Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 Mar 2014, at 10:15, LizR wrote:


On 1 March 2014 21:03, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Mar 2014, at 02:06, LizR wrote:

On 1 March 2014 03:22, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote:
Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept Yes Doctor  
the rest of comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true,
? You might elaborate on this. What is the rest, and why do you  
think it does not follow?


I mean the rest as I understand it. Yes Doctor implies that  
identity relies on a capsule memory, and hence that H=M and H=W,  
and also that H=simulated M / W, H = M+100 years, and so on.

That is not so clear to me.

OK. That is my take on it, which may be based on intuition or  
misunderstanding. But it seems to me the idea of Yes Doctor - that  
you could have your brain replaced by a digital equivalent and not  
know the difference - is only possible if all the other things you  
mention are, too. How would Yes Doctor work? You'd have to have  
your brain frozen (or something similar), scanned and destroyed,  
while the digital one was programmed to be a simulation of your  
brain (below the substitution level). And from your own perspective  
you would fall asleep on the operating table and wake up with a  
digital brain (and maybe a robot body). That's only possible (it  
seems to me) if your continuation of consciousness from day to day  
is discontinuous in a similar manner.


That's correct.



Otherwise in Yes Doctor you would die, and a replica would be  
created.


So, the time of the reconstitution and the modality of the modus  
operandi is not relevant. And, so we don't need to make precise the  
other hypothesis, and the use of simple instantaneous  
teleportation is valid.


But this is explicitly clear in step seven, which technically are  
step 5 like, which means you don't need to be frozen and  
annihilated, you need just to be prepared or reconstituted in the  
concrete UD
which do the rest automatically, even infinitely often. In longer and  
more detailed version of the UDA (like the one in 15 steps done on  
this list at its early beginning) I make this explicit. So you point,  
even if correct for steps 0-6, does not apply on steps 0-7, and of  
course still less to step 0-8.



Similarly after classical teleportation, where you are destroyed and  
recreated, you only come out at the other end as the same person if  
that's what consciousness - if it's Heralicitean, so to speak. But  
if that is the case, then you can be teleported, cloned, and so on -  
not to mention kidnapped (or 50% kidnapped) by someone able to scan  
your brain at some point without destroying it and recreating you in  
their own private digital world.


OK. That follows again from step 5 and step 7, automatically, and this  
entails the reversal.





That's why it seems if you accept Yes Doctor, everything else (the  
other steps) have to follow, because you have already accepted what  
we might as well call the Heraclitean nature of consciousness.


OK.






Of course I define comp by yes doctor + Church's thesis.

That is why I realise it isn't quite true that YD implies  
everything, because you need CT and AR.
But you just said that 1+1=2 is a fact, which is stronger than AR.  
AR just says that 1+1=2, and nothing more. And CT is not really  
needed in the math: just add Turing before machine or universal  
number. But CT makes things smooth and prevent uninteresting critics  
like and what if we are not Turing emulable, but still machines  
in some unknonw sense.


That was in another thread! I was making a suggestion about where  
the maths comes from. I don't necessarily assume that when talking  
about comp.


Well, you were saying that not everything follows from YD, which is  
comp. CT is just needed to give comp a (general) sense, and AR is  
only the belief that 17 is prime independent of you.




Also, I suspect that you have a stronger meaning of fact in mind.  
What is the difference betwen asserting that 1+1=2 (like AR) and  
saying that 1+1=2 is a fact, like I did? (I suspect the difference  
is something like Bp vs p except I beleive B means believing ...)


Because 1+1=2 is elementary math, learned in high school.
 1+1=2 is a fact  is a non trivial philosophical statement, which  
involved a non trivial notion like fact. I have seen people  
discussing ad nauseam on what is a fact, and some philosopher would  
not agree that elementary arithmetical statement can be considered as  
fact.

(Bp is more I believe in 1+1=2, or I can justify that 1+1=2).






But if you accept the Doctor's offer then you are committing to a  
capsule theory of identity which implies most of what you have  
said about duplication experiments with delays, VR, and so on.
OK. I would say relative (to universal numbers) capsule theory of  
identity.


I'm not sure I understand, what would be the alternative capsule  
theory (i.e. one that isn't relative to 

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[LizR]

On 2 March 2014 21:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 Because 1+1=2 is elementary math, learned in high school.

 1+1=2 is a fact  is a non trivial philosophical statement, which
 involved a non trivial notion like fact. I have seen people discussing ad
 nauseam on what is a fact, and some philosopher would not agree that
 elementary arithmetical statement can be considered as fact.
 (Bp is more I believe in 1+1=2, or I can justify that 1+1=2).


OK, I think I see that.


 But if you accept the Doctor's offer then you are committing to a
 capsule theory of identity which implies most of what you have said about
 duplication experiments with delays, VR, and so on.

 OK. I would say relative (to universal numbers) capsule theory of
 identity.


 I'm not sure I understand, what would be the alternative capsule theory
 (i.e. one that isn't relative to universal numbers?)


 Because the state that the doctor put on some disk has a sense only
 relatively to the possible state of some other universal system.
 In fact any number might defined your actual state relatively to *some*
 universal system, itself making sense thanks to the local physical laws,
 for example. A number by itself does not refer to a computational state,
 you need at least two numbers, or you need to fix the base system, or to
 make precise the UD you work with. The notion of computational state is
 relative. OK?
 When everything is reduced to arithmetic, we have to take into account
 this relativity of relativity.

 I think I get this, in an intuitive sort of way. It has seemed to me from
the start that numbers of themselves can't do anything - so they must need
to do so relative to something. But I probably need to learn more to really
understand this.

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 02 Mar 2014, at 10:49, LizR wrote:


On 2 March 2014 21:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Because 1+1=2 is elementary math, learned in high school.
 1+1=2 is a fact  is a non trivial philosophical statement,  
which involved a non trivial notion like fact. I have seen people  
discussing ad nauseam on what is a fact, and some philosopher would  
not agree that elementary arithmetical statement can be considered  
as fact.

(Bp is more I believe in 1+1=2, or I can justify that 1+1=2).

OK, I think I see that.


But if you accept the Doctor's offer then you are committing to a  
capsule theory of identity which implies most of what you have  
said about duplication experiments with delays, VR, and so on.
OK. I would say relative (to universal numbers) capsule theory of  
identity.


I'm not sure I understand, what would be the alternative capsule  
theory (i.e. one that isn't relative to universal numbers?)


Because the state that the doctor put on some disk has a sense only  
relatively to the possible state of some other universal system.
In fact any number might defined your actual state relatively to  
*some* universal system, itself making sense thanks to the local  
physical laws, for example. A number by itself does not refer to a  
computational state, you need at least two numbers, or you need to  
fix the base system, or to make precise the UD you work with. The  
notion of computational state is relative. OK?
When everything is reduced to arithmetic, we have to take into  
account this relativity of relativity.


I think I get this, in an intuitive sort of way. It has seemed to me  
from the start that numbers of themselves can't do anything - so  
they must need to do so relative to something. But I probably need  
to learn more to really understand this.


I am thinking about how to explain this.

When you say numbers of themselves can't do anything you are right.

But the point will be that numbers + addition and multiplication   
can do the thing needed. And this in some absolute sense. In  
particular, numbers +addition+multiplication, can do the universal  
numbers, from which the relativity of the computational state will  
emerge.


This should be much clear when we will derive machine's physics (and  
machine's theology) from arithmetic.


Bruno







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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 Mar 2014, at 02:06, LizR wrote:


On 1 March 2014 03:22, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote:
Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept Yes Doctor  
the rest of comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true,
? You might elaborate on this. What is the rest, and why do you  
think it does not follow?


I mean the rest as I understand it. Yes Doctor implies that  
identity relies on a capsule memory, and hence that H=M and H=W,  
and also that H=simulated M / W, H = M+100 years, and so on.


That is not so clear to me.




Of course I define comp by yes doctor + Church's thesis.

That is why I realise it isn't quite true that YD implies  
everything, because you need CT and AR.


But you just said that 1+1=2 is a fact, which is stronger than AR.  
AR just says that 1+1=2, and nothing more. And CT is not really needed  
in the math: just add Turing before machine or universal number. But  
CT makes things smooth and prevent uninteresting critics like and  
what if we are not Turing emulable, but still machines in some  
unknonw sense.





But if you accept the Doctor's offer then you are committing to a  
capsule theory of identity which implies most of what you have  
said about duplication experiments with delays, VR, and so on.


OK. I would say relative (to universal numbers) capsule theory of  
identity.


Bruno






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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[LizR]

On 1 March 2014 21:03, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 On 01 Mar 2014, at 02:06, LizR wrote:

 On 1 March 2014 03:22, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote:

 Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept Yes Doctor the
 rest of comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true,

 ? You might elaborate on this. What is the rest, and why do you think
 it does not follow?


 I mean the rest as I understand it. Yes Doctor implies that identity
 relies on a capsule memory, and hence that H=M and H=W, and also that
 H=simulated M / W, H = M+100 years, and so on.

 That is not so clear to me.


OK. That is my take on it, which may be based on intuition or
misunderstanding. But it seems to me the idea of Yes Doctor - that you
could have your brain replaced by a digital equivalent and not know the
difference - is only possible if all the other things you mention are, too.
How would Yes Doctor work? You'd have to have your brain frozen (or
something similar), scanned and destroyed, while the digital one was
programmed to be a simulation of your brain (below the substitution level).
And from your own perspective you would fall asleep on the operating table
and wake up with a digital brain (and maybe a robot body). That's only
possible (it seems to me) if your continuation of consciousness from day to
day is discontinuous in a similar manner. Otherwise in Yes Doctor you
would die, and a replica would be created. Similarly after classical
teleportation, where you are destroyed and recreated, you only come out at
the other end as the same person if that's what consciousness - if it's
Heralicitean, so to speak. But if that is the case, then you can be
teleported, cloned, and so on - not to mention kidnapped (or 50% kidnapped)
by someone able to scan your brain at some point without destroying it and
recreating you in their own private digital world. That's why it seems if
you accept Yes Doctor, everything else (the other steps) have to follow,
because you have already accepted what we might as well call the
Heraclitean nature of consciousness.


 Of course I define comp by yes doctor + Church's thesis.


 That is why I realise it isn't quite true that YD implies everything,
 because you need CT and AR.

 But you just said that 1+1=2 is a fact, which is stronger than AR. AR
 just says that 1+1=2, and nothing more. And CT is not really needed in the
 math: just add Turing before machine or universal number. But CT makes
 things smooth and prevent uninteresting critics like and what if we are
 not Turing emulable, but still machines in some unknonw sense.


That was in another thread! I was making a suggestion about where the
maths comes from. I don't necessarily assume that when talking about comp.
Also, I suspect that you have a stronger meaning of fact in mind. What is
the difference betwen asserting that 1+1=2 (like AR) and saying that 1+1=2
is a fact, like I did? (I suspect the difference is something like Bp vs p
except I beleive B means believing ...)


 But if you accept the Doctor's offer then you are committing to a capsule
 theory of identity which implies most of what you have said about
 duplication experiments with delays, VR, and so on.

 OK. I would say relative (to universal numbers) capsule theory of
 identity.


I'm not sure I understand, what would be the alternative capsule theory
(i.e. one that isn't relative to universal numbers?)

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote:

On 26 February 2014 15:16, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com  
wrote:

Hi Liz

 In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition  
of you has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split.


Well what definition of 'you' do you suggest we use? What is your  
criterion for identity over time?


Assuming comp it appears to be the state(s) that could follow on  
from your current brain state via whatever transitions rules are  
allowed by


OK.



- I assume - logical necessity. Perhaps Bruno can explain.


There is no problem of identity. With comp, we can considered both the  
W-person and the M-person genuine H-person, and that is why the 1p- 
identity can be defined by the content of the personal memory, written  
in the diary that the experiencer takes with him/her/it.
But in this case, the transition does not follow logic, as the fact  
that I am in W, or that I am in M is contingent, from the 1p view.  
They know that they could have been the other one. Bt W and M are  
consistent with H. Of course W  M is inconsistent, as comp makes it  
impossible (without further transformations) to make H experiencing  
simultaneously W and M in the 1p view. Again, in the 3-1 view, from an  
outsider, which attribute politely consciousness and 1p subjective  
life to the both copies, H does experience W and M simultanepously,  
yet not from his personal views. He will never open the door of the  
reconstitution telebox and write I see W and M.


In fact, those saying that H = M and H = W, (despite M ≠ W), should  
agree that we experience all the experience of all conscious creature  
simultaneously, wchi might make sense in God's eye, but not in our  
particular eyes. But this identity point is of no use in the reasoning  
presented here.







With regards to Bruno's steps, at this point I actually don't feel I  
need a criterion myself. What I have instead is the yes-doctor  
assumption. In other words, whatever criterion is adopted it must  
satisfy the condition that whenever I am copied, destroyed and  
reconstructed somewhere else, the reconstruction IS me. Otherwise,  
unless suicidal, I would never say yes to the doctor.


This is why I used to argue Bruno was hoist by his own petard  
because its his yes-doctor assumption that forces me to 'accommodate  
the fact that Ive split'.


Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept Yes Doctor  
the rest of comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true,


? You might elaborate on this. What is the rest, and why do you  
think it does not follow?


Of course I define comp by yes doctor + Church's thesis.

Bruno




but that's the big leap.

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[David Nyman]

On 26 February 2014 17:04, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Hi David,

 On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:32, David Nyman wrote:

 On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:

 On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

 *This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures
 in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of
 me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me,
 retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome.*

 Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is
 any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the
 person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should
 assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity
 criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and
 won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what
 Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I
 think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments
 would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated.
 Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.


 Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to
 you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful
 way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to
 be the sole fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a
 heuristic for collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation
 onto the perspective of a single, universal observer. From this
 perspective, the situation of being faced with duplication is just a random
 selection from the class of all possible observer moments.

 Well, the just might be not that easy to define.

 If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to
 get a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more
 probable than being me or you.


 But how would you remember that?


 By noting it in my diary, by inquesting my past, and hacking data banks,
 or reading book on my origin.


Well, I'm not sure if it makes sense to say the Hoyle's universal observer
is the universal machine. I don't know to what extent his idea is
compatible with comp. But to be clear, you suggested above that a
computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable
than being me or you, so I asked you how Bruno, for example, could remember
that, meaning to suggest that of course you could not. I suppose it would
be some sort of problem for Hoyle's idea if one suspected not simply that
certain classes of non-human observer vastly out-numbered human ones, but
that they were likely to be asking themselves similar sorts of questions.
IOW, what might constitute an appropriate equivalence class for ourselves?



 I am not sure that the notion of observer moment makes sense, without a
 notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative states.

 I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a
 universal (self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p  p), an observer
 ([]p  p), and a feeler ([]p  p  p)).

 But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in arithmetic
 and is associated with all relatively self-referential correct löbian
 number) will select among all observer moment.


 Well, perhaps eventually it will select all of them, if we can give some
 relevant sense to eventually in this context.


 Is this not done by simple 3p arithmetical realism?


Not, I think, in the 1p sense, without a certain amount of equivocation.


 There is a sense God select them all, but they inter-relations are
 indexicals.


Yes, but the inner God cannot select them all simultaneously, without the
equivocation to which I refer.





 And I suppose Hoyle's point is that if one imagines a logical
 serialisation of all such moments, its order must be inconsequential
 because of the intrinsic self-ordering of the moments themselves.



 That is the mathematical conception of an order, and there are dualities
 between those ways of considering a structure.

 You can already see that with the modal logic, where properties of
 accessibility will characterize modal formula and theories.



 Essentially he is saying that the panoptic bird view is somehow preserved
 at the frog level, at the price of breaking the simultaneity of the
 momentary views.


 I am not sure I understand.


I think he is saying (as did Schroedinger) that the frog must see every
indexical reality, but cannot see them all simultaneously.








 The hypostatic universal person is more like a universal baby, which
 can split in a much larger spectrum of future 1p histories, but from its
 first person perspective it is like it has still to go through the
 histories to get the right relative statistics on his 

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Feb 2014, at 19:37, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Feb 25, 2014 at 1:21 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 provide the algorithm of prediction.

 Why? What does that have to do with the price of eggs? FPI is  
about the feeling of self and prediction has nothing to do with it.


 FPI = first person indeterminacy

Sorry, I was guessing something along the lines of FPI =  first  
person interpretation.



???

You are the one describing the FPI as a crazy discovery.

You keep seeing ambiguity, but you take not the times to simply focus  
on the point.





Your obscure homemade acronym for something that already has a  
perfectly good name,

uncertainty, has tripped me up yet again.


No one is interested in your personal problem.





And I'm afraid I can't do as you request, I am unable to provide an  
algorithm that can correctly predict all external events that could  
effect me.


 You said that we have to interview all copies and I agree.  
After the interviews this is what we find:

W has not refuted it.
M has not refuted it.
W  M have confirmed it.

 In the 3-1 views.

I guess you're right, after all you invented the 3-1 views so you  
must know what it means. I wish I did.



You, sir, are quite a challenge.

(AUDA shows that all lobian numbers can understand UDA)








You miss this only by confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-view,

 Who's the 1-view?

 Each of them.

Who is this Mr. them who has the 1-view?



We don't need to know that to make the reasoning. We can stay in the  
usual 3p description, where the 1p are defined by the personal content  
of the individual diaries.


Take the iterated WM-self duplication, then, here, at some stage, I  
can interview one of the 2^n copies,  which really means that there  
are 2^n diaries, that is 2^n 1-views. It is an exercise to show that  
most get algorithmically incompressible but has a normal distribution.


The *typical* subjective 1p life of a copy is a WWWMWMMMWMM...M and  
in his diary is a refutation of all previews attempt to predict the  
future of his diary.


Hope this helps.

Bruno





 John K Clark

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[John Clark]

On Fri, Feb 28, 2014 at 11:26 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Sorry, I was guessing something along the lines of FPI =  first person
 interpretation.

  ???


!!!

 You are the one describing the FPI as a crazy discovery.


No, I'm the one who keeps saying that first person indeterminacy (I dislike
homemade acronyms) was discovered not by you but by Mr. Og the caveman.

 AUDA shows that all lobian numbers can understand UDA


Google has more information than any human being but even Google doesn't
know what lobian numbers are. And Google doesn't know what AUDA is. And
Google doesn't know what UDA is. That's 9 words with 4 of them made up
and used by nobody in any language except by you. Well, at least 56% were
real words.

 Who is this Mr. them who has the 1-view?



 We don't need to know that to make the reasoning. We can stay in the
 usual 3p description, where the 1p are defined by the personal content of
 the individual diaries.


There are no diaries there is only a diary and it was written by the
Washington Man AND the Moscow Man.

 The *typical* subjective 1p life of a copy is a WWWMWMMMWMM...M


Finding an infinite regress at the heart of a idea doesn't necessarily mean
it's worthless, but it's never a good sign.

 and in his diary is a refutation of all previews attempt to predict the
 future of his diary.


Two people wrote that diary Mr. Washington and Mr. Moscow, and I don't know
who Mr. his is.


  Hope this helps.


It does not.

  John K Clark

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Feb 2014, at 15:28, David Nyman wrote:


On 26 February 2014 17:04, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Hi David,

On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:32, David Nyman wrote:


On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:

On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com  
wrote:


This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible  
futures in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course,  
the version of me in each branch will be different, and it always  
seems to me, retrospectively, as though I only experienced one  
outcome.


Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think  
there is any disagreement about that. The problems occur when  
considering what the person duplicated will experience and then  
what probability he should assign to each outcome and that seems  
to me to depend on what identity criterion gets imposed. Its a  
consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with  
again. But I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants  
is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I think  
that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability  
assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person  
duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.


Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall  
proposing to you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole  
analogy can be a useful way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of  
this sort, although I appear to be the sole fan of the idea around  
here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a heuristic for collapsing the  
notions of identity, history and continuation onto the perspective  
of a single, universal observer. From this perspective, the  
situation of being faced with duplication is just a random  
selection from the class of all possible observer moments.


Well, the just might be not that easy to define.

If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability  
to get a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be  
more probable than being me or you.


But how would you remember that?


By noting it in my diary, by inquesting my past, and hacking data  
banks, or reading book on my origin.


Well, I'm not sure if it makes sense to say the Hoyle's universal  
observer is the universal machine.


OK, but in this setting, the universal observer was the universal  
machine from the observable points of view. It is not just the  
universal machine.


The point is that if we assume comp, it seems there is room only for  
the indexical self-ordering leading to rational (or over-rational)  
sort of past.





I don't know to what extent his idea is compatible with comp.


