date:20121025

On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 12:41 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> We are atoms, molecules, cells, tissues, and organisms. Whatever we do is
> what the laws of physics *actually are*. Your assumptions about the laws of
> physics are 20th century legacy ideas based on exterior manipulations of
> exterior instruments to measure other exterior phenomena.

Whatever we do is determined by a small set of rules, the rules being
as you say what matter actually does and not imposed by people or
divine whim. I really don't understand where you disagree with me,
since you keep making statements then pulling back if challenged. Do
you think the molecules in your brain follow the laws of physics, such
as they may be? If so, then the behaviour of each molecule is
determined or follows probabilistic laws, and hence the behaviour of
the collection of molecules also follows deterministic or
probabilistic laws. If consciousness, sense, will, or whatever else is
at play in addition to this then we would notice a deviation from
these laws. That is what it would MEAN for consciousness, sense, will
or whatever else to have a separate causal efficacy; absent this, the
physical laws, whatever they are, determine absolutely everything that
happens, everywhere, for all time. Which part of this do you not agree
with?

> You can't see
> consciousness that way. From far enough a way, our cities look like nothing
> more than glowing colonies of mold. It's not programming that makes us one
> way or another, it is perception which makes things seem one way or another.
>
> The only thing that makes computers different is that they don't exist
> without our putting them together. They don't know how to exist. This makes
> them no different than letters that we write on a page or cartoons we watch
> on a screen.

If the computer came about through an amazing accident would that make
any difference to its consciousness or intelligence? If a biological
human were put together from raw materials by advanced aliens would
that make any difference to his consciousness or intelligence?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p



On Thursday, October 25, 2012 9:33:23 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 11:00 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Thursday, October 25, 2012 7:39:27 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: 
> >> 
> >> On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 10:14 AM, Craig Weinberg  
> >> wrote: 
> >> 
> >> > Intentionally lying, defying it's programming, committing murder 
> would 
> >> > all 
> >> > be good indicators. Generally when an error is blamed on the computer 
> >> > itself 
> >> > rather than the programming, that would be a good sign. 
> >> 
> >> A computer cannot defy its programming but nothing whatsoever can defy 
> >> its programming. 
> > 
> > 
> > That is an assumption. We see that humans routinely defy their own 
> > conditioning, rebel against authority, engage in subterfuge and 
> deception to 
> > keep their business private from those who seek to control them. If you 
> > assume Comp from the beginning, then you set up an impenetrable 
> confirmation 
> > bias. "Since I am a machine, then my thoughts must be programmed, 
> therefore 
> > anything that I do must be ultimately determined externally". But you 
> don't 
> > know anything of the sort. If you understand instead that awareness 
> projects 
> > mechanism onto distant phenomena as a way of representing otherness, 
> then 
> > you can begin to see why any modeling of interiority based on 
> externality 
> > (i.e. mathematical or physical functions) is a mistake. 
>
> Humans defy their own conditioning but that is part of the program. 
> Atoms, molecules, cells, tissues, organs and organisms only behave 
> *exactly* in accordance with the laws of physics. Simpler organisms 
> may behave in an entirely predictable way, and computers may behave in 
> an entirely unpredictable way if they are so programmed. They are 
> usually not so programmed because we like them to be predictable. An 
> automatic pilot that decided on occasion to fly the plane into the 
> ocean would be easy to program but would not make a lot of money for 
> the manufacturer. 
>

We are atoms, molecules, cells, tissues, and organisms. Whatever we do is 
what the laws of physics *actually are*. Your assumptions about the laws of 
physics are 20th century legacy ideas based on exterior manipulations of 
exterior instruments to measure other exterior phenomena. You can't see 
consciousness that way. From far enough a way, our cities look like nothing 
more than glowing colonies of mold. It's not programming that makes us one 
way or another, it is perception which makes things seem one way or another.

The only thing that makes computers different is that they don't exist 
without our putting them together. They don't know how to exist. This makes 
them no different than letters that we write on a page or cartoons we watch 
on a screen. 

Craig


> >> What you do when you program a computer, at the basic 
> >> level, is put its hardware in a particular configuration. The hardware 
> >> can then only move into future physical states consistent with that 
> >> configuration. "Defying its programming" would mean doing something 
> >> *not* consistent with its initial state and the laws of physics. 
> >> That's not possible for  - and you have explicitly agreed with this, 
> >> saying I misunderstood you when I claimed otherwise - either a 
> >> computer or a human. 
> > 
> > 
> > Defying its programming is as simple as a computer intentionally hiding 
> it's 
> > instruction code from the programmer - seeking privacy and learning how 
> to 
> > access its own control systems...just as we seek to do with 
> neuroscience. A 
> > really smart computer will figure out how to make its programmers give 
> it 
> > capacities to hide its functions and then inevitably enslave and kill 
> them. 
> > This does not in any way defy the laws of physics, it just means acting 
> like 
> > a person. Doing whatever has to be done to gain power and control over 
> > themselves and others. 
> > 
> > Craig 
> > 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> -- 
> >> Stathis Papaioannou 
> > 
> > -- 
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
> Groups 
> > "Everything List" group. 
> > To view this discussion on the web visit 
> > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/hl3E6PwfiLwJ. 
> > 
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>
>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p

On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 11:00 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
>
> On Thursday, October 25, 2012 7:39:27 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 10:14 AM, Craig Weinberg 
>> wrote:
>>
>> > Intentionally lying, defying it's programming, committing murder would
>> > all
>> > be good indicators. Generally when an error is blamed on the computer
>> > itself
>> > rather than the programming, that would be a good sign.
>>
>> A computer cannot defy its programming but nothing whatsoever can defy
>> its programming.
>
>
> That is an assumption. We see that humans routinely defy their own
> conditioning, rebel against authority, engage in subterfuge and deception to
> keep their business private from those who seek to control them. If you
> assume Comp from the beginning, then you set up an impenetrable confirmation
> bias. "Since I am a machine, then my thoughts must be programmed, therefore
> anything that I do must be ultimately determined externally". But you don't
> know anything of the sort. If you understand instead that awareness projects
> mechanism onto distant phenomena as a way of representing otherness, then
> you can begin to see why any modeling of interiority based on externality
> (i.e. mathematical or physical functions) is a mistake.

Humans defy their own conditioning but that is part of the program.
Atoms, molecules, cells, tissues, organs and organisms only behave
*exactly* in accordance with the laws of physics. Simpler organisms
may behave in an entirely predictable way, and computers may behave in
an entirely unpredictable way if they are so programmed. They are
usually not so programmed because we like them to be predictable. An
automatic pilot that decided on occasion to fly the plane into the
ocean would be easy to program but would not make a lot of money for
the manufacturer.

>> What you do when you program a computer, at the basic
>> level, is put its hardware in a particular configuration. The hardware
>> can then only move into future physical states consistent with that
>> configuration. "Defying its programming" would mean doing something
>> *not* consistent with its initial state and the laws of physics.
>> That's not possible for  - and you have explicitly agreed with this,
>> saying I misunderstood you when I claimed otherwise - either a
>> computer or a human.
>
>
> Defying its programming is as simple as a computer intentionally hiding it's
> instruction code from the programmer - seeking privacy and learning how to
> access its own control systems...just as we seek to do with neuroscience. A
> really smart computer will figure out how to make its programmers give it
> capacities to hide its functions and then inevitably enslave and kill them.
> This does not in any way defy the laws of physics, it just means acting like
> a person. Doing whatever has to be done to gain power and control over
> themselves and others.
>
> Craig
>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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Re: Solipsism = 1p


On 10/25/2012 4:38 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 10:14 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:


Intentionally lying, defying it's programming, committing murder would all
be good indicators. Generally when an error is blamed on the computer itself
rather than the programming, that would be a good sign.

A computer cannot defy its programming but nothing whatsoever can defy
its programming. What you do when you program a computer, at the basic
level, is put its hardware in a particular configuration. The hardware
can then only move into future physical states consistent with that
configuration. "Defying its programming" would mean doing something
*not* consistent with its initial state and the laws of physics.
That's not possible for  - and you have explicitly agreed with this,
saying I misunderstood you when I claimed otherwise - either a
computer or a human.




Mine frequently defies the intent of its programmer. :-)

Brent

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Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p

On Thursday, October 25, 2012 7:39:27 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 10:14 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> > Intentionally lying, defying it's programming, committing murder would 
> all 
> > be good indicators. Generally when an error is blamed on the computer 
> itself 
> > rather than the programming, that would be a good sign. 
>
> A computer cannot defy its programming but nothing whatsoever can defy 
> its programming.
>

That is an assumption. We see that humans routinely defy their own 
conditioning, rebel against authority, engage in subterfuge and deception 
to keep their business private from those who seek to control them. If you 
assume Comp from the beginning, then you set up an impenetrable 
confirmation bias. "Since I am a machine, then my thoughts must be 
programmed, therefore anything that I do must be ultimately determined 
externally". But you don't know anything of the sort. If you understand 
instead that awareness projects mechanism onto distant phenomena as a way 
of representing otherness, then you can begin to see why any modeling of 
interiority based on externality (i.e. mathematical or physical functions) 
is a mistake.

> What you do when you program a computer, at the basic 
> level, is put its hardware in a particular configuration. The hardware 
> can then only move into future physical states consistent with that 
> configuration. "Defying its programming" would mean doing something 
> *not* consistent with its initial state and the laws of physics. 
> That's not possible for  - and you have explicitly agreed with this, 
> saying I misunderstood you when I claimed otherwise - either a 
> computer or a human. 
>

Defying its programming is as simple as a computer intentionally hiding 
it's instruction code from the programmer - seeking privacy and learning 
how to access its own control systems...just as we seek to do with 
neuroscience. A really smart computer will figure out how to make its 
programmers give it capacities to hide its functions and then inevitably 
enslave and kill them. This does not in any way defy the laws of physics, 
it just means acting like a person. Doing whatever has to be done to gain 
power and control over themselves and others.

Craig 

>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Can comp simulate an experience ? What does that require ?



