Bruno Marchal to say "I will see one city", or "we will see two cities", or
"the copies of Bruno Marchal will see two cities", but not "I will see two
cities". Even without duplication, there is no rigid 1:1 connection between
pronouns and proper nouns.
>
On Tue, 22 Aug 2017 at 10:00 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> >
>> Which one and only one outcome will I see when I toss the coin?
>>
>
> I can't tell you today, but tomorrow after the flip I
> 'll be
On Tue, 22 Aug 2017 at 8:39 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >
>>>> While the outcome is certain for you, it is not certain for me.
>>>>
>>>
>>> That's because the meaning of the personal
On Tue, 22 Aug 2017 at 8:12 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at , Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>> >
>>>> >>
>>>>
>>>> Why does this make the question not a question?
>>>
>>>
>>> >>
On 21 August 2017 at 11:16, John Clark wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >
>> There are two people after the event,
>
>
> Yes.
>
>
>
>> >
>> and each has his own answer about which one and only one city he s
On 21 August 2017 at 11:08, John Clark wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 , Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>> >
>> While the outcome is certain for you, it is not certain for me.
>>
>
> That's because the meaning of the personal pronoun "me" w
ious that when we assume mechanism, the question makes
>> perfect sense.
>>
>
> Then now that it's all over and you know all there is to know you should
> have a perfect one word answer to the question. So let's hear it!
>
>
>> You know with certainty (
On Mon, 21 Aug 2017 at 2:27 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 2:18 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> Let me explain the bet more clearly. I will be duplicated tomorrow in
>> Moscow and Washington. I have $1 in my pocket, and this will be dup
On Sat, 19 Aug 2017 at 6:20 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 18, 2017 at 1:48 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >>
>>> Today before the duplication there is only one
>>> "I"
>>> but tomorrow after the duplication there
On Sat, 19 Aug 2017 at 1:30 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 17, 2017 at 12:00 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> There is a problem with asking "which one place will John Clark be in
>> tomorrow", because there will be two of them, in two
On Thu, 17 Aug 2017 at 10:39 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 7:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> The difference between the past and the future in a deterministic
>> multiverse is that for an observer inside it the past is known but
On Wed, 16 Aug 2017 at 3:26 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 9:31 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
>
>>> >>
>>> a rat can remember the past and a rat can use induction to make a
>>> prediction, and most important of all a rat
On Tue, 15 Aug 2017 at 9:09 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >
>> By their behaviour, rats show an operational understanding of
>> probability.
>
>
> That because a rat can remember the past and a rat can use indu
t can cut through spurious philosophical argument, such as the claim
> that making predictions in duplication experiments is gibberish.
>
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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On Tue, 15 Aug 2017 at 2:52 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 8/14/2017 6:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 10:31 pm, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On 14/08/2017 4:20 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, 14 Au
On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 10:31 pm, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
> On 14/08/2017 4:20 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 3:08 pm, Bruce Kellett <
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
>> On 14/08/2017 2:32 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On
On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 3:08 pm, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
> On 14/08/2017 2:32 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 14 August 2017 at 14:15, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
> The point, as I see it, is that if, after duplication, the copies can
>> communicate, and they a
ther my
copy was in the next street, the next galaxy or the next universe, and I
would have exactly the same expectations about the future if I were to
undergo duplication again.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 11:30 am, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
> On 14/08/2017 11:19 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 10:30 am, Bruce Kellett <
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
>> On 14/08/2017 2:51 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 10:30 am, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
> On 14/08/2017 2:51 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:38 pm, Bruce Kellett <
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
>>
>> I think the problem I see is in the insistence that on
On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 7:59 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 13, 2017 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >
>> After duplication, the copies will not claim to be the same person any
>> more,
>>
>
> True but both will claim they are the "I
> &
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> For m
On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:38 pm, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
> On 13/08/2017 6:00 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 13 August 2017 at 16:48, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On 13/08/2017 10:01 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:19 am, Bruce K
On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 1:56 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 12, 2017 at 11:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
>
>>> >>
>>> Pronouns work fine today because nobody has yet made a "I" duplicating
>>> machine, but when
On 13 August 2017 at 16:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 13/08/2017 10:01 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:19 am, Bruce Kellett <
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
>> On 13/08/2017 9:05 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On
On 13 August 2017 at 11:16, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 12, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >
>> You call yourself "I" and I call myself "I", simultaneously, and we don't
>> fight over who deserves the title, because that is ho
On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:19 am, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
> On 13/08/2017 9:05 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 13 August 2017 at 08:48, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On 13/08/2017 12:04 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 4
On 13 August 2017 at 08:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 13/08/2017 12:04 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 4:52 pm, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On 12/08/2017 1:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>> First person experience is i
On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 1:01 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 9:43 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> Before the duplication SP bet that "I will see W".