OK.



But to be clear, you suggested above that a computational history  
involving windows or MacOS might be more probable than being me or  
you, so I asked you how Bruno, for example, could remember that,  
meaning to suggest that of course you could not. I suppose it would  
be some sort of problem for Hoyle's idea if one suspected not simply  
that certain classes of non-human observer vastly out-numbered human  
ones, but that they were likely to be asking themselves similar  
sorts of questions. IOW, what might constitute an appropriate  
equivalence class for ourselves?


It is very complex, and I try to make sense first, then see if it make  
sense in comp, and from which points of view.









I am not sure that the notion of observer moment makes sense,  
without a notion of scenario involving a net of computational  
relative states.


I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a  
universal (self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p  p), an  
observer ([]p  p), and a feeler ([]p  p  p)).


But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in  
arithmetic and is associated with all relatively self-referential  
correct löbian number) will select among all observer moment.


Well, perhaps eventually it will select all of them, if we can  
give some relevant sense to eventually in this context.


Is this not done by simple 3p arithmetical realism?

Not, I think, in the 1p sense, without a certain amount of  
equivocation.


Ah... this I don't know.





There is a sense God select them all, but they inter-relations are  
indexicals.


Yes, but the inner God cannot select them all simultaneously,  
without the equivocation to which I refer.


?









And I suppose Hoyle's point is that if one imagines a logical  
serialisation of all such moments, its order must be  
inconsequential because of the intrinsic self-ordering of the  
moments themselves.



That is the mathematical conception of an order, and there are  
dualities between those ways of considering a structure.


You can already see that with the modal logic, where properties of  
accessibility will characterize modal formula and theories.




Essentially he 

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[LizR]

On 1 March 2014 03:22, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote:

 Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept Yes Doctor the rest
 of comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true,

 ? You might elaborate on this. What is the rest, and why do you think it
 does not follow?


I mean the rest as I understand it. Yes Doctor implies that identity
relies on a capsule memory, and hence that H=M and H=W, and also that
H=simulated M / W, H = M+100 years, and so on.


 Of course I define comp by yes doctor + Church's thesis.


That is why I realise it isn't quite true that YD implies everything,
because you need CT and AR. But if you accept the Doctor's offer then you
are committing to a capsule theory of identity which implies most of what
you have said about duplication experiments with delays, VR, and so on.

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Feb 2014, at 19:14, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Feb 28, 2014 at 11:26 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:
Sorry, I was guessing something along the lines of FPI =  first  
person interpretation.


 ???

!!!

 You are the one describing the FPI as a crazy discovery.

No, I'm the one who keeps saying that first person indeterminacy (I  
dislike homemade acronyms) was discovered not by you but by Mr. Og  
the caveman.


Then he should have published. But no, it did not discovered it, and  
today, scientists still ignore it, or doesn't take its consequences  
into account.


But all this is not relevant, if you are agree so much with the FPI,  
then you can aboard the 4th step.






 AUDA shows that all lobian numbers can understand UDA

Google has more information than any human being but even Google  
doesn't know what lobian numbers are. And Google doesn't know what  
AUDA is. And Google doesn't know what UDA is. That's 9 words  
with 4 of them made up and used by nobody in any language except by  
you. Well, at least 56% were real words.


If that is your notion of argumenting ...





 Who is this Mr. them who has the 1-view?

 We don't need to know that to make the reasoning. We can stay in  
the usual 3p description, where the 1p are defined by the personal  
content of the individual diaries.


There are no diaries there is only a diary and it was written by  
the Washington Man AND the Moscow Man.


That is close to total nonsense.





 The *typical* subjective 1p life of a copy is a WWWMWMMMWMM...M

Finding an infinite regress at the heart of a idea doesn't  
necessarily mean it's worthless, but it's never a good sign.


Which infinite regress?





 and in his diary is a refutation of all previews attempt to  
predict the future of his diary.


Two people wrote that diary Mr. Washington and Mr. Moscow, and I  
don't know who Mr. his is.


Not two, 2^n.
And in the 3p there are 2^n diaries, and the content of each one  
defined the first person views.





 Hope this helps.

It does not.


I am afraid you are severely limited on this subject.  You seem to be  
unable to count 3p diaries, which means you need to oppose something  
like 1+1=2 to make your point.



Bruno






  John K Clark



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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Feb 2014, at 07:21, chris peck wrote:


Hi Bruno

 Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views.

There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these.


Read the posts by John Clark. I made clear that the first person  
expectation are what is confimred or not in the pesronal diaries of  
the copies, that is the 1-views, and it systematically describes only  
the 3-1- views, which is nice and correct, but not asked for.







She should have said: whatever she knows she will see, she should  
expect (with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite.


But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong!


?

I am in H, I predict I will see something definite, meaning W or M,  
but not a fuzzy superpostion of both.


I push on the button.

I open the door, I see Washington. Well defined old Washington. I can  
only write W in my diary, and assess my prediction I will see  
something definite, meaning W or M, but not a fuzzy superposition of  
both.


The same for the I opening the door and seeing the well defined old  
Moscow. he too sees something definite, and assess the prediction.


By definition of the 1p, it is on that personal confirmation or  
refutation that bears the indeterminacy.







 And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome.

You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to  
be seen.


But I can only use what is seen, to refute or assess the prediction,  
that is what can be expected to be see. The 1/3 distinctions makes it  
possible to handled in 3p description only (making a logical  
derivation of the argument looking like a play with word).






I think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect  
to see each outcome without being committed to the view that either  
future self sees both.


Of course, but this is the 3-1 view, and we have agreed on that. In  
that case, she can also consider that from both it will looks like  
they got freely one bit of information, and that is the FPI.





All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen to divert  
attention from the simple error you make here, isn't it?


The contrary. It is needed to avoid the ambiguities. And the 1p/3p  
relations is really an important part of the computionalist, or not,  
mind-body problem, so your remark seems awkward.


In AUDA, the translation in arithmetic, the 3p and 1p will correspond  
to different arithmetical modal logic related to self-reference.


The rubbishy smoke screen,  is the very subject matter. I submit a  
problem, and partial solutions, testable, and up to now tested (thanks  
to both Gödel and QM).



Bruno



All the best

Chris.

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100


On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and  
spin down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where,  
in discussion of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's  
step 3, he argues:


What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following  
premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with  
certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see  
spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down.


That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact.


Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should  
have said:



 whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with  
certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite. And in the 1p it is obvious  
she will never see both outcome.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Feb 2014, at 07:44, chris peck wrote:


Hi Bruno

 Of course, and my point is that comp aggravates that problem, as  
only extends the indterminacy from a wave to arithmetic.


Personally, I don't think it makes a difference what the underlying  
substrata of reality consists of,



So we might work on different subject. No problem. You are the one  
saying that there was a mistake.




be it sums or some fundamental 'matter-esq' substance. What causes  
the problem is just the fact that in any TofE all outcomes are  
catered for. In such a theory genuine probabilities just vanish and  
subjective uncertainty can only exist as an epistemic measure.


Very good. That is what happen in arithmetic with comp.





In versions of MWI it can exist when a person is unable to locate  
himself in a particular branch. ie. in earlier versions of Deutsch  
where infinite numbers of universes run in parallel one might not  
know whether one is in a spin up or spin down universe. Or in your  
step 3, subjective uncertainty can exist after duplication but  
before opening the door.



Do you agree that if today, I can be certain that I will find myself  
in front of something indeterminate, then I am now indeterminate about  
that future outcome?


If you agree, then you are playing with words. If you disagree then  
explain.






These people are unable to locate and that lack of knowledge  
translates into subjective uncertainty.


Which was easily predictable (you just did), and so the guy in H can  
understand what we are talking about, and in which sense W v M is  
the best prediction, and W and M the worst. Even if correct in some  
different views.




They can assign a probability value between 0 and 1 to possible  
outcomes.


And the next step ask if a delay of reconstitution changes the  
expectations.






But crucially, where all relevant facts are known, the only values  
available must be 1 or 0.


Well, after the experience. But the question is asked before.





That just follows from the fact that all outcomes are catered for.  
And it seems to me that H guy in step 3 has all these relevent facts.


Indeed, but that is the very reason he can be sure of one thing: he  
cannot be sure where he will be in an iteration of self-duplication.  
The epistemic probabilities gives a normal distribution, in that  
protocols.






So, whilst the duplicates before opening the door would assign 0.5  
to M or W, prior to duplication H guy would assign 1.


1 to what events?

No, that's the shift in the 3-1 again, using a non relevant principle,  
see above.








This is why I have accused you in the past of smuggling  
probabilities in from the future which strikes me as very fishy.


Insulting is not valid argumentation. Up to now, I see play word and  
hand waving to avoid a simple consequence of logic and mechanism.







 OK, I appreciate the work, but they don't address the mind-body  
problem. Still less the computationalist form of that problem. But  
they get the closer view of the physical possible with respect to  
both comp, and the mathematical theory (comp+Theaetetus).


Im not arguing that these people have a complete or even coherent  
theory. My guess is that they don't, I mean who does?


It is the object matter of this list.





It seems like everyone but me thinks they are in direct contact with  
the one and only truth, but its all just hubris.
It might well be the case that your theory fairs better than theirs  
on the mind-body problem and much else besides but so what? They do  
far better when it comes to probability assignment and subjective  
uncertainty, imho.



My point is that if we assume comp, we have to extend Everett to a  
larger part, in arithmetic.
And by doing this from self-reference, we get the communicable quanta  
and the non communicable qualia. I think. With their rich mathematics.


Bruno






All the best

Chris

From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:33:21 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




2014-02-26 7:31 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:
Hi Liz


 I meant changed from our everyday definition, in which we  
normally assume there is only one you, which is (or is at least  
associated with) your physical structure. Which we generally assume  
exists in one universe.


We lose that definition just by stepping into the realm of MWI don't  
we? Its not as if we can have use of it in MWI until we want to  
argue that we will always see 'spin up'.


MWI forces upon us either the complete abandonment of any notion of  
personal identity over time, or the equal distribution of it through  
all the branches in which 'we' appear.


That's where your wrong... that would mean all branches have equal  
measure, where it must not, if MWI must be in accordance with QM.


http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#PRPO


All the best

Chris.

From: allco

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi David,




On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:32, David Nyman wrote:


On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:

On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com  
wrote:


This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible  
futures in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course,  
the version of me in each branch will be different, and it always  
seems to me, retrospectively, as though I only experienced one  
outcome.


Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think  
there is any disagreement about that. The problems occur when  
considering what the person duplicated will experience and then  
what probability he should assign to each outcome and that seems to  
me to depend on what identity criterion gets imposed. Its a  
consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with  
again. But I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is  
just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I think that  
he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments  
would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated.  
Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.


Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall  
proposing to you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole  
analogy can be a useful way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of  
this sort, although I appear to be the sole fan of the idea around  
here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a heuristic for collapsing the  
notions of identity, history and continuation onto the perspective  
of a single, universal observer. From this perspective, the  
situation of being faced with duplication is just a random  
selection from the class of all possible observer moments.


Well, the just might be not that easy to define.

If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability  
to get a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be  
more probable than being me or you.


But how would you remember that?


By noting it in my diary, by inquesting my past, and hacking data  
banks, or reading book on my origin.








I am not sure that the notion of observer moment makes sense,  
without a notion of scenario involving a net of computational  
relative states.


I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a  
universal (self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p  p), an  
observer ([]p  p), and a feeler ([]p  p  p)).


But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in  
arithmetic and is associated with all relatively self-referential  
correct löbian number) will select among all observer moment.


Well, perhaps eventually it will select all of them, if we can  
give some relevant sense to eventually in this context.


Is this not done by simple 3p arithmetical realism? There is a sense  
God select them all, but they inter-relations are indexicals.




And I suppose Hoyle's point is that if one imagines a logical  
serialisation of all such moments, its order must be inconsequential  
because of the intrinsic self-ordering of the moments themselves.



That is the mathematical conception of an order, and there are  
dualities between those ways of considering a structure.


You can already see that with the modal logic, where properties of  
accessibility will characterize modal formula and theories.




Essentially he is saying that the panoptic bird view is somehow  
preserved at the frog level, at the price of breaking the  
simultaneity of the momentary views.


I am not sure I understand.







The hypostatic universal person is more like a universal baby,  
which can split in a much larger spectrum of future 1p histories,  
but from its first person perspective it is like it has still to go  
through the histories to get the right relative statistics on his  
most probable universal neighbors.


Won't this still be effectively satisfied by Hoyle's heuristic? ISTM  
that going through the histories is a notion that splits in the 3p  
and 1p views.


It splits the 1-p views, as in the 3-1 views, the 1-views themselves  
never split.






I suppose this is equivalent to conceiving observer moments as self- 
ordering monads in terms of which any random serialisation over the  
entire class must eventually preserve the right relative statistics.


Eventually I use only s, 0, +, *, and classical logic.

May be you will get the tools to make this enough precise so that I  
see what you are talking about.


This is my problem, I have to unravel things in term of numbers  
relations. The 8 hypostases, and their multimodal combinations  
provides means to take into account many nuances.


I am not sure about observer moment, although for the 1p I guided  
myself through possible semantics for the S4Grz logics.




Eventually here relies on a similar opacity to delays in  
continuation as you argue in the UDA, plus the 

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[John Clark]

On Tue, Feb 25, 2014 at 1:21 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 provide the algorithm of prediction.


  Why? What does that have to do with the price of eggs? FPI is about
 the feeling of self and prediction has nothing to do with it.


  FPI = first person indeterminacy


Sorry, I was guessing something along the lines of FPI =  first person
interpretation. Your obscure homemade acronym for something that already
has a perfectly good name, uncertainty, has tripped me up yet again. And
I'm afraid I can't do as you request, I am unable to provide an algorithm
that can correctly predict all external events that could effect me.

 You said that we have to interview all copies and I agree. After the
 interviews this is what we find:
 W has not refuted it.
 M has not refuted it.
 W  M have confirmed it.


  In the 3-1 views.


I guess you're right, after all you invented the 3-1 views so you must
know what it means. I wish I did.

You miss this only by confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-view,


  Who's the 1-view?


  Each of them.


Who is this Mr. them who has the 1-view?

 John K Clark

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-25 8:43 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:

 Hi Quentin

 *That's nonsense, *

 The point wasn't whether you think its nonsense or not. I couldn't care
 less about that. we were arguing about whether there are Oxford Dons who
 adopt the same standpoint as me, and given your little outburst above I
 think you've just discovered that there are. And that they are publishing
 these ideas in respected and peer reviewed journals.

 Just to recap then: It is perfectly respectable to reject the notion of
 subjective uncertainty without abandoning MWI. Just as I said.


 * and contrary to observed fact. *

 I always wince when you throw that one out. How does one break it to the
 angriest member of a list that they are continually begging the question?



 * David Deutsch does not reject probability... *

 Sure he does, he swaps out the Born rule for rational decision theory (+
 amendments to make it compatible with MWI). There isn't probability, but we
 should act 'as if' there was. Its what he's famous for, Quentin.


o_O... he doesn't reject probability usage.




 *or could you please show a quote where he does.*
 Do your own homework, mate. I'm not your little quote monkey.


Ok, I give up talking to you, if you want to assert thing and not back them
up, well...


 I've kindly described to you what I think people like Deutsch and Wallace
 argue, I've supplied papers which you've refused to read.


I don't refuse to read them. You've cited *one* paper, I didn't have time
to read it, I will this week. The abstract though did not reject
probability calculus, only the interpretation of what it means. It is clear
that in MWI setting probability is not about what happen and what does not,
but about frequency and measure... that doesn't render probability
meaningless... proof is, as you always are in *one* world, your measure
will follow the predicted distribution... so what's your point ?


 if you disagree you need display the same generosity and explain to me
 what you think they are arguing and how that is different.


See upper

Quentin


 Waving your hands in the air demanding more and more to unceremoniously
 and uncritically ditch is no-ones idea of fun.

 All the best

 Chris.

 --
 Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 20:26:52 +1300

 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 From: lizj...@gmail.com
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com


 In the MWI you *do* see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of
 you has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. Or to put
 it another way, you (now) will become you (who sees spin up) and you (who
 sees spin down), which by then will be two different people.


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RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Quentin

 I don't refuse to read them. You've cited *one* paper, I didn't have time to 
 read it, I will this week.

Ah so you dismiss things that you havent read then? Impressive!


 The abstract though did not reject probability calculus, only the 
 interpretation of what it means. It is clear that in MWI setting probability 
 is not about what happen and what does not,

If I say that x will happen with 50% probability I certainly am talking about 
things happening or not happening and if it is clear that probability is not 
about that in MWI, then it is clear that probability in MWI is not about 
probability. 

 but about frequency and measure... that doesn't render probability 
 meaningless... proof is, as you always are in *one* world, your measure will 
 follow the predicted distribution.


So you're strategy is to try and semantically wriggle out of the claims you 
make? Pretend the words you use have a different meaning than they really do?


 f you want to assert thing and not back them up, well...

But I did back up what I said. You couldn't be arsed to read the paper about 
Deutsch I offered, remember? You're the only one here refusing to back up 
claims. Perhaps you should give up on yourself?


Here's Deutsh from the abstract of his paper: Quantum Theory of Probability 
and Decisions

The probabilistic predictions of quantum theory are conventionally obtained
from a special probabilistic axiom. But that is unnecessary because all the
practical consequences of such predictions follow from the remaining, non-
probabilistic, axioms of quantum theory, together with the non-probabilistic
part of classical decision theory

Read it carefully. It makes clear that he believes that all relevent 
predictions can be made from non probabilistic axioms. You're not going to 
turn around and argue that he meant 'probabilistic axioms' are you?


And from the conclusion:

No probabilistic axiom is required in quantum theory. A decision maker who
believes only the non-probabilistic part of the theory, and is 'rational' in 
the sense
defined by a strictly non-probabilistic restriction of classical decision 
theory, will
make all decisions that depend on predicting the outcomes of measurements as if
those outcomes were determined by stochastic processes, with probabilities 
given by
axiom (1). (However, in other respects he will not behave as if he believed that
stochastic processes occur. For instance if asked whether they occur he will 
certainly
reply 'no', because the non-probabilistic axioms of quantum theory require the 
state
to evolve in a continuous and deterministic way.)

Now if you want to make the case that Deutsch 'does not reject probability' 
whilst he is insisting, indeed founding his reputation on the claim that 'no 
probabilistic axiom is required in quantum theory' be my guest. Im always up 
for a laugh.

All the best

Chris.

From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 10:43:33 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




2014-02-25 8:43 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:





Hi Quentin

That's nonsense, 

The point wasn't whether you think its nonsense or not. I couldn't care less 
about that. we were arguing about whether there are Oxford Dons who adopt the 
same standpoint as me, and given your little outburst above I think you've just 
discovered that there are. And that they are publishing these ideas in 
respected and peer reviewed journals.



Just to recap then: It is perfectly respectable to reject the notion of 
subjective uncertainty without abandoning MWI. Just as I said.

 and contrary to observed fact. 



I always wince when you throw that one out. How does one break it to the 
angriest member of a list that they are continually begging the question?


 David Deutsch does not reject probability... 



Sure he does, he swaps out the Born rule for rational decision theory (+ 
amendments to make it compatible with MWI). There isn't probability, but we 
should act 'as if' there was. Its what he's famous for, Quentin.


o_O... he doesn't reject probability usage. 




or could you please show a quote where he does.

Do your own homework, mate. I'm not your little quote monkey.
Ok, I give up talking to you, if you want to assert thing and not back them up, 
well...


  I've kindly described to you what I think people like Deutsch and Wallace 
argue, I've supplied papers which you've refused to read. 


I don't refuse to read them. You've cited *one* paper, I didn't have time to 
read it, I will this week. The abstract though did not reject probability 
calculus, only the interpretation of what it means. It is clear that in MWI 
setting probability is not about what happen and what does not, but about 
frequency and measure... that doesn't render probability meaningless... proof 
is, as you always are in *one* world, your measure will follow the predicted 
distribution... so what's your point

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-25 15:02 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:

 Hi Quentin


 * I don't refuse to read them. You've cited *one* paper, I didn't have
 time to read it, I will this week.*

 Ah so you dismiss things that you havent read then? Impressive!


I don't... I've said it's about the abstract, and I didn't *dismiss* it.




 * The abstract though did not reject probability calculus, only the
 interpretation of what it means. It is clear that in MWI setting
 probability is not about what happen and what does not,*

 If I say that x will happen with 50% probability I certainly am talking
 about things happening or not happening and if it is clear that
 probability is not about that in MWI, then it is clear that probability in
 MWI is not about probability.


