Re: UDA query
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Yes, I can see that. By aggregating the brain into one computation do you mean replacing it with a synchronous digital computer whose program would not only reproduce the I/O of individual neurons, but also the instantaneous state on signals which were traveling between them (since presumably timing is important to the neurons function)? Or do you mean replacing it with a synchronous digital computer which produces the same I/O at the afferent and efferent nerves? In the former case, it seems that thoughts would be distributed over many, not necessarily sequential, computational steps. In the later it would not be possible to map the the computational steps to brain states at all since they are only required to be the same at the I/O; and hence difficult to say what constituted a thought. Given these to two possible models of functionalism, I'm not clear on what the same computation means. Are these two doing the same computation because they have the same I/O? Over what range of I does the O have to be the same - all possible? all actually experienced? those experienced in the last 2minutes? I think it would be enough for the AI to reproduce the I/O of the whole brain in aggregate. That would involve computing a function controlling each efferent nerve, accepting as data input from the afferent nerves. The behaviour would have to be the same as the brain for all possible inputs, otherwise the AI might fail the Turing test. To have the same output for all possible inputs is a very strong condition and seems to go beyond functionalism. Suppose (as seems likely) there are inputs that crash the brain (e.g. induce epileptic seizures). Would the AI brain be less conscious because it didn't experience these seizures? Passing or failing the Turing test is a rather crude measure - after all interlocutor might simply guess right. It's not clear if the modelling would have to be at the molecular, cellular or some higher level in order to achieve this, but in any case I expect that there would be many different programs that could do the job even if the hardware and operating system are kept the same. It could therefore be a case of multiple computations leading to the same experience. Pinning down a thought to a location in time and space would pose no more of a problem for the AI than for the brain. Then among those AI brains with different computations but the same I/O, you would have to find the same OMs constituted by different sequences of computational steps. My intuition is that having the same O for most (some very large set of ) I would be enough to instantiate consciousness - just not the same consciousness. I think there may be different kinds of consciousness, so a look-up-table (like Searle's Chinese Room) may be conscious but in a different way. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Le 14-janv.-10, à 09:01, Brent Meeker a écrit : I think there may be different kinds of consciousness, so a look-up-table (like Searle's Chinese Room) may be conscious but in a different way. In a way distinguishable by the person? From its own (first person) perspective? Also, I don't think it makes sense to attribute consciousness to anything which do the computation, but only to the (abstract or immaterial) person supervening on the logical and arithmetical relations defining those computations, (infinitely many exist). Persons need to be self-referentially correct relatively to their most probable computations, only. Persons are conscious, not machine, nor computation, nor states, nor numbers, except in a metaphorical way. A universal machine, or number inherits a notion of first person plausibly when the machine can, qua computatio, infer its own ignorance (G-G* gap), that is when the machine is Löbian (like Peano Arithmetic). Then a physics can be associated too. (8 hypostases appear, or 6 + 2 * infinity, actually). Is Peano Arithmetic conscious? No! That would be the same mistake. But by Lobianity it defines a natural (Theaetetical) first person view, and its physics and metaphysics. (or then it is a metaphor or a short cut). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 14-janv.-10, à 09:01, Brent Meeker a écrit : I think there may be different kinds of consciousness, so a look-up-table (like Searle's Chinese Room) may be conscious but in a different way. In a way distinguishable by the person? From its own (first person) perspective? Also, I don't think it makes sense to attribute consciousness to anything which do the computation, but only to the (abstract or immaterial) person supervening on the logical and arithmetical relations defining those computations, (infinitely many exist). Persons need to be self-referentially correct relatively to their most probable computations, only. I don't understand what self-referentially correct means nor in what sense computations can be theirs? Persons are conscious, not machine, nor computation, nor states, nor numbers, except in a metaphorical way. So you take person as well as arithmetic to be fundamental. Brent A universal machine, or number inherits a notion of first person plausibly when the machine can, qua computatio, infer its own ignorance (G-G* gap), that is when the machine is Löbian (like Peano Arithmetic). Then a physics can be associated too. (8 hypostases appear, or 6 + 2 * infinity, actually). Is Peano Arithmetic conscious? No! That would be the same mistake. But by Lobianity it defines a natural (Theaetetical) first person view, and its physics and metaphysics. (or then it is a metaphor or a short cut). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
2010/1/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: You're asserting that neuron I/O replication is the appropriate level to make brain behavior the same; and I tend to agree that would be sufficient (though perhaps not necessary). But that's preserving a particular algorithm; one more specific than the Platonic computation of its equivalence class. Any algorithm would do, implemented on any hardware, as long as it did the job. Ten engineers working independently on the problem would probably come up with ten different solutions, even if they worked with the same theoretical model of a neuron. I suppose a Turing machine could perform the same computation, but it would perform it very differently. And I wonder how the Turing machine would manage perception. The organs of perception would have their responses digitized into bit strings and these would be written to the TM on different tapes? I think this illustrates my point that, while preservation of consciousness under the digital neuron substitution seems plausible, there is still another leap in substituting an abstract computation for the digital neurons. There is a leap involved in eliminating the hardware but the first step is establishing computationalism: that in principal you could replace the brain with a digital computer and preserve the mind. If the artificial neurons work as described then doesn't that prove this? The level of the neuron is an arbitrary one. We could instead consider replacing volumes of brain tissue with a computer-controlled device that replicates the I/O behaviour at the surface of the volume, where it interfaces with normal brain tissue, and expand the size of the volume until the whole brain is replaced. One linear processor could then do all the work, and it wouldn't matter what processor it was (as long as it was fast enough and had enough memory), what language the program was written in, or even what program it was. Multiple realisability is a basic feature of functionalism. Also, such an AI brain would not permit slicing the computations into arbitrarily short time periods because there is communication time involved and neurons run asynchronously. The whole brain could be aggregated into one computation, and a virtual environment could run as a subroutine. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: You're asserting that neuron I/O replication is the appropriate level to make brain behavior the same; and I tend to agree that would be sufficient (though perhaps not necessary). But that's preserving a particular algorithm; one more specific than the Platonic computation of its equivalence class. Any algorithm would do, implemented on any hardware, as long as it did the job. Ten engineers working independently on the problem would probably come up with ten different solutions, even if they worked with the same theoretical model of a neuron. I suppose a Turing machine could perform the same computation, but it would perform it very differently. And I wonder how the Turing machine would manage perception. The organs of perception would have their responses digitized into bit strings and these would be written to the TM on different tapes? I think this illustrates my point that, while preservation of consciousness under the digital neuron substitution seems plausible, there is still another leap in substituting an abstract computation for the digital neurons. There is a leap involved in eliminating the hardware but the first step is establishing computationalism: that in principal you could replace the brain with a digital computer and preserve the mind. If the artificial neurons work as described then doesn't that prove this? The level of the neuron is an arbitrary one. We could instead consider replacing volumes of brain tissue with a computer-controlled device that replicates the I/O behaviour at the surface of the volume, where it interfaces with normal brain tissue, and expand the size of the volume until the whole brain is replaced. One linear processor could then do all the work, and it wouldn't matter what processor it was (as long as it was fast enough and had enough memory), what language the program was written in, or even what program it was. Multiple realisability is a basic feature of functionalism. Also, such an AI brain would not permit slicing the computations into arbitrarily short time periods because there is communication time involved and neurons run asynchronously. The whole brain could be aggregated into one computation, and a virtual environment could run as a subroutine. Yes, I can see that. By aggregating the brain into one computation do you mean replacing it with a synchronous digital computer whose program would not only reproduce the I/O of individual neurons, but also the instantaneous state on signals which were traveling between them (since presumably timing is important to the neurons function)? Or do you mean replacing it with a synchronous digital computer which produces the same I/O at the afferent and efferent nerves? In the former case, it seems that thoughts would be distributed over many, not necessarily sequential, computational steps. In the later it would not be possible to map the the computational steps to brain states at all since they are only required to be the same at the I/O; and hence difficult to say what constituted a thought. Given these to two possible models of functionalism, I'm not clear on what the same computation means. Are these two doing the same computation because they have the same I/O? Over what range of I does the O have to be the same - all possible? all actually experienced? those experienced in the last 2minutes? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
2010/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Yes, I can see that. By aggregating the brain into one computation do you mean replacing it with a synchronous digital computer whose program would not only reproduce the I/O of individual neurons, but also the instantaneous state on signals which were traveling between them (since presumably timing is important to the neurons function)? Or do you mean replacing it with a synchronous digital computer which produces the same I/O at the afferent and efferent nerves? In the former case, it seems that thoughts would be distributed over many, not necessarily sequential, computational steps. In the later it would not be possible to map the the computational steps to brain states at all since they are only required to be the same at the I/O; and hence difficult to say what constituted a thought. Given these to two possible models of functionalism, I'm not clear on what the same computation means. Are these two doing the same computation because they have the same I/O? Over what range of I does the O have to be the same - all possible? all actually experienced? those experienced in the last 2minutes? I think it would be enough for the AI to reproduce the I/O of the whole brain in aggregate. That would involve computing a function controlling each efferent nerve, accepting as data input from the afferent nerves. The behaviour would have to be the same as the brain for all possible inputs, otherwise the AI might fail the Turing test. It's not clear if the modelling would have to be at the molecular, cellular or some higher level in order to achieve this, but in any case I expect that there would be many different programs that could do the job even if the hardware and operating system are kept the same. It could therefore be a case of multiple computations leading to the same experience. Pinning down a thought to a location in time and space would pose no more of a problem for the AI than for the brain. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is being assumed about the computation being the same. Is it the same Platonic algorithm? Is it one that has the same steps as described in FORTRAN, but not those in LISP? Is it just one that has the same input-output? I think these are questions that have been bypassed in the yes doctor scenario. Saying yes to the doctor seems unproblematic when you think of replacing a few neurons with artificial ones - all you care about is the input-output. But then when you jump to replacing a whole brain maybe you care about the FORTRAN/LISP differences. Yet on this list there seems to be an assumption that you can just jump to the Platonic algorithm or even a Platonic computation that's independent of the algorithm. Bruno pushes all this aside by referring to at the appropriate level and by doing all possible algorithms. But I'm more interested in the question of what would I have to do to make a conscious AI. Also, it is the assumption of a Platonic computation that allows one to slice it discretely into OMs. Start by replacing neurons with artificial neurons which are driven by a computer program and whose defining characteristic is that they copy the I/O behaviour of biological neurons. The program has to model the internal workings of a neuron down to a certain level. It may be that the position and configuration of every molecule needs to be modelled, or it may be that shortcuts such as a single parameter for the permeability of ion channels in the cell membrane make no difference to the final result. In any case, there are many possible programs even if the same physical model of a neuron is used, and the same basic program can be written in any language and implemented on any computer: all that matters is that the artificial neuron works properly. (As an aside, we don't need to worry about whether these artificial neurons are zombies, since that would lead to absurd conclusions about the nature of consciousness.) From the single neuron we can progress to replacing the whole brain, the end result being a computer program interacting with the outside world through sensors and effectors. The program can be implemented in any way - any language, any hardware - and the consciousness of the subject will remain the same as long as the brain behaviour remains the same. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is being assumed about the computation being the same. Is it the same Platonic algorithm? Is it one that has the same steps as described in FORTRAN, but not those in LISP? Is it just one that has the same input-output? I think these are questions that have been bypassed in the yes doctor scenario. Saying yes to the doctor seems unproblematic when you think of replacing a few neurons with artificial ones - all you care about is the input-output. But then when you jump to replacing a whole brain maybe you care about the FORTRAN/LISP differences. Yet on this list there seems to be an assumption that you can just jump to the Platonic algorithm or even a Platonic computation that's independent of the algorithm. Bruno pushes all this aside by referring to at the appropriate level and by doing all possible algorithms. But I'm more interested in the question of what would I have to do to make a conscious AI. Also, it is the assumption of a Platonic computation that allows one to slice it discretely into OMs. Start by replacing neurons with artificial neurons which are driven by a computer program and whose defining characteristic is that they copy the I/O behaviour of biological neurons. The program has to model the internal workings of a neuron down to a certain level. It may be that the position and configuration of every molecule needs to be modelled, or it may be that shortcuts such as a single parameter for the permeability of ion channels in the cell membrane make no difference to the final result. In any case, there are many possible programs even if the same physical model of a neuron is used, and the same basic program can be written in any language and implemented on any computer: all that matters is that the artificial neuron works properly. (As an aside, we don't need to worry about whether these artificial neurons are zombies, since that would lead to absurd conclusions about the nature of consciousness.) From the single neuron we can progress to replacing the whole brain, the end result being a computer program interacting with the outside world through sensors and effectors. The program can be implemented in any way - any language, any hardware - and the consciousness of the subject will remain the same as long as the brain behaviour remains the same. You're asserting that neuron I/O replication is the appropriate level to make brain behavior the same; and I tend to agree that would be sufficient (though perhaps not necessary). But that's preserving a particular algorithm; one more specific than the Platonic computation of its equivalence class. I suppose a Turing machine could perform the same computation, but it would perform it very differently. And I wonder how the Turing machine would manage perception. The organs of perception would have their responses digitized into bit strings and these would be written to the TM on different tapes? I think this illustrates my point that, while preservation of consciousness under the digital neuron substitution seems plausible, there is still another leap in substituting an abstract computation for the digital neurons. Also, such an AI brain would not permit slicing the computations into arbitrarily short time periods because there is communication time involved and neurons run asynchronously. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is being assumed about the computation being the same. Is it the same Platonic algorithm? Is it one that has the same steps as described in FORTRAN, but not those in LISP? Is it just one that has the same input-output? I think these are questions that have been bypassed in the yes doctor scenario. Saying yes to the doctor seems unproblematic when you think of replacing a few neurons with artificial ones - all you care about is the input-output. But then when you jump to replacing a whole brain maybe you care about the FORTRAN/LISP differences. Yet on this list there seems to be an assumption that you can just jump to the Platonic algorithm or even a Platonic computation that's independent of the algorithm. Bruno pushes all this aside by referring to at the appropriate level and by doing all possible algorithms. But I'm more interested in the question of what would I have to do to make a conscious AI. Also, it is the assumption of a Platonic computation that allows one to slice it discretely into OMs. Start by replacing neurons with artificial neurons which are driven by a computer program and whose defining characteristic is that they copy the I/O behaviour of biological neurons. The program has to model the internal workings of a neuron down to a certain level. It may be that the position and configuration of every molecule needs to be modelled, or it may be that shortcuts such as a single parameter for the permeability of ion channels in the cell membrane make no difference to the final result. In any case, there are many possible programs even if the same physical model of a neuron is used, and the same basic program can be written in any language and implemented on any computer: all that matters is that the artificial neuron works properly. (As an aside, we don't need to worry about whether these artificial neurons are zombies, since that would lead to absurd conclusions about the nature of consciousness.) From the single neuron we can progress to replacing the whole brain, the end result being a computer program interacting with the outside world through sensors and effectors. The program can be implemented in any way - any language, any hardware - and the consciousness of the subject will remain the same as long as the brain behaviour remains the same. You're asserting that neuron I/O replication is the appropriate level to make brain behavior the same; and I tend to agree that would be sufficient (though perhaps not necessary). But that's preserving a particular algorithm; one more specific than the Platonic computation of its equivalence class. I suppose a Turing machine could perform the same computation, but it would perform it very differently. And I wonder how the Turing machine would manage perception. The organs of perception would have their responses digitized into bit strings and these would be written to the TM on different tapes? I think this illustrates my point that, while preservation of consciousness under the digital neuron substitution seems plausible, there is still another leap in substituting an abstract computation for the digital neurons. Also, such an AI brain would not permit slicing the computations into arbitrarily short time periods because there is communication time involved and neurons run asynchronously. Yes you can, freeze the computation, dump memory... then load memory back, and defreeze. If the time inside the computation is an internal feature (a counter inside the program), the AI associated to the computation cannot notice anything if on the other hand the time inside of the computation is an input parameter from some external then it can notice... but I always can englobe the whole thing and feed that external time from another program or whatever. The fact that you can disrupt a computation and restart it with some different parameters doesn't mean you can't restart it with *exactly* the same parameters as when you froze it. Quentin Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this
Re: UDA query
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto: meeke...@dslextreme.com Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com: I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is being assumed about the computation being the same. Is it the same Platonic algorithm? Is it one that has the same steps as described in FORTRAN, but not those in LISP? Is it just one that has the same input-output? I think these are questions that have been bypassed in the yes doctor scenario. Saying yes to the doctor seems unproblematic when you think of replacing a few neurons with artificial ones - all you care about is the input-output. But then when you jump to replacing a whole brain maybe you care about the FORTRAN/LISP differences. Yet on this list there seems to be an assumption that you can just jump to the Platonic algorithm or even a Platonic computation that's independent of the algorithm. Bruno pushes all this aside by referring to at the appropriate level and by doing all possible algorithms. But I'm more interested in the question of what would I have to do to make a conscious AI. Also, it is the assumption of a Platonic computation that allows one to slice it discretely into OMs. Start by replacing neurons with artificial neurons which are driven by a computer program and whose defining characteristic is that they copy the I/O behaviour of biological neurons. The program has to model the internal workings of a neuron down to a certain level. It may be that the position and configuration of every molecule needs to be modelled, or it may be that shortcuts such as a single parameter for the permeability of ion channels in the cell membrane make no difference to the final result. In any case, there are many possible programs even if the same physical model of a neuron is used, and the same basic program can be written in any language and implemented on any computer: all that matters is that the artificial neuron works properly. (As an aside, we don't need to worry about whether these artificial neurons are zombies, since that would lead to absurd conclusions about the nature of consciousness.) From the single neuron we can progress to replacing the whole brain, the end result being a computer program interacting with the outside world through sensors and effectors. The program can be implemented in any way - any language, any hardware - and the consciousness of the subject will remain the same as long as the brain behaviour remains the same. You're asserting that neuron I/O replication is the appropriate level to make brain behavior the same; and I tend to agree that would be sufficient (though perhaps not necessary). But that's preserving a particular algorithm; one more specific than the Platonic computation of its equivalence class. I suppose a Turing machine could perform the same computation, but it would perform it very differently. And I wonder how the Turing machine would manage perception. The organs of perception would have their responses digitized into bit strings and these would be written to the TM on different tapes? I think this illustrates my point that, while preservation of consciousness under the digital neuron substitution seems plausible, there is still another leap in substituting an abstract computation for the digital neurons. Also, such an AI brain would not permit slicing the computations into arbitrarily short time periods because there is communication time involved and neurons run asynchronously. Yes you can, freeze the computation, dump memory... then load memory back, and defreeze. If the time inside the computation is an internal feature (a counter inside the program), the AI associated to the computation cannot notice anything if on the other hand the time inside of the computation is an input parameter from some external then it can notice... but I always can englobe the whole thing and feed that external time from another program or whatever. That assumes that the AI brain is running synchronously, i.e. at a clock rate small compared to c/R where R is the radius of the brain. But I think the real brain runs asynchronously, so if the AI brain must do the simulation
Re: UDA query
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com: I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is being assumed about the computation being the same. Is it the same Platonic algorithm? Is it one that has the same steps as described in FORTRAN, but not those in LISP? Is it just one that has the same input-output? I think these are questions that have been bypassed in the yes doctor scenario. Saying yes to the doctor seems unproblematic when you think of replacing a few neurons with artificial ones - all you care about is the input-output. But then when you jump to replacing a whole brain maybe you care about the FORTRAN/LISP differences. Yet on this list there seems to be an assumption that you can just jump to the Platonic algorithm or even a Platonic computation that's independent of the algorithm. Bruno pushes all this aside by referring to at the appropriate level and by doing all possible algorithms. But I'm more interested in the question of what would I have to do to make a conscious AI. Also, it is the assumption of a Platonic computation that allows one to slice it discretely into OMs. Start by replacing neurons with artificial neurons which are driven by a computer program and whose defining characteristic is that they copy the I/O behaviour of biological neurons. The program has to model the internal workings of a neuron down to a certain level. It may be that the position and configuration of every molecule needs to be modelled, or it may be that shortcuts such as a single parameter for the permeability of ion channels in the cell membrane make no difference to the final result. In any case, there are many possible programs even if the same physical model of a neuron is used, and the same basic program can be written in any language and implemented on any computer: all that matters is that the artificial neuron works properly. (As an aside, we don't need to worry about whether these artificial neurons are zombies, since that would lead to absurd conclusions about the nature of consciousness.) From the single neuron we can progress to replacing the whole brain, the end result being a computer program interacting with the outside world through sensors and effectors. The program can be implemented in any way - any language, any hardware - and the consciousness of the subject will remain the same as long as the brain behaviour remains the same. You're asserting that neuron I/O replication is the appropriate level to make brain behavior the same; and I tend to agree that would be sufficient (though perhaps not necessary). But that's preserving a particular algorithm; one more specific than the Platonic computation of its equivalence class. I suppose a Turing machine could perform the same computation, but it would perform it very differently. And I wonder how the Turing machine would manage perception. The organs of perception would have their responses digitized into bit strings and these would be written to the TM on different tapes? I think this illustrates my point that, while preservation of consciousness under the digital neuron
Re: UDA query
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com: I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is being assumed about the computation being the same. Is it the same Platonic algorithm? Is it one that has the same steps as described in FORTRAN, but not those in LISP? Is it just one that has the same input-output? I think these are questions that have been bypassed in the yes doctor scenario. Saying yes to the doctor seems unproblematic when you think of replacing a few neurons with artificial ones - all you care about is the input-output. But then when you jump to replacing a whole brain maybe you care about the FORTRAN/LISP differences. Yet on this list there seems to be an assumption that you can just jump to the Platonic algorithm or even a Platonic computation that's independent of the algorithm. Bruno pushes all this aside by referring to at the appropriate level and by doing all possible algorithms. But I'm more interested in the question of what would I have to do to make a conscious AI. Also, it is the assumption of a Platonic computation that allows one to slice it discretely into OMs. Start by replacing neurons with artificial neurons which are driven by a computer program and whose defining characteristic is that they copy the I/O behaviour of biological neurons. The program has to model the internal workings of a neuron down to a certain level. It may be that the position and configuration of every molecule needs to be modelled, or it may be that shortcuts such as a single parameter for the permeability of ion channels in the cell membrane make no difference to the final result. In any case, there are many possible programs even if the same physical model of a neuron is used, and the same basic program can be written in any language and implemented on any computer: all that matters is that the artificial neuron works properly. (As an aside, we don't need to worry about whether these artificial neurons are zombies, since that would lead to absurd conclusions about the nature of consciousness.) From the single neuron we can progress to replacing the whole brain, the end result being a computer program
Re: UDA query
Interesting how the repeated copying and recopying of emails ends up resembling the typography of modern poetry. m.a. I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is being assumed about the computation being the same. Is it the same Platonic algorithm? Is it one that has the same steps as described in FORTRAN, but not those in LISP? Is it just one that has the same input-output? I think these are questions that have been bypassed in the yes doctor scenario. Saying yes to the doctor seems unproblematic when you think of replacing a few neurons with artificial ones - all you care about is the input-output. But then when you jump to replacing a whole brain maybe you care about the FORTRAN/LISP differences. Yet on this list there seems to be an assumption that you can just jump to the Platonic algorithm or even a Platonic computation that's independent of the algorithm. Bruno pushes all this aside by referring to at the appropriate level and by doing all possible algorithms. But I'm more interested in the question of what would I have to do to make a conscious AI. Also, it is the assumption of a Platonic computation that allows one to slice it discretely into OMs. Start by replacing neurons with artificial neurons which are driven by a computer program and whose defining characteristic is that they copy the I/O behaviour of biological neurons. The program has to model the internal workings of a neuron down to a certain level. It may be that the position and configuration of every molecule needs to be modelled, or it may be that shortcuts such as a single parameter for the permeability of ion channels in the cell membrane make no difference to the final result. In any case, there are many possible programs even if the same physical model of a neuron is used, and the same basic program can be written in any language and implemented on any computer: all that matters is that the artificial neuron works properly. (As an aside, we don't need to worry about whether these artificial neurons are zombies, since that would lead to absurd conclusions about the nature of consciousness.) From the single neuron we can progress to replacing the whole brain, the end result being a computer program interacting with the outside world through sensors and effectors. The program can be implemented in any way - any language, any hardware - and the consciousness of the subject will remain the same as long as the brain behaviour remains the same. You're asserting that neuron I/O replication is the appropriate level to make brain behavior the same; and I tend to agree that would be sufficient (though perhaps not necessary). But that's preserving a particular algorithm; one more specific than the Platonic computation of its equivalence class. I suppose a Turing machine could perform the same computation, but it would perform
Re: UDA query
2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But aren't you assuming that consciousness is produced by the abstract Platonic computation - rather than by the actual physical process (which is not the same) - in other words assuming the thing being argued? No, I'm at this point assuming only that consciousness is produced by the physical process. We can assume for simplicity that the two machines M1 and M2 have similar architecture and similar operating systems. Once the program is loaded into M2 from the disc, S2 proceeds exactly the same as it would have had the computation been allowed to continue running on M1. Therefore, at least after the first few milliseconds, the subjective content of S2 must be the same as it would have been on the one machine. Could the subjective content be different at the transition between S1 and S2 if the computation is split up? If there is a subjective difference it won't be something the subject can notice because, later in the course of S2, he can have no memory of it. But if you're only assuming that consciousness is produced by the physical process then the process of downloading and uploading the microstates and shifting the data into registers in the CPU and memory could produce a difference in consciousness. These are all computations too, done by the operating system. And why can't there be memory of it in the sense that it effects some later conscious state? There are traces of the transfer process left on the original computer, the disc, and the second computer. Some subsequent program could retrieve these traces, as is done in forensic cases. If physical processes instantiate consciousness, why shouldn't these make a difference. Because those states are not part of the computation you sliced on the two computers. And also assuming computationalism... Any implementation that does the job... effectively does the job. That means while it's true there are additionnal steps in the two case computer... it's just another *valid* implementation of the same computation on one computer, assuming computationalism that change *nothing*, arguing otherwise is denying computationalism (maybe it's right and computationalism is false). It also can't be a difference that would disrupt the completion of a task or thought that requires continuity of consciousness spanning S1-S2, since again the subject cannot have any evidence that such a disruption occurred. Unless we have a theory of how consciousness is related to the physical computation I don't think we can conclude that. We already know that subliminal perceptions can affect conscious thoughts - so why not subliminal memories. We don't, but what Bruno is showing is the consequences *if* we are turing emulable. If we are turing emulable, all your above objections are not valid because your objections are a level way too high (they are completely valid objections at the level you describe, but assuming comp, those are *still* computed at a lower level and hence are *part* of a computation that generate consciousness, see the generalized brain argument of Bruno). Quentin Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: No, I'm at this point assuming only that consciousness is produced by the physical process. We can assume for simplicity that the two machines M1 and M2 have similar architecture and similar operating systems. Once the program is loaded into M2 from the disc, S2 proceeds exactly the same as it would have had the computation been allowed to continue running on M1. Therefore, at least after the first few milliseconds, the subjective content of S2 must be the same as it would have been on the one machine. Could the subjective content be different at the transition between S1 and S2 if the computation is split up? If there is a subjective difference it won't be something the subject can notice because, later in the course of S2, he can have no memory of it. But if you're only assuming that consciousness is produced by the physical process then the process of downloading and uploading the microstates and shifting the data into registers in the CPU and memory could produce a difference in consciousness. These are all computations too, done by the operating system. And why can't there be memory of it in the sense that it effects some later conscious state? There are traces of the transfer process left on the original computer, the disc, and the second computer. Some subsequent program could retrieve these traces, as is done in forensic cases. If physical processes instantiate consciousness, why shouldn't these make a difference. It's taken for granted even by unsophisticated end users of computers that the hardware won't affect the computation. A calculator application wouldn't be much use if it gave a different answer depending on what brand of machine it was running on. It wouldn't be difficult to write a program that takes input from the environment, including information on what sort of hardware it's running on, and in that case there could be a difference between running S1 and S2 on the one machine and running them on separate machines. A real time clock, for example, would alert the subject to the fact that there had been a discontinuity, and S2 would then *not* proceed the same in both cases. However, this would not happen automatically: it would have to be specifically programmed, and the hardware would have to be capable of feeding the appropriate input into the program. It also can't be a difference that would disrupt the completion of a task or thought that requires continuity of consciousness spanning S1-S2, since again the subject cannot have any evidence that such a disruption occurred. Unless we have a theory of how consciousness is related to the physical computation I don't think we can conclude that. We already know that subliminal perceptions can affect conscious thoughts - so why not subliminal memories. The theory is that if the computation is the same then the consciousness is the same, regardless of what hardware it is being implemented on. I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is being assumed about the computation being the same. Is it the same Platonic algorithm? Is it one that has the same steps as described in FORTRAN, but not those in LISP? Is it just one that has the same input-output? I think these are questions that have been bypassed in the yes doctor scenario. Saying yes to the doctor seems unproblematic when you think of replacing a few neurons with artificial ones - all you care about is the input-output. But then when you jump to replacing a whole brain maybe you care about the FORTRAN/LISP differences. Yet on this list there seems to be an assumption that you can just jump to the Platonic algorithm or even a Platonic computation that's independent of the algorithm. Bruno pushes all this aside by referring to at the appropriate level and by doing all possible algorithms. But I'm more interested in the question of what would I have to do to make a conscious AI. Also, it is the assumption of a Platonic computation that allows one to slice it discretely into OMs. If you don't accept this then you don't accept computationalism, I don't accept it. I only entertain it. Brent for it is difficult to imagine a more drastic hardware change than that involved in going from a biological brain to a digital computer. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: It seems that you're saying the observer would notice that something odd had happened if his program were paused and restarted in the way described, but how is that possible when S1 and S2 are identical whether generated continuously or discontinuously? I think you're assuming what is to be proven, i.e. that S1 and S2 are a) states of consciousness, i.e. thoughts or observer moments and b) are successive and contiguous without overlap. Suppose that states of consciousness have durations of 10msec (or 1e8 microstates of computation at the appropriate level - I don't want to assume a transcendent continuous time) and successive states overlap by 3msec. Then identifying some 10msec period as state S2 is arbitrary and generating it will only be identical with what the brain did for the middle 4msec (where there was no overlap with) S1 or S3. But, ex hypothesi, 4msec isn't enough to constitute a OM. S1 and S2 can be precisely delimited as machine states but only more loosely as mental states. This is because, as you say, there may be a thought that spans S1 and S2, and is therefore partly generated by M1 and partly by M2. I don't see this as an issue since even if the computer was just doing arithmetic it could be broken up and distributed across two machines and the final answer would still be the same. Similarly, if the subject in the virtual environment was doing mental arithmetic he would still get the right answer despite the physical discontinuity introduced mid-calculation, and how would that be possible if the discontinuity caused a disruption in consciousness? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: It seems that you're saying the observer would notice that something odd had happened if his program were paused and restarted in the way described, but how is that possible when S1 and S2 are identical whether generated continuously or discontinuously? I think you're assuming what is to be proven, i.e. that S1 and S2 are a) states of consciousness, i.e. thoughts or observer moments and b) are successive and contiguous without overlap. Suppose that states of consciousness have durations of 10msec (or 1e8 microstates of computation at the appropriate level - I don't want to assume a transcendent continuous time) and successive states overlap by 3msec. Then identifying some 10msec period as state S2 is arbitrary and generating it will only be identical with what the brain did for the middle 4msec (where there was no overlap with) S1 or S3. But, ex hypothesi, 4msec isn't enough to constitute a OM. S1 and S2 can be precisely delimited as machine states but only more loosely as mental states. This is because, as you say, there may be a thought that spans S1 and S2, and is therefore partly generated by M1 and partly by M2. I don't see this as an issue since even if the computer was just doing arithmetic it could be broken up and distributed across two machines and the final answer would still be the same. The answer would be the same, but the computation would not. So the person with the AI brain might add up numbers the same, but have a different conscious experience. Consider for example your conscious experience at age six when asked to add 120 and 280 as compared to how you do it now. Similarly, if the subject in the virtual environment was doing mental arithmetic he would still get the right answer despite the physical discontinuity introduced mid-calculation, and how would that be possible if the discontinuity caused a disruption in consciousness? Because addition, like most thought, is mostly unconscious? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: S1 and S2 can be precisely delimited as machine states but only more loosely as mental states. This is because, as you say, there may be a thought that spans S1 and S2, and is therefore partly generated by M1 and partly by M2. I don't see this as an issue since even if the computer was just doing arithmetic it could be broken up and distributed across two machines and the final answer would still be the same. The answer would be the same, but the computation would not. So the person with the AI brain might add up numbers the same, but have a different conscious experience. Consider for example your conscious experience at age six when asked to add 120 and 280 as compared to how you do it now. I was initially considering the case of a computer doing the calculation directly, not generating a mind that does the calculation. The computation would have to span the two machines, and it would still be the same computation. I suppose it could be the same computation in the Platonic sense that adding 2+2 is a computation, but as realized on two computers it couldn't be the same as realized on a single computer. At a minimum it would take some extra steps to transfer data in the registers. Similarly, if the subject in the virtual environment was doing mental arithmetic he would still get the right answer despite the physical discontinuity introduced mid-calculation, and how would that be possible if the discontinuity caused a disruption in consciousness? Because addition, like most thought, is mostly unconscious? I certainly have to think about it consciously. In the example you gave I look at the 20 and the 80 and notice that they add to 100, How do you notice that? Is it not an unconscious fact recalled into consciousness? and the 100 and 200 add to 300, so the answer is 120 + 280 = 100 + 300 = 400. If this thought was interrupted I might get the wrong answer, or at the very least I would know it was interrupted. But the subject in the proposed experiment by definition does not notice any interruption, since S2 proceeds deterministically whether the computation is on the one machine or spread over two machines But aren't you assuming that consciousness is produced by the abstract Platonic computation - rather than by the actual physical process (which is not the same) - in other words assuming the thing being argued? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But aren't you assuming that consciousness is produced by the abstract Platonic computation - rather than by the actual physical process (which is not the same) - in other words assuming the thing being argued? No, I'm at this point assuming only that consciousness is produced by the physical process. We can assume for simplicity that the two machines M1 and M2 have similar architecture and similar operating systems. Once the program is loaded into M2 from the disc, S2 proceeds exactly the same as it would have had the computation been allowed to continue running on M1. Therefore, at least after the first few milliseconds, the subjective content of S2 must be the same as it would have been on the one machine. Could the subjective content be different at the transition between S1 and S2 if the computation is split up? If there is a subjective difference it won't be something the subject can notice because, later in the course of S2, he can have no memory of it. It also can't be a difference that would disrupt the completion of a task or thought that requires continuity of consciousness spanning S1-S2, since again the subject cannot have any evidence that such a disruption occurred. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But aren't you assuming that consciousness is produced by the abstract Platonic computation - rather than by the actual physical process (which is not the same) - in other words assuming the thing being argued? No, I'm at this point assuming only that consciousness is produced by the physical process. We can assume for simplicity that the two machines M1 and M2 have similar architecture and similar operating systems. Once the program is loaded into M2 from the disc, S2 proceeds exactly the same as it would have had the computation been allowed to continue running on M1. Therefore, at least after the first few milliseconds, the subjective content of S2 must be the same as it would have been on the one machine. Could the subjective content be different at the transition between S1 and S2 if the computation is split up? If there is a subjective difference it won't be something the subject can notice because, later in the course of S2, he can have no memory of it. But if you're only assuming that consciousness is produced by the physical process then the process of downloading and uploading the microstates and shifting the data into registers in the CPU and memory could produce a difference in consciousness. These are all computations too, done by the operating system. And why can't there be memory of it in the sense that it effects some later conscious state? There are traces of the transfer process left on the original computer, the disc, and the second computer. Some subsequent program could retrieve these traces, as is done in forensic cases. If physical processes instantiate consciousness, why shouldn't these make a difference. It also can't be a difference that would disrupt the completion of a task or thought that requires continuity of consciousness spanning S1-S2, since again the subject cannot have any evidence that such a disruption occurred. Unless we have a theory of how consciousness is related to the physical computation I don't think we can conclude that. We already know that subliminal perceptions can affect conscious thoughts - so why not subliminal memories. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: No, I'm at this point assuming only that consciousness is produced by the physical process. We can assume for simplicity that the two machines M1 and M2 have similar architecture and similar operating systems. Once the program is loaded into M2 from the disc, S2 proceeds exactly the same as it would have had the computation been allowed to continue running on M1. Therefore, at least after the first few milliseconds, the subjective content of S2 must be the same as it would have been on the one machine. Could the subjective content be different at the transition between S1 and S2 if the computation is split up? If there is a subjective difference it won't be something the subject can notice because, later in the course of S2, he can have no memory of it. But if you're only assuming that consciousness is produced by the physical process then the process of downloading and uploading the microstates and shifting the data into registers in the CPU and memory could produce a difference in consciousness. These are all computations too, done by the operating system. And why can't there be memory of it in the sense that it effects some later conscious state? There are traces of the transfer process left on the original computer, the disc, and the second computer. Some subsequent program could retrieve these traces, as is done in forensic cases. If physical processes instantiate consciousness, why shouldn't these make a difference. It's taken for granted even by unsophisticated end users of computers that the hardware won't affect the computation. A calculator application wouldn't be much use if it gave a different answer depending on what brand of machine it was running on. It wouldn't be difficult to write a program that takes input from the environment, including information on what sort of hardware it's running on, and in that case there could be a difference between running S1 and S2 on the one machine and running them on separate machines. A real time clock, for example, would alert the subject to the fact that there had been a discontinuity, and S2 would then *not* proceed the same in both cases. However, this would not happen automatically: it would have to be specifically programmed, and the hardware would have to be capable of feeding the appropriate input into the program. It also can't be a difference that would disrupt the completion of a task or thought that requires continuity of consciousness spanning S1-S2, since again the subject cannot have any evidence that such a disruption occurred. Unless we have a theory of how consciousness is related to the physical computation I don't think we can conclude that. We already know that subliminal perceptions can affect conscious thoughts - so why not subliminal memories. The theory is that if the computation is the same then the consciousness is the same, regardless of what hardware it is being implemented on. If you don't accept this then you don't accept computationalism, for it is difficult to imagine a more drastic hardware change than that involved in going from a biological brain to a digital computer. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: You've made this point in the past but I still don't understand it. If S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in your brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be experience them as consecutive if they were generated by chance by causally disconnected processes? No, I don't. Of course if they had durations of seconds or minutes, I would experience much the same thing. But it is not at all convincing to me that the experience at the beginning and end of the period would be identical - and hence in the limit of infinitesimal duration, discrete states I'm not sure what the experience would be, if any at all. We should consider experiences of long duration, say a minute, before going on to infinitesimals. I think you are saying that there is a problem with the connection between S1 and S2 if they are generated by causally disconnected processes, but not if they are generated in the usual manner by causally connected processes. Is that right? No. I'm not sure that causal connection is enough - and in any case causality is hard to define in physics at a fundamental level where it seems to be time-symmetric and QM is unitary (one of the motivations for everything explanations). I think the connection can be that S1 and S2 overlap, since at the level of substitution each one consists of many thousands of computation states. Suppose S1 is being generated by a virtual reality program on machine M1, then after a minute the human operator saves the program and data to disc and shuts down M1, walks over to machine M2, loads the data from the disc and runs the program, which then generates S2. There is a clear causal connection here even though M1 and M2 are separate machines. Do you think there would be normal continuity of consciousness in this case? No, at least I can see reasons to doubt it. Of course if the start-up of the program on M2 were very fast it might not be very noticeable and a rational person might still say yes to the doctor. But that wouldn't generalize to the infinitesimal observer moment. In a second experiment the operator finds when he gets to M2 that the data on the disc is completely corrupted. The only information he can be sure of is that the data comprised a maximum of n bits, this being the capacity of the disc. Worried that he might be responsible for the death of a conscious being, the operator decides to systematically load into M2 all 2^n possible sets of data that the disc could have contained. Do you think that this time there will be a discontinuity between S1 and S2 when S2 is eventually generated? I think there will be difference except in the case where he has loaded S1 and S2 is generated from it. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto: meeke...@dslextreme.com Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/7 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com: A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it along with all the others. If the UD is allowed to run forever, this program will be a lower measure contributor to S2 than the program that generates it sequentially; How do you know this? Why S2 is unlikely to appear out of nowhere is equivalent to the White Rabbit problem in ensemble theories, which has been often discussed over the years on this list. Russell's Theory of Nothing book provides a summary. The general idea is that structures generated by simpler algorithms have higher measure, and it is simpler to write a program that computes a series of mental states iteratively than one that computes a set of disconnected mental states from ad hoc data. and similarly in any physicalist theory. But although S2 may guess from such considerations that he is more likely to have been generated sequentially, the point remains that there is nothing in the nature of his experience to indicate this. That is, the fact that S2 remembers S1 as being in the past and remembers a smooth transition from S1 to S2 is no guarantee that S1 really did happen in the past, or even at all. We're assuming that thought is a kind of computation, a processing of information. And we're also assuming that this processing can consist of static states placed in order. So given two static states, what is the relation that makes their ordering into a computational process? One answer would be that they are successive states generated by some program. But you seem to reject that. To say that S2 remembers S1 doesn't seem to answer the question because remembering is itself a process, not a static state. I tried to phrase it in terms of the entropy, or information content, of S1 and S2 which would be a static property - as for example, if S2 simply contained S1. But that hardly seems a proper representation of states of consciousness - I'm certainly not conscious of my memories most of the time. Even as I type this I obviously remember how to type (though maybe not how to spell :-) ) but I'm not conscious of it. You've made this point in the past but I still don't understand it. If S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in your brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be experience them as consecutive if they were generated by chance by causally disconnected processes? No, I don't. Of course if they had durations of seconds or minutes, I would experience much the same thing. But it is not at all convincing to me that the experience at the beginning and end of the period would be identical - and hence in the limit of infinitesimal duration, discrete states I'm not sure what the experience would be, if any at all. The requirement would be only that the respective experiences have the same subjective content in both cases. Memory is only one aspect of subjective content, if an important one. If S1-S2 spans the typing of a sentence, then both S1 and S2 have to remember how to type and what the sentence they are typing is. But here you have allowed S1 and S2 to be processes with significant duration and even overlap. They are no longer discrete, static states. It may seem to be unconscious but obviously it can't be completely unconscious, otherwise it could be left out without making any difference. Your digestion is an example of a completely unconscious process that need not be taken into account in a simulation of your mind. Another example is your name: you may have no awareness at all of your name during S1-S2 so it
Re: UDA query
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto: meeke...@dslextreme.com Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/7 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com: A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it along with all the others. If the UD is allowed to run forever, this program will be a lower measure contributor to S2 than the program that generates it sequentially; How do you know this? Why S2 is unlikely to appear out of nowhere is equivalent to the White Rabbit problem in ensemble theories, which has been often discussed over the years on this list. Russell's Theory of Nothing book provides a summary. The general idea is that structures generated by simpler algorithms have higher measure, and it is simpler to write a program that computes a series of mental states iteratively than one that computes a set of disconnected mental states from ad hoc data. and similarly in any physicalist theory. But although S2 may guess from such considerations that he is more likely to have been generated sequentially, the point remains that there is nothing in the nature of his experience to indicate this. That is, the fact that S2 remembers S1 as being in the past and remembers a smooth transition from S1 to S2 is no guarantee that S1 really did happen in the past, or even at all. We're assuming that thought is a kind of computation, a processing of information. And we're also assuming that this processing can consist of static states placed in order. So given two static states, what is the relation that makes their ordering into a computational process? One answer would be that they are successive states generated by some program. But you seem to reject that. To say that S2 remembers S1 doesn't seem to answer the question because remembering is itself a process, not a static state. I tried to phrase it in terms of the entropy, or information content, of S1 and S2 which would be a static property - as for example, if S2 simply contained S1. But that hardly seems a proper representation of states of consciousness - I'm certainly not conscious of my memories most of the time. Even as I type this I obviously remember how to type (though maybe not how to spell :-) ) but I'm not conscious of it. You've made this point in the past but I still don't understand it. If S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in your brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be experience them as consecutive if they were generated by chance by causally disconnected processes? No, I don't. Of course if they had durations of seconds or minutes, I would experience much the same thing. But it is not at all convincing to me that the experience at the beginning and end of the period would be identical - and hence in the limit of infinitesimal duration, discrete states I'm not sure what the experience would be, if any at all. The requirement would be only that the respective experiences have the same subjective content in both cases. Memory is only one aspect of subjective content, if an important one. If S1-S2 spans the typing of a sentence, then both S1 and S2 have to remember how to type and what the sentence they are typing is. But here you have allowed S1 and S2 to be processes with significant duration and even overlap. They are no longer discrete, static states. It may seem to be unconscious but obviously it can't be completely unconscious, otherwise it could be left out without making any difference. Your digestion is an example of a completely unconscious process that need not be taken into account in a simulation of your mind. Another example is your name: you
Re: UDA query
On Fri, Jan 8, 2010 at 10:03 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Isn't it? Bruno presents comp as equivalent to betting that replacing your brain with a digitial device at the appropriate level of substitution will leave your stream of consciousness unaffected. From this people are inferring that the discrete states of this digital brain instantiate observer moments. But suppose (which I consider likely) the digital brain would have to have a cycle time of a billionth of a second or less. I don't think you believe you have a different conscious thought every billionth of a second. What it means is that a state of your consciousness corresponds to a million or so successive states of the digitial computation. These sets of a million states can then of course overlap. So the idea of discrete observer moments doesn't follow from yes doctor. It's plausible that observer moments correspond to what are called chaotic attractors in complex systems theory. The brain passes through a complex, dynamic trajectory of states. A stable attractor is a cycle of discrete states that repeats exactly, in the case of a limit cycle, or more often, retraces a similar but not exact trajectory, in the case of a chaotic attractor. Chaotic attractors are robust to perturbation, up to a point, and many complex systems can be characterized by a succession of chaotic attractors separated by rapid transitions driven by external perturbations exceeding some threshold. I use the term meta-state as a synonym for chaotic attractor in this context. My working hypothesis is that nervous systems developed into complex systems capable of generating quasi-stable meta-states which were evolutionarily advantageous, and over (evolutionary) time, were able to reach a level of organization which eventually produced consciousness. In this model, brains are continuously cycling through patterns of firing, which, absent external stimuli, are self-sustaining in some sort quasi-stable chaotic fashion, or meta-state. Sensory input of various types may be ignored if it doesn't reach a threshold of activation which tips the brain into a new meta-state. Or, novel sensations may drive the system into a new meta-state (dynamic cycle) that corresponds to some classification of that input in the context of whatever the current meta-state is. Observer moments, then, correspond to some subset of meta-states in the brain. They aren't discrete states of zero duration, but trajectories of states in a chaotic cycle. A succession of these meta-states would then make up a stream-of-consciousness. As an aside, I strongly suspect that in practice, our sensory input serves to constrain the brain into a (relatively) small set of meta-states that has allowed us to survive in a harsh evolutionary context, and produces what may be called consensus reality (I think Bruno calls this 1st-person plural.) Other chaotic systems do spend most of their time in a small subset of possible states. Yet there is evidence that perturbing the brain in a variety of ways (fasting, breathing exercises, meditation, religious contemplation, drugs, disease, injury, etc.) can allow it to wander off into meta-states that are quite subjectively different from the typical states associated with normal functioning. All of the above speculation could still hold true in a non-physicalist, computationalism-based view of consciousness, where one would replace brain with computational substrate at appropriate level of substitution. Johnathan Corgan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/7 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com: A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it along with all the others. If the UD is allowed to run forever, this program will be a lower measure contributor to S2 than the program that generates it sequentially; How do you know this? Why S2 is unlikely to appear out of nowhere is equivalent to the White Rabbit problem in ensemble theories, which has been often discussed over the years on this list. Russell's "Theory of Nothing" book provides a summary. The general idea is that structures generated by simpler algorithms have higher measure, and it is simpler to write a program that computes a series of mental states iteratively than one that computes a set of disconnected mental states from ad hoc data. and similarly in any physicalist theory. But although S2 may guess from such considerations that he is more likely to have been generated sequentially, the point remains that there is nothing in the nature of his experience to indicate this. That is, the fact that S2 remembers S1 as being in the past and remembers a smooth transition from S1 to S2 is no guarantee that S1 really did happen in the past, or even at all. We're assuming that thought is a kind of computation, a processing of information. And we're also assuming that this processing can consist of static states placed in order. So given two static states, what is the relation that makes their ordering into a computational process? One answer would be that they are successive states generated by some program. But you seem to reject that. To say that S2 remembers S1 doesn't seem to answer the question because "remembering" is itself a process, not a static state. I tried to phrase it in terms of the entropy, or information content, of S1 and S2 which would be a static property - as for example, if S2 simply contained S1. But that hardly seems a proper representation of states of consciousness - I'm certainly not conscious of my memories most of the time. Even as I type this I obviously remember how to type (though maybe not how to spell :-) ) but I'm not conscious of it. You've made this point in the past but I still don't understand it. If S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in your brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be experience them as consecutive if they were generated by chance by causally disconnected processes? No, I don't. Of course if they had durations of seconds or minutes, I would experience much the same thing. But it is not at all convincing to me that the experience at the beginning and end of the period would be identical - and hence in the limit of infinitesimal duration, discrete states I'm not sure what the experience would be, if any at all. The requirement would be only that the respective experiences have the same subjective content in both cases. Memory is only one aspect of subjective content, if an important one. If S1-S2 spans the typing of a sentence, then both S1 and S2 have to remember how to type and what the sentence they are typing is. But here you have allowed S1 and S2 to be processes with significant duration and even overlap. They are no longer discrete, static states. It may seem to be unconscious but obviously it can't be completely unconscious, otherwise it could be left out without making any difference. Your digestion is an example of a completely unconscious process that need not be taken into account in a simulation of your mind. Another example is your name: you may have no awareness at all of your name during S1-S2 so it could safely be left out of the simulation, although at S3 when you reach the end of your post and you need to sign it you need to remember what it is. You are relying on the idea of a
Re: UDA query
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto: meeke...@dslextreme.com Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/7 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com: A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it along with all the others. If the UD is allowed to run forever, this program will be a lower measure contributor to S2 than the program that generates it sequentially; How do you know this? Why S2 is unlikely to appear out of nowhere is equivalent to the White Rabbit problem in ensemble theories, which has been often discussed over the years on this list. Russell's Theory of Nothing book provides a summary. The general idea is that structures generated by simpler algorithms have higher measure, and it is simpler to write a program that computes a series of mental states iteratively than one that computes a set of disconnected mental states from ad hoc data. and similarly in any physicalist theory. But although S2 may guess from such considerations that he is more likely to have been generated sequentially, the point remains that there is nothing in the nature of his experience to indicate this. That is, the fact that S2 remembers S1 as being in the past and remembers a smooth transition from S1 to S2 is no guarantee that S1 really did happen in the past, or even at all. We're assuming that thought is a kind of computation, a processing of information. And we're also assuming that this processing can consist of static states placed in order. So given two static states, what is the relation that makes their ordering into a computational process? One answer would be that they are successive states generated by some program. But you seem to reject that. To say that S2 remembers S1 doesn't seem to answer the question because remembering is itself a process, not a static state. I tried to phrase it in terms of the entropy, or information content, of S1 and S2 which would be a static property - as for example, if S2 simply contained S1. But that hardly seems a proper representation of states of consciousness - I'm certainly not conscious of my memories most of the time. Even as I type this I obviously remember how to type (though maybe not how to spell :-) ) but I'm not conscious of it. You've made this point in the past but I still don't understand it. If S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in your brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be experience them as consecutive if they were generated by chance by causally disconnected processes? No, I don't. Of course if they had durations of seconds or minutes, I would experience much the same thing. But it is not at all convincing to me that the experience at the beginning and end of the period would be identical - and hence in the limit of infinitesimal duration, discrete states I'm not sure what the experience would be, if any at all. The requirement would be only that the respective experiences have the same subjective content in both cases. Memory is only one aspect of subjective content, if an important one. If S1-S2 spans the typing of a sentence, then both S1 and S2 have to remember how to type and what the sentence they are typing is. But here you have allowed S1 and S2 to be processes with significant duration and even overlap. They are no longer discrete, static states. It may seem to be unconscious but obviously it can't be completely unconscious, otherwise it could be left out without making any difference. Your digestion is an example of a completely unconscious process that need not be taken into
Re: UDA query
Johnathan Corgan wrote: On Fri, Jan 8, 2010 at 10:03 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Isn't it? Bruno presents comp as equivalent to betting that replacing your brain with a digitial device at the appropriate level of substitution will leave your stream of consciousness unaffected. From this people are inferring that the discrete states of this digital brain instantiate observer moments. But suppose (which I consider likely) the digital brain would have to have a cycle time of a billionth of a second or less. I don't think you believe you have a different conscious thought every billionth of a second. What it means is that a state of your consciousness corresponds to a million or so successive states of the digitial computation. These sets of a million states can then of course overlap. So the idea of discrete observer moments doesn't follow from yes doctor. It's plausible that observer moments correspond to what are called chaotic attractors in complex systems theory. The brain passes through a complex, dynamic trajectory of states. A stable attractor is a cycle of discrete states that repeats exactly, in the case of a limit cycle, or more often, retraces a similar but not exact trajectory, in the case of a chaotic attractor. Chaotic attractors are robust to perturbation, up to a point, and many complex systems can be characterized by a succession of chaotic attractors separated by rapid transitions driven by external perturbations exceeding some threshold. I use the term meta-state as a synonym for chaotic attractor in this context. My working hypothesis is that nervous systems developed into complex systems capable of generating quasi-stable meta-states which were evolutionarily advantageous, and over (evolutionary) time, were able to reach a level of organization which eventually produced consciousness. In this model, brains are continuously cycling through patterns of firing, which, absent external stimuli, are self-sustaining in some sort quasi-stable chaotic fashion, or meta-state. Sensory input of various types may be ignored if it doesn't reach a threshold of activation which tips the brain into a new meta-state. Or, novel sensations may drive the system into a new meta-state (dynamic cycle) that corresponds to some classification of that input in the context of whatever the current meta-state is. Observer moments, then, correspond to some subset of meta-states in the brain. They aren't discrete states of zero duration, but trajectories of states in a chaotic cycle. A succession of these meta-states would then make up a stream-of-consciousness. As an aside, I strongly suspect that in practice, our sensory input serves to constrain the brain into a (relatively) small set of meta-states that has allowed us to survive in a harsh evolutionary context, and produces what may be called consensus reality (I think Bruno calls this 1st-person plural.) Other chaotic systems do spend most of their time in a small subset of possible states. Yet there is evidence that perturbing the brain in a variety of ways (fasting, breathing exercises, meditation, religious contemplation, drugs, disease, injury, etc.) can allow it to wander off into meta-states that are quite subjectively different from the typical states associated with normal functioning. All of the above speculation could still hold true in a non-physicalist, computationalism-based view of consciousness, where one would replace brain with computational substrate at appropriate level of substitution. Johnathan Corgan That would correspond to my intuition about consciousness. I remember reading in the '60s, when sensory deprivation experiments were the fad, that if one remained long enough in a sensory deprivation tank (more than about 45min) one's mind went into a loop. I've not been able to find a reference to this, but that's what I remember. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
On Fri, Jan 08, 2010 at 11:00:19AM -0800, Johnathan Corgan wrote: It's plausible that observer moments correspond to what are called chaotic attractors in complex systems theory. Well attractors in general - they don't have to be chaotic (or strange as the terminology actually is). More likely the attractors are point or limit cycles, but are only metastable (they will be pushed out of their basic of attraction by longer range coupling within the brain). Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
On 06 Jan 2010, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/6 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I can understand that view, but in that case why consider them computations? Why not just suppose all states of your consciousness (and even other parts of the world) exist. If they can be glued together by inherent features or simply experienced without even an implicit order, then computation seems irrelevant. Of course that leaves the apparent lawfulness of physics even further from possible explanation than the UD theory. We start off with what we observe: apparently there is a physical world, and some parts of this physical world, called brains, seem to give rise to consciousness. There is reason to think that computers running a program can also give rise to consciousness. Taking this hypothesis of computationalism seriously then leads to interesting questions, such as whether there is a reason to suppose that consciousness happens only when the computations are physically instantiated (and what exactly that means), or whether their status as platonic objects is enough to generate the associated consciousness. In other words, there is a series of rational steps starting from what we observe, and if any step is faulted the whole edifice falls; whereas imply assuming idealism from the start is ad hoc and unfalsifiable. I think what I asked about is different from simply assuming idealism. It is carrying your thread of reasoning a few steps further. Suppose Platonic objects exist. Suppose computations, as Platonic objects, are enough to instantiate consciousness. Suppose consciousness consists of discrete states of this computation. I will insist that consciousness cannot consists of discrete states of computation. It may be associated to, attached to, etc. Consciousness is a first person notion, and computational state are third person notions. We cannot identify them. It is the same mistake than identifying mind and brain. Brain are assembly of molecules, minds are memories, informations, logical and pragmatical dispositions, etc. In some thread this can be just an irrelevant detail, but as we are going to the crux of the reasoning, we will have to be very careful. The devil is in the detail ... Suppose the fact that the states are connected by the computation is irrelevant to their instantiation of consciousness. The states are themselves Platonic objects. So if we assume Platonic objects exist we will already have assumed these states to exist and consciousness to have been instantiated by them - with no reference to computation. OK. I think Bruno avoids this by saying consciousness consists of computationally connected sequences thru a given state - not the state itself - but I'm not sure why that should be. Assuming digital mechanism, we can associate consciousness to a computation. This computation makes sense only with respect to a number or a machine which do (platonically) that computation. If not, all number can be said to code a computational state, and all sequence of states could define a computations, and the computations would be non enumerable, but the computations (without oracle), and considered in the third person way are enumerable: it is always generated by a precise phi_i(j). Now, to associate a consciousness to a computation is not enough. The association has to be 1-person statistically stable. We have to take into account the global first person indeterminacy, which involved all computations. I will come back on this in my comment to Nick's last post. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
2010/1/7 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it along with all the others. If the UD is allowed to run forever, this program will be a lower measure contributor to S2 than the program that generates it sequentially; How do you know this? Why S2 is unlikely to appear out of nowhere is equivalent to the White Rabbit problem in ensemble theories, which has been often discussed over the years on this list. Russell's Theory of Nothing book provides a summary. The general idea is that structures generated by simpler algorithms have higher measure, and it is simpler to write a program that computes a series of mental states iteratively than one that computes a set of disconnected mental states from ad hoc data. and similarly in any physicalist theory. But although S2 may guess from such considerations that he is more likely to have been generated sequentially, the point remains that there is nothing in the nature of his experience to indicate this. That is, the fact that S2 remembers S1 as being in the past and remembers a smooth transition from S1 to S2 is no guarantee that S1 really did happen in the past, or even at all. We're assuming that thought is a kind of computation, a processing of information. And we're also assuming that this processing can consist of static states placed in order. So given two static states, what is the relation that makes their ordering into a computational process? One answer would be that they are successive states generated by some program. But you seem to reject that. To say that S2 remembers S1 doesn't seem to answer the question because remembering is itself a process, not a static state. I tried to phrase it in terms of the entropy, or information content, of S1 and S2 which would be a static property - as for example, if S2 simply contained S1. But that hardly seems a proper representation of states of consciousness - I'm certainly not conscious of my memories most of the time. Even as I type this I obviously remember how to type (though maybe not how to spell :-) ) but I'm not conscious of it. You've made this point in the past but I still don't understand it. If S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in your brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be experience them as consecutive if they were generated by chance by causally disconnected processes? The requirement would be only that the respective experiences have the same subjective content in both cases. Memory is only one aspect of subjective content, if an important one. If S1-S2 spans the typing of a sentence, then both S1 and S2 have to remember how to type and what the sentence they are typing is. It may seem to be unconscious but obviously it can't be completely unconscious, otherwise it could be left out without making any difference. Your digestion is an example of a completely unconscious process that need not be taken into account in a simulation of your mind. Another example is your name: you may have no awareness at all of your name during S1-S2 so it could safely be left out of the simulation, although at S3 when you reach the end of your post and you need to sign it you need to remember what it is. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
