Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Jun 2014, at 00:41, David Nyman wrote:


On 8 June 2014 22:47, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

Ready? Have you bought the Mendelson?

OK, I give in.


Wonderful.



I just found a reasonably-priced second-hand copy of the Mendelson  
on Abebooks - should be here in a few days.


Perfect. That will be an opportunity for me to summarize the key points.






Oh, and by the way, I'm presently reading and enjoying Hines's  
"Return to the One". Thanks for the recommendation.


I am glad you appreciate it. He gives justice to Plotinus rationalism,  
but he expands more the mystical issue though, but I find it still to  
be a quite nice "modern" rendering on Plotinus. I might reread it now  
that you are reading it, to make some comments.


Bruno






David

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[David Nyman]

On 8 June 2014 22:47, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

Ready? Have you bought the Mendelson?


OK, I give in. I just found a reasonably-priced second-hand copy of the
Mendelson on Abebooks - should be here in a few days. Oh, and by the way,
I'm presently reading and enjoying Hines's "Return to the One". Thanks for
the recommendation.

David

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 08 Jun 2014, at 14:28, David Nyman wrote:


On 7 June 2014 20:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

At step 7, it is not in principle. Like in the preceding protocol,  
we just assume the existence of an infinite running of the UD in our  
infinite (then) space-time structure.


The proposition is that if that is the case, and don't see white  
rabbits, it means some computations are multiplied, and exploit  
(perhaps) the random oracle inherent in that multiplication.


OK, so the pedagogic purpose of step 7 is to persuade us that our  
experiences *could* be the consequence of the above, but it doesn't  
yet force that conclusion (because it could still be avoided in the  
way I have suggested).


The step 8 does not, and cannot, refute your point above, but it can  
explain how far it goes near a god-of-the-gap move, or a magic move.  
It is close to be proved, as to counteract to step 8 you are forced  
(in the transfinite) to provide a matter which is non Turing  
emulable, and non FPI recoverable. It looks like reifying a mystery  
to prevent a possible partial solution to a mystery. Someone might  
add that matter needs a "Gods" blessing, also.


Step 8, if I've understood it, shows that one can evacuate all  
traces of "computation" from a "primordial" physical instantiation  
(either by substituting a filmed record, under the particular  
contingencies of the movie graph, or by systematically substituting  
each of the "computational relations" by fortuitous physical  
events). This renders the ascription of "computation" to the  
physical events as entirely gratuitous. Hence what follows is either  
the abandonment of CTM, or alternatively the reversal consequence.  
The reversal could only then be avoided by an appeal, as you say, to  
some (presumably presently unknown) aspect of "primordial matter"  
that is not Turing emulable in principle (e.g. that required actual  
computational infinities). Even after such a move, any naturally  
motivated appeal to "computation" and its putative relation with  
consciousness is hardly any clearer than before.


My own intuition, for what its worth, has always been that any  
appeal to "computation" on the assumption of "primordial matter" is  
somewhat suspect and ad hoc. ISTM that what is supposed to be  
"primordial" about a specific set of entities and their relations is  
precisely that they *exclusively* underlie (or more correctly,  
comprise) everything that is "really real". So the hierarchical  
structure of everything we observe thereafter - be it physical,  
chemical, biological, physiological, etc. - would be deemed to be  
underpinned, exclusively and exhaustively, by such a primordial  
substratum.


The higher-order levels in the hierarchy could always, at least in  
principle, be reduced without loss to the primordial entities and  
their relations. They are, IOW, *re-descriptions* of primordial  
reality, not independent realities in themselves. If so, the problem  
in trying to add "computation" to such a hierarchy is that it must  
suffer the same fate - i.e. that of being reduced and eliminated as  
an ultimately supernumerary re-description of what is "really" just  
the primordial substratum. And consequently, if we attempt to attach  
consciousness to such a supernumerary re-description, it must  
inevitably be exposed to similar reduction and elimination. This is,  
I think, what the demonstrations in step 8 lay bare.


By contrast, after the reversal, the primordial entities and  
relations are restricted to the natural numbers (or their  
equivalents) and their additive and multiplicative relations. It  
used to trouble me that the same arguments I have deployed above  
could seemingly equally be directed at this alternative "primordial  
substratum". That is, that whatever was deemed to "emerge" from  
arithmetic could in the final analysis always be reduced to it again  
without loss and hence ultimately eliminated as being independently  
real. But the critical difference here, compared with the starting  
point of "primordial matter", seems to be the natural emulation of  
computation and the universal machine in arithmetic. Their  
consequences in logic seem, at least in principle, to offer a route  
out of the reduction/elimination impasse by connecting an "outer  
structure" of basic arithmetical entities and relations with a much  
larger and more complex "internal reality" consisting of the modes  
of arithmetical truth. This latter reality is then no longer  
vulnerable in the same way to either reduction or elimination,  
though the task (substantially) remains, after a promising  
beginning, to connect it systematically and robustly with "observed  
reality".


It occurred to me that the relation between such a substratum and  
its truth domain might be suggested, albeit rather imperfectly, by  
an analogy with something like an LCD screen. The idea is that an  
enormously large (infinite?) set of possible dramatic storyli

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[David Nyman]

On 7 June 2014 20:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

*At step 7, it is not in principle. Like in the preceding protocol, we just
assume the existence of an infinite running of the UD in our infinite
(then) space-time structure.*

*The proposition is that if that is the case, and don't see white rabbits,
it means some computations are multiplied, and exploit (perhaps) the random
oracle inherent in that multiplication. *

OK, so the pedagogic purpose of step 7 is to persuade us that our
experiences *could* be the consequence of the above, but it doesn't yet
force that conclusion (because it could still be avoided in the way I have
suggested).


*The step 8 does not, and cannot, refute your point above, but it can
explain how far it goes near a god-of-the-gap move, or a magic move. It is
close to be proved, as to counteract to step 8 you are forced (in the
transfinite) to provide a matter which is non Turing emulable, and non FPI
recoverable. It looks like reifying a mystery to prevent a possible partial
solution to a mystery. Someone might add that matter needs a "Gods"
blessing, also.  *

Step 8, if I've understood it, shows that one can evacuate all traces of
"computation" from a "primordial" physical instantiation (either by
substituting a filmed record, under the particular contingencies of the
movie graph, or by systematically substituting each of the "computational
relations" by fortuitous physical events). This renders the ascription of
"computation" to the physical events as entirely gratuitous. Hence what
follows is either the abandonment of CTM, or alternatively the reversal
consequence. The reversal could only then be avoided by an appeal, as you
say, to some (presumably presently unknown) aspect of "primordial matter"
that is not Turing emulable in principle (e.g. that required actual
computational infinities). Even after such a move, any naturally motivated
appeal to "computation" and its putative relation with consciousness is
hardly any clearer than before.

My own intuition, for what its worth, has always been that any appeal to
"computation" on the assumption of "primordial matter" is somewhat suspect
and ad hoc. ISTM that what is supposed to be "primordial" about a specific
set of entities and their relations is precisely that they *exclusively*
underlie (or more correctly, comprise) everything that is "really real". So
the hierarchical structure of everything we observe thereafter - be it
physical, chemical, biological, physiological, etc. - would be deemed to be
underpinned, exclusively and exhaustively, by such a primordial substratum.

The higher-order levels in the hierarchy could always, at least in
principle, be reduced without loss to the primordial entities and their
relations. They are, IOW, *re-descriptions* of primordial reality, not
independent realities in themselves. If so, the problem in trying to add
"computation" to such a hierarchy is that it must suffer the same fate -
i.e. that of being reduced and eliminated as an ultimately supernumerary
re-description of what is "really" just the primordial substratum. And
consequently, if we attempt to attach consciousness to such a supernumerary
re-description, it must inevitably be exposed to similar reduction and
elimination. This is, I think, what the demonstrations in step 8 lay bare.

By contrast, after the reversal, the primordial entities and relations are
restricted to the natural numbers (or their equivalents) and their additive
and multiplicative relations. It used to trouble me that the same arguments
I have deployed above could seemingly equally be directed at this
alternative "primordial substratum". That is, that whatever was deemed to
"emerge" from arithmetic could in the final analysis always be reduced to
it again without loss and hence ultimately eliminated as being
independently real. But the critical difference here, compared with the
starting point of "primordial matter", seems to be the natural emulation of
computation and the universal machine in arithmetic. Their consequences in
logic seem, at least in principle, to offer a route out of the
reduction/elimination impasse by connecting an "outer structure" of basic
arithmetical entities and relations with a much larger and more complex
"internal reality" consisting of the modes of arithmetical truth. This
latter reality is then no longer vulnerable in the same way to either
reduction or elimination, though the task (substantially) remains, after a
promising beginning, to connect it systematically and robustly with
"observed reality".

It occurred to me that the relation between such a substratum and its truth
domain might be suggested, albeit rather imperfectly, by an analogy with
something like an LCD screen. The idea is that an enormously large
(infinite?) set of possible dramatic storylines can potentially be realised
by a finite set (in this case) of "fundamental" entities and their
relations (i.e. the pixels). Of course, the analogy immediately breaks down
becaus

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Jun 2014, at 17:23, David Nyman wrote:


On 12 February 2014 11:17, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

At step seven, the primitive materialist can still invoke a  
physicalist form of ultrafinitism, to prevent the comp reversal  
between physics and arithmetic (or number theology).


If I've grasped this, it's that one could attempt to avoid the  
reversal by claiming that the physical universe isn't (or mightn't  
be) sufficiently "robust" (i.e. physically extended?) to instantiate  
a physical UD that would run "forever". If so, this would presumably  
side-step the need to take the consequent infinities of computations  
into account.


Yees, that the whole point.





However, I've never felt fully in command of this step, actually.  
For example, why couldn't one argue that the physical universe is  
indeed sufficiently robust, in the sense intended, to support the  
infinite running of a UD, but it simply be the case that - in fact -  
*there is no such UD in existence*?



Yes, that certainly exists too. But it is not an interesting protocol  
to get the partial reversal of step seven: if there is a concrete UD*  
then the laws of physics = "the hunting of the arithmetical rabbits".


Then in step eight we quasi-eliminate moves like "small universe, or  
your robust but without UD, etc."






I seem to have missed the force of the implication (at step 7) that  
a physically instantiated, infinitely-running UD *must* be taken  
into account, given the simple fact of a physical universe  
sufficiently robust, *in principle*, to support its existence.


At step 7, it is not in principle. Like in the preceding protocol, we  
just assume the existence of an infinite running of the UD in our  
infinite (then) space-time structure.


The proposition is that if that is the case, and don't see white  
rabbits, it means some computations are multiplied, and exploit  
(perhaps) the random oracle inherent in that multiplication.





IOW, even given the comp assumption, why couldn't one still argue  
that all relevant computations - *absent actual physical evidence*  
of an infinitely-running UD - in fact supervene on physical brains  
and/or other non-biological physical digital machines?


By step 8. That moves above is shown introducing a "god-of-the-gap" to  
select a reality. It entails a sort of magic distinguishing a  
computation from all the others.


You can do this, as step 8 talk about "reality" and thus can only  
suggest the implausibility of such a move.


It is almost like using an ideology (the belief in a primary physical  
universe) to divert from a testable explanation of where the physical  
laws come from, and why the physical can hurt.


It is the same than Omnes, who invoke literally the abandon of  
rationalism to select one universe in his otherwise clear description  
of a (QM) multiverse.


The step 8 does not, and cannot, refute your point above, but it can  
explain how far it goes near a god-of-the-gap move, or a magic move.  
It is close to be proved, as to counteract to step 8 you are forced  
(in the transfinite) to provide a matter which is non Turing emulable,  
and non FPI recoverable. It looks like reifying a mystery to prevent a  
possible partial solution to a mystery. Someone might add that matter  
needs a "Gods" blessing, also.



Bruno






David


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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[David Nyman]

On 12 February 2014 11:17, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

At step seven, the primitive materialist can still invoke a physicalist
> form of ultrafinitism, to prevent the comp reversal between physics and
> arithmetic (or number theology).


If I've grasped this, it's that one could attempt to avoid the reversal by
claiming that the physical universe isn't (or mightn't be) sufficiently
"robust" (i.e. physically extended?) to instantiate a physical UD that
would run "forever". If so, this would presumably side-step the need to
take the consequent infinities of computations into account.

However, I've never felt fully in command of this step, actually. For
example, why couldn't one argue that the physical universe is indeed
sufficiently robust, in the sense intended, to support the infinite running
of a UD, but it simply be the case that - in fact - *there is no such UD in
existence*? I seem to have missed the force of the implication (at step 7)
that a physically instantiated, infinitely-running UD *must* be taken into
account, given the simple fact of a physical universe sufficiently robust,
*in principle*, to support its existence. IOW, even given the comp
assumption, why couldn't one still argue that all relevant computations -
*absent actual physical evidence* of an infinitely-running UD - in fact
supervene on physical brains and/or other non-biological physical digital
machines?

David

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Feb 2014, at 12:25, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-12 12:17 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 12 Feb 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb  wrote:

My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism  
in
the sense required for this argument.  I think consciousness depends  
of

consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about Peano's
arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
"ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous.  There are  
obvious
physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable.   
That's
why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of  
arithmetic?)
are possible independent of any external world - or looked at  
another way,
I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation  
simulate
a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist *relative*  
to

that world.


Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the initial
assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!


I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual
senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.

I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.

I'm not yet convinced it is a genuine problem for step 8, or not, as  
I still

don't feel I fully understand what that says yet.

At step seven, the primitive materialist can still invoke a  
physicalist form of ultrafinitism, to prevent the comp reversal  
between physics and arithmetic (or number theology).


Step 8, shows that if that move is done, then we have to attribute  
some non Turing emulable, but also non FPI recoverable properties in  
that primitive matter to instantiate consciousness. It gives to the  
primitive materialist a hint to refute comp: 1) to define what they  
mean by primitive matter,


It could be as Peter Jones said the thing that renders it real...  
only computations implemented in matter are real... AR as such would  
be false, a mathematical statement not implemented in matter is  
indeterminate, the truth value only come from implementation.  
Computationalism + realness ingredient could still be possible and  
evade UDA conclusion... at the costs of some "magical" property.



I am OK with this, and it is related on the "falsification" issue. It  
is an important thread on which we will have to come back.


Bruno






Quentin

and 2) to show that such matter relies on non FPI recoverable  
properties.
But that is equivalent with the test that comp offers, so it cannot  
be a refutation of comp->reversal, but of comp itself.


To be short. We will have opportunities to come back on this. But  
only if most are OK, with the steps 0-7.


Best,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Kim Jones]

> On 11 Feb 2014, at 2:15 pm, LizR  wrote:
> 
> The point is that if we take the assumptions of comp, then quantum 
> duplication, hypothetical matter transmitter duplication, and living from day 
> to day ALL involve the same amount of (or lack of) continuity.

Yes. The way I now understand it, with Comp, sleeping in your bed at night is 
"Death Lite."

Kim

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Feb 2014, at 18:34, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Isn't quantum mechanics based on the reals?


Yes. Like classical physics. And like, most plausibly the comp- 
physics, by the dovetailing on the reals inputs, which might play a  
role in the measure stabilization problem.  But this has to be  
extracted from the semantics of the comp propositional physics (the  
two, or three, material hypostases).


Bruno




On Sat, Feb 15, 2014 at 12:20 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 2/15/2014 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


You might keep in mind that astonishing truth (deducible from  
Matiyasevitch):
- The polynomial on the reals are not Turing universal (you cannot  
simulate an exponential with such polynomials)
- the polynomial on the integers are Turing universal, you can  
simulate exponential, and indeed all Turing machine with them. You  
can simulate the function sending the integers x on  
x^(x^(x^(x^...))) x times with a integers polynomial of dgree  
four!, but you cannot with any polynomials on the reals.


That is astonishing.  Where can I read a proof (without having to  
learn too much background)?


Brent

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Feb 2014, at 18:20, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/15/2014 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


You might keep in mind that astonishing truth (deducible from  
Matiyasevitch):
- The polynomial on the reals are not Turing universal (you cannot  
simulate an exponential with such polynomials)
- the polynomial on the integers are Turing universal, you can  
simulate exponential, and indeed all Turing machine with them. You  
can simulate the function sending the integers x on  
x^(x^(x^(x^...))) x times with a integers polynomial of dgree  
four!, but you cannot with any polynomials on the reals.


That is astonishing.  Where can I read a proof (without having to  
learn too much background)?


I would recommend the book by Matiyasevich(*). It is very good. You  
don't need a background (except "17 is prime", of course).
But you will need to do some work, of course. It took 70 years to  
Davis, Putnam, Robinson and Matiyasevich to prove this. The so called  
DPRM theorem. Many logicians thought they would not succeed.


Bruno


(*) You will find many accounts when googling on "matiyasevich  
hilbert's tenth problem".

+ "amazon.com" for the references.




Brent

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Russell Standish]

On Sat, Feb 15, 2014 at 09:20:43AM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
> On 2/15/2014 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >You might keep in mind that astonishing truth (deducible from Matiyasevitch):
> >- The polynomial on the reals are not Turing universal (you cannot
> >simulate an exponential with such polynomials)
> >- the polynomial on the integers are Turing universal, you can
> >simulate exponential, and indeed all Turing machine with them. You
> >can simulate the function sending the integers x on
> >x^(x^(x^(x^...))) x times with a integers polynomial of dgree
> >four!, but you cannot with any polynomials on the reals.
> 
> That is astonishing. Where can I read a proof (without having to learn too 
> much background)?
> 

You could try your luck with Wikipedia:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diophantine_equations

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matiyasevich's_theorem#Matiyasevich.27s_theorem

Cheers

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Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Russell Standish]

On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 09:30:52PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 14 Feb 2014, at 05:42, meekerdb wrote:
> 
> >On 2/13/2014 8:40 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> >>I had a look at your SANE paper, which is the main paper where
> >>you describe
> >>your work that you published since your thesis. I can sort of see you
> >>saying something a bit like the above on page 11 "Now DU [sic -
> >>should
> >>be UD in English] is emulated platonistically by the verifiable
> >>propositions of arithmetic. They are equivalent to sentences of the
> >>form ``if exists n such that P(n)'' with P(n) decidable."
> >>
> >>That is actually rather confusing. Obviously a UD executes all proofs
> >>of all true Sigma 1 sentences, but I think what you are trying
> >>to say that
> >>all programs executed by the UD correspond to a proof of some true
> >>Sigma 1 sentence. Is that obvious? I didn't get that when I read
> >>the SANE paper
> >>originally, only got it in context of your statements above.
> >
> >How can that be? Many programs executed by the UD are non-halting,
> >just loops.  Can they be considered to correspond to a proof?
> 
> Yes, like a failed proof. Like searching the first even prime number
> bigger than 2. The search for ExP(x) when Ax~P(x), but you don't
> know that. But for the probability calculus, you can limit yourself
> on the finite pieces of computations, as the first person will glue
> the infinities of them to experience their "consistent" infinite
> union.
> 
> Bruno
> 

I suspect its a little more subtle. Solomonoff's original formulation
of the universal prior failed the axioms of probability theory, because
it included all computation, even non-halting ones. This was fixed by
Levin, who restricted the sum to range over halting computations only.

I think this point needs further thought, as presumably the consistent
computations passing through my state will be dominated by non-halting
ones.

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Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Russell Standish]

> On 14 Feb 2014, at 05:40, Russell Standish wrote:
> 
> >thesis. This doesn't bother me - if you ever bothered to read my
> >thesis (not that I'm recommending you do so), you would find it
> >consists of two faily different topics, with only the most tenuous
> >connection between them. 

Oopsa-daisy! All for the lack of an "r". For the record, I didn't fail
my PhD :).


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Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

[LizR]

On 16 February 2014 00:14, Alberto G. Corona  wrote:

> ;)
>
> From what I observed here, people in this list pass trough the following
> phases:
>
> 1- enter with an apparently bright idea
> 2- is exposed to comp bombardment
> 3- comp seduction
> 4- comp dislike (really comp explains everything and nothing. That means
> nothing)
> 5- comp aversion (too much comp, every discussion ends in a single
> alternative: comp)
> 6- comp resignation (maybe there is something more that I do not manage to
> catch from comp. Occasionally there is some room for what he really like.
> Normally the first five or ten comments of a thread)
>
> finally a three alternative multiverse appears:
>
> 7 comp nirvana : He enter in the mysticism of machine dreams, comp
> soteriology and comp theogony while he look at modal logic expressions and
> smoke a pipe of marihuana
> or
> 7' - comp Hell: the Yang of the comp: He is lost in the fifteen line  of a
> modal logic formula for an Eternity. Later on, he discover that it was
> something trivial, but it was obfuscated and intimidated by the formulas.
> or
> 7''- teleportation to another list with a certain substitution level.
>
> Teehee.

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Feb 2014, at 18:05, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/15/2014 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 Feb 2014, at 18:06, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/14/2014 1:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:

On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:








It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real  
physics.






hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.


So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it  
ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is  
false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done,  
not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not  
done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non  
computable).


You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp +  
theaetetus + we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming  
or simulated at a higher level). OK?  (I think se have  
discussed this before, but it is OK to come back, as this is  
not so easy).


So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it  
is true but at a lower level and what we have observed that  
appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level.


Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe  
then it cannot confirm comp.


I guess you mean "cannot prove, or confirm in some definitive  
way, comp".


No, I meant something stronger than that.  I meant that what we  
observe cannot count in favor of comp.


According to Deustch, nothing can count in favor of any theory. We  
could only refute a theory, but positive confirmation does not lake  
sense, according to him. I am not sanguine about this, and I can  
make sense that a non-refutation can add credence to a theory, but  
not that much.


What most adds credence is a surprising prediction that is  
empirically confirmed.


That is not my task. I translate a problem that anyone assuming comp  
has to solve.


In a sense, I refute physicalism, in the comp theory.

I search the truth, not to impress colleague.

In passing I show a rationalist conception of reality which is  
Plotinian and Non Aristotelician.


All what I described could have been found before QM, and the quantum  
aspect of nature could have been seen as a surprising prediction.


Well, actually, the comparison is not yet finished. Z1* is somehow a  
generator of surprising predictions, as it might depart from the  
quantum prediction.


Don't ask to much, the machine/number theological science is in its  
infacy, to say the least.


Bruno






Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Feb 2014, at 17:55, John Clark wrote:


On 15 February 2014 09:03, John Mikes  wrote:

> LizR: but WHO is the observer?

The one great advantage that Many Worlds has over other quantum  
interpretations is that Everett doesn't need to answer that  
question. That's the reason I like it.



Everett needs a machine able to memorize succession of measurement  
results. He needs comp or some weakening of it.


Yes, that is what I like in Everett too.

But then comp forces us to push Everett's logic farer, on the  
arithmetical spectrum.


You miss this because you confuse the unique 1p with the 3-1p. If I  
explain with the equivalent unique 1-1-p, you throw back the non  
unique 3-1-1 p, endlessly.


You might not listen to yourself, nor to your many selves (after  
duplications experiences).


The "3" "1" p distinction makes all uses of the pronouns unambiguous  
as far as they need for the reasoning to proceed.