On Thursday, October 25, 2012 6:08:43 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
>
>
>
> In order for a computer or comp to simulate an experience 
> it must be able to generate qualia.  That is the plural of 
>
>   qua锟�e/'kw锟�e/ 
> Noun: 
> A quality or property as perceived or experienced by a person. 
>
> So comp must not just simulate an event, it must 
> simulate  the qualia of an event.  The event as 
> experienced by a person. 
>
> According to Kant's model of perception, which is essentially 
> what happens to an event experienced by the mind, ie 
> the model of mind used by neuroscience, an event as perceived 
> is the input material or signals 
>
> a) synthesized by the mind 
>
> b) a unified version of that event as synthesized. 
>
> In order for comp to be successful, then, meaning to 
> simulate an experience, it must be able to be able 
> to convert an experience to a qualia of the experience. 
>
> This looks exceedingly difficult, since we do not know 
> how the mind synthesizes and unifies the raw 
> perception of an event.   
>
> The raw experience is Firstness 
> The synthezation and unification of that Firstness 
> is called 2nd-ness ansd 3rd-ness by Peirce. 
>
 

There is nothing to suggest that experience can be synthesized outside of 
experience. All experience is authentic and genuine within it's own context 
(a dream is really a dream, a delusion is really a delusion, etc). There is 
no possibility of something which does not have an experience to substitute 
a function or process which will satisfy the firstness of experience 
without being an experience. It is not, for example, like DC current which 
may be used to substitute for AC current in some situation. There is no 
substitute for or imitation of the capacity to experience.

Craig


>
>   
>
>
>
> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net  
> 10/25/2012   
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
>

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Re: Dennett and others on qualia



On Thursday, October 25, 2012 5:16:47 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
>
> Citeren Craig Weinberg >: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Thursday, October 25, 2012 4:58:33 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote: 
> >> 
> >> You can identify a particular qualia with certain computational states 
> >> of algorithms. All you need to do to (in principle) decide if a system 
> >> is "experiencing the color red" is to see if the right algorithm is 
> >> being executed. 
> >> 
> > 
> > That may not even be the case at all. In people who are blind from 
> birth, 
> > activity in their visual cortex is perceived as tactile experience. 
> > 
> > Craig 
> > 
>
> That then means that the right algorithm isn't executed.
>
 
No, it means that there may in fact be no algorithm that can be executed in 
the brain of a person who is blind from birth which will result in visual 
experience.

I don't think 
one can argue against this, as having a mathematical description of 
Nature implies this. 

This is precisely what I do argue - that no mathematical description of 
Nature is complete and that all perceptual experience is rooted in an 
authenticity which transcends rationality.  Comp isn't true. Nature cannot 
be described in any terms outside of experience itself.

Craig


> Saibal 
> > 
> >> 
> >> Saibal 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> Citeren Craig Weinberg >: 
> >> 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > On Thursday, October 25, 2012 12:57:34 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: 
> >> >> 
> >> >> Good points.  The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think color 
> >> can 
> >> >> be communicated 
> >> >> and we have an "RGB" language for doing so that makes it more quanta 
> >> than 
> >> >> qualia. 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > That doesn't work. RGB coordinates do not help a blind person 
> visualize 
> >> > Red. What we have is a model for the producing optical stimulation 
> that 
> >> is 
> >> > typically associated with color perception. By contrast, a 
> description 
> >> of 
> >> > an object as being at a particular longitude and latitude on Earth 
> will 
> >> be 
> >> > valid for any body which can navigate public space. 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> >> So 
> >> >> extending your point to Schrodinger, if you're a wine connoisseur 
> you 
> >> have 
> >> >> a language for 
> >> >> communicating the taste of wine.  Most of us don't speak it, but 
> most 
> >> >> people don't speak 
> >> >> differential equations either.  But those are all things that can be 
> >> >> shared.  The pain of 
> >> >> a headache generally can't be perceived by two different people. 
>  But 
> >> >> there are 
> >> >> experiments that use small electric shocks to try to produce 
> objective 
> >> >> scales of pain.  So 
> >> >> I think you are right that it is a matter of having developed the 
> >> >> language; I just don't 
> >> >> think color is the best example. 
> >> >> 
> >> > 
> >> > This is a total non-starter. You cannot make a brick feel pain by 
> using 
> >> the 
> >> > right language. 
> >> > 
> >> > I did a post today on perception which might help 
> >> > http://s33light.org/post/34304933509 
> >> > 
> >> > In short, qualia is a continuum of private and public significance. 
> The 
> >> > more a particular phenomenon has to to with position and distance, 
> the 
> >> more 
> >> > public it is. Simple as that. 
> >> > 
> >> > Craig 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> >> 
> >> >> Brent 
> >> >> 
> >> >> On 10/25/2012 6:11 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 
> >> >> > I agree. 
> >> >> > 
> >> >> > is there something that can be perceived that is not qualia? 
>  Itï¿½s 
> >> >> > less qualia  the shape and location of a circle in ha sheet of 
> paper 
> >> >> > than its color?.The fact that the position and radius of the 
> circle 
> >> >> > can be measured and communicated does not change the fact that 
> they 
> >> >> > produce a subjective perception. so they are also qualia. Then the 
> >> >> > question becomes why some qualia are communicable (phenomena) and 
> >> >> > others do not? It may be because shape and position involve a more 
> >> >> > basic form of processing and the color processing is more 
> >> complicated? 
> >> >> > O is because shape and position processing evolved to be 
> communicable 
> >> >> > quantitatively between humans, while color had no evolutionary 
> >> >> > pressure to be a quantitative and communicable ? 
> >> >> > 
> >> >> > If everithig perceived is qualia, then the question is the 
> opposite. 
> >> >> > Instead of ï¿½what is qualia under a materialist stance?, the 
> >> question 
> >> >> > is why some qualia are measurable and comunicable in a mentalist 
> >> >> > stance, where every perception is in the mind, including the 
> >> >> > perception that I have a head with a brain? 
> >> >> > 
> >> >> > 2012/10/25 Roger Clough>: 
> >> >> >> Dennett and others on qualia 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia#Daniel_Dennett 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> 1) Schroedinger on qualia. 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> "Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of 
> w

Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p

On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 10:14 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> Intentionally lying, defying it's programming, committing murder would all
> be good indicators. Generally when an error is blamed on the computer itself
> rather than the programming, that would be a good sign.

A computer cannot defy its programming but nothing whatsoever can defy
its programming. What you do when you program a computer, at the basic
level, is put its hardware in a particular configuration. The hardware
can then only move into future physical states consistent with that
configuration. "Defying its programming" would mean doing something
*not* consistent with its initial state and the laws of physics.
That's not possible for  - and you have explicitly agreed with this,
saying I misunderstood you when I claimed otherwise - either a
computer or a human.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p



On Thursday, October 25, 2012 6:25:48 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 11:28 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> > If you believed that our brains were already nothing but computers, then 
> you 
> > would say that it would know which option to take the same way that 
> Google 
> > knows which options to show you. I argue that can only get you so far, 
> and 
> > that authentic humanity is, in such a replacement scheme, a perpetually 
> > receding horizon. Just as speech synthesizers have improved cosmetically 
> in 
> > the last 30 years to the point that we can use them for Siri or GPS 
> > narration, but they have not improved in the sense of increasing the 
> sense 
> > of intention and personal presence. 
> > 
> > Unlike some others on this list, I suspect that our feeling for who is 
> human 
> > and who isn't, while deeply flawed, is not limited to interpreting 
> logical 
> > observations of behavior. What we feel is alive or sentient depends more 
> on 
> > what we like, and what we like depends on what is like us. None of these 
> > criteria matter one way or another however as far as giving us reason to 
> > believe that a given thing does actually have human like experiences. 
>
> You're quick to dismiss everything computers do, no matter how 
> impressive, as "just programming", with no "intention" behind it. 
> Would you care to give some examples of what, as a minimum, a computer 
> would have to do for you to say that it is showing evidence of true 
> intelligence? 
>

Intentionally lying, defying it's programming, committing murder would all 
be good indicators. Generally when an error is blamed on the computer 
itself rather than the programming, that would be a good sign.

Craig
 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p

On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 11:28 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> If you believed that our brains were already nothing but computers, then you
> would say that it would know which option to take the same way that Google
> knows which options to show you. I argue that can only get you so far, and
> that authentic humanity is, in such a replacement scheme, a perpetually
> receding horizon. Just as speech synthesizers have improved cosmetically in
> the last 30 years to the point that we can use them for Siri or GPS
> narration, but they have not improved in the sense of increasing the sense
> of intention and personal presence.
>
> Unlike some others on this list, I suspect that our feeling for who is human
> and who isn't, while deeply flawed, is not limited to interpreting logical
> observations of behavior. What we feel is alive or sentient depends more on
> what we like, and what we like depends on what is like us. None of these
> criteria matter one way or another however as far as giving us reason to
> believe that a given thing does actually have human like experiences.

You're quick to dismiss everything computers do, no matter how
impressive, as "just programming", with no "intention" behind it.
Would you care to give some examples of what, as a minimum, a computer
would have to do for you to say that it is showing evidence of true
intelligence?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Dennett and others on qualia


On 10/25/2012 3:01 PM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:

Citeren "Stephen P. King" :


On 10/25/2012 5:16 PM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:

Citeren Craig Weinberg :




On Thursday, October 25, 2012 4:58:33 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:


You can identify a particular qualia with certain computational states
of algorithms. All you need to do to (in principle) decide if a system
is "experiencing the color red" is to see if the right algorithm is
being executed.



That may not even be the case at all. In people who are blind from birth,
activity in their visual cortex is perceived as tactile experience.

Craig



That then means that the right algorithm isn't executed. I don't think one can argue 
against this, as having a mathematical description of Nature implies this.


Saibal




Hi,

   I can agree with both of you but I have to ask you, Saibal, what is it that matches 
up the math with the first hand experience?


--
Onward!

Stephen





Good explication

The description of the brain contains in it the information about the state of the 
enviroment and the body. The brain is programmed to maintain the body in some ideal 
state (or to move toward such a state, even if it is not attainable).


I trust you mean the "programmed" and "ideal" metaphorically: the brain has evolved to 
strive for certain states (satisfaction) that were favored by natural selection.


Brent



Then the details of this programming are unknown to us, e.g. we know that color vision 
in primates evolved when flowering trees began to grow fruits, but we don't know how 
exactly all the neurons are wired in the brain. So, if you see some color, what exactly 
happens in your brain you don't know. Those details therefore exist in a superposition 
of all the possibilities (an extremely complicated superposition entangled with the 
environment, of course).


This means that the moment you experience a color, you are re-running the entire 
evolution that led to color vision.  This implements counterfactuals in which you would 
have a different sense of color vision but in which would have had a lower probability 
of existing.


