finite, always
> finite. In any event, for consistency and what I believe, it had zero
> spatial extent at the time of creation AG *
>

Then it is a singularity, any finite amount of matter in a zero volume, has
infinite density ==> singularity.

Also zero to finite, or zero to infinite; are both as magical... it's your
prejudice not to see it.

>
> Offenses to your intuition are not necessarily logical contradictions.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>> *So the assumption that it's spatially infinite at the beginning when it
>> should be null (at the beginning) is a contradiction. (Proof by
>> contradiction). AG*
>>
>>
>> --
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> 
> .
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Unhappiness with the universe

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le lun. 20 janv. 2020 à 23:14, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 2:59:30 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le lun. 20 janv. 2020 à 22:56, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 2:00:36 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 1/20/2020 5:10 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I explained it several times. There's a singularity implied if it had a
>>>> start AND was infinite. If it's infinite, it never had a beginning or
>>>> start. AG
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Why isn't a singularity implied if it had a start and was *finite*?
>>>> That was exactly the standard argument for a supernatural
>>>> beginning...something (finite) from nothing was a violation of nature and
>>>> reason.  You seem to be stuck in Aristotelian philosophy.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It's not something from nothing. Nothing to do with Aristotle. It's
>>> something from the Multiverse!
>>>
>>
>>
>> What multiverse ?
>>
>> If time starts at the big bang what does it means it's from the
>> multiverse... Is the multiverse a singularity ? Why not ?
>>
>
> The Multiverse is the substratum from which it emerged. I'm probably
> applying the theory of eternal inflation here. We don't have any
> information about this entity. It might not even have space and time as one
> of its defining properties, or it might be infinite in space and time. But
> it is distinct from OUR universe, which emerged from it. AG
>

And why must it be a finite part of this supposed substratum and not an
infinite partition of it who is the starting point of OUR universe ? What
is the substratum of the multiverse ? And what is the substratum of that
substratum ? And what ?

>
>> No singularity if finite in spatial extent because an infinity not
>>> implied by an eruption of something small from something arbitrarily large.
>>> Of course, I have no idea why the eruption occurs. AG
>>>
>>> Physicist tend to use mathematics to cover a domain up to the point it
>>>> produces an infinity or infinitesimal and then just look at that as the end
>>>> of applicability...not a point to start drawing inferences from what
>>>> "infinity" implies.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Maybe they need to go to China and study at a "re-education" camp? AG
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Brent
>>>>
>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
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>>> .
>>>
>> --
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Re: Unhappiness with the universe

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le lun. 20 janv. 2020 à 22:56, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 2:00:36 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 1/20/2020 5:10 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>> I explained it several times. There's a singularity implied if it had a
>> start AND was infinite. If it's infinite, it never had a beginning or
>> start. AG
>>
>>
>> Why isn't a singularity implied if it had a start and was *finite*?
>> That was exactly the standard argument for a supernatural
>> beginning...something (finite) from nothing was a violation of nature and
>> reason.  You seem to be stuck in Aristotelian philosophy.
>>
>
>
> It's not something from nothing. Nothing to do with Aristotle. It's
> something from the Multiverse!
>


What multiverse ?

If time starts at the big bang what does it means it's from the
multiverse... Is the multiverse a singularity ? Why not ?

No singularity if finite in spatial extent because an infinity not implied
> by an eruption of something small from something arbitrarily large. Of
> course, I have no idea why the eruption occurs. AG
>
> Physicist tend to use mathematics to cover a domain up to the point it
>> produces an infinity or infinitesimal and then just look at that as the end
>> of applicability...not a point to start drawing inferences from what
>> "infinity" implies.
>>
>
> Maybe they need to go to China and study at a "re-education" camp? AG
>
>>
>> Brent
>>
> --
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> 
> .
>

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Re: Unhappiness with the universe

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le lun. 20 janv. 2020 à 22:45, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 6:25:29 AM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le lun. 20 janv. 2020 à 14:10, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 6:04:38 AM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Le lun. 20 janv. 2020 à 13:49, Alan Grayson  a
>>>> écrit :
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 3:30:19 AM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 3:02:51 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 2:31:42 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 1:17:58 AM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 1:12:45 AM UTC-7, Alan Grayson
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 12:57:55 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 20, 2020 at 5:59 PM Alan Grayson <
>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, January 19, 2020 at 10:50:46 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 20, 2020 at 4:19 PM Alan Grayson <
>>>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Last sentence above: I mean that if it had a "start" with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite spatial extent, that would seem to mean it did NOT have 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite spatial extent just prior to the start. For me this 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> seems like a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> singularity, an infinite physical process which occurs in zero 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time. If I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> were betting, I'd bet on a finite closed universe for any 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> universe which
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "starts", not for the Multiverse. AG*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> You can bet any way you want. I doubt that the universe gives
>>>>>>>>>>>>> a shit.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Bruce
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> *I'd go further and ask one question: it obviously doesn't. Is
>>>>>>>>>>>> this your idea of value-added? What I think it displays is your 
>>>>>>>>>>>> firmly held
>>>>>>>>>>>> belief that it's flat, and anger that someone might think 
>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise. Not
>>>>>>>>>>>> your finest hour. AG *
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Not anger -- just frustration at your intransigence. I don't
>>>>>>>>>>> care what you think, so why should I be angry?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Bruce
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *Correction in CAPS below: *
>>>>>>&

Re: Unhappiness with the universe

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le lun. 20 janv. 2020 à 14:10, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 6:04:38 AM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le lun. 20 janv. 2020 à 13:49, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 3:30:19 AM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 3:02:51 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 2:31:42 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 1:17:58 AM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 1:12:45 AM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 12:57:55 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 20, 2020 at 5:59 PM Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, January 19, 2020 at 10:50:46 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 20, 2020 at 4:19 PM Alan Grayson <
>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> *Last sentence above: I mean that if it had a "start" with
>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite spatial extent, that would seem to mean it did NOT have an
>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite spatial extent just prior to the start. For me this seems 
>>>>>>>>>>>> like a
>>>>>>>>>>>> singularity, an infinite physical process which occurs in zero 
>>>>>>>>>>>> time. If I
>>>>>>>>>>>> were betting, I'd bet on a finite closed universe for any universe 
>>>>>>>>>>>> which
>>>>>>>>>>>> "starts", not for the Multiverse. AG*
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You can bet any way you want. I doubt that the universe gives a
>>>>>>>>>>> shit.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Bruce
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *I'd go further and ask one question: it obviously doesn't. Is
>>>>>>>>>> this your idea of value-added? What I think it displays is your 
>>>>>>>>>> firmly held
>>>>>>>>>> belief that it's flat, and anger that someone might think otherwise. 
>>>>>>>>>> Not
>>>>>>>>>> your finest hour. AG *
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Not anger -- just frustration at your intransigence. I don't care
>>>>>>>>> what you think, so why should I be angry?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Bruce
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Correction in CAPS below: *
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *Annoyance is only slightly removed from anger. Maybe you're being
>>>>>>>> intransigent. As Brent pointed out, many origin theories have a 
>>>>>>>> "beginning"
>>>>>>>> or "start", so before that our universe CAME INTO BEING, IT didn't 
>>>>>>>> exist
>>>>>>>> (not to be confused with the Multiverse, WHICH COULD BE ANYTHING, FLAT,
>>>>>>>> ETERNAL, WHO KNOWS?). But then, magically perhaps, it comes into
>>>>>>>> instantaneous existence having an infinite spatial extent since it's
>>>>>>>> alleged to be flat. For a genius like you, there's nothing to be 
>>>>>>>> explained
>>>>>>>> h

Re: Unhappiness with the universe

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le lun. 20 janv. 2020 à 13:49, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 3:30:19 AM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 3:02:51 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 2:31:42 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:



 On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 1:17:58 AM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 1:12:45 AM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 20, 2020 at 12:57:55 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>> On Mon, Jan 20, 2020 at 5:59 PM Alan Grayson 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Sunday, January 19, 2020 at 10:50:46 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jan 20, 2020 at 4:19 PM Alan Grayson 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> *Last sentence above: I mean that if it had a "start" with
>> infinite spatial extent, that would seem to mean it did NOT have an
>> infinite spatial extent just prior to the start. For me this seems 
>> like a
>> singularity, an infinite physical process which occurs in zero time. 
>> If I
>> were betting, I'd bet on a finite closed universe for any universe 
>> which
>> "starts", not for the Multiverse. AG*
>>
>
> You can bet any way you want. I doubt that the universe gives a
> shit.
>
> Bruce
>

 *I'd go further and ask one question: it obviously doesn't. Is this
 your idea of value-added? What I think it displays is your firmly held
 belief that it's flat, and anger that someone might think otherwise. 
 Not
 your finest hour. AG *

>>>
>>> Not anger -- just frustration at your intransigence. I don't care
>>> what you think, so why should I be angry?
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>
> *Correction in CAPS below: *
>
>>
>> *Annoyance is only slightly removed from anger. Maybe you're being
>> intransigent. As Brent pointed out, many origin theories have a 
>> "beginning"
>> or "start", so before that our universe CAME INTO BEING, IT didn't exist
>> (not to be confused with the Multiverse, WHICH COULD BE ANYTHING, FLAT,
>> ETERNAL, WHO KNOWS?). But then, magically perhaps, it comes into
>> instantaneous existence having an infinite spatial extent since it's
>> alleged to be flat. For a genius like you, there's nothing to be 
>> explained
>> here. AG *
>>
>
 *If you had more intellectual integrity, a characteristic lacking in
 many physicists/hacks today, instead of mockery you might posit a universe
 without a beginning. AG *

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The problem stems from physicists, for the most part, completely mislead
>>> people about the relationship between the mathematical language of theories
>>> of physics and cosmology and physical reality (which we record via lab
>>> instruments and telescopes into collections of data).
>>>
>>> This is explained in Victor Stenger's
>>>
>>>
>>> https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/physicists-are-philosophers-too/
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>> *TY. I'll read it. The likely solution to the problem I've raised is that
>> only an un-created universe, one which never began but always existed (in
>> some form), can be flat. Unfortunately when one argues too persistently,
>> the response is petulance. AG*
>>
>
> *The truth is, for all his brilliance, Bruce is an asshole. So he makes
> his mocking comments, that he doesn't care what I think, as if that's the
> issue. What shit!  What I am established is that flatness is incompatible
> with a universe which had a beginning. So if it's flat, it never had a
> beginning; or else it did, and is closed, hyper-spherical in shape. AG*
>

What prevent it to be infinite since the start ? As I said, it's space that
expand, so going back in time shows *our obsvervable* universe has been
small... that doesn't preclude it (our observable part) to be from a vastly
bigger thing, even an infinite thing, we would still only see our small
part.

Quentin

>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> --
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> 
> .
>


-- 
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Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Unhappiness with the universe

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 14 janv. 2020 à 12:47, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Tuesday, January 14, 2020 at 4:04:27 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Jan 14, 2020 at 9:30 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>> On Tuesday, January 14, 2020 at 3:06:48 AM UTC-7, John Clark wrote:

 On Mon, Jan 13, 2020 at 9:03 PM Alan Grayson 
 wrote:

 >> If infinite distances makes you squeamish I don't see how you can
>> consistently embrace infinite outcomes. And besides this is not
>> mathematics, in physics nothing is provably infinite, nobody has
>> ever found an infinite number of anything.
>>
>
> *> It's not a matter of, or a case of being squeamish with infinite
> outcomes. I just don't see how cosmologists can claim the universe is flat
> -- which means infinite in spatial extent -- if it starts small and 
> expands
> for a finite time.*
>

 Infinity is not a number, infinity is a process that evolves in time.
 If a cosmologists says the universe is infinite he means that a pulse of
 light will keep getting more distant from its starting point and never
 return.

>>>
>>> *That's what I mean! Only it's not true if the universe is spherical.*
>>>
>>
>> It is true for a de Sitter universe as a solution of the Einstein
>> equations. If the universe is spherical, it will eventually recontract, and
>> light cannot get right round and back to its starting point before the
>> universe recontracts to a point. If the universe is expanding via dark
>> energy, even if spherical, light still cannot get round because of the
>> expansion. In other words, you can never see the back of your own head no
>> matter what the geometry of the universe!
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>>>
> *Since it's not a perfect sphere, light never exactly returns to its
> starting point. That's just an approximation for discussion purposes. So
> let it contract. The point is that if the universe starts off small and
> expands at any finite rate for a finite time (aka, the age of the
> universe), it can't be flat, which implies spatially infinite. Sure it's
> nearly flat, but not exactly flat, like a huge sphere. I don't know why
> this is so hard to see. AG*
>

The only thing expansion tells us is that our observable part of the
universe started small... nothing tells us that it was all there is... the
universe could have been infinite, and our observable part is an
infinitesimal portion of it... as of singularity, yes that means our
theories break down, but I seen nothing bad in infinity or even infinitely
dense... all in all, that's the magical part of reality... at one point,
something miraculous happened. That something is reality.

