Non-Living & Living
https://signsandscience.blogspot.com/2019/09/non-living-living.html
Time, Death & Decay
https://signsandscience.blogspot.com/2021/12/time-death-decay.html
> On 13-Dec-2022, at 5:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> Spud boy wrote
>
>> > Tain't about Youth In Asia, tis
On 12/12/2022 4:14 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Tain't about Youth In Asia, tis about progressive bureaucrats who
presume people don't want to live,
Where do bureaucrats and presumption come into it. People choose
suicide, and not only in Canada but also in Washington and
out, but instead, a way
upstairs.
-Original Message-
From: John Clark
To: 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
Sent: Mon, Dec 12, 2022 7:25 pm
Subject: Euthanasia
Spud boy wrote
> Tain't about Youth In Asia, tis about progressive bureaucrats who presume
> people don't want t
Spud boy wrote
> > Tain't about Youth In Asia, tis about progressive bureaucrats who
> presume people don't want to live,
They presume somebody doesn't want to live because between their screams of
agony they clearly state that they don't want to live. Do you really think
politicians should be
After a New York Times columnist complained about a new law in Canada that
allows people to have control over their own bodies and die if they want to
die, I wrote this letter to the newspaper. As I expected they didn't print
it so I'm going to send it here:
Ross Douthat is appalled that last
cure (I am not sure about cure, it was Bruno who wrote
about it) but hey man, I have no problem. The way the events went did
not change my opinion about the world.
> *> For me eugenics is a natural next step after adopting euthanasia.*
>
>
> It's odd how you are super concern
may not be making the correct choice but it's her choice because
it's her life not yours that we're talking about.
*> For me eugenics is a natural next step after adopting euthanasia.*
It's odd how you are super concerned about hypothetical negative
consequences of euthanasia that may or may not ac
On Sat, Nov 07, 2020 at 12:08:31PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > On 1 Nov 2020, at 19:32, Tomasz Rola wrote:
> >
[...]
> > harmony.
>
> I am not sure I understand. Defending euthanasia is not defending
> murder,
I think it depends on who is defending.
has
>>> reported more COVID-19 cases than the entire country of New Zealand, I
>>> guess New Zealanders are just more civilized and competent than Americans.
>>>
>>> New Zealand votes to legalize euthanasia for terminally ill patients
>>> <https://www.
On Sun, Nov 01, 2020 at 07:50:24PM +, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:
> Very Aristotelian!
[...]
"Plato is my friend but my bigger friend is truth" - why, he sounds
like very amiable guy. Maybe for men whose name is Plato, not so
amiable, but other than those, I am sure he was universally loved by
votes to legalize euthanasia for terminally ill
patients
On Sun, Nov 1, 2020 at 2:21 PM wrote:
> A study from politicized Stanford economists doesn't work for me.
Well of course it doesn't convince you, no finite amount of scientific evidence
could convince you to change your world view, ma
Very Aristotelian! The golden mean made flesh. Reminds me of the ancient Yes
tune, You and I. You guys do know that in the same decision about euthanasia,
marijuana legalization was turned down.
Sad preacher nailed upon the coloured door of time
Insane teacher be there reminded of the rhyme
On Sun, Nov 1, 2020 at 2:21 PM wrote:
*> A study from politicized Stanford economists doesn't work for me.*
>
Well of course it doesn't convince you, no finite amount of scientific
evidence could convince you to change your world view, maybe an infinite
amount could but I rather doubt it. For
k? No idea.
-Original Message-
From: John Clark
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Cc: marc...@ulb.ac.be
Sent: Sun, Nov 1, 2020 11:03 am
Subject: Re: New Zealand votes to legalize euthanasia for terminally ill
patients
On Sun, Nov 1, 2020 at 9:44 AM spudboy100 via Everything List
wr
I
> > guess New Zealanders are just more civilized and competent than Americans.