>>
>
> And that's the problem right there. The above is about
On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 4:52 pm, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
> On 12/08/2017 1:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 12 August 2017 at 13:13, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On 12/08/2017 12:23 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 12 August 2017 at 12:12, Bruce Kellet
On 12 August 2017 at 13:13, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 12/08/2017 12:23 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 12 August 2017 at 12:12, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wro
nowledge that he can gain at
> any time after pressing the button. In which case, the 1p-3p confusion is
> complete, p(M) = p(W) = 1, and he can expect to see both cities. In that
> case, the pure 1p view becomes irrelevant.
The subject directly experiences the details of the experimental pr
On 12 August 2017 at 11:16, John Clark wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 6:01 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >>
>>> Let me ask you
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>> a different question, do you think the following 2 questions are
>>> equ
On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 3:35 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 7:45 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> "What will I see tomorrow?" is meaningful and does not contain any false
>> propositions.
>
>
> If all meaning is beaten
On 11 August 2017 at 10:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 11/08/2017 9:45 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>>
>> "What will I see tomorrow?" is meaningful and does not contain any false
>> propositions. Humans who are fully aware that there will be multiple copies
On Fri, 11 Aug 2017 at 4:44 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 11:36 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>>> I've asked the following question 4 times and you've refused to answer 4
>>> times but I'm going to ask for a fifth t
t know what you're
> arguing in favor of and you're wasting your time and ours.
>
The two questions are not equivalent. Question 2) implies that there will
be a unique individual who remembers being me, whereas in fact there will
be two of them. Question 2) therefore includes a false
>
>> We can prove: IF digital mechanism THEN there is that unpredictability
>>
>
> Nobody can predict it because knows what it is they're being asked to
> predict. Nobody knows what "it" is.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
> --
> You received this me
its
and not even God can tell the observer which event he will end up seeing.
So although for practical purposes under both types of physics the decay
event is random, with a many worlds physics it is logically mandated
randomness, while in the single world case it is not. And perhaps it is
th
On Sun, 6 Aug 2017 at 3:23 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 5, 2017 at 10:04 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
>
>>
>>> >>
>>> Without the duplicating machine after it's all over you can say
>>> "Yesterday I shouldn't
On Sat, 5 Aug 2017 at 4:26 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 3, 2017 at 7:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> You seem to agree that it's obvious the duplicating machine won't make a
>> difference.
>
>
> Sometimes it doe
On Thu, Aug 3, 2017 at 2:50 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>> I already know a rat will try to solve a maze to get food so I'll take
>> that part of the bet, but I'm not sure what "
>> proportion of the number of attempts
>> " means
eing befuddled by the underlying details of the experiment.
Stathis Papaioannou
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On Thu, 3 Aug 2017 at 1:46 am, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Aug 1, 2017 at 12:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >>
>>> If it's after the rat
>>> enters the duplicator
>>> then there are 2 of them, which *one* gets
On Wed, 2 Aug 2017 at 1:01 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 11:41 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> The rat's bet is that it will end up with the reward when it enters the
>> duplicator,
>>
>
> If it's after the rat
On Tue, 1 Aug 2017 at 11:25 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
You can say to the rat, "personal pronouns have no meaning when there are
>> multiple copies of you, and therefore it is nonsensical to predict that you
>> will get t
icator repeatedly, in
expectation of more rewards. You can say to the rat, "personal pronouns
have no meaning when there are multiple copies of you, and therefore it is
nonsensical to predict that you will get the reward", but the rat won't
care, and I think most humans won't
On Mon, 31 Jul 2017 at 12:03 pm, John Clark wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 30, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >
>> If the experiment is repeated many times all the copies will say that, in
>> their recollection, about half the time they ended up in Moscow and half
>&g
ow and half
the time in Washington, and they couldn't predict which city it would be.