You seem to add the noise to make obscure something which is actually  
very simple and clear, in 3p sharable notions.


Bruno




  John K Clark







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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Feb 2014, at 14:10, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-15 10:01 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :


I don't beg the question, I don't see a problem generating a  
virtual world where F=ma does not hold true... that world exists in  
an infinity of versions in the UD deployment as our own reality...  
You have no point proving our own reality could not be a "dream" in  
that sense... The only thing that should render our own reality  
"more" real, is that it certainly requires less rules than a  
reality where F=ma is false...


Not at all. By the invariance of the first person, the number of  
rules and the complexity of the explanations/programs is not  
relevant. If not I would have solve the measure problem by an appeal  
to Kolmogorov or Chaitin complexity. But this cannot work. It is  
only in the "self-multiplication" factors that the laws of physics  
can become stable. nature use linearity, and the discovery of  
arithmetical quantum logic confirms up to now that fact. It makes  
the Everett multiplication of populations (the first person plural)  
protecting comp from solipsism.






All pieces of dreams are consistent with the actual state of a  
sentient being.
That is the origin of the white rabbits. if our brain is a  
universal machine, we can can be failed, and are actually failed in  
infinities of computations. UDA made the laws of physics in a  
probability calculus, assuming the measure exist: that is: a law of  
physics is what multiplies the normal histories again the aberrant  
one.


Yes but you don't have that measure nor a way to calculate it,


I do. That's what Z1* & Co. are supposed to provide. It is  
technically complex to do, but everything is explained here. the  
rest are pure open problem in math.




you don't know it and you can't know that our reality does win the  
measure battle.


I make this testable, of course I need definitions (of belief,  
knowledge, observation, in the ideal case of the self-referentially  
correct machine needed to extract the "correct" physics).




Anyway the fact that almost anything is possible (with different  
proportion as a measure is assumed), means that *no* measure can  
invalidate computationalism...


Then no measure can invalidate Everett QM for the same reason. Comp  
and QM makes both physics into a statistics.



I don't think MWI is falsifiable either...


Of course. We can only falsifies the statistics.








computationalism is a metaphysical stands and up to now in your  
argumentation I see nothing that could falsify comp... You always  
say to compare physics to comp physics, but it's a dead end, no  
contradiction can be inferred from that.


I cannot make sense of that. That opinion was widely hold before  
1991, as X1* and Z1* was believed to collapse the modal logic, due  
to the fact that the "& p" and "p->[]p" seemed to impose  
simultaneously antisymmetry and symmetry, but the nuances brought  
eventually by incompleteness eventually refuted, amazingly enough,  
that collapse.  That is important as it makes comp distinguishing  
clearly comp physical laws from comp possible geographies.


What are comp physical laws then ? if it is an "open problem"  
because calculus is intractable... then comp is not falsifiable, you  
can't use falsifiability argument if such falsification is  
intractable.


The comp + theatetus comp theory of observable is Z1*. A quantum logic  
has already been derived. A theorem prover has been implemented.






And I still don't understand how comp can sort geographical laws  
from deeper laws.



The FPI makes consciousness differentiating on the infinite  
computations existing in arithmetic. Geography is the not materialist  
necessity, or the materialist contingency. In arithmetic this  
correspond to the diamond of some of the material hypostases defined  
by the intensional variant []p & <>p, or []p & <>t.













This can be translated in computer science/arithmetic, and the case  
of probability one can be studied by its logic. This, all Löbian  
machine can understand by "introspection" (self-reference) and so  
the physics is derivable from self-reference only, and then tested  
with the observation. Then the result is that a physical (lawful)  
physical reality does exist, with a fundamental logic which is  
already enough quantum-like to let us hope to have an equivalent of  
Gleason theorem, and in that case the white rabbit problem is  
solved *only* by the quantum logic we observe.
The infinity of computational consistent relative state obeys the  
same logic in an artificial simulation and in the physics, emerging  
(or not) from the sum on UD*.





That one is determined by computer science. The case of the  
"probability one" logic is given by the arithmetical quantization.






so it is below the substitution level, because the level is  
finite or comp is false.



If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma,

How would it proves that ?

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Richard Ruquist]

Isn't quantum mechanics based on the reals?


On Sat, Feb 15, 2014 at 12:20 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 2/15/2014 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  You might keep in mind that astonishing truth (deducible from
> Matiyasevitch):
> - The polynomial on the reals are not Turing universal (you cannot
> simulate an exponential with such polynomials)
> - the polynomial on the integers are Turing universal, you can simulate
> exponential, and indeed all Turing machine with them. You can simulate the
> function sending the integers x on x^(x^(x^(x^...))) x times with a
> integers polynomial of dgree four!, but you cannot with any polynomials on
> the reals.
>
>
> That is astonishing.  Where can I read a proof (without having to learn
> too much background)?
>
> Brent
>
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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[meekerdb]

On 2/15/2014 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


You might keep in mind that astonishing truth (deducible from Matiyasevitch):
- The polynomial on the reals are not Turing universal (you cannot simulate an 
exponential with such polynomials)
- the polynomial on the integers are Turing universal, you can simulate exponential, and 
indeed all Turing machine with them. You can simulate the function sending the integers 
x on x^(x^(x^(x^...))) x times with a integers polynomial of dgree four!, but you cannot 
with any polynomials on the reals.


That is astonishing. Where can I read a proof (without having to learn too much 
background)?

Brent

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[meekerdb]

On 2/15/2014 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 Feb 2014, at 18:06, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/14/2014 1:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal >:



On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>:


On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:


On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:








It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics.





hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.


So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by flying) 
then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a 
simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not 
done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable).


You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are at the 
base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). OK?  (I think 
se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come back, as this is not so easy).


So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a 
lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or 
simulation at a higher level.


Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot 
confirm comp.


I guess you mean "cannot prove, or confirm in some definitive way, comp".


No, I meant something stronger than that.  I meant that what we observe cannot count in 
favor of comp.


According to Deustch, nothing can count in favor of any theory. We could only refute a 
theory, but positive confirmation does not lake sense, according to him. I am not 
sanguine about this, and I can make sense that a non-refutation can add credence to a 
theory, but not that much.


What most adds credence is a surprising prediction that is empirically 
confirmed.

Brent

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[John Clark]

On 15 February 2014 09:03, John Mikes  wrote:


> > LizR: but WHO is the observer?


The one great advantage that Many Worlds has over other quantum
interpretations is that Everett doesn't need to answer that question.
That's the reason I like it.

  John K Clark

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-15 10:01 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

>
> I don't beg the question, I don't see a problem generating a virtual world
> where F=ma does not hold true... that world exists in an infinity of
> versions in the UD deployment as our own reality... You have no point
> proving our own reality could not be a "dream" in that sense... The only
> thing that should render our own reality "more" real, is that it certainly
> requires less rules than a reality where F=ma is false...
>
>
> Not at all. By the invariance of the first person, the number of rules and
> the complexity of the explanations/programs is not relevant. If not I would
> have solve the measure problem by an appeal to Kolmogorov or Chaitin
> complexity. But this cannot work. It is only in the "self-multiplication"
> factors that the laws of physics can become stable. nature use linearity,
> and the discovery of arithmetical quantum logic confirms up to now that
> fact. It makes the Everett multiplication of populations (the first person
> plural) protecting comp from solipsism.
>
>
>
>
>> All pieces of dreams are consistent with the actual state of a sentient
>> being.
>> That is the origin of the white rabbits. if our brain is a universal
>> machine, we can can be failed, and are actually failed in infinities of
>> computations. UDA made the laws of physics in a probability calculus,
>> assuming the measure exist: that is: a law of physics is what multiplies
>> the normal histories again the aberrant one.
>>
>
> Yes but you don't have that measure nor a way to calculate it,
>
>
> I do. That's what Z1* & Co. are supposed to provide. It is technically
> complex to do, but everything is explained here. the rest are pure open
> problem in math.
>
>
>
> you don't know it and you can't know that our reality does win the measure
> battle.
>
>
> I make this testable, of course I need definitions (of belief, knowledge,
> observation, in the ideal case of the self-referentially correct machine
> needed to extract the "correct" physics).
>
>
>
> Anyway the fact that almost anything is possible (with different
> proportion as a measure is assumed), means that *no* measure can invalidate
> computationalism...
>
>
> Then no measure can invalidate Everett QM for the same reason. Comp and QM
> makes both physics into a statistics.
>
>
I don't think MWI is falsifiable either...


>
>
>
> computationalism is a metaphysical stands and up to now in your
> argumentation I see nothing that could falsify comp... You always say to
> compare physics to comp physics, but it's a dead end, no contradiction can
> be inferred from that.
>
>
> I cannot make sense of that. That opinion was widely hold before 1991, as
> X1* and Z1* was believed to collapse the modal logic, due to the fact that
> the "& p" and "p->[]p" seemed to impose simultaneously antisymmetry and
> symmetry, but the nuances brought eventually by incompleteness eventually
> refuted, amazingly enough, that collapse.  That is important as it makes
> comp distinguishing clearly comp physical laws from comp possible
> geographies.
>

What are comp physical laws then ? if it is an "open problem" because
calculus is intractable... then comp is not falsifiable, you can't use
falsifiability argument if such falsification is intractable.

And I still don't understand how comp can sort geographical laws from
deeper laws.


>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> This can be translated in computer science/arithmetic, and the case of
>> probability one can be studied by its logic. This, all Löbian machine can
>> understand by "introspection" (self-reference) and so the physics is
>> derivable from self-reference only, and then tested with the observation.
>> Then the result is that a physical (lawful) physical reality does exist,
>> with a fundamental logic which is already enough quantum-like to let us
>> hope to have an equivalent of Gleason theorem, and in that case the white
>> rabbit problem is solved *only* by the quantum logic we observe.
>> The infinity of computational consistent relative state obeys the same
>> logic in an artificial simulation and in the physics, emerging (or not)
>> from the sum on UD*.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>  That one is determined by computer science. The case of the
>>> "probability one" logic is given by the arithmetical quantization.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> so it is below the substitution level, because the level is finite or
>>> comp is false.
>>>
>>>

 If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma,

>>>
>>> How would it proves that ?
>>>
>>>
>>> By showing that Z1* gives the good type of quantum logic, enough to
>>> assure Gleason theorem, and derive the measure from some canonical
>>> (Hilbertian) semantics. Z1* is already able to decide if the Hilbert space
>>> is finitely dimension, or infinitely dimensional. Then dimension is related
>>> to the probability calculus (by works by many quantum logicians), and
>>> normally, arithmetic add infinitely many constraints at the first order
>>>

Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Feb 2014, at 12:14, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


;)

From what I observed here, people in this list pass trough the  
following phases:


1- enter with an apparently bright idea
2- is exposed to comp bombardment
3- comp seduction
4- comp dislike (really comp explains everything and nothing. That  
means nothing)
5- comp aversion (too much comp, every discussion ends in a single  
alternative: comp)


If there is no flaws, the "real" alternative is more between  
Aristotle's theology (like materialism, naturalism) and Plato's  
theology (where the physical reality is a product of something non  
physical).




6- comp resignation (maybe there is something more that I do not  
manage to catch from comp. Occasionally there is some room for what  
he really like. Normally the first five or ten comments of a thread)


finally a three alternative multiverse appears:

7 comp nirvana : He enter in the mysticism of machine dreams, comp  
soteriology and comp theogony while he look at modal logic  
expressions and smoke a pipe of marihuana

or
7' - comp Hell: the Yang of the comp: He is lost in the fifteen  
line  of a modal logic formula for an Eternity. Later on, he  
discover that it was something trivial, but it was obfuscated and  
intimidated by the formulas.

or
7''- teleportation to another list with a certain substitution level.


Well, that is very bad philosophy, but at least it is funny.

Bruno







2014-02-14 21:39 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 14 Feb 2014, at 12:17, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

To summarize: there are all possible combinations of 1 and 0's  
therefore everithing can be made isomorphic or "emergent" from 0  
and 1's.


?



So stop thinking and praise 0s and 1s hypothesis.


?





-Why people make apparently weird distincitions?
it does not matter: comp says nothing about it.  it depends on FPI
- Why they believe in God?
 God is the universal machine.


the Man is the universal machine. God is not a machine, not even the  
inner God, except perhaps only in the eyes of God.


I think you are writing anything going through your mind, is it?


- Yes but why people distinguish between
god is the universal machine and blah blah blah.


That is akin to a comp blaspheme!





-Yes, but why people... .
 that is FPI as i said before
- Yes but...
I dont´t really care about what you question. but comp UDA and FPI  
are very nice ideas


and so on


You can dislike a theory, but you must grasp it correctly first.

Bruno







2014-02-12 20:37 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :
Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on  
modal logic, directly related to the machine discourse (and this  
will be justified later, as it is not obvious at all).



On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote:
On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish > wrote:

On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote:
>
> You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong  
with it! :-)

>
> (Sorry!)
>
> I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way  
before it's
> likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't  
string theory
> retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that  
was a positive

> result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently...
>

I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of  
incommunicable

facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM.

I said "apparently" because I have no idea how he does it.


I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be  
possible to simulate consciousness because (we think) any  
physical process can be simulated and consciousness necessarily  
accompanies the physical processes of one's brain. This is the  
bet of "saying yes to the doctor".


With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor  
consciousness. We can only simulate the relevant part of the  
brain so that consciousness is preserved. The price to pay is  
that matter becomes something emergent in the 1p views (1p  
plural) and cannot be simulated or emulated.





But there's a catch.  When we simulate an aircraft flying or a  
weather system those have a reference in the 'real' world and  
that's why they are simulations.  But if we simulate a conscious  
brain the consciousness will be 'real' consciousness. So  
simulating conscious is in a sense impossible; we may be able to  
produce it but we can't simulate it.  Consciousness must be  
consciousness of something, but it need not be anything physical;


It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical.


So you're saying that we cannot simulate matter or consciousness.   
But I think we can still produce consciousness by manipulating  
matter - we can still build a conscious Mars rover.



With comp we can say that, but only as a matter of speaking. Mars  
Rover is in Heaven, and the hard task of computer we send 

Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

[Alberto G. Corona]

;)

>From what I observed here, people in this list pass trough the following
phases:

1- enter with an apparently bright idea
2- is exposed to comp bombardment
3- comp seduction
4- comp dislike (really comp explains everything and nothing. That means
nothing)
5- comp aversion (too much comp, every discussion ends in a single
alternative: comp)
6- comp resignation (maybe there is something more that I do not manage to
catch from comp. Occasionally there is some room for what he really like.
Normally the first five or ten comments of a thread)

finally a three alternative multiverse appears:

7 comp nirvana : He enter in the mysticism of machine dreams, comp
soteriology and comp theogony while he look at modal logic expressions and
smoke a pipe of marihuana
or
7' - comp Hell: the Yang of the comp: He is lost in the fifteen line  of a
modal logic formula for an Eternity. Later on, he discover that it was
something trivial, but it was obfuscated and intimidated by the formulas.
or
7''- teleportation to another list with a certain substitution level.



2014-02-14 21:39 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

>
> On 14 Feb 2014, at 12:17, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>
> To summarize: there are all possible combinations of 1 and 0's therefore
> everithing can be made isomorphic or "emergent" from 0 and 1's.
>
>
> ?
>
>
> So stop thinking and praise 0s and 1s hypothesis.
>
>
> ?
>
>
>
>
> -Why people make apparently weird distincitions?
> it does not matter: comp says nothing about it.  it depends on FPI
> - Why they believe in God?
>  God is the universal machine.
>
>
> the Man is the universal machine. God is not a machine, not even the inner
> God, except perhaps only in the eyes of God.
>
> I think you are writing anything going through your mind, is it?
>
> - Yes but why people distinguish between
> god is the universal machine and blah blah blah.
>
>
> That is akin to a comp blaspheme!
>
>
>
>
> -Yes, but why people... .
>  that is FPI as i said before
> - Yes but...
> I dont´t really care about what you question. but comp UDA and FPI are
> very nice ideas
>
> and so on
>
>
> You can dislike a theory, but you must grasp it correctly first.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> 2014-02-12 20:37 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :
>
>> Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on modal
>> logic, directly related to the machine discourse (and this will be
>> justified later, as it is not obvious at all).
>>
>>
>> On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:28, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>  On 2/12/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>  On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>   On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote:
>>
>>  On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote:
>>> >
>>> > You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong with it!
>>> :-)
>>> >
>>> > (Sorry!)
>>> >
>>> > I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way before it's
>>> > likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't string
>>> theory
>>> > retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that was a
>>> positive
>>> > result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently...
>>> >
>>>
>>>  I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of incommunicable
>>> facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM.
>>>
>>
>>  I said "apparently" because I have no idea how he does it.
>>
>>
>> I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be possible to
>> simulate consciousness because (we think) any physical process can be
>> simulated and consciousness necessarily accompanies the physical processes
>> of one's brain. This is the bet of "saying yes to the doctor".
>>
>>
>>  With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor consciousness. We
>> can only simulate the relevant part of the brain so that consciousness is
>> preserved. The price to pay is that matter becomes something emergent in
>> the 1p views (1p plural) and cannot be simulated or emulated.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  But there's a catch.  When we simulate an aircraft flying or a weather
>> system those have a reference in the 'real' world and that's why they are
>> simulations.  But if we simulate a conscious brain the consciousness will
>> be 'real' consciousness. So simulating conscious is in a sense impossible;
>> we may be able to produce it but we can't simulate it.  Consciousness must
>> be consciousness of something, but it need not be anything physical;
>>
>>
>>  It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical.
>>
>>
>> So you're saying that we cannot simulate matter or consciousness.  But I
>> think we can still produce consciousness by manipulating matter - we can
>> still build a conscious Mars rover.
>>
>>
>>
>> With comp we can say that, but only as a matter of speaking. Mars Rover
>> is in Heaven, and the hard task of computer we send on Mars is to
>> distracted it enough so that it can manifest its consciousness to us,
>> notably by sending us interesting data on mars.

Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2014, at 23:27, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/14/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/13/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

What's the definition of G*?


G* is a quite peculiar modal logic. It has as axioms all the  
theorem of G, + the axiom:


[]A -> A

But is NOT close for the necessitation rule (can you see why that  
is impossible). This entails that G* has no Kripke semantics. But  
it has some semantics in term of infinite sequence of G-multiverse.


By Solovay second theorem, G* axiomatizes what is true on the  
machine. Not just what is provable by the machine.
G* minus G is not empty (it contains <>t, <><>t, <><><>t, ... for  
example), and it axiomatizes the true but non provable modal  
(provability) sentences.






It seems that the notation is inadequate since it depends on the  
accesibility relation: For example if the accessibility relation  
is T (for teleportation) then M and W may be false in  
Helsinki


Why.


Because teleportation isn't possible (so far as we know).


? Comp implies the possibility in principle of classical  
teleportation, (UDA step 1). We don't need more.


I was merely using teleportation as an example to illustrate that  
"possible" is a relative concept depending on the accessiblity  
relation.


OK. But with comp we define the box through computer science, and  
isolate the accessibility relation from the math of the boxes, as UDA  
shows it is the only way to do, given that we "cannot look at nature"  
in that approach (cf the treachery).
That is an original and subtle points that perhaps some people are  
still missing.






What does "possible in principle" mean?


But this was in UDA. It means that if the brain is some machine, we  
can survive by substituting an equivalent one, at some level. I assume  
teleportation being practical, in step 1-6, but this assumption is  
eliminated in steps 7 and 8.





Does it only mean "not self contradictory"?


No, it means that to make this absolutely impossible in theory, you  
need non-comp type of assumption.





Does it mean consistent with our best understanding of physics?


No, it means consistent with our best understanding of cognition,  
life, brains and the notion of computation.




Lawrence Krauss discusses the possibility in his book "The Physics  
of Star Trek".  He estimates that it would take more energy than  
available in the Milky Way just to obtain the information to  
teleport a human being.


Classically or quantum mechanically?



Of course putting that much mass/energy in the vicinity of the human  
being would create a black hole.  So what does "possible" really mean?


The possibility of classical teleportation It is a way to explain what  
is meant by saying that the brain is a machine. Nothing else.
Then in AUDA, there come 8 notion of possibility, defined in  
arithmetical terms, all based on the math of self-reference.
Like Jean-Paul Delahaye wrote, you can compare such thought experience  
with Einstein or Maxwell thought experiences to justify relativity or  
electro-magnetism, before doing the math. To move along with a photon  
is also hard to do in practice.


Bruno





Brent





Which brings up another point that bothers me: We are using [] as  
an operator "necessary", and <> as "possible" as just symbols with  
a defined syntax, but in application we must say what they mean.   
What is necessary and what is possible are dependent on context;  
just as above you casually assume that teleportation is possible -  
even though you well know it isn't - just because you can write  
.  This is similar to my complaint about arithmetical realism;  
it is a sort of logical realism.



I use "[] and "<>" usually when I explain modal logic, through many  
examples of different modal systems.


In the translation of UDA in arithmetic, all modalities are defined  
in term of the provability predicate, that is the Gödel's Beweisbar.


What is necessary or possible depends on the worlds, yes, that is  
what Kripke is all about.


All I explain is based on the fact that teleportation is possible  
*theoretically*. Yes.


That it is hard to do in practice is not relevant. You could stop  
at step 0, because the artificial brain is also impossible in  
practice today. But it is not relevant.







We assume comp. They are both true, as H T M and H T W, if  
teleportation is the accessibility relation.






while using F (for flying) would make M and W true.


OK, but it is the same with T.


No it's not.  I can fly to Moscow.


By definition of the protocol in step three. If not you should have  
made such remark at step 0, and just say no to the doctor. You just  
say non-comp (even in theory).


The practicality of teleportation is not relevant for the  
theoretical proof.


Bruno


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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2014, at 22:35, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/14/2014 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 Feb 2014, at 04:19, Russell Standish wrote:


On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 06:07:00PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
















hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.






...




Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown,


It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation,  
which

is already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic).



...


The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the
artificial simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics,  
which

does not result from the interference below the subst. level.

If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, it
will looks "dreamy" to me, I will see that I am not in a real  
(comp)

physical reality, I will see the discrepancy.




F=ma is more of a definition actually, than a logical constraint. It
is how we define (and operationally measure) "force".


No problem with that, and that is why a answered with F = KmM/r^2,  
but that was not much relevant.






If you have a copy of Vic Stenger's "Comprehensible Cosmos", he
discusses this from page 48.


No problem. I appreciate the argument.
I read it online, and it was taught by some physicists.



Actually, the correct relativistic form is F=dp/dt, where p is the 3
momentum of the object under consideration. F=ma is its low velocity
approximation.


Sure. Even F = dp/dt is a classical approximation deducible from  
Feynman integral.





So I would be surprised if COMP fails to prove Newton's second law -
it would mean someone was using terminology inconsistently.


F= ma is like H phi = E phi. All is in F, or H. Those equality  
should be laws indeed, and deducible from deeper laws. It might be  
more doubtful for F or H, except that the Turing universality of  
the vacuum suggest some "H = 0", à-la Dewitt-Wheeler. But we are  
not yet there ..