> >
> > New Zealand votes to legalize euthanasia for terminally ill patients
> > <https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/30/asia/new-zealand-euthanasia-intl-hnk/index.html>
>
>
> I
On Sun, Nov 1, 2020 at 9:44 AM spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
*>NZ also has a "somewhat" smaller population, *
>
On the contrary, the country of New Zealand has a somewhat larger
population than the White House and the 18.7 acres that surround it, but
un, Nov 1, 2020 3:50 am
Subject: Re: New Zealand votes to legalize euthanasia for terminally ill
patients
On 30 Oct 2020, at 11:42, John Clark wrote:
And for the last three weeks the 18.7 acres around the White House has reported
more COVID-19 cases than the entire country of New Zealand, I g
gt;
> New Zealand votes to legalize euthanasia for terminally ill patients
> <https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/30/asia/new-zealand-euthanasia-intl-hnk/index.html>
I have been an advocate of euthanasia for a long time, until the law pass and
in my country (Belgium), euthanasia has been f
infections. This also
would apply to Care homes.
-Original Message-
From: John Clark
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Fri, Oct 30, 2020 6:42 am
Subject: New Zealand votes to legalize euthanasia for terminally ill patients
And for the last three weeks the 18.7 acres around
You can imagine it, but it hasn't happened in the states where
euthanasia is already legal.
Brent
On 10/30/2020 4:31 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
The only way I could support something like this in USA is if there is
a single payer healthcare system. As things stand now I can well
imagine
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 8:05 AM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:
*> It is a hypothetical that easily could be made real. *
The already real does not need to be made real. And for some paralized people
in agony the pressure put upon them to stay alive by the
single payer healthcare system is probably a good idea, it's worked
> well in other countries, but it has little to do with euthanasia.
>
>
>> > I can well imagine there will be insurance weasels pressuring family
>> members to "terminate" a patient the compan
ell
in other countries, but it has little to do with euthanasia.
> > I can well imagine there will be insurance weasels pressuring family
> members to "terminate" a patient the company finds too expensive to pay for.
I think it's illogical to worry about hypothetical problems tha
.
>
> New Zealand votes to legalize euthanasia for terminally ill patients
> <https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/30/asia/new-zealand-euthanasia-intl-hnk/index.html>
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"
And for the last three weeks the 18.7 acres around the White House has
reported more COVID-19 cases than the entire country of New Zealand, I
guess New Zealanders are just more civilized and competent than Americans.
New Zealand votes to legalize euthanasia for terminally ill patients
<ht
And how much is that 2 kg in that 'other' universe?
JM
On 11/23/08, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 20 Nov 2008, at 19:08, m.a. wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC +
MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is
On 23 Nov 2008, at 17:46, John Mikes wrote:
And how much is that 2 kg in that 'other' universe?
Like two kg, when weighted on Earth. I was literal for the sake of the
reasoning.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You
Brent,
thanks for the paper recommendations! I will have a look at them.
Cheers,
Günther
Brent Meeker wrote:
Günther Greindl wrote:
Hello Brent,
That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that
happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function.
On 19 Nov 2008, at 22:16, m.a. wrote:
Bruno,
I was just quoting you: And if you do the math, you get
a physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm
mechanism or to refute it. Did you mean refutes materialism?
Thanks for quoting the entire sentence,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC +
MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is equivalent with
- the proposition saying that MEC implies NON MAT (mechanism refutes
materialism).
- the proposition saying that MAT implies NON
On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:01, m.a. wrote:
So you're saying that a physics extracted from mechanism which
(let's assume) refutes mechanism,
If a physics extracted from mechanism refutes mechanism, then
mechanism is refuted. (p implies not p) is equivalent with (not p).
I guess you meant
Bruno,
I was just quoting you: And if you do the math, you get a
physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm
mechanism or to refute it. Did you mean refutes materialism?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:01, m.a. wrote:
*So you're saying that a
On Nov 16, 2008, at 1:32 PM, Günther Greindl wrote:
nicely put (the below), it captures my current metaphysical position
quite accurately :-)
Thanks, Günther! It'll be interesting to see if we continue to agree
as the MGA thread progresses. :)
-- Kory
*So you're saying that matter is as much a delusion as the luminiferous
aether and could be a logical extension of Kant's subjective definitions
of space and time? And the splitting of the MWI is just permutations of
equations? Gosh.
