Le 28-août-06, à 05:37, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>> It *has* been proved (by diagonalization) that there exist some
>> problem
>> in number theory which are soluble by a machine using a random oracle,
>> although no machine with pseudorandom oracle can sole the problem.
>
> That's intere
Le 27-août-06, à 19:56, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Come on, I have already insist on this. Understanding what really
>> means
>> "surviving through the yes doctor" = understanding that, in *that*
>> case, we survive without doctor.
>
> "Without the doctor" is computationalism
Le 27-aot-06, 17:49, 1Z a crit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 25-aot-06, 02:31, 1Z a crit :
>>
>>> Of course it can. Anything can be attached to a bare substrate.
>>
>> It follows from the UDA that you cannot do that, unless you put
>> explicitly actual infinite in the "bare substrat
Brent Meeker writes:
> >>>This may be coincidental, but I think not. Your PC is engineered to
> >>>avoid the effects of chaos to prevent this very thing occurring. Why
> >>>wouldn't nature do the same thing unless it were deliberately trying
> >>>to exploit randomness?
> >>
> >>In nature there's
Bruno wrote...
>
> > KURTZ S. A., 1983, On the Random Oracle Hypothesis, Information and
> > Control, 57, pp. 40-47.
> >
I recall reading this paper, and the followup entitled "The Random
Oracle Hypothesis is False" by Chang et al.
>From recollection though, the claim was of superior algorit
Bruno marchal writes:
> Le 26-août-06, à 16:35, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> >> And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily
> >> complex way, because any physical
> >> system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate
> >> mapping rules,
> >
> > That is not a fact
Bruno Marchal writes:
> > Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a
> > true random
> > number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only
> > the former
> > could possibly be conscious? I suppose it is possible, but I see no
> > reason to believe
On Sun, Aug 27, 2006 at 09:31:15PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> It seems to me that the idea of a deterministic machine being conscious is
> assumed to be
> preposterous, for no good reason. I believe that I could have acted
> differently even with
> identical environmental inputs, whic
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes (quoting Russell Standish):
>
>
>>>This may be coincidental, but I think not. Your PC is engineered to
>>>avoid the effects of chaos to prevent this very thing occurring. Why
>>>wouldn't nature do the same thing unless it were deliberately trying
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Come on, I have already insist on this. Understanding what really means
> "surviving through the yes doctor" = understanding that, in *that*
> case, we survive without doctor.
"Without the doctor" is computationalism+Platonism, not
computationalism.
--~--~-~--~
Russell Standish wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 25, 2006 at 04:48:01PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > > The UD is
> > > quite possibly enough to emulate the full Multiverse (this is sort of
> > > where
> > > Bruno's partail results are pointing), which we know contain conscious
> > > processes.
> >
>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Russell Standish writes:
>
> > On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 10:01:36PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a
> > > true random
> > > number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, on
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 25-août-06, à 02:31, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > Of course it can. Anything can be attached to a bare substrate.
>
> It follows from the UDA that you cannot do that, unless you put
> explicitly actual infinite in the "bare substrate",
I don't see why.
> an then attach your
> m
Le 26-août-06, à 17:39, Russell Standish a écrit :
> A non-computationalist will believe that the Multiverse contains
> conscious processes (if they believe in a Multiverse at all). However,
> they may disagree that the Multiverse is Turing emulable.
No. A computaionalist has no reason to bel
Le 26-août-06, à 16:35, 1Z a écrit :
>
>> And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily
>> complex way, because any physical
>> system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate
>> mapping rules,
>
> That is not a fact.
It would make sense, indeed, only if
Le 26-août-06, à 14:01, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> Peter Jones writes:
>
That doesn't follow. Comutationalists don't
have to believe any old programme is conscious.
It might be the case that only an indeterministic
one will do. A deterministic programme could
be e
Le 25-août-06, à 10:09, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> You would if it were the non-miraculous branches that were selectively
> pruned, although I guess that it is just this sort of pruning people
> would
> be asking of God (you would hardly need to pray that your coffee remain
> coffee). Neve
Le 25-août-06, à 02:31, 1Z a écrit :
> Of course it can. Anything can be attached to a bare substrate.
It follows from the UDA that you cannot do that, unless you put
explicitly actual infinite in the "bare substrate", an then attach your
mind to it (how?).