So the next time they went into the machine they would take roubles as well
as dollars, to cover both possibilities. Refusing to make provisions for
the future on the grounds that pronouns have
On Sat, 29 Jul 2017 at 6:07 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 2:48 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> In the next few moments in the multiverse multiple parallel copies of me
>> will continue writing this email
>>
>
> If they are
On Sat, 29 Jul 2017 at 4:13 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 12:49 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
>
>>> >>
>>> You're free to act as you like. I wouldn't behave that way but there is
>>> no disputing matters of tas
On Sat, 29 Jul 2017 at 3:35 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 3:37 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> There is the possibility of differentiation even if it doesn't occur. If
>> you know you have been duplicated into 1000 red cubicles and
gt;
>
>> >
>> the same person as I am now, projected into the future,
>>
>
> It won't be exactly the same person,
> Stathis Papaioannou
> of tomorrow will have all of "your" memories but in addition will have
> other memories that "y
On Fri, 28 Jul 2017 at 4:45 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 6:07 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> I would say the probability of ending up in Washington is 1000 times as
>> high, even if the 1000 copies never differentiate.
>
>
> I
On Fri, 28 Jul 2017 at 12:08 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 10:44 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> Your beliefs about your future are demonstrated by your decisions and
>> behaviour,
>>
>
>
> Absolutely true.
>
On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 8:52 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 27 Jul 2017, at 12:07, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 6:18 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 26 Jul 2017, at 22:26, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017
told that the copies in Moscow are totally identical, and will never
>> differentiated.
>>
>
> Then there are only 2 people not 1000.
>
>
>
> Exactly.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> >
>> In that case, there is only two first person experiences
>&
On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 10:49 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>> >
>> You have said multiple times that if there is more than one copy of you
>> then the idea if using personal pronouns when discussing the future i
On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 7:18 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> >
>> The point is you seem to be saying that with 1->1 duplication you would
>> be satisfied that you survive,
>>
>
> Yes.
>
>
> >
On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 2:52 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 2:16 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >>
>> If you were to use a teleporter at A that you knew would destroy the
>> original and make a single copy at B, from what you have
On Wed, 26 Jul 2017 at 11:16 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>>
>>> >>
>>> If after "you" walk into the duplicator at A "you" remain one when "you"
>>> walk out at B and a
On Wed, 26 Jul 2017 at 3:26 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 11:19 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >>
>>> both had a equal continuous feeling of self *after* they walked out of
>>> the teleporter, so to ask the ONE* before* he walked in
On Wed, 26 Jul 2017 at 12:29 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 11:50 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote
>
> >
>> Are you completely dismissing the idea of probability?
>>
>
> No
> ,
> b
> ut I am
>
> completely dismis
On Tue, 25 Jul 2017 at 7:12 am, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sun, Jul 23, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >
>> The original would argue as follows: I have gone through the teleporter
>> multiple times, and about half the time I have come out in city A and
out to be incorrect. Not that
predictions, correct or incorrect, have anything to do with the sense of
self.
> On 24 July 2017 at 12:05, John Clark wrote:
>
On Sun, Jul 23, 2017 at 7:42 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
>
> >
>> Each copy that comes out of the transporter would cont
And try replacing the 4 uses of the personal pronoun "you" in the
> short sentence I quote above with "
> Stathis Papaioannou
> ".
>
> Personal pronouns simply can't be used in the casual way we do in everyday
> life if personal pronoun duplicating machine
On Sun, 23 Jul 2017 at 11:57 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 22, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >>
>>> If "he" knows "he" will be duplicated and if "he" is not a idiot "he"
>>> will know not to ask wh
on "W v M" was the best prediction
>
>
> How on earth can W or M be the best prediction, or any prediction at
> all,
>
> if even AFTER the conclusion of the experiment you STILL can't say if the
> one and only one correct answer was W or if it was M? Fo
; It's OK not to have an explicit definition, but even the intuitive notion
> of free will leads either to triviality (free will is when I do what I want
> to do) or nonsense (free will is not compatible with my behaviour being
> either determined or random).
>
--
Stathis Papaioan
ed bachelor". Even an omnipotent God
could not make free will exist.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
> --
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word quark". Joyce invented the
> word, although certainly not the concept.
>
I bet more people know who Molly Bloom is than could explain what a quark
is.
> --
Stathis Papaioannou
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Will a quantum
> computer, if and when we develop one? I really don't know - obviously we
> living things *are* physical systems that are either directly capable of
> conscious experience or are used as "interfaces" by entities that are. I
> see no reason to feel that *only*
hould be a
>> physical universe - rather it speculates that the UD will necessarily
>> produce not only thread of consciouness but also a physics for
>> consciousness to relate to. But that's why I thing the "reversal" is a
>> cheat. The physics is necessary
On 26 April 2017 at 09:22, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 4/25/2017 6:26 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Sun, 23 Apr 2017 at 5:58 am, John Clark wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> >>
>>>> Suppose ju
On Sun, 23 Apr 2017 at 5:58 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >>
>>> Suppose just for
>>> the sake of argument that non-physical computations did not exist, how
>>> would our physical world
localised it still needs to be implemented in a physical substrate.