In the end, I can't see more than let there be light at the bottom, it's as
nonsensical as anything else for that. There is no reason, no logic for us
to be here. It just is.

>
>
>> * Let's forget it. These discussions are worthless. AG*
>>>
>> --
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Re: Unhappiness with the universe

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le lun. 13 janv. 2020 à 14:41, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Monday, January 13, 2020 at 6:24:00 AM UTC-7, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Jan 13, 2020 at 8:13 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>> *> the winking out is purely a geometric effect of the expansion.*
>>
>>
>> I have no idea what you mean by that but if something is beyond your
>> observable horizon then nothing you do can have any effect on it and
>> nothing it does can have any effect on you.
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>
> *Suppose you're sitting at the origin of a one-dimension space. A line 100
> meters long will increase 1 meter per unit time if the rate of expansion is
> 1% per unit time. If the line is a 1000 meters long, the end point moves
> away 10 meters per unit time, and so forth. So if the line is long enough,
> the length will eventually increase more than 300,000 km, for any rate of
> expansion per unit time. 300,000 km is the distance light travels in one
> second. Thus, the end point will eventually increase in distance more than
> can be overcome by light traveling at c. This is what I mean by a purely
> geometric effect. Brent showed me this awhile back, and it was an A-HA
> moment!  Winking out of distant galaxies does NOT depend on the rate of
> expansion; only that it continues. AG *
>
> --
>

It is the space that is expanding, so you can have it starting infinite at
the big bang, just everything was nearer and nearer. So if it started
infinitely dense, everything was at one point without any space, then space
emerged, and it was already infinite in spatial extend at that point.

Why are you ok with something starting infinitely dense, and not with
infinite amount of matter, that our observable part doesn't contains an
infinity of matter is normal, but that was an infinitely small part of the
infinitely dense starting point.

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Re: Unhappiness with the universe

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le lun. 13 janv. 2020 à 11:21, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Monday, January 13, 2020 at 3:13:57 AM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le lun. 13 janv. 2020 à 11:10, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 13, 2020 at 2:54:48 AM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Le lun. 13 janv. 2020 à 10:50, Alan Grayson  a
>>>> écrit :
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Monday, January 13, 2020 at 2:38:57 AM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Le lun. 13 janv. 2020 à 10:28, Alan Grayson  a
>>>>>> écrit :
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Monday, January 13, 2020 at 1:33:01 AM UTC-7, stathisp wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Mon, 13 Jan 2020 at 13:48, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, January 12, 2020 at 8:58:06 AM UTC-7, John Clark wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Jan 2, 2020 at 2:30 AM Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> *> If we're convinced it's finite in age, then it can't be
>>>>>>>>>>> infinite in spatial extent. AG *
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> We don't know for sure our universe is infinite in size and we'll
>>>>>>>>>> never know for sure because we'll never be able to measure precisely 
>>>>>>>>>> zero
>>>>>>>>>> curvature with no error at all, but we do know it's pretty damn 
>>>>>>>>>> flat, if
>>>>>>>>>> it's curved it's so slight that a light beam would have to go at 
>>>>>>>>>> least 500
>>>>>>>>>> times as far as our telescopes can see for it to return where it 
>>>>>>>>>> started.
>>>>>>>>>> So if you respect the empirical evidence for the Big Bang but the 
>>>>>>>>>> idea of a
>>>>>>>>>> beginning of a infinitely sized universe makes you unhappy then the
>>>>>>>>>> Multiverse idea offers you an obvious solution, you get an 
>>>>>>>>>> infinitely large
>>>>>>>>>> infinitely old Multiverse but with the observable universe having a
>>>>>>>>>> beginning and being only finitely large. However I understand the
>>>>>>>>>> Multiverse makes you unhappy too. I fear you may be destined to be 
>>>>>>>>>> unhappy.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> By the way ... does the inverse also make you unhappy, something
>>>>>>>>>> infinitely old but finite in spatial extent?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> John K Clark
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *All the models pictorially represented, have the Universe
>>>>>>>>> beginning very small, and inflation is claimed to increase its size 
>>>>>>>>> from,
>>>>>>>>> say, much smaller than a proton, to about the size of the Earth or 
>>>>>>>>> Solar
>>>>>>>>> System in a few Planck intervals. If it begins small, or if you run 
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> clock backward it becomes progressively smaller, how could it have 
>>>>>>>>> started
>>>>>>>>> with infinite spatial extent? Don't you see something wrong with the
>>>>>>>>> model?  AG*
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The model says that a subset of the universe starts small and gets
>>>>>>>> bigger. This is not inconsistent with th

Re: Unhappiness with the universe

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le lun. 13 janv. 2020 à 11:10, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Monday, January 13, 2020 at 2:54:48 AM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le lun. 13 janv. 2020 à 10:50, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 13, 2020 at 2:38:57 AM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Le lun. 13 janv. 2020 à 10:28, Alan Grayson  a
>>>> écrit :
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Monday, January 13, 2020 at 1:33:01 AM UTC-7, stathisp wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Mon, 13 Jan 2020 at 13:48, Alan Grayson 
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Sunday, January 12, 2020 at 8:58:06 AM UTC-7, John Clark wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Thu, Jan 2, 2020 at 2:30 AM Alan Grayson 
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *> If we're convinced it's finite in age, then it can't be
>>>>>>>>> infinite in spatial extent. AG *
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We don't know for sure our universe is infinite in size and we'll
>>>>>>>> never know for sure because we'll never be able to measure precisely 
>>>>>>>> zero
>>>>>>>> curvature with no error at all, but we do know it's pretty damn flat, 
>>>>>>>> if
>>>>>>>> it's curved it's so slight that a light beam would have to go at least 
>>>>>>>> 500
>>>>>>>> times as far as our telescopes can see for it to return where it 
>>>>>>>> started.
>>>>>>>> So if you respect the empirical evidence for the Big Bang but the idea 
>>>>>>>> of a
>>>>>>>> beginning of a infinitely sized universe makes you unhappy then the
>>>>>>>> Multiverse idea offers you an obvious solution, you get an infinitely 
>>>>>>>> large
>>>>>>>> infinitely old Multiverse but with the observable universe having a
>>>>>>>> beginning and being only finitely large. However I understand the
>>>>>>>> Multiverse makes you unhappy too. I fear you may be destined to be 
>>>>>>>> unhappy.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> By the way ... does the inverse also make you unhappy, something
>>>>>>>> infinitely old but finite in spatial extent?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> John K Clark
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *All the models pictorially represented, have the Universe beginning
>>>>>>> very small, and inflation is claimed to increase its size from, say, 
>>>>>>> much
>>>>>>> smaller than a proton, to about the size of the Earth or Solar System 
>>>>>>> in a
>>>>>>> few Planck intervals. If it begins small, or if you run the clock 
>>>>>>> backward
>>>>>>> it becomes progressively smaller, how could it have started with 
>>>>>>> infinite
>>>>>>> spatial extent? Don't you see something wrong with the model?  AG*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The model says that a subset of the universe starts small and gets
>>>>>> bigger. This is not inconsistent with the whole universe starting and
>>>>>> remaining infinite in spatial extent.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *I thought I made that clear; what I am calling "the universe" is
>>>>> precisely the SUBSET you refer to, which starts small and gets bigger. It
>>>>> is THAT SUBSET which cosmologists claim has infinite spatial extent, based
>>>>> on measurements. What you're calling "the whole universe" includes the
>>>>> underlying entity on which the BB started, and on which measurements 
>>>>> CANNOT
>>>>> be made. It could be infinite in spatial extent, or is possibly an entity
>>>&

Re: Unhappiness with the universe

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le lun. 13 janv. 2020 à 10:50, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Monday, January 13, 2020 at 2:38:57 AM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le lun. 13 janv. 2020 à 10:28, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 13, 2020 at 1:33:01 AM UTC-7, stathisp wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, 13 Jan 2020 at 13:48, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sunday, January 12, 2020 at 8:58:06 AM UTC-7, John Clark wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, Jan 2, 2020 at 2:30 AM Alan Grayson 
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *> If we're convinced it's finite in age, then it can't be infinite
>>>>>>> in spatial extent. AG *
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We don't know for sure our universe is infinite in size and we'll
>>>>>> never know for sure because we'll never be able to measure precisely zero
>>>>>> curvature with no error at all, but we do know it's pretty damn flat, if
>>>>>> it's curved it's so slight that a light beam would have to go at least 
>>>>>> 500
>>>>>> times as far as our telescopes can see for it to return where it started.
>>>>>> So if you respect the empirical evidence for the Big Bang but the idea 
>>>>>> of a
>>>>>> beginning of a infinitely sized universe makes you unhappy then the
>>>>>> Multiverse idea offers you an obvious solution, you get an infinitely 
>>>>>> large
>>>>>> infinitely old Multiverse but with the observable universe having a
>>>>>> beginning and being only finitely large. However I understand the
>>>>>> Multiverse makes you unhappy too. I fear you may be destined to be 
>>>>>> unhappy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> By the way ... does the inverse also make you unhappy, something
>>>>>> infinitely old but finite in spatial extent?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> John K Clark
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *All the models pictorially represented, have the Universe beginning
>>>>> very small, and inflation is claimed to increase its size from, say, much
>>>>> smaller than a proton, to about the size of the Earth or Solar System in a
>>>>> few Planck intervals. If it begins small, or if you run the clock backward
>>>>> it becomes progressively smaller, how could it have started with infinite
>>>>> spatial extent? Don't you see something wrong with the model?  AG*
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The model says that a subset of the universe starts small and gets
>>>> bigger. This is not inconsistent with the whole universe starting and
>>>> remaining infinite in spatial extent.
>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>
>>>
>>> *I thought I made that clear; what I am calling "the universe" is
>>> precisely the SUBSET you refer to, which starts small and gets bigger. It
>>> is THAT SUBSET which cosmologists claim has infinite spatial extent, based
>>> on measurements. What you're calling "the whole universe" includes the
>>> underlying entity on which the BB started, and on which measurements CANNOT
>>> be made. It could be infinite in spatial extent, or is possibly an entity
>>> for which the concept of spatial extent might not exist. AG*
>>>
>>
And so what do you see not contradictory in the existence of the universe
itself ? Either it has always been, or not, and if not, that makes no
sense. I see nothing contradictory to have something infinite, so it could
always has  been infinite in content, seeing it as zero volume is a mistake
because that presuppose  a volume in another space. What I'm saying is that
there was infinite content (and still is) but all metrics (space) was of
zero extends, and inflation extended the "space" not the content.

Anyway, in the end, there can't be an explanation which make sense. The
fact we're here in the first place being able to ask question is magical.

Quentin

>
>> As the bigbang is a singularity at the start... what prevents it to
>> contain an infinite content in a zero/small volume, after all it's a
>> singularity and we know only things after the big bang started ? and after
>> inflation (which I understand is onl

Re: Unhappiness with the universe

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le lun. 13 janv. 2020 à 10:28, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Monday, January 13, 2020 at 1:33:01 AM UTC-7, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, 13 Jan 2020 at 13:48, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, January 12, 2020 at 8:58:06 AM UTC-7, John Clark wrote:

 On Thu, Jan 2, 2020 at 2:30 AM Alan Grayson 
 wrote:


> *> If we're convinced it's finite in age, then it can't be infinite in
> spatial extent. AG *


 We don't know for sure our universe is infinite in size and we'll never
 know for sure because we'll never be able to measure precisely zero
 curvature with no error at all, but we do know it's pretty damn flat, if
 it's curved it's so slight that a light beam would have to go at least 500
 times as far as our telescopes can see for it to return where it started.
 So if you respect the empirical evidence for the Big Bang but the idea of a
 beginning of a infinitely sized universe makes you unhappy then the
 Multiverse idea offers you an obvious solution, you get an infinitely large
 infinitely old Multiverse but with the observable universe having a
 beginning and being only finitely large. However I understand the
 Multiverse makes you unhappy too. I fear you may be destined to be unhappy.

 By the way ... does the inverse also make you unhappy, something
 infinitely old but finite in spatial extent?