But this seems to point to a deeper problem.  If we elaborate H and  
E as operators and psi as a ray in a Hilbert space and if we further  
define the Hilbert space, we will still have a symbolic expression  
which we can related ostensively to some apparatus.  But we will  
never get down to an arithmetical computation.


That would not make sense. In the (comp) physical reality, we can only  
get down physically, on something physical.
Comp does not make matter into something made of number or  
computations. it is only a point of view, or an internal angle of  
arithmetic seen from inside. If we get H psi = E psi, we will have the  
same ostensive relation with apparatus in comp.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Feb 2014, at 00:15, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/14/2014 2:17 PM, LizR wrote:

On 15 February 2014 10:57, meekerdb  wrote:
On 2/14/2014 12:32 PM, LizR wrote:

On 15 February 2014 09:12, meekerdb  wrote:
On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With  
others it is not.
The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply  
approximation of natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can  
analogically add and multiply the real numbers, and that is not  
Turing universal. (That is not entirely obvious).


That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular  
slide rules).  Of course you can add and subtract on a slide rule  
as well as multiply, divide, exponentiate, and compute the value  
of other functions encoded on the rule (sin, tan), but the rule  
doesn't do it by itself; you provide the sequence of operations  
consisting of reading a cursor and moving the rule.  So why would  
that not be Turing universal?


I would guess because it isn't digital, but analogue? 'cause  
Turing machines use discrete symbols, while slide rules use a  
continuous scale?


Yes, of course a real slide rule can't encode arbitrarily large  
integers because it only has finitely many distinguisable locations  
for the the cursor.  But since a Turing machine is allowed an  
infinite tape, suppose my slide rule (Sliding Machine?) is allowed  
to expand the number of distinct positions arbitrarily?


So you don't think the analogue/digital thing matters? I suppose a  
person using a slide rule could be trusted to correct for small  
errorsor could they?


I think it matters because the power of arithmetic to encode proofs  
depends on it having arbitrarily long strings of digits.  But just  
as Turing idealized infinite tapes, I can idealize arbitrarily large  
slide rules to get arbitrarily high precision.


Not sure this works (despite my allusion to infinitely good  
eyesight).  You might need actual-infinite eye sight, because  
arbitrary good eye sight might still ask you for an infinite  
analogical task. You zoom and zoom and zoom ... and after each finite  
of time, you still don't know if you get 1, or 1+  
0.001, for example, where  digital program could,  
for some reason, find the exact result.


You might keep in mind that astonishing truth (deducible from  
Matiyasevitch):
- The polynomial on the reals are not Turing universal (you cannot  
simulate an exponential with such polynomials)
- the polynomial on the integers are Turing universal, you can  
simulate exponential, and indeed all Turing machine with them. You can  
simulate the function sending the integers x on x^(x^(x^(x^...))) x  
times with a integers polynomial of dgree four!, but you cannot with  
any polynomials on the reals.


Bruno






Brent

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2014, at 21:32, LizR wrote:


On 15 February 2014 09:12, meekerdb  wrote:
On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With  
others it is not.
The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply  
approximation of natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can  
analogically add and multiply the real numbers, and that is not  
Turing universal. (That is not entirely obvious).


That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular  
slide rules).  Of course you can add and subtract on a slide rule as  
well as multiply, divide, exponentiate, and compute the value of  
other functions encoded on the rule (sin, tan), but the rule doesn't  
do it by itself; you provide the sequence of operations consisting  
of reading a cursor and moving the rule.  So why would that not be  
Turing universal?


I would guess because it isn't digital, but analogue? 'cause Turing  
machines use discrete symbols, while slide rules use a continuous  
scale?


Yes, you can sum up in that way.
Formally you can relate that to the fact that the first order theory  
of the real is not Turing complete (indeed it is decidable).


In analysis, if you get a sequence like 0.9, 0.99, 0.999, ..., and you  
know that it converge, but you don't know that it converge toward 1  
(it might converge toward 0, ...9998), you still know that  
your problem admits a solution (and indeed Newton or Sturm Liouville  
provided algorithm to find those solutions when they exist). But the  
digital world is more demanding, as it needs, not just better and  
better approximations, but it needs exact solutions.


Bruno


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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2014, at 21:12, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With  
others it is not.
The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply  
approximation of natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can  
analogically add and multiply the real numbers, and that is not  
Turing universal. (That is not entirely obvious).


That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular  
slide rules).  Of course you can add and subtract on a slide rule as  
well as multiply, divide, exponentiate, and compute the value of  
other functions encoded on the rule (sin, tan), but the rule doesn't  
do it by itself; you provide the sequence of operations consisting  
of reading a cursor and moving the rule.  So why would that not be  
Turing universal?


Because you work in first-order analysis, where you can add and  
multiply real numbers, but still cannot differentiate


1,  
00100100111...


and 1.

Another way to see that slides rules are not universal is in trying to  
define a compiler FORTRAN--> slides rules. In that case, ... well I  
don't know, if you have the sin, you might be able to find the natural  
numbers, by solving sin(2pi*x) = 0, but you will get analogical  
natural numbers, and not clear digital 0, 1, 2, ...
May be slide rule + your moves + infinitely good eye sight might be  
Turing universal.


May be slides rules  can be Turing Universal "in a ring", in the sense  
of Blum, Shub and Smale. I am not sure.


Bruno






Brent

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2014, at 18:06, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/14/2014 1:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:

On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:








It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real  
physics.






hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.


So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it  
ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is  
false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not  
by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done  
by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable).


You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus  
+ we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated  
at a higher level). OK?  (I think se have discussed this before,  
but it is OK to come back, as this is not so easy).


So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is  
true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears  
to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level.


Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe  
then it cannot confirm comp.


I guess you mean "cannot prove, or confirm in some definitive way,  
comp".


No, I meant something stronger than that.  I meant that what we  
observe cannot count in favor of comp.


According to Deustch, nothing can count in favor of any theory. We  
could only refute a theory, but positive confirmation does not lake  
sense, according to him. I am not sanguine about this, and I can make  
sense that a non-refutation can add credence to a theory, but not that  
much.
Anyway, as we get a quantum logic, and many-worlds, what we observe  
today can count as much in favor of comp than of QM.
Then you have the empirical reason in favor of comp, like the  
intuition provided by molecular biology.
The real point is that what we observe might refute comp, like it  
might refute QM.


Bruno







Brent

Correct. I have already explain this with some detail. It is the  
same as the fact that we can know that we dream (lucidity), but  
that we cannot know we are awake.
This is also a consequence of the classical theory of knowledge, or  
of Theaetetus. Not just comp. But comp confirms this.
(Actually, we know something more general: we cannot confirm  
definitively *any* theory about reality).


Bruno



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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2014, at 17:11, David Nyman wrote:


On 14 February 2014 15:49, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

That is the origin of the white rabbits. if our brain is a universal  
machine, we can can be failed, and are actually failed in infinities  
of computations.


Do you mean "fooled"?


I guess you are right.  I thought "failed" was english.

Bruno


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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2014, at 17:03, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-14 16:49 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 13 Feb 2014, at 21:12, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 21:05 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 13 Feb 2014, at 19:10, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 18:07 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
















hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.


So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it  
ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is  
false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done,  
not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not  
done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non  
computable).


I think you can't conclude anything, because as I point out, any  
measure you made is geographical under comp hence no measure can  
invalidate it.


I guess you mean any "measurement" I made is geographical.
I agree that the making of the measurement is geographical, but  
what I measure might be physically universal, unless physics is  
only geography, but that is already refuted by comp, thanks to  
the non collapse of the modal logic brought by the intensional  
variants.
Comp here already predicts that *there* is a physical part common  
to all geographies, and that is what I call "physical laws", as  
the rest will be sort of contingencies.







You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp +  
theaetetus + we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming  
or simulated at a higher level). OK?


Ok... but it is no more comp. The "we are at the base level of  
physics" is the same thing as primitive matter, Peter Jones  
realness ingredient.


Not at all. By definition of that realness ingredient, it cannot  
be tested, except trivially by being "conscious", as all virtual  
being not implemented in physics are non-conscious in that Peter  
Jones theory. This makes Peter Jones "realness" neither  
confirmable nor refutable (and thus pseudo-religious somehow, or  
just a reification philosophical mistake).


But in our case, that "realness" (defined by the satisfiability  
of comp + theaetetus + "non-dream") is *refutable*. That is why I  
explained (to Brett Hall, notably) that a computationalist can  
test if he belongs to an (higher order, physical (in the comp  
sense)) simulation.
If you program that simulation, and I am the simulated observer,  
I can derive the physical laws from comp (without doing any  
observation) and compare it to what I observe. If that fits, I  
can't conclude anything (and my 1p will overlap on reality and  
the simulation. I still derived the correct laws of physics), but  
if I find a discrepancy (and if you don't mess with my virtual  
brain so that I stay "correct") then I can conclude that (~comp V  
~Theaetetus V ~simulation).


As long as you don't specify anything measurable that can be use  
to claim a discrepancy... you can't do that...


I give an infinity of such specification. If my environment obeys  
to the physics Z1*, qZ1*, I can't conclude anything, but I will  
still derive the correct laws, either by introspection, or by  
observation. If my environment does not obey to Z1*, I am in an  
artificial simulation.


That's not something you can measure, please be specific, what do  
you see as experiment we could do to prove or disprove comp, what  
measurement would be able to falsify comp, please be precise.



But we cannot measure a physical laws. We can only postulate it,  
and see if our measurement confirms it or not.


Or we can derive laws, from a theory which is postulated.

So from QM, we can derive that the observable obeys a quantum logic.

From comp, we can derive that the observable obeys to some non  
boolean logic.


Then we can compare the two logics.

Let me give you a specific example. let us take Bell's inequality.  
A simple form is


(A & B) / (A & C) V (B & ~C)   ("/" = we can deduce, I use "/"  
because it is simpler, you can verify that with "->" in place of  
"/", we get a tautology, and so that rule is valid in classical  
logic, by modus ponens).


See my appendices on QM where it is shown how to build Stern  
Gerlach or polarizers setting showing that this is booean tautology  
is statistically violated by QM (and nature, even when A and B are  
quite apart and should be independent). That tautology is not a  
tautology for quantum logic. QL does not prove, and nature provides  
counter-example.


Now QL proves a logical formula if and only if the modal logic B  
proves the quantization of that formula. The quantization is a  
recursive transformation, where you translate p (in QL) into []<>p  
in B, and ~p is translated into []~p.


So what I say above can be expressed by the quantization of "(A &  
B) -> (A & C) V (B & ~C)" is not a theorem of the modal logic B.


The quantization of "(

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2014, at 20:43, John Clark wrote:





On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 1:38 PM, Quentin Anciaux  
 wrote:


> both the W *and* the M guy are the H guy

Yes.

> the question bear on probability of expectation for the H guy when  
he press the button...


If that is the question then the answer will be of zero help in  
understanding the nature of personal identity



But as Quentin just said, that is not the object of the inquiry.




because neither probability nor expectations have anything to do  
with consciousness or of a continuous feeling of self.


OK, but expectations is the object of the inquiry.


Bruno




You feel like Quentin Anciaux today for one reason only, because you  
remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday; it's true that if Everett  
was correct then there are other things that remember that too, but  
how something feels or what they do can have no effect on you  
because neither you nor I will ever interact with them nor they with  
us. And for that reason pronouns like "I" and "you" and "them" and  
"us" cause Everett no trouble, but in Bruno's thought experiment  
they produce endless problems.


Everett wanted to explain why the predictions made by Quantum  
Mechanics were so weird and so accurate, and he wanted to explain it  
without introducing the very nebulous concept of "the observer", and  
I think he was pretty successful in accomplishing his goal. Bruno  
wanted to do something different, he wanted to explain how personal  
identity and a continuous feeling of self worked, and in that he  
failed.


> please state where you disagree.

Please? You're saying "please" now? What happened, did you lose  
you're copy of The Giant Book Of Insults?


  John K Clark


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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[meekerdb]

On 2/14/2014 2:17 PM, LizR wrote:
On 15 February 2014 10:57, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> 
wrote:


On 2/14/2014 12:32 PM, LizR wrote:

On 15 February 2014 09:12, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With others 
it is not.
The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply
approximation of natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can 
analogically
add and multiply the real numbers, and that is not Turing universal. 
(That is
not entirely obvious).


That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular slide
rules).  Of course you can add and subtract on a slide rule as well as
multiply, divide, exponentiate, and compute the value of other functions
encoded on the rule (sin, tan), but the rule doesn't do it by itself; 
you
provide the sequence of operations consisting of reading a cursor and 
moving
the rule.  So why would that not be Turing universal?


I would guess because it isn't digital, but analogue? 'cause Turing 
machines use
discrete symbols, while slide rules use a continuous scale?


Yes, of course a real slide rule can't encode arbitrarily large integers 
because it
only has finitely many distinguisable locations for the the cursor.  But 
since a
Turing machine is allowed an infinite tape, suppose my slide rule (Sliding 
Machine?)
is allowed to expand the number of distinct positions arbitrarily?


So you don't think the analogue/digital thing matters? I suppose a person using a slide 
rule could be trusted to correct for small errorsor could they?


I think it matters because the power of arithmetic to encode proofs depends on it having 
arbitrarily long strings of digits.  But just as Turing idealized infinite tapes, I can 
idealize arbitrarily large slide rules to get arbitrarily high precision.


Brent

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Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

[LizR]

On 15 February 2014 11:27, meekerdb  wrote:

>
> I was merely using teleportation as an example to illustrate that
> "possible" is a relative concept depending on the accessiblity relation.
>  What does "possible in principle" mean?  Does it only mean "not self
> contradictory"?  Does it mean consistent with our best understanding of
> physics?  Lawrence Krauss discusses the possibility in his book "The
> Physics of Star Trek".  He estimates that it would take more energy than
> available in the Milky Way just to obtain the information to teleport a
> human being.  Of course putting that much mass/energy in the vicinity of
> the human being would create a black hole.
>

...and that's WITH Heisenberg compensators!

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Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

[meekerdb]

On 2/14/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/13/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

What's the definition of G*?


G* is a quite peculiar modal logic. It has as axioms all the theorem of G, + 
the axiom:

[]A -> A

But is NOT close for the necessitation rule (can you see why that is impossible). This 
entails that G* has no Kripke semantics. But it has some semantics in term of infinite 
sequence of G-multiverse.


By Solovay second theorem, G* axiomatizes what is true on the machine. Not just what 
is provable by the machine.
G* minus G is not empty (it contains <>t, <><>t, <><><>t, ... for example), and it 
axiomatizes the true but non provable modal (provability) sentences.






It seems that the notation is inadequate since it depends on the accesibility 
relation: For example if the accessibility relation is T (for teleportation) then 
M and W may be false in Helsinki


Why.


Because teleportation isn't possible (so far as we know).


? Comp implies the possibility in principle of classical teleportation, (UDA step 1). We 
don't need more.


I was merely using teleportation as an example to illustrate that "possible" is a relative 
concept depending on the accessiblity relation.  What does "possible in principle" mean?  
Does it only mean "not self contradictory"?  Does it mean consistent with our best 
understanding of physics?  Lawrence Krauss discusses the possibility in his book "The 
Physics of Star Trek".  He estimates that it would take more energy than available in the 
Milky Way just to obtain the information to teleport a human being.  Of course putting 
that much mass/energy in the vicinity of the human being would create a black hole.  So 
what does "possible" really mean?


Brent





Which brings up another point that bothers me: We are using [] as an operator 
"necessary", and <> as "possible" as just symbols with a defined syntax, but in 
application we must say what they mean.  What is necessary and what is possible are 
dependent on context; just as above you casually assume that teleportation is possible 
- even though you well know it isn't - just because you can write .  This is similar 
to my complaint about arithmetical realism; it is a sort of logical realism.



I use "[] and "<>" usually when I explain modal logic, through many examples of 
different modal systems.


In the translation of UDA in arithmetic, all modalities are defined in term of the 
provability predicate, that is the Gödel's Beweisbar.


What is necessary or possible depends on the worlds, yes, that is what Kripke 
is all about.

All I explain is based on the fact that teleportation is possible 
*theoretically*. Yes.

That it is hard to do in practice is not relevant. You could stop at step 0, because the 
artificial brain is also impossible in practice today. But it is not relevant.







We assume comp. They are both true, as H T M and H T W, if teleportation is the 
accessibility relation.






while using F (for flying) would make M and W true.


OK, but it is the same with T.


No it's not.  I can fly to Moscow.


By definition of the protocol in step three. If not you should have made such remark at 
step 0, and just say no to the doctor. You just say non-comp (even in theory).


The practicality of teleportation is not relevant for the theoretical proof.

Bruno


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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[LizR]

On 15 February 2014 10:57, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 2/14/2014 12:32 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 15 February 2014 09:12, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With others
>> it is not.
>> The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply
>> approximation of natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can
>> analogically add and multiply the real numbers, and that is not Turing
>> universal. (That is not entirely obvious).
>>
>>
>>  That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular slide
>> rules).  Of course you can add and subtract on a slide rule as well as
>> multiply, divide, exponentiate, and compute the value of other functions
>> encoded on the rule (sin, tan), but the rule doesn't do it by itself; you
>> provide the sequence of operations consisting of reading a cursor and
>> moving the rule.  So why would that not be Turing universal?
>>
>
>  I would guess because it isn't digital, but analogue? 'cause Turing
> machines use discrete symbols, while slide rules use a continuous scale?
>
>
> Yes, of course a real slide rule can't encode arbitrarily large integers
> because it only has finitely many distinguisable locations for the the
> cursor.  But since a Turing machine is allowed an infinite tape, suppose my
> slide rule (Sliding Machine?) is allowed to expand the number of distinct
> positions arbitrarily?
>

So you don't think the analogue/digital thing matters? I suppose a person
using a slide rule could be trusted to correct for small errorsor could
they?

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[meekerdb]

On 2/14/2014 12:32 PM, LizR wrote:
On 15 February 2014 09:12, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> 
wrote:


On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With others it 
is not.
The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply 
approximation of
natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can analogically add and 
multiply the
real numbers, and that is not Turing universal. (That is not entirely 
obvious).


That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular slide 
rules).  Of
course you can add and subtract on a slide rule as well as multiply, divide,
exponentiate, and compute the value of other functions encoded on the rule 
(sin,
tan), but the rule doesn't do it by itself; you provide the sequence of 
operations
consisting of reading a cursor and moving the rule.  So why would that not 
be Turing
universal?


I would guess because it isn't digital, but analogue? 'cause Turing machines use 
discrete symbols, while slide rules use a continuous scale?


Yes, of course a real slide rule can't encode arbitrarily large integers because it only 
has finitely many distinguisable locations for the the cursor.  But since a Turing machine 
is allowed an infinite tape, suppose my slide rule (Sliding Machine?) is allowed to expand 
the number of distinct positions arbitrarily?


Brent

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[meekerdb]

On 2/14/2014 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 Feb 2014, at 04:19, Russell Standish wrote:


On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 06:07:00PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
















hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.






...




Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown,


It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which
is already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic).



...


The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the
artificial simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which
does not result from the interference below the subst. level.

If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, it
will looks "dreamy" to me, I will see that I am not in a real (comp)
physical reality, I will see the discrepancy.




F=ma is more of a definition actually, than a logical constraint. It
is how we define (and operationally measure) "force".


No problem with that, and that is why a answered with F = KmM/r^2, but that was not much 
relevant.






If you have a copy of Vic Stenger's "Comprehensible Cosmos", he
discusses this from page 48.


No problem. I appreciate the argument.
I read it online, and it was taught by some physicists.



Actually, the correct relativistic form is F=dp/dt, where p is the 3
momentum of the object under consideration. F=ma is its low velocity
approximation.


Sure. Even F = dp/dt is a classical approximation deducible from Feynman 
integral.




So I would be surprised if COMP fails to prove Newton's second law -
it would mean someone was using terminology inconsistently.


F= ma is like H phi = E phi. All is in F, or H. Those equality should be laws indeed, 
and deducible from deeper laws. It might be more doubtful for F or H, except that the 
Turing universality of the vacuum suggest some "H = 0", à-la Dewitt-Wheeler. But we are 
not yet there ..


But this seems to point to a deeper problem.  If we elaborate H and E as operators and psi 
as a ray in a Hilbert space and if we further define the Hilbert space, we will still have 
a symbolic expression which we can related ostensively to some apparatus.  But we will 
never get down to an arithmetical computation.


Brent

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Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2014, at 12:17, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

To summarize: there are all possible combinations of 1 and 0's  
therefore everithing can be made isomorphic or "emergent" from 0 and  
1's.


?



So stop thinking and praise 0s and 1s hypothesis.


?





-Why people make apparently weird distincitions?
it does not matter: comp says nothing about it.  it depends on FPI
- Why they believe in God?
 God is the universal machine.


the Man is the universal machine. God is not a machine, not even the  
inner God, except perhaps only in the eyes of God.


I think you are writing anything going through your mind, is it?


- Yes but why people distinguish between
god is the universal machine and blah blah blah.


That is akin to a comp blaspheme!





-Yes, but why people... .
 that is FPI as i said before
- Yes but...
I dont´t really care about what you question. but comp UDA and FPI  
are very nice ideas


and so on


You can dislike a theory, but you must grasp it correctly first.

Bruno







2014-02-12 20:37 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :
Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on  
modal logic, directly related to the machine discourse (and this  
will be justified later, as it is not obvious at all).



On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote:
On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish  
 wrote:

On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote:
>
> You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong  
with it! :-)

>
> (Sorry!)
>
> I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way  
before it's
> likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't  
string theory
> retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that  
was a positive

> result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently...
>

I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of  
incommunicable

facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM.

I said "apparently" because I have no idea how he does it.


I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be  
possible to simulate consciousness because (we think) any  
physical process can be simulated and consciousness necessarily  
accompanies the physical processes of one's brain. This is the  
bet of "saying yes to the doctor".


With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor  
consciousness. We can only simulate the relevant part of  
the  brain so that consciousness is preserved. The price  
to pay is that matter becomes something emergent in the 1p views  
(1p plural) and cannot be simulated or emulated.





But there's a catch.  When we simulate an aircraft flying or a  
weather system those have a reference in the 'real' world and  
that's why they are simulations.  But if we simulate a conscious  
brain the consciousness will be 'real' consciousness. So  
simulating conscious is in a sense impossible; we may be able to  
produce it but we can't simulate it.  Consciousness must be  
consciousness of something, but it need not be anything physical;


It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical.


So you're saying that we cannot simulate matter or consciousness.   
But I think we can still produce consciousness by manipulating  
matter - we can still build a conscious Mars rover.



With comp we can say that, but only as a matter of speaking. Mars  
Rover is in Heaven, and the hard task of computer we send on Mars is  
to distracted it enough so that it can manifest its consciousness to  
us, notably by sending us interesting data on mars. The  
consciousness of Mars Rover is a 1-view, and it is more "a product"  
of the infinity of computations going through its state in the  
arithmetical reality) than with a "single" machine. Thanks to  
Everett, and our own entanglement with mars, we can indeed bet that  
little Mars Rover share some history with us.












it could just be consciousness of arithmetical truths.  This  
explains why aspects of consciousness are ineffable.  It's  
because conscious processes can prove Goedel's theorem and so  
know that some truths are unprovable.  Bruno takes "qualia are  
ineffable" and "some arithmetical truths are unprovable" and  
postulates "ineffable=unprovable".