2010/1/7 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I think what I asked about is different from simply assuming idealism. It is carrying your thread of reasoning a few steps further. Suppose Platonic objects exist. Suppose computations, as Platonic objects, are enough to instantiate consciousness. Suppose consciousness consists of discrete states of this computation. Suppose the fact that the states are connected by the computation is irrelevant to their instantiation of consciousness. The states are themselves Platonic objects. So if we assume Platonic objects exist we will already have assumed these states to exist and consciousness to have been instantiated by them - with no reference to computation. That could be and in fact it is probably closer to what Plato himself meant. But mathematical objects seem to have a special status in that they necessarily exist, whereas everything else (including God) exists only contingently. You can't imagine the number 7 not existing or not being prime. The special sense in which mathematical objects and relationships exist (maybe not the right word) independently of any material world is their Platonic realm, but it doesn't follow having accepted this that other objects also exist in a separate Platonic realm. However, if consciousness supervenes on computation and it does not require actual physical implementation of the computation, then consciousness piggybacks on the Platonic existence of computation. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/7 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it along with all the others. If the UD is allowed to run forever, this program will be a lower measure contributor to S2 than the program that generates it sequentially; How do you know this? Why S2 is unlikely to appear out of nowhere is equivalent to the White Rabbit problem in ensemble theories, which has been often discussed over the years on this list. Russell's Theory of Nothing book provides a summary. The general idea is that structures generated by simpler algorithms have higher measure, and it is simpler to write a program that computes a series of mental states iteratively than one that computes a set of disconnected mental states from ad hoc data. and similarly in any physicalist theory. But although S2 may guess from such considerations that he is more likely to have been generated sequentially, the point remains that there is nothing in the nature of his experience to indicate this. That is, the fact that S2 remembers S1 as being in the past and remembers a smooth transition from S1 to S2 is no guarantee that S1 really did happen in the past, or even at all. We're assuming that thought is a kind of computation, a processing of information. And we're also assuming that this processing can consist of static states placed in order. So given two static states, what is the relation that makes their ordering into a computational process? One answer would be that they are successive states generated by some program. But you seem to reject that. To say that S2 remembers S1 doesn't seem to answer the question because remembering is itself a process, not a static state. I tried to phrase it in terms of the entropy, or information content, of S1 and S2 which would be a static property - as for example, if S2 simply contained S1. But that hardly seems a proper representation of states of consciousness - I'm certainly not conscious of my memories most of the time. Even as I type this I obviously remember how to type (though maybe not how to spell :-) ) but I'm not conscious of it. You've made this point in the past but I still don't understand it. If S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in your brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be experience them as consecutive if they were generated by chance by causally disconnected processes? No, I don't. Of course if they had durations of seconds or minutes, I would experience much the same thing. But it is not at all convincing to me that the experience at the beginning and end of the period would be identical - and hence in the limit of infinitesimal duration, discrete states I'm not sure what the experience would be, if any at all. The requirement would be only that the respective experiences have the same subjective content in both cases. Memory is only one aspect of subjective content, if an important one. If S1-S2 spans the typing of a sentence, then both S1 and S2 have to remember how to type and what the sentence they are typing is. But here you have allowed S1 and S2 to be processes with significant duration and even overlap. They are no longer discrete, static states. It may seem to be unconscious but obviously it can't be completely unconscious, otherwise it could be left out without making any difference. Your digestion is an example of a completely unconscious process that need not be taken into account in a simulation of your mind. Another example is your name: you may have no awareness at all of your name during S1-S2 so it could safely be left out of the simulation, although at S3 when you reach the end of your post and you need to sign it you need to remember what it is. You are relying on the idea of a digital simulation which is described by a sequence of discrete states. But in an actual realization of such a simulation the discrete states are realized by causal sequences in time which are not of infinitesimal duration and overlap. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/7 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com: A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it along with all the others. If the UD is allowed to run forever, this program will be a lower measure contributor to S2 than the program that generates it sequentially; How do you know this? Why S2 is unlikely to appear out of nowhere is equivalent to the White Rabbit problem in ensemble theories, which has been often discussed over the years on this list. Russell's Theory of Nothing book provides a summary. The general idea is that structures generated by simpler algorithms have higher measure, and it is simpler to write a program that computes a series of mental states iteratively than one that computes a set of disconnected mental states from ad hoc data. and similarly in any physicalist theory. But although S2 may guess from such considerations that he is more likely to have been generated sequentially, the point remains that there is nothing in the nature of his experience to indicate this. That is, the fact that S2 remembers S1 as being in the past and remembers a smooth transition from S1 to S2 is no guarantee that S1 really did happen in the past, or even at all. We're assuming that thought is a kind of computation, a processing of information. And we're also assuming that this processing can consist of static states placed in order. So given two static states, what is the relation that makes their ordering into a computational process? One answer would be that they are successive states generated by some program. But you seem to reject that. To say that S2 remembers S1 doesn't seem to answer the question because remembering is itself a process, not a static state. I tried to phrase it in terms of the entropy, or information content, of S1 and S2 which would be a static property - as for example, if S2 simply contained S1. But that hardly seems a proper representation of states of consciousness - I'm certainly not conscious of my memories most of the time. Even as I type this I obviously remember how to type (though maybe not how to spell :-) ) but I'm not conscious of it. You've made this point in the past but I still don't understand it. If S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in your brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be experience them as consecutive if they were generated by chance by causally disconnected processes? No, I don't. Of course if they had durations of seconds or minutes, I would experience much the same thing. But it is not at all convincing to me that the experience at the beginning and end of the period would be identical - and hence in the limit of infinitesimal duration, discrete states I'm not sure what the experience would be, if any at all. The requirement would be only that the respective experiences have the same subjective content in both cases. Memory is only one aspect of subjective content, if an important one. If S1-S2 spans the typing of a sentence, then both S1 and S2 have to remember how to type and what the sentence they are typing is. But here you have allowed S1 and S2 to be processes with significant duration and even overlap. They are no longer discrete, static states. It may seem to be unconscious but obviously it can't be completely unconscious, otherwise it could be left out without making any difference. Your digestion is an example of a completely unconscious process that need not be taken into account in a simulation of your mind. Another example is your name: you may have no
Re: UDA query
2010/1/6 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk: As I understand it the UD generates all possible programs and as it generates each one it runs one step of it before generating the next. Does that not mean that eventually it will generate the program which is generating what we understand to be some observer moments for us at this particular time. This is where I was thinking of the foliation bit - each hypersurface is a snapshot in time of the universe as experienced by me. This being said would that not mean they would necessarily be in order or are you thinking that some other program. could generate by chance a perfectly good observer moment that was out of sync? A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it along with all the others. If the UD is allowed to run forever, this program will be a lower measure contributor to S2 than the program that generates it sequentially; and similarly in any physicalist theory. But although S2 may guess from such considerations that he is more likely to have been generated sequentially, the point remains that there is nothing in the nature of his experience to indicate this. That is, the fact that S2 remembers S1 as being in the past and remembers a smooth transition from S1 to S2 is no guarantee that S1 really did happen in the past, or even at all. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
2010/1/6 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I can understand that view, but in that case why consider them computations? Why not just suppose all states of your consciousness (and even other parts of the world) exist. If they can be glued together by inherent features or simply experienced without even an implicit order, then computation seems irrelevant. Of course that leaves the apparent lawfulness of physics even further from possible explanation than the UD theory. We start off with what we observe: apparently there is a physical world, and some parts of this physical world, called brains, seem to give rise to consciousness. There is reason to think that computers running a program can also give rise to consciousness. Taking this hypothesis of computationalism seriously then leads to interesting questions, such as whether there is a reason to suppose that consciousness happens only when the computations are physically instantiated (and what exactly that means), or whether their status as platonic objects is enough to generate the associated consciousness. In other words, there is a series of rational steps starting from what we observe, and if any step is faulted the whole edifice falls; whereas imply assuming idealism from the start is ad hoc and unfalsifiable. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote: Yes but the UD will generate infinitely more often the in order S1/ S2/S3 than out of order... with what you are saying I don't even understand what is a computation if not a rules ordered sequential state order. Quentin It seems strange that we start with the hypothesis that consciousness is a kind of computation - a sequential processing of information - and then arrive at picture in which there is no processing and sequence is just inferred. On the one hand consciousness is a process, on the other hand it is static state. I suspect there is something wrong with the slicing of the stream of consciousness into zero-duration, non-overlapping states. But that problem occurs also with physics, as illustrated by the debate on time and block universe. Also, we have to be careful: no where it has been said that consciousness is a kind of computation. Obviously consciousness is not a kind of computation. It is a property of (first) person, which, assuming mechanism, is invariant for a set of functional substitution. Then a reasoning shows that we cannot distinguish a physical computation from a mathematical one, and that we have to take this into account for justifying the (conscious) appearance of the physical laws. Slicing the stream of consciousness, or just the stream of time like the physicists do a lot, into zero-length interval is a critics of the use of real number, and somehow comp escapes it, given that real numbers does not (necessarily) exists at the ontological level. They exist necessarily at the epistemological level though. I can see that states can encode information that, when coarse grained, define a sequence of increasing entropy, but is it legitimate to identify having the information in memory with remembering? In my opinion, time is far less problematical in comp than in physics, given that we assume a form of primitive time, first by the number order, then by the length of computations or of proofs. Arithmletic and provability logic are so antisymmetrical that I was afraid the comp physics would contradict the very symmetry of nature (laws of physics are reversible, most computations are not). But the intelligible and sensible comp matter (the probability one defined by Bp Dt ( p), luckily enough seems able to restaure the symmetry, or at least some symmetry. Enough? Open problem. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:59, Brent Meeker wrote: Nick Prince wrote: Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always there. I can understand this because all the spatio temporal relationships for the actors in the film remain normal i.e obey the laws of physics. But there's the rub. Why the laws of physics? That's what somehow needs to be explained. Is there something about the UD that necessarily generates law like sequences of states with high probability? By definition, the UD generates all and only the (computable) law like sequences. The problem is that the physical law like sequence have to be justified, indeed. This is what is interesting in comp. It gives a solid theory of mind (computer science, mathematical logic, machine self-reference, etc.), and it transforms the mind body problem into a body problem. The laws of physics have a reason, an origin. Doesn't it generate just those laws we seem to find - that would be a great discovery. The UD generates all the laws. It may or not generate the laws we seem to find. In any case, those laws have to be a sum on all the (computable) laws. (ud argument). Or does it generate all possible non-self-contradictory multiverses - in which case nothing has been explained. The UD executes all programs. It generates all the possible computations, those which terminate and those which don't terminate. It is well defined mathematically, with respect to many equivalence results, closure results, Church thesis, etc. A notion like consistent extension makes sense only for the persons relatively appearing in deeper computations, so the precise relation between consistent extensions and the UD needs the use of the Gödel Löb provability logics. Bruno Deutsch argues similarly in the Fabric of reality. In my work I often come across the idea of a foliation of hypersurfaces which is really a set of 3D pictures stuck together and stacked in the direction of the time coordinate of the world at a given instant of time. But that's starting with the physics given, so the hypersurfaces and their relation is already defined. Brent In MW interpretation though I guess that the stacking is less certain as in the block universe idea but that's another issue. Is this analogy similar to how you feel the obvious experience of time being normal? Best Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
On 05 Jan 2010, at 21:18, Nick Prince wrote: It feels a bit lie a chicken and egg situation - do we pick out the laws or do they pick us?. But I am still working my way through this and and loads of other stuff, so I don't understand it yet. The computable laws (definable in elementary arithmetic) pick us, and we pick the physical law. Number = consciousness = matter. But this makes sense only if you mean by us, us, the universal machines. It is pretty ridiculous, if you meant it by us the humans. It is tricky to understand. Comp *is* counterintuitive. It is related to a gap between the fist and third person point of view, which came from the gap between 'true' and 'provable', (and 'true and provable', etc.). The possibility of this reversal comes from programming, or Gödel numbering. It comes from the fact that a part of the mathematical reasoning can be translated into arithmetic, and so does the computations. Auda comes from the fact, already well seen by Gödel in 1931, that machines, or axiomatizable set of beliefs (theorie), can prove their own Gödel's incompleteness result (the so called formalized second incompleteness theorem). (~Bf - ~B ~Bf). Good book: Boolos 1979. (assume Mendelson's book or alike). No need for uda, although it helps to de-trivialize uda, it makes the mind body problem a problem in pure math/computer science. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
On 05 Jan 2010, at 23:44, Brent Meeker wrote: Nick Prince wrote: OOps sorry I sent an empty post by accident. I agree with you here. But I am new to this field so I am uncertain about so many things. However, I don't understand why it is that a UD would know how to generate these law like sequences of states. It may well generate all possible programs that generate all possible universes (with different values for the physical constants say - maybe even different laws) but I wonder why our conciousness defines itself by selecting only those consistent extension among all the states available that obey a certain set of laws of physics. I thought that a TOE should explain the laws of physics and Bruno states in his SANE paper Conclusion: Physics is given by a measure on the consistent computational histories, or maximal consistent extensions as seen from some first person point of view. But consistent in what sense? We can't say consistent with the laws of physics because that's what we're trying to explain. Laws of physics, in particular, should be inferable from the true verifiable ‘‘atomic sentences’’. Those are the verifiable arithmetical sentences. I understand true arithmetical sentences, but I'm not sure what 'verifiable' means? Does it mean computable, or provable? What's an atomic sentence? Is it just a finite statement, like 17 is prime; so it excludes infinite statements like Goldbach's conjecture? p is verifiable means that if p is true then p is provable. p - Bp is true for those sentences p. All statements of the shape It exist a machine x which will access state y are of that nature. We may run all machines, and never access state y, so that we remain ignorant, in case the statement is false, but if the statement is true we will know it, soon or later (in principle, or in platonia). Typically, the Sigma_1 sentences. Those can be put in the shape ExP(x), with P decidable. If ExP(x)' is true, we can find it by testing P(0), P(1), P(2) ... up to the P(k) witnessing the truth of ExP(x). If ExP(x) is false, we may never know, and this procedure will not decide the sentence. The DU, implemented in arithmetic, flows through all true Sigma_1 sentences, but also on all proofs of the false one, this change the internal measure of the true one. Enough for a successful arithmetical renormalization? Open problem. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
On 06 Jan 2010, at 01:21, Nick Prince wrote: Hi Brent Perhaps Bruno could give some clarification here. Just prior to his conclusion on the sane paper I quoted from was this: So if we keep comp at this stage, we are forced to relate the inner experience only to the type of computation involved. The reason is that only those types are univocally related to all their possible counterfactuals. This entails that, from a first person point of view, not only the physical cannot be distinguished from the virtual, but the virtual can no more be distinguished from the arithmetical. Now DU is emulated platonistically by the verifiable propositions of arithmetic. They are equivalent to sentences of the form ‘‘it exists n such that P(n)’’ with P(n) decidable. Their truth entails their provability, and they are known under the name of Sigma1 sentence. If comp is correct, the appearance of physics must be recovered from some point of views emerging from those propositions. Indeed, taking into account the seven steps once more, we arrive at the conclusion that the physical atomic (in the Boolean logician sense) invariant proposition must be given by a probability measure on those propositions. A physical certainty must be true in all maximal extensions, true in at least one maximal extension (we will see later why the second condition does not follow from the first) and accessible by the UD, that is arithmetically verifiable. Figure 8 illustrates our main conclusion, where the number 1 is put for the so called Sigma1 sentences of arithmetic. It sounds as if Bruno thinks that the computations of the UD invoke our inner experiences and also our understanding of physics. Both come from arithmetical platonicism ( because thats what the UD is all about). So the pictures in the film are stiched together by the arithmetical (computation necessity) rather than the laws of of physics... Hmm not what I thought and said earlier!! So according to Bruno the laws of physics come from something intrinsic in the computation? Not quite sure how. I just can't figure out any more at the moment and hope Bruno will give me a hint here. But the quote you give is the conclusion of step 7 and 8. Except that I use a bit the vocabulary which will help to understand the interview of the Löbian machine. Normally at step seven you understand that COMP + concrete UD = I am already in UD* and the physical laws have to result from a sum on my first person (hopefully plural) indeterminacy in UD*. (step 1 -6 + 7) Then step 8, MGA, shows (is supposed to show) that COMP makes any concrete running of the UD irrelevant. (but the MGA thread in this list is better, I may send a new version of MGA). MGA = Movie Graph Argument. This is not *just* because UD* is represented, remarkably enough, in the elementary consequences of addition and multiplication, but mainly because, by MGA, comp together with the physical supervenience thesis makes it necessary to confuse a computation and a description of a computation. The computation has to consist in the logical relations, not in this or that implementation, (which, btw, can only be a reduction to a particular universal machine). Do you see that COMP + concrete UD leads to an Everett-DeWitt shock? We am multiplied by 10^100+ at each instant. COMP leads, naively, to Aleph_zero + multiplication, or even 2^aleph_zero (in a sense)? Then MGA is the next and last difficulty. (before the machine interview, if interested). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
On 06 Jan 2010, at 03:34, Brent Meeker wrote: Nick Prince wrote: Hi Brent Perhaps Bruno could give some clarification here. Just prior to his conclusion on the sane paper I quoted from was this: So if we keep comp at this stage, we are forced to relate the inner experience only to the type of computation involved. The reason is that only those types are univocally related to all their possible counterfactuals. This entails that, from a first person point of view, not only the physical cannot be distinguished from the virtual, but the virtual can no more be distinguished from the arithmetical. Now DU is emulated platonistically by the verifiable propositions of arithmetic. They are equivalent to sentences of the form ‘‘it exists n such that P(n)’’ with P(n) decidable. Their truth entails their provability, and they are known under the name of Sigma1 sentence. If comp is correct, the appearance of physics must be recovered from some point of views emerging from those propositions. Why only the atomic sentences? Why not all true sentences? How is appearance recovered? The atomic propositions p, q, r of the modal logic (G) are interpreted by the Sigma_1 sentences of Arithmetic (with shape ExP(x), P decidable). Dovetailing on their (infinitely many) proofs can be shown equivalent with a universal dovetailing (and thus truly universal with Church thesis). Limiting the arithmetical interpretation on that tiny Sigma_1 complete part is the way to interview the *computationalist machine. The formula p - Bp characterizes such Sigma_1 arithmetical formula, provably so, by the Löbian machine. So G + p - Bp is used in the final. Indeed, taking into account the seven steps once more, we arrive at the conclusion that the physical atomic (in the Boolean logician sense) invariant proposition must be given by a probability measure on those propositions. But what gives the probability measure? Is it just the relative frequency of occurrence of the atomic sentences in the UD output up to a given step? The 'measure one' will have a logic related to the logic of Bp Dt (and variants). The measure itself may follow, or not. Incompleteness; being self-discoverable, provides a geometry on the common ignorance of all universal machines, from which the 'physical laws should emerge. Hmm... I guess you miss something in the MGA, or with computational supervenience. Computational supervenience is really step 7, but in front of arithmetical realism, which contains UD* in some way. Not easy stuff ... Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/6 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk: As I understand it the UD generates all possible programs and as it generates each one it runs one step of it before generating the next. Does that not mean that eventually it will generate the program which is generating what we understand to be some observer moments for us at this particular time. This is where I was thinking of the foliation bit - each hypersurface is a snapshot in time of the universe as experienced by me. But of course relativity tells us there is no canonical way to foliate the universe; your experience is local and is determined by your past light cone, not by the now hypersurface. This being said would that not mean they would necessarily be in order or are you thinking that some other program. could generate by chance a perfectly good observer moment that was out of sync? A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it along with all the others. If the UD is allowed to run forever, this program will be a lower measure contributor to S2 than the program that generates it sequentially; How do you know this? and similarly in any physicalist theory. But although S2 may guess from such considerations that he is more likely to have been generated sequentially, the point remains that there is nothing in the nature of his experience to indicate this. That is, the fact that S2 remembers S1 as being in the past and remembers a smooth transition from S1 to S2 is no guarantee that S1 really did happen in the past, or even at all. We're assuming that thought is a kind of computation, a processing of information. And we're also assuming that this processing can consist of static states placed in order. So given two static states, what is the relation that makes their ordering into a computational process? One answer would be that they are successive states generated by some program. But you seem to reject that. To say that S2 remembers S1 doesn't seem to answer the question because remembering is itself a process, not a static state. I tried to phrase it in terms of the entropy, or information content, of S1 and S2 which would be a static property - as for example, if S2 simply contained S1. But that hardly seems a proper representation of states of consciousness - I'm certainly not conscious of my memories most of the time. Even as I type this I obviously remember how to type (though maybe not how to spell :-) ) but I'm not conscious of it. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/6 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I can understand that view, but in that case why consider them computations? Why not just suppose all states of your consciousness (and even other parts of the world) exist. If they can be glued together by inherent features or simply experienced without even an implicit order, then computation seems irrelevant. Of course that leaves the apparent lawfulness of physics even further from possible explanation than the UD theory. We start off with what we observe: apparently there is a physical world, and some parts of this physical world, called brains, seem to give rise to consciousness. There is reason to think that computers running a program can also give rise to consciousness. Taking this hypothesis of computationalism seriously then leads to interesting questions, such as whether there is a reason to suppose that consciousness happens only when the computations are physically instantiated (and what exactly that means), or whether their status as platonic objects is enough to generate the associated consciousness. In other words, there is a series of rational steps starting from what we observe, and if any step is faulted the whole edifice falls; whereas imply assuming idealism from the start is ad hoc and unfalsifiable. I think what I asked about is different from simply assuming idealism. It is carrying your thread of reasoning a few steps further. Suppose Platonic objects exist. Suppose computations, as Platonic objects, are enough to instantiate consciousness. Suppose consciousness consists of discrete states of this computation. Suppose the fact that the states are connected by the computation is irrelevant to their instantiation of consciousness. The states are themselves Platonic objects. So if we assume Platonic objects exist we will already have assumed these states to exist and consciousness to have been instantiated by them - with no reference to computation. I think Bruno avoids this by saying consciousness consists of computationally connected sequences thru a given state - not the state itself - but I'm not sure why that should be. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote: Yes but the UD will generate infinitely more often the in order S1/S2/S3 than out of order... with what you are saying I don't even understand what is a computation if not a rules ordered sequential state order. Quentin It seems strange that we start with the hypothesis that consciousness is a kind of computation - a sequential processing of information - and then arrive at picture in which there is no processing and sequence is just inferred. On the one hand consciousness is a process, on the other hand it is static state. I suspect there is something wrong with the slicing of the stream of consciousness into zero-duration, non-overlapping states. But that problem occurs also with physics, as illustrated by the debate on time and block universe. Also, we have to be careful: no where it has been said that consciousness is a kind of computation. It's been said on this list several times (at least by me :-) ). Obviously consciousness is not a kind of computation. It's not obvious to me. If the doctor says to me, This artificial-hypothalmus I'm going to substitute for yours, does exactly the same input-output computations that your original does., then I'll be much more inclined to say yes than if he says it doesn't do any computation. It is a property of (first) person, which, assuming mechanism, is invariant for a set of functional substitution. What is invariant under the functional substitution if not the computations? Brent Then a reasoning shows that we cannot distinguish a physical computation from a mathematical one, and that we have to take this into account for justifying the (conscious) appearance of the physical laws. Slicing the stream of consciousness, or just the stream of time like the physicists do a lot, into zero-length interval is a critics of the use of real number, and somehow comp escapes it, given that real numbers does not (necessarily) exists at the ontological level. They exist necessarily at the epistemological level though. I can see that states can encode information that, when coarse grained, define a sequence of increasing entropy, but is it legitimate to identify having the information in memory with remembering? In my opinion, time is far less problematical in comp than in physics, given that we assume a form of primitive time, first by the number order, then by the length of computations or of proofs. Arithmletic and provability logic are so antisymmetrical that I was afraid the comp physics would contradict the very symmetry of nature (laws of physics are reversible, most computations are not). But the intelligible and sensible comp matter (the probability one defined by Bp Dt ( p), luckily enough seems able to restaure the symmetry, or at least some symmetry. Enough? Open problem. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:59, Brent Meeker wrote: Nick Prince wrote: Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always there. I can understand this because all the spatio temporal relationships for the actors in the film remain normal i.e obey the laws of physics. But there's the rub. Why the laws of physics? That's what somehow needs to be explained. Is there something about the UD that necessarily generates law like sequences of states with high probability? By definition, the UD generates all and only the (computable) law like sequences. But only law like in the sense of being computable. Not necessarily law like in conserving momentum in a 4-space with Lorentzian signature. The problem is that the physical law like sequence have to be justified, indeed. This is what is interesting in comp. It gives a solid theory of mind (computer science, mathematical logic, machine self-reference, etc.), and it transforms the mind body problem into a body problem. The laws of physics have a reason, an origin. Doesn't it generate just those laws we seem to find - that would be a great discovery. The UD generates all the laws. It may or not generate the laws we seem to find. In any case, those laws have to be a sum on all the (computable) laws. (ud argument). Or does it generate all possible non-self-contradictory multiverses - in which case nothing has been explained. The UD executes all programs. It generates all the possible computations, those which terminate and those which don't terminate. It is well defined mathematically, with respect to many equivalence results, closure results, Church thesis, etc. Yes, I understand that. A notion like consistent extension makes sense only for the persons relatively appearing in deeper computations, so the precise relation between consistent extensions and the UD needs the use of the Gödel Löb provability logics. So do they allow a definition of consistent extensions such that persons can be identified with sequences of consistent extensions and those persons will define one or more universes in terms of intersubjective agreement? That's where you lose me - I don't see how this is to be done. Brent Bruno Deutsch argues similarly in the Fabric of reality. In my work I often come across the idea of a foliation of hypersurfaces which is really a set of 3D pictures stuck together and stacked in the direction of the time coordinate of the world at a given instant of time. But that's starting with the physics given, so the hypersurfaces and their relation is already defined. Brent In MW interpretation though I guess that the stacking is less certain as in the block universe idea but that's another issue. Is this analogy similar to how you feel the obvious experience of time being normal? Best Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Jan 2010, at 01:21, Nick Prince wrote: Hi Brent Perhaps Bruno could give some clarification here. Just prior to his conclusion on the sane paper I quoted from was this: So if we keep comp at this stage, we are forced to relate the inner experience only to the type of computation involved. The reason is that only those types are univocally related to all their possible counterfactuals. This entails that, from a first person point of view, not only the physical cannot be distinguished from the virtual, but the virtual can no more be distinguished from the arithmetical. Now DU is emulated platonistically by the verifiable propositions of arithmetic. They are equivalent to sentences of the form ‘‘it exists n such that P(n)’’ with P(n) decidable. Their truth entails their provability, and they are known under the name of Sigma1 sentence. If comp is correct, the appearance of physics must be recovered from some point of views emerging from those propositions. Indeed, taking into account the seven steps once more, we arrive at the conclusion that the physical atomic (in the Boolean logician sense) invariant proposition must be given by a probability measure on those propositions. A physical certainty must be true in all maximal extensions, true in at least one maximal extension (we will see later why the second condition does not follow from the first) and accessible by the UD, that is arithmetically verifiable. Figure 8 illustrates our main conclusion, where the number 1 is put for the so called Sigma1 sentences of arithmetic. It sounds as if Bruno thinks that the computations of the UD invoke our inner experiences and also our understanding of physics. Both come from arithmetical platonicism ( because thats what the UD is all about). So the pictures in the film are stiched together by the arithmetical (computation necessity) rather than the laws of of physics... Hmm not what I thought and said earlier!! So according to Bruno the laws of physics come from something intrinsic in the computation? Not quite sure how. I just can't figure out any more at the moment and hope Bruno will give me a hint here. But the quote you give is the conclusion of step 7 and 8. Except that I use a bit the vocabulary which will help to understand the interview of the Löbian machine. Normally at step seven you understand that COMP + concrete UD = I am already in UD* and the physical laws have to result from a sum on my first person (hopefully plural) indeterminacy in UD*. (step 1 -6 + 7) Then step 8, MGA, shows (is supposed to show) that COMP makes any concrete running of the UD irrelevant. (but the MGA thread in this list is better, I may send a new version of MGA). MGA = Movie Graph Argument. This is not *just* because UD* is represented, remarkably enough, in the elementary consequences of addition and multiplication, but mainly because, by MGA, comp together with the physical supervenience thesis makes it necessary to confuse a computation and a description of a computation. I think you need to carefully explicate your teminology here. Logicians and mathematicians tend to use description like model to mean exactly the opposite of what engineers and physicists mean by the terms. The physicists thinks of the physical computer running as the computation and the program as a description of what it is (supposed to be) doing. But I don't think that's what you mean. Brent The computation has to consist in the logical relations, not in this or that implementation, (which, btw, can only be a reduction to a particular universal machine). Do you see that COMP + concrete UD leads to an Everett-DeWitt shock? We am multiplied by 10^100+ at each instant. COMP leads, naively, to Aleph_zero + multiplication, or even 2^aleph_zero (in a sense)? Then MGA is the next and last difficulty. (before the machine interview, if interested). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Hi Bruno OK so there is a good deal of the technical stuff that I've got to catch up on yet before I can interpret what you are saying (although I think I can understand why the everettian imperative based on comp + UDA is there). However if I could for the moment get an intuitive understanding of what you mean by a consistent extension then perhaps that would help with what Brent brought up. From what I gather you are saying our next observer moment is based not on the laws of physics but on what possibilities the UD brings up in UD*. As an analogy, in conways game of life, the next screen output display (=OM for the little inhabitants) depends on the rules put into the cellular automata (I know this only accounts for a single little universe here and there would be an infinity of universal numbers for the real universe etc, but lets try to keep it simple for the sake of clarity). So in this game any (little) laws of physics (regularities in the game) are emergent and would become evident to a conscious entity that arose in the game. So here is a case where physics (regularities in the little world) arise from a program. Is there any simple way this analogy or example can be adapted to demonstrate how the consistent extensions we experience come about. Does it have something to do with the prescription of the UD. If not then how does my existence pick its next consistent extension. It's all to do with what makes extensions consistent. If it's not physics then it must be something and is there a simple analogy that can help me to grasp it? I find I can always work out the technicalities better if I have a road map or analogy to help. Best wishes Nick On Jan 6, 5:12 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Jan 2010, at 01:21, Nick Prince wrote: Hi Brent Perhaps Bruno could give some clarification here. Just prior to his conclusion on the sane paper I quoted from was this: So if we keep comp at this stage, we are forced to relate the inner experience only to the type of computation involved. The reason is that only those types are univocally related to all their possible counterfactuals. This entails that, from a first person point of view, not only the physical cannot be distinguished from the virtual, but the virtual can no more be distinguished from the arithmetical. Now DU is emulated platonistically by the verifiable propositions of arithmetic. They are equivalent to sentences of the form ‘‘it exists n such that P(n)’’ with P(n) decidable. Their truth entails their provability, and they are known under the name of Sigma1 sentence. If comp is correct, the appearance of physics must be recovered from some point of views emerging from those propositions. Indeed, taking into account the seven steps once more, we arrive at the conclusion that the physical atomic (in the Boolean logician sense) invariant proposition must be given by a probability measure on those propositions. A physical certainty must be true in all maximal extensions, true in at least one maximal extension (we will see later why the second condition does not follow from the first) and accessible by the UD, that is arithmetically verifiable. Figure 8 illustrates our main conclusion, where the number 1 is put for the so called Sigma1 sentences of arithmetic. It sounds as if Bruno thinks that the computations of the UD invoke our inner experiences and also our understanding of physics. Both come from arithmetical platonicism ( because thats what the UD is all about). So the pictures in the film are stiched together by the arithmetical (computation necessity) rather than the laws of of physics... Hmm not what I thought and said earlier!! So according to Bruno the laws of physics come from something intrinsic in the computation? Not quite sure how. I just can't figure out any more at the moment and hope Bruno will give me a hint here. But the quote you give is the conclusion of step 7 and 8. Except that I use a bit the vocabulary which will help to understand the interview of the Löbian machine. Normally at step seven you understand that COMP + concrete UD = I am already in UD* and the physical laws have to result from a sum on my first person (hopefully plural) indeterminacy in UD*. (step 1 -6 + 7) Then step 8, MGA, shows (is supposed to show) that COMP makes any concrete running of the UD irrelevant. (but the MGA thread in this list is better, I may send a new version of MGA). MGA = Movie Graph Argument. This is not *just* because UD* is represented, remarkably enough, in the elementary consequences of addition and multiplication, but mainly because, by MGA, comp together with the physical supervenience thesis makes it necessary to confuse a computation and a description of a computation. The computation has to consist in the logical relations, not in this or that
Re: UDA query
2010/1/5 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk:
Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow
like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from
the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always
there. I can understand this because all the spatio temporal
relationships for the actors in the film remain normal i.e obey the
laws of physics. Deutsch argues similarly in the Fabric of reality.