 John K Clark

>>>
>>> *All the models pictorially represented, have the Universe beginning
>>> very small, and inflation is claimed to increase its size from, say, much
>>> smaller than a proton, to about the size of the Earth or Solar System in a
>>> few Planck intervals. If it begins small, or if you run the clock backward
>>> it becomes progressively smaller, how could it have started with infinite
>>> spatial extent? Don't you see something wrong with the model?  AG*
>>>
>>
>> The model says that a subset of the universe starts small and gets
>> bigger. This is not inconsistent with the whole universe starting and
>> remaining infinite in spatial extent.
>>
>>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> *I thought I made that clear; what I am calling "the universe" is
> precisely the SUBSET you refer to, which starts small and gets bigger. It
> is THAT SUBSET which cosmologists claim has infinite spatial extent, based
> on measurements. What you're calling "the whole universe" includes the
> underlying entity on which the BB started, and on which measurements CANNOT
> be made. It could be infinite in spatial extent, or is possibly an entity
> for which the concept of spatial extent might not exist. AG*
>

As the bigbang is a singularity at the start... what prevents it to contain
an infinite content in a zero/small volume, after all it's a singularity
and we know only things after the big bang started ? and after inflation
(which I understand is only space metric which inflate), there is still an
infinite content.

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> .
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 17 déc. 2019 à 21:00, John Clark  a écrit :

> On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 12:23 PM Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>
>  >> I can accept the fact that you are going to be duplicated but that
>>> will not change your expectations. And perhaps your expectation is to see
>>> Santa Claus's workshop but I really don't care. I don't care about what you
>>> expect to happen, I'm interested it what actually turned out to have
>>> happened.
>>>
>>
>> *> But as I see it, I must be superhuman to be able to do what you can't.
>> *
>>
>
> Yes, and the superhuman ability that you have and I lack is the ability
> not to be bothered by logical self contradictions, such as demanding to
> know what one and only one thing will happen to one thing after one thing
> becomes two things.
>

No, that's only the strawman you've invented...

Dodging Clark is in the house...

>
> John K Clark
>
>
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> .
>

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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 17 déc. 2019 à 17:49, John Clark  a écrit :

>
> On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 11:32 AM Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>
> >  *i'm as able to talk about my future expectations as I am now,
>> duplication or not change absolutely nothing about that,*
>
>
> OK I have no problem with that, I can accept the fact that you are going
> to be duplicated but that will not change your expectations. And perhaps
> your expectation is to see Santa Claus's workshop but I really don't care.
> I don't care about what you expect to happen, I'm interested it what
> actually turned out to have happened.
>
> But as I see it, I must be superhuman to be able to do what you can't. So
with my superhuman ability, I see four possible outcomes:
A. I'll vanish from existence
B. I'll see washington or I'll see moscow, still feeling to be in one and
only one place after pushing the button (even if I'll know intellectually
I'll have a doppelganger with the same feeling but in the other city)
C. I'll see washington and moscow feeling to be in both place at once
D. Obiwan Kenobi

Je vais choisir D Jean-Pierre.

Quentin

>  John K Clark
>
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> .
>


-- 
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Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 17 déc. 2019 à 17:18, John Clark  a écrit :

> On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 7:47 AM Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>
> > *John Clark is not human and* [...]
>>
>
> I think your obvious rage and frustration comes from the fact that you are
> unable to coherently express your views no matter how fast you wave your
> arms around.
>
>
>> *> he is unable to ask expectation questions about the next moment of his
>> own live without proper pronouns...*
>>
>
> In my everyday life I have no problem with using personal pronouns, I use
> them all the time, but in my everyday life I do not have access to one of
> Bruno's Personal Pronoun Duplicating Machines and most of the time I am not
> contemplating the nature of personal identity.
>

So ad I said, you're not conscious... Me in front of a duplicating button
or a send email button, i'm as able to talk about my future expectations as
I am now, duplication or not change absolutely nothing about that, neither
pronouns.


> John K Clark
>
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> .
>

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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 17 déc. 2019 à 12:55, John Clark  a écrit :

> On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 10:35 PM 'Brent Meeker'  <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>
>> *> Expecting what you will experience after pushing the button must refer
>> to thoughts before the button is pushed, so "you" must refer to the
>> Helsinki man. *
>
>
> OK, but the very definition of "The Helsinki Man" is the man who is
> experiencing Helsinki right now today. Or at least that's the definition on
> Mondays Wednesdays and Fridays, but on other days of the week the
> definition is the man who REMEMBERS experiencing Helsinki today, and on
> those days the Helsinki Man would be a fool to expect that the Helsinki Man
> would experience one and only one thing tomorrow.
>
>
>> * > And the answer is not "Nothing" because the Helsinki man exists
>> before the button is pushed. "Expecting" is having a thought about the
>> future. *
>>
>
> Right, and John Clark expects that tomorrow nobody will be experiencing
> Helsinki today. It may seem like John Clark is being overly pedantic but
> Brent Meeker needs to be that way too if the conversation is about the
> nature of personal identity and personal identity duplicating machines are
> involved.
>
> But all this confusion could be totally avoided if people on this list
> would simply STOP USING PERSONAL PRONOUNS and replace them with their
> proper noun referent; they don't need to do this all the time, only when
> personal pronoun duplicating machines are thrown into the hypothetical mix.
> The very fact that nobody, absolutely positively nobody on this list except
> for John Clark is able to stop themselves from continuing to use them is
> clear indication to John Clark that they cannot because personal pronouns
> are being used to cover up multiple holes in the logical structure of their
> argument.
>
> John K Clark
>

John Clark is not human and not conscious, as he is unable to ask
expectation questions about the next moment of his own live without proper
pronouns...  Personnally I can, I have my little voice in my head, and It's
thinking it will hit send button in the next few seconds... maybe I'll be
duplicated in the process... still I expect to see this computer screen
after hitting send.. who knows, I'll be wrong, maybe I'll see the giant
spaghetti or vanish from existence.

Quentin

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> 
> .
>


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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 17 déc. 2019 à 04:54, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 2:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> On 12/16/2019 6:31 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 5:29 PM Quentin Anciaux 
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> *> You're so absurd after so many years... Just put your shoes in the
>>> experiment,*
>>>
>>
>> Who's shoes should I put my feet into, the H Man's the W Man's, or the M
>> Man's?
>>
>> > *imagine you in front of the button, *
>>>
>>
>> OK
>>
>>
>>> > *what do you expect after pushing it.. *
>>>
>>
>> If "you" means the W Man I expect to be experiencing W.
>>
>>
>> Expecting what you will experience after pushing the button must refer to
>> thoughts before the button is pushed, so "you" must refer to the Helsinki
>> man.  And the answer is not "Nothing" because the Helsinki man exists
>> before the button is pushed.  "Expecting" is having a thought about the
>> future.  So the question is clear enough.
>>
>
> But Quentin did say "expect AFTER pushing it". Not BEFORE pushing it. So
> after pushing the button, H-man is duplicated to both W and M: So the W
> copy expects Washington, and the M copy expects Moscow.
>

No I mean is in front of the button ready to be pushing it, what does he
expect will happen, what does he expect he will see the next moment after
pushingit, the question is asked by the Helsinki man to himself... Wilk he
vanish from existence ? Will he see m or w ? Will he see m and w ? The
question is clear, has been for more than twenty years now, only bad faith
has make it go through 2019 again... And will through 2029.

>
> Bruce
>
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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le lun. 16 déc. 2019 à 23:22, John Clark  a écrit :

>
>
> On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 10:16 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> >> Yes indeed, Mr.He knows who he is, Mr.He knows he is the man who saw W
>>> and also knows that the man who sees W is the W man, and both those things
>>> could be predicted long ago back in H.
>>
>>
>> *> But in H, it was still impossible to predict any of the two outcomes.*
>>
>
> Please explain exactly what those two outcomes turned out to be and please
> do not use personal pronouns when doing so, instead use the referent those
> personal pronouns would have had. And if the term "first person
> perspective" is mentioned please make it clear who's first person
> perspective is being referred to.
>
>  John K Clark
>

You're so absurd after so many years... Just put your shoes in the
experiment, imagine you in front of the button, what do you expect after
pushing it...

But I know it's a waste of time, dodging Clark's coming.

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> .
>

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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le jeu. 28 nov. 2019 à 15:50, John Clark  a écrit :

>
> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 8:14 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> >> Then what one and only one city do "you" personally feel to be in?
>>
>>
>
> > *In the third person view on the first person view, you can say *[...]
>>
>
> What about the first person view of the third person view of the first
> person view? And what about the third person view of the first person
> view of the third person view of the first person view? And what about
>
> >> If you can not clearly answer that question,
>>
>>
>> *> The clear answer is the prediction I have made in Helsinki: with
>> certainty, I will * [...]
>>
>
> By casually throwing in the personal pronoun "I" in a thought experiment
> that contains a "I" duplicating machine you have already demonstrated you
> are unable to clearly answer the question.
>
> > [...]* feel to be in only one city, but I cannot predict which one
>> among Washington and Moscow.*
>>
>
> *Forget prediction!!* Even *AFTER* the experiment is long over you *STILL*
> can not answer the question "what city did you turn out to see?"
>

Wait... what ? Sure you can, if you are the one who ended up in moscow...
you answer moscow and write it in the diary... if you're the one who end up
in washington, you answer washington. Easy.


> and the reason you can't answer it is because it contains the personal
> pronoun "you"; and if personal pronoun duplicating machines are involved
> that means it is not a question at all, it's just gibberish with a question
> mark at the end.
>
> If you can't even clearly say what happened yesterday then you can't have
> had been expected to make a clear prediction on the day before yesterday
> about what would happen the next day.
>
>  John K Clark
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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> 
> .
>


-- 
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Re: Sean Carroll's Google talk about his book

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le jeu. 10 oct. 2019 à 11:30, Philip Thrift  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Thursday, October 10, 2019 at 2:40:53 AM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le jeu. 10 oct. 2019 à 09:34, Philip Thrift  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, October 9, 2019 at 3:59:50 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Oct 9, 2019 at 4:55 PM Philip Thrift 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> *> Other interpretations (but not MWI, as far as I can see) are used in
>>>>> writing programs for computational QM.*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Like what?
>>>>
>>>> John K Clark
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Multiple Histories.
>>>
>>
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple_histories  ?
>>
>> So there are multiple "worlds", if multiple past histories are real
>> so as you dislike MWI, what's different here for you to accept multiple
>> past ? (because if each event has multiple *real* past then likewise it has
>> multiple *real* future).
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>> --
>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
>> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
>>
>
>
>
> That's one way to look at it.
>
> In Fay Dowker's debate with a Many Worlder:
>
> via https://www.imperial.ac.uk/people/f.dowker
>
> In this public debate <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HeuI_Oja-P4> I
> argue that the path integral (or sum over histories) approach to quantum
> mechanics provides a One World interpretation
>

I didn't have time to look at it for now (I will), but could you resume her
position and explain how considering an event has *multiple* *real* past
histories provides a *one* world interpretation ?

Thanks;


>
>
> Bottom line: multiple histories are cheaper than many worlds.
>
>
> @philipthrift
>
> --
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> .
>


-- 
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Re: Sean Carroll's Google talk about his book

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le jeu. 10 oct. 2019 à 09:34, Philip Thrift  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, October 9, 2019 at 3:59:50 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Oct 9, 2019 at 4:55 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>> *> Other interpretations (but not MWI, as far as I can see) are used in
>>> writing programs for computational QM.*
>>
>>
>> Like what?
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>>
>>
> Multiple Histories.
>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple_histories  ?

So there are multiple "worlds", if multiple past histories are real so
as you dislike MWI, what's different here for you to accept multiple past ?
(because if each event has multiple *real* past then likewise it has
multiple *real* future).

Quentin

>
> @philipthrift
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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> 
> .
>


-- 
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Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Sean Carroll's new book

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le ven. 27 sept. 2019 à 08:41, Philip Thrift  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Thursday, September 26, 2019 at 7:01:19 PM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell
> wrote:
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 25, 2019 at 6:54:59 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> It seems that nearly everyone on the list has a strong opinion
>>> about Sean Carroll's new book, but has anyone other than me actually read
>>> it?
>>>
>>> John K Clark
>>>
>>
>> I have not read his book, but I have read his papers and the one he
>> coauthored with Sebbens. I know what he has done. I am definitely agnostic
>> about MWI as I am with all interpretations. Carroll and Sebens has though
>> opened the door to a relationship between the Born rule and MWI, and I
>> suspect quantum interpretations in general. Now that is something I find
>> potentially very interesting.
>>
>> LC
>>
>
>
>
> See if Sean Carroll answers the question of "weighing" worlds:
>
> *How much is too Many Worlds, is it just right?*
> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/E3WLUdnW8jI/MLPg3dAhAgAJ
>
>
> Suppose world W branches (in reality, not in "bookkeeping") to worlds W0
> and W1.
>
> If reality is pure information (basically purely mathematical bits of 0s
> and 1s), then that sort of "production" seems OK.
>
> But what if W is (or contains) matter. Based on matter contents of W, W0,
> and W1:
>
> *If the matter contents of W0 plus W1 combined is greater than the matter
> content of W, **how was the extra matter "produced"?*
>
>
> Two answers so far:
>
> 1. *If an infinity of indiscernible universes already exist at the start
> and are only differentiating/diverging (instead of splitting), then no
> matter is created, all of it was already there.*
>
> 2. *Differentiation rather that duplication of matter is one possibility,
> but duplication of matter is not logically impossible either. Empirically,
> we have that matter cannot be created, but that is within a single world.*
>
>
And you forgot 3- it's always the same matter in w0 and w1, just seen from
another POV, like a circle in a 2d plane could be thought to be from a
sphere or a cylinder intersecting a 2d plane, so if you see the many 2d
planes intersecting the cylinder, they see each a part of it, no new circle
are created on each plane.