WTF ?? Do you claim people when they are taking MWI seriously say that 0.5
probability to see spin up, means if you see spin up, the spin down version
of the observer does not exists ? Do you really claim that ? because with
MWI, both version do exist, so sure probability in MWI settings is not
about what exists and what doesn't... it's about measure and frequency,
what else could it be ?



 * but about frequency and measure... that doesn't render probability
 meaningless... proof is, as you always are in *one* world, your measure
 will follow the predicted distribution.*


 So you're strategy is to try and semantically wriggle out of the claims
 you make? Pretend the words you use have a different meaning than they
 really do?


So your strategy is to troll ? Have I got it right ?




 * f you want to assert thing and not back them up, well...*

 But I did back up what I said.


No you didn't.


 You couldn't be arsed to read the paper about Deutsch I offered, remember?


Which paper ?


 You're the only one here refusing to back up claims. Perhaps you should
 give up on yourself?


I do.




 Here's Deutsh from the abstract of his paper: Quantum Theory of
 Probability and Decisions





 *The probabilistic predictions of quantum theory are conventionally
 obtainedfrom a special probabilistic axiom. But that is unnecessary because
 all the practical consequences of such predictions follow from the
 remaining, non-probabilistic, axioms of quantum theory, together with the
 non-probabilisticpart of classical decision theory*

 Read it carefully. It makes clear that he believes that all relevent
 predictions can be made from non probabilistic axioms. You're not going
 to turn around and argue that he meant 'probabilistic axioms' are you?


He didn't reject *The probabilistic predictions  *he's just saying as I
do... that it doesn't mean some things happens or not... as with MWI
clearly every non zero probability do happen... what else could it mean ?




 And from the conclusion:





 *No probabilistic axiom is required in quantum theory. A decision maker
 who believes only the non-probabilistic part of the theory, and is
 ‘rational’ in the sensedefined by a strictly non-probabilistic restriction
 of classical decision theory, willmake all decisions that depend on
 predicting the outcomes of measurements as if those outcomes were
 determined by stochastic processes, *




 ***with probabilities given by axiom (1). ***


Wait ? what ? he's talking about probabilities or what ?

Quentin





 *(However, in other respects he will not behave as if he believed
 thatstochastic processes occur. For instance if asked whether they occur he
 will certainly reply ‘no’, because the non-probabilistic axioms of quantum
 theory require the stateto evolve in a continuous and deterministic way.)*

 Now if you want to make the case that Deutsch 'does not reject
 probability' whilst he is insisting, indeed founding his reputation on the
 claim that 'no probabilistic axiom is required in quantum theory' be my
 guest. Im always up for a laugh.

 All the best

 Chris.

 --
 From: allco...@gmail.com
 Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 10:43:33 +0100

 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com





 2014-02-25 8:43 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:

 Hi Quentin

 *That's nonsense, *

 The point wasn't whether you think its nonsense or not. I couldn't care
 less about that. we were arguing about whether there are Oxford Dons who
 adopt the same standpoint as me, and given your little outburst above I
 think you've just discovered that there are. And that they are publishing
 these ideas in respected and peer reviewed journals.

 Just to recap then: It is perfectly respectable to reject the notion of
 subjective uncertainty without abandoning MWI. Just as I said.


 * and contrary to observed fact. *

 I always wince when you throw that one out. How does one break it to the
 angriest member of a list that they are continually begging the question?



 * David Deutsch does not reject probability... *

 Sure he does, he swaps out the Born rule for rational decision theory

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[John Clark]

On Sun, Feb 23, 2014 at 1:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


  Did the Helsinki Man see Washington and Moscow? Yes.


   In the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view.



  In who's 1-1 view? You'll probably say in The Helsinki Man's


  No. The W-man and the M-m


But that's 2 not one, so if Bruno Marchal wishes to be logical then Bruno
Marchal is going to have to stop saying the 1-1 view and start saying a
1-1 view.

  but his view is just of Helsinki. Perhaps you mean the future 1 view
 of the Helsinki Man. If so then anybody who can remember having the past 1
 view of the Helsinki Man would fit that description; so the Helsinki Man
 will see both Washington and Moscow.

  In the 3-1 views. Not in the 1-1 views.


In who's 1-1 view?

  I said that we have to interview all copies.


  Good, then I never want to hear you say again that the Washington Man
 saying that he didn't see Moscow contradicts the claim that the Helsinki
 man will see both Washington AND Moscow.

  In the 3-1 views. Not in the 1-1 view.


In who's 1-1 view?


  this looks like wordplay


The reason it's so childishly easy to play with your words and tie them
into logical knots is because they are so self contradictory; if your words
made sense I couldn't do that.

 If the FPI does not exist


I never said it does not exist, what I said is that in a world with
duplicating chambers great care must be taken in explaining exactly who the
P in the FPI is, and you have been anything but careful.

 provide the algorithm of prediction.


Why? What does that have to do with the price of eggs? FPI is about the
feeling of self and prediction has nothing to do with it.

 W  M has been refuted.


You said that we have to interview all copies and I agree. After the
interviews this is what we find:

W has not refuted it.
M has not refuted it.
W  M have confirmed it.

 You miss this only by confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-view,


Who's the 1-view?

  John K Clark

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Feb 2014, at 01:05, chris peck wrote:

The point is that how probability fits into MWI's determinist  
framework, or any TofE really, is still an open question.



Of course, and my point is that comp aggravates that problem, as only  
extends the indterminacy from a wave to arithmetic.
But then I show that comp+theaetetus provides the means to test the  
theory.





And to argue that must reject MWI if they reject Brunos probability  
sums is plain wrong. Im happy to find myself in the company of  
Oxford Dons like Deutsch and Greaves.


OK, I appreciate the work, but they don't address the mind-body  
problem. Still less the computationalist form of that problem. But  
they get the closer view of the physical possible with respect to both  
comp, and the mathematical theory (comp+Theaetetus).


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Feb 2014, at 10:43, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


 David Deutsch does not reject probability...

Sure he does, he swaps out the Born rule for rational decision  
theory (+ amendments to make it compatible with MWI). There isn't  
probability, but we should act 'as if' there was. Its what he's  
famous for, Quentin.


I think Deustch is more famous for the quantum universal Turing machine.

To say There isn't probability, but we should act 'as if' there was.  
seems to me to oversimplify what he says, as it is close to non sense  
to me.


With comp this would extends into there is no physical reality, but we  
should act as if.


It is still better than there is no consciousness, but we must act as  
if.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Feb 2014, at 18:35, John Clark wrote:




 provide the algorithm of prediction.

Why? What does that have to do with the price of eggs? FPI is about  
the feeling of self and prediction has nothing to do with it.


FPI = first person indeterminacy of result of experience having two  
outcome due to digital self-duplication.






 W  M has been refuted.

You said that we have to interview all copies and I agree. After  
the interviews this is what we find:


W has not refuted it.
M has not refuted it.
W  M have confirmed it.


In the 3-1 views.






 You miss this only by confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-view,

Who's the 1-view?


Each of them.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

 In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of you has 
 been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. 

Well what definition of 'you' do you suggest we use? What is your criterion for 
identity over time?

With regards to Bruno's steps, at this point I actually don't feel I need a 
criterion myself. What I have instead is the yes-doctor assumption. In other 
words, whatever criterion is adopted it must satisfy the condition that 
whenever I am copied, destroyed and reconstructed somewhere else, the 
reconstruction IS me. Otherwise, unless suicidal, I would never say yes to the 
doctor.

This is why I used to argue Bruno was hoisted by his own petard because its his 
yes-doctor assumption that forces me to 'accommodate the fact that Ive split'.

All the best

Chris.


 From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 19:21:00 +0100
 
 
 On 25 Feb 2014, at 18:35, John Clark wrote:
 
 
 
   provide the algorithm of prediction.
 
  Why? What does that have to do with the price of eggs? FPI is about  
  the feeling of self and prediction has nothing to do with it.
 
 FPI = first person indeterminacy of result of experience having two  
 outcome due to digital self-duplication.
 
 
 
 
   W  M has been refuted.
 
  You said that we have to interview all copies and I agree. After  
  the interviews this is what we find:
 
  W has not refuted it.
  M has not refuted it.
  W  M have confirmed it.
 
 In the 3-1 views.
 
 
 
 
 
   You miss this only by confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-view,
 
  Who's the 1-view?
 
 Each of them.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 
 
 
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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[LizR]

On 26 February 2014 15:16, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Hi Liz

 * In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of
 you has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. *

 Well what definition of 'you' do you suggest we use? What is your
 criterion for identity over time?


Assuming comp it appears to be the state(s) that could follow on from your
current brain state via whatever transitions rules are allowed by - I
assume - logical necessity. Perhaps Bruno can explain.


 With regards to Bruno's steps, at this point I actually don't feel I need
 a criterion myself. What I have instead is the yes-doctor assumption. In
 other words, whatever criterion is adopted it must satisfy the condition
 that whenever I am copied, destroyed and reconstructed somewhere else, the
 reconstruction IS me. Otherwise, unless suicidal, I would never say yes to
 the doctor.

 This is why I used to argue Bruno was hoist by his own petard because its
 his yes-doctor assumption that forces me to 'accommodate the fact that Ive
 split'.

 Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept Yes Doctor the rest
of comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true, but that's the big leap.

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RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

Assuming comp it appears to be the state(s) that could 
follow on from your current brain state via whatever transitions rules 
are allowed by - I assume - logical necessity. Perhaps Bruno can 
explain.

let me ask a more round about question:

you say that we see spin up every time 'if the definition of you has been 
changed to accommodate the fact that you've split'

Changed from which definition?

All the best

Chris.

Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 15:31:01 +1300
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 26 February 2014 15:16, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:




Hi Liz
 In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of you has 
 been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. 


Well what definition of 'you' do you suggest we use? What is your criterion for 
identity over time?

Assuming comp it appears to be the state(s) that could follow on from your 
current brain state via whatever transitions rules are allowed by - I assume - 
logical necessity. Perhaps Bruno can explain.


With regards to Bruno's steps, at this point I actually don't feel I need a 
criterion myself. What I have instead is the yes-doctor assumption. In other 
words, whatever criterion is adopted it must satisfy the condition that 
whenever I am copied, destroyed and reconstructed somewhere else, the 
reconstruction IS me. Otherwise, unless suicidal, I would never say yes to the 
doctor.


This is why I used to argue Bruno was hoist by his own petard because its his 
yes-doctor assumption that forces me to 'accommodate the fact that Ive split'.

Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept Yes Doctor the rest of 
comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true, but that's the big leap.






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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[LizR]

On 26 February 2014 15:53, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Hi Liz

 *Assuming comp it appears to be the state(s) that could follow on from
 your current brain state via whatever transitions rules are allowed by - I
 assume - logical necessity. Perhaps Bruno can explain.*

 let me ask a more round about question:

 you say that we see spin up every time 'if the definition of you has
 been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split'

 Changed from which definition?


I meant changed from our everyday definition, in which we normally assume
there is only one you, which is (or is at least associated with) your
physical structure. Which we generally assume exists in one universe.

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

Chris, I wait your answer to my post. The one I re-explained and ask  
what is wrong above. Please use the 1-p distinction, which is the  
key precision to get things right (which is why Clark systematically  
forget it to refute step 3).


Bruno


On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:16, chris peck wrote:


Hi Liz

 In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition  
of you has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split.


Well what definition of 'you' do you suggest we use? What is your  
criterion for identity over time?


With regards to Bruno's steps, at this point I actually don't feel I  
need a criterion myself. What I have instead is the yes-doctor  
assumption. In other words, whatever criterion is adopted it must  
satisfy the condition that whenever I am copied, destroyed and  
reconstructed somewhere else, the reconstruction IS me. Otherwise,  
unless suicidal, I would never say yes to the doctor.


This is why I used to argue Bruno was hoisted by his own petard  
because its his yes-doctor assumption that forces me to 'accommodate  
the fact that Ive split'.


All the best

Chris.


 From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 19:21:00 +0100


 On 25 Feb 2014, at 18:35, John Clark wrote:

 
 
   provide the algorithm of prediction.
 
  Why? What does that have to do with the price of eggs? FPI is  
about

  the feeling of self and prediction has nothing to do with it.

 FPI = first person indeterminacy of result of experience having two
 outcome due to digital self-duplication.



 
   W  M has been refuted.
 
  You said that we have to interview all copies and I agree. After
  the interviews this is what we find:
 
  W has not refuted it.
  M has not refuted it.
  W  M have confirmed it.

 In the 3-1 views.




 
   You miss this only by confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-view,
 
  Who's the 1-view?

 Each of them.

 Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and  
spin down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where,  
in discussion of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's  
step 3, he argues:


What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following  
premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with  
certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see  
spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down.


That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact.



Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should have  
said:



 whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with  
certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite. And in the 1p it is obvious  
she will never see both outcome.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

 Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views.

There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these.

She should have said: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect 
(with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite. 

But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong! 

 And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome.

You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to be seen. I 
think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect to see each 
outcome without being committed to the view that either future self sees both. 
All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen to divert attention 
from the simple error you make here, isn't it?

All the best

Chris.

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100


On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:Greaves rejects subjective 
uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin down pay special attention to the 
point in section 4.1 where, in discussion of a thought experiment formally 
identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues:

What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: 
whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. 
So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with 
certainty) expect to see spin-down.
That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact. 

Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should have said:

 whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see 
SOMETHING definite. And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both 
outcome.
Bruno
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 





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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-26 7:21 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:

 Hi Bruno


  Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views.

 There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these.


 She should have said: whatever she knows she will see, she should
 expect (with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite.

 But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong!

  And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome.

 You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to be
 seen. I think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect to
 see each outcome without being committed to the view that either future
 self sees both. All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen
 to divert attention from the simple error you make here, isn't it?


She can make a probabilistic prediction as you can make in MWI... you're
the one wanting to say probability are wrong, but only the interpretation
of what is probability change in MWI (and duplication settings)... not the
prediction... if you say it is totally useless, then you're ready to make a
bet with me (as everything for your has equal probability of happening...)

Quentin


 All the best

 Chris.

 --
 From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100



 On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

 Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin
 down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion
 of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues:

 *What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following
 premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with
 certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up,
 and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down.*

 That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact.



 Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should have
 said:


  whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to
 see SOMETHING definite. And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see
 both outcome.

 Bruno

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-26 7:28 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com:




 2014-02-26 7:21 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:

  Hi Bruno


  Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views.

 There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these.


 She should have said: whatever she knows she will see, she should
 expect (with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite.

 But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong!

  And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome.

 You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to be
 seen. I think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect to
 see each outcome without being committed to the view that either future
 self sees both. All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen
 to divert attention from the simple error you make here, isn't it?


And so your error come from the no probability smoke screen you use  as
defense... Don't say Deutsch follows you, he accept probabilistic
prediction,  he even explains at length how a rational agent in MWI would
follow the probabilistic distribution when making a choice.

Quentin


 She can make a probabilistic prediction as you can make in MWI... you're
 the one wanting to say probability are wrong, but only the interpretation
 of what is probability change in MWI (and duplication settings)... not the
 prediction... if you say it is totally useless, then you're ready to make a
 bet with me (as everything for your has equal probability of happening...)

 Quentin


 All the best

 Chris.

 --
 From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100



 On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

 Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin
 down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion
 of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues:

 *What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following
 premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with
 certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up,
 and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down.*

 That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact.



 Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should have
 said:


  whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to
 see SOMETHING definite. And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see
 both outcome.

 Bruno

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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 --
 All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
 Batty/Rutger Hauer)




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RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

 I meant changed from our everyday definition, in which we normally assume 
 there is only one you, which is (or is at least associated with) your 
 physical structure. Which we generally assume exists in one universe.

We lose that definition just by stepping into the realm of MWI don't we? Its 
not as if we can have use of it in MWI until we want to argue that we will 
always see 'spin up'. 

MWI forces upon us either the complete abandonment of any notion of personal 
identity over time, or the equal distribution of it through all the branches in 
which 'we' appear.

All the best

Chris.

From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:28:53 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




2014-02-26 7:21 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:





Hi Bruno

 Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views.

There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these.

She should have said: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect 
(with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite. 



But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong! 

 And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome.

You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to be seen. I 
think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect to see each 
outcome without being committed to the view that either future self sees both. 
All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen to divert attention 
from the simple error you make here, isn't it?



She can make a probabilistic prediction as you can make in MWI... you're the 
one wanting to say probability are wrong, but only the interpretation of what 
is probability change in MWI (and duplication settings)... not the 
prediction... if you say it is totally useless, then you're ready to make a bet 
with me (as everything for your has equal probability of happening...)


Quentin
All the best

Chris.

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be


To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100




On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin down 
pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion of a 
thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues:



What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: 
whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. 
So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with 
certainty) expect to see spin-down.


That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact. 

Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should have said:



 whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see 
SOMETHING definite. And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both 
outcome.


Bruno
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



 





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Hauer)






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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-26 7:31 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:

 Hi Liz


 * I meant changed from our everyday definition, in which we normally
 assume there is only one you, which is (or is at least associated with)
 your physical structure. Which we generally assume exists in one universe.*

 We lose that definition just by stepping into the realm of MWI don't we?
 Its not as if we can have use of it in MWI until we want to argue that we
 will always see 'spin up'.

 MWI forces upon us either the complete abandonment of any notion of
 personal identity over time, or the equal distribution of it through all
 the branches in which 'we' appear.


That's where your wrong... that would mean all branches have equal measure,
where it must not, if MWI must be in accordance with QM.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#PRPO



 All the best

 Chris.

 --
 From: allco...@gmail.com
 Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:28:53 +0100

 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com





 2014-02-26 7:21 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:

 Hi Bruno


  Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views.

 There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these.


 She should have said: whatever she knows she will see, she should
 expect (with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite.

 But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong!

  And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome.

 You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to be
 seen. I think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect to
 see each outcome without being committed to the view that either future
 self sees both. All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen
 to divert attention from the simple error you make here, isn't it?


 She can make a probabilistic prediction as you can make in MWI... you're
 the one wanting to say probability are wrong, but only the interpretation
 of what is probability change in MWI (and duplication settings)... not the
 prediction... if you say it is totally useless, then you're ready to make a
 bet with me (as everything for your has equal probability of happening...)

 Quentin


 All the best

 Chris.

 --
 From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100



 On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

 Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin
 down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion
 of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues:

 *What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following
 premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with
 certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up,
 and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down.*

 That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact.



 Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should have
 said:


  whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to
 see SOMETHING definite. And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see
 both outcome.

 Bruno

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

 Of course, and my point is that comp aggravates that problem, as only 
 extends the indterminacy from a wave to arithmetic.

Personally, I don't think it makes a difference what the underlying substrata 
of reality consists of, be it sums or some fundamental 'matter-esq' substance. 
What causes the problem is just the fact that in any TofE all outcomes are 
catered for. In such a theory genuine probabilities just vanish and subjective 
uncertainty can only exist as an epistemic measure.

In versions of MWI it can exist when a person is unable to locate himself in a 
particular branch. ie. in earlier versions of Deutsch where infinite numbers of 
universes run in parallel one might not know whether one is in a spin up or 
spin down universe. Or in your step 3, subjective uncertainty can exist after 
duplication but before opening the door. These people are unable to locate and 
that lack of knowledge translates into subjective uncertainty. They can assign 
a probability value between 0 and 1 to possible outcomes.

But crucially, where all relevant facts are known, the only values available 
must be 1 or 0. That just follows from the fact that all outcomes are catered 
for. And it seems to me that H guy in step 3 has all these relevent facts.

So, whilst the duplicates before opening the door would assign 0.5 to M or W, 
prior to duplication H guy would assign 1. 

This is why I have accused you in the past of smuggling probabilities in from 
the future which strikes me as very fishy.


 OK, I appreciate the work, but they don't address the mind-body problem. 
 Still less the computationalist form of that problem. But they get the 
 closer view of the physical possible with respect to both comp, and the 
 mathematical theory (comp+Theaetetus).

Im not arguing that these people have a complete or even coherent theory. My 
guess is that they don't, I mean who does? It seems like everyone but me thinks 
they are in direct contact with the one and only truth, but its all just 
hubris. It might well be the case that your theory fairs better than theirs on 
the mind-body problem and much else besides but so what? They do far better 
when it comes to probability assignment and subjective uncertainty, imho.

All the best

Chris

From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:33:21 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




2014-02-26 7:31 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:





Hi Liz

 I meant changed from our everyday definition, in which we normally assume 
 there is only one you, which is (or is at least associated with) your 
 physical structure. Which we generally assume exists in one universe.