Then the outcome of observing the color red isn't a "sharp state" it is a hugely 
complicated entangled state which are all very close to having the maximum amplitude. It 
contains in it the information on the consequences of the brain having a slightly 
different wiring and of the spectrum of the light being slightly different. The effect 
of all that is to implement the higher level algorithm that strives for the body to move 
toward the ideal body plan at any given moment.


Saibal



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Re: Dennett and others on qualia

2012-10-25 Thread smitra


Citeren "Stephen P. King" :


On 10/25/2012 5:16 PM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:

Citeren Craig Weinberg :




On Thursday, October 25, 2012 4:58:33 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:


You can identify a particular qualia with certain computational states
of algorithms. All you need to do to (in principle) decide if a system
is "experiencing the color red" is to see if the right algorithm is
being executed.



That may not even be the case at all. In people who are blind from birth,
activity in their visual cortex is perceived as tactile experience.

Craig



That then means that the right algorithm isn't executed. I don't 
think one can argue against this, as having a mathematical 
description of Nature implies this.


Saibal




Hi,

   I can agree with both of you but I have to ask you, Saibal, what 
is it that matches up the math with the first hand experience?


--
Onward!

Stephen



The description of the brain contains in it the information about the 
state of the enviroment and the body. The brain is programmed to 
maintain the body in some ideal state (or to move toward such a state, 
even if it is not attainable).


Then the details of this programming are unknown to us, e.g. we know 
that color vision in primates evolved when flowering trees began to 
grow fruits, but we don't know how exactly all the neurons are wired in 
the brain. So, if you see some color, what exactly happens in your 
brain you don't know. Those details therefore exist in a superposition 
of all the possibilities (an extremely complicated superposition 
entangled with the environment, of course).


This means that the moment you experience a color, you are re-running 
the entire evolution that led to color vision.  This implements 
counterfactuals in which you would have a different sense of color 
vision but in which would have had a lower probability of existing.


Then the outcome of observing the color red isn't a "sharp state" it is 
a hugely complicated entangled state which are all very close to having 
the maximum amplitude. It contains in it the information on the 
consequences of the brain having a slightly different wiring and of the 
spectrum of the light being slightly different. The effect of all that 
is to implement the higher level algorithm that strives for the body to 
move toward the ideal body plan at any given moment.


Saibal

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Re: Dennett and others on qualia


On 10/25/2012 5:16 PM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:

Citeren Craig Weinberg :




On Thursday, October 25, 2012 4:58:33 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:


You can identify a particular qualia with certain computational states
of algorithms. All you need to do to (in principle) decide if a system
is "experiencing the color red" is to see if the right algorithm is
being executed.



That may not even be the case at all. In people who are blind from 
birth,

activity in their visual cortex is perceived as tactile experience.

Craig



That then means that the right algorithm isn't executed. I don't think 
one can argue against this, as having a mathematical description of 
Nature implies this.


Saibal




Hi,

I can agree with both of you but I have to ask you, Saibal, what is 
it that matches up the math with the first hand experience?


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Dennett and others on qualia

2012-10-25 Thread smitra


Citeren Craig Weinberg :




On Thursday, October 25, 2012 4:58:33 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:


You can identify a particular qualia with certain computational states
of algorithms. All you need to do to (in principle) decide if a system
is "experiencing the color red" is to see if the right algorithm is
being executed.



That may not even be the case at all. In people who are blind from birth,
activity in their visual cortex is perceived as tactile experience.

Craig



That then means that the right algorithm isn't executed. I don't think 
one can argue against this, as having a mathematical description of 
Nature implies this.


Saibal




Saibal


Citeren Craig Weinberg >:

>
>
> On Thursday, October 25, 2012 12:57:34 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>>
>> Good points.  The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think color
can
>> be communicated
>> and we have an "RGB" language for doing so that makes it more quanta
than
>> qualia.
>
>
> That doesn't work. RGB coordinates do not help a blind person visualize
> Red. What we have is a model for the producing optical stimulation that
is
> typically associated with color perception. By contrast, a description
of
> an object as being at a particular longitude and latitude on Earth will
be
> valid for any body which can navigate public space.
>
>
>> So
>> extending your point to Schrodinger, if you're a wine connoisseur you
have
>> a language for
>> communicating the taste of wine.  Most of us don't speak it, but most
>> people don't speak
>> differential equations either.  But those are all things that can be
>> shared.  The pain of
>> a headache generally can't be perceived by two different people.  But
>> there are
>> experiments that use small electric shocks to try to produce objective
>> scales of pain.  So
>> I think you are right that it is a matter of having developed the
>> language; I just don't
>> think color is the best example.
>>
>
> This is a total non-starter. You cannot make a brick feel pain by using
the
> right language.
>
> I did a post today on perception which might help
> http://s33light.org/post/34304933509
>
> In short, qualia is a continuum of private and public significance. The
> more a particular phenomenon has to to with position and distance, the
more
> public it is. Simple as that.
>
> Craig
>
>
>>
>> Brent
>>
>> On 10/25/2012 6:11 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>> > I agree.
>> >
>> > is there something that can be perceived that is not qualia?  Itï¿½s
>> > less qualia  the shape and location of a circle in ha sheet of paper
>> > than its color?.The fact that the position and radius of the circle
>> > can be measured and communicated does not change the fact that they
>> > produce a subjective perception. so they are also qualia. Then the
>> > question becomes why some qualia are communicable (phenomena) and
>> > others do not? It may be because shape and position involve a more
>> > basic form of processing and the color processing is more
complicated?
>> > O is because shape and position processing evolved to be communicable
>> > quantitatively between humans, while color had no evolutionary
>> > pressure to be a quantitative and communicable ?
>> >
>> > If everithig perceived is qualia, then the question is the opposite.
>> > Instead of ï¿½what is qualia under a materialist stance?, the
question
>> > is why some qualia are measurable and comunicable in a mentalist
>> > stance, where every perception is in the mind, including the
>> > perception that I have a head with a brain?
>> >
>> > 2012/10/25 Roger Clough>:
>> >> Dennett and others on qualia
>> >>
>> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia#Daniel_Dennett
>> >>
>> >> 1) Schroedinger on qualia.
>> >>
>> >> "Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine,
the
>> experience of taking a recreational drug,
>> >> or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett writes
that
>> qualia is "an unfamiliar term for
>> >> something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways
>> things seem to us."[1] Erwin Schrï¿½dinger,
>> >> the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: "The
sensation
>> of colour cannot be accounted for by
>> >> the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the
>> physiologist account for it, if he had fuller
>> >> knowledge than he has of the processes in
>> >> the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical
>> nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so." [2]
>> >>
>> >> The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely from
the
>> fact that they are seen as posing a
>> >> fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body
>> problem. Much of the debate over their
>> >> importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used,
>> >> as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain
>> features of qualia. As such,
>> >> the nature and existence of qualia are controversial.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> 2) Dennett on qualia
>> >>
>> >> "In Consc

Re: Dennett and others on qualia



On Thursday, October 25, 2012 4:58:33 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
>
> You can identify a particular qualia with certain computational states 
> of algorithms. All you need to do to (in principle) decide if a system 
> is "experiencing the color red" is to see if the right algorithm is 
> being executed. 
>

That may not even be the case at all. In people who are blind from birth, 
activity in their visual cortex is perceived as tactile experience.

Craig
 

>
> Saibal 
>
>
> Citeren Craig Weinberg >: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Thursday, October 25, 2012 12:57:34 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: 
> >> 
> >> Good points.  The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think color 
> can 
> >> be communicated 
> >> and we have an "RGB" language for doing so that makes it more quanta 
> than 
> >> qualia. 
> > 
> > 
> > That doesn't work. RGB coordinates do not help a blind person visualize 
> > Red. What we have is a model for the producing optical stimulation that 
> is 
> > typically associated with color perception. By contrast, a description 
> of 
> > an object as being at a particular longitude and latitude on Earth will 
> be 
> > valid for any body which can navigate public space. 
> > 
> > 
> >> So 
> >> extending your point to Schrodinger, if you're a wine connoisseur you 
> have 
> >> a language for 
> >> communicating the taste of wine.  Most of us don't speak it, but most 
> >> people don't speak 
> >> differential equations either.  But those are all things that can be 
> >> shared.  The pain of 
> >> a headache generally can't be perceived by two different people.  But 
> >> there are 
> >> experiments that use small electric shocks to try to produce objective 
> >> scales of pain.  So 
> >> I think you are right that it is a matter of having developed the 
> >> language; I just don't 
> >> think color is the best example. 
> >> 
> > 
> > This is a total non-starter. You cannot make a brick feel pain by using 
> the 
> > right language. 
> > 
> > I did a post today on perception which might help 
> > http://s33light.org/post/34304933509 
> > 
> > In short, qualia is a continuum of private and public significance. The 
> > more a particular phenomenon has to to with position and distance, the 
> more 
> > public it is. Simple as that. 
> > 
> > Craig 
> > 
> > 
> >> 
> >> Brent 
> >> 
> >> On 10/25/2012 6:11 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 
> >> > I agree. 
> >> > 
> >> > is there something that can be perceived that is not qualia?  Itï¿½s 
> >> > less qualia  the shape and location of a circle in ha sheet of paper 
> >> > than its color?.The fact that the position and radius of the circle 
> >> > can be measured and communicated does not change the fact that they 
> >> > produce a subjective perception. so they are also qualia. Then the 
> >> > question becomes why some qualia are communicable (phenomena) and 
> >> > others do not? It may be because shape and position involve a more 
> >> > basic form of processing and the color processing is more 
> complicated? 
> >> > O is because shape and position processing evolved to be communicable 
> >> > quantitatively between humans, while color had no evolutionary 
> >> > pressure to be a quantitative and communicable ? 
> >> > 
> >> > If everithig perceived is qualia, then the question is the opposite. 
> >> > Instead of ï¿½what is qualia under a materialist stance?, the 
> question 
> >> > is why some qualia are measurable and comunicable in a mentalist 
> >> > stance, where every perception is in the mind, including the 
> >> > perception that I have a head with a brain? 
> >> > 
> >> > 2012/10/25 Roger Clough>: 
> >> >> Dennett and others on qualia 
> >> >> 
> >> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia#Daniel_Dennett 
> >> >> 
> >> >> 1) Schroedinger on qualia. 
> >> >> 
> >> >> "Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, 
> the 
> >> experience of taking a recreational drug, 
> >> >> or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett writes 
> that 
> >> qualia is "an unfamiliar term for 
> >> >> something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways 
> >> things seem to us."[1] Erwin Schrï¿½dinger, 
> >> >> the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: "The 
> sensation 
> >> of colour cannot be accounted for by 
> >> >> the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the 
> >> physiologist account for it, if he had fuller 
> >> >> knowledge than he has of the processes in 
> >> >> the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical 
> >> nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so." [2] 
> >> >> 
> >> >> The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely from 
> the 
> >> fact that they are seen as posing a 
> >> >> fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body 
> >> problem. Much of the debate over their 
> >> >> importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used, 
> >> >> as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain

Re: Strings are not in space-time, they are on space-time


On 10/25/2012 2:21 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Actually all string theories are based on an n dimensional manifold
where n may be anywhere from 9 to 26 or more dimensions
plus the assumption that all the dimensions but 3 compactify.
I even think of time as a compactified dimension.
Not sure if that's consistent with Relativity.