Quentin


> @philipthrift
>
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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> 
> .
>


-- 
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Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Sean Carroll: Universe a 'tiny sliver' of all there is

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le jeu. 26 sept. 2019 à 14:39, Stathis Papaioannou  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Thu, 26 Sep 2019 at 11:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 26, 2019 at 4:30:01 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, 26 Sep 2019 at 09:41, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>


 On Wednesday, September 25, 2019 at 7:32:39 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9/25/2019 8:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Sep 2019, at 17:44, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, September 24, 2019 at 6:23:10 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Sep 2019, at 10:22, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, September 24, 2019 at 3:05:39 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, September 24, 2019 at 1:36:42 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift
>>> wrote:



 On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 8:44:39 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9/23/2019 6:24 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 3:44:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 9/23/2019 11:59 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>> *But other quantum experts use decoherence to explain quantum
>> phenomena without invoking multiple universes.*
>>
>>
>> "Without invoking" doesn't mean "denying".
>>
>
> It does if you believe in applying Occam's Razor. AG
>
>
> True.  But I'm still waiting for pt to quote this expert saying he
> explains quantum phenomena without MW.  He keeps implying it's Zurek, 
> but I
> just read Zurek's paper on quantum Darwinism again and ISTM Zurek is
> assuming MWI throughout.  QD is just his solution to the basis 
> problem.
>
> Brent
>
>
>


 Zurek is not on a book tour, nor does he tweet, but after the
 rollout of Carroll's book, one can only conclude:

 *  Many Worlds is religion, not science.*

 @philipthrift

>>>
>>>  Right. You'll notice how my comment that the MWI is tantamount to
>>> "hubris on steroids" was never responded to. Hopefully, he'll be denied
>>> tenure, and his book and personage can go into the dustbin of history,
>>> where it belongs. AG
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I can't believe (well, I guess I can believe) the number of physicist
>> who think MWI is a valuable contribution to science.  If you tell them
>> otherwise they they you that you don't understand physics. Many Worlds is
>> "in the math" (as Sean Carroll claims) so it must be true.
>>
>> They engage in magical thinking, but think they are doing science.
>> Amazing.
>>
>>
>> The many-histories is a logical consequence of the theory. To assume
>> a theory without accepting its consequence is just wrong, or irrational.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> Which specific theory formulation are you talking about?
>
>
> Any formulation without physical wave reduction. Everett’s one, for
> example. With our without the Born rules (the fact that they are derivable
> or not is not much relevant, as you know I do think that Gleason theorem
> makes them derivable, but that is not relevant here).
>
>
>
>
> There's *quantum measure theory*:
>
> Axioms in section 2: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1002.0589.pdf
>
>
> That is a very interesting paper.
>
>
>
> But I don't see where Many Worlds as Carroll presents them are
> necessarily implied by these axioms.
>
>
> They are implied by the SWE, or Dirac. May be the best argument is
> that the founder have invented the notion of collapse because that is the
> only way to avoid them.
>
> QM predict that I f I put cat in the state dead + alive, and if I look
> at the cat living/dead state, I will put myself in the state
> seeing-the-cat-dead + seeing the cat-alive, and without a wave reduction
> postulate, no branche of that superposition can be made more real or less
> real than the other.
>
> I don’t need quantum mechanics to bet on many-world: like Deutsch I
> consider that the two slit experiment is enough.
>
>
> I think the alternative is something suggested by Zurek.  He shows
> that decoherence plus einselection will make the reduced density matrix
> strictly diagonal, i.e. he solves the preferred basis and derivation of 
> the
> Born rule.  Then he suggests, but doesn't really argue, that the universe
> cannot have enough information to realize all the non-zero states on the
> diagonal and so only a few can be realized and that realization is per the

Re: Sean Carroll: Universe a 'tiny sliver' of all there is

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le jeu. 26 sept. 2019 à 09:41, Philip Thrift  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, September 25, 2019 at 7:32:39 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 9/25/2019 8:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Sep 2019, at 17:44, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, September 24, 2019 at 6:23:10 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 24 Sep 2019, at 10:22, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, September 24, 2019 at 3:05:39 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:



 On Tuesday, September 24, 2019 at 1:36:42 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 8:44:39 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 9/23/2019 6:24 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 3:44:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 9/23/2019 11:59 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>> *But other quantum experts use decoherence to explain quantum
>>> phenomena without invoking multiple universes.*
>>>
>>>
>>> "Without invoking" doesn't mean "denying".
>>>
>>
>> It does if you believe in applying Occam's Razor. AG
>>
>>
>> True.  But I'm still waiting for pt to quote this expert saying he
>> explains quantum phenomena without MW.  He keeps implying it's Zurek, 
>> but I
>> just read Zurek's paper on quantum Darwinism again and ISTM Zurek is
>> assuming MWI throughout.  QD is just his solution to the basis problem.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> Zurek is not on a book tour, nor does he tweet, but after the rollout
> of Carroll's book, one can only conclude:
>
> *  Many Worlds is religion, not science.*
>
> @philipthrift
>

  Right. You'll notice how my comment that the MWI is tantamount to
 "hubris on steroids" was never responded to. Hopefully, he'll be denied
 tenure, and his book and personage can go into the dustbin of history,
 where it belongs. AG

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I can't believe (well, I guess I can believe) the number of physicist
>>> who think MWI is a valuable contribution to science.  If you tell them
>>> otherwise they they you that you don't understand physics. Many Worlds is
>>> "in the math" (as Sean Carroll claims) so it must be true.
>>>
>>> They engage in magical thinking, but think they are doing science.
>>> Amazing.
>>>
>>>
>>> The many-histories is a logical consequence of the theory. To assume a
>>> theory without accepting its consequence is just wrong, or irrational.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> Which specific theory formulation are you talking about?
>>
>>
>> Any formulation without physical wave reduction. Everett’s one, for
>> example. With our without the Born rules (the fact that they are derivable
>> or not is not much relevant, as you know I do think that Gleason theorem
>> makes them derivable, but that is not relevant here).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> There's *quantum measure theory*:
>>
>> Axioms in section 2: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1002.0589.pdf
>>
>>
>> That is a very interesting paper.
>>
>>
>>
>> But I don't see where Many Worlds as Carroll presents them are
>> necessarily implied by these axioms.
>>
>>
>> They are implied by the SWE, or Dirac. May be the best argument is that
>> the founder have invented the notion of collapse because that is the only
>> way to avoid them.
>>
>> QM predict that I f I put cat in the state dead + alive, and if I look at
>> the cat living/dead state, I will put myself in the state
>> seeing-the-cat-dead + seeing the cat-alive, and without a wave reduction
>> postulate, no branche of that superposition can be made more real or less
>> real than the other.
>>
>> I don’t need quantum mechanics to bet on many-world: like Deutsch I
>> consider that the two slit experiment is enough.
>>
>>
>> I think the alternative is something suggested by Zurek.  He shows that
>> decoherence plus einselection will make the reduced density matrix strictly
>> diagonal, i.e. he solves the preferred basis and derivation of the Born
>> rule.  Then he suggests, but doesn't really argue, that the universe cannot
>> have enough information to realize all the non-zero states on the diagonal
>> and so only a few can be realized and that realization is per the Born
>> rule.  This is what Carroll would dismiss as a "disappearing world
>> interpretation"; but it would provide a physical principle for why worlds
>> disappear, i.e. branches of lowest probability are continually pruned.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
> I have one question (for Carroll or Zurek):
>
> Suppose world W branches *(in reality, not in "bookkeeping")* to worlds
> W0 and W1.
>
> If reality is pure information (basically purely mathematical bits of 0s
> and 1s), then that sort of "production" seems OK.
>
> But what if W is (or contains) matter. Based on matter contents of W, W0,
> and W1:
>
> *If the matter contents of W0 plus W1 combined is greater than the matter

Re: Many Worlds morality

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 25 sept. 2019 à 14:52, Philip Thrift  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, September 25, 2019 at 6:01:24 AM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le mer. 25 sept. 2019 à 12:57, Philip Thrift  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, September 25, 2019 at 5:51:59 AM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux
>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  saying ontology metaphysics is bullshit
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I said ontologies *without applications* is BS.
>>>
>>>
>> There are no applications to ontology...
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
> Ontologies (making them for applications) are everywhere in computer
> science:
>
>
> Ontology Development 101: A Guide to Creating Your First Ontology
>
>
> https://protege.stanford.edu/publications/ontology_development/ontology101-noy-mcguinness.html
>
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mereotopology#Applications
>

Well it's not "ontology" per se which deals with the nature of the real..
and that (ontology/metaphysics) has no purpose other than an intetellectual
one...  Maybe pursuing an ontology can bring new ideas that can lead to new
discoveiesy which could have applications, other than that, ontology has no
applications (and if you want to redefine the term as in your links, why
not, but that doesn't change the purpose of this list which for you is
talking about BS, yet still you want to participate... and call others name
and what not, denying your own religious bias).

Quentin

>
>
>
>  @philipthrift
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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> .
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Many Worlds morality

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 25 sept. 2019 à 12:57, Philip Thrift  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, September 25, 2019 at 5:51:59 AM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>  saying ontology metaphysics is bullshit
>>
>
>
>
> I said ontologies *without applications* is BS.
>
>
There are no applications to ontology...


> As I noted: You don't read.
>
> @philipthrift
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/06f328f7-1214-4d30-b7a5-babbce44f423%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email_source=footer>
> .
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Many Worlds morality

[Quentin Anciaux]

And more insults...

You're first calling others religious, saying ontology metaphysics is
bullshit on a list just about that, then more insults... well I'm sorry for
you.

Le mer. 25 sept. 2019 à 12:06, Philip Thrift  a
écrit :

>
>
> Sorry, I didn't realize you were the Group Nazi.
>
> @philipthrift
>
> On Wednesday, September 25, 2019 at 3:26:01 AM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux
> wrote:
>>
>> http://www.weidai.com/everything.html
>>
>> Le mer. 25 sept. 2019 à 10:24, Quentin Anciaux  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Le mer. 25 sept. 2019 à 10:21, Philip Thrift  a
>>> écrit :
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wednesday, September 25, 2019 at 3:00:52 AM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Le mer. 25 sept. 2019 à 09:55, Philip Thrift  a
>>>>> écrit :
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wednesday, September 25, 2019 at 1:25:58 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, 25 Sep 2019 at 08:16, Philip Thrift 
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Many Worlds leads Sean Carroll to speculate about the morality of
>>>>>>>> duplicated selves when they bach off into other worlds.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Sean Carroll
>>>>>>>> @seanmcarroll
>>>>>>>> https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1176617631408775168
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *Congressional votes do not *cause* the wave function to branch,
>>>>>>>> but unlikely quantum events can bring into existence branches where
>>>>>>>> classically unlikely outcomes have occurred. A nucleus might decay in 
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> right Representative's brain at just the right time, etc.*
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> He asks:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "If You Existed in Multiple Universes, How Would You Act In This
>>>>>>>> One?"
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> https://lithub.com/if-you-existed-in-multiple-universes-how-would-you-act-in-this-one/
>>>>>>>> (From Something Deeply Hidden: Quantum Worlds and the Emergence of
>>>>>>>> Spacetime by Sean Carroll)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But he gives away the game here:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "To each individual on some branch of the wave function, life goes
>>>>>>>> on just as if they lived in a single world with truly stochastic 
>>>>>>>> quantum
>>>>>>>> events."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Maybe there's a Sean Carroll branch that loves stochasticity.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Many Worlds (a religion, or quasi-religion, but not science) is
>>>>>>>> fundamentally an anti-probabilities superstition. And anti-materialist 
>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>> well. Those who think we are pure information - platotonist bits - 
>>>>>>>> have no
>>>>>>>> problem with the idea of multiple copies of things here and now being 
>>>>>>>> made,
>>>>>>>> because there is no new material needed.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (The religious aspect of Many Worlds has been made apparent with
>>>>>>>> the promotion - Carroll's own tweets, for example - of the book.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Pro-deterministic is not anti-probability. Also, pro-materialistic
>>>>>>> is no less “religious” than anti-materialistic, since there is no way to
>>>>>>> know that a true material world does or does not exist. When it comes to
>>>>>>> deciding which interpretation of reality to prefer, one can either use
>>>>>>> aesthetic considerations (Occam’s razor) or refuse to engage in 
>>>>>>> discussion.
>>>>>>>
>>

Re: Many Worlds morality

[Quentin Anciaux]

Well now the insults... Okay.