Not really.
I guess people progress, as this is the new common error in  
fashion, but some logician did it too, and is a confusion between  
hypostases. Qualia are related to non communicable, but only  
*indirectly* through G*. It happens through Z1* and X1* (and  
S4Grz1),


Don't understand that.


Incompleteness does not just separate the provability/consistency  
modal logic G into two parts: the provable statements, and the true  
statements, it also makes the logic of the differents modalities:


p
[]p
[]p & p
[]p & <>t
[]p & <>t & p

obeying different modal logics, despite G* proves them all  
equivalent extensionnally (they "

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[LizR]

On 15 February 2014 09:12, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With others it
> is not.
> The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply
> approximation of natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can
> analogically add and multiply the real numbers, and that is not Turing
> universal. (That is not entirely obvious).
>
>
> That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular slide
> rules).  Of course you can add and subtract on a slide rule as well as
> multiply, divide, exponentiate, and compute the value of other functions
> encoded on the rule (sin, tan), but the rule doesn't do it by itself; you
> provide the sequence of operations consisting of reading a cursor and
> moving the rule.  So why would that not be Turing universal?
>

I would guess because it isn't digital, but analogue? 'cause Turing
machines use discrete symbols, while slide rules use a continuous scale?

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2014, at 05:42, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/13/2014 8:40 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I had a look at your SANE paper, which is the main paper where you  
describe

your work that you published since your thesis. I can sort of see you
saying something a bit like the above on page 11 "Now DU [sic -  
should

be UD in English] is emulated platonistically by the verifiable
propositions of arithmetic. They are equivalent to sentences of the
form ``if exists n such that P(n)'' with P(n) decidable."

That is actually rather confusing. Obviously a UD executes all proofs
of all true Sigma 1 sentences, but I think what you are trying to  
say that

all programs executed by the UD correspond to a proof of some true
Sigma 1 sentence. Is that obvious? I didn't get that when I read  
the SANE paper

originally, only got it in context of your statements above.


How can that be? Many programs executed by the UD are non-halting,  
just loops.  Can they be considered to correspond to a proof?


Yes, like a failed proof. Like searching the first even prime number  
bigger than 2. The search for ExP(x) when Ax~P(x), but you don't know  
that. But for the probability calculus, you can limit yourself on the  
finite pieces of computations, as the first person will glue the  
infinities of them to experience their "consistent" infinite union.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[LizR]

On 15 February 2014 09:03, John Mikes  wrote:

> LizR: but WHO is the observer? In my vocabulary "observer" is
> anyrhing/body acknowledging input on anything/body.
> (from a charged ion to G.B.Shaw upon an electric charge up to a
> drama-input.Observation is part of consciousness (again
> in my terms: as response to relations). (Now Brent, please, do not accuse
> me, the agnostic, of "knowing" too much).
> In such case there is no problem with the 'early' universe, no matter how
> we imagine the explanations of 'observed' data
>  any time by our "science".
>

But we weren't talking about your vocabulary, we were talking specifically
about comp. And in comp, as far as I know, an "observer" has to be a
conscious being (see exchange quoted below).

JM.
>
>
> On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 3:47 PM, LizR  wrote:
>
>> On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>> On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>>  That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in
>>> some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics.
>>>
>>> Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this
>>> is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all
>>> universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies.
>>>
>>
>> So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist,
>> according to comp? So the physics they observe will necessarily be such
>> that it allows them to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic
>> Principle" ?)
>>
>> If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe
>> in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create
>> it (somehow) ?
>>
>>

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[meekerdb]

On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With others it is 
not.
The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply approximation of 
natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can analogically add and multiply the real 
numbers, and that is not Turing universal. (That is not entirely obvious).


That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular slide rules).  Of course 
you can add and subtract on a slide rule as well as multiply, divide, exponentiate, and 
compute the value of other functions encoded on the rule (sin, tan), but the rule doesn't 
do it by itself; you provide the sequence of operations consisting of reading a cursor and 
moving the rule.  So why would that not be Turing universal?


Brent

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2014, at 05:40, Russell Standish wrote:


On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 10:42:21AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 05:38, Russell Standish wrote:


On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 12:24:18PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:02, Russell Standish wrote:


On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 07:31:24PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:


You are right, the qualia are in X1* \  X1, like we get quanta in
S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*.


The only thing you can say is that qualia ought to obey the
axioms of
X1*\X1, (and even that supposes that Z captures all observations,
which I think is debatable),


By UDA, "p" to refer to a "physical certainty" needs to

1) UD generated (= sigma_1 arithmetical and true).
2) provable (true in all consistent extensions)
3) and non "trivially" provable (= there must be at least one
consistent extension)

This give the []p & <>t, with p sigma_1.

So the logic of observable certainty should be given by the Z1*
logic.




This is certainly an interesting understanding that I hadn't met in
your writings before.


You worry me a bit, as I think this is explained in all papers and
the thesis. I know that I am concise.
Normally, if everything get clear, you should see that this is what
I am explaining everywhere.



Indeed this doesn't come out with your Lille thesis. There is almost  
no

connection between Chapter 5 and the previous 4 chapters of the
thesis. This doesn't bother me - if you ever bothered to read my
thesis (not that I'm recommending you do so), you would find it
consists of two faily different topics, with only the most tenuous
connection between them. This was because it actually was two
different topics with two different supervisors. I was actually
lightly chided by one of the thesis reviewers for attempting to draw
out the connection between the topics :).


In "conscience and mécanisme" I make the link UDA and AUDA, more  
explicit, but this was judged too much easy material, and, in the  
Lille thesis I refer to "conscience & mécanisme".
(Of course I have realized since that this is not so much easy. It ask  
some familiarity with mathematical logic).







I had a look at your SANE paper, which is the main paper where you  
describe

your work that you published since your thesis.


There has been more. I gave the references. SANE remains the simplest  
and the most accessible.

There has been the Plotinus paper too, from the Sienna conferences.

I should update my webpage ...




I can sort of see you
saying something a bit like the above on page 11 "Now DU [sic - should
be UD in English]


OK.




is emulated platonistically by the verifiable
propositions of arithmetic. They are equivalent to sentences of the
form ``if exists n such that P(n)'' with P(n) decidable."


Yes, but for the typo. It is of course "it exists n such that ...".





That is actually rather confusing. Obviously a UD executes all proofs
of all true Sigma 1 sentences,


All right.




but I think what you are trying to say that
all programs executed by the UD correspond to a proof of some true
Sigma 1 sentence.


The reverse. Yes.





Is that obvious?



It is obvious for a recursion theorists. It is "well known", among  
theoretical computer scientists.


Sigma_1 completeness, that is the ability to prove all true sentences  
with the shape "ExP(x, y)" and P decidable, leads to Turing  
universality, and so, by the compiling theorem, you can translate, in  
both direction from computation, in whatever universal systems, and  
"some proof of the sigma_1 sentence".


We have the intensional Church thesis (consequence of the usual CT).  
Not only all universal machines can compute the same class of  
computable functions, but they can imitate also the other machines,  
and compute functions in all possible digital manners.







I didn't get that when I read the SANE paper
originally, only got it in context of your statements above.


Thanks for making me realize this.










In associating provable with "true in all consistent extensions",


In case of "provable", this is Gödel COMPLEteness result (not
incompleteness!).
In case of an abstract box, in a modal logic having a Kripke
semantics, this is just the semantics of Kripke.





are
you meaning that so long as something (ie proposition) is computed  
by

all programs instantiating your current state, no matter how far in
the future that calculation might require, then that something is
(sigma_1) provable.


I am not sure. "true in all consistent extensions" is a very general
notion.



It is your term. I take it to mean all programs compatible with your
current state, your current here-and-now.


OK.





What happens is that, in arithmetic, the sigma_1 sentences, when
true, are provable (already by RA).

So they verify the formula A -> []A.  (called TRIV for trivial, as
that sentence makes many modal logic collapsing, but not so in the
provability logic, not even in the 1p S4Grz).


Yes - thanks for reminding me.



In fact a 

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[John Mikes]

LizR: but WHO is the observer? In my vocabulary "observer" is anyrhing/body
acknowledging input on anything/body.
(from a charged ion to G.B.Shaw upon an electric charge up to a
drama-input.Observation is part of consciousness (again
in my terms: as response to relations). (Now Brent, please, do not accuse
me, the agnostic, of "knowing" too much).
In such case there is no problem with the 'early' universe, no matter how
we imagine the explanations of 'observed' data
 any time by our "science".
JM.


On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 3:47 PM, LizR  wrote:

> On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>  That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in
>> some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics.
>>
>> Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this is
>> a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all
>> universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies.
>>
>
> So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, according
> to comp? So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it
> allows them to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic Principle" ?)
>
> If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe
> in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create
> it (somehow) ?
>
> You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your
>> theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of.  That
>> makes it impossible to test.
>>
>> Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than
>> evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more.
>> It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to
>> find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+
>> Theaetetus). But this needs more on "AUDA", so let us not anticipate
>> everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to
>> AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner
>> and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in
>> decent condition.
>>
>> I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like
> "comp predicts whatever physics we've got!"
>
> However I see that isn't so, so I will be interested to know how it's
> testable - if I ever make it to understanding AUDA.
>
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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[John Clark]

On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 1:38 PM, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

> both the W *and* the M guy are the H guy
>

Yes.

> the question bear on probability of expectation for the H guy when he
> press the button...
>

If that is the question then the answer will be of zero help in
understanding the nature of personal identity because neither probability
nor expectations have anything to do with consciousness or of a continuous
feeling of self. You feel like Quentin Anciaux today for one reason only,
because you remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday; it's true that if
Everett was correct then there are other things that remember that too, but
how something feels or what they do can have no effect on you because
neither you nor I will ever interact with them nor they with us. And for
that reason pronouns like "I" and "you" and "them" and "us" cause Everett
no trouble, but in Bruno's thought experiment they produce endless problems.

Everett wanted to explain why the predictions made by Quantum Mechanics
were so weird and so accurate, and he wanted to explain it without
introducing the very nebulous concept of "the observer", and I think he was
pretty successful in accomplishing his goal. Bruno wanted to do something
different, he wanted to explain how personal identity and a continuous
feeling of self worked, and in that he failed.

> please state where you disagree.
>

Please? You're saying "please" now? What happened, did you lose you're copy
of The Giant Book Of Insults?

  John K Clark

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2014, at 04:19, Russell Standish wrote:


On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 06:07:00PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
















hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.






...




Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown,


It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which
is already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic).



...


The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the
artificial simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which
does not result from the interference below the subst. level.

If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, it
will looks "dreamy" to me, I will see that I am not in a real (comp)
physical reality, I will see the discrepancy.




F=ma is more of a definition actually, than a logical constraint. It
is how we define (and operationally measure) "force".


No problem with that, and that is why a answered with F = KmM/r^2, but  
that was not much relevant.






If you have a copy of Vic Stenger's "Comprehensible Cosmos", he
discusses this from page 48.


No problem. I appreciate the argument.
I read it online, and it was taught by some physicists.



Actually, the correct relativistic form is F=dp/dt, where p is the 3
momentum of the object under consideration. F=ma is its low velocity
approximation.


Sure. Even F = dp/dt is a classical approximation deducible from  
Feynman integral.





So I would be surprised if COMP fails to prove Newton's second law -
it would mean someone was using terminology inconsistently.


F= ma is like H phi = E phi. All is in F, or H. Those equality should  
be laws indeed, and deducible from deeper laws. It might be more  
doubtful for F or H, except that the Turing universality of the vacuum  
suggest some "H = 0", à-la Dewitt-Wheeler. But we are not yet there ..


Best,

Bruno







Cheers

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Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[John Clark]

On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 2:53 PM, Richard Ruquist  wrote:

> John, You need to read about the latest developments in string theory.
>

The sad fact is that there are no recent developments in string "theory" ,
and in fact in its entire history it only made one prediction that could be
tested even theoretically and it turned out to be wrong, it predicted that
there were 9 (or maybe 10 they're not sure) spacial dimensions; they had to
invent all sorts of fudge factors and said that for no particular reason 6
(or maybe 7) of those extra dimensions are far too small to ever see.

> Here is a link the the original Maldacena-Susskind 48 page paper
> http://arxiv.org/abs/1306.0533.
>

If they're right then the universe is non-local and I stand by what I said,
both Einstein and Rosen would be appalled about how their bridge was used.
And it still can't explain, as Everett could, how quantum particles seem to
know when they are being observed.

  John K Clark

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2014, at 00:50, LizR wrote:

On 14 February 2014 12:46, chris peck   
wrote:

Hi Liz

>>Personally, I feel that objections to comp on the basis of what we  
can and can't do with our present technology are a bit hair  
splitting, or perhaps simply evading the issue. Anyone who has  
accepted the MWI has accepted that duplication is possible.


my objections were to do with the correct way to predict expectancy  
in a universe in which every possible outcome occurs. They didn't  
concern technological limitations. I don't think anyone has objected  
on that score have they?


Some people have objected on the basis that we can't duplicate  
people, for example. I think the "expectation value objection" is a  
valid one (and Bruno agrees that it is an open problem in comp) - we  
have no way to work out what we should expect to see on the basis of  
an infinite number of computations (I think the MWI has a similar  
problem?)



In a nutshell, MWI has not that problem, intuitively already with  
Feynman formulation of QM (see his book on light), or formally  
(algebraically) by Gleason Theorem.


In comp it is *the* problem. AUDA consists in some steps toward  
formulating the problem and the beginning of a solution, (with a nice  
and simple global semantics through the arithmetical interpretation of  
Plotinus, but that can make some people nervous).


Bruno




All the best

Chris.

Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 12:31:28 +1300

Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

Personally, I feel that objections to comp on the basis of what we  
can and can't do with our present technology are a bit hair  
splitting, or perhaps simply evading the issue. Anyone who has  
accepted the MWI has accepted that duplication is possible. (And  
anyone who thinks consciousness is digital above the quantum level  
has accepted "Yes Doctor".)


If there's a valid objection, I think it should be a bit more robust  
than "oh but we can't do that (yet) !"



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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-14 19:29 GMT+01:00 John Clark :

> On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>>
>>  > > In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who "I" or "you"
>>> is because however many copies of "I" or "you" there may or may not be they
>>> will never meet.
>>>
>>
>> > That changes absolutely nothing... just put the reconstruction of the W
>> guy 200 years later than the M guy, they will never meet...
>>
>
> If that happened then it's true the W guy could not interact with the M
> guy, but the M guy could still interact with the W guy; just as you can
> make no changes in Plato but Plato can make changes in you, and it happens
> every time you pick up one of Plato's books. But I can have absolutely no
> effect on the John Clark in one of Everett's Many Worlds nor can that other
> fellow have any effect on me; so in Everett pronouns cause no trouble and
> the question "which one is you?"
>

But that's not the question both the W *and* the M guy are the H guy... the
question bear on probability of expectation for the H guy when he press the
button...

MWI scenario:

You stand in a white room with two doors, one on the left, one on the
right, there is a column with a button in the middle of the room, when you
press it, the spin of an electron is measured, if it is up the left door
open, if it is down the right door open... probability for you to see the
left door opening after having pressed the button is 0.5.

Duplication scenario:

You stand in a white room with two doors, one on the left, one on the
right, there is a column with a button in the middle of the room, when you
press it,
you are duplicated, one version of you is reconstructed in a totally
similar room where the left door open, one version of you is reconstructed
in a totally similar room where the right door open (the original is
destroyed), suppose for the sake of the argument, that the
copying/annihilation process is instantaneous and not detectable/feelable
by the reconstructed guys.
Probability for you to see the left door opening after having pressed the
button is 0.5 like in MWI *assuming comp and that the copy are still you
which is trivially true if computationalism is true.

No difference between MWI and comp duplication here... please state where
you disagree.

Quentin



> never comes up, but it certainly does with Bruno's stuff.
>
>   John K Clark
>
>
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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Feb 2014, at 23:38, chris peck wrote:


Hi Bruno

>> Come on, the poor guy tried hard since two years, and has  
convinced only him


That's a good way of spinning the fact that for two years it is in  
reality you who has failed to convince him.


That's a good way of spinning the difference between convincing only  
oneself and convincing his peers, notably academical (even if some  
philosophers resist, and some scientists react by solidarity, but not  
by argument nor even dialog). Then on this list I think most people  
grasp easily steps 0-6, if not 7, and some have no problem with 8.
New difficulties can arise as we dig deeper in the arithmetical  
version of the UDA.


I agree, perhaps too much, that the work is not perfect, and that some  
clarification can be added to the step 8, and to the relation between  
UDA and AUDA, and that is why I like to discuss this with people  
sharing some interest.


Now if you can make sense of Clark's post, please, say something. If  
it just rhetorical tricks to confuse people, then refrain, please.


Bruno





All the best

Chris

From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: Suicide Words God and Ideas
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2014 22:23:08 +

Hi Quentin

>> I do not, valid critics are valid,

By definition mate.

>> but when you point to someone the inconsistency in his argument  
and that he maintains for years the same invalid argument that means  
that person does not want to argue, he wants to defend a position at  
all costs, that's evil.


This is what I mean by emotional arm waving. I can honestly think of  
things that are more evil and I suppose, from Clark's point of view,  
hes been pointing out the inconsistencies in Bruno's argument for  
two years too. Does that make Bruno evil???


In a later post you try to rebut Clark :

>>>>In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who "I" or  
"you" is because however many copies of "I" or "you" there may or  
may not be they will never meet.



>>That changes absolutely nothing... just put the reconstruction of  
the W guy 200 years later than the M guy, they will never meet...


But if you can send the W guy skipping through time, you can send  
the M guy skipping through time too. So they could potentially meet.  
In MWI 'copies' can not potentially meet. If this is your attempt to  
point out an inconsistency its dismissively lazy and fails  
triumphantly.


In my opinion your beef is impotent anyhow. The most you'd ever show  
was that Clark applied his argument inconsistently, you certainly  
wouldn't show that he was wrong about Bruno's metaphysics.


all the best

Chris.


Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 09:39:21 +1300
Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 14 February 2014 08:56, meekerdb  wrote:

So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is  
true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to  
refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level.


If this is true, comp isn't a scientific theory.

Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe  
then it cannot confirm comp.


This is true of any scientific theory (if comp is one, therefore,  
also true of comp).




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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[John Clark]

On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

>
> > > In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who "I" or "you" is
>> because however many copies of "I" or "you" there may or may not be they
>> will never meet.
>>
>
> > That changes absolutely nothing... just put the reconstruction of the W
> guy 200 years later than the M guy, they will never meet...
>

If that happened then it's true the W guy could not interact with the M
guy, but the M guy could still interact with the W guy; just as you can
make no changes in Plato but Plato can make changes in you, and it happens
every time you pick up one of Plato's books. But I can have absolutely no
effect on the John Clark in one of Everett's Many Worlds nor can that other
fellow have any effect on me; so in Everett pronouns cause no trouble and
the question "which one is you?" never comes up, but it certainly does with
Bruno's stuff.

  John K Clark

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 6:06 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 2/14/2014 1:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
>
> 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :
>
>>
>>  On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :
>>
>>>
>>>  On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:
>>>
>>>   On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>


>  
>
>
>  It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics.
>
>
>
>
>hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.
>
>
>  So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it ostensibly
> (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are
> dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented
> on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole
> UD in a non computable).
>
>  You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we
> are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher
> level). OK?  (I think se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come
> back, as this is not so easy).
>
>
> So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true
> but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp
> is a dream or simulation at a higher level.
>
> Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it
> cannot confirm comp.
>
>
>  I guess you mean "cannot prove, or confirm in some definitive way, comp".
>
>
> No, I meant something stronger than that.  I meant that what we observe
> cannot count in favor of comp.
>

Not strongly, I suppose.

But I still find it perplexing that we can send electricity through a CPU
with memory, given foundations of some interpretation of QM, and that
certain properties of arithmetic can be realized and exploited on a higher
level to yield the working languages and GUIs that most people use today,
not to speak of informing and underpinning so many scientific models, even
if Bruno notes correctly that we don't employ self-reference above some use
of recursion in a very confined sense.

All these attacks for "metaphysics, soft philosophy bullshit" ignore the
thing you are typing on and viewing at this very moment, and the arithmetic
properties at work in so many scientific models.

That these models, the wealth of technologies we derive with arithmetic in
hand... or that PCs for instance, work at all, given some interpretation of
QM as a base, is just plain weird/amazing. Definitive proof for comp? Of
course not. But "just metaphysics" will force you into "being
metaphysical", when you push the button and boot your system. As if some
metaphysical connotation bars an idea/person of being fruitful to science
or our immediate practical lives a priori: where's the proof of this btw?
It seems more to confirm a physicalist bias, when we just don't know.

As a musician, my bias is supported by the fact that I count all day;
meeting the felicity conditions of getting my ratios right on all levels I
can parse, say while improvising or teaching, gives me paychecks.

So much for "comp not working- its just a vain metaphysical tool for
retro-explanations". Sure, if you want. Currently I just don't swing that
way. I need a beat and some groove. PGC


>
> Brent
>
>
>  Correct. I have already explain this with some detail. It is the same as
> the fact that we can know that we dream (lucidity), but that we cannot know
> we are awake.
> This is also a consequence of the classical theory of knowledge, or of
> Theaetetus. Not just comp. But comp confirms this.
> (Actually, we know something more general: we cannot confirm definitively
> *any* theory about reality).
>
>  Bruno
>
>
>  --
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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[meekerdb]

On 2/14/2014 1:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>:


On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:


On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:








It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics.





hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.


So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by flying) 
then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a 
simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done 
by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable).


You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are at the base 
level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). OK?  (I think se have 
discussed this before, but it is OK to come back, as this is not so easy).


So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a lower 
level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at 
a higher level.


Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot confirm 
comp.


I guess you mean "cannot prove, or confirm in some definitive way, comp".


No, I meant something stronger than that.  I meant that what we observe cannot count in 
favor of comp.


Brent

Correct. I have already explain this with some detail. It is the same as the fact that 
we can know that we dream (lucidity), but that we cannot know we are awake.
This is also a consequence of the classical theory of knowledge, or of Theaetetus. Not 
just comp. But comp confirms this.
(Actually, we know something more general: we cannot confirm definitively *any* theory 
about reality).


Bruno


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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Feb 2014, at 21:39, LizR wrote:


On 14 February 2014 08:56, meekerdb  wrote:

So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is  
true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to  
refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level.


If this is true, comp isn't a scientific theory.


Correct.

But "this" is not true. "this" is already refuted in comp + theaetetus.





Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe  
then it cannot confirm comp.


This is true of any scientific theory (if comp is one, therefore,  
also true of comp).


Correct again.

Bruno






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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[David Nyman]

On 14 February 2014 15:49, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

That is the origin of the white rabbits. if our brain is a universal
> machine, we can can be failed, and are actually failed in infinities of
> computations.