We lose that definition just by stepping into the realm of MWI don't we? Its 
not as if we can have use of it in MWI until we want to argue that we will 
always see 'spin up'. 

MWI forces upon us either the complete abandonment of any notion of personal 
identity over time, or the equal distribution of it through all the branches in 
which 'we' appear.



That's where your wrong... that would mean all branches have equal measure, 
where it must not, if MWI must be in accordance with QM.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#PRPO


 
All the best



Chris.

From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:28:53 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)


To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




2014-02-26 7:21 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:







Hi Bruno

 Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views.

There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these.

She should have said: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect 
(with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite. 





But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong! 

 And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome.

You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to be seen. I 
think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect to see each 
outcome without being committed to the view that either future self sees both. 
All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen to divert attention 
from the simple error you make here, isn't it?





She can make a probabilistic prediction as you can make in MWI... you're the 
one wanting to say probability are wrong, but only the interpretation of what 
is probability change in MWI (and duplication settings)... not the 
prediction... if you say it is totally useless, then you're ready to make a bet 
with me (as everything for your has equal probability of happening...)




Quentin
All the best

Chris.

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be




To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100






On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[LizR]

On 26 February 2014 19:31, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Hi Liz

 * I meant changed from our everyday definition, in which we normally
 assume there is only one you, which is (or is at least associated with)
 your physical structure. Which we generally assume exists in one universe.*

 We lose that definition just by stepping into the realm of MWI don't we?
 Its not as if we can have use of it in MWI until we want to argue that we
 will always see 'spin up'.

 MWI forces upon us either the complete abandonment of any notion of
 personal identity over time, or the equal distribution of it through all
 the branches in which 'we' appear.

 Yes indeed. However we do cling on to our apparent identities even if we
do believe the MWI is correct. For example I expect to go to work tomorrow,
rather than unexpectedly being declared Empress of the Universe and never
having to lift a finger again.

I think we all know what happens once the MWI is assumed. The rest is just
arguing over terminology.

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

 the best

Chris.

 From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 07:56:14 +0100


 On 22 Feb 2014, at 21:09, LizR wrote to Clark (with the above  
pap =

 the FPI of step 3):

  The above pap is only a small step in an argument (and it only
  reproduces a result obtained in the MWI, anyway).


 OK, but the MWI is a big thing, relying on another big thing: QM.

 The FPI assumes only the comp theory of mind, and extracts, as PGC
 indicates, a strong form of indeterminacy in a purely deterministic
 framework. That makes QM confirming a simple, (even according to
 Clark) but startling and counter-intuitive consequence of
 computationalism.

 That was new, and broke the common brain-mind identity thesis, and  
is

 basically still ignored by everyone, except on this list and my
 papers, 'course.

 Bruno



 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:

On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com  
wrote:


This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible  
futures in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course,  
the version of me in each branch will be different, and it always  
seems to me, retrospectively, as though I only experienced one  
outcome.


Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there  
is any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering  
what the person duplicated will experience and then what probability  
he should assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on  
what identity criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone  
into at length and won't bore you with again. But I will say that  
where you think that what Bruno wants is just recognition that each  
duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show  
that 3p and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the  
stand point of the person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't  
manage that.


Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall  
proposing to you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole  
analogy can be a useful way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of  
this sort, although I appear to be the sole fan of the idea around  
here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a heuristic for collapsing the  
notions of identity, history and continuation onto the perspective  
of a single, universal observer. From this perspective, the  
situation of being faced with duplication is just a random selection  
from the class of all possible observer moments.



Well, the just might be not that easy to define.

If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to  
get a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more  
probable than being me or you.


I am not sure that the notion of observer moment makes sense,  
without a notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative  
states.


I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a  
universal (self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p  p), an  
observer ([]p  p), and a feeler ([]p  p  p)).


But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in  
arithmetic and is associated with all relatively self-referential  
correct löbian number) will select among all observer moment.


The hypostatic universal person is more like a universal baby, which  
can split in a much larger spectrum of future 1p histories, but from  
its first person perspective it is like it has still to go through the  
histories to get the right relative statistics on his most probable  
universal neighbors. Of course, in the arithmetical reality, it don't  
get it, it is an indexical internal point of view.







The situations of having been duplicated one or more times are then  
just non-simultaneous selections from the same class. This gives us  
a consistent way of considering the 3p and 1p (or bird and frog)  
probabilities symmetrically. That is, it is now certain that I will  
confront each and every 3p continuation from a unique 1p  
perspective, just not simultaneously.


That said, this approach retains a quasi-frequency interpretation of  
probability in the case that there are fungible or equivalent  
continuations. For example, if the protocol mandates that I will be  
duplicated 100 times and 99 of my copies will be sent to a red room  
and one to a blue room, it would be rational to anticipate a higher  
probability of continuation associated with the larger class, even  
though each continuation is individually certain in a different  
underlying sense. This is just to say that subjective uncertainty  
(or the expectation of probabilistic outcomes) is a function of  
incomplete knowledge at any given point in the sequence.


OK.




I know that Bruno quarrels with Hoyle's idea as being superfluous  
to, or possibly even incompatible with, comp


I think about it. I try to make sense of it. That might have sense,  
but then it remains to look at it in arithmetic.
 I mean the relations between a person and the universal person in  
her is complex, and the splitting between []p and []p  p is part of  
it.





but personally I still find it a neat heuristic for pumping one's  
intuition on the indeterminacy of first-personal expectations.


OK.
It is just that I expect platonism to be counter-intuitive and so  
intuition pump must be handled with care. But you know that. I just  
try to understand the point.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[David Nyman]

On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:

 On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

 *This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures
 in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of
 me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me,
 retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome.*

 Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is
 any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the
 person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should
 assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity
 criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and
 won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what
 Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I
 think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments
 would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated.
 Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.


 Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to
 you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful
 way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to
 be the sole fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a
 heuristic for collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation
 onto the perspective of a single, universal observer. From this
 perspective, the situation of being faced with duplication is just a random
 selection from the class of all possible observer moments.

 Well, the just might be not that easy to define.

 If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to get
 a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable
 than being me or you.


But how would you remember that?



 I am not sure that the notion of observer moment makes sense, without a
 notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative states.

 I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a
 universal (self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p  p), an observer
 ([]p  p), and a feeler ([]p  p  p)).

 But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in arithmetic
 and is associated with all relatively self-referential correct löbian
 number) will select among all observer moment.


Well, perhaps eventually it will select all of them, if we can give some
relevant sense to eventually in this context. And I suppose Hoyle's point
is that if one imagines a logical serialisation of all such moments, its
order must be inconsequential because of the intrinsic self-ordering of the
moments themselves. Essentially he is saying that the panoptic bird view is
somehow preserved at the frog level, at the price of breaking the
simultaneity of the momentary views.


 The hypostatic universal person is more like a universal baby, which can
 split in a much larger spectrum of future 1p histories, but from its first
 person perspective it is like it has still to go through the histories to
 get the right relative statistics on his most probable universal neighbors.


Won't this still be effectively satisfied by Hoyle's heuristic? ISTM that
going through the histories is a notion that splits in the 3p and 1p
views. I suppose this is equivalent to conceiving observer moments as
self-ordering monads in terms of which any random serialisation over the
entire class must eventually preserve the right relative statistics.
Eventually here relies on a similar opacity to delays in continuation as
you argue in the UDA, plus the reliance on prior relativisation to some
specific spatial-temporal orientation, to get a 1p notion of temporal
order. But perhaps this formulation of a discrete observer moment is
incompatible with comp?

Of course, in the arithmetical reality, it don't get it, it is an indexical
 internal point of view.


Perhaps it gets it eventually, in the sense I outline above?



 The situations of having been duplicated one or more times are then just
 non-simultaneous selections from the same class. This gives us a consistent
 way of considering the 3p and 1p (or bird and frog) probabilities
 symmetrically. That is, it is now certain that I will confront each and
 every 3p continuation from a unique 1p perspective, just not simultaneously.

 That said, this approach retains a quasi-frequency interpretation of
 probability in the case that there are fungible or equivalent
 continuations. For example, if the protocol mandates that I will be
 duplicated 100 times and 99 of my copies will be sent to a red room and one
 to a blue room, it would be rational to anticipate a higher probability
 of continuation associated with the larger class, even though each
 continuation is individually certain in a different underlying 

RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Quentin


As I see from the abstract, he doesn't reject probability calculus, only the 
interpretation of it... I'll read the article later. 

Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin down 
pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion of a 
thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues:

What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: 
whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. 
So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with 
certainty) expect to see spin-down.

 One reason for MWI, is to explain the observed QM probabilities... 

No, MWI was devised in response to the measurement problem but in abandoning 
wave function collapse Everett ends up with a theory which is very parsimonious 
but entirely deterministic. How to then account for probability in a 
determinist framework has become the Achilles heel of MWI not its raison 
d'être. 

Since Everett there have been numerous attempts to smuggle an account of 
probability back into the theory, and more recent attempts: Deutsch, Wallace, 
Greaves etc., do that by abandoning the concept of subjective uncertainty 
altogether and replacing it with some kind of rational action principle. In 
otherwords, you can expect to see spin up and spin down, but you should act as 
if there was some objective bias towards one or the other. The approach comes 
complete with its own set of philosophical problems.

The point is that how probability fits into MWI's determinist framework, or any 
TofE really, is still an open question. And to argue that must reject MWI if 
they reject Brunos probability sums is plain wrong. Im happy to find myself in 
the company of Oxford Dons like Deutsch and Greaves.

 your theory is disproven by fact... you never see constant spin up... which 
 should be the case if the probability to measure spin up was one.

See above.

All the best

Chris.

From: da...@davidnyman.com
Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 16:32:01 +
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

 
This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the 
MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each 
branch will be different, and it always seems to me, retrospectively, as 
though I only experienced one outcome.


 
Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any 
disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the person 
duplicated will experience and then what probability he should assign to each 
outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity criterion gets imposed. 
Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with again. But 
I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just recognition that 
each duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show that 3p 
and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the 
person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.

 
Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to you 
on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful way of 
tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to be the sole 
fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a heuristic for 
collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation onto the 
perspective of a single, universal observer. From this perspective, the 
situation of being faced with duplication is just a random selection from the 
class of all possible observer moments.

Well, the just might be not that easy to define.
If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to get a 
computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable than 
being me or you.


But how would you remember that? 


I am not sure that the notion of observer moment makes sense, without a 
notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative states.
I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a universal 
(self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p  p), an observer ([]p  p), 
and a feeler ([]p  p  p)).


But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in arithmetic and 
is associated with all relatively self-referential correct löbian number) will 
select among all observer moment.


Well, perhaps eventually it will select all of them, if we can give some 
relevant sense to eventually in this context. And I suppose Hoyle's point is 
that if one imagines a logical serialisation of all such moments, its order 
must be inconsequential because of the intrinsic self-ordering

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[LizR]

On 25 February 2014 13:05, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Since Everett there have been numerous attempts to smuggle an account of
 probability back into the theory, and more recent attempts: Deutsch,
 Wallace, Greaves etc., do that by abandoning the concept of subjective
 uncertainty altogether and replacing it with some kind of rational action
 principle. In otherwords, you can expect to see spin up and spin down, but
 you should act as if there was some objective bias towards one or the
 other. The approach comes complete with its own set of philosophical
 problems.


I can't see why the MWI's existing explanation of probability needs to have
anything added.

Probability in the MWI is deduced from the results of measurements by an
experimenter. Effectively, if they assume that they inhabit a non-branching
universe, they will regard the proportion of times a measurement comes out
one way (spin up say) as the probability of that result occurring. If they
assume an MWI perspective, however, the probabilty of that outcome is a
measure of the proportion of experimenters who will be found in the spin-up
branch.

Is there something wrong with that?

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RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

 I can't see why the MWI's existing explanation of probability needs to have 
 anything added.

I can't see that MWI has an explanation of probability.

Probability in the MWI is deduced from the results of measurements by an 
experimenter. Effectively, if they assume that they inhabit a non-branching 
universe, they will regard the proportion of times a measurement comes out 
one way (spin up say) as the probability of that result occurring. If they 
assume an MWI perspective, however, the probabilty of that outcome is a 
measure of the proportion of experimenters who will be found in the spin-up 
branch.

Is there something wrong with that?

It doesn't really address the issue. It doesn't address the question 'what can 
I expect to see'. Of course, I can say this set of future mes will inhabit a 
spin up branch and this set of future mes will inhabit a spin down branch. So, 
this proportion of future mes will see spin up and this portion will see spin 
down.

Asked what I (present me) can expect to see: well I can expect to see spin up 
and spin down Asked to assign a probability to seeing either result I 
assign 1 to both.

Theirs is a method of calculating frequencies of me seeing ups and downs but 
not probabilities of seeing up or down.

All the best

Chris.

Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 13:30:48 +1300
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 25 February 2014 13:05, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:




Since Everett there have been numerous attempts to smuggle an account of 
probability back into the theory, and more recent attempts: Deutsch, Wallace, 
Greaves etc., do that by abandoning the concept of subjective uncertainty 
altogether and replacing it with some kind of rational action principle. In 
otherwords, you can expect to see spin up and spin down, but you should act as 
if there was some objective bias towards one or the other. The approach comes 
complete with its own set of philosophical problems.


I can't see why the MWI's existing explanation of probability needs to have 
anything added.

Probability in the MWI is deduced from the results of measurements by an 
experimenter. Effectively, if they assume that they inhabit a non-branching 
universe, they will regard the proportion of times a measurement comes out one 
way (spin up say) as the probability of that result occurring. If they assume 
an MWI perspective, however, the probabilty of that outcome is a measure of the 
proportion of experimenters who will be found in the spin-up branch.


Is there something wrong with that?






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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[LizR]

On 25 February 2014 16:54, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Hi Liz

 * I can't see why the MWI's existing explanation of probability needs to
 have anything added.*

 I can't see that MWI has an explanation of probability.




 *Probability in the MWI is deduced from the results of measurements by
 an experimenter. Effectively, if they assume that they inhabit a
 non-branching universe, they will regard the proportion of times a
 measurement comes out one way (spin up say) as the probability of that
 result occurring. If they assume an MWI perspective, however, the
 probabilty of that outcome is a measure of the proportion of experimenters
 who will be found in the spin-up branch.Is there something wrong with that?*

 It doesn't really address the issue. It doesn't address the question 'what
 can I expect to see'. Of course, I can say this set of future mes will
 inhabit a spin up branch and this set of future mes will inhabit a spin
 down branch. So, this proportion of future mes will see spin up and this
 portion will see spin down.

 Asked what I (present me) can expect to see: well I can expect to see spin
 up and spin down Asked to assign a probability to seeing either result
 I assign 1 to both.


You should assign 1 to seeing both in your multiversal form - you will
split. This is basically a misuse of the term probability because it's a
deterministic outcome (but appears probabilistic).


 Theirs is a method of calculating frequencies of me seeing ups and downs
 but not probabilities of seeing up or down.


So what's wrong with that?

As I said our expectation of probability in the MWI is based on what
happens after the measurement. There is no actual probability from the MWI
perspective, only certainty. We only think there is if we don't take an MWI
view (similar to the 1p vs 3p distinction in comp).

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-25 1:05 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:

 Hi Quentin



 *As I see from the abstract, he doesn't reject probability calculus,
 only the interpretation of it... I'll read the article later. *

 Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin
 down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion
 of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues:

 *What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following
 premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with
 certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up,
 and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down.*

 That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact.



 * One reason for MWI, is to explain the observed QM probabilities... *

 No, MWI was devised in response to the measurement problem but in
 abandoning wave function collapse Everett ends up with a theory which is
 very parsimonious but entirely deterministic. How to then account for
 probability in a determinist framework has become the Achilles heel of MWI
 not its raison d'être.

 Since Everett there have been numerous attempts to smuggle an account of
 probability back into the theory, and more recent attempts: Deutsch,
 Wallace, Greaves etc., do that by abandoning the concept of subjective
 uncertainty altogether and replacing it with some kind of rational action
 principle. In otherwords, you can expect to see spin up and spin down, but
 you should act as if there was some objective bias towards one or the
 other. The approach comes complete with its own set of philosophical
 problems.

 The point is that how probability fits into MWI's determinist framework,
 or any TofE really, is still an open question. And to argue that must
 reject MWI if they reject Brunos probability sums is plain wrong. Im happy
 to find myself in the company of Oxford Dons like Deutsch and Greaves.


David Deutsch does not reject probability... or could you please show a
quote where he does.



 * your theory is disproven by fact... you never see constant spin up...
 which should be the case if the probability to measure spin up was one.*

 See above.


Well what I see does not seem to make sense.

Regards,
Quentin


 All the best

 Chris.

 --
 From: da...@davidnyman.com
 Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 16:32:01 +

 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com


 On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:

 On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

 *This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures
 in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of
 me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me,
 retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome.*

 Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is
 any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the
 person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should
 assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity
 criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and
 won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what
 Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I
 think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments
 would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated.
 Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.


 Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to
 you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful
 way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to
 be the sole fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a
 heuristic for collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation
 onto the perspective of a single, universal observer. From this
 perspective, the situation of being faced with duplication is just a random
 selection from the class of all possible observer moments.

 Well, the just might be not that easy to define.

 If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to get
 a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable
 than being me or you.


 But how would you remember that?



 I am not sure that the notion of observer moment makes sense, without a
 notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative states.

 I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a
 universal (self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p  p), an observer
 ([]p  p), and a feeler ([]p  p  p)).

 But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in arithmetic
 and is associated with all relatively self-referential correct löbian

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[LizR]

In the MWI you *do* see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of you
has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. Or to put it
another way, you (now) will become you (who sees spin up) and you (who sees
spin down), which by then will be two different people.

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RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Quentin

That's nonsense, 

The point wasn't whether you think its nonsense or not. I couldn't care less 
about that. we were arguing about whether there are Oxford Dons who adopt the 
same standpoint as me, and given your little outburst above I think you've just 
discovered that there are. And that they are publishing these ideas in 
respected and peer reviewed journals.

Just to recap then: It is perfectly respectable to reject the notion of 
subjective uncertainty without abandoning MWI. Just as I said.

 and contrary to observed fact. 

I always wince when you throw that one out. How does one break it to the 
angriest member of a list that they are continually begging the question?


 David Deutsch does not reject probability... 

Sure he does, he swaps out the Born rule for rational decision theory (+ 
amendments to make it compatible with MWI). There isn't probability, but we 
should act 'as if' there was. Its what he's famous for, Quentin.

or could you please show a quote where he does.

Do your own homework, mate. I'm not your little quote monkey. I've kindly 
described to you what I think people like Deutsch and Wallace argue, I've 
supplied papers which you've refused to read. if you disagree you need display 
the same generosity and explain to me what you think they are arguing and how 
that is different. Waving your hands in the air demanding more and more to 
unceremoniously and uncritically ditch is no-ones idea of fun.

All the best

Chris.

Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 20:26:52 +1300
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of you has 
been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. Or to put it another 
way, you (now) will become you (who sees spin up) and you (who sees spin down), 
which by then will be two different people.






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RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

  Let's also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be sent to, 
 and that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send you to A or B 
 with equal probability based on some quantum coin flip. But by accident it 
 duplicates you, and sends you to both. This effectively conflates the comp 
 and MWI versions IMHO, so you can't easily disentangle them in this thought 
 experiment.

An important aspect of step 3's experiment is that it depicts a determined 
result from 3p which is, allegedly, subject to uncertainty from 1p. Thats the 
big result right? That seems to get lost in your revision. You get 1p 
uncertainty but at the expense of 3p certainty. By introducing a 'quantum coin 
flip' you're loading the dice towards uncertainty. So I can't really say you 
shown an equivalence between step 3 and MWI.

This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the 
MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each 
branch will be different, and it always seems to me, retrospectively, as 
though I only experienced one outcome.

Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any 
disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the person 
duplicated will experience and then what probability he should assign to each 
outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity criterion gets imposed. 
Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with again. But 
I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just recognition that 
each duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show that 3p 
and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the 
person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.

All the best

Chris.

 From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 07:56:14 +0100
 
 
 On 22 Feb 2014, at 21:09, LizR wrote to Clark (with the above pap =  
 the FPI of step 3):
 
  The above pap is only a small step in an argument (and it only  
  reproduces a result obtained in the MWI, anyway).
 
 
 OK, but the MWI is a big thing, relying on another big thing: QM.
 