Le mer. 25 sept. 2019 à 11:49, Philip Thrift  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, September 25, 2019 at 3:24:18 AM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le mer. 25 sept. 2019 à 10:21, Philip Thrift  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, September 25, 2019 at 3:00:52 AM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux
>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Le mer. 25 sept. 2019 à 09:55, Philip Thrift  a
>>>> écrit :
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wednesday, September 25, 2019 at 1:25:58 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, 25 Sep 2019 at 08:16, Philip Thrift 
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Many Worlds leads Sean Carroll to speculate about the morality of
>>>>>>> duplicated selves when they bach off into other worlds.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Sean Carroll
>>>>>>> @seanmcarroll
>>>>>>> https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1176617631408775168
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Congressional votes do not *cause* the wave function to branch, but
>>>>>>> unlikely quantum events can bring into existence branches where 
>>>>>>> classically
>>>>>>> unlikely outcomes have occurred. A nucleus might decay in the right
>>>>>>> Representative's brain at just the right time, etc.*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> He asks:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "If You Existed in Multiple Universes, How Would You Act In This
>>>>>>> One?"
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://lithub.com/if-you-existed-in-multiple-universes-how-would-you-act-in-this-one/
>>>>>>> (From Something Deeply Hidden: Quantum Worlds and the Emergence of
>>>>>>> Spacetime by Sean Carroll)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But he gives away the game here:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "To each individual on some branch of the wave function, life goes
>>>>>>> on just as if they lived in a single world with truly stochastic quantum
>>>>>>> events."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Maybe there's a Sean Carroll branch that loves stochasticity.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Many Worlds (a religion, or quasi-religion, but not science) is
>>>>>>> fundamentally an anti-probabilities superstition. And anti-materialist 
>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>> well. Those who think we are pure information - platotonist bits - have 
>>>>>>> no
>>>>>>> problem with the idea of multiple copies of things here and now being 
>>>>>>> made,
>>>>>>> because there is no new material needed.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (The religious aspect of Many Worlds has been made apparent with the
>>>>>>> promotion - Carroll's own tweets, for example - of the book.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Pro-deterministic is not anti-probability. Also, pro-materialistic is
>>>>>> no less “religious” than anti-materialistic, since there is no way to 
>>>>>> know
>>>>>> that a true material world does or does not exist. When it comes to
>>>>>> deciding which interpretation of reality to prefer, one can either use
>>>>>> aesthetic considerations (Occam’s razor) or refuse to engage in 
>>>>>> discussion.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> What I know is that *materials science*  taught in universities,
>>>>> applied in technology companies.
>>>>>
>>>>> But *nonmaterials* "science" is taught in theology schools, and has
>>>>> no applications.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> So what ? We're talking ontology/metaphysics here, so it has no
>>>> application... You don't use ontology to make things.
>>>>
>>>>

Re: Many Worlds morality

[Quentin Anciaux]

http://www.weidai.com/everything.html

Le mer. 25 sept. 2019 à 10:24, Quentin Anciaux  a
écrit :

>
>
> Le mer. 25 sept. 2019 à 10:21, Philip Thrift  a
> écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 25, 2019 at 3:00:52 AM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Le mer. 25 sept. 2019 à 09:55, Philip Thrift  a
>>> écrit :
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wednesday, September 25, 2019 at 1:25:58 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, 25 Sep 2019 at 08:16, Philip Thrift 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Many Worlds leads Sean Carroll to speculate about the morality of
>>>>>> duplicated selves when they bach off into other worlds.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sean Carroll
>>>>>> @seanmcarroll
>>>>>> https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1176617631408775168
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Congressional votes do not *cause* the wave function to branch, but
>>>>>> unlikely quantum events can bring into existence branches where 
>>>>>> classically
>>>>>> unlikely outcomes have occurred. A nucleus might decay in the right
>>>>>> Representative's brain at just the right time, etc.*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> He asks:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "If You Existed in Multiple Universes, How Would You Act In This One?"
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://lithub.com/if-you-existed-in-multiple-universes-how-would-you-act-in-this-one/
>>>>>> (From Something Deeply Hidden: Quantum Worlds and the Emergence of
>>>>>> Spacetime by Sean Carroll)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But he gives away the game here:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "To each individual on some branch of the wave function, life goes on
>>>>>> just as if they lived in a single world with truly stochastic quantum
>>>>>> events."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Maybe there's a Sean Carroll branch that loves stochasticity.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Many Worlds (a religion, or quasi-religion, but not science) is
>>>>>> fundamentally an anti-probabilities superstition. And anti-materialist as
>>>>>> well. Those who think we are pure information - platotonist bits - have 
>>>>>> no
>>>>>> problem with the idea of multiple copies of things here and now being 
>>>>>> made,
>>>>>> because there is no new material needed.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (The religious aspect of Many Worlds has been made apparent with the
>>>>>> promotion - Carroll's own tweets, for example - of the book.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Pro-deterministic is not anti-probability. Also, pro-materialistic is
>>>>> no less “religious” than anti-materialistic, since there is no way to know
>>>>> that a true material world does or does not exist. When it comes to
>>>>> deciding which interpretation of reality to prefer, one can either use
>>>>> aesthetic considerations (Occam’s razor) or refuse to engage in 
>>>>> discussion.
>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> What I know is that *materials science*  taught in universities,
>>>> applied in technology companies.
>>>>
>>>> But *nonmaterials* "science" is taught in theology schools, and has no
>>>> applications.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> So what ? We're talking ontology/metaphysics here, so it has no
>>> application... You don't use ontology to make things.
>>>
>>> Putting matter as primary is no less religious than if it is not, that's
>>> all, so treating other religious regarding that is ridiculous. Of course
>>> they are, as much as you are about matter being primary.
>>>
>>> Quentin
>>>
>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving

Re: Many Worlds morality

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 25 sept. 2019 à 10:21, Philip Thrift  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, September 25, 2019 at 3:00:52 AM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le mer. 25 sept. 2019 à 09:55, Philip Thrift  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, September 25, 2019 at 1:25:58 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, 25 Sep 2019 at 08:16, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Many Worlds leads Sean Carroll to speculate about the morality of
>>>>> duplicated selves when they bach off into other worlds.
>>>>>
>>>>> Sean Carroll
>>>>> @seanmcarroll
>>>>> https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1176617631408775168
>>>>>
>>>>> *Congressional votes do not *cause* the wave function to branch, but
>>>>> unlikely quantum events can bring into existence branches where 
>>>>> classically
>>>>> unlikely outcomes have occurred. A nucleus might decay in the right
>>>>> Representative's brain at just the right time, etc.*
>>>>>
>>>>> He asks:
>>>>>
>>>>> "If You Existed in Multiple Universes, How Would You Act In This One?"
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> https://lithub.com/if-you-existed-in-multiple-universes-how-would-you-act-in-this-one/
>>>>> (From Something Deeply Hidden: Quantum Worlds and the Emergence of
>>>>> Spacetime by Sean Carroll)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But he gives away the game here:
>>>>>
>>>>> "To each individual on some branch of the wave function, life goes on
>>>>> just as if they lived in a single world with truly stochastic quantum
>>>>> events."
>>>>>
>>>>> Maybe there's a Sean Carroll branch that loves stochasticity.
>>>>>
>>>>> Many Worlds (a religion, or quasi-religion, but not science) is
>>>>> fundamentally an anti-probabilities superstition. And anti-materialist as
>>>>> well. Those who think we are pure information - platotonist bits - have no
>>>>> problem with the idea of multiple copies of things here and now being 
>>>>> made,
>>>>> because there is no new material needed.
>>>>>
>>>>> (The religious aspect of Many Worlds has been made apparent with the
>>>>> promotion - Carroll's own tweets, for example - of the book.)
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Pro-deterministic is not anti-probability. Also, pro-materialistic is
>>>> no less “religious” than anti-materialistic, since there is no way to know
>>>> that a true material world does or does not exist. When it comes to
>>>> deciding which interpretation of reality to prefer, one can either use
>>>> aesthetic considerations (Occam’s razor) or refuse to engage in discussion.
>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What I know is that *materials science*  taught in universities,
>>> applied in technology companies.
>>>
>>> But *nonmaterials* "science" is taught in theology schools, and has no
>>> applications.
>>>
>>>
>> So what ? We're talking ontology/metaphysics here, so it has no
>> application... You don't use ontology to make things.
>>
>> Putting matter as primary is no less religious than if it is not, that's
>> all, so treating other religious regarding that is ridiculous. Of course
>> they are, as much as you are about matter being primary.
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>>> an email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
>>> To view this discussion on the web visit
>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/36802602-a2a1-4b8f-96a6-3a289daf0e45%40googlegroups.com
>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/36802602-a2a1-4b8f-96a6-3a289daf0e45%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email_source=footer>
>>> .
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
>> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
>

Re: Many Worlds morality

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 25 sept. 2019 à 09:55, Philip Thrift  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, September 25, 2019 at 1:25:58 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, 25 Sep 2019 at 08:16, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Many Worlds leads Sean Carroll to speculate about the morality of
>>> duplicated selves when they bach off into other worlds.
>>>
>>> Sean Carroll
>>> @seanmcarroll
>>> https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1176617631408775168
>>>
>>> *Congressional votes do not *cause* the wave function to branch, but
>>> unlikely quantum events can bring into existence branches where classically
>>> unlikely outcomes have occurred. A nucleus might decay in the right
>>> Representative's brain at just the right time, etc.*
>>>
>>> He asks:
>>>
>>> "If You Existed in Multiple Universes, How Would You Act In This One?"
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> https://lithub.com/if-you-existed-in-multiple-universes-how-would-you-act-in-this-one/
>>> (From Something Deeply Hidden: Quantum Worlds and the Emergence of
>>> Spacetime by Sean Carroll)
>>>
>>>
>>> But he gives away the game here:
>>>
>>> "To each individual on some branch of the wave function, life goes on
>>> just as if they lived in a single world with truly stochastic quantum
>>> events."
>>>
>>> Maybe there's a Sean Carroll branch that loves stochasticity.
>>>
>>> Many Worlds (a religion, or quasi-religion, but not science) is
>>> fundamentally an anti-probabilities superstition. And anti-materialist as
>>> well. Those who think we are pure information - platotonist bits - have no
>>> problem with the idea of multiple copies of things here and now being made,
>>> because there is no new material needed.
>>>
>>> (The religious aspect of Many Worlds has been made apparent with the
>>> promotion - Carroll's own tweets, for example - of the book.)
>>>
>>
>> Pro-deterministic is not anti-probability. Also, pro-materialistic is no
>> less “religious” than anti-materialistic, since there is no way to know
>> that a true material world does or does not exist. When it comes to
>> deciding which interpretation of reality to prefer, one can either use
>> aesthetic considerations (Occam’s razor) or refuse to engage in discussion.
>>
>>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
>
>
> What I know is that *materials science*  taught in universities, applied
> in technology companies.
>
> But *nonmaterials* "science" is taught in theology schools, and has no
> applications.
>
>
So what ? We're talking ontology/metaphysics here, so it has no
application... You don't use ontology to make things.

Putting matter as primary is no less religious than if it is not, that's
all, so treating other religious regarding that is ridiculous. Of course
they are, as much as you are about matter being primary.

Quentin

> @philipthrift
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
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> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/36802602-a2a1-4b8f-96a6-3a289daf0e45%40googlegroups.com
> 
> .
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Quantum Supremacy

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le lun. 23 sept. 2019 à 15:23, John Clark  a écrit :

> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 7:42 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> *> Mathematically, it is still an open problem if a quantum computer
>> really speed-up the computations, but like with P = NP, most experts have
>> few doubt that this is the case.*
>
>
> I think you mean P is not equal to NP, most mathematicians would be
> astonished if it turned out that P=NP  but that doesn't mean it
> couldn't happen.
>
> John K Clark
>

The sentence refers to "it is still an open problem if a quantum computer
really speed-up the computations," not to P=NP.