In my work I often come across the idea of a foliation of
hypersurfaces which is really a set of 3D pictures stuck together and
stacked in the direction of the time coordinate of the world at a
given instant of time. In MW interpretation though I guess that the
stacking is less certain as in the block universe idea but that's
another issue. Is this analogy similar to how you feel the obvious
experience of time being normal?
(I'm afraid the idea of a foliation of hypersurfaces is wasted on me
as an explanatory aid!)
It's like a reel of film in which the characters are conscious. For an
outside observer rearranging the frames out of sequence and playing
the film would be totally confusing, but for the characters in the
film it would make no difference. because the ordering is implicit in
the information contained in each frame.
Consider a set of three one minute intervals of experience, {S1, S2,
S3}, which belong to a person S. S2 remembers S1 and remembers no gap
or intervening experiences between S2 and S1; S3 remembers S1 and S2
and remembers that S1 preceded S2; and S3 also remembers no gap or
intervening experiences between S2 and S1 or between S3 and S2. In
other words, they are subjectively three consecutive minutes in the
life of S. S is aware that his experiences are generated on a
computer, and he is also aware that they are being generated in one of
two ways: in sequence as S1, S2, S3 or out of sequence as S2, S1, S3.
Does S have any basis for deciding that it is more likely that his
experiences are being generated in sequence?
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: UDA query
2010/1/5 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
2010/1/5 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk:
Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow
like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from
the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always
there. I can understand this because all the spatio temporal
relationships for the actors in the film remain normal i.e obey the
laws of physics. Deutsch argues similarly in the Fabric of reality.
In my work I often come across the idea of a foliation of
hypersurfaces which is really a set of 3D pictures stuck together and
stacked in the direction of the time coordinate of the world at a
given instant of time. In MW interpretation though I guess that the
stacking is less certain as in the block universe idea but that's
another issue. Is this analogy similar to how you feel the obvious
experience of time being normal?
(I'm afraid the idea of a foliation of hypersurfaces is wasted on me
as an explanatory aid!)
It's like a reel of film in which the characters are conscious. For an
outside observer rearranging the frames out of sequence and playing
the film would be totally confusing, but for the characters in the
film it would make no difference. because the ordering is implicit in
the information contained in each frame.
Consider a set of three one minute intervals of experience, {S1, S2,
S3}, which belong to a person S. S2 remembers S1 and remembers no gap
or intervening experiences between S2 and S1; S3 remembers S1 and S2
and remembers that S1 preceded S2; and S3 also remembers no gap or
intervening experiences between S2 and S1 or between S3 and S2. In
other words, they are subjectively three consecutive minutes in the
life of S. S is aware that his experiences are generated on a
computer, and he is also aware that they are being generated in one of
two ways: in sequence as S1, S2, S3 or out of sequence as S2, S1, S3.
Does S have any basis for deciding that it is more likely that his
experiences are being generated in sequence?
It seems to me that it depends if the computation is iterative or not... in
other words, to compute step N you must have computed step N-1 before that.
If you can directly compute step N without computing prior step, S2/S1/S3 is
possible. If not you had necessarily computed step S1 before S2, only by
doing a replay of a previously done computation you could do it :
- first generate S1/S2/S3 in order and save each intermediate result, then
you can do
- S2 (taking the previously intermediate result of S1), S1 then S3 (taking
S2 result).
But running the same thing more times add a priori nothing. If the process
is iterative then in order computation win the measure battle (because any
out of order one require a genuine in order computation before).
Regards,
Quentin
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Re: UDA query
2010/1/5 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com:
Consider a set of three one minute intervals of experience, {S1, S2,
S3}, which belong to a person S. S2 remembers S1 and remembers no gap
or intervening experiences between S2 and S1; S3 remembers S1 and S2
and remembers that S1 preceded S2; and S3 also remembers no gap or
intervening experiences between S2 and S1 or between S3 and S2. In
other words, they are subjectively three consecutive minutes in the
life of S. S is aware that his experiences are generated on a
computer, and he is also aware that they are being generated in one of
two ways: in sequence as S1, S2, S3 or out of sequence as S2, S1, S3.
Does S have any basis for deciding that it is more likely that his
experiences are being generated in sequence?
It seems to me that it depends if the computation is iterative or not... in
other words, to compute step N you must have computed step N-1 before that.
If you can directly compute step N without computing prior step, S2/S1/S3 is
possible. If not you had necessarily computed step S1 before S2, only by
doing a replay of a previously done computation you could do it :
- first generate S1/S2/S3 in order and save each intermediate result, then
you can do
- S2 (taking the previously intermediate result of S1), S1 then S3 (taking
S2 result).
But running the same thing more times add a priori nothing. If the process
is iterative then in order computation win the measure battle (because any
out of order one require a genuine in order computation before).
Another way to compute S2 without using S1 would be to run the UD.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: UDA query
Le mercredi 06 janvier 2010 à 00:29 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
2010/1/5 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com:
Consider a set of three one minute intervals of experience, {S1, S2,
S3}, which belong to a person S. S2 remembers S1 and remembers no gap
or intervening experiences between S2 and S1; S3 remembers S1 and S2
and remembers that S1 preceded S2; and S3 also remembers no gap or
intervening experiences between S2 and S1 or between S3 and S2. In
other words, they are subjectively three consecutive minutes in the
life of S. S is aware that his experiences are generated on a
computer, and he is also aware that they are being generated in one of
two ways: in sequence as S1, S2, S3 or out of sequence as S2, S1, S3.
Does S have any basis for deciding that it is more likely that his
experiences are being generated in sequence?
It seems to me that it depends if the computation is iterative or not... in
other words, to compute step N you must have computed step N-1 before that.
If you can directly compute step N without computing prior step, S2/S1/S3 is
possible. If not you had necessarily computed step S1 before S2, only by
doing a replay of a previously done computation you could do it :
- first generate S1/S2/S3 in order and save each intermediate result, then
you can do
- S2 (taking the previously intermediate result of S1), S1 then S3 (taking
S2 result).
But running the same thing more times add a priori nothing. If the process
is iterative then in order computation win the measure battle (because any
out of order one require a genuine in order computation before).
Another way to compute S2 without using S1 would be to run the UD.
Yes but the UD will generate infinitely more often the in order S1/S2/S3
than out of order... with what you are saying I don't even understand
what is a computation if not a rules ordered sequential state order.
Quentin
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Re: UDA query
2010/1/6 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com: It seems to me that it depends if the computation is iterative or not... in other words, to compute step N you must have computed step N-1 before that. If you can directly compute step N without computing prior step, S2/S1/S3 is possible. If not you had necessarily computed step S1 before S2, only by doing a replay of a previously done computation you could do it : - first generate S1/S2/S3 in order and save each intermediate result, then you can do - S2 (taking the previously intermediate result of S1), S1 then S3 (taking S2 result). But running the same thing more times add a priori nothing. If the process is iterative then in order computation win the measure battle (because any out of order one require a genuine in order computation before). Another way to compute S2 without using S1 would be to run the UD. Yes but the UD will generate infinitely more often the in order S1/S2/S3 than out of order... with what you are saying I don't even understand what is a computation if not a rules ordered sequential state order. A UD running on an actual computer for a finite time *could* generate S2 before S1. There is nothing in the experience of S to indicate which was generated first, even though if he had to guess with no other information he is more likely to be right if he guesses he is being generated sequentially. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Thank you Stathis, That does make sense to me.
On Jan 5, 12:22 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
2010/1/5 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk:
Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow
like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from
the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always
there. I can understand this because all the spatio temporal
relationships for the actors in the film remain normal i.e obey the
laws of physics. Deutsch argues similarly in the Fabric of reality.
In my work I often come across the idea of a foliation of
hypersurfaces which is really a set of 3D pictures stuck together and
stacked in the direction of the time coordinate of the world at a
given instant of time. In MW interpretation though I guess that the
stacking is less certain as in the block universe idea but that's
another issue. Is this analogy similar to how you feel the obvious
experience of time being normal?
(I'm afraid the idea of a foliation of hypersurfaces is wasted on me
as an explanatory aid!)
It's like a reel of film in which the characters are conscious. For an
outside observer rearranging the frames out of sequence and playing
the film would be totally confusing, but for the characters in the
film it would make no difference. because the ordering is implicit in
the information contained in each frame.
Consider a set of three one minute intervals of experience, {S1, S2,
S3}, which belong to a person S. S2 remembers S1 and remembers no gap
or intervening experiences between S2 and S1; S3 remembers S1 and S2
and remembers that S1 preceded S2; and S3 also remembers no gap or
intervening experiences between S2 and S1 or between S3 and S2. In
other words, they are subjectively three consecutive minutes in the
life of S. S is aware that his experiences are generated on a
computer, and he is also aware that they are being generated in one of
two ways: in sequence as S1, S2, S3 or out of sequence as S2, S1, S3.
Does S have any basis for deciding that it is more likely that his
experiences are being generated in sequence?
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Re: UDA query
As I understand it the UD generates all possible programs and as it generates each one it runs one step of it before generating the next. Does that not mean that eventually it will generate the program which is generating what we understand to be some observer moments for us at this particular time. This is where I was thinking of the foliation bit - each hypersurface is a snapshot in time of the universe as experienced by me. This being said would that not mean they would necessarily be in order or are you thinking that some other program. could generate by chance a perfectly good observer moment that was out of sync? Best Nick On Jan 5, 2:09 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: 2010/1/6 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com: It seems to me that it depends if the computation is iterative or not... in other words, to compute step N you must have computed step N-1 before that. If you can directly compute step N without computing prior step, S2/S1/S3 is possible. If not you had necessarily computed step S1 before S2, only by doing a replay of a previously done computation you could do it : - first generate S1/S2/S3 in order and save each intermediate result, then you can do - S2 (taking the previously intermediate result of S1), S1 then S3 (taking S2 result). But running the same thing more times add a priori nothing. If the process is iterative then in order computation win the measure battle (because any out of order one require a genuine in order computation before). Another way to compute S2 without using S1 would be to run the UD. Yes but the UD will generate infinitely more often the in order S1/S2/S3 than out of order... with what you are saying I don't even understand what is a computation if not a rules ordered sequential state order. A UD running on an actual computer for a finite time *could* generate S2 before S1. There is nothing in the experience of S to indicate which was generated first, even though if he had to guess with no other information he is more likely to be right if he guesses he is being generated sequentially. -- Stathis Papaioannou- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
On 05 Jan 2010, at 15:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/6 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com: It seems to me that it depends if the computation is iterative or not... in other words, to compute step N you must have computed step N-1 before that. If you can directly compute step N without computing prior step, S2/S1/S3 is possible. If not you had necessarily computed step S1 before S2, only by doing a replay of a previously done computation you could do it : - first generate S1/S2/S3 in order and save each intermediate result, then you can do - S2 (taking the previously intermediate result of S1), S1 then S3 (taking S2 result). But running the same thing more times add a priori nothing. If the process is iterative then in order computation win the measure battle (because any out of order one require a genuine in order computation before). Another way to compute S2 without using S1 would be to run the UD. Yes but the UD will generate infinitely more often the in order S1/ S2/S3 than out of order... with what you are saying I don't even understand what is a computation if not a rules ordered sequential state order. A UD running on an actual computer for a finite time *could* generate S2 before S1. The UD will generate all the computations going through S1 and S2. From the first point of view, if S1 correspond to a possible comp state of mind, the next probable states depends on the infinitely many computations going through S1. There is nothing in the experience of S to indicate which was generated first, even though if he had to guess with no other information he is more likely to be right if he guesses he is being generated sequentially. Note that universal computation can be made reversible. Quantum computer are reversible, up to the measurement, which is an internal event (in the MWI) happening. A priori, the average UD will be non reversible, and most computations evolves in more and more complex type of events (like a zoom on the Mandelbrot set: it is not just self- similar, it is more and more locally complex). If the sequence S1 S2 S3 belongs to a computation, it means there is a universal number U such that U compute S1 into S2 and then S3. Automatically the UD will generate later (in the UD time) another universal number W which will compute U: (U S1) = (U S2) = (U S3), (this is a different, probably longer computation, generating again the computation S1, S2, S3) and then another universal J, etc. So if the order S1, S2, S3 has some logic, it will reoccurs an infinite of times in deeper and deeper computations, some leading to rare object (object having a necessary long computations), that may explain some cosmic aspect. The UD will also generate infinitely many description of S1, S2, and S3, in many order, but without relating them to logical histories (computations). This is due to the fact that the UD dovetails also on the bigger and bigger inputs, using bigger and bigger part of oracles (real numbers), which may describe computations. But such description of computations are NOT computations. They are not linked through a universal machine. If you take arbitrary sequence of state S1, S2, S3, S4, ..., you will have 2^aleph_zero sequences. The computations are (third person) enumerable, because defined by universal number, which are enumerable. So, of course, we have to choose an initial universal machine. It defines the base of the phi_i. The UDA shows that ANY choice will do. In particular we can chose elementary arithmetic, or the combinators, or the universal wave function. But choosing the universal wave function is a bad choice if we want to progress on the mind-body (consciousness/reality) problem, given that comp makes the physics defined by a measure on all computations, it is preferable to verify this from elementary arithmetic, or the combinators, than the universal wave function (where this is trivial), so that we can test the comp physics and better understand the comp hypothesis. The logic of self-reference makes then possible to distinguish the quanta (physical communication) and the qualia (physical sensations). It does not give explicitly the measure on the computational histories, but it gives the logics obeyed by the measure one, from each person points of view (hypostases). (That's auda). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le mercredi 06 janvier 2010 à 00:29 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
2010/1/5 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com:
Consider a set of three one minute intervals of experience, {S1, S2,
S3}, which belong to a person S. S2 remembers S1 and remembers no gap
or intervening experiences between S2 and S1; S3 remembers S1 and S2
and remembers that S1 preceded S2; and S3 also remembers no gap or
intervening experiences between S2 and S1 or between S3 and S2. In
other words, they are subjectively three consecutive minutes in the
life of S. S is aware that his experiences are generated on a
computer, and he is also aware that they are being generated in one of
two ways: in sequence as S1, S2, S3 or out of sequence as S2, S1, S3.
Does S have any basis for deciding that it is more likely that his
experiences are being generated in sequence?
It seems to me that it depends if the computation is iterative or not... in
other words, to compute step N you must have computed step N-1 before that.
If you can directly compute step N without computing prior step, S2/S1/S3 is
possible. If not you had necessarily computed step S1 before S2, only by
doing a replay of a previously done computation you could do it :
- first generate S1/S2/S3 in order and save each intermediate result, then
you can do
- S2 (taking the previously intermediate result of S1), S1 then S3 (taking
S2 result).
But running the same thing more times add a priori nothing. If the process
is iterative then in order computation win the measure battle (because any
out of order one require a genuine in order computation before).
Another way to compute S2 without using S1 would be to run the UD.
Yes but the UD will generate infinitely more often the in order S1/S2/S3
than out of order... with what you are saying I don't even understand
what is a computation if not a rules ordered sequential state order.
Quentin
It seems strange that we start with the hypothesis that consciousness is
a kind of computation - a sequential processing of information - and
then arrive at picture in which there is no processing and sequence is
just inferred. On the one hand consciousness is a process, on the other
hand it is static state. I suspect there is something wrong with the
slicing of the stream of consciousness into zero-duration,
non-overlapping states. I can see that states can encode information
that, when coarse grained, define a sequence of increasing entropy, but
is it legitimate to identify having the information in memory with
remembering?
Brent
Brent
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Re: UDA query
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/4 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I think you give an excellent explication of the problem, Stathis. However, one thing about it that still worries me is the role of time. You say the mapping need not be consistent even moment to moment, and yet the mapping is a timeless Platonic object. To be a timeless object the the moments need some timeless representation. In Bruno's theory time arises from the computational sequence. But in the mapping, time is just a relation of similarity (closest continuation) of states. So three states which when ordered by closest continuation are XYZ may have been computed in the order XZY. So I find myself seeing the hardwareless computer as a reductio against consciousness=computation thesis and support for Peter's view that ur-stuff and contingency are fundamental. It always seemed to me obvious that I would experience time normally if the computations or other physical processes generating my stream of consciousness were chopped up and played out of sequence, backwards, simultaneously or whatever. It could be happening right now: I have no way to know if the seconds of my life are running sequentially or all in parallel during a single second of real time. The two problems that many seem to have with this idea is a feeling that there needs to be some sort of mechanism for singling out the time slice that is the now, and a feeling that the time slices lack a causal glue to connect them together. But maybe I'm missing something, because these objections never seemed to me to be problems. I can understand that view, but in that case why consider them computations? Why not just suppose all states of your consciousness (and even other parts of the world) exist. If they can be glued together by inherent features or simply experienced without even an implicit order, then computation seems irrelevant. Of course that leaves the apparent lawfulness of physics even further from possible explanation than the UD theory. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Nick Prince wrote: Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always there. I can understand this because all the spatio temporal relationships for the actors in the film remain normal i.e obey the laws of physics. But there's the rub. Why the laws of physics? That's what somehow needs to be explained. Is there something about the UD that necessarily generates law like sequences of states with high probability? Doesn't it generate just those laws we seem to find - that would be a great discovery. Or does it generate all possible non-self-contradictory multiverses - in which case nothing has been explained. Deutsch argues similarly in the Fabric of reality. In my work I often come across the idea of a foliation of hypersurfaces which is really a set of 3D pictures stuck together and stacked in the direction of the time coordinate of the world at a given instant of time. But that's starting with the physics given, so the hypersurfaces and their relation is already defined. Brent In MW interpretation though I guess that the stacking is less certain as in the block universe idea but that's another issue. Is this analogy similar to how you feel the obvious experience of time being normal? Best Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
On Jan 5, 6:59 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Nick Prince wrote: Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always there. I can understand this because all the spatio temporal relationships for the actors in the film remain normal i.e obey the laws of physics. But there's the rub. Why the laws of physics? That's what somehow needs to be explained. Is there something about the UD that necessarily generates law like sequences of states with high probability? Doesn't it generate just those laws we seem to find - that would be a great discovery. Or does it generate all possible non-self-contradictory multiverses - in which case nothing has been explained. Deutsch argues similarly in the Fabric of reality. In my work I often come across the idea of a foliation of hypersurfaces which is really a set of 3D pictures stuck together and stacked in the direction of the time coordinate of the world at a given instant of time. But that's starting with the physics given, so the hypersurfaces and their relation is already defined. Brent In MW interpretation though I guess that the stacking is less certain as in the block universe idea but that's another issue. Is this analogy similar to how you feel the obvious experience of time being normal? Best Nick- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
OOps sorry I sent an empty post by accident. I agree with you here. But I am new to this field so I am uncertain about so many things. However, I don't understand why it is that a UD would know how to generate these law like sequences of states. It may well generate all possible programs that generate all possible universes (with different values for the physical constants say - maybe even different laws) but I wonder why our conciousness defines itself by selecting only those consistent extension among all the states available that obey a certain set of laws of physics. I thought that a TOE should explain the laws of physics and Bruno states in his SANE paper Conclusion: Physics is given by a measure on the consistent computational histories, or maximal consistent extensions as seen from some first person point of view. Laws of physics, in particular, should be inferable from the true verifiable ‘‘atomic sentences’’. Those are the verifiable arithmetical sentences. They should be true everywhere (= in all comp histories), true somewhere (= true in at least one comp history), and inferred from the DU-accessible ‘‘atomic’’ states. It feels a bit lie a chicken and egg situation - do we pick out the laws or do they pick us?. But I am still working my way through this and and loads of other stuff, so I don't understand it yet. Best Nick On Jan 5, 6:59 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Nick Prince wrote: Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always there. I can understand this because all the spatio temporal relationships for the actors in the film remain normal i.e obey the laws of physics. But there's the rub. Why the laws of physics? That's what somehow needs to be explained. Is there something about the UD that necessarily generates law like sequences of states with high probability? Doesn't it generate just those laws we seem to find - that would be a great discovery. Or does it generate all possible non-self-contradictory multiverses - in which case nothing has been explained. Deutsch argues similarly in the Fabric of reality. In my work I often come across the idea of a foliation of hypersurfaces which is really a set of 3D pictures stuck together and stacked in the direction of the time coordinate of the world at a given instant of time. But that's starting with the physics given, so the hypersurfaces and their relation is already defined. Brent In MW interpretation though I guess that the stacking is less certain as in the block universe idea but that's another issue. Is this analogy similar to how you feel the obvious experience of time being normal? Best Nick- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Nick Prince wrote: OOps sorry I sent an empty post by accident. I agree with you here. But I am new to this field so I am uncertain about so many things. However, I don't understand why it is that a UD would know how to generate these law like sequences of states. It may well generate all possible programs that generate all possible universes (with different values for the physical constants say - maybe even different laws) but I wonder why our conciousness defines itself by selecting only those consistent extension among all the states available that obey a certain set of laws of physics. I thought that a TOE should explain the laws of physics and Bruno states in his SANE paper Conclusion: Physics is given by a measure on the consistent computational histories, or maximal consistent extensions as seen from some first person point of view. But consistent in what sense? We can't say consistent with the laws of physics because that's what we're trying to explain. Laws of physics, in particular, should be inferable from the true verifiable ‘‘atomic sentences’’. Those are the verifiable arithmetical sentences. I understand true arithmetical sentences, but I'm not sure what 'verifiable' means? Does it mean computable, or provable? What's an atomic sentence? Is it just a finite statement, like 17 is prime; so it excludes infinite statements like Goldbach's conjecture? Brent They should be true everywhere (= in all comp histories), true somewhere (= true in at least one comp history), and inferred from the DU-accessible ‘‘atomic’’ states. It feels a bit lie a chicken and egg situation - do we pick out the laws or do they pick us?. But I am still working my way through this and and loads of other stuff, so I don't understand it yet. Best Nick On Jan 5, 6:59 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Nick Prince wrote: Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always there. I can understand this because all the spatio temporal relationships for the actors in the film remain normal i.e obey the laws of physics. But there's the rub. Why the laws of physics? That's what somehow needs to be explained. Is there something about the UD that necessarily generates law like sequences of states with high probability? Doesn't it generate just those laws we seem to find - that would be a great discovery. Or does it generate all possible non-self-contradictory multiverses - in which case nothing has been explained. Deutsch argues similarly in the Fabric of reality. In my work I often come across the idea of a foliation of hypersurfaces which is really a set of 3D pictures stuck together and stacked in the direction of the time coordinate of the world at a given instant of time. But that's starting with the physics given, so the hypersurfaces and their relation is already defined. Brent In MW interpretation though I guess that the stacking is less certain as in the block universe idea but that's another issue. Is this analogy similar to how you feel the obvious experience of time being normal? Best Nick- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Nick Prince wrote: Hi Brent Perhaps Bruno could give some clarification here. Just prior to his conclusion on the sane paper I quoted from was this: "So if we keep comp at this stage, we are forced to relate the inner experience only to the type of computation involved. The reason is that only those types are univocally related to all their possible counterfactuals. This entails that, from a first person point of view, not only the physical cannot be distinguished from the virtual, but the virtual can no more be distinguished from the arithmetical. Now DU is emulated platonistically by the verifiable propositions of arithmetic. They are equivalent to sentences of the form ‘‘it exists n such that P(n)’’ with P(n) decidable. Their truth entails their provability, and they are known under the name of Sigma1 sentence. If comp is correct, the appearance of physics must be recovered from some point of views emerging from those propositions. Why only the atomic sentences? Why not all true sentences? How is "appearance" recovered? Indeed, taking into account the seven steps once more, we arrive at the conclusion that the physical atomic (in the Boolean logician sense) invariant proposition must be given by a probability measure on those propositions. But what gives the probability measure? Is it just the relative frequency of occurrence of the atomic sentences in the UD output up to a given step? Brent A physical certainty must be true in all maximal extensions, true in at least one maximal extension (we will see later why the second condition does not follow from the first) and accessible by the UD, that is arithmetically verifiable. Figure 8 illustrates our main conclusion, where the number 1 is put for the so called Sigma1 sentences of arithmetic." It sounds as if Bruno thinks that the computations of the UD invoke our inner experiences and also our understanding of physics. Both come from arithmetical platonicism ( because thats what the UD is all about). So the pictures in the "film" are stiched together by the arithmetical (computation necessity) rather than the laws of of physics... Hmm not what I thought and said earlier!! So according to Bruno the laws of physics come from something intrinsic in the computation? Not quite sure how. I just can't figure out any more at the moment and hope Bruno will give me a hint here. Enjoying the dialogue! Nick On Jan 5, 10:44 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Nick Prince wrote: OOps sorry I sent an empty post by accident. I agree with you here. But I am new to this field so I am uncertain about so many things. However, I don't understand why it is that a UD would know how to generate these law like sequences of states. It may well generate all possible programs that generate all possible universes (with different values for the physical constants say - maybe even different laws) but I wonder why our conciousness defines itself by "selecting" only those "consistent" extension among all the states available that obey a certain set of laws of physics. I thought that a TOE should explain the laws of physics and Bruno states in his SANE paper " Conclusion: Physics is given by a measure on the consistent computational histories, or maximal consistent extensions as seen from some first person point of view. But consistent in what sense? We can't say "consistent with the laws of physics" because that's what we're trying to explain. Laws of physics, in particular, should be inferable from the true verifiable atomic sentences . Those are the verifiable arithmetical sentences. I understand true arithmetical sentences, but I'm not sure what 'verifiable' means? Does it mean computable, or provable? What's an atomic sentence? Is it just a finite statement, like "17 is prime"; so it excludes infinite statements like Goldbach's conjecture? Brent They should be true everywhere (= in all comp histories), true somewhere (= true in at least one comp history), and inferred from the DU-accessible atomic states". It feels a bit lie a chicken and egg situation - do we pick out the laws or do they pick us?. But I am still working my way through this and and loads of other stuff, so I don't understand it yet. Best Nick On Jan 5, 6:59 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Nick Prince wrote: Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always there. I can understand this because all the spatio temporal relationships for the actors in the film remain "normal" i.e
Re: UDA query
On 02 Jan 2010, at 17:06, Nick Prince wrote: HI Bruno Thank you so much for your answers to my queries so far. I really need to do some more thinking about all that you have said so far and to understand why I am having difficulty replacing a real physical universal machine existing in the future (like Tipler suggests) or a great programmer existing now (like schmidhuber suggests) with your arithmetical realism. I also need to search some previous posts to make use of past discussion topics that are relevant. Perhaps my background makes me a physicalist who can currently accept a milder form of comp. However, I want to explore your position because I think it makes sense in so far as I think it is less vulnerable to the threat of infinite regressions like in Schmidhuber’s great programmer (or even the greater programmer that programmed him). Your version of computationalism would still be valid if either or both of the two options above were true. Herein lies its appeal to me (both fundamental and universal). My point is that we have no choice in the matter (no pun). Mechanism and materialism are just epistemologically incompatible. Primitive Matter appears to be a mythic product. What Schmidhuber and Tegmark are still a bit naive about is the mind body problem. They does not take the persons view into account, and their explanation of physics relies still on some identity thesis, which are shown not capable of working when we assume comp (mainly by the movie graph argument). I would like to read up on logic and computation as you suggest. I have read about all the books you recommend . However, can you suggest topic areas within these texts which I can focus on to help me get up to speed with the problems I have regarding arithmetical realism with the UDA? I am still not sure to understand what is your difficulty. Arithmetical realism is the belief that the truth of elementary arithmetic does not depend of my consciousness. The fact that all positive integers can be written as the sum of four squares (Lagranges theorem) is true independently of Diophantes and Lagranges (who find and prove the result), even if the big bang did not occur. All mathematicians are arithmetical realists, except a very small (ultrafinitist) minority. There is much that could perhaps be left out on a first reading and to my untrained eyes, it’s difficult to know what to omit (for example what would godels arithmetisation technique come under? (Googling it brings not much up). Sorry but I haven’t ordered any books yet so I can’t look into them. Is there an English translation of your Ph.D. thesis yet? Sorry but I can’t do French. My thanks and best wishes. I feel guilty not writing a long english text, nor submitting papers, but there are some personal reasons for that. Up to now, I realize that physicist have no understanding of logic at all, and logicians have no interest neither in physics, and still less in the philosophy of mind. It is hard to find the right way to introduce all this. The subject is transdiciplinary, and touches very hot (taboo) notions, also. I got all this in the sixties/seventies, and at that time the work has been considered too much simple and obvious (!). I have been mislead. Now I know it is not simple, and that for a physicist, the very introductory part of logic is just impenetrable. I have assisted to many deaf-dialog between logicians and physicists. Big mathematicians like Penrose have shown that it is easy to be rigorous yet wrong on Gödel's theorem, and now many just don't dare to study the subject. But the few who have take the time to really study the work have understood it, and that is why eventually I have defended it as a thesis in computer science in France. In Belgium the thesis has been rejected by literary philosophers who confuse materialism with marxism, and it is just a sort of blasphemy for them to even harbor the shadow of a doubt toward materialism. Of course my PhD thesis says just nothing about marxism, nor any thing political. It is just logic applied to ontological questions at the intersection of physics and cognitive science. But literary continental philosopher have a very long tradition of disliking the scientific attitude in their field. They feel like to be invaded by science, and, be them atheist or christians, they know such kind of attitude could make ridiculous the kind of crap they are teaching, and they would lose power (and they actually defend the idea that scientific truth does not exist, and that all is a question of political power, and they offer me a demonstration of this). At least most Christians are aware of this, and can react in a scientific way, unlike most atheists philosophers who have become more dogmatic than the pope on Aristotelian theology. Freedom of thought just don't exist in some country. Humans loves
Re: UDA query
On 03 Jan 2010, at 14:55, Nick Prince wrote:
Thank you Stathis
This has helped move me on a bit. “The hardwareless computer” has been
giving me some real problems. Let me replay my understanding of what
you said back just to check it is on the right lines.