Do you mean "fooled"?

David

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Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

[Alberto G. Corona]

To summarize: there are all possible combinations of 1 and 0's therefore
everithing can be made isomorphic or "emergent" from 0 and 1's. So stop
thinking and praise 0s and 1s hypothesis.


-Why people make apparently weird distincitions?
it does not matter: comp says nothing about it.  it depends on FPI
- Why they believe in God?
 God is the universal machine.
- Yes but why people distinguish between
god is the universal machine and blah blah blah.
-Yes, but why people... .
 that is FPI as i said before
- Yes but...
I dont´t really care about what you question. but comp UDA and FPI are very
nice ideas

and so on


2014-02-12 20:37 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

> Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on modal
> logic, directly related to the machine discourse (and this will be
> justified later, as it is not obvious at all).
>
>
> On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:28, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 2/12/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote:
>
>   On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote:
>> >
>> > You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong with it!
>> :-)
>> >
>> > (Sorry!)
>> >
>> > I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way before it's
>> > likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't string
>> theory
>> > retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that was a
>> positive
>> > result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently...
>> >
>>
>>  I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of incommunicable
>> facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM.
>>
>
>  I said "apparently" because I have no idea how he does it.
>
>
> I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be possible to
> simulate consciousness because (we think) any physical process can be
> simulated and consciousness necessarily accompanies the physical processes
> of one's brain. This is the bet of "saying yes to the doctor".
>
>
>  With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor consciousness. We
> can only simulate the relevant part of the brain so that consciousness is
> preserved. The price to pay is that matter becomes something emergent in
> the 1p views (1p plural) and cannot be simulated or emulated.
>
>
>
>
>  But there's a catch.  When we simulate an aircraft flying or a weather
> system those have a reference in the 'real' world and that's why they are
> simulations.  But if we simulate a conscious brain the consciousness will
> be 'real' consciousness. So simulating conscious is in a sense impossible;
> we may be able to produce it but we can't simulate it.  Consciousness must
> be consciousness of something, but it need not be anything physical;
>
>
>  It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical.
>
>
> So you're saying that we cannot simulate matter or consciousness.  But I
> think we can still produce consciousness by manipulating matter - we can
> still build a conscious Mars rover.
>
>
>
> With comp we can say that, but only as a matter of speaking. Mars Rover is
> in Heaven, and the hard task of computer we send on Mars is to distracted
> it enough so that it can manifest its consciousness to us, notably by
> sending us interesting data on mars. The consciousness of Mars Rover is a
> 1-view, and it is more "a product" of the infinity of computations going
> through its state in the arithmetical reality) than with a "single"
> machine. Thanks to Everett, and our own entanglement with mars, we can
> indeed bet that little Mars Rover share some history with us.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  it could just be consciousness of arithmetical truths.  This explains
> why aspects of consciousness are ineffable.  It's because conscious
> processes can prove Goedel's theorem and so know that some truths are
> unprovable.  Bruno takes "qualia are ineffable" and "some arithmetical
> truths are unprovable" and postulates "ineffable=unprovable".
>
>
>  Not really.
> I guess people progress, as this is the new common error in fashion, but
> some logician did it too, and is a confusion between hypostases. Qualia are
> related to non communicable, but only *indirectly* through G*. It happens
> through Z1* and X1* (and S4Grz1),
>
>
> Don't understand that.
>
>
> Incompleteness does not just separate the provability/consistency modal
> logic G into two parts: the provable statements, and the true statements,
> it also makes the logic of the differents modalities:
>
> p
> []p
> []p & p
> []p & <>t
> []p & <>t & p
>
> obeying different modal logics, despite G* proves them all equivalent
> extensionnally (they "proves" the same true arithmetical propositions, but
> they see them differently.
>
> Among them, three logics splits into provable and non provable parts:
>
> []p   (gives G and G*, by Solovay theorem)
> []p & <>p  (gives Z and Z*-
> []p & <>t & p   (gives X and X*)
>
> That 

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:

On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:








It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics.





hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.


So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it  
ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp  
is  false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation,  
done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is  
not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non  
computable).


You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus +  
we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a  
higher level). OK?  (I think se have discussed this before, but it  
is OK to come back, as this is not so easy).


So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is  
true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to  
refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level.


Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe  
then it cannot confirm comp.


I guess you mean "cannot prove, or confirm in some definitive way,  
comp".
Correct. I have already explain this with some detail. It is the same  
as the fact that we can know that we dream (lucidity), but that we  
cannot know we are awake.
This is also a consequence of the classical theory of knowledge, or of  
Theaetetus. Not just comp. But comp confirms this.
(Actually, we know something more general: we cannot confirm  
definitively *any* theory about reality).


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:51, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/13/2014 2:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:


On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:
That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as  
contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have  
different physics.


Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree  
this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be  
true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have  
only different geographies.


So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist,  
according to comp?


Not completely, as you will still have all the computations  
approximating all possible geographical reality, including those  
without observers, and in that sense, those "realities" exist, but  
they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could  
explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution  
level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something  
that one computation can only approximate). Your question can  
depend if a quantum universal dovetailer win the "a measure  
battle", so that the computations going through you states are  
asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example.





So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it  
allows them to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic  
Principle" ?)


Is that not tautological?




If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early  
universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as  
obsverers create it (somehow) ?


We select them. See above.





You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever  
your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we  
know of.  That makes it impossible to test.


Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable  
than evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from,  
and much more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the  
laws, and it is enough to find one natural phenomenon  
contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this  
needs more on "AUDA", so let us not anticipate everything too  
much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA.  
Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the  
dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue  
the discussion in decent condition.


I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was  
something like "comp predicts whatever physics  
we've  got!"


This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white  
rabbits. But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put  
constraints on what we can observe ([]p & <>t), so  
comp(+Theaetetus)  is not refuted yet, and is the only theory  
explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp  
predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not  
depend at all from what we observe in nature (we assume *only*  
comp!), and so we can compare the comp-physics with nature  
physics, and test comp.


I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that...  
because whatever you could measure about reality could just be  
"geographical" and so comp is always in accordance with whatever  
measure... if not, could you precisely point on a specific thing  
that would invalidate comp ?


If all the "hypostases" (points of view) modalities were collapsing  
into CPL,


What's CPL?  Classical Predicate Logic?


Classical Propositionnal Logic.





then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws,  
and everything would be geographical. This would predict that we  
can "travel" in the universe/multiverse, and observe anything  
logically consistent.


This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in "Forever  
Undecided"  (page 47):


"The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that  
holds for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic  
study all possible state of affairs".


Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is  
those observations which led us to believe that there are physical  
laws, and laws means that something is true everywhere in our  
universe (or should means that, if that set is not empty). Indeed  
we believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 are laws, that is are true, not  
only everywhere, but even in all branch of the universal wave.


But that can be explained from Noether's theorem + our insistence  
that whatever we call a law should be translation invariant.  In  
other words we pick out what is translation invariant - and the rest  
is geography.


OK. But Noether theorem assume space, real numbers, etc. But you can  
see Z1* as a sort of generalization, and the interest relies in the  
fact that this general

Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Feb 2014, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/13/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

What's the definition of G*?


G* is a quite peculiar modal logic. It has as axioms all the  
theorem of G, + the axiom:


[]A -> A

But is NOT close for the necessitation rule (can you see why that  
is impossible). This entails that G* has no Kripke semantics. But  
it has some semantics in term of infinite sequence of G-multiverse.


By Solovay second theorem, G* axiomatizes what is true on the  
machine. Not just what is provable by the machine.
G* minus G is not empty (it contains <>t, <><>t, <><><>t, ... for  
example), and it axiomatizes the true but non provable modal  
(provability) sentences.






It seems that the notation is inadequate since it depends on the  
accesibility relation:  For example if the accessibility relation  
is T (for teleportation) then M and W may be false in Helsinki


Why.


Because teleportation isn't possible (so far as we know).


? Comp implies the possibility in principle of classical  
teleportation, (UDA step 1). We don't need more.




Which brings up another point that bothers me: We are using [] as an  
operator "necessary", and <> as "possible" as just symbols with a  
defined syntax, but in application we must say what they mean.  What  
is necessary and what is possible are dependent on context; just as  
above you casually assume that teleportation is possible - even  
though you well know it isn't - just because you can write .   
This is similar to my complaint about arithmetical realism; it is a  
sort of logical realism.



I use "[] and "<>" usually when I explain modal logic, through many  
examples of different modal systems.


In the translation of UDA in arithmetic, all modalities are defined in  
term of the provability predicate, that is the Gödel's Beweisbar.


What is necessary or possible depends on the worlds, yes, that is what  
Kripke is all about.


All I explain is based on the fact that teleportation is possible  
*theoretically*. Yes.


That it is hard to do in practice is not relevant. You could stop at  
step 0, because the artificial brain is also impossible in practice  
today. But it is not relevant.







We assume comp. They are both true, as H T M and H T W, if  
teleportation is the accessibility relation.






while using F (for flying) would make M and W true.


OK, but it is the same with T.


No it's not.  I can fly to Moscow.


By definition of the protocol in step three. If not you should have  
made such remark at step 0, and just say no to the doctor. You just  
say non-comp (even in theory).


The practicality of teleportation is not relevant for the theoretical  
proof.


Bruno











so in the "eye of God", nothing changes.

But G, which represents the machine ability, does not prove that  
equivalence, and this entails that []p and []p & <>t will obeys  
different logics.


OK?


I'm not sure what you mean by "obey different logics"?


I meant different modal logics. It just means that they have  
different theorems. They are different theories. For example G  
proves []([]p ->p) -> []p, but Z and X does not prove that. Z  
proves <><>A for all A, but G does not prove that. S4Grz proves []p  
-> p, but G does not prove that. S4Grz proves []([]p ->p), but G  
does not prove that, etc.


OK.

Brent



By incompleteness, despite G* proves the equivalence of []p, []p &  
p, []p & <>t, are equivalent, as G cannot prove that equivalence,  
they obeys different logic. They have different theorems. They are  
different theories, and that's why we have 8 different hypostases.  
That's how we got a theory of knowledge, a theory of observation,  
etc, all based on the same arithmetyical truth. That corresponds to  
the different "person points of view". You get the 1p view by the  
"& p" constraints, and the matter by the "& p or & <>t"  
constraints, and the non communicable parts, by the passage x to x*  
for each logic x.


Bruno


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[meekerdb]

On 2/13/2014 8:40 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

I had a look at your SANE paper, which is the main paper where you describe
your work that you published since your thesis. I can sort of see you
saying something a bit like the above on page 11 "Now DU [sic - should
be UD in English] is emulated platonistically by the verifiable
propositions of arithmetic. They are equivalent to sentences of the
form ``if exists n such that P(n)'' with P(n) decidable."

That is actually rather confusing. Obviously a UD executes all proofs
of all true Sigma 1 sentences, but I think what you are trying to say that
all programs executed by the UD correspond to a proof of some true
Sigma 1 sentence. Is that obvious? I didn't get that when I read the SANE paper
originally, only got it in context of your statements above.


How can that be? Many programs executed by the UD are non-halting, just loops.  Can they 
be considered to correspond to a proof?


Brent

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Russell Standish]

On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 10:42:21AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 13 Feb 2014, at 05:38, Russell Standish wrote:
> 
> >On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 12:24:18PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >>On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:02, Russell Standish wrote:
> >>
> >>>On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 07:31:24PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> You are right, the qualia are in X1* \  X1, like we get quanta in
> S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*.
> >>>
> >>>The only thing you can say is that qualia ought to obey the
> >>>axioms of
> >>>X1*\X1, (and even that supposes that Z captures all observations,
> >>>which I think is debatable),
> >>
> >>By UDA, "p" to refer to a "physical certainty" needs to
> >>
> >>1) UD generated (= sigma_1 arithmetical and true).
> >>2) provable (true in all consistent extensions)
> >>3) and non "trivially" provable (= there must be at least one
> >>consistent extension)
> >>
> >>This give the []p & <>t, with p sigma_1.
> >>
> >>So the logic of observable certainty should be given by the Z1*
> >>logic.
> >>
> >>
> >
> >This is certainly an interesting understanding that I hadn't met in
> >your writings before.
> 
> You worry me a bit, as I think this is explained in all papers and
> the thesis. I know that I am concise.
> Normally, if everything get clear, you should see that this is what
> I am explaining everywhere.
> 

Indeed this doesn't come out with your Lille thesis. There is almost no
connection between Chapter 5 and the previous 4 chapters of the
thesis. This doesn't bother me - if you ever bothered to read my
thesis (not that I'm recommending you do so), you would find it
consists of two faily different topics, with only the most tenuous
connection between them. This was because it actually was two
different topics with two different supervisors. I was actually
lightly chided by one of the thesis reviewers for attempting to draw
out the connection between the topics :).

I had a look at your SANE paper, which is the main paper where you describe
your work that you published since your thesis. I can sort of see you
saying something a bit like the above on page 11 "Now DU [sic - should
be UD in English] is emulated platonistically by the verifiable
propositions of arithmetic. They are equivalent to sentences of the
form ``if exists n such that P(n)'' with P(n) decidable."

That is actually rather confusing. Obviously a UD executes all proofs
of all true Sigma 1 sentences, but I think what you are trying to say that
all programs executed by the UD correspond to a proof of some true
Sigma 1 sentence. Is that obvious? I didn't get that when I read the SANE paper
originally, only got it in context of your statements above.


> 
> >
> >In associating provable with "true in all consistent extensions",
> 
> In case of "provable", this is Gödel COMPLEteness result (not
> incompleteness!).
> In case of an abstract box, in a modal logic having a Kripke
> semantics, this is just the semantics of Kripke.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> >are
> >you meaning that so long as something (ie proposition) is computed by
> >all programs instantiating your current state, no matter how far in
> >the future that calculation might require, then that something is
> >(sigma_1) provable.
> 
> I am not sure. "true in all consistent extensions" is a very general
> notion.
> 

It is your term. I take it to mean all programs compatible with your
current state, your current here-and-now.

> What happens is that, in arithmetic, the sigma_1 sentences, when
> true, are provable (already by RA).
> 
> So they verify the formula A -> []A.  (called TRIV for trivial, as
> that sentence makes many modal logic collapsing, but not so in the
> provability logic, not even in the 1p S4Grz).

Yes - thanks for reminding me.

> 
> In fact a machine is Turing universal iff for all sigma_1 sentences
> A we have A -> []A. So "A -> []A" is the Turing universality axiom,
> when A is put for any sigma_1 sentence.

Where []A means provable by the machine in question, I take it.

> 
> G1 is G + A->[]A. Visser proved an equivalent of Solovay theorem for
> G1 and G1*. You can find it in Boolos 1993.
> 
> It is a way to restrict the logic of the different points of view on
> the UD*. "To be a finite piece of computation" is itself given by a
> sigma_1 formula, and the sigma-1 sentences model computations.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> >
> >Then 1&2 gives your hypostase for knowledge, ie S4Grz1.
> 
> Only G1 at that stage. To get knowledge, you need to do 1 and 2, but
> on []p & p, 

But p statisfying 1&2 => p&[]p, so why is this G1 and not S4Grz1?

Perhaps you mean p satisfying p->[]p (-p v p&[]p), which can be added
to G (Visser's move).


> like to get observation/probability/expectation, you
> need to do 1 and 2, but on (3) []p & <>t.
> And to get sensible observation, you can mix knowledge ( " & p"),
> and "consistency" <>t.

Yes - I still don't get that - either in the full or Sigma_1
restricted sense.

Where the penny dropped, if only slightly, was that the existence of a
universal dovet

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Russell Standish]

On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 06:07:00PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 
> >
> >
> >
> >2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :
> >
> >On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>>hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.
> >>
> 

...

> 
> >Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown,
> 
> It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which
> is already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic).
> 

...

> The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the
> artificial simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which
> does not result from the interference below the subst. level.
> 
> If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, it
> will looks "dreamy" to me, I will see that I am not in a real (comp)
> physical reality, I will see the discrepancy.
> 
> 

F=ma is more of a definition actually, than a logical constraint. It
is how we define (and operationally measure) "force".

If you have a copy of Vic Stenger's "Comprehensible Cosmos", he
discusses this from page 48.

Actually, the correct relativistic form is F=dp/dt, where p is the 3
momentum of the object under consideration. F=ma is its low velocity
approximation.

So I would be surprised if COMP fails to prove Newton's second law -
it would mean someone was using terminology inconsistently.

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[LizR]

On 14 February 2014 12:46, chris peck  wrote:

> Hi Liz
>
> >>Personally, I feel that objections to comp on the basis of what we can
> and can't do with our present technology are a bit hair splitting, or
> perhaps simply evading the issue. Anyone who has accepted the MWI has
> accepted that duplication is possible.
>
> my objections were to do with the correct way to predict expectancy in a
> universe in which every possible outcome occurs. They didn't concern
> technological limitations. I don't think anyone has objected on that score
> have they?
>

Some people have objected on the basis that we can't duplicate people, for
example. I think the "expectation value objection" is a valid one (and
Bruno agrees that it is an open problem in comp) - we have no way to work
out what we should expect to see on the basis of an infinite number of
computations (I think the MWI has a similar problem?)

>
> All the best
>
> Chris.
>
> --------------
> Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 12:31:28 +1300
>
> Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
> From: lizj...@gmail.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> Personally, I feel that objections to comp on the basis of what we can and
> can't do with our present technology are a bit hair splitting, or perhaps
> simply evading the issue. Anyone who has accepted the MWI has accepted that
> duplication is possible. (And anyone who thinks consciousness is digital
> above the quantum level has accepted "Yes Doctor".)
>
> If there's a valid objection, I think it should be a bit more robust than
> "oh but we can't do that (yet) !"
>
>
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RE: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

>>Personally, I feel that objections to comp on the basis of what we can and 
>>can't do with our present technology are a bit hair splitting, or perhaps 
>>simply evading the issue. Anyone who has accepted the MWI has accepted that 
>>duplication is possible. 

my objections were to do with the correct way to predict expectancy in a 
universe in which every possible outcome occurs. They didn't concern 
technological limitations. I don't think anyone has objected on that score have 
they?

All the best

Chris.

Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 12:31:28 +1300
Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

Personally, I feel that objections to comp on the basis of what we can and 
can't do with our present technology are a bit hair splitting, or perhaps 
simply evading the issue. Anyone who has accepted the MWI has accepted that 
duplication is possible. (And anyone who thinks consciousness is digital above 
the quantum level has accepted "Yes Doctor".)


If there's a valid objection, I think it should be a bit more robust than "oh 
but we can't do that (yet) !"






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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[LizR]

Personally, I feel that objections to comp on the basis of what we can and
can't do with our present technology are a bit hair splitting, or perhaps
simply evading the issue. Anyone who has accepted the MWI has accepted that
duplication is possible. (And anyone who thinks consciousness is digital
above the quantum level has accepted "Yes Doctor".)

If there's a valid objection, I think it should be a bit more robust than
"oh but we can't do that (yet) !"

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-13 23:23 GMT+01:00 chris peck :

> Hi Quentin
>
> >> I do not, valid critics are valid,
>
> By definition mate.
>
> >> but when you point to someone the inconsistency in his argument and
> that he maintains for years the same invalid argument that means that
> person does not want to argue, he wants to defend a position at all costs,
> that's evil.
>
> This is what I mean by emotional arm waving. I can honestly think of
> things that are more evil and I suppose, from Clark's point of view, hes
> been pointing out the inconsistencies in Bruno's argument for two years
> too. Does that make Bruno evil???
>
> In a later post you try to rebut Clark :
>
> >>>>In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who "I" or "you"
> is because however many copies of "I" or "you" there may or may not be they
> will never meet.
>
>
> >>That changes absolutely nothing... just put the reconstruction of the W
> guy 200 years later than the M guy, they will never meet...
>
> But if you can send the W guy skipping through time, you can send the M
> guy skipping through time too.
>

Not if you follow the protocol,  if you reconstruct the W guy 200 years
later and the protocol is strictly followed, they'll never meet and that's
all what's needed to proceed to this objection... that's all, and the fact
that they could meet or not change absolutely nothing.


> So they could potentially meet.
>

The potential meeting changes nothing... the feeling to be yourself does
not depend on the possibility to meet a doppelganger... it's utterly absurd
to claim otherwise.

Quentin


> In MWI 'copies' can not potentially meet. If this is your attempt to point
> out an inconsistency its dismissively lazy and fails triumphantly.
>
> In my opinion your beef is impotent anyhow. The most you'd ever show was
> that Clark applied his argument inconsistently, you certainly wouldn't show
> that he was wrong about Bruno's metaphysics.
>
> all the best
>
> Chris.
>
>
> --
> Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 09:39:21 +1300
>
> Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
> From: lizj...@gmail.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
>
> On 14 February 2014 08:56, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>
> So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true
> but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp
> is a dream or simulation at a higher level.
>
>
> If this is true, comp isn't a scientific theory.
>
>
> Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it
> cannot confirm comp.
>
> This is true of any scientific theory (if comp is one, therefore, also
> true of comp).
>
>
>
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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[LizR]

Can the MWI copies ever communicate, e.g. via quantum interference?


On 14 February 2014 11:38, chris peck  wrote:

> Hi Bruno
>
> >> Come on, the poor guy tried hard since two years, and has convinced
> only him
>
> That's a good way of spinning the fact that for two years it is in reality
> you who has failed to convince him.
>
> All the best
>
> Chris
>
> --
> From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: RE: Suicide Words God and Ideas
> Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2014 22:23:08 +
>
>
> Hi Quentin
>
> >> I do not, valid critics are valid,
>
> By definition mate.
>
> >> but when you point to someone the inconsistency in his argument and
> that he maintains for years the same invalid argument that means that
> person does not want to argue, he wants to defend a position at all costs,
> that's evil.
>
> This is what I mean by emotional arm waving. I can honestly think of
> things that are more evil and I suppose, from Clark's point of view, hes
> been pointing out the inconsistencies in Bruno's argument for two years
> too. Does that make Bruno evil???
>
> In a later post you try to rebut Clark :
>
> >>>>In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who "I" or "you"
> is because however many copies of "I" or "you" there may or may not be they
> will never meet.
>
>
> >>That changes absolutely nothing... just put the reconstruction of the W
> guy 200 years later than the M guy, they will never meet...
>
> But if you can send the W guy skipping through time, you can send the M
> guy skipping through time too. So they could potentially meet. In MWI
> 'copies' can not potentially meet. If this is your attempt to point out an
> inconsistency its dismissively lazy and fails triumphantly.
>
> In my opinion your beef is impotent anyhow. The most you'd ever show was
> that Clark applied his argument inconsistently, you certainly wouldn't show
> that he was wrong about Bruno's metaphysics.
>
> all the best
>
> Chris.
>
>
> --
> Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 09:39:21 +1300
> Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
> From: lizj...@gmail.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> On 14 February 2014 08:56, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>
> So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true
> but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp
> is a dream or simulation at a higher level.
>
>
> If this is true, comp isn't a scientific theory.
>
>
> Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it
> cannot confirm comp.
>
> This is true of any scientific theory (if comp is one, therefore, also
> true of comp).
>
>
>
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RE: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

>> Come on, the poor guy tried hard since two years, and has convinced only him

That's a good way of spinning the fact that for two years it is in reality you 
who has failed to convince him.