On 18 Nov 2008, at 15:30, m.a. wrote:
So you're saying that matter is as much a delusion as the
luminiferous aether
Yes. If you mean matter by fundamental matter.
It does not mean the Higgs boson is an illusion (in case the LHC
shows it). It means that the idea that there are
Hi m.a.
On 18 Nov 2008, at 20:18, m.a. wrote:
Dear Bruno,
Needless to say I feel honored that you've
taken the time to answer my naive questions.
Naive questions I love.
But since you invite such questions, I do have a problem with the
phrase highlighted
On 17 Nov 2008, at 00:29, Michael Rosefield wrote:
If there is a split, does it create differentiated consciousnesses?
I doubt it.
I guess you are talking about the QM splitting, and not the comp-
splitting. In both case it is better to talk about consciousness
differentiation instead
On 17 Nov 2008, at 04:41, Brent Meeker wrote:
But does un-implemented mean not implemented in any language?
This is a vague question depending of the context. If you have find a
beautiful algorithm, and your boss asks you if you have implemented
it, well, if you have not implemente,
the arithmetic truth by looking inside' (pardon
my poetic
distortion). How close can we look? The light is on but nobody's
home?
Gordon
--- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon
On Nov 16, 2008, at 6:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Some believe that for having a real conscious person, you have to
implement it in a real primary material universe. It is clearly what
Peter Jones thinks. I am saying that a person can be fully conscious
like you or me, even when implemented
On 16 Nov 2008, at 11:20, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:22 PM, m.a. wrote:
Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event,
whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that
substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called
physical
On 17 Nov 2008, at 04:41, Brent Meeker wrote:
But all possible implementations is a logical concept that exists only
in platonia -
Any program for the universal dovetailer like this one
GEN DU
implements all computations in our (apparently) material world we are
sharing now.
so what
On 16 Nov 2008, at 09:52, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It's computations supporting consciousness that makes this idea
interesting. Otherwise, it's like claiming that a block of marble
contains any given statue: in a sense it's true, but you need a
sculptor to allow the statue to interact
On 17 Nov 2008, at 16:22, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 16, 2008, at 6:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Some believe that for having a real conscious person, you have to
implement it in a real primary material universe. It is clearly what
Peter Jones thinks. I am saying that a person can be fully
Günther Greindl wrote:
Hello Brent,
That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that
happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. But
these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical
objects. Those objects are not in
2008/11/16 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then
every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not
the null state?
I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any
computation can be mapped
2008/11/16 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then
every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not
the null state?
I'm not sure that works. In the original idea the mapping was to be
one-to-one (which is
On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:22 PM, m.a. wrote:
Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event,
whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that
substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called physical
existence?
That's certainly the prevailing
On 15 Nov 2008, at 12:12, Michael Rosefield wrote:
Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness,
racketeering, or just an attempt to push his own reality in a
certain direction on the character's part.
For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible
Hi Kory,
nicely put (the below), it captures my current metaphysical position
quite accurately :-)
Cheers,
Günther
Imagine again the mathematical description of Conway's Life applied to
the binary digits of PI. Somewhere within that description there may
be descriptions of beings who
If there is a split, does it create differentiated consciousnesses? I doubt
it. Perhaps there are two main causes of splitting: where an event would
cause different 'observables', or where an event by necessity breaks the
mechanism of consciousness into different streams. In the latter case, there
*I wonder whether my selves, after a split, retain their memories from
the world before the split or now have all the memories appropriate to
the self in the new universe. Theoretically of course, they wouldn't
know the difference, but it seems strange to think that we might
perceive entirely
Surely the split is from a single history to multiple histories consistent
with the original? Sure, you could say we move from identity to identity at
random, but that is unlikely under QM and should be similarly improbable
from any other metatheory.