>
> John K Clark
>
>
> --
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> 
> .
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le jeu. 19 sept. 2019 à 15:37, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:

 On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson 
 wrote:


> *> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there
> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently
> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even
> plausibly argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?*
>

 Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite
 number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE
 universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite
 then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in
 fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see
 such a thing.

>>>
>>> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of
>>> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming
>>> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number
>>> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a
>>> different universe. AG
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Tegmark missed this?
>>>
>>> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather
>>> good argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non countable
>>> universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a continuum
>>> (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the
>>> measure can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the
>>> least.
>>>
>>
>> *What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- which I
>> haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious that any
>> repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG *
>>
>>
>>
>> I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat exist,
>> indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some point the
>> difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital mechanist truncate,
>> which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non countable case.
>>
>
> *I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they occur,
> just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  *
>

Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in  1920x1080  pixels
then in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and more
"precision", once you are at the correct substitution level (the level at
which your consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation
thant the ones at the correct level (which exists by assumption and there
are an infinity of them) does not make any difference, but there are an
infinity of them (at the correct level and below it).

>
>>
>>
>>
>> *As to your general theory, that with mechanism (replacing brains and
>> presumably consciousness, with digital copies), computability, and the
>> natural numbers, we can derive the physical universe we observe. This is
>> your theory, isn't it? *
>>
>>
>> It is a theorem. Not a theory. My theory is not mine. It is usually
>> attributed to Descartes, and revised by Turing in the digital frame.
>>
>>
>> *If so, I just don't see it as explanatory. AG*
>>
>>
>> It explains many things, some trivially, like why physics seems so much
>> mathematical. But it is also the only theory that I know which explains why
>> there is a physical universe, instead of nothing. Then I found the
>> “many-histories” and its quantum logic by myself well before I realise that
>> the physicists were already there. In fact even when I studied quantum
>> mechanics, due to the collapse, I taught that QM was refuting mechanism.
>> Only by reading Everett will I realise that QM is an incredible
>> confirmation of the most startling (and shocking I guess) aspect of
>> mechanism: that we are multiplied "all the times”, and that physics is
>> “only” a statistics on all relative computations (“seen from inside”).
>>
>> Comare the three theory of physics:
>>
>> Copenhagen:
>> SWE + unintelligible dualist theory of mind on which nobody agree
>>
>> Everett
>> SWE + mechanism
>>
>> Your servitor
>> Mechanism.
>>
>> Not only Mechanism explains the quanta (qualitatively and quantatitavely)
>> but it explains the qualia, and protect consciousness and (first) person of
>> the materialist velleity to dismiss them.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Your closest identical copy is 10^12 light years away. About 10^76 light
 years away there is a sphere of radius 100 light-years identical to the one
 centered here, so everything we see here during the next century will 

Re: Quantum immortality

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le ven. 13 sept. 2019 à 13:21, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 9:18 PM Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>
>> Le ven. 13 sept. 2019 à 13:16, Bruce Kellett  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>> I don't get Mallah's point here, either. I will have to look more
>>> clearly at his argument against QS. I don't think that case is a clear-cut
>>> as for QI. The fact that I am not the oldest person around is clear
>>> evidence against QI.
>>>
>>
>> It's wrong, that imply you can nerver have been young.
>>
>
> That does not follow.
>
> It does, because if it does the fact you're not the oldest person means
nothing, because *every year* before being old you had the possibilité to
make the same observation and as it's mandatory to lives those before being
old, you can't conclude what you do.


> Bruce
>
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> .
>


-- 
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Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Quantum immortality

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le ven. 13 sept. 2019 à 13:16, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:49 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On 12 Sep 2019, at 01:50, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 1:55 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>> On 11 Sep 2019, at 01:30, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> From: Bruno Marchal 
>>>
>>> On 8 Sep 2019, at 13:59, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>>
>>> If the only relevance you can find for many worlds is quantum
>>> immortality, then many worlds is indeed dead. Quantum immortality has been
>>> shown many times to be a complete nonsense.
>>>
>>>
>>> Really. I did not known that. Could you give the references.
>>>
>>> Follow the Wikipedia entry on quantum suicide.
>>>
>>> That is not what I mean by a  reference.
>>>
>>
>> I later gave a reference to the paper by Mallah -- whom you know of,
>> apparently. The paper is available at
>>
>> https://arxiv.org/abs/0902.0187
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Yes, the oldest participant in this list have know Jacques Mallah, who
>> participated a lot in this list.
>>
>> Mallah is wrong here:
>>
>> <<
>> Max Tegmark publicized the QS idea, but in some ways he is more of a
>> moderate on the issue than most of its believers are. If he were to follow
>> in the footsteps of Don Page and alter his views, recanting belief in QS,
>> it would be a great help in exposing the belief as a fallacy, and I hold
>> out hope that it is possible that he will do so.
>>
>> In his paper [Tegmark 1] QS is explained as follows:
>>
>> “Since there is exactly one observer having perceptions both before and
>> after the trigger event, and since it occurred too fast to notice, the MWI
>> prediction is that” (the experimenter) “will hear “click” with 100%
>> certainty.”
>>
>> That is a rather odd statement because he is certainly aware that in the
>> MWI there is no sense in which it can be rightfully said that “there is
>> exactly one observer” either before
>>
>> [image: page13image25488]
>> or after the experiment. The ket notation may be unhelpful here; indeed,
>> if the tensor product of kets on the left hand side were expanded instead
>> of factoring out the observer, there would appear to have been “two
>> observers” initially.
>> >>
>>
>
> I don't get Mallah's point here, either. I will have to look more clearly
> at his argument against QS. I don't think that case is a clear-cut as for
> QI. The fact that I am not the oldest person around is clear evidence
> against QI.
>

It's wrong, that imply you can nerver have been young.


>
> Bruce
>
> Two different brains doing the same computation gives only one subjective
>> first person.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
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Re: Quantum immortality

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le ven. 13 sept. 2019 à 08:03, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 3:07 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> On 9/12/2019 9:49 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 1:41 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, 12 Sep 2019 at 09:38, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 2:55 AM Jason Resch 
 wrote:

> On Tuesday, September 10, 2019, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 10:18 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 9/10/2019 4:30 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> > Another argument that has been given here before is that if
>>> quantum
>>> > immortality is true, then we should expect to see a number of
>>> people
>>> > who are considerably older than the normal life expectancy -- and
>>> we
>>> > do not see people who are two or three hundred years old. Even if
>>> the
>>> > probabilities are very low, there have been an awful lot of people
>>> > born within the last 500 or so years -- some must have survived on
>>> our
>>> > branch if this scenario is true.
>>>
>>> My argument was that each of us should find ourselves to be much
>>> older
>>> than even the oldest people we know.
>>
>>
>> That is probably the best single argument against quantum
>> immortality: if QI is true, then the measure of our lifetime after one
>> reaches a normal lifetime is infinitely greater than the measure before 
>> age
>> , say, 120 yr. So if one finds oneself younger than 120 years, QI is 
>> false,
>> and if MWI is still considered to be true, there must be another argument
>> why MWI does not imply QI.
>>
>
>
> Why do you think that measure only increases with age? On an objective
> level it only decreases.
>

 As Bruno would say, "you confuse the 1p with the 1pp." I am talking
 about my personal measure of the number of years I have lived. As I get
 older, the number of years I have lived increases. If I live to 1000, I
 have lived more years between 100 and 1000 than between 1 and 100. This is
 arithmetic, after all.

 But this discussion has gone off the rails. It started as a discussion
 of quantum immortality, and the arguments against this notion, even in MWI.
 The arguments against QI that have been advanced are that life-threatening
 events tend not to be binary or quantum, but rather we enter a period of
 slow decline, due to illness or other factors. Consequently, there is no
 reason for us to expect to be immortal, even in MWI. The other argument is
 that if QI is true, then you would expect to be very old. This argument was
 advanced by Mallah (arXiv: 0905.0187) and has not been satisfactorily
 rebutted.

>>>
>>> It is not simple arithmetic if you live to be very old that most of your
>>> measure is in your older years if you take into account all the copies.
>>> Suppose there are 10^100 copies of you under 100 years old and then all but
>>> one copy dies, but that one copy goes on to live to 1000. If you did not
>>> know how old you were and you had to guess given this information, then you
>>> would guess with near certainty that you were under 100 years old. However,
>>> you would also know with certainty that you would live to 1000, and you
>>> would not notice anything weird happening as you approached your 100th
>>> birthday.
>>>
>>
>> The trouble with this argument is that you know that at least one copy of
>> you will survive past 100 years (or past any age, for that matter). Given
>> that you survive, the probability of survival is one. Taking account of all
>> the other copies who die does not alter this fact. If you are all your
>> copies, then your probability of survival under the assumption of QI is
>> always one.
>>
>> Your RSSA assumption is effectively a dualist model -- there is only one
>> soul that makes you really you, and that soul goes at random into one and
>> only one copy at any time. Then the chances that this soul-containing copy
>> is the one that survives, does indeed decrease rapidly with age. But that
>> is the wrong way to look at it -- there is no 'soul' that makes a copy you.
>> On the MWI assumptions, every copy is 'you', so since at least one copy
>> always survives, 'you' will always survive. The number of years you survive
>> past age 100 is indefinitely large, so you spend more time in those years,
>> and you have probability one of getting there.
>>
>>
>> As I understand it the theory is that all these 'you's' on all the
>> branches are potentially the you-of-here-and-now.  So the probability that
>> you-of-here-and-now sees your self as much older than others depends on the
>> measure of intervals along all the branches.  So the question then turns,
>> as Telmo said, 

Re: Quantum immortality

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 11 sept. 2019 à 14:08, Quentin Anciaux  a
écrit :

>
>
> Le mer. 11 sept. 2019 à 14:01, Bruce Kellett  a
> écrit :
>
>> On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 4:57 PM Quentin Anciaux 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> The argument of the measure is based on ASSA and that's why it is
>>> flawed, moments are not random sampled from all possible moments, with this
>>> argument and without QI, you should have never find yourself young... But
>>> somewhere just before your death.
>>>
>>
>> ASSA is not a law of physics. I am not assuming random sampling from
>> anything. It is just that you spend more time old than young given quantum
>> immortality. That is not to say that you are never young -- of course you
>> have to pass through all the years since your birth, one year at a time. It
>> is just that there are more years after any given age than before that age.
>>
>
> And so by this reasoning I must be old near death, and it's not the case,
> so something is wrong with your theory.
>

I mean even *without* QI...

>
>> Bruce
>>
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>> .
>>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
>


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Re: Quantum immortality

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 11 sept. 2019 à 14:01, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 4:57 PM Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>
>> The argument of the measure is based on ASSA and that's why it is flawed,
>> moments are not random sampled from all possible moments, with this
>> argument and without QI, you should have never find yourself young... But
>> somewhere just before your death.
>>
>
> ASSA is not a law of physics. I am not assuming random sampling from
> anything. It is just that you spend more time old than young given quantum
> immortality. That is not to say that you are never young -- of course you
> have to pass through all the years since your birth, one year at a time. It
> is just that there are more years after any given age than before that age.
>

And so by this reasoning I must be old near death, and it's not the case,
so something is wrong with your theory.

>
> Bruce
>
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>


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Re: Quantum immortality

[Quentin Anciaux]

The argument of the measure is based on ASSA and that's why it is flawed,
moments are not random sampled from all possible moments, with this
argument and without QI, you should have never find yourself young... But
somewhere just before your death.

Quentin

Le mer. 11 sept. 2019 à 08:43, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 4:26 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 11 Sep 2019 at 12:00, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 10:18 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>
 On 9/10/2019 4:30 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
 > Another argument that has been given here before is that if quantum
 > immortality is true, then we should expect to see a number of people
 > who are considerably older than the normal life expectancy -- and we
 > do not see people who are two or three hundred years old. Even if the
 > probabilities are very low, there have been an awful lot of people
 > born within the last 500 or so years -- some must have survived on
 our
 > branch if this scenario is true.