All the best

Chris

From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: Suicide Words God and Ideas
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2014 22:23:08 +




Hi Quentin

>> I do not, valid critics are valid, 

By definition mate.

>> but when you point to someone the inconsistency in his argument and that he 
>> maintains for years the same invalid argument that means that person does 
>> not want to argue, he wants to defend a position at all costs, that's evil. 

This is what I mean by emotional arm waving. I can honestly think of things 
that are more evil and I suppose, from Clark's point of view, hes been pointing 
out the inconsistencies in Bruno's argument for two years too. Does that make 
Bruno evil??? 

In a later post you try to rebut Clark :

>>>>In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who "I" or "you" is 
>>>> because however many copies of "I" or "you" there may or may not be they 
>>>> will never meet. 


>>That changes absolutely nothing... just put the reconstruction of the W guy 
>>200 years later than the M guy, they will never meet...

But if you can send the W guy skipping through time, you can send the M guy 
skipping through time too. So they could potentially meet. In MWI 'copies' can 
not potentially meet. If this is your attempt to point out an inconsistency its 
dismissively lazy and fails triumphantly.

In my opinion your beef is impotent anyhow. The most you'd ever show was that 
Clark applied his argument inconsistently, you certainly wouldn't show that he 
was wrong about Bruno's metaphysics.

all the best

Chris.


Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 09:39:21 +1300
Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 14 February 2014 08:56, meekerdb  wrote:


  

  
  

So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is
true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to
refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level.

If this is true, comp isn't a scientific theory. 




Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe
then it cannot confirm comp.


This is true of any scientific theory (if comp is one, therefore, also true of 
comp).
 






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RE: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[chris peck]

Hi Quentin

>> I do not, valid critics are valid, 

By definition mate.

>> but when you point to someone the inconsistency in his argument and that he 
>> maintains for years the same invalid argument that means that person does 
>> not want to argue, he wants to defend a position at all costs, that's evil. 

This is what I mean by emotional arm waving. I can honestly think of things 
that are more evil and I suppose, from Clark's point of view, hes been pointing 
out the inconsistencies in Bruno's argument for two years too. Does that make 
Bruno evil??? 

In a later post you try to rebut Clark :

>>>>In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who "I" or "you" is 
>>>> because however many copies of "I" or "you" there may or may not be they 
>>>> will never meet. 


>>That changes absolutely nothing... just put the reconstruction of the W guy 
>>200 years later than the M guy, they will never meet...

But if you can send the W guy skipping through time, you can send the M guy 
skipping through time too. So they could potentially meet. In MWI 'copies' can 
not potentially meet. If this is your attempt to point out an inconsistency its 
dismissively lazy and fails triumphantly.

In my opinion your beef is impotent anyhow. The most you'd ever show was that 
Clark applied his argument inconsistently, you certainly wouldn't show that he 
was wrong about Bruno's metaphysics.

all the best

Chris.


Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 09:39:21 +1300
Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 14 February 2014 08:56, meekerdb  wrote:


  

  
  

So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is
true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to
refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level.

If this is true, comp isn't a scientific theory. 




Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe
then it cannot confirm comp.


This is true of any scientific theory (if comp is one, therefore, also true of 
comp).
 






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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[LizR]

On 14 February 2014 08:56, meekerdb  wrote:

>
> So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true
> but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp
> is a dream or simulation at a higher level.
>

If this is true, comp isn't a scientific theory.

>
> Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it
> cannot confirm comp.
>
> This is true of any scientific theory (if comp is one, therefore, also
true of comp).

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[LizR]

On 14 February 2014 07:26, Richard Ruquist  wrote:

> The duplication of human beings, such a significant prediction of comp,
> should then be amenable to test- using mice of course.
>
> I don't think comp predicts this. Bruno only uses it as a thought
experiment.

However if this is a prediction of comp, we might be able to test it if we
can find a way to test the MWI, which also predicts this.

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[meekerdb]

On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>:


On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:


On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:

On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:

That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated 
in
some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics.

Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree 
this is
a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for 
all
universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different 
geographies.


So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, 
according to
comp?


Not completely, as you will still have all the computations 
approximating all
possible geographical reality, including those without observers, and 
in that
sense, those "realities" exist, but they might not be first person 
plural
sharable, and if you could explore one, they can violate our physics 
below our
substitution level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations,
something that one computation can only approximate). Your question can 
depend
if a quantum universal dovetailer win the "a measure battle", so that 
the
computations going through you states are asspciated to some precise
subdovetailing, for example.





So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows 
them to
exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic Principle" ?)


Is that not tautological?




If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early 
universe in
which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create 
it
(somehow) ?


We select them. See above.






You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your
theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of. 
That makes it impossible to test.

Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than
evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much
more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and 
it is
enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to 
refute
comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on "AUDA", so let us not
anticipate everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to 
step 8,
and then to AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we 
have to
do the dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want to 
continue the
discussion in decent condition.

I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like
"comp predicts whatever physics we've got!"


This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But
thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we 
can
observe ([]p & <>t), so comp(+Theaetetus)  is not refuted yet, and is 
the only
theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp 
predicts one
precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all from what 
we
observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can compare the
comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp.


I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because 
whatever you
could measure about reality could just be "geographical" and so comp is 
always in
accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you precisely point on a
specific thing that would invalidate comp ?


If all the "hypostases" (points of view) modalities were collapsing into 
CPL, then
comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws, and everything 
would
be geographical. This would predict that we can "travel" in the
universe/multiverse, and observe anything logically consistent.

This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in "Forever Undecided"  
(page 47):

"The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that holds 
for the
actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study all possible state of 
affairs".

Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is those
observations which led us to believe that there are physical laws, and laws 
means
that something is true everywhere in our universe (or should means that, if 
that
set is not empty). Indeed we believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 are laws, 
that is are
tru

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[meekerdb]

On 2/13/2014 2:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>:


On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:


On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:

On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:

That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in 
some
versions of cosmology, they may have different physics.

Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this 
is a
matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all 
universal
machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies.


So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, according 
to comp?


Not completely, as you will still have all the computations approximating 
all
possible geographical reality, including those without observers, and in 
that
sense, those "realities" exist, but they might not be first person plural 
sharable,
and if you could explore one, they can violate our physics below our 
substitution
level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something that one
computation can only approximate). Your question can depend if a quantum 
universal
dovetailer win the "a measure battle", so that the computations going 
through you
states are asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example.





So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them to 
exist?
(In other words, the "Strong Anthropic Principle" ?)


Is that not tautological?




If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe in 
which
there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create it 
(somehow) ?


We select them. See above.






You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your 
theory
produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of. That 
makes it
impossible to test.

Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than 
evolution.
It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more. It is
extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to 
find one
natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ 
Theaetetus). But
this needs more on "AUDA", so let us not anticipate everything too much
quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is
interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner and that kind 
of
things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in decent 
condition.

I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like 
"comp
predicts whatever physics we've got!"


This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But 
thanks to
Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we can observe ([]p 
&
<>t), so comp(+Theaetetus)  is not refuted yet, and is the only theory 
explaining
where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp predicts one precise 
physics, in a
way which indeed does not depend at all from what we observe in nature (we 
assume
*only* comp!), and so we can compare the comp-physics with nature physics, 
and test
comp.


I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because whatever you could 
measure about reality could just be "geographical" and so comp is always in accordance 
with whatever measure... if not, could you precisely point on a specific thing that 
would invalidate comp ?


If all the "hypostases" (points of view) modalities were collapsing into CPL,


What's CPL?  Classical Predicate Logic?

then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws, and everything would 
be geographical. This would predict that we can "travel" in the universe/multiverse, and 
observe anything logically consistent.


This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in "Forever Undecided"  (page 
47):

"The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that holds for the actual 
world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study all possible state of affairs".


Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is those observations 
which led us to believe that there are physical laws, and laws means that something is 
true everywhere in our universe (or should means that, if that set is not empty). Indeed 
we believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 are laws, that is are true, not only everywhere, but 
even in all branch of the universal wave.


But that can be explained from Noether's theorem + our insistence that whatever we call a 
law should be translation invariant.  In other words we pick out what is translation 
invariant - and the rest is geography.




But comp justifies this: the modalities of provability and obser

Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

[meekerdb]

On 2/13/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

What's the definition of G*?


G* is a quite peculiar modal logic. It has as axioms all the theorem of G, + 
the axiom:

[]A -> A

But is NOT close for the necessitation rule (can you see why that is impossible). This 
entails that G* has no Kripke semantics. But it has some semantics in term of infinite 
sequence of G-multiverse.


By Solovay second theorem, G* axiomatizes what is true on the machine. Not just what is 
provable by the machine.
G* minus G is not empty (it contains <>t, <><>t, <><><>t, ... for example), and it 
axiomatizes the true but non provable modal (provability) sentences.






It seems that the notation is inadequate since it depends on the accesibility 
relation:  For example if the accessibility relation is T (for teleportation) then M 
and W may be false in Helsinki


Why.


Because teleportation isn't possible (so far as we know).  Which brings up another point 
that bothers me: We are using [] as an operator "necessary", and <> as "possible" as just 
symbols with a defined syntax, but in application we must say what they mean.  What is 
necessary and what is possible are dependent on context; just as above you casually assume 
that teleportation is possible - even though you well know it isn't - just because you can 
write .  This is similar to my complaint about arithmetical realism; it is a sort of 
logical realism.



We assume comp. They are both true, as H T M and H T W, if teleportation is the 
accessibility relation.






while using F (for flying) would make M and W true.


OK, but it is the same with T.


No it's not.  I can fly to Moscow.









so in the "eye of God", nothing changes.

But G, which represents the machine ability, does not prove that equivalence, and this 
entails that []p and []p & <>t will obeys different logics.


OK?


I'm not sure what you mean by "obey different logics"?


I meant different modal logics. It just means that they have different theorems. They 
are different theories. For example G proves []([]p ->p) -> []p, but Z and X does not 
prove that. Z proves <><>A for all A, but G does not prove that. S4Grz proves []p -> p, 
but G does not prove that. S4Grz proves []([]p ->p), but G does not prove that, etc.


OK.

Brent



By incompleteness, despite G* proves the equivalence of []p, []p & p, []p & <>t, are 
equivalent, as G cannot prove that equivalence, they obeys different logic. They have 
different theorems. They are different theories, and that's why we have 8 different 
hypostases. That's how we got a theory of knowledge, a theory of observation, etc, all 
based on the same arithmetyical truth. That corresponds to the different "person points 
of view". You get the 1p view by the "& p" constraints, and the matter by the "& p or & 
<>t" constraints, and the non communicable parts, by the passage x to x* for each logic x.


Bruno


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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Richard Ruquist]

The duplication of human beings, such a significant prediction of comp,
should then be amenable to test- using mice of course.


On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 1:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

>
>
>
> 2014-02-13 18:07 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :
>
>
>> On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :
>>
>>>
>>> On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>




 hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.


 So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it ostensibly
 (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are
 dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented
 on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole
 UD in a non computable).

>>>
>>> I think you can't conclude anything, because as I point out, any measure
>>> you made is geographical under comp hence no measure can invalidate it.
>>>
>>>
>>> I guess you mean any "measurement" I made is geographical.
>>> I agree that the making of the measurement is geographical, but what I
>>> measure might be physically universal, unless physics is only geography,
>>> but that is already refuted by comp, thanks to the non collapse of the
>>> modal logic brought by the intensional variants.
>>> Comp here already predicts that *there* is a physical part common to all
>>> geographies, and that is what I call "physical laws", as the rest will be
>>> sort of contingencies.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>

 You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we
 are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher
 level). OK?

>>>
>>> Ok... but it is no more comp. The "we are at the base level of physics"
>>> is the same thing as primitive matter, Peter Jones realness ingredient.
>>>
>>>
>>> Not at all. By definition of that realness ingredient, it cannot be
>>> tested, except trivially by being "conscious", as all virtual being not
>>> implemented in physics are non-conscious in that Peter Jones theory. This
>>> makes Peter Jones "realness" neither confirmable nor refutable (and thus
>>> pseudo-religious somehow, or just a reification philosophical mistake).
>>>
>>> But in our case, that "realness" (defined by the satisfiability of comp
>>> + theaetetus + "non-dream") is *refutable*. That is why I explained (to
>>> Brett Hall, notably) that a computationalist can test if he belongs to an
>>> (higher order, physical (in the comp sense)) simulation.
>>> If you program that simulation, and I am the simulated observer, I can
>>> derive the physical laws from comp (without doing any observation) and
>>> compare it to what I observe. If that fits, I can't conclude anything (and
>>> my 1p will overlap on reality and the simulation. I still derived the
>>> correct laws of physics), but if I find a discrepancy (and if you don't
>>> mess with my virtual brain so that I stay "correct") then I can conclude
>>> that (~comp V ~Theaetetus V ~simulation).
>>>
>>
>> As long as you don't specify anything measurable that can be use to claim
>> a discrepancy... you can't do that...
>>
>>
>> I give an infinity of such specification. If my environment obeys to the
>> physics Z1*, qZ1*, I can't conclude anything, but I will still derive the
>> correct laws, either by introspection, or by observation. If my environment
>> does not obey to Z1*, I am in an artificial simulation.
>>
>
> That's not something you can measure, please be specific, what do you see
> as experiment we could do to prove or disprove comp, what measurement would
> be able to falsify comp, please be precise.
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown,
>>
>>
>> It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which is
>> already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic).
>>
>>
>> the fact that I could write a virtual world where it does not hold, imply
>> that this virtual world exists in the UD deployement in an infinity of
>> computations which interfere like our reality, no difference here...
>>
>>
>> The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the
>> artificial simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which does
>> not result from the interference below the subst. level.
>>
>
> It must be below the substitution level as such world(s) also results from
> an infinity of computations... so it is below the substitution level,
> because the level is finite or comp is false.
>
>
>>
>> If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma,
>>
>
> How would it proves that ? It can't, the proof is that there *can be*
> environments where F!=ma which also results from an infinity of
> computations.
>
>
>>  it will looks "dreamy" to me,
>>
>
> No argument there proving that.
>
>
>>  I will see that I am not in a real (comp) physical reality, I will see
>> the discrepancy.
>>
>
> 

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-13 18:07 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

>
> On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
>
> 2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :
>
>>
>> On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.
>>>
>>>
>>> So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it ostensibly
>>> (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are
>>> dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented
>>> on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole
>>> UD in a non computable).
>>>
>>
>> I think you can't conclude anything, because as I point out, any measure
>> you made is geographical under comp hence no measure can invalidate it.
>>
>>
>> I guess you mean any "measurement" I made is geographical.
>> I agree that the making of the measurement is geographical, but what I
>> measure might be physically universal, unless physics is only geography,
>> but that is already refuted by comp, thanks to the non collapse of the
>> modal logic brought by the intensional variants.
>> Comp here already predicts that *there* is a physical part common to all
>> geographies, and that is what I call "physical laws", as the rest will be
>> sort of contingencies.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we
>>> are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher
>>> level). OK?
>>>
>>
>> Ok... but it is no more comp. The "we are at the base level of physics"
>> is the same thing as primitive matter, Peter Jones realness ingredient.
>>
>>
>> Not at all. By definition of that realness ingredient, it cannot be
>> tested, except trivially by being "conscious", as all virtual being not
>> implemented in physics are non-conscious in that Peter Jones theory. This
>> makes Peter Jones "realness" neither confirmable nor refutable (and thus
>> pseudo-religious somehow, or just a reification philosophical mistake).
>>
>> But in our case, that "realness" (defined by the satisfiability of comp +
>> theaetetus + "non-dream") is *refutable*. That is why I explained (to Brett
>> Hall, notably) that a computationalist can test if he belongs to an (higher
>> order, physical (in the comp sense)) simulation.
>> If you program that simulation, and I am the simulated observer, I can
>> derive the physical laws from comp (without doing any observation) and
>> compare it to what I observe. If that fits, I can't conclude anything (and
>> my 1p will overlap on reality and the simulation. I still derived the
>> correct laws of physics), but if I find a discrepancy (and if you don't
>> mess with my virtual brain so that I stay "correct") then I can conclude
>> that (~comp V ~Theaetetus V ~simulation).
>>
>
> As long as you don't specify anything measurable that can be use to claim
> a discrepancy... you can't do that...
>
>
> I give an infinity of such specification. If my environment obeys to the
> physics Z1*, qZ1*, I can't conclude anything, but I will still derive the
> correct laws, either by introspection, or by observation. If my environment
> does not obey to Z1*, I am in an artificial simulation.
>

That's not something you can measure, please be specific, what do you see
as experiment we could do to prove or disprove comp, what measurement would
be able to falsify comp, please be precise.


>
>
>
> Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown,
>
>
> It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which is
> already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic).
>
>
> the fact that I could write a virtual world where it does not hold, imply
> that this virtual world exists in the UD deployement in an infinity of
> computations which interfere like our reality, no difference here...
>
>
> The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the artificial
> simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which does not result
> from the interference below the subst. level.
>

It must be below the substitution level as such world(s) also results from
an infinity of computations... so it is below the substitution level,
because the level is finite or comp is false.


>
> If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma,
>

How would it proves that ? It can't, the proof is that there *can be*
environments where F!=ma which also results from an infinity of
computations.


>  it will looks "dreamy" to me,
>

No argument there proving that.


>  I will see that I am not in a real (comp) physical reality, I will see
> the discrepancy.
>

You still haven't show of what consist comp physical reality beside vague
manyworld like prediction...


>
>
>
>
>
> so by the same point as our "real" world, a conscious being in my virtual
> world (if a UD exists, and in platonia of course it exists), then at the
> next step he will be out *my* virtual world but not the consistent
> extensi

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
















hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.


So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it  
ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is  
false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not  
by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by  
the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable).


I think you can't conclude anything, because as I point out, any  
measure you made is geographical under comp hence no measure can  
invalidate it.


I guess you mean any "measurement" I made is geographical.
I agree that the making of the measurement is geographical, but what  
I measure might be physically universal, unless physics is only  
geography, but that is already refuted by comp, thanks to the non  
collapse of the modal logic brought by the intensional variants.
Comp here already predicts that *there* is a physical part common to  
all geographies, and that is what I call "physical laws", as the  
rest will be sort of contingencies.







You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus +  
we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a  
higher level). OK?


Ok... but it is no more comp. The "we are at the base level of  
physics" is the same thing as primitive matter, Peter Jones  
realness ingredient.


Not at all. By definition of that realness ingredient, it cannot be  
tested, except trivially by being "conscious", as all virtual being  
not implemented in physics are non-conscious in that Peter Jones  
theory. This makes Peter Jones "realness" neither confirmable nor  
refutable (and thus pseudo-religious somehow, or just a reification  
philosophical mistake).


But in our case, that "realness" (defined by the satisfiability of  
comp + theaetetus + "non-dream") is *refutable*. That is why I  
explained (to Brett Hall, notably) that a computationalist can test  
if he belongs to an (higher order, physical (in the comp sense))  
simulation.
If you program that simulation, and I am the simulated observer, I  
can derive the physical laws from comp (without doing any  
observation) and compare it to what I observe. If that fits, I can't  
conclude anything (and my 1p will overlap on reality and the  
simulation. I still derived the correct laws of physics), but if I  
find a discrepancy (and if you don't mess with my virtual brain so  
that I stay "correct") then I can conclude that (~comp V ~Theaetetus  
V ~simulation).


As long as you don't specify anything measurable that can be use to  
claim a discrepancy... you can't do that...


I give an infinity of such specification. If my environment obeys to  
the physics Z1*, qZ1*, I can't conclude anything, but I will still  
derive the correct laws, either by introspection, or by observation.  
If my environment does not obey to Z1*, I am in an artificial  
simulation.





Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown,


It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which  
is already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic).



the fact that I could write a virtual world where it does not hold,  
imply that this virtual world exists in the UD deployement in an  
infinity of computations which interfere like our reality, no  
difference here...


The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the  
artificial simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which  
does not result from the interference below the subst. level.


If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, it  
will looks "dreamy" to me, I will see that I am not in a real (comp)  
physical reality, I will see the discrepancy.






so by the same point as our "real" world, a conscious being in my  
virtual world (if a UD exists, and in platonia of course it exists),  
then at the next step he will be out *my* virtual world but not the  
consistent extension of it where F=m*a still does not hold true...  
hence F=m*a cannot be universal in this context and cannot be use to  
invalidate comp... so as long as you can't say precisely what kind  
of measurement would invalidate comp or what exactly comp physics  
encompass (IMO not much except multiplicity of worlds), I can't see  
a way to falsify it, and certainly not by a measurement. If you  
think otherwise, please state what kind of measurement you think  
would qualify.


*All* physical measurement can refute comp V simulation in principle,  
as anything physical can be both derived in comp, and then tested.


Of course, if there were no physical laws, and that all number  
relations measured by physicists are contingent, then that would be a  
pity for the notion of physical laws. But then comp would predict that  
those geographical laws have to be accessible and we should be able to 

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

>
> On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
>
> 2014-02-13 12:29 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :
>
>>
>> On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :
>>
>>>
>>> On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :
>>>

 On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:

  On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated
> in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics.
>
> Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this
> is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all
> universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different 
> geographies.
>

 So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist,
 according to comp?


 Not completely, as you will still have all the computations
 approximating all possible geographical reality, including those without
 observers, and in that sense, those "realities" exist, but they might not
 be first person plural sharable, and if you could explore one, they can
 violate our physics below our substitution level (which witnesses the
 infinitely many computations, something that one computation can only
 approximate). Your question can depend if a quantum universal dovetailer
 win the "a measure battle", so that the computations going through you
 states are asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example.




 So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows
 them to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic Principle" ?)


 Is that not tautological?



  If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early
 universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers
 create it (somehow) ?


  We select them. See above.




 You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your
> theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of.  That
> makes it impossible to test.
>
> Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than
> evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more.
> It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough 
> to
> find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+
> Theaetetus). But this needs more on "AUDA", so let us not anticipate
> everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to
> AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner
> and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in
> decent condition.
>
> I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something
 like "comp predicts whatever physics we've got!"


 This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits.
 But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we
 can observe ([]p & <>t), so comp(+Theaetetus)  is not refuted yet, and is
 the only theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp
 predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all
 from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can
 compare the comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp.

>>>
>>> I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because
>>> whatever you could measure about reality could just be "geographical" and
>>> so comp is always in accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you
>>> precisely point on a specific thing that would invalidate comp ?
>>>
>>>
>>> If all the "hypostases" (points of view) modalities were collapsing into
>>> CPL, then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws, and
>>> everything would be geographical. This would predict that we can "travel"
>>> in the universe/multiverse, and observe anything logically consistent.
>>>
>>> This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in "Forever Undecided"
>>>  (page 47):
>>>
>>> "The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that holds
>>> for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study all possible
>>> state of affairs".
>>>
>>> Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is
>>> those observations which led us to believe that there are physical laws,
>>> and laws means that something is true everywhere in our universe (or should
>>> means that, if that set is not empty). Indeed we believe that F=ma, or F=
>>> KmM/r^2 are laws, that is are true, no

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 12:29 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:


On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:
That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as  
contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have  
different physics.


Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree  
this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be  
true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have  
only different geographies.


So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist,  
according to comp?


Not completely, as you will still have all the computations  
approximating all possible geographical reality, including those  
without observers, and in that sense, those "realities" exist, but  
they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could  
explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution  
level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something  
that one computation can only approximate). Your question can  
depend if a quantum universal dovetailer win the "a measure  
battle", so that the computations going through you states are  
asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example.





So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it  
allows them to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic  
Principle" ?)


Is that not tautological?




If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early  
universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as  
obsverers create it (somehow) ?


We select them. See above.





You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever  
your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we  
know of.  That makes it impossible to test.


Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable  
than evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from,  
and much more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the  
laws, and it is enough to find one natural phenomenon  
contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this  
needs more on "AUDA", so let us not anticipate everything too  
much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA.  
Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the  
dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue  
the discussion in decent condition.


I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was  
something like "comp predicts whatever physics we've got!"


This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white  
rabbits. But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put  
constraints on what we can observe ([]p & <>t), so  
comp(+Theaetetus)  is not refuted yet, and is the only theory  
explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp  
predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not  
depend at all from what we observe in nature (we assume *only*  
comp!), and so we can compare the comp-physics with nature  
physics, and test comp.


I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that...  
because whatever you could measure about reality could just be  
"geographical" and so comp is always in accordance with whatever  
measure... if not, could you precisely point on a specific thing  
that would invalidate comp ?


If all the "hypostases" (points of view) modalities were collapsing  
into CPL, then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no  
physical laws, and everything would be geographical. This would  
predict that we can "travel" in the universe/multiverse, and  
observe anything logically consistent.


This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in "Forever  
Undecided"  (page 47):


"The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that  
holds for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic  
study all possible state of affairs".


Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is  
those observations which led us to believe that there are physical  
laws, and laws means that something is true everywhere in our  
universe (or should means that, if that set is not empty). Indeed  
we believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 are laws, that is are true, not  
only everywhere, but even in all branch of the universal wave.



But it can't be true everywhere with comp,




It must be true at the physical level, about the "real" (by comp)  
physical reality.



because, I can write a virtual world where this does not hold, and  
as it is a virtual world, an infinity of computations approximate  
it at any level in the UD deployement (like our reality) hence,  
that "virtual" world is as real as ours by UDA (an

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-13 12:29 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

>
> On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
>
> 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :
>
>>
>> On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :
>>
>>>
>>> On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
 On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:

  That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in
 some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics.

 Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this
 is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all
 universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different 
 geographies.

>>>
>>> So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist,
>>> according to comp?
>>>
>>>
>>> Not completely, as you will still have all the computations
>>> approximating all possible geographical reality, including those without
>>> observers, and in that sense, those "realities" exist, but they might not
>>> be first person plural sharable, and if you could explore one, they can
>>> violate our physics below our substitution level (which witnesses the
>>> infinitely many computations, something that one computation can only
>>> approximate). Your question can depend if a quantum universal dovetailer
>>> win the "a measure battle", so that the computations going through you
>>> states are asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them
>>> to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic Principle" ?)
>>>
>>>
>>> Is that not tautological?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early
>>> universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers
>>> create it (somehow) ?
>>>
>>>
>>>  We select them. See above.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your
 theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of.  That
 makes it impossible to test.

 Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than
 evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more.
 It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to
 find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+
 Theaetetus). But this needs more on "AUDA", so let us not anticipate
 everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to
 AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner
 and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in
 decent condition.

 I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something
>>> like "comp predicts whatever physics we've got!"
>>>
>>>
>>> This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But
>>> thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we can
>>> observe ([]p & <>t), so comp(+Theaetetus)  is not refuted yet, and is the
>>> only theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp
>>> predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all
>>> from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can
>>> compare the comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp.
>>>
>>
>> I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because
>> whatever you could measure about reality could just be "geographical" and
>> so comp is always in accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you
>> precisely point on a specific thing that would invalidate comp ?
>>
>>
>> If all the "hypostases" (points of view) modalities were collapsing into
>> CPL, then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws, and
>> everything would be geographical. This would predict that we can "travel"
>> in the universe/multiverse, and observe anything logically consistent.
>>
>> This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in "Forever Undecided"
>>  (page 47):
>>
>> "The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that holds
>> for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study all possible
>> state of affairs".
>>
>> Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is those
>> observations which led us to believe that there are physical laws, and laws
>> means that something is true everywhere in our universe (or should means
>> that, if that set is not empty). Indeed we believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2
>> are laws, that is are true, not only everywhere, but even in all branch of
>> the universal wave.
>>
>
>
> But it can't be true everywhere with comp,
>
>
>
>
> It must be true at the physical level, about the "real" (by comp) physical
> reality.
>
>
> because, I

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:


On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:
That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as  
contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have  
different physics.


Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree  
this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be  
true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only  
different geographies.


So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist,  
according to comp?


Not completely, as you will still have all the computations  
approximating all possible geographical reality, including those  
without observers, and in that sense, those "realities" exist, but  
they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could  
explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution  
level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something  
that one computation can only approximate). Your question can  
depend if a quantum universal dovetailer win the "a measure  
battle", so that the computations going through you states are  
asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example.





So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it  
allows them to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic  
Principle" ?)


Is that not tautological?




If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early  
universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as  
obsverers create it (somehow) ?


We select them. See above.





You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever  
your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we  
know of.  That makes it impossible to test.


Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable  
than evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from,  
and much more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the  
laws, and it is enough to find one natural phenomenon  
contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this  
needs more on "AUDA", so let us not anticipate everything too much  
quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA. Well,  
it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner and  
that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion  
in decent condition.


I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was  
something like "comp predicts whatever physics we've got!"


This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white  
rabbits. But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put  
constraints on what we can observe ([]p & <>t), so  
comp(+Theaetetus)  is not refuted yet, and is the only theory  
explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp predicts  
one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all  
from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we  
can compare the comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp.


I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because  
whatever you could measure about reality could just be  
"geographical" and so comp is always in accordance with whatever  
measure... if not, could you precisely point on a specific thing  
that would invalidate comp ?


If all the "hypostases" (points of view) modalities were collapsing  
into CPL, then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no  
physical laws, and everything would be geographical. This would  
predict that we can "travel" in the universe/multiverse, and observe  
anything logically consistent.


This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in "Forever  
Undecided"  (page 47):


"The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that  
holds for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study  
all possible state of affairs".


Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is  
those observations which led us to believe that there are physical  
laws, and laws means that something is true everywhere in our  
universe (or should means that, if that set is not empty). Indeed we  
believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 are laws, that is are true, not  
only everywhere, but even in all branch of the universal wave.



But it can't be true everywhere with comp,




It must be true at the physical level, about the "real" (by comp)  
physical reality.



because, I can write a virtual world where this does not hold, and  
as it is a virtual world, an infinity of computations approximate it  
at any level in the UD deployement (like our reality) hence,  
that "virtual" world is as real as ours by UDA (and not so virtual)...


It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics.





hen

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

>
> On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
>
> 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :
>
>>
>> On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:
>>
>> On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>> On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>>  That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in
>>> some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics.
>>>
>>> Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this
>>> is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all
>>> universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies.
>>>
>>
>> So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist,
>> according to comp?
>>
>>
>> Not completely, as you will still have all the computations approximating
>> all possible geographical reality, including those without observers, and
>> in that sense, those "realities" exist, but they might not be first person
>> plural sharable, and if you could explore one, they can violate our physics
>> below our substitution level (which witnesses the infinitely many
>> computations, something that one computation can only approximate). Your
>> question can depend if a quantum universal dovetailer win the "a measure
>> battle", so that the computations going through you states are asspciated
>> to some precise subdovetailing, for example.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them
>> to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic Principle" ?)
>>
>>
>> Is that not tautological?
>>
>>
>>
>> If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe
>> in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create
>> it (somehow) ?
>>
>>
>> We select them. See above.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your
>>> theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of.  That
>>> makes it impossible to test.
>>>
>>> Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than
>>> evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more.
>>> It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to
>>> find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+
>>> Theaetetus). But this needs more on "AUDA", so let us not anticipate
>>> everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to
>>> AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner
>>> and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in
>>> decent condition.
>>>
>>> I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like
>> "comp predicts whatever physics we've got!"
>>
>>
>> This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But
>> thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we can
>> observe ([]p & <>t), so comp(+Theaetetus)  is not refuted yet, and is the
>> only theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp
>> predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all
>> from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can
>> compare the comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp.
>>
>
> I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because
> whatever you could measure about reality could just be "geographical" and
> so comp is always in accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you
> precisely point on a specific thing that would invalidate comp ?
>
>
> If all the "hypostases" (points of view) modalities were collapsing into
> CPL, then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws, and
> everything would be geographical. This would predict that we can "travel"
> in the universe/multiverse, and observe anything logically consistent.
>
> This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in "Forever Undecided"
>  (page 47):
>
> "The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that holds
> for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study all possible
> state of affairs".
>
> Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is those
> observations which led us to believe that there are physical laws, and laws
> means that something is true everywhere in our universe (or should means
> that, if that set is not empty). Indeed we believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2
> are laws, that is are true, not only everywhere, but even in all branch of
> the universal wave.
>


But it can't be true everywhere with comp, because, I can write a virtual
world where this does not hold, and as it is a virtual world, an infinity
of computations approximate it at any level in the UD deployement (like our
reality) hence, that "virtual" world is as real as ours by UDA (and not
so virtual)... hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.

Quentin


>
> Bu

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:


On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:
That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as  
contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have  
different physics.


Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree  
this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be  
true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only  
different geographies.


So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist,  
according to comp?


Not completely, as you will still have all the computations  
approximating all possible geographical reality, including those  
without observers, and in that sense, those "realities" exist, but  
they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could  
explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution  
level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something  
that one computation can only approximate). Your question can depend  
if a quantum universal dovetailer win the "a measure battle", so  
that the computations going through you states are asspciated to  
some precise subdovetailing, for example.





So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows  
them to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic Principle" ?)


Is that not tautological?




If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early  
universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as  
obsverers create it (somehow) ?


We select them. See above.





You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever  
your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we  
know of.  That makes it impossible to test.


Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than  
evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and  
much more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws,  
and it is enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1*  
or X1* to refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on  
"AUDA", so let us not anticipate everything too much quickly. You  
jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is  
interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner and that  
kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in  
decent condition.


I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something  
like "comp predicts whatever physics we've got!"


This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits.  
But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on  
what we can observe ([]p & <>t), so comp(+Theaetetus)  is not  
refuted yet, and is the only theory explaining where matter and  
consciousness comes from. Comp predicts one precise physics, in a  
way which indeed does not depend at all from what we observe in  
nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can compare the comp- 
physics with nature physics, and test comp.


I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because  
whatever you could measure about reality could just be  
"geographical" and so comp is always in accordance with whatever  
measure... if not, could you precisely point on a specific thing  
that would invalidate comp ?


If all the "hypostases" (points of view) modalities were collapsing  
into CPL, then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical  
laws, and everything would be geographical. This would predict that we  
can "travel" in the universe/multiverse, and observe anything  
logically consistent.


This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in "Forever  
Undecided"  (page 47):


"The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that  
holds for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study  
all possible state of affairs".


Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is  
those observations which led us to believe that there are physical  
laws, and laws means that something is true everywhere in our universe  
(or should means that, if that set is not empty). Indeed we believe  
that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 are laws, that is are true, not only  
everywhere, but even in all branch of the universal wave.


But comp justifies this: the modalities of provability and observation  
does not collapse, and so there are universal (in a strong sense) laws  
or physical truth. Among those already predicted by comp, is the Many- 
worlds aspect of reality, which appears under the substitution level,  
and the existence of indeterminacy and non-cloning. In particular,  
without QM, I would probably tend to believe that comp is not plausible.


But comp gives the whole mathematics of observability, which leads to  
infinitely many testable propositions. For example, a form of Bell's  
inequality can be

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Feb 2014, at 05:38, Russell Standish wrote:


On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 12:24:18PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:02, Russell Standish wrote:


On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 07:31:24PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:


You are right, the qualia are in X1* \  X1, like we get quanta in
S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*.


The only thing you can say is that qualia ought to obey the axioms  
of

X1*\X1, (and even that supposes that Z captures all observations,
which I think is debatable),


By UDA, "p" to refer to a "physical certainty" needs to

1) UD generated (= sigma_1 arithmetical and true).
2) provable (true in all consistent extensions)
3) and non "trivially" provable (= there must be at least one
consistent extension)

This give the []p & <>t, with p sigma_1.

So the logic of observable certainty should be given by the Z1*  
logic.





This is certainly an interesting understanding that I hadn't met in
your writings before.


You worry me a bit, as I think this is explained in all papers and the  
thesis. I know that I am concise.
Normally, if everything get clear, you should see that this is what I  
am explaining everywhere.





In associating provable with "true in all consistent extensions",


In case of "provable", this is Gödel COMPLEteness result (not  
incompleteness!).
In case of an abstract box, in a modal logic having a Kripke  
semantics, this is just the semantics of Kripke.






are
you meaning that so long as something (ie proposition) is computed by
all programs instantiating your current state, no matter how far in
the future that calculation might require, then that something is
(sigma_1) provable.


I am not sure. "true in all consistent extensions" is a very general  
notion.


What happens is that, in arithmetic, the sigma_1 sentences, when true,  
are provable (already by RA).


So they verify the formula A -> []A.  (called TRIV for trivial, as  
that sentence makes many modal logic collapsing, but not so in the  
provability logic, not even in the 1p S4Grz).


In fact a machine is Turing universal iff for all sigma_1 sentences A  
we have A -> []A. So "A -> []A" is the Turing universality axiom, when  
A is put for any sigma_1 sentence.


G1 is G + A->[]A. Visser proved an equivalent of Solovay theorem for  
G1 and G1*. You can find it in Boolos 1993.


It is a way to restrict the logic of the different points of view on  
the UD*. "To be a finite piece of computation" is itself given by a  
sigma_1 formula, and the sigma-1 sentences model computations.







Then 1&2 gives your hypostase for knowledge, ie S4Grz1.


Only G1 at that stage. To get knowledge, you need to do 1 and 2, but  
on []p & p, like to get observation/probability/expectation, you need  
to do 1 and 2, but on (3) []p & <>t.
And to get sensible observation, you can mix knowledge ( " & p"), and  
"consistency" <>t.

Incompleteness makes all those views obeying to different logic.




It is, of
course the sigma_1 restriction of Theatetus's definition of knowledge,
which both Brent & I share quibbles with, but accept for the "sake of
the argument".


Since Plato, many philosophers quibble on Theaetetus' definition. The  
fist quibbler being Socrate, who refuted it.
The magic things happening with comp, is that Socrate's refutation  
does no more apply, and the only argument against it which remains, is  
the argument put forward by people who believe that they can  
distinguish, immediately in the 1p view, simulations or dreams from  
reality. But this we have already abandoned when we accept an  
artificial brain (like in step 6).






But assuming 3) above is equivalent to assuming the no cul-de-sac
conjecture by fiat.


The beauty is that incompleteness makes sense of that move. In most  
modal logic []p -> <>t.






I don't feel comfortable in assuming that axiomatically - I was hoping
for a proof, or even just a better justification for that.


I am not sure what that would mean. Here the proofs is that the move  
need to get a probability notion from a provability notion makes  
genuine new sense thanks to incompleteness.
When we predict P(head) = 1/2, we also, but *implicitly*, assume <>t  
by fiat.  Incompleteness gives the opportunity to see that making it  
explicit does change the logic, and that is why observation will obeys  
to a different logic than knowledge, and that is exactly what we need  
to get physics and knowledge, and belief, ... from the same  
arithmetical reality accessible by a machine.


A rumor, alluded in the book by Franzen (on the abuse of Gödel!), is  
that I define probability by provability, but of course, that is not  
the case. Knowledge and probability are intensional nuance of  
provability, not provability itself.


Best,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Feb 2014, at 04:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2014 11:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on  
modal logic, directly related to the machine discourse (and this  
will be justified later, as it is not obvious at all).










which translates the UDA. the Gödel provability cannot be used  
for the UD measure, due to the cul-de-sac worlds. That is why we  
need []p & p, or []p & Dt, or []p & Dt & p.



Brent, do you see this?

Are you OK that in a cul-de-sac world we have []A for all A?


I understand that "W is a cul-de-sac world" means there is no world  
accessible from W (including W itself), so "A is true in all worlds  
accessible from W" is vacuously satisfied.


OK.



But then we also have []~A in W.



OK.



So []A in W doesn't say anything about the truth value of A in W.   
That seems like a peculiar formulation.



?
This means only that modal logic is not truth-functional.  We already  
know that. If alpha R beta (and only beta), and if p is true in beta  
and false in alpha, you have []p in alpha, and ~p in alpha. But you  
could have p in alpha. []A truth value does not depend on the truth  
value of A. We say that modal logic is not truth functional.









I repeat two arguments.

I recall first Kripke semantics:

All the worlds obeys CPL. And there is some fixed binary relation R  
on that set of worlds (called "accessibility").


Then,

[]p is true in a world alpha if p is true in all worlds beta such  
that alpha R beta


Or equivalently, (and dually):

<>p is true in a world alpha if it exists a world beta with p true  
in beta and alpha R beta.


(re-verify that this entails well

<>p = ~[]~p
[]p = ~<>~p
~[]p = <>~p   (jump law 1)
~<>p = []~p   (jump law 2)

OK?)


Now consider some multiverse with zeta being a cul-de-sac world, like

{alpha, beta, gamma, zeta} with

alpha R beta, beta R gamma, gamma R zeta.

And nothing else. In that multiverse zeta is a cul-de-sac world.

OK?

Proposition. For any proposition A,  []A is true in zeta.

Proof.

Imagine that []A is not true in Zeta. Zeta obeys CPL, so if []A is  
not true, []A is false. OK? And if []A is false, then

~[]A is true, by classical logic. OK?

But if ~[]A is true, then <>~A is true, by the jump law 1 above. OK?

Then by Kripke semantics above, if <>~A is true in Zeta, it means  
that there is a world accessible from Zeta, and in which ~A is true.




But that is impossible, given that Zeta is a culd-de-sac world.

Conclusion:  []A cannot be false in Zeta.


But since A is any proposition it is also the case that []~A cannot  
be false in Zeta.  So while either A or ~A but not both are true in  
Zeta, []A and []~A are both true.


Exact. That is why cul-de-sac world shoild be avoided: everything is  
"necessary", and nothing is "possible" (when reading the box and  
diamond with the alethic sense, which is some abuse, but can be useful  
pedagogically).








Summary: []A is true, for any A,  in any cul-de-sac world, of any  
Kripke multiverse. This is a direct consequence of the jump law: as  
[]A can only be false if <>~A is true, and all proposition  
beginning by a diamond "<>" are false in a cul-de-sac world.


In particular []f is true in the cul-de-sac worlds. And in fact []f  
is false in any non cul-de-sac world. So []f characterizes the cul- 
de-sac worlds in Kripke semantics. OK?


definition: I will say that a world is transitory iff it is not   
cul-de-sac world.


Now, the G modal logic has curious Kripke multiverse.


What's the definition of the G modal logic?


It is the logic obeyed by Gödel's beweisbar, when provable by the  
machine.

By Solovay first theorem it is axiomatized by the axiom:

[]([]A -> A) -> []A)

With CPL (and thus the modus ponens rule), the K axioms [](A -> B) ->  
([]A -> []B), and the necessitation rules A / []A.


[]A -> [][]A can be proved in that theory, like <>t -> ~[]<>t   
("Gödel's incompleteness theorem").


On Kripke semantics is given by finite irreflexive and transitive  
multiverse.
Another one is transitive multiverse without infinite path (a R b, b R  
c, c R d, ...). In particular this implies irreflexivity, as a R a  
entails a R a, a R a, a R a, etc.






No worlds can ever access to itself, but worse, all worlds access  
to some cul-de-sac world. (cf the image "you die at each instant in  
comp or in the little buddhist theory).


G proves <>t -> <>[]f. This says, in Kripke semantics, that if I am  
in a transitory world, then I can access to a cul-de-sac world.


OK?

So let us come back in reality, and let us consider our common very  
small multiverse {Helsinki, Washington, Moscou}, or {H, W, M} to be  
shorter.


We are in the protocol of step 3. And suppose we are told that in M  
and W, we will have a cup of coffee.


Then we would like to say that

  "[](we-will have a cup-of-coffee)"

is true in Helsinki. Ou guardian angel G* told us that <>W and <>M  
is true in Helsinki, so it looks

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal :

>
> On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:
>
> On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>  That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in
>> some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics.
>>
>> Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this is
>> a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all
>> universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies.
>>
>
> So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, according
> to comp?
>
>
> Not completely, as you will still have all the computations approximating
> all possible geographical reality, including those without observers, and
> in that sense, those "realities" exist, but they might not be first person
> plural sharable, and if you could explore one, they can violate our physics
> below our substitution level (which witnesses the infinitely many
> computations, something that one computation can only approximate). Your
> question can depend if a quantum universal dovetailer win the "a measure
> battle", so that the computations going through you states are asspciated
> to some precise subdovetailing, for example.
>
>
>
>
> So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them
> to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic Principle" ?)
>
>
> Is that not tautological?
>
>
>
> If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe
> in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create
> it (somehow) ?
>
>
> We select them. See above.
>
>
>
>
> You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your
>> theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of.  That
>> makes it impossible to test.
>>
>> Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than
>> evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more.
>> It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to
>> find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+
>> Theaetetus). But this needs more on "AUDA", so let us not anticipate
>> everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to
>> AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner
>> and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in
>> decent condition.
>>
>> I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like
> "comp predicts whatever physics we've got!"
>
>
> This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But
> thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we can
> observe ([]p & <>t), so comp(+Theaetetus)  is not refuted yet, and is the
> only theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp
> predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all
> from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can
> compare the comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp.
>

I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because
whatever you could measure about reality could just be "geographical" and
so comp is always in accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you
precisely point on a specific thing that would invalidate comp ?

Regards,
Quentin

>
>
>
> However I see that isn't so, so I will be interested to know how it's
> testable - if I ever make it to understanding AUDA.
>
>
> I hope to be able to explain enough so that you understand the main line
> on this.
> Meanwhile, more explanation, notably in my answer to Brent.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>  --
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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:


On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:
That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated  
in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics.


Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree  
this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be  
true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only  
different geographies.


So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist,  
according to comp?


Not completely, as you will still have all the computations  
approximating all possible geographical reality, including those  
without observers, and in that sense, those "realities" exist, but  
they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could  
explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution level  
(which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something that one  
computation can only approximate). Your question can depend if a  
quantum universal dovetailer win the "a measure battle", so that the  
computations going through you states are asspciated to some precise  
subdovetailing, for example.