2008/11/17 m.a. [EMAIL PROTECTED]
*I wonder
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Nov 2008, at 19:46, Brent Meeker wrote:
That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event
that
happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function.
But
these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical
Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness, racketeering, or
just an attempt to push his own reality in a certain direction on the
character's part.
For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible
computations is that you end up with no possible way of knowing
2008/11/15 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Actually, I think my formulation already goes further than the theory
outlined in PC. Although it's a subtle point, I get the feeling that
reality in PC is still materialist, in the sense that at the root
there still is material stuff which is
2008/11/15 Michael Rosefield [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness, racketeering, or
just an attempt to push his own reality in a certain direction on the
character's part.
For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible
computations
2008/11/15 Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
2008/11/15 Michael Rosefield [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
'Nothing' := 'Something' - 'Everything'
Just what I was saying!
I was about to say that...
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are
is on but nobody's home?
Gordon
--- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM
On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 12
*Is it wrong to ask what the lattice is made of? Isn't some sort of
substrate necessary for any mathematical event, whether it be a brain or
a screen or a universe? And isn't that substrate sufficiently different
from the math to be called physical existence?
m.a.
*
Kory Heath wrote
On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then
every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not
the null state?
I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any
computation
If you look at the structure and relationships of maths, it's all rather an
incestuous family tree anyway. You can get from any one point to another if
you try hard enough. It's like 6 degrees of Kevin Bacon. Now think of any
physical system embedded in the maths. It's easy enough to get to other
Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then
every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not
the null state?
I'm not sure that works. In the original idea the
2008/11/14 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be
interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the
conclusion. So ...
Yes, I'd be interested in an explanation of the MGA in English; I read
French only with
I've always thought - and this might just be betraying my lack of
understanding - that these are simply two sides of the same coin: we can't
distinguish between these quantum events, so we can consider ourselves as
either being a classical being 'above' a sea of quantum noise, or as being a
bundle
Hi Brent,
On 14 Nov 2008, at 07:02, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think there is a misunderstanding of the MWI. Although the
details haven't
been worked out (and maybe they won't be, c.f. Dowker and Kent) it
is generally
thought that you, as a big hot macroscopic body, do not split into
On 14 Nov 2008, at 11:54, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2008/11/14 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be
interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the
conclusion. So ...
Yes, I'd be interested in an
Hi Bruno,
a very cool series of posts.
I would also like to express my interest in your MGA argument (my French
is very rusty). I have read the Maudlin Olympia paper, but would like to
hear your version.
Cheers,
Günther
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this
On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will
have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember
that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not
Bruno Marchal skrev:
For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me,
i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness.
There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a
materialist can and even should interpret this as a
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Brent,
On 14 Nov 2008, at 07:02, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think there is a misunderstanding of the MWI. Although the
details haven't
been worked out (and maybe they won't be, c.f. Dowker and Kent) it
is generally
thought that you, as a big hot macroscopic
Thanks Günther. A long time ago Russell asks me to explain the UDA,
and I have made the first presentation of it into steps for the
everything-list. It was UDA in 15 steps, and it has converge to 7
steps, and that has helped a bit. I have also made on the list (with
Joel, George and
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will
have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember
that only *person* are
On 14 Nov 2008, at 18:43, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and
me,
i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness.
There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material.
Now a
On Fri, 2008-11-14 at 10:46 -0800, Brent Meeker wrote:
That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that
happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. But
these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical
objects. Those
On Nov 13, 2008, at 10:02 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think there is a misunderstanding of the MWI.
Ok. I wanted to try putting things in terms of the MWI rather than a
more extreme version of many-worlds like Bruno's, since a lot more
people accept the MWI. But of course, I can make the
On Nov 14, 2008, at 9:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Now a computationalist cannot say I believe that persons represented
by unimplemented computations are conscious for the reason that all
computations have to be implemented.