As a possible example of one of these “lurking computations” we could
consider the one which begins with no-thing and think of the null set
as made of it phi ={ } and then associating it with the number 0. Then
imagine the set { phi} associating it with 1, then{ phi,{phi }}
associating this with 2, then { phi, { phi} , { ,{phi }} },
associating it with 3 etc. Hence we get an infinite sequence of
abstract (platonic) entities which can conjure up (compute) the
natural numbers and the implied successor function simply from the
abstract (platonic) notion of a set and an association rule (also a
platonic relation). More and more structure can be built up until - as
you say - the entire structure of the computation contained in the
mapping can be envisioned. Now although no external observers might be
able to access these computations, the computations might just create
conscious observers – bootstrapped into existence by the special class
of computations which these (internal) observers (if they believed in
comp) would naturally consider as non trivial. As you say the entire
structure of the mapping which describes the computation is a platonic
object too – hence the world comes from nothing and computation.
Have I got this roughly right? I would be grateful for any critical
comments from you, Bruno (or anyone).
Many thanks
Nick
On Jan 3, 11:05 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
2010/1/3 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk:
HI Bruno
Thank you so much for your answers to my queries so far. I really
need to do some more thinking about all that you have said so far
and
to understand why I am having difficulty replacing a real physical
universal machine existing in the future (like Tipler suggests) or a
great programmer existing now (like schmidhuber suggests) with your
arithmetical realism. I also need to search some previous posts to
make use of past discussion topics that are relevant. Perhaps my
background makes me a physicalist who can currently accept a milder
form of comp. However, I want to explore your position because I
think it makes sense in so far as I think it is less vulnerable to
the
threat of infinite regressions like in Schmidhuber’s great
programmer
(or even the greater programmer that programmed him). Your
version of
computationalism would still be valid if either or both of the two
options above were true. Herein lies its appeal to me (both
fundamental and universal).
I would like to read up on logic and computation as you suggest. I
have read about all the books you recommend . However, can you
suggest
topic areas within these texts which I can focus on to help me
get up
to speed with the problems I have regarding arithmetical realism
with
the UDA? There is much that could perhaps be left out on a first
reading and to my untrained eyes, it’s difficult to know what to
omit
(for example what would godels arithmetisation technique come under?
(Googling it brings not much up). Sorry but I haven’t ordered any
books yet so I can’t look into them.
Is there an English translation of your Ph.D. thesis yet? Sorry
but I
can’t do French. My thanks and best wishes.
My justification for the hardwareless computer is the fact that any
computation can be mapped onto any physical process, in the same way
that any English sentence can be mapped onto any string of symbols.
Such a post hoc mapping would be useless to an observer trying to
extract meaning from the symbols or the result of a calculation from
the computer, since he would have to figure out the mapping himself
and he would have to know the answer he wants before doing this. With
the right key Bruno's PhD thesis contains an account of next week's
news, but so what? If you look at it the right way the dust swept up
by a storm is implementing a Turing machine calculating the digits of
pi, but what good does that do anyone? The claim that codes and
computations lurk hidden all around us could be taken as true but
trivial, or perhaps defined away as untrue on account of its
triviality. However, there is a special class of computations to
consider: computations that give rise to conscious observers in
virtual universes that do not interact with the environment at the
level of the substrate of implementation. If such computations are
possible (i.e. if comp is true) then it doesn't matter that no
external observers have access to the mapping that would allow them
to
recognise them, for these computations create their own observers,
bootstrapping themselves into non-triviality. The physical process
sustaining the computation need not even be as complex in
Re: UDA query
Thanks Bruno. I'll look this up and also I want to scan through your seven steps series for November. The later posts in these I think will help me make contact with the concepts.I want to be able to understand your Sane paper - especially the later parts. Is there any english translation of your thesis still underway as it says in the pages part of the list? On Jan 4, 1:15 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Nick, Oops, soory. I sent an empty answer. Actually I agree with all you say here, so an empty comment was a good comment! I think all this becomes simpler once you grasp that a computation, in the math sense, is a very well defined object. If a computation exists, it can be proved to exist in elementary arithmetic. And it exists there with a relative measure. This can not necessarily prove in arithmetic (but init can be proved for arithmetic in set theory). But here Stathis' intuition is correct, we don't have to prove in arithmetic the existence of the measure to be able to live it, and develop a first person perspective. An hardwareless computer is well defined mathematical notion. Conceptually, it is even difficult and not yet solved problem to define an hardware computer (despite its common use could give you the contrary feeling). Without the rize of quantum computation, I am not sure I would have ever believed in a notion of physical computation. Cf also, the Mallah implementation problem. Bruno On 03 Jan 2010, at 14:55, Nick Prince wrote: -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
2010/1/3 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk: HI Bruno Thank you so much for your answers to my queries so far. I really need to do some more thinking about all that you have said so far and to understand why I am having difficulty replacing a real physical universal machine existing in the future (like Tipler suggests) or a great programmer existing now (like schmidhuber suggests) with your arithmetical realism. I also need to search some previous posts to make use of past discussion topics that are relevant. Perhaps my background makes me a physicalist who can currently accept a milder form of comp. However, I want to explore your position because I think it makes sense in so far as I think it is less vulnerable to the threat of infinite regressions like in Schmidhuber’s great programmer (or even the greater programmer that programmed him). Your version of computationalism would still be valid if either or both of the two options above were true. Herein lies its appeal to me (both fundamental and universal). I would like to read up on logic and computation as you suggest. I have read about all the books you recommend . However, can you suggest topic areas within these texts which I can focus on to help me get up to speed with the problems I have regarding arithmetical realism with the UDA? There is much that could perhaps be left out on a first reading and to my untrained eyes, it’s difficult to know what to omit (for example what would godels arithmetisation technique come under? (Googling it brings not much up). Sorry but I haven’t ordered any books yet so I can’t look into them. Is there an English translation of your Ph.D. thesis yet? Sorry but I can’t do French. My thanks and best wishes. My justification for the hardwareless computer is the fact that any computation can be mapped onto any physical process, in the same way that any English sentence can be mapped onto any string of symbols. Such a post hoc mapping would be useless to an observer trying to extract meaning from the symbols or the result of a calculation from the computer, since he would have to figure out the mapping himself and he would have to know the answer he wants before doing this. With the right key Bruno's PhD thesis contains an account of next week's news, but so what? If you look at it the right way the dust swept up by a storm is implementing a Turing machine calculating the digits of pi, but what good does that do anyone? The claim that codes and computations lurk hidden all around us could be taken as true but trivial, or perhaps defined away as untrue on account of its triviality. However, there is a special class of computations to consider: computations that give rise to conscious observers in virtual universes that do not interact with the environment at the level of the substrate of implementation. If such computations are possible (i.e. if comp is true) then it doesn't matter that no external observers have access to the mapping that would allow them to recognise them, for these computations create their own observers, bootstrapping themselves into non-triviality. The physical process sustaining the computation need not even be as complex in structure as the computation: the computation could be mapped for example onto a repetitive process, the idle passage of time, even a single instant of time implementing the parts of the computation in parallel. And if we get that far, it's obvious that the physical process does nothing, and we may as well map the computation onto the null set. It is obvious that the entire structure of the computation is contained in the mapping, and the mapping is a platonic object, not dependent on being written down or even understood in the mind of an external observer. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Thank you Stathis
This has helped move me on a bit. “The hardwareless computer” has been
giving me some real problems. Let me replay my understanding of what
you said back just to check it is on the right lines.
As a possible example of one of these “lurking computations” we could
consider the one which begins with no-thing and think of the null set
as made of it phi ={ } and then associating it with the number 0. Then
imagine the set { phi} associating it with 1, then{ phi,{phi }}
associating this with 2, then { phi, { phi} , { ,{phi }} },
associating it with 3 etc. Hence we get an infinite sequence of
abstract (platonic) entities which can conjure up (compute) the
natural numbers and the implied successor function simply from the
abstract (platonic) notion of a set and an association rule (also a
platonic relation). More and more structure can be built up until - as
you say - the entire structure of the computation contained in the
mapping can be envisioned. Now although no external observers might be
able to access these computations, the computations might just create
conscious observers – bootstrapped into existence by the special class
of computations which these (internal) observers (if they believed in
comp) would naturally consider as non trivial. As you say the entire
structure of the mapping which describes the computation is a platonic
object too – hence the world comes from nothing and computation.
Have I got this roughly right? I would be grateful for any critical
comments from you, Bruno (or anyone).
Many thanks
Nick
On Jan 3, 11:05 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
2010/1/3 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk:
HI Bruno
Thank you so much for your answers to my queries so far. I really
need to do some more thinking about all that you have said so far and
to understand why I am having difficulty replacing a real physical
universal machine existing in the future (like Tipler suggests) or a
great programmer existing now (like schmidhuber suggests) with your
arithmetical realism. I also need to search some previous posts to
make use of past discussion topics that are relevant. Perhaps my
background makes me a physicalist who can currently accept a milder
form of comp. However, I want to explore your position because I
think it makes sense in so far as I think it is less vulnerable to the
threat of infinite regressions like in Schmidhuber’s great programmer
(or even the greater programmer that programmed him). Your version of
computationalism would still be valid if either or both of the two
options above were true. Herein lies its appeal to me (both
fundamental and universal).
I would like to read up on logic and computation as you suggest. I
have read about all the books you recommend . However, can you suggest
topic areas within these texts which I can focus on to help me get up
to speed with the problems I have regarding arithmetical realism with
the UDA? There is much that could perhaps be left out on a first
reading and to my untrained eyes, it’s difficult to know what to omit
(for example what would godels arithmetisation technique come under?
(Googling it brings not much up). Sorry but I haven’t ordered any
books yet so I can’t look into them.
Is there an English translation of your Ph.D. thesis yet? Sorry but I
can’t do French. My thanks and best wishes.
My justification for the hardwareless computer is the fact that any
computation can be mapped onto any physical process, in the same way
that any English sentence can be mapped onto any string of symbols.
Such a post hoc mapping would be useless to an observer trying to
extract meaning from the symbols or the result of a calculation from
the computer, since he would have to figure out the mapping himself
and he would have to know the answer he wants before doing this. With
the right key Bruno's PhD thesis contains an account of next week's
news, but so what? If you look at it the right way the dust swept up
by a storm is implementing a Turing machine calculating the digits of
pi, but what good does that do anyone? The claim that codes and
computations lurk hidden all around us could be taken as true but
trivial, or perhaps defined away as untrue on account of its
triviality. However, there is a special class of computations to
consider: computations that give rise to conscious observers in
virtual universes that do not interact with the environment at the
level of the substrate of implementation. If such computations are
possible (i.e. if comp is true) then it doesn't matter that no
external observers have access to the mapping that would allow them to
recognise them, for these computations create their own observers,
bootstrapping themselves into non-triviality. The physical process
sustaining the computation need not even be as complex in structure
as the computation: the computation could be mapped for example onto a
Re: UDA query
2010/1/4 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk:
Thank you Stathis
This has helped move me on a bit. “The hardwareless computer” has been
giving me some real problems. Let me replay my understanding of what
you said back just to check it is on the right lines.
As a possible example of one of these “lurking computations” we could
consider the one which begins with no-thing and think of the null set
as made of it phi ={ } and then associating it with the number 0. Then
imagine the set { phi} associating it with 1, then { phi,{phi }}
associating this with 2, then { phi, { phi} , { ,{phi }} },
associating it with 3 etc. Hence we get an infinite sequence of
abstract (platonic) entities which can conjure up (compute) the
natural numbers and the implied successor function simply from the
abstract (platonic) notion of a set and an association rule (also a
platonic relation). More and more structure can be built up until - as
you say - the entire structure of the computation contained in the
mapping can be envisioned. Now although no external observers might be
able to access these computations, the computations might just create
conscious observers – bootstrapped into existence by the special class
of computations which these (internal) observers (if they believed in
comp) would naturally consider as non trivial. As you say the entire
structure of the mapping which describes the computation is a platonic
object too – hence the world comes from nothing and computation.
Have I got this roughly right? I would be grateful for any critical
comments from you, Bruno (or anyone).
Yes, but a critic could still say that no conscious observer could be
conjured up by a computation unless the computation is physically
implemented. At least at first glance that seems to be the case: the
brain is required for consciousness, since if the brain is destroyed
consciousness is destroyed. And if the mind is generated by a computer
program, it would be normal to think that if the computer is
destroyed, so is the mind, although the program in Platonia remains
unaffected even if the entire universe blows up. These are the common
sense objections. So the question is, is physical implementation
necessary for consciousness, and what does it actually mean to
physically implement a program?
Suppose we agree that it is necessary to physically implement a
program in order to get the consciousness. Physical implementation
then involves, essentially, causing a machine to go through a sequence
of causally connected configurations such that the configurations and
the state transition rules match up with the abstract program. There
is a mapping from the abstract program to the machine so that the
engineer, programmer and end user know what's going on. But write 1
and then move the head to the left could be represented in an
infinite number of ways. If a man walks down the street chewing gum,
that could represent write 1 then move the head to the left, while
if he stood still humming Jingle Bells that would have represented
write 0 then move the head to the right. Moreover the mapping does
not have to be consistent from moment to moment: chewing gum could
mean 0 on Fridays and 1 on other days. There is no reason why a
computer could not be designed to function in such an inconsistent
way, other than the practical necessity of keeping track of what's
going on, which is necessary if the computer is to be of any use to
anyone. But if we don't care about its usefulness to an outside
observer we could say that any abstract computation maps to any
physical process: a random physical process, a repetitive physical
process, or a single physical state. The man walking down the street
chewing gum over the course of a second could be seen as representing
the one thousand steps of a Turing machine adding two numbers
together, although of course it wouldn't be of any use to anyone
interested in the result of the calculation. You can see no doubt that
if you accept the argument so far the physical process is irrelevant,
and all of the computation, such as it is, consists in the abstract
machine and the mapping, which are timeless platonic objects. Arguable
the mapping is also irrelevant, since there are an infinite number of
possible mappings for an infinite number of possible physical
processes. The only thing that seems to make a difference is the
abstract machine or program itself. The program runs necessarily,
even in the absence of a physical universe, and it only need run on
physical hardware in order to interact with the environment at the
level of the hardware (and of course, this hardware may itself be part
of the virtual world generated in Platonia).
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
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Re: UDA query
Stathis wrote
Yes, but a critic could still say that no conscious observer could be
conjured up by a computation unless the computation is physically
implemented. At least at first glance that seems to be the case: the
brain is required for consciousness, since if the brain is destroyed
consciousness is destroyed. And if the mind is generated by a computer
program, it would be normal to think that if the computer is
destroyed, so is the mind, although the program in Platonia remains
unaffected even if the entire universe blows up. These are the common
sense objections. So the question is, is physical implementation
necessary for consciousness, and what does it actually mean to
physically implement a program?
From what I surmised and what Bruno wrote earlier in the discussion, I
thought that consciousness might supervene over all computations that
were essentially equivalent (whatever that might mean— i.e. some sort
of equivalence class?). Anyway, this would imply that if the brain
was destroyed, then consciousness would simply be continued on by the
rest of the (competing) and remaining equivalent computations.
These would presumably be consistent extensions of the consciousness
in other worlds (MW interpretation) or in a platonic UD.
SP
(and of course, this hardware may itself be part
of the virtual world generated in Platonia).
I thought that this would be a consequence of comp since the
probability of consciousness staying in any “concrete” universe would
seem to be essentially zero. see below from earlier in the discussion:
NP In other words every observer
moment of his life (not just the one just before being blown up - but
any of them) could just as easily be followed by a suitable one in
the virtual UD rather than one in the initial run of the universe.
BM
Absolutely. Would a real *singular* concrete material universe exist,
the probability to stay in that universe is zero.
Brent
I think you give an excellent explication of the problem, Stathis.
However, one thing about it that still worries me is the role of time.
You say the mapping need not be consistent even moment to moment, and
yet the mapping is a timeless Platonic object. To be a timeless
object the the moments need some timeless representation. In Bruno's
theory time arises from the computational sequence. But in the
mapping, time is just a relation of similarity (closest continuation)
of states. So three states which when ordered by closest continuation
are XYZ may have been computed in the order XZY. So I find myself
seeing the hardwareless computer as a reductio against
consciousness=computation thesis and support for Peter's view that ur-
stuff and contingency are fundamental.
The time bit confuses me too but if the UD is recursive (as I thought
it would have to be) and a successor function was implicit in the
algorithm then the timeless algorithm would give a perception of time
to the internal observers that Stathis spoke of earlier generated by
the computation.
However I am still not convinced about this myself and get this
feeling that there is a dynamic element missing from the static or
timeless representations which I am assuming to be existent in the
platonic realm
Nick
On Jan 3, 6:57 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:2010/1/4 Nick Princem...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk:Thank
you Stathis This has helped move me on a bit. The hardwareless computer has
been giving me some real problems. Let me replay my understanding of what you
said back just to check it is on the right lines. As a possible example of
one of these lurking computations we could consider the one which begins with
no-thing and think of the null set as made of it phi ={ } and then
associating it with the number 0. Then imagine the set { phi} associating it
with 1, then { phi,{phi }} associating this with 2, then { phi, { phi} , {
,{phi }} }, associating it with 3 etc. Hence we get an infinite sequence of
abstract (platonic) entities which can conjure up (compute) the natural
numbers and the implied successor function simply from the abstract
(platonic) notion of a set and an association rule (also a platonic
relation). More and more structure can be built up until - as you say - the
entire structure of the computation contained in the mapping can be
envisioned. Now although no external observers might be able to access these
computations, the computations might just create conscious observers
bootstrapped into existence by the special class of computations which these
(internal) observers (if they believed in comp) would naturally consider as
non trivial. As you say the entire structure of the mapping which describes
the computation is a platonic object too hence the world comes from nothing
and computation. Have I got this roughly right? I would be grateful for any
critical comments from you, Bruno (or anyone).Yes, but a critic could still
say that no conscious observer
Re: UDA query
Hi Folks,
I would like to append a question that we all seem to circle around: Why
do we even need to have a physical existance at all? Why isn't Platonic
existence sufficient?
Onward!
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk
To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, January 03, 2010 4:30 PM
Subject: Re: UDA query
Stathis wrote
Yes, but a critic could still say that no conscious observer could be
conjured up by a computation unless the computation is physically
implemented. At least at first glance that seems to be the case: the
brain is required for consciousness, since if the brain is destroyed
consciousness is destroyed. And if the mind is generated by a computer
program, it would be normal to think that if the computer is
destroyed, so is the mind, although the program in Platonia remains
unaffected even if the entire universe blows up. These are the common
sense objections. So the question is, is physical implementation
necessary for consciousness, and what does it actually mean to
physically implement a program?
From what I surmised and what Bruno wrote earlier in the discussion, I
thought that consciousness might supervene over all computations that
were essentially equivalent (whatever that might mean— i.e. some sort
of equivalence class?). Anyway, this would imply that if the brain
was destroyed, then consciousness would simply be continued on by the
rest of the (competing) and remaining equivalent computations.
These would presumably be consistent extensions of the consciousness
in other worlds (MW interpretation) or in a platonic UD.
SP
(and of course, this hardware may itself be part
of the virtual world generated in Platonia).
I thought that this would be a consequence of comp since the
probability of consciousness staying in any “concrete” universe would
seem to be essentially zero. see below from earlier in the discussion:
NP In other words every observer
moment of his life (not just the one just before being blown up - but
any of them) could just as easily be followed by a suitable one in
the virtual UD rather than one in the initial run of the universe.
BM
Absolutely. Would a real *singular* concrete material universe exist,
the probability to stay in that universe is zero.
Brent
I think you give an excellent explication of the problem, Stathis.
However, one thing about it that still worries me is the role of time.
You say the mapping need not be consistent even moment to moment, and
yet the mapping is a timeless Platonic object. To be a timeless
object the the moments need some timeless representation. In Bruno's
theory time arises from the computational sequence. But in the
mapping, time is just a relation of similarity (closest continuation)
of states. So three states which when ordered by closest continuation
are XYZ may have been computed in the order XZY. So I find myself
seeing the hardwareless computer as a reductio against
consciousness=computation thesis and support for Peter's view that ur-
stuff and contingency are fundamental.
The time bit confuses me too but if the UD is recursive (as I thought
it would have to be) and a successor function was implicit in the
algorithm then the timeless algorithm would give a perception of time
to the internal observers that Stathis spoke of earlier generated by
the computation.
However I am still not convinced about this myself and get this
feeling that there is a dynamic element missing from the static or
timeless representations which I am assuming to be existent in the
platonic realm
Nick
On Jan 3, 6:57 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:2010/1/4 Nick Princem...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk:Thank
you Stathis This has helped move me on a bit. The hardwareless computer
has been giving me some real problems. Let me replay my understanding of
what you said back just to check it is on the right lines. As a possible
example of one of these lurking computations we could consider the one
which begins with no-thing and think of the null set as made of it phi
={ } and then associating it with the number 0. Then imagine the set {
phi} associating it with 1, then { phi,{phi }} associating this with 2,
then { phi, { phi} , { ,{phi }} }, associating it with 3 etc. Hence we get
an infinite sequence of abstract (platonic) entities which can conjure up
(compute) the natural numbers and the implied successor function simply
from the abstract (platonic) notion of a set and an association rule (also
a platonic relation). More and more structure can be built up until - as
you say - the entire structure of the computation contained in the mapping
can be envisioned. Now although no external observers might be able to
access these computations, the computations might just create conscious
observers bootstrapped into existence by the special class of computations
which these (internal) observers
Re: UDA query
We're not circling around it. Bruno asserts it. But then we need to
explain the things that were formerly explained by physical existence -
e.g. intersubjective agreement about a physical world, the dependence
of thought on brains, etc.
Brent
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Hi Folks,
I would like to append a question that we all seem to circle around: Why
do we even need to have a physical existance at all? Why isn't Platonic
existence sufficient?
Onward!