 The FPI assumes only the comp theory of mind, and extracts, as PGC  
 indicates, a strong form of indeterminacy in a purely deterministic  
 framework. That makes QM confirming a simple, (even according to  
 Clark) but startling and counter-intuitive consequence of  
 computationalism.
 
 That was new, and broke the common brain-mind identity thesis, and is  
 basically still ignored by everyone, except on this list and my  
 papers, 'course.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 
 
 
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RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Quentin

  then I can't see how you could still agree with many world interpretation 
 and reject probability, that's not consistent... unless of course, you 
 reject MWI.

I definitely wouldn't say I accept MWI. But even so, not everyone who does 
accept it agrees that there is subjective uncertainty. So, I can accept MWI and 
reject the probability sums Bruno derives and be in good company.

See here:

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

All the best

Chris.

From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 01:04:53 +




Hi Liz

  Let's also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be sent to, 
 and that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send you to A or B 
 with equal probability based on some quantum coin flip. But by accident it 
 duplicates you, and sends you to both. This effectively conflates the comp 
 and MWI versions IMHO, so you can't easily disentangle them in this thought 
 experiment.

An important aspect of step 3's experiment is that it depicts a determined 
result from 3p which is, allegedly, subject to uncertainty from 1p. Thats the 
big result right? That seems to get lost in your revision. You get 1p 
uncertainty but at the expense of 3p certainty. By introducing a 'quantum coin 
flip' you're loading the dice towards uncertainty. So I can't really say you 
shown an equivalence between step 3 and MWI.

This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the 
MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each 
branch will be different, and it always seems to me, retrospectively, as 
though I only experienced one outcome.

Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any 
disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the person 
duplicated will experience and then what probability he should assign to each 
outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity criterion gets imposed. 
Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with again. But 
I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just recognition that 
each duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show that 3p 
and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the 
person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.

All the best

Chris.

 From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 07:56:14 +0100
 
 
 On 22 Feb 2014, at 21:09, LizR wrote to Clark (with the above pap =  
 the FPI of step 3):
 
  The above pap is only a small step in an argument (and it only  
  reproduces a result obtained in the MWI, anyway).
 
 
 OK, but the MWI is a big thing, relying on another big thing: QM.
 
 The FPI assumes only the comp theory of mind, and extracts, as PGC  
 indicates, a strong form of indeterminacy in a purely deterministic  
 framework. That makes QM confirming a simple, (even according to  
 Clark) but startling and counter-intuitive consequence of  
 computationalism.
 
 That was new, and broke the common brain-mind identity thesis, and is  
 basically still ignored by everyone, except on this list and my  
 papers, 'course.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 
 
 
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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[David Nyman]

On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

*This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures
 in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of
 me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me,
 retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome.*

 Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is
 any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the
 person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should
 assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity
 criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and
 won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what
 Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I
 think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments
 would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated.
 Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.


Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to
you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful
way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to
be the sole fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a
heuristic for collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation
onto the perspective of a single, universal observer. From this
perspective, the situation of being faced with duplication is just a random
selection from the class of all possible observer moments. The situations
of having been duplicated one or more times are then just non-simultaneous
selections from the same class. This gives us a consistent way of
considering the 3p and 1p (or bird and frog) probabilities symmetrically.
That is, it is now certain that I will confront each and every 3p
continuation from a unique 1p perspective, just not simultaneously.

That said, this approach retains a quasi-frequency interpretation of
probability in the case that there are fungible or equivalent
continuations. For example, if the protocol mandates that I will be
duplicated 100 times and 99 of my copies will be sent to a red room and one
to a blue room, it would be rational to anticipate a higher probability
of continuation associated with the larger class, even though each
continuation is individually certain in a different underlying sense. This
is just to say that subjective uncertainty (or the expectation of
probabilistic outcomes) is a function of incomplete knowledge at any given
point in the sequence.

I know that Bruno quarrels with Hoyle's idea as being superfluous to, or
possibly even incompatible with, comp but personally I still find it a neat
heuristic for pumping one's intuition on the indeterminacy of
first-personal expectations.

David

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[LizR]

On 24 February 2014 14:04, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Hi Liz

 *  Let's also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be sent
 to, and that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send you to A or
 B with equal probability based on some quantum coin flip. But by accident
 it duplicates you, and sends you to both. This effectively conflates the
 comp and MWI versions IMHO, so you can't easily disentangle them in this
 thought experiment.*

 An important aspect of step 3's experiment is that it depicts a determined
 result from 3p which is, allegedly, subject to uncertainty from 1p. Thats
 the big result right? That seems to get lost in your revision. You get 1p
 uncertainty but at the expense of 3p certainty. By introducing a 'quantum
 coin flip' you're loading the dice towards uncertainty. So I can't really
 say you shown an equivalence between step 3 and MWI.


Yes, maybe. My idea was that the person thought the outcome was random, but
in this particular case it was completely determined - he was duplicated,
and sent to both places. The idea was to split out the 1p probability view
from the 3p determined view (which might not be realised for a long time,
say, until someone eventually worked out what had happened).

*This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures
in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of
me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me,
retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome.*

Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any
 disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the
 person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should
 assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity
 criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and
 won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what
 Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I
 think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments
 would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated.
 Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.


Hmm. This was why I was trying to make the 3p certainty unknown to the 1p
concerned (though reconstructable at a later date, so one can eventually
see that there was a 3p certainty involved).

I can't see how Bruno fails to show that probability assignments work in an
equivalent manner to to Everett's. If one doesn't know about the
duplication then it appears that there is, say, a 50% chance of each
outcome; if one does know, there is a 100% chance of the outcome, which
involves duplication. Which is how it's supposed to work in the MWI, surely?

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Quentin Anciaux]

As I see from the abstract, he doesn't reject probability calculus, only
the interpretation of it... I'll read the article later. One reason for
MWI, is to explain the observed QM probabilities... so if you reject that,
MWI is useless IMHO... and your theory is disproven by fact... you never
see constant spin up... which should be the case if the probability to
measure spin up was one.

Quentin


2014-02-24 2:36 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:

 Hi Quentin


   then I can't see how you could still agree with many world
 interpretation and reject probability, that's not consistent... unless of
 course, you reject MWI.

 I definitely wouldn't say I accept MWI. But even so, not everyone who does
 accept it agrees that there is subjective uncertainty. So, I can accept MWI
 and reject the probability sums Bruno derives and be in good company.

 See here:

 http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

 All the best

 Chris.

 --
 From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 01:04:53 +


 Hi Liz

 *  Let's also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be sent
 to, and that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send you to A or
 B with equal probability based on some quantum coin flip. But by accident
 it duplicates you, and sends you to both. This effectively conflates the
 comp and MWI versions IMHO, so you can't easily disentangle them in this
 thought experiment.*

 An important aspect of step 3's experiment is that it depicts a determined
 result from 3p which is, allegedly, subject to uncertainty from 1p. Thats
 the big result right? That seems to get lost in your revision. You get 1p
 uncertainty but at the expense of 3p certainty. By introducing a 'quantum
 coin flip' you're loading the dice towards uncertainty. So I can't really
 say you shown an equivalence between step 3 and MWI.

 *This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures
 in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of
 me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me,
 retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome.*

 Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is
 any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the
 person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should
 assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity
 criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and
 won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what
 Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I
 think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments
 would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated.
 Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.

 All the best

 Chris.

  From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
  Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
  Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 07:56:14 +0100
 
 
  On 22 Feb 2014, at 21:09, LizR wrote to Clark (with the above pap =
  the FPI of step 3):
 
   The above pap is only a small step in an argument (and it only
   reproduces a result obtained in the MWI, anyway).
 
 
  OK, but the MWI is a big thing, relying on another big thing: QM.
 
  The FPI assumes only the comp theory of mind, and extracts, as PGC
  indicates, a strong form of indeterminacy in a purely deterministic
  framework. That makes QM confirming a simple, (even according to
  Clark) but startling and counter-intuitive consequence of
  computationalism.
 
  That was new, and broke the common brain-mind identity thesis, and is
  basically still ignored by everyone, except on this list and my
  papers, 'course.
 
  Bruno
 
 
 
  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 
 
 
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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[John Clark]

On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 1:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  Did the Helsinki Man see Washington and Moscow? Yes.


  In the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view.


In who's 1-1 view? You'll probably say in The Helsinki Man's, but his
view is just of Helsinki. Perhaps you mean the future 1 view of the
Helsinki Man. If so then anybody who can remember having the past 1 view
of the Helsinki Man would fit that description; so the Helsinki Man will
see both Washington and Moscow.

 I said that we have to interview all copies.


Good, then I never want to hear you say again that the Washington Man
saying that he didn't see Moscow contradicts the claim that the Helsinki
man will see both Washington AND Moscow.

 I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves math
 and it is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2 to the
 number 3 and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't predict if it will
 end up as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery is just as profound as
 yours. Not very.



 So you accept that step 3 is a discovery?


  I think my discovery is virtually identical to yours and is just as
 profound. Not very.


  So that's it. You blow the candle of another because you are jealous he
 published it and exploit to get something


What the hell!!? Did you really think I was serious? Did you really think I
believed the above pap was a major discovery?!

  John K Clark

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[LizR]

The above pap is only a small step in an argument (and it only reproduces
a result obtained in the MWI, anyway).

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 7:45 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 1:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

   Did the Helsinki Man see Washington and Moscow? Yes.


  In the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view.


 In who's 1-1 view? You'll probably say in The Helsinki Man's, but his
 view is just of Helsinki. Perhaps you mean the future 1 view of the
 Helsinki Man. If so then anybody who can remember having the past 1 view
 of the Helsinki Man would fit that description; so the Helsinki Man will
 see both Washington and Moscow.

  I said that we have to interview all copies.


 Good, then I never want to hear you say again that the Washington Man
 saying that he didn't see Moscow contradicts the claim that the Helsinki
 man will see both Washington AND Moscow.

   I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves
 math and it is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2 to the
 number 3 and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't predict if it will
 end up as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery is just as profound as
 yours. Not very.



   So you accept that step 3 is a discovery?


  I think my discovery is virtually identical to yours and is just as
 profound. Not very.


  So that's it. You blow the candle of another because you are jealous he
 published it and exploit to get something


 What the hell!!? Did you really think I was serious? Did you really think
 I believed the above pap was a major discovery?!



Concerning FPI and step 3, yes its just a step but to me it is not
trivial, especially when UDA is followed through to its concluding
implications and problems in conjunction with steps 7 and 8.

A non-trivial fundamental point here for yours truly, is that determinism
in the mechanist setting of the protocol entails strong form of
first-person subjective indeterminacy. P(Washington) = P(Tokio) =1/2 is
just set out to fix the damn question to explore further implications of
comp, eventually including the search of such distributions of probability
bearing on observable physics given backdrop of a lot of redundant UD work.

The objective probability asserted here at step 3 seems fundamental;
applied to first person subjective outcomes in a deterministic UD setting
providing a foundation for examining self-reference observation constraints
of various types of reasoning machines arising from something as general as
arithmetic/possible logics, and comparing this with our observable physics,
appears as a valid, if overlooked move.

This might be trivial pap to you, but then I'd like to know clearly: why
would such a comparison be trivial or bogus? In other words: how do you
know? Things are obviously not all unexplainable magic, when arithmetic is
effectively applied, nor is everything computable.

For now, I see no reason to not keep trying to grasp at both ends and keep
comparing. If this is trivial to you then I'll grant you my low standards
and taste for pap. But then why further concern yourself with these
questions; being patronizing and insulting? Waste of time by your own
standards of pap it would seem. Go preach elsewhere whatever it is you want
to preach with such furious ambition, maybe? PGC


   John K Clark

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Feb 2014, at 19:45, John Clark wrote:



On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 1:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


  Did the Helsinki Man see Washington and Moscow? Yes.

 In the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view.

In who's 1-1 view? You'll probably say in The Helsinki Man's,



No. The W-man and the M-man.



but his view is just of Helsinki. Perhaps you mean the future 1  
view of the Helsinki Man. If so then anybody who can remember  
having the past 1 view of the Helsinki Man would fit that  
description; so the Helsinki Man will see both Washington and Moscow.


In the 3-1 views. Not in the 1-1 views.





 I said that we have to interview all copies.

Good, then I never want to hear you say again that the Washington  
Man saying that he didn't see Moscow contradicts the claim that the  
Helsinki man will see both Washington AND Moscow.


In the 3-1 views. Not in the 1-1 view.

I think that with that way or arguing, you don't even convince  
yourself. You continue to play with words, and ignore the details of  
the question, based on the 1-3 distinction.


If the FPI does not exist, provide the algorithm of prediction. W   
M has been refuted. You miss this only by confusing the 3-1 view and  
the 1-view, systematically, in a boring repetition.


Bruno





 I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves  
math and it is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2  
to the number 3 and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't  
predict if it will end up as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery  
is just as profound as yours. Not very.


 So you accept that step 3 is a discovery?

 I think my discovery is virtually identical to yours and is  
just as profound. Not very.


 So that's it. You blow the candle of another because you are  
jealous he published it and exploit to get something


What the hell!!? Did you really think I was serious? Did you really  
think I believed the above pap was a major discovery?!


  John K Clark


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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Feb 2014, at 21:09, LizR wrote to Clark (with the above pap =  
the FPI of step 3):


The above pap is only a small step in an argument (and it only  
reproduces a result obtained in the MWI, anyway).



OK, but the MWI is a big thing, relying on another big thing: QM.

The FPI assumes only the comp theory of mind, and extracts, as PGC  
indicates, a strong form of indeterminacy in a purely deterministic  
framework. That makes QM confirming a simple, (even according to  
Clark) but startling and counter-intuitive consequence of  
computationalism.


That was new, and broke the common brain-mind identity thesis, and is  
basically still ignored by everyone, except on this list and my  
papers, 'course.


Bruno



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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[LizR]

On 21 February 2014 16:48, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Hi Liz



 *Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you
 to another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life.
 Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be
 transported :) A malfunction causes you to be duplicated and sent to both
 destinations, but you will never meet your doppelganger in the other solar
 system, or find out that he exists. Does this make any difference to how
 you assign probabilities? If so, why?*

 My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar
 system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I
 don't know about the possibility of accidents.


OK, Fair enough. I didn't quite phrase my scenario as I intended. Let's
also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be sent to, and
that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send you to A or B with
equal probability based on some quantum coin flip. But by accident it
duplicates you, and sends you to both. This effectively conflates the comp
and MWI versions IMHO, so you can't easily disentangle them in this thought
experiment.


 But,
 If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then
 the probabilities end up:


 Solar System A : 1
 Solar System B : small chance.

 Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small
 chance) as far as I am concerned.

 Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of
 their own, the probabilities end up:

 Solar System A : 1
 Solar System B : 1.

 So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an
 unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up
 to 1 in MWI scenarios.


This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in
the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me
in each branch will be different, and it always *seems* to me,
retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome. So even if you
believe the MWI to give the correct explanation of probability, you will
still tend to say something like there is a 50% chance of rain tomorrow
rather than it will both rain and not rain tomorrow. Which is I think
what Bruno is getting at with the FPI.


 All the best

 Chris.



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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[John Clark]

On Thu, Feb 20, 2014  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we
 have to interview all the copies.


Then don't just talk to the Moscow Man and say that is enough to disprove
the prediction that the Helsinki Man will see Moscow AND Washington because
the Moscow Man, the one and only person you talked to, says he didn't see
Washington.  Not that predictions have any relevance to matters of self
identity.


  I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of ideas you
 call comp is false or not. The word is your invention not mine and you're
 the only one who seems to know exactly what it means.


  You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times.


I've told you a billion times don't exaggerate!

 Comp is the quite standard hypothesis [...]


Comp is NOBODY'S standard hypothesis, I have never in my life heard a
scientist use the word comp. Not once. And don't tell me that it means
Computationalism and you're just too lazy to type the extra letters, if it
were just that then after I had complained about it an infinite number of
times I think you would have stopped being so lazy. I think there is much
more to it than that, there must be because I agree with Computationalism
but I sure as hell don't agree with comp.

 you once said something abut the future 1p of the Helsinki man, well
 that description would fit 2 people because both remember being the
 Helsinki man.



 yes, and that is why the confirmation is asked to the 2 people.


Exactly, there are 2 people not just 1 who will inhabit the future 1p ,
or more precisely a future 1p of the Helsinki Man, so interviewing just
one man would not provide enough information to know if the prediction
John Clark will see both Moscow and Washington was correct or not, but
after interviewing both you would know enough to be able to judge the truth
or falsehood of the prediction, and in this case you'd know that the
prediction was correct. Not that predictions, good or bad, would matter in
the slightest, not if you're talking about consciousness and the nature of
self identity.

So to sum up, did the Washington Man see Moscow? No. Did the Moscow Man see
Washington? No. Was the Washington Man once the Helsinki Man? Yes. Was the
Moscow Man once the Helsinki Man? Yes. Is the Moscow Man the Washington
Man? No. Is the Washington Man the Moscow Man? No. Did the Helsinki Man see
Washington and Moscow? Yes.

 I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves math and
 it is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2 to the number 3
 and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't predict if it will end up
 as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery is just as profound as yours. Not
 very.



 So you accept that step 3 is a discovery?


I think my discovery is virtually identical to yours and is just as
profound. Not very.

  John K Clark

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-21 19:07 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:

 On Thu, Feb 20, 2014  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

   if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we
 have to interview all the copies.


 Then don't just talk to the Moscow Man and say that is enough to disprove
 the prediction that the Helsinki Man will see Moscow AND Washington because
 the Moscow Man, the one and only person you talked to, says he didn't see
 Washington.  Not that predictions have any relevance to matters of self
 identity.


  I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of ideas you
 call comp is false or not. The word is your invention not mine and you're
 the only one who seems to know exactly what it means.


  You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times.


 I've told you a billion times don't exaggerate!

  Comp is the quite standard hypothesis [...]


 Comp is NOBODY'S standard hypothesis, I have never in my life heard a
 scientist use the word comp. Not once. And don't tell me that it means
 Computationalism and you're just too lazy to type the extra letters, if it
 were just that then after I had complained about it an infinite number of
 times I think you would have stopped being so lazy. I think there is much
 more to it than that, there must be because I agree with Computationalism
 but I sure as hell don't agree with comp.

  you once said something abut the future 1p of the Helsinki man, well
 that description would fit 2 people because both remember being the
 Helsinki man.



  yes, and that is why the confirmation is asked to the 2 people.


 Exactly, there are 2 people not just 1 who will inhabit the future 1p ,
 or more precisely a future 1p of the Helsinki Man, so interviewing just
 one man would not provide enough information to know if the prediction
 John Clark will see both Moscow and Washington was correct or not, but
 after interviewing both you would know enough to be able to judge the truth
 or falsehood of the prediction, and in this case you'd know that the
 prediction was correct. Not that predictions, good or bad, would matter in
 the slightest, not if you're talking about consciousness and the nature of
 self identity.

 So to sum up, did the Washington Man see Moscow? No. Did the Moscow Man
 see Washington? No. Was the Washington Man once the Helsinki Man? Yes. Was
 the Moscow Man once the Helsinki Man? Yes. Is the Moscow Man the Washington
 Man? No. Is the Washington Man the Moscow Man? No. Did the Helsinki Man see
 Washington and Moscow? Yes.

  I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves math
 and it is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2 to the
 number 3 and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't predict if it will
 end up as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery is just as profound as
 yours. Not very.



   So you accept that step 3 is a discovery?


 I think my discovery is virtually identical to yours and is just as
 profound. Not very.


As usual, you go from denial, to not profound... you know why it is
called *step* three ? I'll tell you a real discovery your big brain still
didn't found... it is a step because *that's not the discovery*. Anyway,
you've decided long ago to dismiss anything coming from Bruno, Bruno is too
patient with you, you'll never accept continuing reading/discussing the
argument, it would be an admittance that you lost your game. So keep your
belief in probability and MWI and dismiss anything else with all your heart
even when it's obviously inconsistent  (I await your theory explaining how
meeting a doppelganger render the probabilty calculus null) , everybody
knows that if you repeat a lie enough, it becomes truth... or maybe not.

Quentin



   John K Clark


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All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 21 February 2014 14:48, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
 Hi Liz


Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you to
 another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life.
 Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be
 transported :) A malfunction causes you to be duplicated and sent to both
 destinations, but you will never meet your doppelganger in the other solar
 system, or find out that he exists.

 Does this make any difference to how you assign probabilities? If so, why?

 My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar
 system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I
 don't know about the possibility of accidents. But,
 If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then the
 probabilities end up:

 Solar System A : 1
 Solar System B : small chance.

 Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small
 chance) as far as I am concerned.

 Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of
 their own, the probabilities end up:

 Solar System A : 1
 Solar System B : 1.

 So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an
 unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up
 to 1 in MWI scenarios.

 All the best

Since in the world we live in probabilities for everything don't seem
to be 1, is this evidence that the MWI is false? Is it even logically
possible to be an observer in a multiverse where everything happens
with probability 1, and if so, what would it be like?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Feb 2014, at 19:07, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Feb 20, 2014  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is  
simple: we have to interview all the copies.


Then don't just talk to the Moscow Man and say that is enough to  
disprove the prediction that the Helsinki Man will see Moscow AND  
Washington because the Moscow Man, the one and only person you  
talked to, says he didn't see Washington.


I said that we have to interview all copies.





Not that predictions have any relevance to matters of self identity.


Self-identity is not what we talk about.





 I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of ideas  
you call comp is false or not. The word is your invention not mine  
and you're the only one who seems to know exactly what it means.


 You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times.

I've told you a billion times don't exaggerate!

 Comp is the quite standard hypothesis [...]

Comp is NOBODY'S standard hypothesis, I have never in my life  
heard a scientist use the word comp. Not once. And don't tell me  
that it means Computationalism


It is. I have used so often computationalism on this list that I  
called it comp, but I call it indexical mechanism in conscience   
mécanisme, and computationalism in most other text.




and you're just too lazy to type the extra letters, if it were just  
that then after I had complained about it an infinite number of  
times I think you would have stopped being so lazy. I think there is  
much more to it than that, there must be because I agree with  
Computationalism but I sure as hell don't agree with comp.


Computationalism is what we assume. What you don't admit are the  
consequence. tell what do add or retrieve for comp to get the  
consequence, if you think we don't get them from comp. But we know why  
you don't get the consequence: you confuse, or deliberately ignore the  
1-3 p distinctions.








 you once said something abut the future 1p of the Helsinki man,  
well that description would fit 2 people because both remember being  
the Helsinki man.


 yes, and that is why the confirmation is asked to the 2 people.

Exactly, there are 2 people not just 1 who will inhabit the future  
1p , or more precisely a future 1p of the Helsinki Man, so  
interviewing just one man would not provide enough information to  
know if the prediction John Clark will see both Moscow and  
Washington was correct or not, but after interviewing both you  
would know enough to be able to judge the truth or falsehood of the  
prediction, and in this case you'd know that the prediction was  
correct.


Which one? Yours W  M?
Not at all. You have already agreed that both feel to be in one city.  
So if I interview both, they will both confirm W v M, and they will  
both refute W  M.








Not that predictions, good or bad, would matter in the slightest,  
not if you're talking about consciousness and the nature of self  
identity.


But I am not. I talk about prediction. It is the main notion to  
understand that physics has to be redefined as a probability calculus  
on first person view associated to computation.






So to sum up, did the Washington Man see Moscow? No. Did the Moscow  
Man see Washington? No. Was the Washington Man once the Helsinki  
Man? Yes. Was the Moscow Man once the Helsinki Man? Yes. Is the  
Moscow Man the Washington Man? No. Is the Washington Man the Moscow  
Man? No.


Good.



Did the Helsinki Man see Washington and Moscow? Yes.


In the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view. Your persistent 1-3 confusion  
again. sigh






 I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves  
math and it is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2  
to the number 3 and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't  
predict if it will end up as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery  
is just as profound as yours. Not very.


 So you accept that step 3 is a discovery?

I think my discovery is virtually identical to yours and is just  
as profound. Not very.


So that's it. You blow the candle of another because you are jealous  
he published it and exploit to get something, and you don't even look  
at that something?


You know, to discover something is not enough. The real discovery is  
in the understanding that something apparently not deep is actually  
very deep. In this case it shows that Aristotle theology must be  
replaced by Plato's theology, when assuming computationalism, and  
that, consequently, physics, or physics' core non geographical truth,  
must be retrieved from the logic of self-reference, which is done in  
the Arithmetical UDA (AUDA, once for all).


Again, if you accept the point (even have discovered it) please tell  
us if you agree with the step 4, and then 5 and 6.  And 7.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Feb 2014, at 19:36, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux  
allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding  
the argument that you can't meet your doppelganger,


So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use  
logic in doing so. No can do.



You translate don't use the doppelganger argument by don't use  
logic.

That is a rhetorical trick (I will count them).





 or you have to explain why the possibility of meeting render  
probability calculus meaningless.


If Everett's probability calculus produced figures that didn't agree  
with both experiment and Quantum Mechanics then the MWI would indeed  
be meaningless because the entire point of the MWI is to explain why  
Quantum Mechanics works as well as it does. But Bruno isn't trying  
to explain why Quantum Mechanics works,


Sorry but this is exactly what I don and what UDA shows that we have  
to do.


This is a second rhetorical trick. You attribute some goal to the  
opponent, which in fact is not existing.







that's already been done, he's trying to explain the nature of self,



Not at all. Again the same error. I define precisely the 3p self and  
the 1p self using a simple definition in UDA, and using the Dx = xx  
method in AUDA. Computer science has already elucidate the notion of  
3p self, and the theaetetus idea, which works in arithmetic thanks to  
incompleteness, is used in the math part to (re)define the 1p self,  
and this works remarkably well. We do find a non nameable knower  
verifying all the axioms fro consciousness in Brouwer theory, for  
example.





and so I don't care if Bruno's probability calculus works or not  
because probability and prediction have nothing to do with that;


You repeat the rhetorical trick. The question is precisely on  
prediction and notably 1p prediction of 1p experiences.






as I have said before, you feel like Quentin Anciaux today because  
you remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday and for no other reason.


Exact at alst, and this is quite enough to say that you will survive  
in both city in the 3-1 view, but as comp makes it impossible to be  
simulatneously in two places at once, you know that you, in the 1p- 
sense, and using the definition just given in your quote, entails that  
in Helsinki, you cannot make a prediction more definite than W or M.







And despite what you say above the situations are not equivalent.  
According to Everett the very laws of physics forbid you from ever  
interacting with your doppelganger


Assuming QM totally linear. If tomorrow we discover that QM is  
slightly non linear, we can meet the QM doppelganger. I doubt this is  
possible, but the point is logical, given that in comp we do not  
assume QM at all. Your argument is invalid.






and so Bruno's favorite type of words, personal pronouns, cause no  
problem;


It has never caused any problem, as I distinguish clearly the 1 and 3  
pronouns. Ecah time you have shown a problem, it is your wording  
which introduced an ambiguity only.





but in Bruno's thought experiment you can interact with your
doppelganger and that turns personal pronouns, which work fine in  
our everyday world without duplicating chambers, into a chaotic mass  
of ASCII characters with no clear meaning.


This is just insane. To study what happens, you need only to keep in  
mind that the prediction is on the 1p, asked to the H-guy, and the  
confirmation of the prediction is asked to each individual copies.


I use W and M, so that the doppelganger does not meet for some period  
of time, and distintinguish unambiguously the city in which they have  
been individually reconstituted.


The chaotic mess of ASCII character exists only in your imagination,  
due to the failure of taking the given 1-3 nuances into account, as we  
have shown many times to you.






 All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain

I loved Blade Runner too, one of the few things we can agree on.



Blade runner is good, yes.

Bruno




  John K Clark


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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Feb 2014, at 20:53, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:
On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux  
allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding  
the argument that you can't meet your doppelganger,


So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use  
logic in doing so. No can do.


That's not what I was asking,


John seems to dialog with himself. He very often do that trick.



I was asking that if you use your meet doppelganger argument, ==  
read the next quote.


 or you have to explain why the possibility of meeting render  
probability calculus meaningless.


If Everett's probability calculus produced figures that didn't agree  
with both experiment and Quantum Mechanics then the MWI would indeed  
be meaningless because the entire point of the MWI is to explain why  
Quantum Mechanics works as well as it does.


The thing is to devise a though experiment matching MWI, in the MWI  
case you accept probability calculus.


Yes.




But Bruno isn't trying to explain why Quantum Mechanics works,  
that's already been done, he's trying to explain the nature of self,


He does not, and certainly does not at step 3.


Step 3 is just a simple step toward this. but I know we have to come  
back on this.






and so I don't care if Bruno's probability calculus works

He does, that's what is showing FPI (which *of course* also exists  
under MWI)


or not because probability and prediction have nothing to do with  
that;


It has all to do with that because it is specifically the question  
asked.


yes. there is no problem with the notion of self in which I use simple  
definitions in UDA, and the standard notions in AUDA. Computer  
science, thanks to the Dx = xx method, excels on the notion of self.  
That is why I decide to be mathematicians, instead of biologist.







as I have said before, you feel like Quentin Anciaux today because  
you remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday and for no other reason.


As I have said before and before and before, that's not the question.


It is the not the question, and in fact, here John gives the minimal  
correct account of the 1p-identity (memory, diary content) which leads  
directly to the FPI.






And despite what you say above the situations are not equivalent.

They are from the probability POV.


Exactly. John fails completely in showing how possibly meeting the  
doppelganger has any relevance on the probabilities.


It is a well known rhetorical trick. Introduce something non relevant  
and accusing someone to not take it into account, without showing the  
relevance. But it is just plainly obvious that it cannot be relevant  
without adding magic connections between the doppelgangers, which are  
already sufficiently well separated in Moscow and Washington.






According to Everett the very laws of physics forbid you from ever  
interacting with your doppelganger


And what does it have to do with frequency and probability ?

and so Bruno's favorite type of words, personal pronouns, cause no  
problem;


They don't pose problem in this experiment and in the question  
asked. So I'll try one last time,  and will try à la Jesse, with  
simple yes/no questions and explanation from your part.


So I will first describe the setup and will suppose for the argument  
that what we will do (duplicating you) is possible.


So you (John Clark reading this email or the one from tomorrow or  
whatever, so I'll use *you*) are in front of a button that is in a  
room with two doors. When *you* will press the button, *you* will be  
duplicated (by destroying you in the room and recreating you two  
times in two exactly identical room), the only difference in each  
room is that one has the left door open and one has the right door  
open... what do *you* expect to see when you'll press the button ?


1- Do you expect to see the left and the right doors opened ? Yes/No
2- Do you expect to see the left or the right doors opened ? Yes/No

If you answer 'Yes' at the 1st question, do you really mean *you*  
expect to see both event simultaneously ?


If you answer 'Yes' at the 2nd question, do you think you can put a  
probability to see the left door opened (or reversely the right  
door) ? Yes/No


If you answer 'No', why can't you assign a probability to see each  
door ? As I see it, there are 2 possible events, so each as a 0.5  
probability of occurence... If not why not ? Why in the MWI case,  
you accept the 0.5 probability ? If you follow strictly the  
protocol, MWI and this experiment are equivalent, and are not about  
your personal identity... If you answer both No to the 1st and 2nd  
question, please develop what you will expect to see when you press  
the button ?



The worst is that we can imagine easily the type of rhetoric that John  
will use to evade the questioning.


Bruno





Quentin



but in Bruno's 

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

 comp is  
assumed. This involves only the personal content of the diaries,  
entering, or not, in the teleboxes.






The other point that Clark often makes is that step 3 is worthless,  
and if the intention of step 3 is to hammer home that duplicated  
people would only ever have a single POV, then step 3 is indeed  
worthless.


But of course, that is not the point of step 3, as this is the point  
of step 2. Step 3 is the FPI point. It shows that in a context of pure  
3p comp determinacy, the 1p are confronted to a string form of  
indeterminacy, and this without invoking QM.




Does Bruno really need to advertise an inability to conduct simple  
probability sums to convince you that individuals only have a single  
pov?


I do the contrary. By definition of the 1p, it is just obvious that  
individuals only have a single pov, and this is used to lead to the  
probabilities.







But I don't think that is all step 3 is really about.


Good, as you put it in the wrong direction.


Its also about trying to maintain 'indeterminacy' in the mistaken  
belief that it has a legitimate place in Everettian MWI.


In the Everettian MWI, the probabilities are the same as in the non- 
everett setting, but are reduced implicitly to the comp FPI, although  
this could be the object of another debate, as UDA importantly does  
not assume QM.


Bruno






From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 20:53:46 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:
On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux  
allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding  
the argument that you can't meet your doppelganger,


So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use  
logic in doing so. No can do.


That's not what I was asking, I was asking that if you use your meet  
doppelganger argument, == read the next quote.


 or you have to explain why the possibility of meeting render  
probability calculus meaningless.


If Everett's probability calculus produced figures that didn't agree  
with both experiment and Quantum Mechanics then the MWI would indeed  
be meaningless because the entire point of the MWI is to explain why  
Quantum Mechanics works as well as it does.


The thing is to devise a though experiment matching MWI, in the MWI  
case you accept probability calculus.


But Bruno isn't trying to explain why Quantum Mechanics works,  
that's already been done, he's trying to explain the nature of self,


He does not, and certainly does not at step 3.

and so I don't care if Bruno's probability calculus works

He does, that's what is showing FPI (which *of course* also exists  
under MWI)


or not because probability and prediction have nothing to do with  
that;


It has all to do with that because it is specifically the question  
asked.


as I have said before, you feel like Quentin Anciaux today because  
you remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday and for no other reason.


As I have said before and before and before, that's not the question.

And despite what you say above the situations are not equivalent.

They are from the probability POV.

According to Everett the very laws of physics forbid you from ever  
interacting with your doppelganger


And what does it have to do with frequency and probability ?

and so Bruno's favorite type of words, personal pronouns, cause no  
problem;


They don't pose problem in this experiment and in the question  
asked. So I'll try one last time,  and will try à la Jesse, with  
simple yes/no questions and explanation from your part.


So I will first describe the setup and will suppose for the argument  
that what we will do (duplicating you) is possible.


So you (John Clark reading this email or the one from tomorrow or  
whatever, so I'll use *you*) are in front of a button that is in a  
room with two doors. When *you* will press the button, *you* will be  
duplicated (by destroying you in the room and recreating you two  
times in two exactly identical room), the only difference in each  
room is that one has the left door open and one has the right door  
open... what do *you* expect to see when you'll press the button ?


1- Do you expect to see the left and the right doors opened ? Yes/No
2- Do you expect to see the left or the right doors opened ? Yes/No

If you answer 'Yes' at the 1st question, do you really mean *you*  
expect to see both event simultaneously ?


If you answer 'Yes' at the 2nd question, do you think you can put a  
probability to see the left door opened (or reversely the right  
door) ? Yes/No


If you answer 'No', why can't you assign a probability to see each  
door ? As I see it, there are 2 possible events, so each as a 0.5  
probability of occurence... If not why not ? Why in the MWI case,  
you accept the 0.5 probability ? If you follow strictly

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[John Clark]

On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last week.


But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could
say exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed.


  and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he sees
 neither Washington nor Moscow.


  So, this is my first post to you,


Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if
duplicating chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is.


  despite I remember having sent other post?


The question is ambiguous because lots and lots of people in addition to
Mr. I remember the exact same thing.


  If Mr he sees neither W or M, then he died,


If Bruno Marchal wants to invent a new language and that's what the words
death and he  are decreed to mean then fine, but to be consistent John
Clark and Bruno Marchal of yesterday would have to be dead too. And it
should be noted that invented languages make communication with others
difficult, just look at Esperanto, and John Clark thinks that deep
philosophical discussions are difficult enough as they are even if
conducted in a mutually agreed upon language, so more obstacles to
understanding are not needed.


   and then comp is false.


That's fine, I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of
ideas you call comp is false or not. The word is your invention not mine
and you're the only one who seems to know exactly what it means.


   We also died each time we measure a spin, or anything.


Then the word died doesn't mean much.


  In AUDA this is a confusion


You have forgotten IHA.


  between []p and []p  t.


How in the world could anybody be confused between []p and []p  t
especially if they had a nice low mileage AUDA convertible to help them get
around town?


  you believe we have refuted comp. That would be a gigantic discovery


Not to me it wouldn't! I don't care if comp is true or false because I
don't believe comp is worth a bucket of warm spit.


  Pronouns does not introduce any problem,


Personal pronouns like all pronouns are just a sort of shorthand that were
invented to save time and for no other reason,  they generally cause no
trouble as long as the referent is clear. And yet it is a fact that Bruno
Marchal is simply incapable of expressing ideas about the unique nature of
personal identity without using personal pronouns. Why? Could it be because
by using them and the assumption of uniqueness of identity they engender it
makes it much easier to prove the uniqueness of identity? After all it is
well known that proofs become somewhat easier to write if Bruno Marchal
just assumes what Bruno Marchal is trying to prove. And if ideas are
unclear the language should be too; a bad idea clearly expressed is easy to
identify as bad, but a bad idea expressed in murky language can sometimes
sound impressive if it's murky enough.


  when you agree that after the duplication we are both copies in the 3p
 view


Yes. And you once said something abut the future 1p of the Helsinki man,
well that description would fit 2 people because both remember being the
Helsinki man.


  and only one of them, in the 1p view.


Only one? So which one is the phony, the Washington Man or the Moscow Man?


  I am happy you think it is a world class discovery, but let us be
 modest, it is a reminder that the mind-body problem is not solved, and that
 science has not decided between Aristotle and Plato. The discovery (the
 thesis) is in the math part


I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves math and it
is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2 to the number 3
and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't predict if it will end up
as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery is just as profound as yours. Not
very.

  John K Clark

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


  I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of  
last week.


But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who  
could say exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed.


Well, if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is  
simple: we have to interview all the copies.






 and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he  
sees neither Washington nor Moscow.


 So, this is my first post to you,

Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if  
duplicating chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is.


On the contrary. It is always clear. In the 3p we are all copies, and  
in the 1p we are one of them.
That is what they all say. They have they own permanent atomic  
memories like WWMWMM. Say.







 despite I remember having sent other post?

The question is ambiguous because lots and lots of people in  
addition to Mr. I remember the exact same thing.


Obviously. We agree. But there is no ambiguity. By definition of 1p  
and comp, we have to take all the copies 1p view into account. That is  
why if the H-guy predicted W v M, all its copies win the bet, and if  
he predicted W  M, all the copies admits this was wrong (even if  
correct for the 3-1 view, but clearly false from their 1-views).






 If Mr he sees neither W or M, then he died,

If Bruno Marchal wants to invent a new language and that's what the  
words  death and he  are decreed to mean then fine, but to be  
consistent John Clark and Bruno Marchal of yesterday would have to  
be dead too. And it should be noted that invented languages make  
communication with others difficult, just look at Esperanto, and  
John Clark thinks that deep philosophical discussions are difficult  
enough as they are even if conducted in a mutually agreed upon  
language, so more obstacles to understanding are not needed.


You quote and comment yourself!






  and then comp is false.

That's fine, I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag  
of ideas you call comp is false or not. The word is your invention  
not mine and you're the only one who seems to know exactly what it  
means.


You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times. Comp is the  
quite standard hypothesis that the brain, or whatever responsible for  
my consciousness manifestation here and now, is Turing emulable.
It is not my invention. comp abbreviates computationalism. I show  
the consequence, and you stop at step 3 for reason that you do not  
succeed to communicate.





  We also died each time we measure a spin, or anything.

Then the word died doesn't mean much.


That was a consequence of your saying.





 In AUDA this is a confusion

You have forgotten IHA.


I told you more than five times what AUDA means. Stop joking, and try  
to be serious. AUDA is the Arithmetical UDA, also called interview of  
the universal machine in sane04. It is the main part of the thesis in  
computer science.

If you doubt that it means that you do repeat hearsay.




 between []p and []p  t.

How in the world could anybody be confused between []p and []p  t  
especially if they had a nice low mileage AUDA convertible to help  
them get around town?


Mocking does not help you.




 you believe we have refuted comp. That would be a gigantic discovery

Not to me it wouldn't! I don't care if comp is true or false  
because I don't believe comp is worth a bucket of warm spit.


That contradicts your saying yes to step 0, 1 and 2.





 Pronouns does not introduce any problem,

Personal pronouns like all pronouns are just a sort of shorthand  
that were invented to save time and for no other reason,  they  
generally cause no trouble as long as the referent is clear. And yet  
it is a fact that Bruno Marchal is simply incapable of expressing  
ideas about the unique nature of personal identity without using  
personal pronouns.


I did it, but you are the one caming back with ambiguous pronouns in  
your refutation.


There is no ambiguity at all. Just keep the 1-3 distinction in all the  
uses.