In this case we avoid dualism by reverting things: ok, so it is time
> and space that are generated by mind.
>
> I think.
>
> Telmo.
>
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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On Wed., 29 Mar. 2017 at 5:16 pm, Kim Jones wrote:
>
> On 29 Mar 2017, at 3:32 pm, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
>
> On Wed., 29 Mar. 2017 at 10:30 am, Kim Jones
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On 29 Mar 2017, at 10:22 am, 'cdemorse...@
mathematical
> foundation from which that which we perceive as being matter emerges?
>
>
> Sure - but then they wouldn't need to identify with atheism. They could
> just call themselves - wait for it - "mathematicians".
>
But if they are asked if they believe in
or a separate
physical universe. The appearance of a stable physical universe then
emerges from the ensemble of these observer moments.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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to be agnostic.
>
> In this mailing list, we have seen hypothesis about such a mind that
> do not require man-in-the-sky, creationism or other absurdities, nor
> conflict with current scientific models. Are they correct? I don't
> know, so...
Is agnosticism about God differe
On Sun., 22 Jan. 2017 at 12:33 pm, John Clark wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 19, 2017 at 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> >
> In Plato-like theology
> [blah blah blah]
>
>
>
>
> It's unreasonable to call Plato an "imbecile". Have you read any of his
> Socratic dialogues? They qualify as brillia
ding our encrypted brain states to be processed
> in the cloud?
>
> 7. Would you say yes to the FHE doctor?
>
>
> I am interested in hearing everyone's thoughts on the matter.
>
I can't "decrypt" my own brain, in the sense that I'm not aware of the
neural
> On 27 Dec. 2016, at 10:03 pm, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
> I take a break from the god-wars to propose an idea that I have been
> thinking about. This is probably both silly and unoriginal, but here
> it goes...
>
> If we assume the MWI, isn't it the case that we should expect the
> world to bec
fect and that does not effect our lives. Why
>> even invent a word for a concept as useless as that?
>>
>
> I have found that God is exactly the same as my subconscious. And my
> subconscious is connected to other peoples subconsciouses.
>
> When I pray, I talk to my own subco
What I meant was that the subjective experience of time would be the same
whether there was a material universe with real time, a material block
universe without time, or no material universe.
On 16 September 2016 at 02:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 9/15/2016 4:44 AM, Stathis Pa
curring in real time, this is not necessarily
relevant to the supervenient mental processes. A future mental state could
be computed in real time before a past mental state; it could have happened
to you right now, and you wouldn't know. Thus, even if there is a real
world, with real time an
> On 14 Sep 2016, at 10:13 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
>> On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>> On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>> In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent.
> On 14 Sep 2016, at 11:25 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>> On 14/09/2016 10:13 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>> On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>> On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>> In the UD model of the wor
underpinning consciousness and leave the stream of consciousness unchanged;
otherwise there would be a radical decoupling of the mental from the
physical. At the limit, this means the process underpinning consciousness
can be cut up into infinitesimals.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
You received this
remember yesterday as occurring in the past, but assuming there
is an objective past, it might not have. You would still feel that
yesterday occurred in the past if there was no objective yesterday at all.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
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icated?" is just words with a
question mark at the end and is not a question because after "*you*" is
duplicated there would be 2 chunks of matter
that behaves in a Telmomenezesian way
.
The distinction you insist on seems arbitrary. Whether the two versions of
you can meet
On 9 August 2016 at 03:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 8/8/2016 6:18 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, 8 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> Not necessarily
to exactly define
the timing of a neuron's excitation, so you are right, that would not be
digitisable. Practically, however, brains would have to have a non-zero
engineering tolerance, or they would be too unstable. The gravitational
attraction of a passing ant would slightly change the timin
On Friday, 5 August 2016, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 05 Aug 2016, at 06:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
> On 8/4/2016 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 8/4/2016 2:57 AM
On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 8/4/2016 2:57 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> The problem with (3) is a general problem with multiverses. A single,
> infinite universe is an example of a multiverse theory, since there will be
> infinite copies of
On 4 August 2016 at 11:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 8/3/2016 5:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 3 August 2016 at 16:02, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 8/2/2016 10:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> O
On 3 August 2016 at 16:02, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 8/2/2016 10:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 8/2/2016 3:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
On 4 August 2016 at 09:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 4/08/2016 9:30 am, smitra wrote:
>
>> On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>> On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:
>>>
>>> On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>
>
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