> If it
> were impossible to at
Brent Meeker writes (quoting Russell Standish):
> > This may be coincidental, but I think not. Your PC is engineered to
> > avoid the effects of chaos to prevent this very thing occurring. Why
> > wouldn't nature do the same thing unless it were deliberately trying
> > to exploit randomness?
>
>
Russell Standish writes:
> On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 10:01:36PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true
> > random
> > number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only the
> > former
> > could possibly
Norman Samish writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> That's right, but with a fixed input the computer follows a perfectly
> deterministic course, like a clockwork mechanism, however many times we
> repeat the run. Moreover, if we consider the recording of the input as
> hardwired into the
On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 08:28:06PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> In nature there's no reason to depend on amplifying quantum randomness -
> there's
> plenty of "random" environmental input to keep our brains from getting stuck
> in loops.
>
Prevention of loops is not the only use of randomn
Russell Standish wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 01:57:07PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>>What are the ingredients of a conscious computer ? Perhaps
>>>one essential component is a central processing unit that depends on quantum
>>>randomness to arrive at a decision when other factors balan
On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 01:57:07PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >What are the ingredients of a conscious computer ? Perhaps
> > one essential component is a central processing unit that depends on
> > quantum
> > randomness to arrive at a decision when other factors balance out.
>
> I don't t
On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 10:01:36PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true
> random
> number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only the
> former
> could possibly be conscious? I suppose it is possibl
On Fri, Aug 25, 2006 at 04:48:01PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > The UD is
> > quite possibly enough to emulate the full Multiverse (this is sort of
> > where
> > Bruno's partail results are pointing), which we know contain conscious
> > processes.
>
> Of course a non-computationalist will
Norman Samish wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> That's right, but with a fixed input the computer follows a perfectly
> deterministic course, like a clockwork mechanism, however many times we
> repeat the run. Moreover, if we consider the recording of the input as
> hardwired into the com
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>>What I meant was, if a computer program can be associated with
>>>consciousness, then a rigid and deterministic computer program can also
>>>be associated with consciousness - leaving aside the question of how
>>>exactly the association
---- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Brent Meeker"
Sent: Saturday, August 26, 2006 7:17 AM
Subject: RE: computationalism and supervenience
Brent Meeker writes:
> > What I meant was, if a computer program can be a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > > A classical computer is perfectly deterministic - it wouldn't be much use
> > > as a computer if were not. If
> > > it is provided with the same inputs, it will go through the same sequence
> > > of physical states.
> >
> > But here it i
Norman Samish wrote:
>And since the
> computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily complex way, because
> any physical system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate
> mapping rules,
That isn't a fact.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You recei
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
That's right, but with a fixed input the computer follows a perfectly
deterministic course, like a clockwork mechanism, however many times we
repeat the run. Moreover, if we consider the recording of the input as
hardwired into the computer, it does not interact wit
Peter Jones writes:
> > A classical computer is perfectly deterministic - it wouldn't be much use
> > as a computer if were not. If
> > it is provided with the same inputs, it will go through the same sequence
> > of physical states.
>
> But here it is not the computation itself that is
> reco
Peter Jones writes:
> > > It was never conscious, and if anyonw concludede it was on
> > > the first run, they were mistaken. The TT is a rule-of-thumb for
> > > detecting,
> > > it does not magically endow consciousness.
> >
> > Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containin
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
>
> > > > > This does not necessarily mean that the consciousness is caused by or
> > > > > supervenes on the pattern of dots, any more that the number 3 is
> > > > > caused by or supervenes
> > > > > on a collection of 3 objects. If
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> > > > This does not necessarily mean that the consciousness is caused by or
> > > > supervenes on the pattern of dots, any more that the number 3 is caused
> > > > by or supervenes
> > > > on a collection of 3 objects. If anything, it could be the other way
>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > It was never conscious, and if anyonw concludede it was on
> > the first run, they were mistaken. The TT is a rule-of-thumb for
> > detecting,
> > it does not magically endow consciousness.
>
> Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a
Peter Jones writes:
> > > That doesn't follow. Comutationalists don't
> > > have to believe any old programme is conscious.
> > > It might be the case that only an indeterministic
> > > one will do. A deterministic programme could
> > > be exposed as a programme in a Turing Test.