Why? Could it be because by using them and the assumption of  
uniqueness of identity they engender it makes it much easier to  
prove the uniqueness of identity? After all it is well known that  
proofs become somewhat easier to write if Bruno Marchal just assumes  
what Bruno Marchal is trying to prove. And if ideas are unclear the  
language should be too; a bad idea clearly expressed is easy to  
identify as bad, but a bad idea expressed in murky language can  
sometimes sound impressive if it's murky enough.


Stop doing irrelevant meta-remarks to hide your absence of arguments.  
Focus on your point, if there is one, of move top step 4, if only to  
get the idea.






 when you agree that after the duplication we are both copies in  
the 3p view


Yes. And 

RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter 
transmitter sends you to another solar system where you will live out 
the reminder of your life. Maybe you committed some crime and this is 
the consequence, to be transported :) A malfunction causes you
to be duplicated and sent to both destinations, but you will never meet 
your doppelganger in the other solar system, or find out that he exists.
 





Does this make any difference to how you assign probabilities? If so, why?

My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar 
system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I don't 
know about the possibility of accidents. But, 
If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then the 
probabilities end up:

Solar System A : 1
Solar System B : small chance.

Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small 
chance) as far as I am concerned.

Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of their 
own, the probabilities end up:

Solar System A : 1
Solar System B : 1.

So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an unpopular 
view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up to 1 in MWI 
scenarios. 

All the best

Chris.





From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 20:45:39 +0100


On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote:On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, 
Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

   I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last week.
 
But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could say 
exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed.

Well, if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we 
have to interview all the copies.


  
  and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he sees 
  neither Washington nor Moscow.
 
 So, this is my first post to you,
 
Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if duplicating 
chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is.

On the contrary. It is always clear. In the 3p we are all copies, and in the 1p 
we are one of them.That is what they all say. They have they own permanent 
atomic memories like WWMWMM. Say.



  
 despite I remember having sent other post?
 
The question is ambiguous because lots and lots of people in addition to Mr. I 
remember the exact same thing.

Obviously. We agree. But there is no ambiguity. By definition of 1p and comp, 
we have to take all the copies 1p view into account. That is why if the H-guy 
predicted W v M, all its copies win the bet, and if he predicted W  M, all 
the copies admits this was wrong (even if correct for the 3-1 view, but clearly 
false from their 1-views).


  
 If Mr he sees neither W or M, then he died,
 
If  Bruno Marchal wants to invent a new language and that's what the words  
death and he  are decreed to mean then fine, but to be consistent John 
Clark and Bruno Marchal of yesterday would have to be dead too. And it should 
be noted that invented languages make communication with others difficult, just 
look at Esperanto, and John Clark thinks that deep philosophical discussions 
are difficult enough as they are even if conducted in a mutually agreed upon 
language, so more obstacles to understanding are not needed.

You quote and comment yourself!



  
  and then comp is false.
 
That's fine, I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of ideas 
you call comp is false or not. The word is your invention not mine and you're 
the only one who seems to know exactly what it means.

You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times. Comp is the quite 
standard hypothesis that the brain, or whatever responsible for my 
consciousness manifestation here and now, is Turing emulable.It is not my 
invention. comp abbreviates computationalism. I show the consequence, and you 
stop at step 3 for reason that you do not succeed to communicate.

  
  We also died each time we measure a spin, or anything.
 
Then the word died doesn't mean much.

That was a consequence of your saying.


  
 In AUDA this is a confusion
 
You have forgotten IHA.

I told you more than five times what AUDA means. Stop joking, and try to be 
serious. AUDA is the Arithmetical UDA, also called interview of the universal 
machine in sane04. It is the main part of the thesis in computer science.If 
you doubt that it means that you do repeat hearsay. 

 
  between []p and []p  t.
 
How in the world could anybody be confused between []p and []p  t especially 
if they had a nice low mileage AUDA convertible to help them get around town?

Mocking does not help you.

  
 you believe we have refuted comp. That would be a gigantic discovery
 
 Not to me it wouldn't! I don't care if comp is true or false because I don't 
believe comp is worth

RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

By and large you didn't get my response to Quentin and largely the comments you 
made didn't actually address the comments I was making, or the questions I was 
asking Quentin. It seems more as if you were addressing comments you hoped I 
was making but didn't. With respect then I've just passed all that stuff by.

I thought this was worth commenting on though:

 So from the FPI, you can infer which you notion was involved. It is asked 
 to the 1-you in Helsinki, coexistencial with the 3-you in Helsinki. And the 
 question bears on which next 1-you H-you will feel to be, or equivalently, 
 which city you will feel to be reconstituted in. The 3-you == 1-you in 
 Helsinki knows that there will be only one, from his future pov.

No, (3-you == 1-you) knows he has 2 future povs. He knows he will feel to be in 
both Washington and Moscow.

How can I make this clear for you that this is a 1-p expectancy? Because I 
think you have things completely the wrong way around. You say that it takes an 
act of intellectual and 3-p reasoning to draw the conclusion that I will be in 
both W and M, and that more naturally from the 1-p perspective I will only 
expect to see 1 city.

I say, no. Before the trip to both M and W I will day dream about walking 
through the corridors of the white house in Washington AND day dream about 
walking through the corridors of the Kremlin in moscow. I will imagine meeting 
and talking to Obama but also dream of meeting and talking to Putin. I'll sit 
at my work desk planning what I would say to each of them if we actually did 
meet. At night I wil dream of doing these things and wake up surprised that I 
am not actually in Moscow and not actually in Washington yet. And these dreams 
will be as 1-p as any common-all-garden dream. If I stop and think about 
things, if I intellectualize the matter from a 3-p perspective, then I will 
realize that my two future selves will be unique and separate and therefore 
will only see one or the other, but from my current non-duplicated perspective 
this will seem odd and hard to imagine. when I relax and let my mind wander I 
will expect to see both and dream of seeing both.

So, when you ask me where I will expect to be, of course I will answer that i 
expect to be in Moscow and Washington. And if you tell me that I will in fact 
only experience one or the other, I will demand my money back or at least half 
of it.

All the best

Chris.

From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 03:48:43 +




Hi Liz

Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter 
transmitter sends you to another solar system where you will live out 
the reminder of your life. Maybe you committed some crime and this is 
the consequence, to be transported :) A malfunction causes you
to be duplicated and sent to both destinations, but you will never meet 
your doppelganger in the other solar system, or find out that he exists.
 





Does this make any difference to how you assign probabilities? If so, why?

My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar 
system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I don't 
know about the possibility of accidents. But, 
If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then the 
probabilities end up:

Solar System A : 1
Solar System B : small chance.

Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small 
chance) as far as I am concerned.

Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of their 
own, the probabilities end up:

Solar System A : 1
Solar System B : 1.

So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an unpopular 
view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up to 1 in MWI 
scenarios. 

All the best

Chris.





From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 20:45:39 +0100


On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote:On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, 
Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

   I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last week.
 
But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could say 
exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed.

Well, if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we 
have to interview all the copies.


  
  and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he sees 
  neither Washington nor Moscow.
 
 So, this is my first post to you,
 
Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if duplicating 
chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is.

On the contrary. It is always clear. In the 3p we are all copies, and in the 1p 
we are one of them.That is what they all say. They have they own permanent 
atomic memories like

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Russell Standish]

On Fri, Feb 21, 2014 at 03:48:43AM +, chris peck wrote:
 
 My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar 
 system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I 
 don't know about the possibility of accidents. But, 
 If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then the 
 probabilities end up:
 
 Solar System A : 1
 Solar System B : small chance.
 
 Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small 
 chance) as far as I am concerned.
 
 Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of 
 their own, the probabilities end up:
 
 Solar System A : 1
 Solar System B : 1.
 
 So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an
unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get
rounded up to 1 in MWI scenarios. 

This contradicts Kolmogorov's 4th axiom of probability, namely that the
probability of the certain event = 1.

In your probabilities, the probability of the certain event of seeing
either solar system A or seeing solar system B, or something else
entirely different again ends up being greater than or equal to 2.

So maybe you can give meaning to your measure, but it aint probability
as we known it.


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Russel

 This contradicts Kolmogorov's 4th axiom of probability, namely that the
probability of the certain event = 1.

Yes it does doesnt it. 

But thats ok. Im not convinced Kolmogorov had MWI in view when he dreamt up his 
axioms and Im too green behind the ears vis a vis probability axioms to know 
whether it matters much. But that 4th axiom does look like it might need 
revising.

So maybe you can give meaning to your measure, but it aint probability
as we known it.

sure and thats fine by me. Particularly if these thought experiments are 
intended as analogies for MWI then I think probability loses meaning from both 
frog and bird's eye views. In fact, for any TofE where all possibilities are 
catered for probability is the first casualty. Its the logic of the situation 
that does violence to the concept of probability not the manner in which the 
plenitude is realized. What i think is unusual about my position is that I 
stand fast against uncertainty in frogs as well as birds. Thank goodness there 
are academics out there like Hilary Graves who think in tune with me, its an 
unusual position but not a unique one.

All the best

Chris.

 Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 16:19:47 +1100
 From: li...@hpcoders.com.au
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 
 On Fri, Feb 21, 2014 at 03:48:43AM +, chris peck wrote:
  
  My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar 
  system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I 
  don't know about the possibility of accidents. But, 
  If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then 
  the probabilities end up:
  
  Solar System A : 1
  Solar System B : small chance.
  
  Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small 
  chance) as far as I am concerned.
  
  Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of 
  their own, the probabilities end up:
  
  Solar System A : 1
  Solar System B : 1.
  
  So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an
 unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get
 rounded up to 1 in MWI scenarios. 
 
 This contradicts Kolmogorov's 4th axiom of probability, namely that the
 probability of the certain event = 1.
 
 In your probabilities, the probability of the certain event of seeing
 either solar system A or seeing solar system B, or something else
 entirely different again ends up being greater than or equal to 2.
 
 So maybe you can give meaning to your measure, but it aint probability
 as we known it.
 
 
 -- 
 
 
 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Principal, High Performance Coders
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
 
 
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Feb 2014, at 05:36, chris peck wrote:


Hi Bruno

By and large you didn't get my response to Quentin and largely the  
comments you made didn't actually address the comments I was making,  
or the questions I was asking Quentin. It seems more as if you were  
addressing comments you hoped I was making but didn't. With respect  
then I've just passed all that stuff by.


Without specific comment, this looks like wordplay.



I thought this was worth commenting on though:

 So from the FPI, you can infer which you notion was involved.  
It is asked to the 1-you in Helsinki, coexistencial with the 3-you  
in Helsinki. And the question bears on which next 1-you H-you will  
feel to be, or equivalently, which city you will feel to be  
reconstituted in. The 3-you == 1-you in Helsinki knows that there  
will be only one, from his future pov.


No, (3-you == 1-you) knows he has 2 future povs. He knows he will  
feel to be in both Washington and Moscow.



He knows that, after pushing the button, he will be in both W and M in  
the third person pov.
But he knows about comp, and so he knows that what will actually be  
the case, is that in the 3-1 view, he will feel to be unique in W and  
he will feel to be unique in M. But those feeling correspond to  
incompatible event, and indeed each diary will contain only W or only  
M, from both 1-view. As the question bears on those 1-views, the  
answer has to be be: W or M, with an exclusive or.







How can I make this clear for you that this is a 1-p expectancy?  
Because I think you have things completely the wrong way around. You  
say that it takes an act of intellectual and 3-p reasoning to draw  
the conclusion that I will be in both W and M, and that more  
naturally from the 1-p perspective I will only expect to see 1 city.


I say, no. Before the trip to both M and W I will day dream about  
walking through the corridors of the white house in Washington AND  
day dream about walking through the corridors of the Kremlin in  
moscow.



OK, you can do that.





I will imagine meeting and talking to Obama but also dream of  
meeting and talking to Putin.



OK. But unless you ignore comp, you will not daydream that you will  
meet both Obama and Putin, together.







I'll sit at my work desk planning what I would say to each of them  
if we actually did meet. At night I wil dream of doing these things  
and wake up surprised that I am not actually in Moscow and not  
actually in Washington yet. And these dreams will be as 1-p as any  
common-all-garden dream. If I stop and think about things, if I  
intellectualize the matter from a 3-p perspective, then I will  
realize that my two future selves will be unique and separate and  
therefore will only see one or the other, but from my current non- 
duplicated perspective this will seem odd and hard to imagine. when  
I relax and let my mind wander I will expect to see both and dream  
of seeing both.


Not simultaneously. That is the point. Or you are just wrong on  
computationalism. If you write W and M, you can, in Helsinki, know  
in advance that both copies will have to admit having been wrong.







So, when you ask me where I will expect to be, of course I will  
answer that i expect to be in Moscow and Washington.


So you write W and M in the diary. And after pushing the button,  
both copies will realize they were wrong, or not answering the  
question asked.
It is very simple to see that the prediction W v M will be verified  
by both copies.





And if you tell me that I will in fact only experience one or the  
other, I will demand my money back or at least half of it.


Then if you predict the spin of an electron that we will both see in  
some experience that we do together, in the MWI,  you should predict  
that we will see both. We do the experience, and we see spin up. You  
were wrong and if you bet something on this, you lose.


You are just using the pronouns in the ambiguous way of Clark, and  
like him, just describe the 3-1 views, instead of the 1-1 views asked.


Best,

Bruno






All the best

Chris.

From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 03:48:43 +

Hi Liz

Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends  
you to another solar system where you will live out the reminder of  
your life. Maybe you committed some crime and this is the  
consequence, to be transported :) A malfunction causes you to be  
duplicated and sent to both destinations, but you will never meet  
your doppelganger in the other solar system, or find out that he  
exists.


Does this make any difference to how you assign probabilities? If  
so, why?


My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing  
solar system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar  
System B if I don't know about the possibility of accidents. But,
If I know

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Quentin Anciaux]

Ok, then you simply reject probability usage in both scenario... then
you're consistent unlike John... but if you reject such usage, that's
throwing an axe on MWI explanation... then I can't see how you could still
agree with many world interpretation and reject probability, that's not
consistent... unless of course, you reject MWI.

Quentin


2014-02-21 4:48 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:

 Hi Liz




 *Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you
 to another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life.
 Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be
 transported :) A malfunction causes you to be duplicated and sent to both
 destinations, but you will never meet your doppelganger in the other solar
 system, or find out that he exists. Does this make any difference to how
 you assign probabilities? If so, why?*

 My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar
 system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I
 don't know about the possibility of accidents. But,
 If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then
 the probabilities end up:

 Solar System A : 1
 Solar System B : small chance.

 Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small
 chance) as far as I am concerned.

 Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of
 their own, the probabilities end up:

 Solar System A : 1
 Solar System B : 1.

 So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an
 unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up
 to 1 in MWI scenarios.

 All the best

 Chris.





 --
 From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 20:45:39 +0100



 On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote:

 On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

   I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last
 week.


 But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could
 say exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed.


 Well, if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple:
 we have to interview all the copies.





  and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he sees
 neither Washington nor Moscow.


  So, this is my first post to you,


 Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if
 duplicating chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is.


 On the contrary. It is always clear. In the 3p we are all copies, and in
 the 1p we are one of them.
 That is what they all say. They have they own permanent atomic memories
 like WWMWMM. Say.






  despite I remember having sent other post?


 The question is ambiguous because lots and lots of people in addition to
 Mr. I remember the exact same thing.


 Obviously. We agree. But there is no ambiguity. By definition of 1p and
 comp, we have to take all the copies 1p view into account. That is why if
 the H-guy predicted W v M, all its copies win the bet, and if he
 predicted W  M, all the copies admits this was wrong (even if correct
 for the 3-1 view, but clearly false from their 1-views).





  If Mr he sees neither W or M, then he died,


 If Bruno Marchal wants to invent a new language and that's what the words
 death and he  are decreed to mean then fine, but to be consistent John
 Clark and Bruno Marchal of yesterday would have to be dead too. And it
 should be noted that invented languages make communication with others
 difficult, just look at Esperanto, and John Clark thinks that deep
 philosophical discussions are difficult enough as they are even if
 conducted in a mutually agreed upon language, so more obstacles to
 understanding are not needed.


 You quote and comment yourself!






   and then comp is false.


 That's fine, I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of
 ideas you call comp is false or not. The word is your invention not mine
 and you're the only one who seems to know exactly what it means.


 You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times. Comp is the quite
 standard hypothesis that the brain, or whatever responsible for my
 consciousness manifestation here and now, is Turing emulable.
 It is not my invention. comp abbreviates computationalism. I show the
 consequence, and you stop at step 3 for reason that you do not succeed to
 communicate.




   We also died each time we measure a spin, or anything.


 Then the word died doesn't mean much.


 That was a consequence of your saying.





  In AUDA this is a confusion


 You have forgotten IHA.


 I told you more than five times what AUDA means. Stop joking, and try to
 be serious. AUDA is the Arithmetical UDA, also called interview of the
 universal machine in sane04. It is the main

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[John Clark]

On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

 Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding the
 argument that you can't meet your doppelganger,


So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use logic
in doing so. No can do.

 or you have to explain why the possibility of meeting render probability
 calculus meaningless.


If Everett's probability calculus produced figures that didn't agree with
both experiment and Quantum Mechanics then the MWI would indeed be
meaningless because the entire point of the MWI is to explain why Quantum
Mechanics works as well as it does. But Bruno isn't trying to explain why
Quantum Mechanics works, that's already been done, he's trying to explain
the nature of self, and so I don't care if Bruno's probability calculus
works or not because probability and prediction have nothing to do with
that; as I have said before, you feel like Quentin Anciaux today because
you remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday and for no other reason.

And despite what you say above the situations are not equivalent. According
to Everett the very laws of physics forbid you from ever interacting with
your doppelganger and so Bruno's favorite type of words, personal pronouns,
cause no problem; but in Bruno's thought experiment you can interact with
your   doppelganger and that turns personal pronouns, which work fine in
our everyday world without duplicating chambers, into a chaotic mass of
ASCII characters with no clear meaning.

 All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain


I loved Blade Runner too, one of the few things we can agree on.

  John K Clark

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:

 On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

  Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding the
 argument that you can't meet your doppelganger,


 So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use logic
 in doing so. No can do.


That's not what I was asking, I was asking that if you use your meet
doppelganger argument, == read the next quote.


  or you have to explain why the possibility of meeting render probability
 calculus meaningless.


 If Everett's probability calculus produced figures that didn't agree with
 both experiment and Quantum Mechanics then the MWI would indeed be
 meaningless because the entire point of the MWI is to explain why Quantum
 Mechanics works as well as it does.


The thing is to devise a though experiment matching MWI, in the MWI case
you accept probability calculus.


  But Bruno isn't trying to explain why Quantum Mechanics works, that's
 already been done, he's trying to explain the nature of self,


He does not, and certainly does not at step 3.


  and so I don't care if Bruno's probability calculus works


He does, that's what is showing FPI (which *of course* also exists under
MWI)


 or not because probability and prediction have nothing to do with that;


It has all to do with that because it is specifically the question asked.


  as I have said before, you feel like Quentin Anciaux today because you
 remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday and for no other reason.


As I have said before and before and before, that's not the question.


 And despite what you say above the situations are not equivalent.


They are from the probability POV.


 According to Everett the very laws of physics forbid you from ever
 interacting with your doppelganger


And what does it have to do with frequency and probability ?


 and so Bruno's favorite type of words, personal pronouns, cause no
 problem;


They don't pose problem in this experiment and in the question asked. So
I'll try one last time,  and will try à la Jesse, with simple yes/no
questions and explanation from your part.

So I will first describe the setup and will suppose for the argument that
what we will do (duplicating you) is possible.

So you (John Clark reading this email or the one from tomorrow or whatever,
so I'll use *you*) are in front of a button that is in a room with two
doors. When *you* will press the button, *you* will be duplicated (by
destroying you in the room and recreating you two times in two exactly
identical room), the only difference in each room is that one has the left
door open and one has the right door open... what do *you* expect to see
when you'll press the button ?

1- Do you expect to see the left and the right doors opened ? Yes/No
2- Do you expect to see the left or the right doors opened ? Yes/No

If you answer 'Yes' at the 1st question, do you really mean *you* expect to
see both event simultaneously ?

If you answer 'Yes' at the 2nd question, do you think you can put a
probability to see the left door opened (or reversely the right door) ?
Yes/No

If you answer 'No', why can't you assign a probability to see each door ?
As I see it, there are 2 possible events, so each as a 0.5 probability of
occurence... If not why not ? Why in the MWI case, you accept the 0.5
probability ? If you follow strictly the protocol, MWI and this experiment
are equivalent, and are not about your personal identity... If you answer
both No to the 1st and 2nd question, please develop what you will expect to
see when you press the button ?