Ok, I see your point. Computations are actions that people (or
Take this level of abstraction much further and what you have essentially is
the 'dust theory' from Greg Egan's Permutation City.
--
- Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven?
- Mmm.
- That was me... and six other guys.
2008/11/15 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Nov
On Nov 14, 2008, at 5:09 PM, Michael Rosefield wrote:
Take this level of abstraction much further and what you have
essentially is the 'dust theory' from Greg Egan's Permutation City.
Actually, I think my formulation already goes further than the theory
outlined in PC. Although it's a
2008/11/13 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to
tell us what he means by a physical universe.
I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say,
What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe. What's
On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the
argument
with people interested in the matter.
True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.)
Second, it happens that sometimes
PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM
On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
First, I have never stop to work
On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will
have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember
that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be
it soft or hard wired).
Good point.
Kory Heath wrote:
Sorry for the long delay on this reply.
On Nov 2, 2008, at 7:04 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Kory Heath wrote:
In this mundane sense, it's perfectly sensible for me to say, as I'm
sitting here typing this email, I expect to still be sitting in this
room one second from now.
On Nov 11, 2008, at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The problem with Dennett is that he takes physical reality for
granted.
I agree. But from his perspective, the burden is on us to explain why
we can't take physical reality for granted. I've never seen the
arguments laid out quite clearly
On 11 Nov 2008, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will
have to
On 11 Nov 2008, at 22:44, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Nov 11, 2008 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
PS I think I see the point that you are still
I think the most compelling arguments against a fundamental physical reality
go along the lines of starting with one, and showing you can abstract away
from it until it becomes just another arbitrary perspective.
--
- Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven?
- Mmm.
- That
On 12 Nov 2008, at 12:11, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 11, 2008, at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The problem with Dennett is that he takes physical reality for
granted.
I agree. But from his perspective, the burden is on us to explain why
we can't take physical reality for granted.
On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the argument
with people interested in the matter.
True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.)
Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to
tell us what he
Hi Brent,
On 09 Nov 2008, at 20:29, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
You don't get the point. Mechanism is incompatible with naturalism.
To
solve the mind body problem, keeping mechanism, the laws of physicist
have to be explained from computer science, even from the gap
Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 09 Nov 2008, at 20:29, Brent Meeker wrote:
Many physicists think that an ultimate theory would be
discrete,
This is highly implausible, assuming comp. I know that if we want
quantize gravitation, then space and time should be quantized, but
then I hope
On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to
explain that whatever the physical universe is, in the case I am
Turing
emulable, the physical
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to
explain that whatever the physical universe
On Tue, Nov 11, 2008 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to
explain that whatever the
John,
I meant loosely a universe conceivable by anyone (that might conceivably
exist [?]), not limited to human conceptions.
Jason
On Tue, Nov 11, 2008 at 1:30 PM, John Mikes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Jason, I don't have anything against your question just pick one expression
from your post:
Le 09-nov.-08, à 20:29, Brent Meeker a écrit :
You don't get the point. Mechanism is incompatible with naturalism. To
solve the mind body problem, keeping mechanism, the laws of physicist
have to be explained from computer science, even from the gap between
computer science and computer's
On Nov 9, 2008, at 3:24 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
I'm with you and Dennett - except I'm reserved about the use of
logical
possibility.
Fair enough. I might be misusing that term. Maybe a better way to
state my position would be that I think the standard conception of
philosophical zombie
On Nov 7, 2008, at 10:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Do you understand that if comp is false, then arithmetical truth
contains (immaterial) zombies (because it contains already the
relative implementations of all solutions of Schroedinger equations
and variant, if only that for example ...)?
On Nov 7, 2008, at 9:34 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think I agree with Bruno that it is *logically* possible, e.g.
accidental zombies. It's just not nomologically possible.
I'm not sure what counts as an accidental zombie. Do you mean
something like the following:
I can write a very short
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