> >
> > Then you
Brent Meeker writes:
> > I'm responsible for a misunderstanding if you thought I meant "recording"
> > in the usual sense of the word, i.e. a copy of a limited subset (sound or
> > video, for example) of a subject's attributes over a period of time. What
> > I intended was a copy of all of th
Brent Meeker writes:
> > What I meant was, if a computer program can be associated with
> > consciousness, then a rigid and deterministic computer program can also
> > be associated with consciousness - leaving aside the question of how
> > exactly the association occurs. For example, suppose
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> [quoting Russell Standish]
> > > > The Game of Life is known to be Turing complete. However, I do not
> > > > think any arrangement of dots in GoL could be conscious. Rather there
> > > > is an arrangement that implements a universal dovetaile
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jone swrites:
>
> > > What I meant was, if a computer program can be associated with
> > > consciousness, then a rigid and deterministic computer program can also
> > > be associated with consciousness -
> >
> >
> > That doesn't follow. Comutationalists don't
>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> [quoting Russell Standish]
>
The Game of Life is known to be Turing complete. However, I do not
think any arrangement of dots in GoL could be conscious. Rather there
is an arrangement that implements a universal dovetailer. The UD
Peter Jones writes:
[quoting Russell Standish]
> > > The Game of Life is known to be Turing complete. However, I do not
> > > think any arrangement of dots in GoL could be conscious. Rather there
> > > is an arrangement that implements a universal dovetailer. The UD is
> > > quite possibly enough
Peter Jone swrites:
> > What I meant was, if a computer program can be associated with
> > consciousness, then a rigid and deterministic computer program can also
> > be associated with consciousness -
>
>
> That doesn't follow. Comutationalists don't
> have to believe any old programme is cons
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Various people write:
>>>
>>>
blah blah ...recording... blah blah... consciousness... blah blah
>>>
>>>But WHY can't a recording be conscious? How do I know I'm not in
>>>a recording at the moment?
>>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
>
>>Le 24-août-06, à 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>>
>>
I would say the multiple branches are needed to have any *stable*
conscious experience, i.e. to have conscious experience "with the
right
(relative) probabili
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Russell Standish writes:
>
> > > Is there any reason to believe that we would lose consciousness, or notice
> > > that anything strange had happened at all, if most or all of the parallel
> > > branches
> > > in the multiverse suddenly vanished?
> > >
> >
> > I think
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> What I meant was, if a computer program can be associated with
> consciousness, then a rigid and deterministic computer program can also
> be associated with consciousness -
That doesn't follow. Comutationalists don't
have to believe any old programme is conscious.
Le 25-août-06, à 01:01, Russell Standish a écrit :
> On Thu, Aug 24, 2006 at 09:04:26PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> Is there any reason to believe that we would lose consciousness, or
>> notice
>> that anything strange had happened at all, if most or all of the
>> parallel branches
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > Various people write:
> >
> > > blah blah ...recording... blah blah... consciousness... blah blah
> >
> > But WHY can't a recording be conscious? How do I know I'm not in
> > a recording at the moment?
>
> The question is why you don't rega
Russell Standish writes:
> > Is there any reason to believe that we would lose consciousness, or notice
> > that anything strange had happened at all, if most or all of the parallel
> > branches
> > in the multiverse suddenly vanished?
> >
>
> I think this question is ill-posed, but I'll t
Bruno Marchal writes:
> Le 24-août-06, à 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> >> I would say the multiple branches are needed to have any *stable*
> >> conscious experience, i.e. to have conscious experience "with the
> >> right
> >> (relative) probabilities"
> >
> > It may as a matter of
Russell Standish wrote:
> . The UD is
> quite possibly enough to emulate the full Multiverse (this is sort of where
> Bruno's partail results are pointing), which we know contain conscious
> processes.
*Know*
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this messag
Russell Standish wrote:
> Supervenience requires a token, or object in the physical world, that
> consciousness supervenes. All I'm saying is that this token must
> really implement all the counterfactual situations, ie exist in a
> Multiverse.
Multiverses don't implement counterfactuals as COU
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Russell Standish writes:
>
> > Its a fair point, given that we can't exactly define consciousness,
> > but doesn't it seem a tad unlikely to you?
> >
> > The point is that in a Multiverse our own consciousnesses are not
> > equivalent to recordings is suggestive, but
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Various people write:
>
> > blah blah ...recording... blah blah... consciousness... blah blah
>
> But WHY can't a recording be conscious? How do I know I'm not in
> a recording at the moment?