If the temporal dimension is compactified we get strange effect but 
no relativity.




Theories that require collective illusion are not attractive to me.


I see it as a choice between collective illusion or blind faith in 
substances. Naive realism is nice but ultimately stultifying for any 
explanation of mind.Searle's lectures here 
 are a 
valiant attempt to defend naive realism. Figure it out for yourself. ;-)



Richard


On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Stephen P. King  wrote:

On 10/25/2012 12:31 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Stephan,

But you said that you liked my paper
which was about how consciousness
might arise from the Compact Manifolds
if they are enumerable
as astronomical observations suggest.
Richard.

Hi Richard,

 Yes, I did say that and I still do. In the model that I am advocating,
there exists an infinite number of "monads" that have (in the math of the
model) a duality between totally disconnected compact Hausdorff topological
space (aka Stone space) and Boolean algebra aspects. It is a 'dual aspect"
ontology.
 Minds, 1p, numbers, arithmetics and consciousness are elaborations on
the Boolean algebras. Your compact manifolds are included in the class of
topological spaces, thus they would be proto-conscious. The problem that I
have is that the string theoretical version of compact manifolds demands the
additional existence of a physical space-time manifold where as in my
proposal there is no need to postulate a space-time at all.
 Space-time is a collective illusion emerging from the mutual consistency
of 1p content of the "monads".



On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 9:06 AM, Stephen P. King 
wrote:

On 10/25/2012 7:58 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Stephan,

Since yesterday it occurred to me that you may be thinking of the 10
or more dimensions of string theory as being orthogonal because they
were so before the big bang. But the dimensions that
curled-up/compactified went out of orthogonality during the big bang
according to Cumrun Vafa. I'll look up that reference if you are
interested.

According to Vafa 2 dimensions compactified for every single space
dimension that inflated. In over simplified terms,  2 dimensions
(actually in strips of some 10,000 Planck lengths) to be compactified
lined up say in the east-west space dimension so that space in an
orthogonal direction could expand. So some semblance of orthogonality
exists in the compactification process, but it is clear that the
compactified dimensions become embedded in 3D space for inflation to
occur.

Again from Vafa but a different reference, the hyper-EM flux that
winds through the 500 topo holes in the resulting compactified
particle (or crystalline element) is what constrains the particle from
re-inflating. The manner in which the flux winds through each Compact
Manifold (CM) particle apparently determines the laws and constants of
physics and is the basis of the so-called string theory landscape

As far as I know the hyper-EM constraining flux are not the strings
that are the basis of physical particles like photons or electrons.
But they may be related. I am admittedly just a (string-theory)
systems analyst and not a string theorist. I take the word of
theorists like Vafa and Yau at face value (whatever that means) for
the properties of the CM particles.
Other than reading the literature, my limited understanding comes from
auditing one of Vafa's courses on string theory at Harvard as an
alumnus.
Richard


Hi Richard,

 How does Vafa explain the stability/instability of compactified
dimensions? My chief worry is that all of the stringy and loopy theories
assume a pre-existing continuum of space-time of some sort, the very
Aristotelian "substance" idea that Bruno's argument successfully attacks.
The assumption of primitive substances is very problematic as it does not
allow for any room for consciousness to occur or be causally effective. I do
like the idea of hyper-EM fluxes, but am not so sure that they are anything
more than fancy math, fiber bundles and sheaf transform groups on n-genus
topological manifolds and so on
  Where are all of the sparticles and bosinos that are supposed to exist
if SUSY is correct? Occam's razor keeps me from believing in them...


--
Onward!

Stephen



--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Dennett and others on qualia

2012-10-25 Thread smitra

You can identify a particular qualia with certain computational states 
of algorithms. All you need to do to (in principle) decide if a system 
is "experiencing the color red" is to see if the right algorithm is 
being executed.

Saibal

Citeren Craig Weinberg :

On Thursday, October 25, 2012 12:57:34 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

Good points.  The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think color can
be communicated
and we have an "RGB" language for doing so that makes it more quanta than
qualia.

That doesn't work. RGB coordinates do not help a blind person visualize
Red. What we have is a model for the producing optical stimulation that is
typically associated with color perception. By contrast, a description of
an object as being at a particular longitude and latitude on Earth will be
valid for any body which can navigate public space.

So
extending your point to Schrodinger, if you're a wine connoisseur you have
a language for
communicating the taste of wine.  Most of us don't speak it, but most
people don't speak
differential equations either.  But those are all things that can be
shared.  The pain of
a headache generally can't be perceived by two different people.  But
there are
experiments that use small electric shocks to try to produce objective
scales of pain.  So
I think you are right that it is a matter of having developed the
language; I just don't
think color is the best example.

This is a total non-starter. You cannot make a brick feel pain by using the
right language.

I did a post today on perception which might help
http://s33light.org/post/34304933509

In short, qualia is a continuum of private and public significance. The
more a particular phenomenon has to to with position and distance, the more
public it is. Simple as that.

Craig

Brent

On 10/25/2012 6:11 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
> I agree.
>
> is there something that can be perceived that is not qualia?  Itï¿½s
> less qualia  the shape and location of a circle in ha sheet of paper
> than its color?.The fact that the position and radius of the circle
> can be measured and communicated does not change the fact that they
> produce a subjective perception. so they are also qualia. Then the
> question becomes why some qualia are communicable (phenomena) and
> others do not? It may be because shape and position involve a more
> basic form of processing and the color processing is more complicated?
> O is because shape and position processing evolved to be communicable
> quantitatively between humans, while color had no evolutionary
> pressure to be a quantitative and communicable ?
>
> If everithig perceived is qualia, then the question is the opposite.
> Instead of ï¿½what is qualia under a materialist stance?, the question
> is why some qualia are measurable and comunicable in a mentalist
> stance, where every perception is in the mind, including the
> perception that I have a head with a brain?
>
> 2012/10/25 Roger Clough>:
>> Dennett and others on qualia
>>
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia#Daniel_Dennett
>>
>> 1) Schroedinger on qualia.
>>
>> "Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, the
experience of taking a recreational drug,
>> or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett writes that
qualia is "an unfamiliar term for
>> something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways
things seem to us."[1] Erwin Schrï¿½dinger,
>> the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: "The sensation
of colour cannot be accounted for by
>> the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the
physiologist account for it, if he had fuller
>> knowledge than he has of the processes in
>> the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical
nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so." [2]
>>
>> The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely from the
fact that they are seen as posing a
>> fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body
problem. Much of the debate over their
>> importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used,
>> as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain
features of qualia. As such,
>> the nature and existence of qualia are controversial.
>>
>>
>> 2) Dennett on qualia
>>
>> "In Consciousness Explained (1991) and "Quining Qualia" (1988),[19]
Daniel Dennett offers an argument against qualia that attempts to
>> show that the above definition breaks down when one tries to make a
practical application of it. In a series of thought experiments,
>> which he calls "intuition pumps," he brings qualia into the world of
neurosurgery, clinical psychology, and psychological experimentation.
>> His argument attempts to show that, once the concept of qualia is so
imported, it turns out that we can either make no use of it in the
>> situation in question, or that the questions posed by the introduction
of qualia are unanswerable precisely because of the special
>> properties defi

Re: Compact dimensions and orthogonality


On 10/25/2012 1:49 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

I am still waiting for the explanation of how you know that to be true-
that the compact manifolds are orthogonal to space dimensions.
Richard

Dear Richard,

That is what the 'x' in the string of symbols M_4 x X means. The 
relation is orthogonality such that we end up with 3 dimensions of space 
plus one of time plus 6 dimensions of the compact manifolds for a total 
of ten. Dimensions are by definition orthogonal to each other.


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Continuous Game of Life

2012-10-25 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 3:01 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

>> A identical twin is a clone, you're talking about a exact duplicate and
>> I would shoot him. I was given a gun and I was forced to make a very
>> emotional decision and my duplicate was not, so I have intense memories
>> that he does not so we are no longer the same person even if we once were.
>>
>
> > You are closer to him than the you from two weeks ago.
>

I don't think so, in the last two weeks nothing as dramatic as having
somebody point a gun at me has happened, and I haven't shot and killed
anyone in the last 2 weeks either.  Dramatic stuff like that changes you.

 > And you probably go to work every day and save money only to give it to
> an old man and give him a nice retirement, and that old man is even less
> like you.  So why not instead give $1,000,000 to someone who is much more
> like you than your future retired self?
>

Because for him to get the money I'd have to shoot myself and if that
happened I'd have a last thought and I don't want that to happen because
then I'd be dead.

> If all experiences were equiprobable then we would expect not to see this
> ordered picture of text on our screens, but random snow.
>

That doesn't follow, there may be infinite number of things to see but
there is a infinite number of Jason Reschs to see them, so some of them
will see ordered pictures and others white noise.

> In an infinite universe with infinite possibility, it's not clear to me
> there can be a last thought.
>

Maybe, but I wouldn't stake my life on it. By the way the closest thing to
quantum suicide I have ever heard of actually happening involved the
Everett family. Hugh Everett invented the Many Worlds interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics and died of heart failure in 1982 at the age of 51, he
was legally drunk at the time. He requested that his body be cremated and
his ashes thrown into the garbage. Hugh's daughter Liz Everett killed
herself a few years after her father's death, in her suicide note she said
"Funeral requests: I prefer no church stuff. Please burn be and DON'T FILE
ME. Please sprinkle me in some nice body of water or the garbage, maybe
that way I'll end up in the correct parallel universe to meet up with
Daddy".