So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows  
them to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic Principle" ?)


Is that not tautological?




If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early  
universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as  
obsverers create it (somehow) ?


We select them. See above.





You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever  
your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we  
know of.  That makes it impossible to test.


Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than  
evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much  
more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it  
is enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to  
refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on "AUDA", so let us  
not anticipate everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to  
step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz  
said, we have to do the dinner and that kind of things of life, if  
we want to continue the discussion in decent condition.


I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something  
like "comp predicts whatever physics we've got!"


This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits.  
But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on  
what we can observe ([]p & <>t), so comp(+Theaetetus)  is not refuted  
yet, and is the only theory explaining where matter and consciousness  
comes from. Comp predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed  
does not depend at all from what we observe in nature (we assume  
*only* comp!), and so we can compare the comp-physics with nature  
physics, and test comp.





However I see that isn't so, so I will be interested to know how  
it's testable - if I ever make it to understanding AUDA.


I hope to be able to explain enough so that you understand the main  
line on this.

Meanwhile, more explanation, notably in my answer to Brent.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Russell Standish]

On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 12:24:18PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:02, Russell Standish wrote:
> 
> >On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 07:31:24PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >>You are right, the qualia are in X1* \  X1, like we get quanta in
> >>S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*.
> >
> >The only thing you can say is that qualia ought to obey the axioms of
> >X1*\X1, (and even that supposes that Z captures all observations,
> >which I think is debatable),
> 
> By UDA, "p" to refer to a "physical certainty" needs to
> 
> 1) UD generated (= sigma_1 arithmetical and true).
> 2) provable (true in all consistent extensions)
> 3) and non "trivially" provable (= there must be at least one
> consistent extension)
> 
> This give the []p & <>t, with p sigma_1.
> 
> So the logic of observable certainty should be given by the Z1* logic.
> 
> 

This is certainly an interesting understanding that I hadn't met in
your writings before.

In associating provable with "true in all consistent extensions", are
you meaning that so long as something (ie proposition) is computed by
all programs instantiating your current state, no matter how far in
the future that calculation might require, then that something is
(sigma_1) provable.

Then 1&2 gives your hypostase for knowledge, ie S4Grz1. It is, of
course the sigma_1 restriction of Theatetus's definition of knowledge,
which both Brent & I share quibbles with, but accept for the "sake of
the argument".

But assuming 3) above is equivalent to assuming the no cul-de-sac
conjecture by fiat.

I don't feel comfortable in assuming that axiomatically - I was hoping
for a proof, or even just a better justification for that.

Cheers

-- 


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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

[meekerdb]

On 2/12/2014 11:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on modal logic, 
directly related to the machine discourse (and this will be justified later, as it is 
not obvious at all).



On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote:
On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish > wrote:


On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote:
>
> You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong with it! :-)
>
> (Sorry!)
>
> I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way before it's
> likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't string theory
> retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that was a positive
> result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently...
>

I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of incommunicable
facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM.


I said "apparently" because I have no idea how he does it.


I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be possible to simulate 
consciousness because (we think) any physical process can be simulated and 
consciousness necessarily accompanies the physical processes of one's brain. This is 
the bet of "saying yes to the doctor".


With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor consciousness. We can only 
simulate the relevant part of the brain so that consciousness is preserved. The price 
to pay is that matter becomes something emergent in the 1p views (1p plural) and 
cannot be simulated or emulated.





But there's a catch.  When we simulate an aircraft flying or a weather system those 
have a reference in the 'real' world and that's why they are simulations. But if we 
simulate a conscious brain the consciousness will be 'real' consciousness. So 
simulating conscious is in a sense impossible; we may be able to produce it but we 
can't simulate it.  Consciousness must be consciousness of something, but it need not 
be anything physical;


It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical.


So you're saying that we cannot simulate matter or consciousness.  But I think we can 
still produce consciousness by manipulating matter - we can still build a conscious 
Mars rover.



With comp we can say that, but only as a matter of speaking. Mars Rover is in Heaven, 
and the hard task of computer we send on Mars is to distracted it enough so that it can 
manifest its consciousness to us, notably by sending us interesting data on mars. The 
consciousness of Mars Rover is a 1-view, and it is more "a product" of the infinity of 
computations going through its state in the arithmetical reality) than with a "single" 
machine. Thanks to Everett, and our own entanglement with mars, we can indeed bet that 
little Mars Rover share some history with us.












it could just be consciousness of arithmetical truths.  This explains why aspects of 
consciousness are ineffable.  It's because conscious processes can prove Goedel's 
theorem and so know that some truths are unprovable.  Bruno takes "qualia are 
ineffable" and "some arithmetical truths are unprovable" and postulates 
"ineffable=unprovable".


Not really.
I guess people progress, as this is the new common error in fashion, but some logician 
did it too, and is a confusion between hypostases. Qualia are related to non 
communicable, but only *indirectly* through G*. It happens through Z1* and X1* (and 
S4Grz1),


Don't understand that.


Incompleteness does not just separate the provability/consistency modal logic G into two 
parts: the provable statements, and the true statements, it also makes the logic of the 
differents modalities:


p
[]p
[]p & p
[]p & <>t
[]p & <>t & p

obeying different modal logics, despite G* proves them all equivalent extensionnally 
(they "proves" the same true arithmetical propositions, but they see them differently.


Among them, three logics splits into provable and non provable parts:

[]p   (gives G and G*, by Solovay theorem)
[]p & <>p  (gives Z and Z*-
[]p & <>t & p   (gives X and X*)

That remains true when we restrict p on the sigma_1 arithmetical reality (the 
arithmetical UD, which is a UD, provably).


That changes G into a modal logic G1 (G + p->[]p) and all hypostases get changed by 
this. I change their names by adding a 1. And qualia and quanta appears in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*.










which translates the UDA. the Gödel provability cannot be used for the UD measure, due 
to the cul-de-sac worlds. That is why we need []p & p, or []p & Dt, or []p & Dt & p.



Brent, do you see this?

Are you OK that in a cul-de-sac world we have []A for all A?


I understand that "W is a cul-de-sac world" means there is no world accessible from W 
(including W itself), so "A is true in all worlds accessible from W" is vacu

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[LizR]

On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in
> some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics.
>
> Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this is
> a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all
> universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies.
>

So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, according
to comp? So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it
allows them to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic Principle" ?)

If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe in
which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create it
(somehow) ?

You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your theory
> produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of.  That makes
> it impossible to test.
>
> Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than
> evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more.
> It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to
> find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+
> Theaetetus). But this needs more on "AUDA", so let us not anticipate
> everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to
> AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner
> and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in
> decent condition.
>
> I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like
"comp predicts whatever physics we've got!"

However I see that isn't so, so I will be interested to know how it's
testable - if I ever make it to understanding AUDA.

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[LizR]

On 12 February 2014 21:21, Richard Ruquist  wrote:

> On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 12:12 AM, LizR  wrote:
>
>> On 12 February 2014 17:16, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 10:45 PM, LizR  wrote:
>>>
 On 12 February 2014 16:33, Richard Ruquist  wrote:

> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 10:29 PM, LizR  wrote:
>
>> On 12 February 2014 16:23, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Bell's Inequality in my opinion does not explain the mechanism of
>>> EPR. The Einstein-Rosen bridge does. It explains how entangled particles
>>> maintain their connection.
>>>

  I don't understand what you mean. Bell's inequality isn't an
>> explanation, it's a number which is violated in the measured results of 
>> EPR
>> experiments.
>>
>
> You seem to have forgotten my original claim for string theory, that
> using Maldacena's duality it explains the mechanism of EPR. *Bell's
> Inequality does not explain the mechanism. *Seems you trust math more
> than physics or even data as in the other thread.
>

 Shorn of the ad hominem nonsense, that's what I just said.

 What you said was:

 String theory based on Maldacena's conjecture predicted the viscosity
> of the quark-gluon plasma before it was measured and more recently
> explained the mechanism behind EPR based on Einstein-Rosen bridges, which
> is more like a retrodiction.
>

 So you are, or appear to be, saying that string theory predicts the
 viscosity of the quark-gluon plasma based on Maldacena's conjecture, and
 that it also explains the EPR mechanism using ERBs. Or at least that is the
 most reasonable way to parse of your sentence.

>>>
>>> You brought up Bell's Inequality, not me. Happy to see that you now get
>>> it.
>>>
>>
>> You mentioned EPR. The point of EPR is that the results violate Bell's
>> inequality.
>>
>
> You are beginning to sound like Edgar.
>
> Except I'm quoting real scientists talking about real science.

But anyway, you long ago started sounding like Edgar, so I won't be
continuing this conversation. If you work out (or read up on) the relevance
of Bell's inequality to EPR you can email me and tell me, otherwise it's
pointless discussing this subject with you.

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2014 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:22, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/11/2014 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
What Everett did for the quantum universal wave, we can do that  
on any universal system, and comp predicts that this will always  
give the same physics.


How does it predict that?


All universal systems produce the same collection of all  
computations, with exactly the same redundancy.
Physics emerged from that set of all computations. So physics must  
be the same whatever pho_i are chosen for the ontological base.


That doesn't follow.  If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated  
in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics.


Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this  
is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for  
all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different  
geographies.




You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your  
theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know  
of.  That makes it impossible to test.


Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than  
evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much  
more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it  
is enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to  
refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on "AUDA", so let us  
not anticipate everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to  
step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said,  
we have to do the dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want  
to continue the discussion in decent condition.


See you,

Bruno







Brent

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:55, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2014 3:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:40, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/11/2014 4:50 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:

On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb  wrote:

My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical  
realism in
the sense required for this argument.  I think consciousness  
depends of
consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about  
Peano's

arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
"ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous. There are  
obvious
physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be  
ineffable.  That's
why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of  
arithmetic?)
are possible independent of any external world - or looked at  
another way,
I think to make it work would require that the 'inert'  
computation simulate
a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist  
*relative* to

that world.

Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the  
initial

assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!


I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the  
actual

senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.


Exactly.  One may still say yes to the doctor who give you an  
artificial brain that functions within this world (and cannot be  
the 'inert' brain of step 8).


?







I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.


If you accept AR *and* the identification of "unprovable  
arithmetical truth"="qualia"


I have never identify qualia and "unprovable arithmetical truth".

Qualia are defined by possible semantics bearing on the logic of  
certain unprovable arithmetical truth". That is very different.

technically, you confuse G* and Z*; Z1*, etc.



?? Don't know what that means.


Tell me if my preceding post (modal logic 4) did help, and I can  
explain more tomorrow, as I will have to go.


Bruno





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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:54, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2014 3:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Actually yes, but that is not relevant, as arithmetic simulate all  
digital approximation of all physical universe, (and the real  
physical universe is a non Turing emulable sum on all those  
computations), so arithmetic provides the worlds you need to be  
conscious of.


But in another reply you say that neither matter nor consciousness  
can be emulated.


Yes. But that's the advanced stuff that the people must first grasp by  
themselves.


I say it out of the reasoning, and usually in a context where the  
result is admitted. Not at step 3.





From that I infer that what you mean is they cannot be finitely  
emulated but only emulated as threads in the infinite UD computation.


Not even that. I say that they are the 1p experience of the machines  
infinitely distributed in the UD*.


Take the Helsinki guy and its continuation in M. That simple 1p  
experience cannot be really emulated, without doing the duplication  
again, and in that case, you don't emulate the 1p experience, you  
emulate two 1p experiences. You can emulate it only by duplicating the  
people, as a random oracle is not Turing emulable.





But this implies that in the MGA argument consciousness,


But here you make a gigantic jump.



even dream consciousness, cannot be emulated by the 'inert'  
computation (or any other computation)


Yes, at that part of the MGA, we realize that consciousness is not  
related to any particular computation at all. So we take a  
computationalist supervenience, where the whole indexicalness  
determines all the points of view, and we attach consciousness to the  
"abstract" states and their statistical relations with the neighbors  
(and this assures the meaningfulness of the counterfactuals, so that  
Maudlin's problem is solved in passing).





except as it depends on 'real' matter, matter which is not finitely  
emulable.


In that case, you need the "magic role" of the inert device. But if  
that was true, I am not even sure I would say "yes" to a doctor who  
suggest only that I buy a new toothbrush.


I am OK to talk on step 8, but only when you assess clearly the steps  
1-7 before, as you did once. If not we will mix difficulties and take  
the risk to run in circle.


Bruno






Brent

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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Richard Ruquist]

On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 12:58 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 10:23 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>
>> > Bell's Inequality in my opinion does not explain the mechanism of EPR.
>>
>
> True, Bell couldn't explain it but he did prove that if his inequality is
> violated then there is something that needs to be explained. Bell said that
> if the universe worked in a way that nearly everybody thought was
> intuitively obvious then a inequality that he found could never be
> violated, but quantum mechanics said that it could be. Years later
> experiments were performed to see who was right and it turned out that
> quantum mechanics triumphed over common sense. Today very few physicists
> even claim to have a deep understanding of why that is true, but the
> experimental evidence is now so strong that none can deny that it is in
> fact true.
>
> > The Einstein-Rosen bridge does.
>>
>
> No it does not. In fact, although Einstein never lived to see Bell's work,
> if he had he would have certainly bet that experiments would never find
> that Bell's inequality was ever violated. And Einstein would have lost his
> bet.
>
> > It explains how entangled particles maintain their connection.
>>
>
> Einstein-Rosen bridges may or may not exist, but even if they do neither
> Einstein nor Rosen could explain how their bridge "knows" if a observer
> (whatever that means) is looking at it or not.
>

John, You need to read about the latest developments in string theory. Here
is a link the the original Maldacena-Susskind 48 page paper
http://arxiv.org/abs/1306.0533. But if that is a bit much here is a
seemingly accurate summary
http://news.sciencemag.org/physics/2013/12/link-between-wormholes-and-quantum-entanglementincluding
some follow on work. Most of the popular write-ups describing
ER=EPR by tech writers are plainly inaccurate. Richard


>
>  John K Clark
>
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Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:59, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2014 3:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Feb 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote:


On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote:

On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb  wrote:

My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical  
realism in
the sense required for this argument.  I think consciousness  
depends of
consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about  
Peano's

arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
"ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous.  There are  
obvious
physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be  
ineffable.  That's
why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of  
arithmetic?)
are possible independent of any external world - or looked at  
another way,
I think to make it work would require that the 'inert'  
computation simulate
a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist  
*relative* to

that world.



Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the  
initial

assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8!



I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial
computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual
senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated
reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate.

I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument.

I'm not yet convinced it is a genuine problem for step 8, or not,  
as I still

don't feel I fully understand what that says yet.


At step seven, the primitive materialist can still invoke a  
physicalist form of ultrafinitism, to prevent the comp reversal  
between physics and arithmetic (or number theology).


Step 8, shows that if that move is done, then we have to attribute  
some non Turing emulable, but also non FPI recoverable properties  
in that primitive matter to instantiate consciousness.


I think the only non FPI property we have to invoke is that  
somethings exist and some don't.


That is the same error as Craig and Edgar: it consists in taking  
reality as the explanation of reality.
But the whole UDA consists in showing that if you take comp seriously  
enough, this makes no sense at all.


Now, you were cautious and said that you *think* that  I suggest  
we progress, and I can only hope that you will grasp why we cannot do  
that (if we are interested in the mind-body problem, as we don't need  
that to find bosons, or go on Mars).


Bruno





Brent


It gives to the primitive materialist a hint to refute comp: 1) to  
define what they mean by primitive matter, and 2) to show that such  
matter relies on non FPI recoverable properties.
But that is equivalent with the test that comp offers, so it cannot  
be a refutation of comp->reversal, but of comp itself.


To be short. We will have opportunities to come back on this. But  
only if most are OK, with the steps 0-7.


Best,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

[Bruno Marchal]

Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on  
modal logic, directly related to the machine discourse (and this will  
be justified later, as it is not obvious at all).



On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/12/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote:
On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish  
 wrote:

On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote:
>
> You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong  
with it! :-)

>
> (Sorry!)
>
> I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way  
before it's
> likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't  
string theory
> retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that was  
a positive

> result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently...
>

I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of  
incommunicable

facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM.

I said "apparently" because I have no idea how he does it.


I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be possible  
to simulate consciousness because (we think) any physical process  
can be simulated and consciousness necessarily accompanies the  
physical processes of one's brain. This is the bet of "saying yes  
to the doctor".


With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor consciousness.  
We can only simulate the relevant part of the brain so that  
consciousness is preserved. The price to pay is that matter becomes  
something emergent in the 1p views (1p plural) and cannot be  
simulated or emulated.





But there's a catch.  When we simulate an aircraft flying or a  
weather system those have a reference in the 'real' world and  
that's why they are simulations.  But if we simulate a conscious  
brain the consciousness will be 'real' consciousness. So  
simulating conscious is in a sense impossible; we may be able to  
produce it but we can't simulate it.  Consciousness must be  
consciousness of something, but it need not be anything physical;


It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical.


So you're saying that we cannot simulate matter or consciousness.   
But I think we can still produce consciousness by manipulating  
matter - we can still build a conscious Mars rover.



With comp we can say that, but only as a matter of speaking. Mars  
Rover is in Heaven, and the hard task of computer we send on Mars is  
to distracted it enough so that it can manifest its consciousness to  
us, notably by sending us interesting data on mars. The consciousness  
of Mars Rover is a 1-view, and it is more "a product" of the infinity  
of computations going through its state in the arithmetical reality)  
than with a "single" machine. Thanks to Everett, and our own  
entanglement with mars, we can indeed bet that little Mars Rover share  
some history with us.












it could just be consciousness of arithmetical truths.  This  
explains why aspects of consciousness are ineffable.  It's because  
conscious processes can prove Goedel's theorem and so know that  
some truths are unprovable.  Bruno takes "qualia are ineffable"  
and "some arithmetical truths are unprovable" and postulates  
"ineffable=unprovable".


Not really.
I guess people progress, as this is the new common error in  
fashion, but some logician did it too, and is a confusion between  
hypostases. Qualia are related to non communicable, but only  
*indirectly* through G*. It happens through Z1* and X1* (and S4Grz1),


Don't understand that.


Incompleteness does not just separate the provability/consistency  
modal logic G into two parts: the provable statements, and the true  
statements, it also makes the logic of the differents modalities:


p
[]p
[]p & p
[]p & <>t
[]p & <>t & p

obeying different modal logics, despite G* proves them all equivalent  
extensionnally (they "proves" the same true arithmetical propositions,  
but they see them differently.


Among them, three logics splits into provable and non provable parts:

[]p   (gives G and G*, by Solovay theorem)
[]p & <>p  (gives Z and Z*-
[]p & <>t & p   (gives X and X*)

That remains true when we restrict p on the sigma_1 arithmetical  
reality (the arithmetical UD, which is a UD, provably).


That changes G into a modal logic G1 (G + p->[]p) and all hypostases  
get changed by this. I change their names by adding a 1. And qualia  
and quanta appears in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*.










which translates the UDA. the Gödel provability cannot be used for  
the UD measure, due to the cul-de-sac worlds. That is why we need  
[]p & p, or []p & Dt, or []p & Dt & p.



Brent, do you see this?

Are you OK that in a cul-de-sac world we have []A for all A?

I repeat two arguments.

I recall first Kripke semantics:

All the worlds obeys CPL. And there is some fixed binary relation R on  
that set of worlds (called "accessibility").


Then,

[]p is true in a world alpha if p is tru

Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-12 19:54 GMT+01:00 John Clark :

>
> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 7:17 PM, chris peck wrote:
>
> > I will say though that I find it astonishing if people work their way
>> through Bruno's steps and claim to understand them and then maintain that
>> Clark's erudite and ofttimes witty criticisms are in some way obtuse or
>> difficult to follow.
>>
>
> Thank you.
>
>
> > There is some fuss about Clark's reluctance to apply his argument to
>> MWI. Like some others I think Clark possibly makes a misstep when (if?) he
>> defends the notion of 1p in-determinism within an MWI context.
>
>
> In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who "I" or "you" is
> because however many copies of "I" or "you" there may or may not be they
> will never meet.
>

That changes absolutely nothing... just put the reconstruction of the W guy
200 years later than the M guy, they will never meet...

Quentin


> But in Bruno's thought experiment that is no longer true, so pronouns like
> "you" and "I" cause endless trouble. The MWI is about explaining why
> Quantum Mechanics is able to make such good predictions, and it does so
> without making use of the concept of a "observer" so it has no need to
> explain exactly what that is, and that's why I like MWI.
>
> But Bruno's "proof" is supposed to do something entirely different,
> explain the continuous subjective feeling of self,  and yet he talks
> constantly about probability and probability implies prediction and
> prediction has absolutely positively nothing to do with a sense of self.
> If when you pressed the button on the teleportation chamber you were 99%
> certain, hell even if you were 100% certain that you would end up in
> Washington and there was not the tiniest particle of doubt in your mind and
> one second later you found yourself in Moscow your sense of self would not
> be diminished one bit, you'd just figure that you made a bad prediction,
> and it wouldn't be for the first time.
>
> Bruno is going about it backward and is trying to push on a string, he's
> trying to uniquely establish identity from the present to the future and
> that can't be done, you can only go from the past to the present. The fact
> that you feel like Chris Peck today has nothing to do with probability or
> prediction or if the Many World's Interpretation is correct or not; you
> feel like Chris Peck because you remember being Chris Peck yesterday and
> for no other reason.
>
>   John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> I can see though that in Comp people are duplicated within worlds whereas
>> in MWI they are duplicated between worlds, and there possibly are some
>> repercussions vis a vis the proper use of pro-nouns because of that. Im not
>> sure it matters much, because Clark could be right about Comp and just
>> inconsistent about MWI. So this complaint, loudly pursued by Quentin, has
>> always seemed impotent to me and not worth bothering about.
>>
>> Im reluctant to get involved in the step 3 discussions because,
>> mentioning no names Quentin and PGC, people can get very emotional and arm
>> wavey about people criticizing Bruno's metaphysics. So for now at least,
>> I'll limit myself to recommending the odd sci-fi movie on the film thread.
>> The Quiet Earth (1985) is a little known gem, btw.
>>
>> All the best
>> Chris.
>>
>> --
>> Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 12:00:42 +1300
>> Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
>> From: lizj...@gmail.com
>> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>>
>>
>> On 12 February 2014 10:55, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 4:10 PM, LizR  wrote:
>>
>> On 12 February 2014 08:50, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 1:42 PM, LizR  wrote:
>>
>> On 12 February 2014 00:41, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 3:45 AM, LizR  wrote:
>>
>> On 11 February 2014 18:40, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>>
>>
>> String theory based on Maldacena's conjecture predicted the viscosity of
>> the quark-gluon plasma before it was measured
>>
>>
>> Correctly, I assume.
>>
>>
>>  and more recently explained the mechanism behind EPR based on
>> Einstein-Rosen bridges, which is more like a retrodiction.
>>
>>
>> That seems like a sledgehammer to crack a nut, although the initials have
>> a nice near-symmetry. Why would one need to have E