The question is why you don't regard the recordings in your video
cabinet
Russell Standish wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 22, 2006 at 01:18:06PM -, 1Z wrote:
> >
> > That is an interesting point. However, a computation would have to be
> > associated
> > with all related branches in order to bring all the counterfactuals (or
> > rather
> > conditionals) into a single comput
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 23-août-06, à 14:39, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> >
> > On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 04:15:41PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>> Physical supervenience is not equivalent to assuming a concrete
> >>> primitive material world. The latter is an additional assumptio
On Thu, Aug 24, 2006 at 09:04:26PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Is there any reason to believe that we would lose consciousness, or notice
> that anything strange had happened at all, if most or all of the parallel
> branches
> in the multiverse suddenly vanished?
>
I think this q
Le 24-août-06, à 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>> I would say the multiple branches are needed to have any *stable*
>> conscious experience, i.e. to have conscious experience "with the
>> right
>> (relative) probabilities"
>
> It may as a matter of fact be the case that our consciousness
Bruno Marchal writes:
> > On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 08:32:04PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >>
> >> Russell Standish writes:
> >>
> >>> Not really, as conscious experience is only associated with one
> >>> branch, but multiple branches are needed to have any conscious
> >>> experience at all
Russell Standish writes:
> Its a fair point, given that we can't exactly define consciousness,
> but doesn't it seem a tad unlikely to you?
>
> The point is that in a Multiverse our own consciousnesses are not
> equivalent to recordings is suggestive, but not conclusive, that
> recordings aren't
> On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 08:32:04PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> Russell Standish writes:
>>
>>> Not really, as conscious experience is only associated with one
>>> branch, but multiple branches are needed to have any conscious
>>> experience at all.
>>
>> What does this mean?
>>
>> S
Le 23-août-06, à 17:58, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> I take this to be what is needed to be "self-conscious". But is that
> the same as
> having an inner narrative? Is it the same as passing the mirror test?
> Is my dog
> conscious - or must he first do arithmetic?
I would bet dogs are conscio
Le 23-août-06, à 14:39, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 04:15:41PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Physical supervenience is not equivalent to assuming a concrete
>>> primitive material world. The latter is an additional assumption.
>>
>>
>> This depends entirely of
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 21-août-06, à 19:48, Tom Caylor a écrit :
>
> >
> > I'd rather go with Pascal. ;)
>
>
> Comp has its own "Pascal wag", when the doctor said that either you
> will die soon or you accept an artificial brain. Some people will
> believe an artificial brain could be a last c
Its a fair point, given that we can't exactly define consciousness,
but doesn't it seem a tad unlikely to you?
The point is that in a Multiverse our own consciousnesses are not
equivalent to recordings is suggestive, but not conclusive, that
recordings aren't conscious.
The Maudlin/movie-graph a
Supervenience requires a token, or object in the physical world, that
consciousness supervenes. All I'm saying is that this token must
really implement all the counterfactual situations, ie exist in a
Multiverse.
Conscious experience (the inside view) will only be of one of the
histories in the
On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 04:15:41PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> > Physical supervenience is not equivalent to assuming a concrete
> > primitive material world. The latter is an additional assumption.
>
>
> This depends entirely of what you mean by physical. If
> "physical-supervenience"
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 21-août-06, à 22:49, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>
>>But leaving that aside, I think there is another question in play:
>>What kind of
>>computation implements intelligence? ...consciousness? Is it every
>>computation,
>>with differences only of degree? Or are ther
Le 22-août-06, à 05:53, Russell Standish a écrit :
>> This is a very interesting remark, although I am not convinced. I have
>> also believed for a while that a material universe could be saved by
>> the way the quantum multiverse actualizes the counterfactuals.
>> But if that were true, conscio
Various people write:
> blah blah ...recording... blah blah... consciousness... blah blah
But WHY can't a recording be conscious? How do I know I'm not in
a recording at the moment? True, I am surprised by my experiences
and believe I could have acted differently had I wanted to, but that
mig
Russell Standish writes:
> Not really, as conscious experience is only associated with one
> branch, but multiple branches are needed to have any conscious
> experience at all.
What does this mean?
Stathis Papaioannou
_
Be one of t
Le 22-août-06, à 05:32, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> That sentence summarises the problem pretty well. We have to agree
> that there is this dichotomy before proceeding further, and I don't
> think most computationalists do.
I guess my work is not so well known and I guess I have some
r
Le 21-août-06, à 22:49, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> But leaving that aside, I think there is another question in play:
> What kind of
> computation implements intelligence? ...consciousness? Is it every
> computation,
> with differences only of degree? Or are there distinct requirements?