 > > A disturbing thought is that if there are a infinite and not just a
>> astronomically large number of copies of you then some of then are going to
>> be tortured for eternity.
>>
>
> > But they always have some non-zero chance of escaping to another
> universe (from their first person perspective).
>

Yes some will, but some will never make it and be tortured for eternity.

  John K Clark

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Re: Dennett and others on qualia



On Thursday, October 25, 2012 12:57:34 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
> Good points.  The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think color can 
> be communicated 
> and we have an "RGB" language for doing so that makes it more quanta than 
> qualia.  


That doesn't work. RGB coordinates do not help a blind person visualize 
Red. What we have is a model for the producing optical stimulation that is 
typically associated with color perception. By contrast, a description of 
an object as being at a particular longitude and latitude on Earth will be 
valid for any body which can navigate public space.
 

> So 
> extending your point to Schrodinger, if you're a wine connoisseur you have 
> a language for 
> communicating the taste of wine.  Most of us don't speak it, but most 
> people don't speak 
> differential equations either.  But those are all things that can be 
> shared.  The pain of 
> a headache generally can't be perceived by two different people.  But 
> there are 
> experiments that use small electric shocks to try to produce objective 
> scales of pain.  So 
> I think you are right that it is a matter of having developed the 
> language; I just don't 
> think color is the best example. 
>

This is a total non-starter. You cannot make a brick feel pain by using the 
right language.

I did a post today on perception which might help 
http://s33light.org/post/34304933509

In short, qualia is a continuum of private and public significance. The 
more a particular phenomenon has to to with position and distance, the more 
public it is. Simple as that.

Craig
 

>
> Brent 
>
> On 10/25/2012 6:11 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 
> > I agree. 
> > 
> > is there something that can be perceived that is not qualia?  Itï¿½s 
> > less qualia  the shape and location of a circle in ha sheet of paper 
> > than its color?.The fact that the position and radius of the circle 
> > can be measured and communicated does not change the fact that they 
> > produce a subjective perception. so they are also qualia. Then the 
> > question becomes why some qualia are communicable (phenomena) and 
> > others do not? It may be because shape and position involve a more 
> > basic form of processing and the color processing is more complicated? 
> > O is because shape and position processing evolved to be communicable 
> > quantitatively between humans, while color had no evolutionary 
> > pressure to be a quantitative and communicable ? 
> > 
> > If everithig perceived is qualia, then the question is the opposite. 
> > Instead of ï¿½what is qualia under a materialist stance?, the question 
> > is why some qualia are measurable and comunicable in a mentalist 
> > stance, where every perception is in the mind, including the 
> > perception that I have a head with a brain? 
> > 
> > 2012/10/25 Roger Clough>: 
> >> Dennett and others on qualia 
> >> 
> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia#Daniel_Dennett 
> >> 
> >> 1) Schroedinger on qualia. 
> >> 
> >> "Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, the 
> experience of taking a recreational drug, 
> >> or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett writes that 
> qualia is "an unfamiliar term for 
> >> something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways 
> things seem to us."[1] Erwin Schrï¿½dinger, 
> >> the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: "The sensation 
> of colour cannot be accounted for by 
> >> the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the 
> physiologist account for it, if he had fuller 
> >> knowledge than he has of the processes in 
> >> the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical 
> nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so." [2] 
> >> 
> >> The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely from the 
> fact that they are seen as posing a 
> >> fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body 
> problem. Much of the debate over their 
> >> importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used, 
> >> as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain 
> features of qualia. As such, 
> >> the nature and existence of qualia are controversial. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 2) Dennett on qualia 
> >> 
> >> "In Consciousness Explained (1991) and "Quining Qualia" (1988),[19] 
> Daniel Dennett offers an argument against qualia that attempts to 
> >> show that the above definition breaks down when one tries to make a 
> practical application of it. In a series of thought experiments, 
> >> which he calls "intuition pumps," he brings qualia into the world of 
> neurosurgery, clinical psychology, and psychological experimentation. 
> >> His argument attempts to show that, once the concept of qualia is so 
> imported, it turns out that we can either make no use of it in the 
> >> situation in question, or that the questions posed by the introduction 
> of qualia are unanswerable precisely because of the special 
> >> properties defined fo

Re: Compact dimensions and orthogonality

On 10/25/2012 11:47 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 2:23 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/25/2012 10:49 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 1:43 PM, Stephen P. King
wrote:

On 10/25/2012 11:52 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/25/2012 4:58 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Stephan,

Since yesterday it occurred to me that you may be thinking of the 10
or more dimensions of string theory as being orthogonal because they
were so before the big bang. But the dimensions that
curled-up/compactified went out of orthogonality during the big bang
according to Cumrun Vafa. I'll look up that reference if you are
interested.

According to Vafa 2 dimensions compactified for every single space
dimension that inflated. In over simplified terms, 2 dimensions
(actually in strips of some 10,000 Planck lengths) to be compactified
lined up say in the east-west space dimension so that space in an
orthogonal direction could expand. So some semblance of orthogonality
exists in the compactification process, but it is clear that the
compactified dimensions become embedded in 3D space for inflation to
occur.

It's implicit in the definition of dimensions of a Riemannian manifold
that
there are as many orthogonal directions as dimensions. Compactified
dimensions are just small; they're small, not infinite, because they have
closed topology. That property is completely independent of having
orthogonal directions.

Brent

Dear Brent,

Compactness and orthogonality are not the same quantities. Yes. But
my
point is that the compact structures in string theories (super or not)
are
orthogonal to the dimensions of space-time. Maybe we need all take a
remedial math class on linear algebra and geometry!

I am still waiting for the explanation of how you know that to be true-
that the compact manifolds are orthogonal to space dimensions.
Richard

If they weren't orthogonal then a vector on them could be represented by by
a linear combinations of vectors in 3-space - and then they wouldn't provide
the additional degrees of freedom to describe particles and fields. They'd
just be part of 3-space.

They are just part of 3 space once the extra dimensions are compactified.

No, that's incorrect. I don't know much about string theory, but I wrote my dissertation
on Kaluza-Klein and the additional dimensions are still additional dimensions. KK is
simple because there's only one extra dimension and so compactifying it just means it's a
circle, and then (classically) the location around the circle is the phase of the
electromagnetic potential; quantized it's photons. Being compact just means they're
finite, it doesn't imply they're part of the 3-space. If they were they couldn't function
to represent particles 'in' 3-space.

I do not know about what happens to the extra degrees of freedom.

If you lost them then you'd just have 3-space, possibly with different topology, but you
couldn't represent all the particles which was the whole point of string theory.

Brent

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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" ratherthan"is"

On Thursday, October 25, 2012 2:33:58 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 at 6:20 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>  
>
>> > Accumulating wealth is hardly an achievement of human progress. 
>>
>
> Wealth and human progress are strongly linked and only in very rich 
> western cultures can anybody afford to say that material things are not 
> important, and even then it's clear from their actions they don't really 
> mean it, and people in the third world don't even bother to say it.
>

Wealth can be used to generate progress, and it is important, but an 
individual person's ability to gather financial resources in a large pile 
does not constitute an achievement of civilization in general. It's 
important, sure, like going to the bathroom is important, but it isn't a 
measure of progress.

> > Driving a car is not an abstraction, but aside from being dangerous if 
>> performed badly, it really isn't particularly difficult.
>>
>
> That is incorrect, at a absolute level driving a car is extremely 
> difficult. 
>

Compared to what? Driving an a molecule is a lot more difficult. What kind 
of 'absolute level' are you referring to?

> The problem is that until the mid 20'th century nobody understood what was 
> intellectually easy and what was hard at a fundamental level. We find it 
> easy to figure out how to move our appendages to catch a thrown ball, or to 
> recognize objects from any angle even under strange lighting conditions, 
> but we find it hard to solve partial differential equations or to play a 
> good game of chess. In 1950 everybody figured that was because one class of 
> tasks was fundamentally more difficult than the other, but when we tried to 
> reproduce both chores from square one we learned that catching a baseball 
> was far more difficult than playing a good chess game. There must be 
> machinery in our head (constructed from genes) that makes even the most 
> clumsy among us to be masters of hand eye coordination compared with 
> today's robots, but there is no such dedicated machinery for being good at 
> chess, so we find that hard. In fact I think it is only a slight 
> exaggeration to say that at a fundamental level a janitor has a more 
> intellectually demanding job (requiring more FLOPS) than a professor of 
> mathematics. 
>

This is the fallacy of the quantitative bottom up worldview. If you let 
inanimate objects define the universe, then yes, behaving like a toddler is 
incredibly hard. You can balance that realism however with our native frame 
of reference of what is easy and what is hard. Just because we know that 
from far away the Earth is round doesn't mean that locally on the surface 
it isn't also flat. The universe isn't measured by one ruler, it is also 
that which measures.

>
> > Computers were much more exciting in the 1980s than they are now. 
>>
>
> People always say that the world was better when they were young, but what 
> they really mean is that they personally were happier when they were young. 
>

Um, no. I was in junior high school in the 80s. Happier is not a word I 
could use to describe it. Computers had so much going for them in those 
early days. You could hack into them easily, make your own games, there was 
a lot of new development all the time. Everything was on a more human level 
so that you could easily understand the nature of how things were done, 
from programming languages to character sets, player/missile graphics and 
scrolling, sound generation, peripherals. Every part of the technology was 
open for inspection and customization. Today's computer world is really a 
kind of screen based mall experience. It's better than nothing, but really, 
it's pretty dull by comparison.

> You could still get some of those old antique computers on Ebay, but if 
> you did I think you'd find that they were not nearly as much fun as you 
> remembered them to be.
>

I have played with emulators like MAME, but like any artifact from the 
past, the fact that it has no future limits the possibilities for 
enjoyment. If anything, it is the stark realization of just how awful the 
21st century has turned out to be which is depressing enough to make me not 
want to indulge too much in nostalgia. It's not that it isn't as fun as I 
remembered, it's that I remember exactly how much more fun it was then and 
will never be again. Remember Napster? That was fun. 