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: "Nick Prince" m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk
To: "Everything List" everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, January 03, 2010 4:30 PM
Subject: Re: UDA query
Stathis wrote
Yes, but a critic could still say that no conscious observer could be
conjured up by a computation unless the computation is physically
implemented. At least at first glance that seems to be the case: the
brain is required for consciousness, since if the brain is destroyed
consciousness is destroyed. And if the mind is generated by a computer
program, it would be normal to think that if the computer is
destroyed, so is the mind, although the program in Platonia remains
unaffected even if the entire universe blows up. These are the common
sense objections. So the question is, is physical implementation
necessary for consciousness, and what does it actually mean to
physically implement a program?
From what I surmised and what Bruno wrote earlier in the discussion, I
thought that consciousness might supervene over all computations that
were essentially equivalent (whatever that might mean— i.e. some sort
of equivalence class?). Anyway, this would imply that if the brain
was destroyed, then consciousness would simply be continued on by the
rest of the (competing) and remaining equivalent computations.
These would presumably be consistent extensions of the consciousness
in other worlds (MW interpretation) or in a platonic UD.
SP
(and of course, this hardware may itself be part
of the virtual world generated in Platonia).
I thought that this would be a consequence of comp since the
probability of consciousness staying in any “concrete” universe would
seem to be essentially zero. see below from earlier in the discussion:
NP In other words every observer
moment of his life (not just the one just before being blown up - but
any of them) could just as easily be followed by a suitable one in
the virtual UD rather than one in the initial run of the universe.
BM
Absolutely. Would a real *singular* concrete material universe exist,
the probability to stay in that universe is zero.
Brent
I think you give an excellent explication of the problem, Stathis.
However, one thing about it that still worries me is the role of time.
You say the mapping need not be consistent even moment to moment, and
yet the mapping is a timeless Platonic object. To be a timeless
object the the moments need some timeless representation. In Bruno's
theory time arises from the computational sequence. But in the
mapping, time is just a relation of similarity (closest continuation)
of states. So three states which when ordered by closest continuation
are XYZ may have been computed in the order XZY. So I find myself
seeing the hardwareless computer as a reductio against
consciousness=computation thesis and support for Peter's view that ur-
stuff and contingency are fundamental.
The time bit confuses me too but if the UD is recursive (as I thought
it would have to be) and a successor function was implicit in the
algorithm then the timeless algorithm would give a perception of time
to the internal observers that Stathis spoke of earlier generated by
the computation.
However I am still not convinced about this myself and get this
feeling that there is a dynamic element missing from the static or
timeless representations which I am assuming to be existent in the
platonic realm
Nick
On Jan 3, 6:57 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:2010/1/4 Nick Princem...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk:Thank
you Stathis This has helped move me on a bit. The hardwareless computer
has been giving me some real problems. Let me replay my understanding of
what you said back just to check it is on the right lines. As a possible
example of one of these lurking computations we could consider the one
which begins with no-thing and think of the null set as made of it phi
={ } and then associating it with the number 0. Then imagine the set {
phi} associating it with 1, then { phi,{phi }} associating this with 2,
then { phi, { phi} , { ,{phi }} }, associating it with 3 etc. Hence we get
an infinite sequence of abstract (platonic) entities which can conjure up
(compute) the natural numbers and the implied successor function simply
from the abstract (plato
Re: UDA query
HI Bruno Thank you so much for your answers to my queries so far. I really need to do some more thinking about all that you have said so far and to understand why I am having difficulty replacing a real physical universal machine existing in the future (like Tipler suggests) or a great programmer existing now (like schmidhuber suggests) with your arithmetical realism. I also need to search some previous posts to make use of past discussion topics that are relevant. Perhaps my background makes me a physicalist who can currently accept a milder form of comp. However, I want to explore your position because I think it makes sense in so far as I think it is less vulnerable to the threat of infinite regressions like in Schmidhuber’s great programmer (or even the greater programmer that programmed him). Your version of computationalism would still be valid if either or both of the two options above were true. Herein lies its appeal to me (both fundamental and universal). I would like to read up on logic and computation as you suggest. I have read about all the books you recommend . However, can you suggest topic areas within these texts which I can focus on to help me get up to speed with the problems I have regarding arithmetical realism with the UDA? There is much that could perhaps be left out on a first reading and to my untrained eyes, it’s difficult to know what to omit (for example what would godels arithmetisation technique come under? (Googling it brings not much up). Sorry but I haven’t ordered any books yet so I can’t look into them. Is there an English translation of your Ph.D. thesis yet? Sorry but I can’t do French. My thanks and best wishes. Nick On Dec 31 2009, 6:10 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 Dec 2009, at 17:51, Nick Prince wrote: Hi Bruno If the UD was a concrete one like you ran then it would start to generate all programs and execute them all by one step etc. But are you saying that because the UD exists platonically all these programs and each of their steps exist also and hence, by the existence of a successor law they have an implicit time order? Yes. The UD exist, and is even representable by a number. UD*, the complete running of the UD does not exist in that sense, because it is an infinite object, and such object does not exist in simple arithmetical theories. But all finite parts of the UD* exist, and this will be enough for first person being able to glue the computations. For example, you could, for theoretical purpose, represent all the running of the UD by a specific total computable function. For example by the function F which on n gives the (number representing the) nth first steps of the UD*. Then you can use the theorem which asserts that all total computable functions are representable in Robinson Arithmetic (a tiny fragment of Pean Arithmetic). That theorems is proved in detail, for Robinson-ile arithmetic, in Boolos and Jeffrey, or in Epstein and Carnielli. In Mendelson book it is done directly in Peano Arithmetic. It is because our 3-we, our bodies, or our bodies descriptions, are constructed within these steps. But our first person are not, and no finite pieces of the UD can give the real experience. This is a consequence of the first six steps: our next personal experience is determined by the whole actual infinity of all the infinitely many computations arrive at our current state. (+ step 8, where we abandon explicitly the physical supervenience thesis for the computational one). This “glueing” idea reminds me of David Deutsch’s attempt to explain how time is an illusion in “The Fabric of Reality”. I never have got this one! I can follow your argument but it seems to put a very special status on the ist person experience. You say that our “3-person”/ bodily descriptions are contained as subprograms in the (infinite) programs which collectively provide Observer Moments for them. OK. I rephrase for myself. If you meant things differently, just tell me. By comp assumption, I survive if some machine goes through a computation, that is, a sequence of computational states related by some universal machine: s0, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, ... The bodily description are, strictly speaking defined by the doctor choice of level of my description. They are third person sharable, you can send them by mail attachment, in principle (a lot of giga!). But the computation itself is defined by the logical relation between those steps, and by digitality those steps, and their sequencing (made by a universal machine) are definable in arithmetic, and the existence of the steps, the states, the finite piece of computations, and (in a slightly different sense for technical reason) the infinite computations are all described completely in the elementary relations between number (or between combinators, or whatever is
Re: UDA query
Bruno: yes that is unfortunately true. Ronald On Dec 30, 10:25 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 Dec 2009, at 03:29, ronaldheld wrote: Bruno: Is there a UD that is implemented in Fortran? I don't know. If you know Fortran, it should be a relatively easy task to implement one. Note that you have still the choice between a fortran program dovetailing on all computations by combinators, or on all computations by LISP programs, or on all proofs of Sigma_1 complete arithmetical sentences, or on all running of game of life patterns, etc. Of you can write a Fortran program executing all Fortran programs. All this will be equivalent. All UD executes all UDs, and this an infinity of times. Good exercise. A bit tedious though. Bruno On Dec 29, 4:55 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Dec 2009, at 21:24, Nick Prince wrote: Well, it is better to assume just the axiom of, say, Robinson arithmetic. You assume 0, the successors, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. You assume some laws, like s(x) = s(y) - x = y, 0 ≠ s(x), the laws of addition, and multiplication. Then the existence of the universal machine and the UD follows as consequences. Ok so the UD exists (platonically?) Yes. The UD exists, and its existence can be proved in or by very weak (not yet Löbian) arithmetical theories, like Robinson Arithmetic. The UD exists like the number 733 exists. The proof of its existence is even constructive, so it exists even for an intuitionist (non platonist). No need of the excluded middle principle. Better not to conceive them as living in some place. where and when are not arithmetical predicate. The UD exists like PI or the square root of 2. (Assuming CT of course, to pretend the U in the UD is really universal, with respect to computability). Fine so the UD has an objective existence in spite of whatever else exists. It exists in the sense that we can prove it to exist once we accept the statement that 0 is different from all successor (0 ≠ s(x) for all x), etc. If you accept high school elementary arithmetic, then the UD exists in the same sense that prime numbers exists. exist is used in sense of first order logic. This leads to the usual philosophical problems in math, no new one, and the UDA reasoning does not depend on the alternative way to solve those philsophical problem, unless you propose a ultra-finitist solution (which I exclude in comp by arithmetical realism). There is a time order. The most basic one, after the successor law, is the computational steps of a Universal Dovetailer. Then you have a (different) time order for each individual computations generated by the UD, like phi_24 (7)^1, phi_24 (7)^2, phi_24 (7)^3, phi_24 (7)^4, ... where phi_i (j)^s denotes the sth steps of the computation (by the UD) of the ith programs on input j. If the UD was a concrete one like you ran then it would start to generate all programs and execute them all by one step etc. But are you saying that because the UD exists platonically all these programs and each of their steps exist also and hence, by the existence of a successor law they have an implicit time order? Yes. The UD exist, and is even representable by a number. UD*, the complete running of the UD does not exist in that sense, because it is an infinite object, and such object does not exist in simple arithmetical theories. But all finite parts of the UD* exist, and this will be enough for first person being able to glue the computations. For example, you could, for theoretical purpose, represent all the running of the UD by a specific total computable function. For example by the function F which on n gives the (number representing the) nth first steps of the UD*. Then you can use the theorem which asserts that all total computable functions are representable in Robinson Arithmetic (a tiny fragment of Pean Arithmetic). That theorems is proved in detail, for Robinson-ile arithmetic, in Boolos and Jeffrey, or in Epstein and Carnielli. In Mendelson book it is done directly in Peano Arithmetic. Then there will be the time generated by first person learning and which relies eventually on a statistical view on infinities of computations. Is this because we are essentially constructs within these steps? It is because our 3-we, our bodies, or our bodies descriptions, are constructed within these steps. But our first person are not, and no finite pieces of the UD can give the real experience. This is a consequence of the first six steps: our next personal experience is determined by the whole actual infinity of all the infinitely many computations arrive at our current state. (+ step 8, where we abandon explicitly the physical supervenience thesis for the computational one).
Re: UDA query
On 30 Dec 2009, at 17:51, Nick Prince wrote: Hi Bruno If the UD was a concrete one like you ran then it would start to generate all programs and execute them all by one step etc. But are you saying that because the UD exists platonically all these programs and each of their steps exist also and hence, by the existence of a successor law they have an implicit time order? Yes. The UD exist, and is even representable by a number. UD*, the complete running of the UD does not exist in that sense, because it is an infinite object, and such object does not exist in simple arithmetical theories. But all finite parts of the UD* exist, and this will be enough for first person being able to glue the computations. For example, you could, for theoretical purpose, represent all the running of the UD by a specific total computable function. For example by the function F which on n gives the (number representing the) nth first steps of the UD*. Then you can use the theorem which asserts that all total computable functions are representable in Robinson Arithmetic (a tiny fragment of Pean Arithmetic). That theorems is proved in detail, for Robinson-ile arithmetic, in Boolos and Jeffrey, or in Epstein and Carnielli. In Mendelson book it is done directly in Peano Arithmetic. It is because our 3-we, our bodies, or our bodies descriptions, are constructed within these steps. But our first person are not, and no finite pieces of the UD can give the real experience. This is a consequence of the first six steps: our next personal experience is determined by the whole actual infinity of all the infinitely many computations arrive at our current state. (+ step 8, where we abandon explicitly the physical supervenience thesis for the computational one). This “glueing” idea reminds me of David Deutsch’s attempt to explain how time is an illusion in “The Fabric of Reality”. I never have got this one! I can follow your argument but it seems to put a very special status on the ist person experience. You say that our “3-person”/ bodily descriptions are contained as subprograms in the (infinite) programs which collectively provide Observer Moments for them. OK. I rephrase for myself. If you meant things differently, just tell me. By comp assumption, I survive if some machine goes through a computation, that is, a sequence of computational states related by some universal machine: s0, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, ... The bodily description are, strictly speaking defined by the doctor choice of level of my description. They are third person sharable, you can send them by mail attachment, in principle (a lot of giga!). But the computation itself is defined by the logical relation between those steps, and by digitality those steps, and their sequencing (made by a universal machine) are definable in arithmetic, and the existence of the steps, the states, the finite piece of computations, and (in a slightly different sense for technical reason) the infinite computations are all described completely in the elementary relations between number (or between combinators, or whatever is your favorite universal inductive structure, say). I take the number because they are taught in school (I think). So, all the statements asserting that there are machines x accessing state i and (may be) 'outputing' j, are arithmetical true statement (when true), and actually, with Church thesis, they are theorems of any Sigma_1 complete theory. When true, they are true independently of you and me, and when they are proved in a theory, that fact is true independently of me and you. Theories and machines are mathematical object, and the fact that a theory or a machine proves a theorem is a mathematical truth. That is independent of you, me, but also of time and space. Up to this, we did not mention first person experiences. Just all machine's histories, described by numbers relations. The problem of the first person view of the machine, is that a machine cannot know which machines it is, nor which computations emulate it. He can bet for a continuum (with the rule Y = II, bifurcation of futur retrospect on the path). But I think you saying that our 1-person experience (frog view) is emergent from the collective (infinite) computations which are consistent with this emergent experience which is elaborated in your steps 1-7. It seems to make this ist person experience somewhat mystical as to why it is “experienced” at all. I think you are right. But here the amount of mysticism needed, is the amount needed to say yes to the doctor. The belief in the possibility (in principle) of technological reincarnation. And then, the math explain why this, which is our consciousness, has to seem completely mysterious at first sight. But that mystery is no more mysterious than our awakening in the morning. Consciousness is the most basic mystical state,
Re: UDA query
On 30 Dec 2009, at 03:29, ronaldheld wrote: Bruno: Is there a UD that is implemented in Fortran? I don't know. If you know Fortran, it should be a relatively easy task to implement one. Note that you have still the choice between a fortran program dovetailing on all computations by combinators, or on all computations by LISP programs, or on all proofs of Sigma_1 complete arithmetical sentences, or on all running of game of life patterns, etc. Of you can write a Fortran program executing all Fortran programs. All this will be equivalent. All UD executes all UDs, and this an infinity of times. Good exercise. A bit tedious though. Bruno On Dec 29, 4:55 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Dec 2009, at 21:24, Nick Prince wrote: Well, it is better to assume just the axiom of, say, Robinson arithmetic. You assume 0, the successors, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. You assume some laws, like s(x) = s(y) - x = y, 0 ≠ s(x), the laws of addition, and multiplication. Then the existence of the universal machine and the UD follows as consequences. Ok so the UD exists (platonically?) Yes. The UD exists, and its existence can be proved in or by very weak (not yet Löbian) arithmetical theories, like Robinson Arithmetic. The UD exists like the number 733 exists. The proof of its existence is even constructive, so it exists even for an intuitionist (non platonist). No need of the excluded middle principle. Better not to conceive them as living in some place. where and when are not arithmetical predicate. The UD exists like PI or the square root of 2. (Assuming CT of course, to pretend the U in the UD is really universal, with respect to computability). Fine so the UD has an objective existence in spite of whatever else exists. It exists in the sense that we can prove it to exist once we accept the statement that 0 is different from all successor (0 ≠ s(x) for all x), etc. If you accept high school elementary arithmetic, then the UD exists in the same sense that prime numbers exists. exist is used in sense of first order logic. This leads to the usual philosophical problems in math, no new one, and the UDA reasoning does not depend on the alternative way to solve those philsophical problem, unless you propose a ultra-finitist solution (which I exclude in comp by arithmetical realism). There is a time order. The most basic one, after the successor law, is the computational steps of a Universal Dovetailer. Then you have a (different) time order for each individual computations generated by the UD, like phi_24 (7)^1, phi_24 (7)^2, phi_24 (7)^3, phi_24 (7)^4, ... wherephi_i (j)^s denotes the sth steps of the computation (by the UD) of the ith programs on input j. If the UD was a concrete one like you ran then it would start to generate all programs and execute them all by one step etc. But are you saying that because the UD exists platonically all these programs and each of their steps exist also and hence, by the existence of a successor law they have an implicit time order? Yes. The UD exist, and is even representable by a number. UD*, the complete running of the UD does not exist in that sense, because it is an infinite object, and such object does not exist in simple arithmetical theories. But all finite parts of the UD* exist, and this will be enough for first person being able to glue the computations. For example, you could, for theoretical purpose, represent all the running of the UD by a specific total computable function. For example by the function F which on n gives the (number representing the) nth first steps of the UD*. Then you can use the theorem which asserts that all total computable functions are representable in Robinson Arithmetic (a tiny fragment of Pean Arithmetic). That theorems is proved in detail, for Robinson-ile arithmetic, in Boolos and Jeffrey, or in Epstein and Carnielli. In Mendelson book it is done directly in Peano Arithmetic. Then there will be the time generated by first person learning and which relies eventually on a statistical view on infinities of computations. Is this because we are essentially constructs within these steps? It is because our 3-we, our bodies, or our bodies descriptions, are constructed within these steps. But our first person are not, and no finite pieces of the UD can give the real experience. This is a consequence of the first six steps: our next personal experience is determined by the whole actual infinity of all the infinitely many computations arrive at our current state. (+ step 8, where we abandon explicitly the physical supervenience thesis for the computational one). Time is not difficult. It is right in the successor axioms of arithmetic. Here again you confirm the invocation of the successor axioms. Yes. It is fundamental. I cannot extract those from logic alone. No more than
Re: UDA query
On 28 Dec 2009, at 21:24, Nick Prince wrote: Well, it is better to assume just the axiom of, say, Robinson arithmetic. You assume 0, the successors, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. You assume some laws, like s(x) = s(y) - x = y, 0 ≠ s(x), the laws of addition, and multiplication. Then the existence of the universal machine and the UD follows as consequences. Ok so the UD exists (platonically?) Yes. The UD exists, and its existence can be proved in or by very weak (not yet Löbian) arithmetical theories, like Robinson Arithmetic. The UD exists like the number 733 exists. The proof of its existence is even constructive, so it exists even for an intuitionist (non platonist). No need of the excluded middle principle. Better not to conceive them as living in some place. where and when are not arithmetical predicate. The UD exists like PI or the square root of 2. (Assuming CT of course, to pretend the U in the UD is really universal, with respect to computability). Fine so the UD has an objective existence in spite of whatever else exists. It exists in the sense that we can prove it to exist once we accept the statement that 0 is different from all successor (0 ≠ s(x) for all x), etc. If you accept high school elementary arithmetic, then the UD exists in the same sense that prime numbers exists. exist is used in sense of first order logic. This leads to the usual philosophical problems in math, no new one, and the UDA reasoning does not depend on the alternative way to solve those philsophical problem, unless you propose a ultra-finitist solution (which I exclude in comp by arithmetical realism). There is a time order. The most basic one, after the successor law, is the computational steps of a Universal Dovetailer. Then you have a (different) time order for each individual computations generated by the UD, like phi_24 (7)^1, phi_24 (7)^2, phi_24 (7)^3, phi_24 (7)^4, ... wherephi_i (j)^s denotes the sth steps of the computation (by the UD) of the ith programs on input j. If the UD was a concrete one like you ran then it would start to generate all programs and execute them all by one step etc. But are you saying that because the UD exists platonically all these programs and each of their steps exist also and hence, by the existence of a successor law they have an implicit time order? Yes. The UD exist, and is even representable by a number. UD*, the complete running of the UD does not exist in that sense, because it is an infinite object, and such object does not exist in simple arithmetical theories. But all finite parts of the UD* exist, and this will be enough for first person being able to glue the computations. For example, you could, for theoretical purpose, represent all the running of the UD by a specific total computable function. For example by the function F which on n gives the (number representing the) nth first steps of the UD*. Then you can use the theorem which asserts that all total computable functions are representable in Robinson Arithmetic (a tiny fragment of Pean Arithmetic). That theorems is proved in detail, for Robinson-ile arithmetic, in Boolos and Jeffrey, or in Epstein and Carnielli. In Mendelson book it is done directly in Peano Arithmetic. Then there will be the time generated by first person learning and which relies eventually on a statistical view on infinities of computations. Is this because we are essentially constructs within these steps? It is because our 3-we, our bodies, or our bodies descriptions, are constructed within these steps. But our first person are not, and no finite pieces of the UD can give the real experience. This is a consequence of the first six steps: our next personal experience is determined by the whole actual infinity of all the infinitely many computations arrive at our current state. (+ step 8, where we abandon explicitly the physical supervenience thesis for the computational one). Time is not difficult. It is right in the successor axioms of arithmetic. Here again you confirm the invocation of the successor axioms. Yes. It is fundamental. I cannot extract those from logic alone. No more than I can define addition or multiplication without using the successor terms s(-) : for all x x + 0 = x for all x and yx + s(y) = s(x + y) You have to understand that all the talk on the phi_i and w_i, including the existence of universal number (EuAxAy phi_u(x,y) = phi_x(y)) can be translated in pure first order arithmetic, using only s, + and *. I could add some nuances. To be prime is an intrinsic property of a number. To be a universal number is not intrinsic. To define a universal number I have to arithmetize the theory. The theory uses variables x, y, z, ..., so I will have to represent to be a variable in the theory. The theory understands only numbers. I can decide to represent the variables by even numbers
Re: UDA query
Bruno: Is there a UD that is implemented in Fortran? Ronald On Dec 29, 4:55 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Dec 2009, at 21:24, Nick Prince wrote: Well, it is better to assume just the axiom of, say, Robinson arithmetic. You assume 0, the successors, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. You assume some laws, like s(x) = s(y) - x = y, 0 ≠ s(x), the laws of addition, and multiplication. Then the existence of the universal machine and the UD follows as consequences. Ok so the UD exists (platonically?) Yes. The UD exists, and its existence can be proved in or by very weak (not yet Löbian) arithmetical theories, like Robinson Arithmetic. The UD exists like the number 733 exists. The proof of its existence is even constructive, so it exists even for an intuitionist (non platonist). No need of the excluded middle principle. Better not to conceive them as living in some place. where and when are not arithmetical predicate. The UD exists like PI or the square root of 2. (Assuming CT of course, to pretend the U in the UD is really universal, with respect to computability). Fine so the UD has an objective existence in spite of whatever else exists. It exists in the sense that we can prove it to exist once we accept the statement that 0 is different from all successor (0 ≠ s(x) for all x), etc. If you accept high school elementary arithmetic, then the UD exists in the same sense that prime numbers exists. exist is used in sense of first order logic. This leads to the usual philosophical problems in math, no new one, and the UDA reasoning does not depend on the alternative way to solve those philsophical problem, unless you propose a ultra-finitist solution (which I exclude in comp by arithmetical realism). There is a time order. The most basic one, after the successor law, is the computational steps of a Universal Dovetailer. Then you have a (different) time order for each individual computations generated by the UD, like phi_24 (7)^1, phi_24 (7)^2, phi_24 (7)^3, phi_24 (7)^4, ... where phi_i (j)^s denotes the sth steps of the computation (by the UD) of the ith programs on input j. If the UD was a concrete one like you ran then it would start to generate all programs and execute them all by one step etc. But are you saying that because the UD exists platonically all these programs and each of their steps exist also and hence, by the existence of a successor law they have an implicit time order? Yes. The UD exist, and is even representable by a number. UD*, the complete running of the UD does not exist in that sense, because it is an infinite object, and such object does not exist in simple arithmetical theories. But all finite parts of the UD* exist, and this will be enough for first person being able to glue the computations. For example, you could, for theoretical purpose, represent all the running of the UD by a specific total computable function. For example by the function F which on n gives the (number representing the) nth first steps of the UD*. Then you can use the theorem which asserts that all total computable functions are representable in Robinson Arithmetic (a tiny fragment of Pean Arithmetic). That theorems is proved in detail, for Robinson-ile arithmetic, in Boolos and Jeffrey, or in Epstein and Carnielli. In Mendelson book it is done directly in Peano Arithmetic. Then there will be the time generated by first person learning and which relies eventually on a statistical view on infinities of computations. Is this because we are essentially constructs within these steps? It is because our 3-we, our bodies, or our bodies descriptions, are constructed within these steps. But our first person are not, and no finite pieces of the UD can give the real experience. This is a consequence of the first six steps: our next personal experience is determined by the whole actual infinity of all the infinitely many computations arrive at our current state. (+ step 8, where we abandon explicitly the physical supervenience thesis for the computational one). Time is not difficult. It is right in the successor axioms of arithmetic. Here again you confirm the invocation of the successor axioms. Yes. It is fundamental. I cannot extract those from logic alone. No more than I can define addition or multiplication without using the successor terms s(-) : for all x x + 0 = x for all x and y x + s(y) = s(x + y) You have to understand that all the talk on the phi_i and w_i, including the existence of universal number (EuAxAy phi_u(x,y) = phi_x(y)) can be translated in pure first order arithmetic, using only s, + and *. I could add some nuances. To be prime is an intrinsic property of a number. To be a universal number is not intrinsic. To define a universal number I
Re: UDA query
On 27 Dec 2009, at 18:13, Nick Prince wrote: Ok so I have come up with an argument to try and convince myself of step 8 but it still has some catches to it. If anyone sees that I am using incorrect thinking at any time please correct me. Misunderstanding means bad foundations. Up to step 7 all seems well and you begin step 8 by saying “but what if we don’t grant a concrete robust physical universe?” Some people have attempted to suggest the possibility of a Universe which is sufficiently robust. For example in Frank Tipler “The physics of Immortality “ he explains how the universe could be utilised to act as a computational engine in order to generate consistent extensions of sentient beings. His claims have been heavily criticised, but I do think he has made a brave and ingenious try at explaining how a reductionist approach along with a belief in strong AI can yield interesting speculations. If he had written his book in a more modest and understated manner his ideas would have been much better received. Incidentally, the fact that, because the universe has been shown to be expanding at an accelerating rate does not invalidate his theory because there is currently no clear understanding of the nature of dark energy – for example it may be a decaying scalar field ( we understand theoretically this type of mechanism because it is one of the best candidate mechanisms for understanding the (temporary) inflation in the early universe. If it is like this, then re-collapse might provide the physics necessary for high computational capability. But let’s suppose things are as you say and that the universe is not robust enough in any circumstances. Careful. If the universe contains a real UD, we don't need step 8 to conclude that physics is derivable from computer science. I don't assume that the universe is not robust enough, I was just considering that move as an objection to the UDA seventh first steps. The 8th step is an independent step showing that the physical supervenience thesis is incoherent with the mechanist assumption. I want to understand the assertion that platonic realism underpins my ist person reality. If I dispense with Schmidhuber’s great programmer (and his hardware) then rather than infinite regress, I assume there exists a platonic UD. Well, it is better to assume just the axiom of, say, Robinson arithmetic. You assume 0, the successors, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. You assume some laws, like s(x) = s(y) - x = y, 0 ≠ s(x), the laws of addition, and multiplication. Then the existence of the universal machine and the UD follows as consequences. I am not assuming more, with respect to math, than any mathematicians (on the contrary, given that the ontology is provided by a tiny part of arithmetic). Platonism or realism means here that we explicitly allow non constructive proof of existence, that is we allow the excluded-middle principle: we accept the idea that a closed arithmetical sentences is either true, or false. Now, since (I also assume) platonic reality is somehow timeless, You don't have to assume arithmetic is timeless! To do that you have to first assume there is a time, and then say that arithmetic is true at all the times. But arithmetical proposition, by definition or construction are not conceive as being time dependent, at the start. Theories of time will on the contrary depend on the assumption of some mathematical structures. then the UD algorithm must surely exist in this timeless “place”. Better not to conceive them as living in some place. where and when are not arithmetical predicate. The UD exists like PI or the square root of 2. (Assuming CT of course, to pretend the U in the UD is really universal, with respect to computability). I have implemented and run a UD in 1991, for about six days. I mean, a UD is a very concrete object. Here is the PDF of the code and example of executions (but it is badly commented): http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume4CC/4%20GEN%20%26%20DU.pdf Now it gets interesting. I have assumed the algorithm is there too just like I assume that a perfect scalene triangle is in a more general platonia. However this triangle is made of perfect line segments combined together to make it - and in turn the segments were made up of a sum of ideal points (lets not go into details about the reals and integers at this stage). Clearly though the triangle does not have to be fully represented in this reality if everything can be made of points. As long as an algorithm exists in the platonic realm which enables lines and combinations of them to be combined as triangles. But such an algorithm would be made up of numbers anyway and hence it’s all numbers. Indeed the numbers hardly need to be grouped in an list as we are familiar with seeing programs in because ordering is hardly important. Now I’ve almost convinced myself that