 My argument was that each of us should find ourselves to be much older
 than even the oldest people we know.
>>>
>>>
>>> That is probably the best single argument against quantum immortality:
>>> if QI is true, then the measure of our lifetime after one reaches a normal
>>> lifetime is infinitely greater than the measure before age , say, 120 yr.
>>> So if one finds oneself younger than 120 years, QI is false, and if MWI is
>>> still considered to be true, there must be another argument why MWI does
>>> not imply QI.
>>>
>>
>> The measure of our lifetime when young might be larger than the measure
>> when very old if surviving as a very old person becomes exponentially less
>> likely. In any case, this is not relevant if it is given that there will be
>> a very old version of you in some corner of the world, whether distant in
>> time, space or in a parallel universe. You cannot avoid surviving to become
>> this version if it actually exists.
>>
>
> I think the point of quantum immortality is that everyone is immortal --
> it is not that this is very unlikely because it happens to everyone. So I
> am not sure what measure you think is exponentially decreasing. My personal
> measure of life-years is clearly greater for periods after age 120 yr than
> for the period before. Since this happens for everyone, the collective
> measure over all people is likewise exponentially greater. Even if one
> considers an infinite universe, with an infinite number of copies of me,
> all of these are immortal on the basis of the QI argument. So, again, the
> measure of old age is not decreasing with age.
>
> The situation is different for quantum suicide in the absence of quantum
> immortality. Then one is deliberately courting death on ever run of the
> scenario, and the number of survivors inevitably decreases, even if one
> copy survives indefinitely.
>
> Bruce
>
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> .
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Re: Observation versus assumption

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 24 juil. 2019 à 21:57, John Clark  a écrit :

> On 23 Jul 2019, at 20:16, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
> *> In 1972, Washington University professors Wesley Clark and Bob Arnzen
>> likely made the first physical version of Turing's machine.*
>
>
> I think that estimate is off by at least fifteen orders of magnitude, not
> counting stuff that may be on other planets, but even if it were dead
> accurate that would still mean there was one more Turing Machine than Lambda
> Calculus Machines.
>

I think you're conflating physical Von Neumann machines as turing
machines...

https://stackoverflow.com/questions/2782014/turing-machine-vs-von-neuman-machine

>
> John K Clark
>
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Re: subjective experience

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 20:18, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

>
>
> On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> I didn't say there was.  I said *youse-self* sees Moscow and Washington.
>> "Youse-self" is second person *plural*.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept
> frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's
> clear and meaningful.
>
>
> But does it have a clear answer?
>
> The MWI has it's own problems with probability.  It's straightforward if
> there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we
> implicitly assume they are equi-probable).  But what if there are two
> possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other?  Does the world
> split into three, two of which are the same?  If two worlds are the same,
> can they really be two.  Aren't they just one?  And what if there are two
> possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand
> chance.  Does the world then split into 1001 worlds?  And what if the
> probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds.
> But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely
> many times and there is no natural measure of probability.
>
> Brent
>


Well there is always an infinity of worlds at each split but the density of
every possible results should conform to the partition.

Either probabilities have no meaning in the mwi and duplication experiment
or they do, but you can't says as JC holds that they're meaningful in the
MWI case and not in the duplication experiment because you could meet your
doppelganger... That makes no sense.

Quentin

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Re: subjective experience

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:28, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

>
>
> On 7/20/2019 11:16 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On 7/20/2019 10:59 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> > Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you
>>>> > will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
>>>> > being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it
>>>> is
>>>> > quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
>>>> > experience.
>>>> >
>>>> > There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply
>>>> factual.
>>>>
>>>> But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second
>>>> person
>>>> plural and second person singular being the same word in English.  In
>>>> the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
>>>> they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
>>>> duplication thought experiments.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both
>>> subject, and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...
>>>
>>> Quentin
>>>
>>>
>>> Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find youse-self
>>> is "Washington and Moscow."
>>>
>>
>> It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in
>> Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not on the
>> duplicated bodies.
>>
>>
>> The pov gets duplicated with the bodies.
>>
>
> No there is two unique pov, one that sees Moscow, one that sees
> Washington, none that sees Washington and Moscow.
>
>
> I didn't say there was.  I said *youse-self* sees Moscow and Washington.
> "Youse-self" is second person *plural*.
>
> Brent
>

Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept
frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's
clear and meaningful.

Quentin

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Re: subjective experience

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:16, Quentin Anciaux  a
écrit :

>
>
> Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On 7/20/2019 10:59 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> > Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you
>>>> > will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
>>>> > being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it
>>>> is
>>>> > quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
>>>> > experience.
>>>> >
>>>> > There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply
>>>> factual.
>>>>
>>>> But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second
>>>> person
>>>> plural and second person singular being the same word in English.  In
>>>> the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
>>>> they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
>>>> duplication thought experiments.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both
>>> subject, and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...
>>>
>>> Quentin
>>>
>>>
>>> Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find youse-self
>>> is "Washington and Moscow."
>>>
>>
>> It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in
>> Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not on the
>> duplicated bodies.
>>
>>
>> The pov gets duplicated with the bodies.
>>
>
> No there is two unique pov, one that sees Moscow, one that sees
> Washington, none that sees Washington and Moscow.
>
If you say that after pushing the button your pov will be Washington and
Moscow, it's false, as your POV will be only Moscow or only Washington,
there are no next POV of yourself who sees both in the same POV.

>
>> Brent
>>
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Re: subjective experience

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

>
>
> On 7/20/2019 10:59 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> > Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you
>>> > will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
>>> > being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it is
>>> > quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
>>> > experience.
>>> >
>>> > There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply
>>> factual.
>>>
>>> But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second person
>>> plural and second person singular being the same word in English.  In
>>> the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
>>> they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
>>> duplication thought experiments.
>>>
>>>
>> Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both subject,
>> and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>> Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find youse-self
>> is "Washington and Moscow."
>>
>
> It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in
> Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not on the
> duplicated bodies.
>
>
> The pov gets duplicated with the bodies.
>

No there is two unique pov, one that sees Moscow, one that sees Washington,
none that sees Washington and Moscow.

>
> Brent
>
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Re: subjective experience

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

>
>
> On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> > Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you
>> > will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
>> > being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it is
>> > quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
>> > experience.
>> >
>> > There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply
>> factual.
>>
>> But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second person
>> plural and second person singular being the same word in English.  In
>> the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
>> they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
>> duplication thought experiments.
>>
>>
> Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both subject,
> and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...
>
> Quentin
>
>
> Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find youse-self is
> "Washington and Moscow."
>

It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in
Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not on the
duplicated bodies.

Quentin

>
> Brent
>
> --
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Re: subjective experience

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

>
>
> On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you
> > will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
> > being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it is
> > quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
> > experience.
> >
> > There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply factual.
>
> But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second person
> plural and second person singular being the same word in English.  In
> the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
> they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
> duplication thought experiments.
>
>
Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both subject,
and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...

Quentin

>
> Brent
>
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> .
>

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Re: Observation versus assumption

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le ven. 19 juil. 2019 à 14:45, Philip Thrift  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 6:31:53 AM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le ven. 19 juil. 2019 à 13:02, Philip Thrift  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 5:50:11 AM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Le ven. 19 juil. 2019 à 12:18, Philip Thrift  a
>>>> écrit :
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 3:52:05 AM UTC-5, telmo wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ...
>>>>>> You insist that nobody has been able to produce a computer without
>>>>>> using matter. I agree. What you refuse to consider is the possibility 
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> matter is the dream of computations, and not the other way around. 
>>>>>> Whatever
>>>>>> we are, it seems clear that we are bound to perceive reality as made of
>>>>>> matter, but it doesn't follow that matter is the ultimate reality. This 
>>>>>> is
>>>>>> just Plato's Cave with modern language.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Telmo.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> I've been perplexed for 50 years how the idea of immaterialism (that
>>>>> there is something other than matter) came to be.
>>>>>
>>>>> The so-called abstractions - like the definition of the Turing machine
>>>>> you read in a textbook - are just fictions. But fictions can be useful.
>>>>> Maybe there should be a better word for useful fictions. Math is as good 
>>>>> as
>>>>> any, for part of that anyway.
>>>>>
>>>>> The old guys, Thales, Democritus, Epicurus, were curious about matter.
>>>>> Where did this bizarre trend towards immaterialism come from?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> How is trend to believe there is only matter (what is it ?) came to be
>>>> ? How is the believe in *only matter* not bizarre ? It is as bizarre as
>>>> anything reality is... I don't see materialism as less bizarre than
>>>> anything about the nature of reality... as if we knew what reality was...
>>>> It seems to me it's the people who believe there are some beliefs about
>>>> reality which are *not* bizarre that are bizarre.
>>>>
>>>> Quentin
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *The original sin of philosophy occurred when mathematical and mental
>>>>> (and computational) entities were abstracted away from their material 
>>>>> home.*
>>>>>
>>>>> @pphilipthrift
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I just don't believe in anything immaterial, or supernatural - like God,
>>> or ghosts. It is a fact a lot of people do. Some just are prone to believe
>>> in the immaterial/supernatural:
>>>
>>>  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antimaterialism
>>>
>>
>> I understand, but *how* your beliefs are *not* bizarre ? Do you know what
>> reality is ?
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>
>
> Well matter is bizarre enough on its own.
>
> Read the latest science news on new discoveries in *materials science.*
>
> I don't see why you would want to add ghosts into the mix.
>

Where did I talk about ghosts ? nowhere, but you did.

I'm only talking about your assertion your beliefs are not *bizarre*
(contrary to others who are bizarre)... I'm just saying they are bizarre
(your beliefs) as anything about reality is. So can you explain why yours
are not *bizarre* and others are.



> @philipthrift
>
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Re: Observation versus assumption

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le ven. 19 juil. 2019 à 13:02, Philip Thrift  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 5:50:11 AM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le ven. 19 juil. 2019 à 12:18, Philip Thrift  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 3:52:05 AM UTC-5, telmo wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ...
>>>> You insist that nobody has been able to produce a computer without
>>>> using matter. I agree. What you refuse to consider is the possibility that
>>>> matter is the dream of computations, and not the other way around. Whatever
>>>> we are, it seems clear that we are bound to perceive reality as made of
>>>> matter, but it doesn't follow that matter is the ultimate reality. This is
>>>> just Plato's Cave with modern language.
>>>>
>>>> Telmo.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> I've been perplexed for 50 years how the idea of immaterialism (that
>>> there is something other than matter) came to be.
>>>
>>> The so-called abstractions - like the definition of the Turing machine
>>> you read in a textbook - are just fictions. But fictions can be useful.
>>> Maybe there should be a better word for useful fictions. Math is as good as
>>> any, for part of that anyway.
>>>
>>> The old guys, Thales, Democritus, Epicurus, were curious about matter.
>>> Where did this bizarre trend towards immaterialism come from?
>>>
>>
>> How is trend to believe there is only matter (what is it ?) came to be ?
>> How is the believe in *only matter* not bizarre ? It is as bizarre as
>> anything reality is... I don't see materialism as less bizarre than
>> anything about the nature of reality... as if we knew what reality was...
>> It seems to me it's the people who believe there are some beliefs about
>> reality which are *not* bizarre that are bizarre.
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>>
>>> *The original sin of philosophy occurred when mathematical and mental
>>> (and computational) entities were abstracted away from their material home.*
>>>
>>> @pphilipthrift
>>>
>>>
>
>
>
> I just don't believe in anything immaterial, or supernatural - like God,
> or ghosts. It is a fact a lot of people do. Some just are prone to believe
> in the immaterial/supernatural:
>
>  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antimaterialism
>

I understand, but *how* your beliefs are *not* bizarre ? Do you know what
reality is ?



>
>
> @philipthrift
>
>
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Re: Observation versus assumption

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le ven. 19 juil. 2019 à 12:18, Philip Thrift  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 3:52:05 AM UTC-5, telmo wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> ...
>> You insist that nobody has been able to produce a computer without using
>> matter. I agree. What you refuse to consider is the possibility that matter
>> is the dream of computations, and not the other way around. Whatever we
>> are, it seems clear that we are bound to perceive reality as made of
>> matter, but it doesn't follow that matter is the ultimate reality. This is
>> just Plato's Cave with modern language.
>>
>> Telmo.
>>
>>
>>
> I've been perplexed for 50 years how the idea of immaterialism (that there
> is something other than matter) came to be.
>
> The so-called abstractions - like the definition of the Turing machine you
> read in a textbook - are just fictions. But fictions can be useful. Maybe
> there should be a better word for useful fictions. Math is as good as any,
> for part of that anyway.
>
> The old guys, Thales, Democritus, Epicurus, were curious about matter.
> Where did this bizarre trend towards immaterialism come from?
>

How is trend to believe there is only matter (what is it ?) came to be ?
How is the believe in *only matter* not bizarre ? It is as bizarre as
anything reality is... I don't see materialism as less bizarre than
anything about the nature of reality... as if we knew what reality was...
It seems to me it's the people who believe there are some beliefs about
reality which are *not* bizarre that are bizarre.