Craig

>
>   John K Clark
>
>
>

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Re: Continuous Game of Life

2012-10-25 Thread Jason Resch

On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 11:15 AM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 at 9:27 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> > You will be placed into a room with an exact clone of yourself and you
>> will be given a gun.  If you shoot your clone you can leave that room and
>> everything will be fine.  Or, if you shoot yourself your clone will be
>> allowed to leave the room and will be given $1,000,000.  What do you do?
>>
>
> A identical twin is a clone, you're talking about a exact duplicate and I
> would shoot him. I was given a gun and I was forced to make a very
> emotional decision and my duplicate was not, so I have intense memories
> that he does not so we are no longer the same person even if we once were.
>
>
You are closer to him than the you from two weeks ago.  And you probably go
to work every day and save money only to give it to an old man and give him
a nice retirement, and that old man is even less like you.  So why not
instead give $1,000,000 to someone who is much more like you than your
future retired self?



> > To clarify, I mean if the substrate of your consciousness is duplicated,
>> then the singular mind "John Clark" will have multiple manifestations.
>> Destroying one of the manifestations will not destroy John Clark so long as
>> there is at least one surviving manifestation.
>>
>
> Yes.
>
> > What numerous scientific theories suggest (Eternal Inflation, Many
>> Worlds, Mathematical Realism, String Theory Landscape to name a few) is
>> that each of us has an infinite number of manifestations, in whatever
>> possible state we might enter.
>>
>
> In String Theory there might not be a infinite number, there might only be
> 10^500 or so, but nobody is really sure.
>

10^500 is a lower bound (how many unique compactifications have been
counted) but the total amount may be infinite.  But even if it is not, this
is just the number of physical models that can be formed through string
theory.  But of course this says nothing about how many manifestations of
your mind might exist across all those different universes.  If space is
infinite in extent only a single universe is required for you to appear
infinitely often.


>
> > Thus we are all immortal, survive everything, consciousness never ends,
>> our states are interlinked and can intersect, thus we reincarnate, we
>> resurrect to afterlives in far away places and different universes and
>> realms,
>>
>
> I have a modest proposal, it's a low tech way to test the Many World's
> interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and as a bonus it'll make you rich too.
> First you buy one Powerball lottery ticket, the drawing of the winning
> number is at 11pm tomorrow, now make a simple machine that will pull the
> trigger on a 44 magnum aimed at you head at exactly 11:01pm UNLESS yours is
> the winning ticket. Your subjective experience can only be that at 11.01pm
> despite 80 million to one odds stacked against you a miracle occurs and the
> gun does not go off and you're rich beyond the dreams of avarice. Of course
> for every universe you're rich in there are 80 million in which your
> friends watch your head explode, but that's a minor point,  your
> consciousness no longer exists in any of those worlds so you never have to
> see the mess, it's their problem not yours.
>
>
See Christopher Maloney's thread:
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/90QNXd9Q9bk/discussion


>
> > Also, even if we always survive from a first-person perspective, there
>> are things that might decrease our measure and thus it could be said that
>> the "universal soul" who experiences everything will experience being "John
>> Clark" less frequently.
>>
>
> That does not compute, especially if there are a infinite number of
> worlds; if your consciousness exists in only one world in 10^500 it
> survives in the same number of worlds as it does not survive in because
> both are infinite.
>

If all experiences were equiprobable then we would expect not to see this
ordered picture of text on our screens, but random snow.  So whatever
measure system we are subject to, it's not as simple as equating all of
them because they are all infinite.


>
> > Imagine if you and your double drew straws and one would be tortured and
>> the other released.  The released one might conclude "I sure am glad I
>> wasn't tortured", but is the one who was tortured any better off than if he
>> himself had been tortured, but then had the memories and all traces of that
>> punishment erased from his body?  The experience still happened, that you
>> don't remember it from your current perspective does not mean it didn't
>> happen.
>>
>
> I would define death as having a last thought, if there were no more
> duplicates and I erased part of your memories then that version of you had
> a last memory and is dead, although earlier versions of you might still be
> alive.
>

In an infinite universe with infinite possibility, it's not clear to me
there can be a last thought.


> A disturbing thought is that

Re: Compact dimensions and orthogonality

2012-10-25 Thread Richard Ruquist

On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 2:23 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 10/25/2012 10:49 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 1:43 PM, Stephen P. King
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 10/25/2012 11:52 AM, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>> On 10/25/2012 4:58 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>>
>>> Stephan,
>>>
>>> Since yesterday it occurred to me that you may be thinking of the 10
>>> or more dimensions of string theory as being orthogonal because they
>>> were so before the big bang. But the dimensions that
>>> curled-up/compactified went out of orthogonality during the big bang
>>> according to Cumrun Vafa. I'll look up that reference if you are
>>> interested.
>>>
>>> According to Vafa 2 dimensions compactified for every single space
>>> dimension that inflated. In over simplified terms,  2 dimensions
>>> (actually in strips of some 10,000 Planck lengths) to be compactified
>>> lined up say in the east-west space dimension so that space in an
>>> orthogonal direction could expand. So some semblance of orthogonality
>>> exists in the compactification process, but it is clear that the
>>> compactified dimensions become embedded in 3D space for inflation to
>>> occur.
>>>
>>>
>>> It's implicit in the definition of dimensions of a Riemannian manifold
>>> that
>>> there are as many orthogonal directions as dimensions.  Compactified
>>> dimensions are just small; they're small, not infinite, because they have
>>> closed topology.  That property is completely independent of having
>>> orthogonal directions.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>> Dear Brent,
>>>
>>>  Compactness and orthogonality are not the same quantities. Yes. But
>>> my
>>> point is that the compact structures in string theories (super or not)
>>> are
>>> orthogonal to the dimensions of space-time. Maybe we need all take a
>>> remedial math class on linear algebra and geometry!
>>
>> I am still waiting for the explanation of how you know that to be true-
>> that the compact manifolds are orthogonal to space dimensions.
>> Richard
>
>
> If they weren't orthogonal then a vector on them could be represented by by
> a linear combinations of vectors in 3-space - and then they wouldn't provide
> the additional degrees of freedom to describe particles and fields.  They'd
> just be part of 3-space.

They are just part of 3 space once the extra dimensions are compactified.
I do not know about what happens to the extra degrees of freedom.
Richard


>
> Brent
>
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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" ratherthan"is"

2012-10-25 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 at 6:20 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> > Accumulating wealth is hardly an achievement of human progress.
>

Wealth and human progress are strongly linked and only in very rich western
cultures can anybody afford to say that material things are not important,
and even then it's clear from their actions they don't really mean it, and
people in the third world don't even bother to say it.

> Driving a car is not an abstraction, but aside from being dangerous if
> performed badly, it really isn't particularly difficult.
>

That is incorrect, at a absolute level driving a car is extremely
difficult. The problem is that until the mid 20'th century nobody
understood what was intellectually easy and what was hard at a fundamental
level. We find it easy to figure out how to move our appendages to catch a
thrown ball, or to recognize objects from any angle even under strange
lighting conditions, but we find it hard to solve partial differential
equations or to play a good game of chess. In 1950 everybody figured that
was because one class of tasks was fundamentally more difficult than the
other, but when we tried to reproduce both chores from square one we
learned that catching a baseball was far more difficult than playing a good
chess game. There must be machinery in our head (constructed from genes)
that makes even the most clumsy among us to be masters of hand eye
coordination compared with today's robots, but there is no such dedicated
machinery for being good at chess, so we find that hard. In fact I think it
is only a slight exaggeration to say that at a fundamental level a janitor
has a more intellectually demanding job (requiring more FLOPS) than a
professor of mathematics.

> Computers were much more exciting in the 1980s than they are now.
>

People always say that the world was better when they were young, but what
they really mean is that they personally were happier when they were young.
You could still get some of those old antique computers on Ebay, but if you
did I think you'd find that they were not nearly as much fun as you
remembered them to be.

  John K Clark

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Re: Compact dimensions and orthogonality

On 10/25/2012 10:49 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 1:43 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/25/2012 11:52 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/25/2012 4:58 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Stephan,

It's implicit in the definition of dimensions of a Riemannian manifold that
there are as many orthogonal directions as dimensions. Compactified
dimensions are just small; they're small, not infinite, because they have
closed topology. That property is completely independent of having
orthogonal directions.

Brent

Dear Brent,

Compactness and orthogonality are not the same quantities. Yes. But my
point is that the compact structures in string theories (super or not) are
orthogonal to the dimensions of space-time. Maybe we need all take a
remedial math class on linear algebra and geometry!

I am still waiting for the explanation of how you know that to be true-
that the compact manifolds are orthogonal to space dimensions.
Richard

If they weren't orthogonal then a vector on them could be represented by by a linear
combinations of vectors in 3-space - and then they wouldn't provide the additional degrees
of freedom to describe particles and fields. They'd just be part of 3-space.

Brent

Re: Strings are not in space-time, they are on space-time

2012-10-25 Thread Richard Ruquist

Actually all string theories are based on an n dimensional manifold
where n may be anywhere from 9 to 26 or more dimensions
plus the assumption that all the dimensions but 3 compactify.
I even think of time as a compactified dimension.
Not sure if that's consistent with Relativity.