Re: UDA query
Well, it is better to assume just the axiom of, say, Robinson arithmetic. You assume 0, the successors, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. You assume some laws, like s(x) = s(y) - x = y, 0 ≠ s(x), the laws of addition, and multiplication. Then the existence of the universal machine and the UD follows as consequences. Ok so the UD exists (platonically?) Better not to conceive them as living in some place. where and when are not arithmetical predicate. The UD exists like PI or the square root of 2. (Assuming CT of course, to pretend the U in the UD is really universal, with respect to computability). Fine so the UD has an objective existence in spite of whatever else exists. There is a time order. The most basic one, after the successor law, is the computational steps of a Universal Dovetailer. Then you have a (different) time order for each individual computations generated by the UD, like phi_24 (7)^1, phi_24 (7)^2, phi_24 (7)^3, phi_24 (7)^4, ... wherephi_i (j)^s denotes the sth steps of the computation (by the UD) of the ith programs on input j. If the UD was a concrete one like you ran then it would start to generate all programs and execute them all by one step etc. But are you saying that because the UD exists platonically all these programs and each of their steps exist also and hence, by the existence of a successor law they have an implicit time order? Then there will be the time generated by first person learning and which relies eventually on a statistical view on infinities of computations. Is this because we are essentially constructs within these steps? Time is not difficult. It is right in the successor axioms of arithmetic. Here again you confirm the invocation of the successor axioms. Nick On Dec 28, 5:48 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 27 Dec 2009, at 18:13, Nick Prince wrote: Ok so I have come up with an argument to try and convince myself of step 8 but it still has some catches to it. If anyone sees that I am using incorrect thinking at any time please correct me. Misunderstanding means bad foundations. Up to step 7 all seems well and you begin step 8 by saying “but what if we don’t grant a concrete robust physical universe?” Some people have attempted to suggest the possibility of a Universe which is sufficiently robust. For example in Frank Tipler “The physics of Immortality “ he explains how the universe could be utilised to act as a computational engine in order to generate consistent extensions of sentient beings. His claims have been heavily criticised, but I do think he has made a brave and ingenious try at explaining how a reductionist approach along with a belief in strong AI can yield interesting speculations. If he had written his book in a more modest and understated manner his ideas would have been much better received. Incidentally, the fact that, because the universe has been shown to be expanding at an accelerating rate does not invalidate his theory because there is currently no clear understanding of the nature of dark energy – for example it may be a decaying scalar field ( we understand theoretically this type of mechanism because it is one of the best candidate mechanisms for understanding the (temporary) inflation in the early universe. If it is like this, then re-collapse might provide the physics necessary for high computational capability. But let’s suppose things are as you say and that the universe is not robust enough in any circumstances. Careful. If the universe contains a real UD, we don't need step 8 to conclude that physics is derivable from computer science. I don't assume that the universe is not robust enough, I was just considering that move as an objection to the UDA seventh first steps. The 8th step is an independent step showing that the physical supervenience thesis is incoherent with the mechanist assumption. I want to understand the assertion that platonic realism underpins my ist person reality. If I dispense with Schmidhuber’s great programmer (and his hardware) then rather than infinite regress, I assume there exists a platonic UD. Well, it is better to assume just the axiom of, say, Robinson arithmetic. You assume 0, the successors, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. You assume some laws, like s(x) = s(y) - x = y, 0 ≠ s(x), the laws of addition, and multiplication. Then the existence of the universal machine and the UD follows as consequences. I am not assuming more, with respect to math, than any mathematicians (on the contrary, given that the ontology is provided by a tiny part of arithmetic). Platonism or realism means here that we explicitly allow non constructive proof of existence, that is we allow the excluded-middle principle: we accept the idea that a closed arithmetical sentences is either true, or false. Now, since (I also assume) platonic reality is somehow timeless, You don't
Re: UDA query
Ok so I have come up with an argument to try and convince myself of step 8 but it still has some catches to it. If anyone sees that I am using incorrect thinking at any time please correct me. Misunderstanding means bad foundations. Up to step 7 all seems well and you begin step 8 by saying “but what if we don’t grant a concrete robust physical universe?” Some people have attempted to suggest the possibility of a Universe which is sufficiently robust. For example in Frank Tipler “The physics of Immortality “ he explains how the universe could be utilised to act as a computational engine in order to generate consistent extensions of sentient beings. His claims have been heavily criticised, but I do think he has made a brave and ingenious try at explaining how a reductionist approach along with a belief in strong AI can yield interesting speculations. If he had written his book in a more modest and understated manner his ideas would have been much better received. Incidentally, the fact that, because the universe has been shown to be expanding at an accelerating rate does not invalidate his theory because there is currently no clear understanding of the nature of dark energy – for example it may be a decaying scalar field ( we understand theoretically this type of mechanism because it is one of the best candidate mechanisms for understanding the (temporary) inflation in the early universe. If it is like this, then re-collapse might provide the physics necessary for high computational capability. But let’s suppose things are as you say and that the universe is not robust enough in any circumstances. I want to understand the assertion that platonic realism underpins my ist person reality. If I dispense with Schmidhuber’s great programmer (and his hardware) then rather than infinite regress, I assume there exists a platonic UD. Now, since (I also assume) platonic reality is somehow timeless, then the UD algorithm must surely exist in this timeless “place”. Now it gets interesting. I have assumed the algorithm is there too just like I assume that a perfect scalene triangle is in a more general platonia. However this triangle is made of perfect line segments combined together to make it - and in turn the segments were made up of a sum of ideal points (lets not go into details about the reals and integers at this stage). Clearly though the triangle does not have to be fully represented in this reality if everything can be made of points. As long as an algorithm exists in the platonic realm which enables lines and combinations of them to be combined as triangles. But such an algorithm would be made up of numbers anyway and hence it’s all numbers. Indeed the numbers hardly need to be grouped in an list as we are familiar with seeing programs in because ordering is hardly important. Now I’ve almost convinced myself that I’m on the right track but then come the niggles. The static timeless platonic reality has to somehow generate my seemingly dynamic existence and we are back to the same problem. Where is the spotlight which shines on each platonic number in the right order to give the experience of succession? Russell’s theory of nothing idea springs to mind here. The arithmetical reality I am supposing underpins my existence has no meaning without the spotlight that some observer would have to give to it to make it feel like our existence feels (somehow intuition calls out for a sequential map from N to N with some notion of time/ order). Indeed there is also the idea of an “instruction set”. A jumble of bit strings make up a program but the physical hardware has to react to these numbers in a well defined way in order to know how to shuffle other numbers around. In other words the function mapping the numbers has to be represented in the platonic reality somehow and I am not sure it can be done with just more numbers. Best Nick On Dec 25, 2:56 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Nick, hi Quentin, On 25 Dec 2009, at 04:13, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Nick Prince wrote I can understand that numbers and arithmetic operations (as well as a whole lot of other stuff) exist as some kind of objective reality (called a platonic reality). These archetypal “things” are to me clearly discovered by us rather than invented. But that our dynamic world emerges somehow from this static ethereal repository seems very difficult to see. And Quentin commented: Would it be easier if I said that all of this came from bouncing particle of matter (whatever that is) ? That is a good point, which I find rather convincing. To attribute consciousness to arithmetical (static, ethereal) relations is not more intriguing than to attribute it to continuous particle 4D line universe in any block universe conception. But remember the Peter Jones type of move. He understands comp as a material form of comp. He posits that to be conscious, you need a physical primary
Re: UDA query
Hi Nick, hi Quentin, On 25 Dec 2009, at 04:13, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Nick Prince wrote I can understand that numbers and arithmetic operations (as well as a whole lot of other stuff) exist as some kind of objective reality (called a platonic reality). These archetypal “things” are to me clearly discovered by us rather than invented. But that our dynamic world emerges somehow from this static ethereal repository seems very difficult to see. And Quentin commented: Would it be easier if I said that all of this came from bouncing particle of matter (whatever that is) ? That is a good point, which I find rather convincing. To attribute consciousness to arithmetical (static, ethereal) relations is not more intriguing than to attribute it to continuous particle 4D line universe in any block universe conception. But remember the Peter Jones type of move. He understands comp as a material form of comp. He posits that to be conscious, you need a physical primary universe in which the computations are executed. Of course this moves seems completely ad hoc. he has to invoke some magic in both mind and matter, which is already against the comp idea. But unfortunately, with only the first seven steps, you can still believe in such ad hoc theory. It is enough to believe that the seven steps just show that we are living in a small primary physical universe (small = not enough big to run the UD), and that is why the 8th step is needed to prevent that type of move, and to conclude the proof. Nick Prince wrote This must be difficult. How can any theory be interpreted without the formalisms or some model. Remember that logicians use the word model like the painters. The model (the naked person) is the reality. The theory (the painting) is the finite piece of crap trying to capture or represent that reality. A theory is on the side of the machine. It is a finite or finitely representable things, like a program. It has a sort of operational syntactical interpretation: it generates mechanically theorems or numbers, and it can (and usually have) a (mathematical )meaning called model, and which is the thing it compute or prove statements about. If you want, a brain is already a theory (with reality as intended model). The brain is supposed to interpret reality, or to implement some higher level interpreter (you, actually) of reality. for example: reality = a bird flies in the sky (let us assume). You look at it, and this makes your eyes sending a (giant) bitstring to your brain, which, through many (parallel) computations makes your self interpreting the bitstring as (strong evidence that) a bird flies in the sky. Who interpret the working of the brain itself? Well the answer is certainly *some reality*. Aristotelian would say it is nature, or the physical reality, but by the cartesian dream argument, a computationalist will say some universal machine, but then he will eventually understand that below his level of substitution an infinity of universal machines have to compete. It is often said that with the many worlds interpretation it is the mathematics which tends to give us the lead on how to interpret Quantum Mechanics. It was this that made me tend to agree with the many worlders. Then you should love comp :) Comp forces us to do, in arithmetic, exactly what Everett has done in the quantum theory. I do agree with Bryce deWitt (and Everett) that the (statistical) interpretation of quantum mechanics is given by the theory itself (QM). And this in some precise sense. By QM I mean the high dimensional Hilbert space, the tensor product rule, and the unitary evolution of states (or observables). I mean, no collapse. Then you could define the interpretation of QM by the normal average talk of the memory-machine described by the wave. This makes really the universal wave explanatively close. But you need comp to do that, as most Everettian accept. But then the uda should make understand that this has to be done for any universal machine (not just the universal QM wave), and even that the appearance of the universal wave has to be explained by the competition between all universal machines below some level. Arithmetic generates its own interpretation, exactly like Everett showed for the universal wave. The universal wave can justify the appearance of the collapse in most observer's mind, and uda shows that if QM and comp are correct, then the appearance of the universal wave can be explained by the average universal machine intepretation of what they observe. Monist theories, which embed the subject in the object, have to do a trick of that kind, in a way or in another. Note that this is not standard. What I am doing for arithmetic is as original for a logician, than what Everett has done for QM is for a physicist (or the layman). To sum up roughly: an interpretation is the doing of a
Re: UDA query
On 24 Dec 2009, at 02:13, Nick Prince wrote: Thanks Bruno I want to have a good think about your answers and also the eighth step in your paper. I think it is the most difficult for me and yet I sense its somehow. Schmidhuber assumes a great programmer runs the UD but you effectively dispense with him. If a universal turing machine necessarilly exists platonically which is capable of running UD's that can simulate our minds then our experience of reality follows. Yet I still feel that somehow this will be confusing the map of the territory with the reality, the equations of physics with the physically real. And here there is a famous difficulty, which is that physicists and logicians use very different if not opposite vocabulary. Logicians distinguish a theory (-usually a finite or recursive (mechanically decidable) thing, and its interpretation (usually an infinite mathematical structure. In the comp frame, it is even more difficult, given that we are going through a metatheory, where both the theory and its interpretations are studied at the theory level, and then we have to consider the fixed point of the interpretation function. Intuitively, you can understand that with comp, we do confuse, purposefully, the map and the territory. You can see a brain as a theory of reality. But that reality contains a brain. So, at some point the brain will accept (or bet) that it is itself an object in that theory, and the computationalist practicers will have to bet that is brain-theory is well described (relatively to his neighborhood) by a finite thing (its own backup in such or that machine). It is not stranger that Brouwer fixed point in geometry or topology. After all, we know that if the map of a territory is continuously embedded in the territory, a point of the map will be confused with a point in the territory. It is the indexical You are here point of the map. Likewise, in computer science, the meaning of a program can be described by a fixed point of some universal transformation (like in Scott denotational semantics, for example). To understand this well, it is necessary to NOT confuse a theory, with his mathematical interpretation, and to NOT confuse a mathematical interpretation with an interpretation in some reality. Physicists have not yet this level of sophistication. They usually confuse a theory (the SWE for example) with the mathematical (standard) interpretation (the wave function). This can lead to many misunderstanding of what the logicians are doing, especially in applied logic. Concerning the existence of platonic Turing Universal Machine, it is equivalent with the platonic existence of the prime numbers, or the even numbers, etc. With Church thesis you can eliminate the Turing label. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Hi Bruno And here there is a famous difficulty, which is that physicists and logicians use very different if not opposite vocabulary. Logicians distinguish a theory (-usually a finite or recursive (mechanically decidable) thing, and its interpretation (usually an infinite mathematical structure. This must be difficult. How can any theory be interpreted without the formalisms or some model. It is often said that with the many worlds interpretation it is the mathematics which tends to give us the lead on how to interpret Quantum Mechanics. It was this that made me tend to agree with the many worlders. Can you give a simple example of what you mean? In the comp frame, it is even more difficult, given that we are going through a metatheory, where both the theory and its interpretations are studied at the theory level, and then we have to consider the fixed point of the interpretation function. Intuitively, you can understand that with comp, we do confuse, purposefully, the map and the territory. You can see a brain as a theory of reality. But that reality contains a brain. So, at some point the brain will accept (or bet) that it is itself an object in that theory, and the computationalist practicers will have to bet that is brain-theory is well described (relatively to his neighborhood) by a finite thing (its own backup in such or that machine). It is not stranger that Brouwer fixed point in geometry or topology. After all, we know that if the map of a territory is continuously embedded in the territory, a point of the map will be confused with a point in the territory. It is the indexical You are here point of the map. Likewise, in computer science, the meaning of a program can be described by a fixed point of some universal transformation (like in Scott denotational semantics, for example). A map is a kind of (mathematical) model of reality so although there is a one to one correspondence between the points on the map to reality I still can’t see the trick of how to get through your step 8. Sorry if I am seeming stupid. To understand this well, it is necessary to NOT confuse a theory, with his mathematical interpretation, and to NOT confuse a mathematical interpretation with an interpretation in some reality. Physicists have not yet this level of sophistication. They usually confuse a theory (the SWE for example) with the mathematical (standard) interpretation (the wave function). This can lead to many misunderstanding of what the logicians are doing, especially in applied logic. I’m struggling with this one as stated above. Concerning the existence of platonic Turing Universal Machine, it is equivalent with the platonic existence of the prime numbers, or the even numbers, etc. With Church thesis you can eliminate the Turing label. Bruno I can understand that numbers and arithmetic operations (as well as a whole lot of other stuff) exist as some kind of objective reality (called a platonic reality). These archetypal “things” are to me clearly discovered by us rather than invented. But that our dynamic world emerges somehow from this static ethereal repository seems very difficult to see. I’m missing the trick here. Maybe its some kind of insight restructured perception that I need. I will try to read up some more to see if I can make some more progress. Thank you very much for your kind replies. Happy Christmas Nick On Dec 24, 9:26 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Dec 2009, at 02:13, Nick Prince wrote: Thanks Bruno I want to have a good think about your answers and also the eighth step in your paper. I think it is the most difficult for me and yet I sense its somehow. Schmidhuber assumes a great programmer runs the UD but you effectively dispense with him. If a universal turing machine necessarilly exists platonically which is capable of running UD's that can simulate our minds then our experience of reality follows. Yet I still feel that somehow this will be confusing the map of the territory with the reality, the equations of physics with the physically real. And here there is a famous difficulty, which is that physicists and logicians use very different if not opposite vocabulary. Logicians distinguish a theory (-usually a finite or recursive (mechanically decidable) thing, and its interpretation (usually an infinite mathematical structure. In the comp frame, it is even more difficult, given that we are going through a metatheory, where both the theory and its interpretations are studied at the theory level, and then we have to consider the fixed point of the interpretation function. Intuitively, you can understand that with comp, we do confuse, purposefully, the map and the territory. You can see a brain as a theory of reality. But that reality contains a brain. So, at some point the brain will accept (or bet) that it is itself an object in that theory, and the computationalist practicers will
Re: UDA query
2009/12/24 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk Hi Bruno And here there is a famous difficulty, which is that physicists and logicians use very different if not opposite vocabulary. Logicians distinguish a theory (-usually a finite or recursive (mechanically decidable) thing, and its interpretation (usually an infinite mathematical structure. This must be difficult. How can any theory be interpreted without the formalisms or some model. It is often said that with the many worlds interpretation it is the mathematics which tends to give us the lead on how to interpret Quantum Mechanics. It was this that made me tend to agree with the many worlders. Can you give a simple example of what you mean? In the comp frame, it is even more difficult, given that we are going through a metatheory, where both the theory and its interpretations are studied at the theory level, and then we have to consider the fixed point of the interpretation function. Intuitively, you can understand that with comp, we do confuse, purposefully, the map and the territory. You can see a brain as a theory of reality. But that reality contains a brain. So, at some point the brain will accept (or bet) that it is itself an object in that theory, and the computationalist practicers will have to bet that is brain-theory is well described (relatively to his neighborhood) by a finite thing (its own backup in such or that machine). It is not stranger that Brouwer fixed point in geometry or topology. After all, we know that if the map of a territory is continuously embedded in the territory, a point of the map will be confused with a point in the territory. It is the indexical You are here point of the map. Likewise, in computer science, the meaning of a program can be described by a fixed point of some universal transformation (like in Scott denotational semantics, for example). A map is a kind of (mathematical) model of reality so although there is a one to one correspondence between the points on the map to reality I still can’t see the trick of how to get through your step 8. Sorry if I am seeming stupid. To understand this well, it is necessary to NOT confuse a theory, with his mathematical interpretation, and to NOT confuse a mathematical interpretation with an interpretation in some reality. Physicists have not yet this level of sophistication. They usually confuse a theory (the SWE for example) with the mathematical (standard) interpretation (the wave function). This can lead to many misunderstanding of what the logicians are doing, especially in applied logic. I’m struggling with this one as stated above. Concerning the existence of platonic Turing Universal Machine, it is equivalent with the platonic existence of the prime numbers, or the even numbers, etc. With Church thesis you can eliminate the Turing label. Bruno I can understand that numbers and arithmetic operations (as well as a whole lot of other stuff) exist as some kind of objective reality (called a platonic reality). These archetypal “things” are to me clearly discovered by us rather than invented. But that our dynamic world emerges somehow from this static ethereal repository seems very difficult to see. Would it be easier if I said that all of this came from bouncing particle of matter (whatever that is) ? What is important in all of this is the view point, the observer, what as been abstracted for too much time, what is central to the computationalist hyposthesis. What could you see *easily* that explain your view point ? the fact that you see the universe being Nick Prince and not being Quentin Anciaux ? Regards, Quentin I’m missing the trick here. Maybe its some kind of insight restructured perception that I need. I will try to read up some more to see if I can make some more progress. Thank you very much for your kind replies. Happy Christmas Nick On Dec 24, 9:26 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Dec 2009, at 02:13, Nick Prince wrote: Thanks Bruno I want to have a good think about your answers and also the eighth step in your paper. I think it is the most difficult for me and yet I sense its somehow. Schmidhuber assumes a great programmer runs the UD but you effectively dispense with him. If a universal turing machine necessarilly exists platonically which is capable of running UD's that can simulate our minds then our experience of reality follows. Yet I still feel that somehow this will be confusing the map of the territory with the reality, the equations of physics with the physically real. And here there is a famous difficulty, which is that physicists and logicians use very different if not opposite vocabulary. Logicians distinguish a theory (-usually a finite or recursive (mechanically decidable) thing, and its interpretation (usually an infinite mathematical structure. In the comp frame, it is even
Re: UDA query
Sorry I accidently posted my previous message twice. A pity because now I think the conclusion I came to in them was wrong. Because I assume comp to be true and the line of reasoning implies a simulated realityy because of comp then it doesn't make comp any less contingent. Oh well!, the rest was insightful to think over. If anyone sees any other errors in my thinking then please do let me know because I don't want to take anything on board that is wrong and has been cleared up in the past. Nick Prince On Dec 23, 1:02 am, Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk wrote: On Dec 23, 12:55 am, Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk wrote: Hi Bruno My background is in mathematical physics but I am trying to read up a bit of this new stuff as I go along. Thank you for being patient with me. However, I think you have confirmed some things - let me know if any of these is fundamentally wrong. I want to put aside the platonic arithmetical UD for the moment but will come back to that. Just supposing that there is as yet NO UD operating. Comp says it is possible to build a concrete one and in step 7 of your paper you say that the UD could provide infinitely many possible consistent extensions of me. (I am thinking of descriptions of simulated worlds with me in them as bit strings) I quote you from the sane paper: Then, it follows from the six preceding steps that it will generate all possible Turing machine states, infinitely often (why?), which (by comp) includes all your virtual reconstitutions corresponding to (hopefully) consistent extensions of yourself, in all possible (locally) emulable environments or computational histories. And this, with comp, even in the case you consider that your ‘‘generalised brain’’ (the ‘‘whatever’’ which is needed to be emulated by a DU digital body/brain to survive) is the whole Milky Way galaxy. And we don’t need any Science Fiction like devices to make this concrete, if we make exception of the robust universe. Actually the kind of teleportation I am interested in, for reasons as you will see is the usual simple one which takes us from moment to moment. I am being teleported into the next observer moment all the time ( if this is because I'm already being computed by a UD then as I say lets just ignore this possibility for now as you did in your paper). If someone is blown to bits, then we have lost the chance to make a decent copy of them. However, Once the “concrete” UD is run then it computes all possible futures for all possible virtual extensions. Then there will be an (infinitely many) extension(s) for the blown to bits person. The blowing to bits is just the equivalent of the annhiallation part of your earlier steps. So here we have the basic quantum immortality thing coming in again. However, if it takes the UD a long time to generate sufficient extensions then the delay will be considerable before the blown to bits man continues consciousness - although to him it will seem instantaneous. From 3d person, well - they see the delay. Now is the interesting bit. Because this future UD creates all possible extensions of all possible states of the blown to bits man then what’s to stop him finding continuation with a consistent extension prior to the blowing up! In other words every observer moment of his life (not just the one just before being blown up - but any of them) could just as easily be followed by a suitable one in the virtual UD rather than one in the initial run of the universe. In conclusion, from our ist person point of view we do not know whether our next observer moment will occur in the “real” universe or in a simulated one- this is 1-indeterminacy again. If the UD can simulate all possible observer moments then it will have those associated with our very first sense of consciousness and hence we will have very quickly slipped, without knowing it, into the UD’s virtual world. We never noticed any delay of course but there may have been a huge time difference assuming Russell’s time postulate has meaning here! Hence if a UD is possible, then only the first observer moment(s) -or fraction of our conscious lives - were ever lived in a “basic/real” universe at all. The rest is all simulation. The very existence of a UD implies that we are in a simulation. If they exist platonically then it's all simulation and computationalism must be necessary rather than contingent. It's a very fumbling line of thinking but it helps me to learn about things as I go along. Best Nick On Dec 22, 6:41 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Dec 2009, at 18:48, Nick P wrote: Hence by it generating all possible emulations of stages of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my next OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current wetware (or
Re: UDA query
Hi Nick, On 23 Dec 2009, at 01:55, Nick Prince wrote: My background is in mathematical physics but I am trying to read up a bit of this new stuff as I go along. Thank you for being patient with me. However, I think you have confirmed some things - let me know if any of these is fundamentally wrong. I want to put aside the platonic arithmetical UD for the moment but will come back to that. Just supposing that there is as yet NO UD operating. Comp says it is possible to build a concrete one and in step 7 of your paper you say that the UD could provide infinitely many possible consistent extensions of me. (I am thinking of descriptions of simulated worlds with me in them as bit strings) I quote you from the sane paper: Then, it follows from the six preceding steps that it will generate all possible Turing machine states, infinitely often (why?), which (by comp) includes all your virtual reconstitutions corresponding to (hopefully) consistent extensions of yourself, in all possible (locally) emulable environments or computational histories. And this, with comp, even in the case you consider that your ‘‘generalised brain’’ (the ‘‘whatever’’ which is needed to be emulated by a DU digital body/brain to survive) is the whole Milky Way galaxy. And we don’t need any Science Fiction like devices to make this concrete, if we make exception of the robust universe. Actually the kind of teleportation I am interested in, for reasons as you will see is the usual simple one which takes us from moment to moment. I am being teleported into the next observer moment all the time ( if this is because I'm already being computed by a UD then as I say lets just ignore this possibility for now as you did in your paper). If someone is blown to bits, then we have lost the chance to make a decent copy of them. However, Once the “concrete” UD is run then it computes all possible futures for all possible virtual extensions. Then there will be an (infinitely many) extension(s) for the blown to bits person. The blowing to bits is just the equivalent of the annhiallation part of your earlier steps. So here we have the basic quantum immortality thing coming in again. OK. TO be sure it is the older comp immortality, and it is an open problem if the quantum interference and immortality *is* a result of the comp interference and immortality. It looks like that, and up to now the math confirms formally the resemblance. However, if it takes the UD a long time to generate sufficient extensions then the delay will be considerable before the blown to bits man continues consciousness - although to him it will seem instantaneous. From 3d person, well - they see the delay. Yes. (would they live long enough) Now is the interesting bit. Because this future UD creates all possible extensions of all possible states of the blown to bits man then what’s to stop him finding continuation with a consistent extension prior to the blowing up! Sure. (that happens all the time, and that's why we have to justify the apparent stable laws from that). In other words every observer moment of his life (not just the one just before being blown up - but any of them) could just as easily be followed by a suitable one in the virtual UD rather than one in the initial run of the universe. Absolutely. Would a real *singular* concrete material universe exist, the probability to stay in that universe is zero. In conclusion, from our ist person point of view we do not know whether our next observer moment will occur in the “real” universe or in a simulated one- this is 1-indeterminacy again. If the UD can simulate all possible observer moments then it will have those associated with our very first sense of consciousness and hence we will have very quickly slipped, without knowing it, into the UD’s virtual world. We never noticed any delay of course but there may have been a huge time difference assuming Russell’s time postulate has meaning here! It has meaning, because it is neither physical time nor subjective time, but just the natural numbers with the successor operation, or the number of steps taken by the UD to reach the computational states. And the step 8 explains why, even if a real physical time exists, it just cannot compete with the UD time. It is no more than 0, 1, 2, 3, ... or a set having a computable bijection with N. Hence if a UD is possible, Well, the mathematical existence of the UD is a logical consequence of Church thesis + Turing's theorem in computer science. There is number U such that for all x and y, phi_U(x, y) = phi_x(y). U can emulate x on y. Once you can emulate all x, you can dovetail on all emulations possible, including those with oracles in some rings. then only the first observer moment(s) -or fraction of our conscious lives - were ever lived in a “basic/real” universe at all. The rest is all simulation.