You
Le 21-août-06, à 19:48, Tom Caylor a écrit :
>
> I'd rather go with Pascal. ;)
Comp has its own "Pascal wag", when the doctor said that either you
will die soon or you accept an artificial brain. Some people will
believe an artificial brain could be a last chance to ... see their
grand gran
On Tue, Aug 22, 2006 at 01:18:06PM -, 1Z wrote:
>
> That is an interesting point. However, a computation would have to be
> associated
> with all related branches in order to bring all the counterfactuals (or
> rather
> conditionals) into a single computation.
>
> (IOW treating branches ind
On Tue, Aug 22, 2006 at 11:50:07AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > To be sure, this is not how I interpret Maudlin or the movie-graph
> > argument. I interpret it as NOT COMP or NOT PHYS SUP or NOT
> > SINGLE_UNIVERSE.
> >
> > In a multiple universe (eg Everett style MWI), all counterfactuals
Russell Standish wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 22, 2006 at 01:32:14PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > Bruno Marchal writes:
> >
> > > > The other sticking point is, given computationalism
> > > > is right, what does it take to implement a computation? There have
> > > > been arguments
> > > > th
Le 21-août-06, à 20:28, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> On Tue, Aug 22, 2006 at 01:32:14PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> Bruno Marchal writes:
>>
The other sticking point is, given computationalism
is right, what does it take to implement a computation? There have
been ar
Tom Caylor writes:
> As I remember it, my interpretation/expansion of the "Yes Doctor"
> assumption is that 1) there is a (finite of course) level of (digital)
> substitution (called the "correct level of substitution") that is
> sufficient to represent "all that I am", and "all that I could be i
On Tue, Aug 22, 2006 at 01:32:14PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
> > > The other sticking point is, given computationalism
> > > is right, what does it take to implement a computation? There have
> > > been arguments
> > > that a computation is implemented by any
Bruno Marchal writes:
> > The other sticking point is, given computationalism
> > is right, what does it take to implement a computation? There have
> > been arguments
> > that a computation is implemented by any physical system (Putnam,
> > Searle, Moravec)
> > and by no physical system (Maudl
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> It seems to me that there are two main sticking points in the discussions on
> several list threads in recent weeks. One is computationalism: is it right or
> wrong?
> This at least is straightforward in that it comes down to a question of
> faith, in the
> final
1Z wrote:
> Suppose you were faced with two Doctors: Dr 1 promises
> to reproduce you approximately in a robotic body that can
> interact with the environment. Dr 2 promises to
> reproduce you exactly, and leave the resulting tape gathering dust...
Dr 1: not interested
Dr 2: even less interested
David Nyman wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
>
> S_p
> > can be expressed by a finite number, since the substitution itself can
> > be expressed by a finite number (whatever is written on the tape/CD or
> > other storage/transmitting device).
>
> Does your 'interpretation' of 'Yes doctor' leave open
Good questions. I am bracing for Bruno's reply to include something
about the dependence on Church Thesis and "effective computability" to
put some constraints on S_c, more than finiteness. My question on the
weakness of the finiteness of S_c was valid even when giving "the
benefit of the doubt"
Tom Caylor wrote:
S_p
> can be expressed by a finite number, since the substitution itself can
> be expressed by a finite number (whatever is written on the tape/CD or
> other storage/transmitting device).
Does your 'interpretation' of 'Yes doctor' leave open all assumptions
about actual *inst
I'd rather go with Pascal. ;)
Tom Caylor wrote:
> As I remember it, my interpretation/expansion of the "Yes Doctor"
> assumption is that 1) there is a (finite of course) level of (digital)
> substitution (called the "correct level of substitution") that is
> sufficient to represent "all that I a
As I remember it, my interpretation/expansion of the "Yes Doctor"
assumption is that 1) there is a (finite of course) level of (digital)
substitution (called the "correct level of substitution") that is
sufficient to represent "all that I am", and "all that I could be if I
hadn't undergone a subst
Le 21-août-06, à 07:11, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> It seems to me that there are two main sticking points in the
> discussions on
> several list threads in recent weeks. One is computationalism: is it
> right or wrong?
> This at least is straightforward in that it comes down to a questi
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> It seems to me that there are two main sticking points in the discussions on
> several list threads in recent weeks. One is computationalism: is it right or
> wrong?
> This at least is straightforward in that it comes down to a question of
> faith, in the
> final an
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