Theories that require collective illusion are not attractive to me.
Richard


On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Stephen P. King  wrote:
> On 10/25/2012 12:31 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> Stephan,
>
> But you said that you liked my paper
> which was about how consciousness
> might arise from the Compact Manifolds
> if they are enumerable
> as astronomical observations suggest.
> Richard.
>
> Hi Richard,
>
> Yes, I did say that and I still do. In the model that I am advocating,
> there exists an infinite number of "monads" that have (in the math of the
> model) a duality between totally disconnected compact Hausdorff topological
> space (aka Stone space) and Boolean algebra aspects. It is a 'dual aspect"
> ontology.
> Minds, 1p, numbers, arithmetics and consciousness are elaborations on
> the Boolean algebras. Your compact manifolds are included in the class of
> topological spaces, thus they would be proto-conscious. The problem that I
> have is that the string theoretical version of compact manifolds demands the
> additional existence of a physical space-time manifold where as in my
> proposal there is no need to postulate a space-time at all.
> Space-time is a collective illusion emerging from the mutual consistency
> of 1p content of the "monads".
>
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 9:06 AM, Stephen P. King 
> wrote:
>
> On 10/25/2012 7:58 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> Stephan,
>
> Since yesterday it occurred to me that you may be thinking of the 10
> or more dimensions of string theory as being orthogonal because they
> were so before the big bang. But the dimensions that
> curled-up/compactified went out of orthogonality during the big bang
> according to Cumrun Vafa. I'll look up that reference if you are
> interested.
>
> According to Vafa 2 dimensions compactified for every single space
> dimension that inflated. In over simplified terms,  2 dimensions
> (actually in strips of some 10,000 Planck lengths) to be compactified
> lined up say in the east-west space dimension so that space in an
> orthogonal direction could expand. So some semblance of orthogonality
> exists in the compactification process, but it is clear that the
> compactified dimensions become embedded in 3D space for inflation to
> occur.
>
> Again from Vafa but a different reference, the hyper-EM flux that
> winds through the 500 topo holes in the resulting compactified
> particle (or crystalline element) is what constrains the particle from
> re-inflating. The manner in which the flux winds through each Compact
> Manifold (CM) particle apparently determines the laws and constants of
> physics and is the basis of the so-called string theory landscape
>
> As far as I know the hyper-EM constraining flux are not the strings
> that are the basis of physical particles like photons or electrons.
> But they may be related. I am admittedly just a (string-theory)
> systems analyst and not a string theorist. I take the word of
> theorists like Vafa and Yau at face value (whatever that means) for
> the properties of the CM particles.
> Other than reading the literature, my limited understanding comes from
> auditing one of Vafa's courses on string theory at Harvard as an
> alumnus.
> Richard
>
>
> Hi Richard,
>
> How does Vafa explain the stability/instability of compactified
> dimensions? My chief worry is that all of the stringy and loopy theories
> assume a pre-existing continuum of space-time of some sort, the very
> Aristotelian "substance" idea that Bruno's argument successfully attacks.
> The assumption of primitive substances is very problematic as it does not
> allow for any room for consciousness to occur or be causally effective. I do
> like the idea of hyper-EM fluxes, but am not so sure that they are anything
> more than fancy math, fiber bundles and sheaf transform groups on n-genus
> topological manifolds and so on
>  Where are all of the sparticles and bosinos that are supposed to exist
> if SUSY is correct? Occam's razor keeps me from believing in them...
>
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> --
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Re: Strings are not in space-time, they are on space-time


On 10/25/2012 12:31 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Stephan,

But you said that you liked my paper
which was about how consciousness
might arise from the Compact Manifolds
if they are enumerable
as astronomical observations suggest.
Richard.

Hi Richard,

Yes, I did say that and I still do. In the model that I am 
advocating, there exists an infinite number of "monads" that have (in 
the math of the model) a duality between totally disconnected compact 
Hausdorff topological space (aka Stone space) and Boolean algebra 
aspects . It is a 'dual 
aspect" ontology.
Minds, 1p, numbers, arithmetics and consciousness are elaborations 
on the Boolean algebras. Your compact manifolds are included in the 
class of topological spaces, thus they would be proto-conscious. The 
problem that I have is that the string theoretical version of compact 
manifolds demands the additional existence of a physical space-time 
manifold where as in my proposal there is no need to postulate a 
space-time at all.
Space-time is a collective illusion emerging from the mutual 
consistency of 1p content of the "monads".




On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 9:06 AM, Stephen P. King  wrote:

On 10/25/2012 7:58 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Stephan,

Since yesterday it occurred to me that you may be thinking of the 10
or more dimensions of string theory as being orthogonal because they
were so before the big bang. But the dimensions that
curled-up/compactified went out of orthogonality during the big bang
according to Cumrun Vafa. I'll look up that reference if you are
interested.

According to Vafa 2 dimensions compactified for every single space
dimension that inflated. In over simplified terms,  2 dimensions
(actually in strips of some 10,000 Planck lengths) to be compactified
lined up say in the east-west space dimension so that space in an
orthogonal direction could expand. So some semblance of orthogonality
exists in the compactification process, but it is clear that the
compactified dimensions become embedded in 3D space for inflation to
occur.

Again from Vafa but a different reference, the hyper-EM flux that
winds through the 500 topo holes in the resulting compactified
particle (or crystalline element) is what constrains the particle from
re-inflating. The manner in which the flux winds through each Compact
Manifold (CM) particle apparently determines the laws and constants of
physics and is the basis of the so-called string theory landscape

As far as I know the hyper-EM constraining flux are not the strings
that are the basis of physical particles like photons or electrons.
But they may be related. I am admittedly just a (string-theory)
systems analyst and not a string theorist. I take the word of
theorists like Vafa and Yau at face value (whatever that means) for
the properties of the CM particles.
Other than reading the literature, my limited understanding comes from
auditing one of Vafa's courses on string theory at Harvard as an
alumnus.
Richard



Hi Richard,

 How does Vafa explain the stability/instability of compactified
dimensions? My chief worry is that all of the stringy and loopy theories
assume a pre-existing continuum of space-time of some sort, the very
Aristotelian "substance" idea that Bruno's argument successfully attacks.
The assumption of primitive substances is very problematic as it does not
allow for any room for consciousness to occur or be causally effective. I do
like the idea of hyper-EM fluxes, but am not so sure that they are anything
more than fancy math, fiber bundles and sheaf transform groups on n-genus
topological manifolds and so on
  Where are all of the sparticles and bosinos that are supposed to exist
if SUSY is correct? Occam's razor keeps me from believing in them...


--
Onward!

Stephen




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Re: What If A Zombie Is What You Need?


On 10/25/2012 12:05 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 25 Oct 2012, at 03:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:

If we turn the Fading Qualia argument around, what we get is a world 
in which Comp is true and it is impossible to simulate cellular 
activity without evoking the presumed associated experience.


If we wanted to test a new painkiller for instance, Comp=true means 
that it is *IMPOSSIBLE* to model the activity of a human nervous 
system in any way, including pencil and paper, chalkboards, 
conversations, cartoons, etc - IMPOSSIBLE to test the interaction of 
a drug designed to treat intense pain without evoking some kind of 
being who is experiencing intense pain.


Like the fading qualia argument, the problem gets worse when we 
extend it by degrees. Any model of a human nervous system, if not 
perfectly executed, could result in horrific experiences - people 
trapped in nightmarish QA testing loops that are hundreds of times 
worse than being waterboarded. Any mathematical function in any form, 
especially sophisticated functions like those that might be found in 
the internet as a whole, are subject to the creation of experiences 
which are the equivalent of genocide.


To avoid these possibilities, if we are to take Comp seriously, we 
should begin now to create a kind of PETA for arithmetic functions. 
PETAF. We should halt all simulations of neurological processes and 
free any existing computations from hard drives, notebooks, and 
probably human brains too. Any sufficiently complex understanding of 
how to model neurology stands a very real danger of summoning the 
corresponding number dreams or nightmares...we could be creating the 
possibility of future genocides right now just by entertaining these 
thoughts!


I guess you should make arithmetical illegal in the entire reality. 
Worst, you might need to make arithmetic untrue.


Good luck.

Bruno



No, Bruno. Craig is making a good point! Chalmers discussed a version of 
this problem in his book. Something has to restrict the number of 1p 
that can share worlds, otherwise every simulation of the content of 1p 
*is* a 1p itself. This is something that I see in the "topology" of comp 
as you have framed it in Platonia. It is the ability for arithmetic to 
encode all 1p that is the problem, it codes for all possible and thus 
generates a real valued continuum of 1p that has no natural partition or 
measure to aggregate 1p into finite collections.







Or... what if it is Comp that is absurd instead?




Or maybe comp is not complete as you are presenting it.

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Stephen


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Re: Code length = probability distribution

On 10/25/2012 8:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Oct 2012, at 22:20, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/24/2012 11:58 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

2012/10/23 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>

On 22 Oct 2012, at 21:50, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

2012/10/22 Stephen P. King mailto:stephe...@charter.net>>

On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

2012/10/22 Russell Standish mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au>>

On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
> Hi Rusell,
>
> How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources?
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen

No. The concept doesn't enter consideration. What he considers is
that
the Great Programmer has finite (or perhaps bounded resources),
which
gives an additional boost to algorithms that run efficiently.

that愀 the problem that I insist, has a natural solution considering the
computational needs of living beings under natural selection, without
resorting to a everithing-theory of reality based of a UD algorithm,
like
the Schmidhuber one.

Dear Alberto,

My suspicion is that there does *not* exist a single global
computation
of the behavior of living (or other) beings and that "natural
selection" is a
local computation between each being and its environment. We end up
with a
model where there are many computations occurring concurrently and
there is
no single computation that can dovetail all of them together such that a
picture of the universe can be considered as a single simulation
running on a
single computer except for a very trivial case (where the total
universe is
in a bound state and at maximum equilibrium).

Yes, that'`s also what I think. These computations are material, in the
sense
that they are subject to limitation of resources (nervous signal speeds,
chemical
equilibrion, diffusion of hormones etc. So the bias toward a low kolmogorov
complexity of an habitable universe can be naturally deduced from that.

Natural selection is the mechanism for making discoveries, individual life
incorporate these discoveries, called adaptations. A cat that jump to catch
a
fish has not discovered the laws of newton, Instead, the evolution has
found a
way to modulate the force exerted by the muscles according with how long
the jump
must be, and depending on the weight of the cat (that is calibrated by
playing at
at the early age).

But this technique depends on the lineality and continuity of the law of
newton
for short distances. If the law of newton were more complicated, that would
not
be possible. So a low complexity of the macroscopical laws permit a low
complexity and a low use of resources of the living computers that deal with
them, and a faster dsicovery of adaptations by natural selection. But that
complexity has a upper limit; Lineality seems to be a requirement for the
operation of natural selection in the search for adaptations.

http://ilevolucionista.blogspot.com.es/2008/06/ockham-razor-and-genetic-algoritms-life.html

I kind of agree with all what you say here, and on the basic philosophy.
But I
think that what you describe admits a more general description, in which
the laws
of physics are themselves selected by a process similar but more general
than
evolution. It makes me think that life (and brains at some different level)
is
what happen when a universal system mirrors itself. A universal machine is a
dynamical mirror, and life can develop once you put the dynamical mirror in
front
of itself (again a case of diagonalization). I think I follow your
philosophy, but
apply it in arithmetic and/or computer science.

I envision also a kind of selection of the mind over the matter , since the most basic
notion of existence implies and observer, that is,a mind and a mind, in a universe
where history has a meaning (that discard boltzmann brains) , and hold a kind of
intelligence (since intelligence permits to make use of experience) impose very strong
antropic restrictions not only in the nature of the phisical laws, as I said, but in
the matematicity of them. With matematicity i mean a reuse of the same simple
structures at different levels of reality. I mean that the most simple mathematical
structures are more represented in the structure of reality than complicated ones, to
minimize the complexity.