Re: UDA query
Thanks Bruno I want to have a good think about your answers and also the eighth step in your paper. I think it is the most difficult for me and yet I sense its somehow. Schmidhuber assumes a great programmer runs the UD but you effectively dispense with him. If a universal turing machine necessarilly exists platonically which is capable of running UD's that can simulate our minds then our experience of reality follows. Yet I still feel that somehow this will be confusing the map of the territory with the reality, the equations of physics with the physically real. Best wishes Nick On Dec 23, 2:15 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Nick, On 23 Dec 2009, at 01:55, Nick Prince wrote: My background is in mathematical physics but I am trying to read up a bit of this new stuff as I go along. Thank you for being patient with me. However, I think you have confirmed some things - let me know if any of these is fundamentally wrong. I want to put aside the platonic arithmetical UD for the moment but will come back to that. Just supposing that there is as yet NO UD operating. Comp says it is possible to build a concrete one and in step 7 of your paper you say that the UD could provide infinitely many possible consistent extensions of me. (I am thinking of descriptions of simulated worlds with me in them as bit strings) I quote you from the sane paper: Then, it follows from the six preceding steps that it will generate all possible Turing machine states, infinitely often (why?), which (by comp) includes all your virtual reconstitutions corresponding to (hopefully) consistent extensions of yourself, in all possible (locally) emulable environments or computational histories. And this, with comp, even in the case you consider that your ‘‘generalised brain’’ (the ‘‘whatever’’ which is needed to be emulated by a DU digital body/brain to survive) is the whole Milky Way galaxy. And we don’t need any Science Fiction like devices to make this concrete, if we make exception of the robust universe. Actually the kind of teleportation I am interested in, for reasons as you will see is the usual simple one which takes us from moment to moment. I am being teleported into the next observer moment all the time ( if this is because I'm already being computed by a UD then as I say lets just ignore this possibility for now as you did in your paper). If someone is blown to bits, then we have lost the chance to make a decent copy of them. However, Once the “concrete” UD is run then it computes all possible futures for all possible virtual extensions. Then there will be an (infinitely many) extension(s) for the blown to bits person. The blowing to bits is just the equivalent of the annhiallation part of your earlier steps. So here we have the basic quantum immortality thing coming in again. OK. TO be sure it is the older comp immortality, and it is an open problem if the quantum interference and immortality *is* a result of the comp interference and immortality. It looks like that, and up to now the math confirms formally the resemblance. However, if it takes the UD a long time to generate sufficient extensions then the delay will be considerable before the blown to bits man continues consciousness - although to him it will seem instantaneous. From 3d person, well - they see the delay. Yes. (would they live long enough) Now is the interesting bit. Because this future UD creates all possible extensions of all possible states of the blown to bits man then what’s to stop him finding continuation with a consistent extension prior to the blowing up! Sure. (that happens all the time, and that's why we have to justify the apparent stable laws from that). In other words every observer moment of his life (not just the one just before being blown up - but any of them) could just as easily be followed by a suitable one in the virtual UD rather than one in the initial run of the universe. Absolutely. Would a real *singular* concrete material universe exist, the probability to stay in that universe is zero. In conclusion, from our ist person point of view we do not know whether our next observer moment will occur in the “real” universe or in a simulated one- this is 1-indeterminacy again. If the UD can simulate all possible observer moments then it will have those associated with our very first sense of consciousness and hence we will have very quickly slipped, without knowing it, into the UD’s virtual world. We never noticed any delay of course but there may have been a huge time difference assuming Russell’s time postulate has meaning here! It has meaning, because it is neither physical time nor subjective time, but just the natural numbers with the successor operation, or the number of steps taken by the UD to reach the computational states. And the
Re: UDA query
On 21 Dec 2009, at 22:33, Nick P wrote: Thank you quentin and Bruno... Right I think I see what Quentin is saying in that we take the copying procedure as given for the purpose of the experiment however technically problematic. I think I get part of what you say Bruno. What I had thought myself was that even if it was not possible to extract sufficient information down to the correct level by a copying process, there could still be an identical me generated (perhaps many times) by the UD. Yes. Even if the level is given by the (rational) quantum state of the entire Milky Way, in term of strings and branes, the UD will generate an infinity of computations going through that state. Robinson Arithmetic (very weak yet Turing universal) proves the existence of all those computations, and relative computation. By first person indeterminacy we (wetvare) belongs to an infinity of computations. Hence by it generating all possible emulations of me implies that their would be a consistent extension of me (at any stage of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my next OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact already software constructs in a simulation). This is weird. From some absolute, non machine accessible view point, you can expect anything. Perhaps. But from your current here and now experience, you have to expect the most probable relative computation(s) (among all generated in the UD going through your current state. You have to take into account the first person indeterminacy intrinsic to the UD (or elementary arithmetic, combinators, etc.). That is why, if you prefer to use the simpler (and very well verified) quantum theory, the honest mechanist has to justify it from elementary arithmetic as seen from the lobian (self-aware in the Gödel-Löb- Smullyan sense). The needed mathematical restriction on the ideal self-referential correct universal machine, makes it possible to see the shadows of the reason of the negative probabilities (amplitude). We have to justify the stable appearance of the current wetware (or whateverware) from our being software constructs (numbers, relative variable numbers) executed (in the math sense) by infinitely many universal machines. In a sense, below our substitution level, all universal machines compete. Bruno On Dec 21, 9:08 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 21 Dec 2009, at 08:57, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/12/21 Nick P m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk Bruno states in his paper “The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations” that “The description encoded at Brussels after the reading-cutting process is just the description of a state of some Turing machine, given that we assume comp. So its description can be duplicated, and the experiencer can be reconstituted simultaneously at two different places, for example Washington and Moscow”. However to get this Turing state from the human, I suspect that this might result in the destruction of the original – I am not sure just a passive reading is possible. Bruno gives the footnote below. “For an example, it could be the state of a Turing machine emulating some unitary transformation in case the brain, whatever it is, is correctly described by quantum mechanics. This recall that quantum computer does not violate Church thesis, and comp, in its all classical and Platonist form, is not incompatible with the thesis that the brain is a quantum computer (which I doubt). Giving that machine Turing state, it can be recopied, without violating the non cloning theorem of quantum information science”. The unitary transformation alluded to above would need an initial state to operate on in order to enable evolution. This initial state must be obtained from a possibly destructive “read” to obtain configurational data at below the substitution level, I’m not sure that the no clone theorem can be overcome here? You're anticipating how this could be done on humans. But the argument is done by taking for granted that we/consciousness can be captured by a computational process (is turing emulable). So let's take as a start a conscious being already running on something else as wetware with input/output system that permits easy access to the current computational state. The fact that we would be turing emulable does not entails that it is actually possible to copy our current state without destructing the wetware or that it is feasible at all... but if it is possible (even at the expense of destructing the original) then after that data gathering, unlimited duplication can be done... so the fact that the original would have been destroyed in the copying process doesn't matter. That's right. Another way to see this consists in reminding one that a quantum computer can be emulated by a classical digital computer.
Re: UDA query
Hence by it generating all possible emulations of stages of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my next OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact already software constructs in a simulation). This is weird. From some absolute, non machine accessible view point, you can expect anything. Perhaps. Assuming that comp is true, then I am not sure why you think it is weird. Perhaps I have not explained myself very well. First of all please check that my understanding of computationalism is correct. By comp I mean (loosly)that I am assuming that any conscious being can be simulated on some form of computer. Currently my consciousness is running on the substrate provided by my brain (hardware). If the underlying reality is a much more fundamental (unknown) substrate then fine because this shouldn’t invalidate what I’m saying. Now If I want to be teleported from Brussels to Moskow then sufficient information must be coded for my reconstitution later on. This may or may not be possible because it may turn out that the accessing of my final state in Brussels destroys my brain before the detailed brain state was properly copied. Worse still, suppose someone loses whatever coded data they did have of me such that the reconstitution becomes impossible. What I am trying to say is that if comp is true then at least I can be confident that some consistent extension of me could exist in the future provided the robust physical universe you speak of exists such that a suitable UD can actually be built. Once built then there would exist at least one consistent extension of me (including the milky way if this level of entanglement is to be necessary to adequately ensure this is the most probable next state of my consciousness) in the UD which will enable me to experience my next Observer Moment (after the last one in Brussells). But from your current here and now experience, you have to expect the most probable relative computation(s) (among all generated in the UD going through your current state. You have to take into account the first person indeterminacy intrinsic to the UD (or elementary arithmetic, combinators, etc.). As pointed out above, somewhere in the UD there WILL be a possible world (Obs moment) which will best provide the consistent extension which will give me a sense of continuity with myself at Brussels – but it will be a long way into the future. This is like your delay scenario in the SANE paper. That is why, if you prefer to use the simpler (and very well verified) quantum theory, the honest mechanist has to justify it from elementary arithmetic as seen from the lobian (self-aware in the Gödel-Löb- Smullyan sense). The needed mathematical restriction on the ideal self-referential correct universal machine, makes it possible to see the shadows of the reason of the negative probabilities (amplitude). Hmmm. I’m really sorry but I’m not understanding this. We have to justify the stable appearance of the current wetware (or whateverware) from our being software constructs (numbers, relative variable numbers) executed (in the math sense) by infinitely many universal machines. In a sense, below our substitution level, all universal machines compete. Yes I think I understand this bit because you are saying that that there may be (infinitely) many UD’s (already existing for all we know)? Bruno I’ll wait for a response before I bring up a complication which is a spanner in the works which probably you have already pre empted as indicated by your last sentence. I am very grateful for your comments. Forgive me if I am not quick at picking things up but I have swopped fields to some extent and I am finding this area fascinating but difficult! On Dec 22, 3:39 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 21 Dec 2009, at 22:33, Nick P wrote: Thank you quentin and Bruno... Right I think I see what Quentin is saying in that we take the copying procedure as given for the purpose of the experiment however technically problematic. I think I get part of what you say Bruno. What I had thought myself was that even if it was not possible to extract sufficient information down to the correct level by a copying process, there could still be an identical me generated (perhaps many times) by the UD. Yes. Even if the level is given by the (rational) quantum state of the entire Milky Way, in term of strings and branes, the UD will generate an infinity of computations going through that state. Robinson Arithmetic (very weak yet Turing universal) proves the existence of all those computations, and relative computation. By first person indeterminacy we (wetvare) belongs to an infinity of computations. Hence by it generating all possible emulations of me implies that their would be a consistent extension of me (at any stage of my life) that I could just as
Re: UDA query
On 22 Dec 2009, at 18:48, Nick P wrote: Hence by it generating all possible emulations of stages of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my next OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact already software constructs in a simulation). This is weird. From some absolute, non machine accessible view point, you can expect anything. Perhaps. Assuming that comp is true, then I am not sure why you think it is weird. Perhaps I have not explained myself very well. First of all please check that my understanding of computationalism is correct. By comp I mean (loosly)that I am assuming that any conscious being can be simulated on some form of computer. Currently my consciousness is running on the substrate provided by my brain (hardware). If the underlying reality is a much more fundamental (unknown) substrate then fine because this shouldn’t invalidate what I’m saying. Now If I want to be teleported from Brussels to Moskow then sufficient information must be coded for my reconstitution later on. This may or may not be possible because it may turn out that the accessing of my final state in Brussels destroys my brain before the detailed brain state was properly copied. Worse still, suppose someone loses whatever coded data they did have of me such that the reconstitution becomes impossible. What I am trying to say is that if comp is true then at least I can be confident that some consistent extension of me could exist in the future provided the robust physical universe you speak of exists such that a suitable UD can actually be built. OK. (and then step 8 explains why the initial universe is no more useful, the arithmetical UD is enough). Also, it is perhaps always one next 1-observer moment, but also always an infinity of 3-observer moments. The UD is terribly redundant, and anything it does, it will repeat it infinitely often. A compactification of it looks really like the border of the Mandelbrot set. The closer you look, the more complex it appears. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g9iOORSU9zk Once built then there would exist at least one consistent extension of me (including the milky way if this level of entanglement is to be necessary to adequately ensure this is the most probable next state of my consciousness) in the UD which will enable me to experience my next Observer Moment (after the last one in Brussells). Infinitely one. in the UD means third person describable (in principle) by an outside observers. The probable next 1-moment is a winner among those 3-moments. But from your current here and now experience, you have to expect the most probable relative computation(s) (among all generated in the UD going through your current state. You have to take into account the first person indeterminacy intrinsic to the UD (or elementary arithmetic, combinators, etc.). As pointed out above, somewhere in the UD there WILL be a possible world (Obs moment) which will best provide the consistent extension which will give me a sense of continuity with myself at Brussels – but it will be a long way into the future. This is like your delay scenario in the SANE paper. Yes, and we cannot be aware of those delays. And the step 8 discharges the need of the robust concrete universe. A tiny part of arithmetical truth will play that role. That is why, if you prefer to use the simpler (and very well verified) quantum theory, the honest mechanist has to justify it from elementary arithmetic as seen from the lobian (self-aware in the Gödel-Löb- Smullyan sense). The needed mathematical restriction on the ideal self-referential correct universal machine, makes it possible to see the shadows of the reason of the negative probabilities (amplitude). Hmmm. I’m really sorry but I’m not understanding this. It is normal. You need to read Gödel 1931, Löb, 1955, Solovay 1976, + Everett 1957. (and the needed books or courses). It is why I separate UDA from AUDA. UDA needs some amount of familiarity with computers, but AUDA needs mathematical logics (which is not very well known). We have to justify the stable appearance of the current wetware (or whateverware) from our being software constructs (numbers, relative variable numbers) executed (in the math sense) by infinitely many universal machines. In a sense, below our substitution level, all universal machines compete. Yes I think I understand this bit because you are saying that that there may be (infinitely) many UD’s (already existing for all we know)? Any UD generates all other UDs, infinitely often. It is really like the mandelbrot set. I’ll wait for a response before I bring up a complication which is a spanner in the works which probably you have already pre empted as indicated by your last sentence. I am very grateful for your comments.
Re: UDA query
Hi Bruno My background is in mathematical physics but I am trying to read up a bit of this new stuff as I go along. Thank you for being patient with me. However, I think you have confirmed some things - let me know if any of these is fundamentally wrong. I want to put aside the platonic arithmetical UD for the moment but will come back to that. Just supposing that there is as yet NO UD operating. Comp says it is possible to build a concrete one and in step 7 of your paper you say that the UD could provide infinitely many possible consistent extensions of me. (I am thinking of descriptions of simulated worlds with me in them as bit strings) I quote you from the sane paper: Then, it follows from the six preceding steps that it will generate all possible Turing machine states, infinitely often (why?), which (by comp) includes all your virtual reconstitutions corresponding to (hopefully) consistent extensions of yourself, in all possible (locally) emulable environments or computational histories. And this, with comp, even in the case you consider that your ‘‘generalised brain’’ (the ‘‘whatever’’ which is needed to be emulated by a DU digital body/brain to survive) is the whole Milky Way galaxy. And we don’t need any Science Fiction like devices to make this concrete, if we make exception of the robust universe. Actually the kind of teleportation I am interested in, for reasons as you will see is the usual simple one which takes us from moment to moment. I am being teleported into the next observer moment all the time ( if this is because I'm already being computed by a UD then as I say lets just ignore this possibility for now as you did in your paper). If someone is blown to bits, then we have lost the chance to make a decent copy of them. However, Once the “concrete” UD is run then it computes all possible futures for all possible virtual extensions. Then there will be an (infinitely many) extension(s) for the blown to bits person. The blowing to bits is just the equivalent of the annhiallation part of your earlier steps. So here we have the basic quantum immortality thing coming in again. However, if it takes the UD a long time to generate sufficient extensions then the delay will be considerable before the blown to bits man continues consciousness - although to him it will seem instantaneous. From 3d person, well - they see the delay. Now is the interesting bit. Because this future UD creates all possible extensions of all possible states of the blown to bits man then what’s to stop him finding continuation with a consistent extension prior to the blowing up! In other words every observer moment of his life (not just the one just before being blown up - but any of them) could just as easily be followed by a suitable one in the virtual UD rather than one in the initial run of the universe. In conclusion, from our ist person point of view we do not know whether our next observer moment will occur in the “real” universe or in a simulated one- this is 1-indeterminacy again. If the UD can simulate all possible observer moments then it will have those associated with our very first sense of consciousness and hence we will have very quickly slipped, without knowing it, into the UD’s virtual world. We never noticed any delay of course but there may have been a huge time difference assuming Russell’s time postulate has meaning here! Hence if a UD is possible, then only the first observer moment(s) -or fraction of our conscious lives - were ever lived in a “basic/real” universe at all. The rest is all simulation. The very existence of a UD implies that we are in a simulation as Nick Bostrom has suggested. If they exist platonically then it's all simulation and computationalism must be necessary rather than contingent. It's a very fumbling line of thinking but it helps me to learn about things as I go along. Best Nick On Dec 22, 6:41 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Dec 2009, at 18:48, Nick P wrote: Hence by it generating all possible emulations of stages of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my next OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact already software constructs in a simulation). This is weird. From some absolute, non machine accessible view point, you can expect anything. Perhaps. Assuming that comp is true, then I am not sure why you think it is weird. Perhaps I have not explained myself very well. First of all please check that my understanding of computationalism is correct. By comp I mean (loosly)that I am assuming that any conscious being can be simulated on some form of computer. Currently my consciousness is running on the substrate provided by my brain (hardware). If the underlying reality is a much more fundamental (unknown) substrate then fine because this shouldn’t invalidate what I’m saying.
Re: UDA query
On Dec 23, 12:55 am, Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk wrote: Hi Bruno My background is in mathematical physics but I am trying to read up a bit of this new stuff as I go along. Thank you for being patient with me. However, I think you have confirmed some things - let me know if any of these is fundamentally wrong. I want to put aside the platonic arithmetical UD for the moment but will come back to that. Just supposing that there is as yet NO UD operating. Comp says it is possible to build a concrete one and in step 7 of your paper you say that the UD could provide infinitely many possible consistent extensions of me. (I am thinking of descriptions of simulated worlds with me in them as bit strings) I quote you from the sane paper: Then, it follows from the six preceding steps that it will generate all possible Turing machine states, infinitely often (why?), which (by comp) includes all your virtual reconstitutions corresponding to (hopefully) consistent extensions of yourself, in all possible (locally) emulable environments or computational histories. And this, with comp, even in the case you consider that your ‘‘generalised brain’’ (the ‘‘whatever’’ which is needed to be emulated by a DU digital body/brain to survive) is the whole Milky Way galaxy. And we don’t need any Science Fiction like devices to make this concrete, if we make exception of the robust universe. Actually the kind of teleportation I am interested in, for reasons as you will see is the usual simple one which takes us from moment to moment. I am being teleported into the next observer moment all the time ( if this is because I'm already being computed by a UD then as I say lets just ignore this possibility for now as you did in your paper). If someone is blown to bits, then we have lost the chance to make a decent copy of them. However, Once the “concrete” UD is run then it computes all possible futures for all possible virtual extensions. Then there will be an (infinitely many) extension(s) for the blown to bits person. The blowing to bits is just the equivalent of the annhiallation part of your earlier steps. So here we have the basic quantum immortality thing coming in again. However, if it takes the UD a long time to generate sufficient extensions then the delay will be considerable before the blown to bits man continues consciousness - although to him it will seem instantaneous. From 3d person, well - they see the delay. Now is the interesting bit. Because this future UD creates all possible extensions of all possible states of the blown to bits man then what’s to stop him finding continuation with a consistent extension prior to the blowing up! In other words every observer moment of his life (not just the one just before being blown up - but any of them) could just as easily be followed by a suitable one in the virtual UD rather than one in the initial run of the universe. In conclusion, from our ist person point of view we do not know whether our next observer moment will occur in the “real” universe or in a simulated one- this is 1-indeterminacy again. If the UD can simulate all possible observer moments then it will have those associated with our very first sense of consciousness and hence we will have very quickly slipped, without knowing it, into the UD’s virtual world. We never noticed any delay of course but there may have been a huge time difference assuming Russell’s time postulate has meaning here! Hence if a UD is possible, then only the first observer moment(s) -or fraction of our conscious lives - were ever lived in a “basic/real” universe at all. The rest is all simulation. The very existence of a UD implies that we are in a simulation. If they exist platonically then it's all simulation and computationalism must be necessary rather than contingent. It's a very fumbling line of thinking but it helps me to learn about things as I go along. Best Nick On Dec 22, 6:41 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Dec 2009, at 18:48, Nick P wrote: Hence by it generating all possible emulations of stages of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my next OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact already software constructs in a simulation). This is weird. From some absolute, non machine accessible view point, you can expect anything. Perhaps. Assuming that comp is true, then I am not sure why you think it is weird. Perhaps I have not explained myself very well. First of all please check that my understanding of computationalism is correct. By comp I mean (loosly)that I am assuming that any conscious being can be simulated on some form of computer. Currently my consciousness is running on the substrate provided by my brain (hardware). If the underlying
Re: UDA query
On 21 Dec 2009, at 08:57, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/12/21 Nick P m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk Bruno states in his paper “The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations” that “The description encoded at Brussels after the reading-cutting process is just the description of a state of some Turing machine, given that we assume comp. So its description can be duplicated, and the experiencer can be reconstituted simultaneously at two different places, for example Washington and Moscow”. However to get this Turing state from the human, I suspect that this might result in the destruction of the original – I am not sure just a passive reading is possible. Bruno gives the footnote below. “For an example, it could be the state of a Turing machine emulating some unitary transformation in case the brain, whatever it is, is correctly described by quantum mechanics. This recall that quantum computer does not violate Church thesis, and comp, in its all classical and Platonist form, is not incompatible with the thesis that the brain is a quantum computer (which I doubt). Giving that machine Turing state, it can be recopied, without violating the non cloning theorem of quantum information science”. The unitary transformation alluded to above would need an initial state to operate on in order to enable evolution. This initial state must be obtained from a possibly destructive “read” to obtain configurational data at below the substitution level, I’m not sure that the no clone theorem can be overcome here? You're anticipating how this could be done on humans. But the argument is done by taking for granted that we/consciousness can be captured by a computational process (is turing emulable). So let's take as a start a conscious being already running on something else as wetware with input/output system that permits easy access to the current computational state. The fact that we would be turing emulable does not entails that it is actually possible to copy our current state without destructing the wetware or that it is feasible at all... but if it is possible (even at the expense of destructing the original) then after that data gathering, unlimited duplication can be done... so the fact that the original would have been destroyed in the copying process doesn't matter. That's right. Another way to see this consists in reminding one that a quantum computer can be emulated by a classical digital computer. So, despite we cannot clone arbitrary (unknown) quantum states, we can actually prepare them (in the quantum sense of preparation) in many exemplars, and, (and this is the point), the universal dovetailer generate those preparations infinitely often. The universal dovetailer, although typically classical and digital, does generate all rational possible quantum states. Now, if you attach your consciousness a real (or complex, with all decimals) quantum state, then we may be non quantum preparable, but in that case we are no more Turing emulable, and it means that we are working in another theory than comp. (But you don't need quantum mechanics here, if we are analog classical machine using all the decimals of the reals involved, we are no more digitalizable machine either). Actually comp predicts already a non cloning phenomenon for any piece of observable matter, given that observation (of matter) emerges from an infinity of infinite computations (a priori), and that is not ( priori) digitally emulable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Thank you quentin and Bruno... Right I think I see what Quentin is saying in that we take the copying procedure as given for the purpose of the experiment however technically problematic. I think I get part of what you say Bruno. What I had thought myself was that even if it was not possible to extract sufficient information down to the correct level by a copying process, there could still be an identical me generated (perhaps many times) by the UD. Hence by it generating all possible emulations of me implies that their would be a consistent extension of me (at any stage of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my next OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact already software constructs in a simulation). On Dec 21, 9:08 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 21 Dec 2009, at 08:57, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/12/21 Nick P m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk Bruno states in his paper “The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations” that “The description encoded at Brussels after the reading-cutting process is just the description of a state of some Turing machine, given that we assume comp. So its description can be duplicated, and the experiencer can be reconstituted simultaneously at two different places, for example Washington and Moscow”. However to get this Turing state from the human, I suspect that this might result in the destruction of the original – I am not sure just a passive reading is possible. Bruno gives the footnote below. “For an example, it could be the state of a Turing machine emulating some unitary transformation in case the brain, whatever it is, is correctly described by quantum mechanics. This recall that quantum computer does not violate Church thesis, and comp, in its all classical and Platonist form, is not incompatible with the thesis that the brain is a quantum computer (which I doubt). Giving that machine Turing state, it can be recopied, without violating the non cloning theorem of quantum information science”. The unitary transformation alluded to above would need an initial state to operate on in order to enable evolution. This initial state must be obtained from a possibly destructive “read” to obtain configurational data at below the substitution level, I’m not sure that the no clone theorem can be overcome here? You're anticipating how this could be done on humans. But the argument is done by taking for granted that we/consciousness can be captured by a computational process (is turing emulable). So let's take as a start a conscious being already running on something else as wetware with input/output system that permits easy access to the current computational state. The fact that we would be turing emulable does not entails that it is actually possible to copy our current state without destructing the wetware or that it is feasible at all... but if it is possible (even at the expense of destructing the original) then after that data gathering, unlimited duplication can be done... so the fact that the original would have been destroyed in the copying process doesn't matter. That's right. Another way to see this consists in reminding one that a quantum computer can be emulated by a classical digital computer. So, despite we cannot clone arbitrary (unknown) quantum states, we can actually prepare them (in the quantum sense of preparation) in many exemplars, and, (and this is the point), the universal dovetailer generate those preparations infinitely often. The universal dovetailer, although typically classical and digital, does generate all rational possible quantum states. Now, if you attach your consciousness a real (or complex, with all decimals) quantum state, then we may be non quantum preparable, but in that case we are no more Turing emulable, and it means that we are working in another theory than comp. (But you don't need quantum mechanics here, if we are analog classical machine using all the decimals of the reals involved, we are no more digitalizable machine either). Actually comp predicts already a non cloning phenomenon for any piece of observable matter, given that observation (of matter) emerges from an infinity of infinite computations (a priori), and that is not ( priori) digitally emulable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Sorry I should have added that I was assuming that the UD was operating at some future time as in step 7 (fig 7) of Bruno's paper. Is my reasoning correct in what I have said in the last post? On Dec 21, 9:33 pm, Nick P m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk wrote: Thank you quentin and Bruno... Right I think I see what Quentin is saying in that we take the copying procedure as given for the purpose of the experiment however technically problematic. I think I get part of what you say Bruno. What I had thought myself was that even if it was not possible to extract sufficient information down to the correct level by a copying process, there could still be an identical me generated (perhaps many times) by the UD. Hence by it generating all possible emulations of me implies that their would be a consistent extension of me (at any stage of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my next OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact already software constructs in a simulation). On Dec 21, 9:08 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 21 Dec 2009, at 08:57, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/12/21 Nick P m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk Bruno states in his paper “The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations” that “The description encoded at Brussels after the reading-cutting process is just the description of a state of some Turing machine, given that we assume comp. So its description can be duplicated, and the experiencer can be reconstituted simultaneously at two different places, for example Washington and Moscow”. However to get this Turing state from the human, I suspect that this might result in the destruction of the original – I am not sure just a passive reading is possible. Bruno gives the footnote below. “For an example, it could be the state of a Turing machine emulating some unitary transformation in case the brain, whatever it is, is correctly described by quantum mechanics. This recall that quantum computer does not violate Church thesis, and comp, in its all classical and Platonist form, is not incompatible with the thesis that the brain is a quantum computer (which I doubt). Giving that machine Turing state, it can be recopied, without violating the non cloning theorem of quantum information science”. The unitary transformation alluded to above would need an initial state to operate on in order to enable evolution. This initial state must be obtained from a possibly destructive “read” to obtain configurational data at below the substitution level, I’m not sure that the no clone theorem can be overcome here? You're anticipating how this could be done on humans. But the argument is done by taking for granted that we/consciousness can be captured by a computational process (is turing emulable). So let's take as a start a conscious being already running on something else as wetware with input/output system that permits easy access to the current computational state. The fact that we would be turing emulable does not entails that it is actually possible to copy our current state without destructing the wetware or that it is feasible at all... but if it is possible (even at the expense of destructing the original) then after that data gathering, unlimited duplication can be done... so the fact that the original would have been destroyed in the copying process doesn't matter. That's right. Another way to see this consists in reminding one that a quantum computer can be emulated by a classical digital computer. So, despite we cannot clone arbitrary (unknown) quantum states, we can actually prepare them (in the quantum sense of preparation) in many exemplars, and, (and this is the point), the universal dovetailer generate those preparations infinitely often. The universal dovetailer, although typically classical and digital, does generate all rational possible quantum states. Now, if you attach your consciousness a real (or complex, with all decimals) quantum state, then we may be non quantum preparable, but in that case we are no more Turing emulable, and it means that we are working in another theory than comp. (But you don't need quantum mechanics here, if we are analog classical machine using all the decimals of the reals involved, we are no more digitalizable machine either). Actually comp predicts already a non cloning phenomenon for any piece of observable matter, given that observation (of matter) emerges from an infinity of infinite computations (a priori), and that is not ( priori) digitally emulable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/-Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the
Re: UDA query
2009/12/21 Nick P m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk Bruno states in his paper “The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations” that “The description encoded at Brussels after the reading-cutting process is just the description of a state of some Turing machine, given that we assume comp. So its description can be duplicated, and the experiencer can be reconstituted simultaneously at two different places, for example Washington and Moscow”. However to get this Turing state from the human, I suspect that this might result in the destruction of the original – I am not sure just a passive reading is possible. Bruno gives the footnote below. “For an example, it could be the state of a Turing machine emulating some unitary transformation in case the brain, whatever it is, is correctly described by quantum mechanics. This recall that quantum computer does not violate Church thesis, and comp, in its all classical and Platonist form, is not incompatible with the thesis that the brain is a quantum computer (which I doubt). Giving that machine Turing state, it can be recopied, without violating the non cloning theorem of quantum information science”. The unitary transformation alluded to above would need an initial state to operate on in order to enable evolution. This initial state must be obtained from a possibly destructive “read” to obtain configurational data at below the substitution level, I’m not sure that the no clone theorem can be overcome here? You're anticipating how this could be done on humans. But the argument is done by taking for granted that we/consciousness can be captured by a computational process (is turing emulable). So let's take as a start a conscious being already running on something else as wetware with input/output system that permits easy access to the current computational state. The fact that we would be turing emulable does not entails that it is actually possible to copy our current state without destructing the wetware or that it is feasible at all... but if it is possible (even at the expense of destructing the original) then after that data gathering, unlimited duplication can be done... so the fact that the original would have been destroyed in the copying process doesn't matter. Regards, Quentin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