Quentin

>
> *The original sin of philosophy occurred when mathematical and mental (and
> computational) entities were abstracted away from their material home.*
>
> @pphilipthrift
>
> --
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> 
> .
>


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Re: subjective experience

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mer. 17 juil. 2019 à 00:37, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Wed, Jul 17, 2019 at 12:55 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On 16 Jul 2019, at 13:44, PGC  wrote:
>>
>> On Monday, July 15, 2019 at 1:53:11 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> I don’t understand well what you say.
>>>
>>
>> Nobody, including yourself, understands what you say generally.
>>
>>
>>
>> Just tell me what you don’t understand specifically, and avoid ad hominem
>> attack. It bores everybody, and distract from the thread.
>>
>
> That is just bullying, Bruno. You accuse everyone who disagrees with you
> of ad hominem attacks.
>
> Bruce
>

What you're doing is in french "C'est l'hôpital qui se fout de la charité"
or "paille/poutre"... The bullies whining about being accused of bullying,
what a joke.

The PGC email is just a long email of insults, not a discussion, yours are
similar... what do you expect ? So either you reframe this into a
discussion or you continue to bully, insult and don't expect anything new
here.

Quentin

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Re: Artist and Picture by J.W. Dunne

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le ven. 12 juil. 2019 à 11:53, Philip Thrift  a
écrit :

>
>
> AI researchers have been using *genetic algorithms* and *artificial life*
> to "evolve" AI programs since the 1970s.
>
> @philipthrift
>
>
I know, that's why I'm asking  Terren about his position...


>
>
> On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 3:28:59 AM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> Is it not how evolution is working ? By iteration and random
>> modification, new better organisms come to existence ?
>>
>> Why AI could not use iterating evolution to make better and better AI ?
>>
>> Also if *we build* a real AGI, isn't it the same thing ? Wouldn't we have
>> built a better, smarter version of us ? The AI surely would be able to
>> build another one and by iterating, a better one.
>>
>> What's wrong with this ?
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>> Le ven. 12 juil. 2019 à 06:28, Terren Suydam  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>> Sure, but that's not the "FOOM" scenario, in which an AI modifies its
>>> own source code, gets smarter, and with the increase in intelligence, is
>>> able to make yet more modifications to its own source code, and so on,
>>> until its intelligence far outstrips its previous capabilities before the
>>> recursive self-improvement began. It's hypothesized that such a process
>>> could take an astonishingly short amount of time, thus "FOOM". See
>>> https://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/AI_takeoff#Hard_takeoff for more.
>>>
>>> My point was that the inherent limitation of a mind to understand itself
>>> completely, makes the FOOM scenario less likely. An AI would be forced to
>>> model its own cognitive apparatus in a necessarily incomplete way. It might
>>> still be possible to improve itself using these incomplete models, but
>>> there would always be some uncertainty.
>>>
>>> Another more minor objection is that the FOOM scenario also selects for
>>> AIs that become massively competent at self-improvement, but it's not clear
>>> whether this selected-for intelligence is merely a narrow competence, or
>>> translates generally to other domains of interest.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 2:56 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Advances in intelligence can just be gaining more factual knowledge,
>>>> knowing more mathematics, using faster algorithms, etc.  None of that
>>>> is
>>>> barred by not being able to model oneself.
>>>>
>>>> Brent
>>>>
>>>> On 7/11/2019 11:41 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>> > Similarly, one can never completely understand one's own mind, for it
>>>> > would take a bigger mind than one has to do so. This, I believe, is
>>>> > the best argument against the runaway-intelligence scenarios in which
>>>> > sufficiently advanced AIs recursively improve their own code to
>>>> > achieve ever increasing advances in intelligence.
>>>> >
>>>> > Terren
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>>
>>> --
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Re: Artist and Picture by J.W. Dunne

[Quentin Anciaux]

Hi,

Is it not how evolution is working ? By iteration and random modification,
new better organisms come to existence ?

Why AI could not use iterating evolution to make better and better AI ?

Also if *we build* a real AGI, isn't it the same thing ? Wouldn't we have
built a better, smarter version of us ? The AI surely would be able to
build another one and by iterating, a better one.

What's wrong with this ?

Quentin

Le ven. 12 juil. 2019 à 06:28, Terren Suydam  a
écrit :

> Sure, but that's not the "FOOM" scenario, in which an AI modifies its own
> source code, gets smarter, and with the increase in intelligence, is able
> to make yet more modifications to its own source code, and so on, until its
> intelligence far outstrips its previous capabilities before the recursive
> self-improvement began. It's hypothesized that such a process could take an
> astonishingly short amount of time, thus "FOOM". See
> https://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/AI_takeoff#Hard_takeoff for more.
>
> My point was that the inherent limitation of a mind to understand itself
> completely, makes the FOOM scenario less likely. An AI would be forced to
> model its own cognitive apparatus in a necessarily incomplete way. It might
> still be possible to improve itself using these incomplete models, but
> there would always be some uncertainty.
>
> Another more minor objection is that the FOOM scenario also selects for
> AIs that become massively competent at self-improvement, but it's not clear
> whether this selected-for intelligence is merely a narrow competence, or
> translates generally to other domains of interest.
>
>
> On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 2:56 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> Advances in intelligence can just be gaining more factual knowledge,
>> knowing more mathematics, using faster algorithms, etc.  None of that is
>> barred by not being able to model oneself.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>> On 7/11/2019 11:41 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>> > Similarly, one can never completely understand one's own mind, for it
>> > would take a bigger mind than one has to do so. This, I believe, is
>> > the best argument against the runaway-intelligence scenarios in which
>> > sufficiently advanced AIs recursively improve their own code to
>> > achieve ever increasing advances in intelligence.
>> >
>> > Terren
>>
>>
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>> .
>>
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> 
> .
>


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Re: The anecdote of Moon landing

[Quentin Anciaux]

Do as you wish, if it makes you feel better... I don't think insulting is
useful, and a list like this one should be free of it, but instead here
disagreement is always followed with insults. It's just sad.

Le jeu. 4 juil. 2019 à 13:02, PGC  a écrit :

>
>
> On Wednesday, July 3, 2019 at 4:08:29 PM UTC+2, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> I don't know what Bruno did to you,what's the point to always attacking
>> him like that and misunderstand on purpose what is written ?
>>
>> You can keep that for you.
>>
>> If you have something interesting to say, say it, if it's only for
>> insulting don't bother posting... those king of insulting emails are really
>> boring, not only yours, all of them. You're not greater or something, it
>> does not serve the debates, it is just useless and shaming.
>>
>
> Serve the debates? What multiverse do you inhabit?
>
> In the past weeks this list has gone through a religious purge with
> Platonia and its specialists here not merely conceding that they've
> tampered with evidence, but that doing so in the name of their truth
> displays the only kind of "correct scientific attitude". This while
> continuing to claim that mind-body problem is the only critical problem to
> solve, while denouncing all forms of materialism, while writing on material
> keyboards in clock time and using an internet reliant on the existence of
> material servers plus electricity, through a culture of democratic freedoms
> afforded to us by physicalist mad men! And this every single day without
> fail, as if confusing their material screens with reality.
>
> Mind body solutions are provided by just about every institutional
> religion on the planet, all with their own books and "evidences". As
> somebody that regularly analyzes discourse of all kinds, I see no debate
> here but a monologue of ideologues that suffocates any alternative
> ontological approaches on a list designed to discuss "theories of
> everything". Yup, theories in plural. Therefore, au contraire Quentin the
> anxious, the fact that for some 2 decades, the list is barraged by
> discourse such as "what world, what clock you naive person?", as soon as
> any everyday interpretation and/or wording of events or phenomena is stated
> by Brent and others, quite gratuitously and insultingly by platonists.
> Whenever the platonists feel like it. In essence solidifying pure opinion
> as mathematical truth riding the high moral horse of truth of ignorance.
>
> When the non-platonists bemoan pronoun use or unclear grandmother
> assumption notions that forcibly arise in the initial discursive setup of
> UDA on the other hand, such unclear notions get a pass by platonists here.
> Double standard through cherrypicking.
>
> The discourse in question also appears to yours truly as ascetic in
> nature: denial of access to reality, so how can a metaphysics or anything
> including debates be meaningfully pursued? Nihilism overlaps with
> asceticism and denial of access to the real or that can be shared. So how
> could any agreement or disagreement for example be as meaningful as stating
> the "right theological attitude" in the first place? Then the discourse
> deploys "infinitely weak mechanism for the search" or similar without
> provision of an account of evidence and/or map.
>
> Don't take my word for it, but these discursive styles and principles have
> been refuted from many angles and/or have been unable to resolve basic
> philosophical problems and consistency constraints. See
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asceticism
>
> Quote "the purpose of pursuing spiritual goals" as an operation of
> platonic mind commonly assumed here equates to fundamental inquiry as a
> sort of redemption from the illusion/dream of life. That's pretty Christian
> and all too human for bona fide computationalistas of this list, or is it
> not? Just shadows but salvation in rejecting materiality while
> materializing numbers, literalizing their properties strongly and laying a
> territorial claim to "Origins of physical laws", which I'll maintain is
> ambitious in proportion to the speculative existence of means to evidence
> besides being "territorial" in nature. Tampering with evidence is a thing
> in platonia, is it not? Science does better.
>
> Quote "Asceticism is seen in the ancient theologies as a journey towards
> spiritual transformation, where the simple is sufficient, the bliss is
> within, the frugal is plenty." This is the basic aesthetic decor of our
> discourse here: the simplest 2+2=4 decor that hides the monstrosities of
> duplicating machines and powerful computing ability we don't have to verify
>

Re: The anecdote of Moon landing

[Quentin Anciaux]

The disbelief of moon landing vs telepathy... ;(

Le jeu. 4 juil. 2019 à 16:39, John Clark  a écrit :

> Does anyone know what the title of this thread means?
>
>  John K Clark
>
> --
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> 
> .
>

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Re: The anecdote of Moon landing

[Quentin Anciaux]

What bruno implies is this:

https://www.google.com/search?safe=off=gLccXfiGGtDDwQK997PQBQ=time+seems+slower+when+younger=time+seems+slower+when+younger_l=psy-ab.3..33i22i29i30.8751.8946..9440...0.0..0.66.132.2..01..gws-wiz...35i304i39.4ljUkeeOpYc


yes times seems to go faster as we age... so your younger period seems to
have been longer as it is..

Anyway, duration of moments is totally subjective and that's what he meant.

Le mer. 3 juil. 2019 à 16:08, Quentin Anciaux  a écrit :

> I don't know what Bruno did to you,what's the point to always attacking
> him like that and misunderstand on purpose what is written ?
>
> You can keep that for you.
>
> If you have something interesting to say, say it, if it's only for
> insulting don't bother posting... those king of insulting emails are really
> boring, not only yours, all of them. You're not greater or something, it
> does not serve the debates, it is just useless and shaming.
>
> Quentin
>
> Le mer. 3 juil. 2019 à 15:50, PGC  a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, July 3, 2019 at 11:51:52 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> > On 2 Jul 2019, at 20:22, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > On 7/2/2019 2:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> >> Which time? I can access only my subjective time, and I would say
>>> that my period between birth and the age of ten has been considerable
>>> longer that the once between 10 and 60.
>>> >
>>> > We should send you a clock and a calendar then.
>>>
>>> :)
>>>
>>> The whole point is that physics arise from the statistics on first
>>> person experiences, which are required when we do physical experiment and
>>> look at a needle.
>>> Thanks for sending me a clock and a calendar, but we cannot use it to
>>> solve the measure problem, or you are invoking the mind-brain identity link
>>> which is the problematic thing, not in physics, but in physicalist
>>> metaphysics.
>>>
>>
>> No shadow of your smile as it would be consistent to not award you the
>> supposed prize we keep hearing about! Those guys understood the situation
>> apparently. Some prize awarded at some time t cannot be real. Lol
>>
>> You get no clock, so you get a clock. No prize means that you got a
>> prize. Death means immortality. Losing means winning, so not having solved
>> the measure problem means having solved it. Applause is appropriate but
>> non-applause is preferable and it's what you got!
>>
>> So the absence of success on all fronts means: success platonic!
>> Everybody with debts is now rich, which means that everybody is dumb, which
>> means that they're smart. That's what age will do to you: you get old and
>> your arguments + evidence get better and better hurtling towards certain
>> immortality. The heavenly stuff. Mind body total reality. Total partial
>> non-control. Tomorrow it will be rainy or snowy or foggy or sunny or
>> everything or nothing. With the bar so high one begins to wonder why anyone
>> could have the audacity to think they've failed or succeeded at anything
>> without Bruno's generous support. PGC
>>
>>
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>> .
>>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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