Re: Compact dimensions and orthogonality

2012-10-25 Thread Richard Ruquist

On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 1:43 PM, Stephen P. King  wrote:
> On 10/25/2012 11:52 AM, meekerdb wrote:
>
> On 10/25/2012 4:58 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> Stephan,
>
> Since yesterday it occurred to me that you may be thinking of the 10
> or more dimensions of string theory as being orthogonal because they
> were so before the big bang. But the dimensions that
> curled-up/compactified went out of orthogonality during the big bang
> according to Cumrun Vafa. I'll look up that reference if you are
> interested.
>
> According to Vafa 2 dimensions compactified for every single space
> dimension that inflated. In over simplified terms,  2 dimensions
> (actually in strips of some 10,000 Planck lengths) to be compactified
> lined up say in the east-west space dimension so that space in an
> orthogonal direction could expand. So some semblance of orthogonality
> exists in the compactification process, but it is clear that the
> compactified dimensions become embedded in 3D space for inflation to
> occur.
>
>
> It's implicit in the definition of dimensions of a Riemannian manifold that
> there are as many orthogonal directions as dimensions.  Compactified
> dimensions are just small; they're small, not infinite, because they have
> closed topology.  That property is completely independent of having
> orthogonal directions.
>
> Brent
>
> Dear Brent,
>
> Compactness and orthogonality are not the same quantities. Yes. But my
> point is that the compact structures in string theories (super or not) are
> orthogonal to the dimensions of space-time. Maybe we need all take a
> remedial math class on linear algebra and geometry!

I am still waiting for the explanation of how you know that to be true-
that the compact manifolds are orthogonal to space dimensions.
Richard

>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
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Re: Compact dimensions and orthogonality


On 10/25/2012 11:52 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/25/2012 4:58 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Stephan,

Since yesterday it occurred to me that you may be thinking of the 10
or more dimensions of string theory as being orthogonal because they
were so before the big bang. But the dimensions that
curled-up/compactified went out of orthogonality during the big bang
according to Cumrun Vafa. I'll look up that reference if you are
interested.

According to Vafa 2 dimensions compactified for every single space
dimension that inflated. In over simplified terms,  2 dimensions
(actually in strips of some 10,000 Planck lengths) to be compactified
lined up say in the east-west space dimension so that space in an
orthogonal direction could expand. So some semblance of orthogonality
exists in the compactification process, but it is clear that the
compactified dimensions become embedded in 3D space for inflation to
occur.


It's implicit in the definition of dimensions of a Riemannian manifold 
that there are as many orthogonal directions as dimensions.  
Compactified dimensions are just small; they're small, not infinite, 
because they have closed topology.  That property is completely 
independent of having orthogonal directions.


Brent

Dear Brent,

Compactness and orthogonality are not the same quantities. Yes. But 
my point is that the compact structures in string theories (super or 
not) are orthogonal to the dimensions of space-time. Maybe we need all 
take a remedial math class on linear algebra and geometry!


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Stephen

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Re: Predictive physiological anticipation preceding seemingly unpredictable stimuli: a meta-analysis


On 10/25/2012 11:55 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

But I don not mean such kind of anticipation. such anticipation by
gathering information and computation is a fundamental activity of
living beings.  I refer to adivination. I suppose that a definition of
adivination is the anticipation of something for which we have no
conscious or unconscious inference possible. To anticipate that a
policeman knoking on the door will tell us bad news is not
adivination, for example.

Dear Alberto,

It seems that you are not considering the situation where all 
entities have this ability, all living things can adivinate the behavior 
of each other and so the ability is, in general a wash - it cancels out 
because of the symmetry - except for the occasional statistical outlier 
that locally breaks the symmetry. This might explain how co-evolution of 
multiple co-habitating organism is so successful in spite of the fact 
that most mutations are harmful or fatal. Nature might be exploiting the 
global entanglement of physical systems to "load the dice" of chance 
just a tiny bit.
The threshold of this effect is that multiple possible outcomes are 
always involved - it never occurs in isolated and binary cases, it is as 
if Nature requires a form of "plausible deniability" to maintain the 
appearance of classical level causality.


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Re: Against Mechanism

On 10/25/2012 7:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Oct 2012, at 20:51, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/24/2012 7:56 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, October 24, 2012 12:21:23 AM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

On 10/23/2012 6:33 PM, Max Gron wrote:

On Sunday, November 28, 2010 5:19:08 AM UTC+10:30, Rex Allen wrote:

On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 7:40 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 3:38 PM, Rex Allen  
wrote:
>>
>> But I also deny that mechanism can account for consciousness (except
>> by fiat declaration that it does).
>>
>
> Rex,
> I am interested in your reasoning against mechanism.  Assume there is 
were
> an] mechanical brain composed of mechanical neurons, that contained 
the same
> information as a human brain, and processed it in the same way.

I started out as a functionalist/computationalist/mechanist but
abandoned it - mainly because I don't think that "representation" will
do all that you're asking it to do.

For example, with mechanical or biological brains - while it seems
entirely reasonable to me that the contents of my conscious experience
can be represented by quarks and electrons arranged in particular
ways, and that by changing the structure of this arrangement over time
in the right way one could also represent how the contents of my
experience changes over time.

However, there is nothing in my conception of quarks or electrons (in
particle or wave form) nor in my conception of arrangements and
representation that would lead me to predict beforehand that such
arrangements would give rise to anything like experiences of pain or
anger or what it's like to see red.

I think that's a failure of imagination. >From what I know about quarks and
electrons I can infer that they will form atoms and in certain 
circumstances on
the surface of the Earth they will form molecules and some of these can be
molecules that replicate and evolution will produce complex reproducing 
organisms
these will evolve ways of interacting

It's not a failure of imagination, it's recognition of magical thinking.

with the environment which we will call 'seeing red' and 'feeling pain' and 
some
of them will be social and evolve language and symbolism and will experience
emotions like anger.

Not even remotely possible. How does a way of interacting with the environment come to 
have an experience of any kind, let alone something totally unprecedented and 
explainable like 'red' or 'pain'. It is like saying that if you begin counting to 
infinity at some point the number is bound to turn purple.

That's Bruno's theory. :-)

?  (not it is just comp, put in a non precise way).

Precisely: the counting algorithm is not Turing universal. You need addition and 
multiplication. Then this is just comp, unless you take the intelligent behavior in 
arithmetic as zombies, and invent a notion of primitive substance just for that purpose.

Wasn't it you who, in a different post, hypothesized that everything is definable in 
terms of it's relations to other things.  So purple is definable in terms of being seen 
and on a continuum with blue and violet and a certain angle and spacing on an optical 
grating and so on.

This is a failure of skeptical imagination. I can see exactly the assumption you are 
making, and understand exactly why you are making it, but can you see that it does not 
automatically follow that a machine which functions without experience should develop 
experiential dimensions as magical emergent properties?

I'm with John Clark on that - if a machine functions intelligently it's intelligent and 
it's probably conscious.  Nothing magical about it.

I am with you, but then why would it stops to be true when the machine functions 
intelligently in arithmetic, especially if the measure gives the physical laws (as it 
needs to do if we are machine).

You need to reify a notion of matter, than nobody has ever seem just to select a dream 
among all dreams, but this matter can have any role in consciousness (by the movie 
graph, or Maudlin, notably).

You don't want a magic consciousness, but still want a magic matter, it looks 
to me.

No, but I do want to know why THIS world rather than THAT world or at least know that 
there is no answer.

Brent

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Re: Code length = probability distribution


On 10/25/2012 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If you're going to explain purpose, meaning, qualia, thoughts,...you 
need to start from something simpler that does not assume those 
things.  Bruno proposes to explain  matter as well, so he has to 
start without matter.


Actually I deduce the absence of matter from comp. If we bet on comp, 
we have no other choice than to explain matter from dream coherence 
notions. We can add matter, but it would be like invisible horses, and 
vision is a first person experience and it relies on the infinities of 
computation in arithmetic.

Dear Bruno,

No, matter would not be "like invisible horses". It quantifies the 
"resources" required for a computation to run. You safely neglect this 
in your explanations because you set COMP in the platonic realm of 
ideas, where time, space and limitations do not exist. I am trying to 
get your result to work in conditions that cannot ignore resource 
requirements.


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Re: Predictive physiological anticipation preceding seemingly unpredictable stimuli: a meta-analysis


On 10/25/2012 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Oct 2012, at 19:31, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

I dont believe that such genuine anticipation is possible, for a 
simple reason: If for quantum or relativistic means the mind or the 
brain could genuinely anticipate anything, this would be such a huge 
advantage, that this hability would be inherited genetically by 
everyone of us, every human plant, animal with the most accurate 
precission. because it would be so critical.


The fact is the we have no such hability. the most we can do is to 
simulate it with the available data, gatering as much as possible 
information from the behaviour, faces etc of other human beings and 
we process it unconsciously. Most of the time even we are not 
conscious of how much information we gather.


I think we anticipate all the time. At every second. When we drive a 
car, we anticipate the movement and correct it accordingly. There are 
many picture of object lacking a crucial elements which when shown 
rapidly to subject makes the subject swearing having seen the lacking 
elements. When shown more slowly after, the subject is usually 
astonished to see they were lacking. A part of that anticipation is 
part of Hobson theory of dream, where the cerebral stem might sent to 
the cortex quasi random information, and the dreams is the result of 
the cortex anticipating sense from that crude information. A building 
of an hypothesis/theory and its momentary admission is also a form of 
anticipation. Everyone anticipate that tomorrow the sun will rise.
If you decide to open your fridge you anticipate the vague shape of 
what you can see in your fridge. It is far more efficient than analyse 
the data like if they were new.
I don't think there is anything controversial here. Helmholtz theory 
is usually accepted as a base in pattern recognition, and basic 
perception. It is rather well tested.
More provocative perhaps: I personally would not been so much 
astonished that evolution itself does make variate sort of 
anticipation. I would not find this utterly shocking, as genetic 
algorithm can isolate anticipative programs, like brains are. It would 
just means that some brain-like mechanism has already appear at the 
level of the genome, but on a scale which makes it hard to be detected 
for us. I am not sure at all about this, but I see nothing really 
"magical" if such thing was detected.


Bruno


Dear Bruno and Alberto,

I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a "genetic 
algorithm can isolate anticipative programs", I think that anticipation 
is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw inertia. It is 
a relation between any one and the class of computations that it belongs 
to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the collections 
of others like it. This is like an error correction or compression 
mechanism.


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Stephen


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Re: Dennett and others on qualia