Quentin




 but in Bruno's thought experiment you can interact with your
 doppelganger and that turns personal pronouns, which work fine in our
 everyday world without duplicating chambers, into a chaotic mass of ASCII
 characters with no clear meaning.

  All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain


 I loved Blade Runner too, one of the few things we can agree on.

   John K Clark

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Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Quentin

They don't pose problem in this experiment and in the question asked. So I'll 
try one last time,  and will try à la Jesse, with simple yes/no questions and 
explanation from your part.

So I will first describe the setup and will suppose for the argument that what 
we will do (duplicating you) is possible.

Quentin, that pronouns pose problems in the thoughtexperiment is clearly 
illustrated by your need to distinguish between 'you' and '*you*'.

 So you (John Clark reading this email or the one from tomorrow or whatever, 
 so I'll use *you*) are in front of a button that is in a room with two 
 doors. When *you* will press the button, *you* will be duplicated (by 
 destroying you in the room and recreating you two times in two exactly 
 identical room),

Can you clarify. you say that when '*you*' is duplicated, 'you' is destroyed 
and 'you' is recreated two times. Is 'you' who gets destroyed and recreated 
'*you*' who presses the button? or someone different? Afterall, you explicitly 
introduced the distinction to make things clear, so Im not sure if you just 
made a typo. if not where did 'you' come from? I feel like huge violence is 
being done to the pronoun you here. I say you so that you can distinguish 
between you, 'you' and '*you*'. All are now in play. when I say you rather 
than 'you' or '*you*' I will be meaning you.


 the only difference in each room is that one has the left door open and one 
 has the right door open... what do *you* expect to see when you'll press the 
 button ?

I thought '*you*' presses the button, but here you say : ' when you'll press 
the button' Did '*you*' or 'you' press the button? ie. did you mean 'when 
*you*'ll press the button'?


look at this bit:

1- Do you expect to see the left and the right doors opened ? Yes/No
2- Do you expect to see the left or the right doors opened ? Yes/No

If you answer 'Yes' at the 1st question, do you really mean *you* expect to 
see both event simultaneously ?

In the questions 1 and 2 you are talking about what 'you' expect to see, but 
then in the follow on question you ask about what '*you*' expect to see. Are 
you asking about 'you', 'you' or '*you*' or all three? It seems to me that 
'you' can expect to see one room or the other, and 'you' (the other 'you', 
there being two 'you' and one '*you*') can expect to see one room or the other, 
and '*you*' can expect to see both if 'you','you' and '*you*' bear the identity 
relation that is stipulated by the yes doctor assumption, you see? 

Note that in predicting to see both, '*you*' is not predicting 'you' or 'you' 
will see both. The result of the probability calculus ... actually, lets not 
call it calculus because its just a way of bigging up what infact is very 
little ... the result of the probability sum that '*you*' conducts is different 
from the result of the sum 'you' and 'you' conduct, because '*you*' is going to 
be duplicated but neither 'you' nor 'you' are. '*you*' has to bear in mind that 
both 'you' and 'you' are '*you*' in some sense. 'you' and 'you' don't need to 
worry about that. And infact to get any other result than zero from the sum, 
this identity relation between '*you*', 'you' and 'you' must stand, which 
brings us to another point: as Clark points out, preservation of identity is 
central to this thought experiment.

The other point that Clark often makes is that step 3 is worthless, and if the 
intention of step 3 is to hammer home that duplicated people would only ever 
have a single POV, then step 3 is indeed worthless. Does Bruno really need to 
advertise an inability to conduct simple probability sums to convince you that 
individuals only have a single pov? 

But I don't think that is all step 3 is really about. Its also about trying to 
maintain 'indeterminacy' in the mistaken belief that it has a legitimate place 
in Everettian MWI.

All the best

Chris.

From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 20:53:46 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:


On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:




 Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding the 
 argument that you can't meet your doppelganger, 



So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use logic in 
doing so. No can do. 

That's not what I was asking, I was asking that if you use your meet 
doppelganger argument, == read the next quote.





 or you have to explain why the possibility of meeting render probability 
 calculus meaningless.



If Everett's probability calculus produced figures that didn't agree with both 
experiment and Quantum Mechanics then the MWI would indeed be meaningless 
because the entire point of the MWI is to explain why Quantum Mechanics works 
as well as it does.


The thing is to devise a though experiment matching MWI, in the MWI case you

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[LizR]

You are looking at a geiger counter pointing at a radioactive source. On
average, it clicks about once every other second. Do you expect to hear it
click in the next second?

What is wrong with the above question? It seems to me exactly equivalent in
probability terms to do you expect to see Washington or Moscow when you
exit the matter transmitter?

Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you to
another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life.
Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be
transported :) A malfunction causes you to be duplicated and sent to both
destinations, but you will never meet your doppelganger in the other solar
system, or find out that he exists.

Does this make any difference to how you assign probabilities? If so, why?

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RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Quentin Anciaux]

The problem is the same with mwi.  Your comment here is simply bad faith,
guess I can't expect discussion. So long then.
Le 20 févr. 2014 02:57, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com a écrit :

 Hi Quentin




 *They don't pose problem in this experiment and in the question asked.
 So I'll try one last time,  and will try à la Jesse, with simple yes/no
 questions and explanation from your part.So I will first describe the setup
 and will suppose for the argument that what we will do (duplicating you) is
 possible.*
 Quentin, that pronouns pose problems in the thoughtexperiment is clearly
 illustrated by your need to distinguish between 'you' and '*you*'.

 * So you (John Clark reading this email or the one from tomorrow or
 whatever, so I'll use *you*) are in front of a button that is in a room
 with two doors. When *you* will press the button, *you* will be duplicated
 (by destroying you in the room and recreating you two times in two exactly
 identical room),*

 Can you clarify. you say that when '*you*' is duplicated, 'you' is
 destroyed and 'you' is recreated two times. Is 'you' who gets destroyed and
 recreated '*you*' who presses the button? or someone different? Afterall,
 you explicitly introduced the distinction to make things clear, so Im not
 sure if you just made a typo. if not where did 'you' come from? I feel like
 huge violence is being done to the pronoun you here. I say you so that
 you can distinguish between you, 'you' and '*you*'. All are now in play.
 when I say you rather than 'you' or '*you*' I will be meaning you.


 * the only difference in each room is that one has the left door open
 and one has the right door open... what do *you* expect to see when you'll
 press the button ?*

 I thought '*you*' presses the button, but here you say : ' when you'll
 press the button' Did '*you*' or 'you' press the button? ie. did you mean
 'when *you*'ll press the button'?


 look at this bit:




 *1- Do you expect to see the left and the right doors opened ?
 Yes/No2- Do you expect to see the left or the right doors opened ?
 Yes/NoIf you answer 'Yes' at the 1st question, do you really mean *you*
 expect to see both event simultaneously ?*

 In the questions 1 and 2 you are talking about what 'you' expect to see,
 but then in the follow on question you ask about what '*you*' expect to
 see. Are you asking about 'you', 'you' or '*you*' or all three? It seems to
 me that 'you' can expect to see one room or the other, and 'you' (the other
 'you', there being two 'you' and one '*you*') can expect to see one room or
 the other, and '*you*' can expect to see both if 'you','you' and '*you*'
 bear the identity relation that is stipulated by the yes doctor assumption,
 you see?

 Note that in predicting to see both, '*you*' is not predicting 'you' or
 'you' will see both. The result of the probability calculus ... actually,
 lets not call it calculus because its just a way of bigging up what infact
 is very little ... the result of the probability sum that '*you*' conducts
 is different from the result of the sum 'you' and 'you' conduct, because
 '*you*' is going to be duplicated but neither 'you' nor 'you' are. '*you*'
 has to bear in mind that both 'you' and 'you' are '*you*' in some sense.
 'you' and 'you' don't need to worry about that. And infact to get any other
 result than zero from the sum, this identity relation between '*you*',
 'you' and 'you' must stand, which brings us to another point: as Clark
 points out, preservation of identity is central to this thought experiment.

 The other point that Clark often makes is that step 3 is worthless, and if
 the intention of step 3 is to hammer home that duplicated people would only
 ever have a single POV, then step 3 is indeed worthless. Does Bruno really
 need to advertise an inability to conduct simple probability sums to
 convince you that individuals only have a single pov?

 But I don't think that is all step 3 is really about. Its also about
 trying to maintain 'indeterminacy' in the mistaken belief that it has a
 legitimate place in Everettian MWI.

 All the best

 Chris.

 --
 From: allco...@gmail.com
 Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 20:53:46 +0100
 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




 2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:

 On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

  Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding the
 argument that you can't meet your doppelganger,


 So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use logic
 in doing so. No can do.


 That's not what I was asking, I was asking that if you use your meet
 doppelganger argument, == read the next quote.


  or you have to explain why the possibility of meeting render probability
 calculus meaningless.


 If Everett's probability calculus produced figures that didn't agree with
 both experiment

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Quentin Anciaux]

: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com





 2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:

 On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

  Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding the
 argument that you can't meet your doppelganger,


 So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use logic
 in doing so. No can do.


 That's not what I was asking, I was asking that if you use your meet
 doppelganger argument, == read the next quote.


  or you have to explain why the possibility of meeting render probability
 calculus meaningless.


 If Everett's probability calculus produced figures that didn't agree with
 both experiment and Quantum Mechanics then the MWI would indeed be
 meaningless because the entire point of the MWI is to explain why Quantum
 Mechanics works as well as it does.


 The thing is to devise a though experiment matching MWI, in the MWI case
 you accept probability calculus.


  But Bruno isn't trying to explain why Quantum Mechanics works, that's
 already been done, he's trying to explain the nature of self,


 He does not, and certainly does not at step 3.


  and so I don't care if Bruno's probability calculus works


 He does, that's what is showing FPI (which *of course* also exists under
 MWI)


 or not because probability and prediction have nothing to do with that;


 It has all to do with that because it is specifically the question asked.


  as I have said before, you feel like Quentin Anciaux today because you
 remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday and for no other reason.


 As I have said before and before and before, that's not the question.


 And despite what you say above the situations are not equivalent.


 They are from the probability POV.


 According to Everett the very laws of physics forbid you from ever
 interacting with your doppelganger


 And what does it have to do with frequency and probability ?


 and so Bruno's favorite type of words, personal pronouns, cause no
 problem;


 They don't pose problem in this experiment and in the question asked. So
 I'll try one last time,  and will try à la Jesse, with simple yes/no
 questions and explanation from your part.

 So I will first describe the setup and will suppose for the argument that
 what we will do (duplicating you) is possible.

 So you (John Clark reading this email or the one from tomorrow or
 whatever, so I'll use *you*) are in front of a button that is in a room
 with two doors. When *you* will press the button, *you* will be duplicated
 (by destroying you in the room and recreating you two times in two exactly
 identical room), the only difference in each room is that one has the left
 door open and one has the right door open... what do *you* expect to see
 when you'll press the button ?

 1- Do you expect to see the left and the right doors opened ? Yes/No
 2- Do you expect to see the left or the right doors opened ? Yes/No

 If you answer 'Yes' at the 1st question, do you really mean *you* expect
 to see both event simultaneously ?

 If you answer 'Yes' at the 2nd question, do you think you can put a
 probability to see the left door opened (or reversely the right door) ?
 Yes/No

 If you answer 'No', why can't you assign a probability to see each door ?
 As I see it, there are 2 possible events, so each as a 0.5 probability of
 occurence... If not why not ? Why in the MWI case, you accept the 0.5
 probability ? If you follow strictly the protocol, MWI and this experiment
 are equivalent, and are not about your personal identity... If you answer
 both No to the 1st and 2nd question, please develop what you will expect to
 see when you press the button ?

 Quentin




 but in Bruno's thought experiment you can interact with your
 doppelganger and that turns personal pronouns, which work fine in our
 everyday world without duplicating chambers, into a chaotic mass of ASCII
 characters with no clear meaning.

  All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain


 I loved Blade Runner too, one of the few things we can agree on.

   John K Clark


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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Feb 2014, at 19:49, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 at 1:14 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


  what exactly is the question? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND  
PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.


The question is what do you [blah blah]

 DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.


I did, as you quote below.



 You = the unique 1p owner of your personal memory in Helsinki

Then after the button has been pushed and the personal memory in  
Helsinki is not unique anymore who is the p in the 1p ? And why  
1, what is so one-ish about it?


You seem to have problem with english. I have answered that question  
many times. The p in the 1p is persons in both cities. There are one- 
ish in their own first person pov, on the which the question was  
about, as with comp we know that both feel unique, and both are  
genuine descendant of the person in Helsinki.







 In Helsinki you know that P(my experience will be the experience  
of seeing a unique city) = 1.


 Who is Mr. my? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO  
CLEAR REFERENT.


 The unique 1p owner of your [blah blah]

DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.  Is Mr. p blah or  
blah?


?





 By comp we know that [blah blah]

Well good for comp.

 the question asked was about his first person experience,

 Who is Mr. his, and who exactly is the person having this first  
person experience? Be specific, give names, and DON'T HIDE BEHIND  
PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.


 The question is asked to John-Clark with diary H, before the  
pushing on the button.


 Who is Mr. you? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH  
NO CLEAR REFERENT


The owner of the H diary, before he pushes on the button

If the owner of the diary, a certain Mr. he, is John Clark then the  
correct prediction would be that Mr. he will see both Washington AND  
Moscow.


Not from their 1p view, unless you assume non Turing emulable telepathy.




However if Mr. he is the fellow who is experiencing Helsinki right  
now then the correct prediction would be Mr. he will see neither  
Washington NOR Moscow.


Simple calculus show that this prediction will be refuted by both  
copies. That should be enough to understand that they did not answer  
the right question. Or comp is false, and you would die in the  
simplest teleportation, without duplication, of step one. But then non- 
step-3 entials non-comp, which proves the point.





But of course none of this really matters because predictions, good  
bad or indifferent, have nothing to do with identity and the feeling  
of self.


Exactly. That's my point. Except that we are handling the prediction  
problem, not the identity problem which we have solved (we are both  
copies, in the 3p, but only one of them, in he 1p view).





 Well comp implies [blah blah]

Well good for comp.

 Please go to step 4.

Why? Because the first 3 steps were so free of ambiguity? The entire  
point of including strange but physically possible machines like  
duplicating chambers in a thought experiment is that it forces (or  
at least it should force) Bruno Marchal and John Clark to reexamine  
concepts that in a world without such machines seem so self  
evidently true that they're not worth thinking about. But even in  
these bizarre circumstances Bruno Marchal continues to use pronouns  
in exactly the same way that Bruno Marchal does in the everyday  
world when Bruno Marchal orders a pizza.


No. Only when thinking about comp, or about Everett QM. In everyday  
life we use the pronouns I both for the 1p and 3p self-reference.  
The context supplies the information. But here, we have to make the  
distinction explicit. Your argument' consists of attributing a notion  
of I which I don't use at all.




Duplicating chambers are not everyday things and thus everyday  
language is not good enough in a world that contains them; if the  
referent to personal pronouns was always unambiguous then the  
thought experiment itself would be unnecessary because the point it  
was trying to make would already be clear.


That's why I ask you to take the distinction into account. It saves  
the whole reasoning from ambiguity. You just rename the indeterminacy  
into an ambiguity, but you convince no one. The 1p indeterminacy is 3p  
defined, and everyone who can read a diary and distinguish W from  
M can understand the argument.


Bruno





  John K Clark






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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 17 Feb 2014, at 19:49, John Clark wrote:

 On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 at 1:14 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


   what exactly is the question? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND
 PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.


 The question is what do you [blah blah]


  DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.


 I did, as you quote below.


  You = the unique 1p owner of your personal memory in Helsinki


 Then after the button has been pushed and the personal memory in Helsinki
 is not unique anymore who is the p in the 1p ? And why 1, what is so
 one-ish about it?


 You seem to have problem with english. I have answered that question many
 times. The p in the 1p is persons in both cities. There are one-ish in
 their own first person pov, on the which the question was about, as with
 comp we know that both feel unique, and both are genuine descendant of the
 person in Helsinki.





  In Helsinki you know that P(my experience will be the experience of
 seeing a unique city) = 1.


  Who is Mr. my? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO
 CLEAR REFERENT.


  The unique 1p owner of your [blah blah]


 DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.  Is Mr. p blah or blah?


 ?




  By comp we know that [blah blah]


 Well good for comp.

  the question asked was about his first person experience,


  Who is Mr. his, and who exactly is the person having this first
 person experience? Be specific, give names, and DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS
 WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.


  The question is asked to John-Clark with diary H, before the pushing on
 the button.


  Who is Mr. you? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO
 CLEAR REFERENT


 The owner of the H diary, before he pushes on the button


 If the owner of the diary, a certain Mr. he, is John Clark then the
 correct prediction would be that Mr. he will see both Washington AND
 Moscow.


 Not from their 1p view, unless you assume non Turing emulable telepathy.




 However if Mr. he is the fellow who is experiencing Helsinki right now
 then the correct prediction would be Mr. he will see neither Washington NOR
 Moscow.


 Simple calculus show that this prediction will be refuted by both copies.
 That should be enough to understand that they did not answer the right
 question. Or comp is false, and you would die in the simplest
 teleportation, without duplication, of step one. But then non-step-3
 entials non-comp, which proves the point.




 But of course none of this really matters because predictions, good bad or
 indifferent, have nothing to do with identity and the feeling of self.


 Exactly. That's my point. Except that we are handling the prediction
 problem, not the identity problem which we have solved (we are both copies,
 in the 3p, but only one of them, in he 1p view).



  Well comp implies [blah blah]


 Well good for comp.


  Please go to step 4.


 Why? Because the first 3 steps were so free of ambiguity? The entire point
 of including strange but physically possible machines like duplicating
 chambers in a thought experiment is that it forces (or at least it should
 force) Bruno Marchal and John Clark to reexamine concepts that in a world
 without such machines seem so self evidently true that they're not worth
 thinking about. But even in these bizarre circumstances Bruno Marchal
 continues to use pronouns in exactly the same way that Bruno Marchal does
 in the everyday world when Bruno Marchal orders a pizza.


 No. Only when thinking about comp, or about Everett QM. In everyday life
 we use the pronouns I both for the 1p and 3p self-reference. The context
 supplies the information. But here, we have to make the distinction
 explicit. Your argument' consists of attributing a notion of I which I
 don't use at all.



 Duplicating chambers are not everyday things and thus everyday language is
 not good enough in a world that contains them; if the referent to personal
 pronouns was always unambiguous then the thought experiment itself would be
 unnecessary because the point it was trying to make would already be clear.


 That's why I ask you to take the distinction into account. It saves the
 whole reasoning from ambiguity. You just rename the indeterminacy into an
 ambiguity, but you convince no one.


That's it.

From what I can understand in John's posts concerning the pronouns, he is
just hammering away this tautology again and again, exploiting the very
indeterminacy that is the consequence of this part of UDA, claiming it's
some unfair, unclear, strange, non-standard ambiguity that implies bad
reasoning.

If John is serious and not trolling you/the list on this matter, this is
probably why he thinks he found some flaw, when he seems to just
underestimate the result of the argument at this point; because on the
other hand to him it's so clear you can't predict the next moment... so
trivial [+add some standard insult with an 

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Feb 2014, at 19:52, John Clark wrote:



On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 3:33 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 if Mr. he is the fellow who is experiencing Helsinki right now  
then the correct prediction would be Mr. he will see neither  
Washington NOR Moscow.


 Simple calculus show that this prediction will be refuted by both  
copies.


Bullshit! Both copies will have equally vivid memories of being Mr. he



We agree on that, and we agreed this means that both copies are, from  
their 1p view, survivors. Both can say I am the H-guy, like I can say  
today that I am the guy having answered your post of last week.





and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he  
sees neither Washington nor Moscow.


So, this is my first post to you, despite I remember having sent other  
post?


You are gravely irrational, and contradict your own terms. If Mr he  
sees neither W or M, then he died, and then comp is false. We also  
died each time we measure a spin, or anything. In AUDA this is a  
confusion between []p and []p  t.


You get the 3-1 view, and seems unable to come back in your bodies  
after the button pushing. You leave the body, and never come back.






 Or comp is false

Fine, then comp is false. And now that we both agree that comp  
is false there is no need for either of us to ever use that word  
again.


OK. you use ~step-3 - ~comp is false,  so you agree that comp - step  
3. So please move to step 4, whose question can only clarify to you  
the 1p/3p distinction that you omitted up to now.


Or you believe we have refuted comp. That would be a gigantic  
discovery, but it is unfortunately only your traditional fake  (I  
think now) confusion between the 1p and 3p pov.









 we are both copies, in the 3p, but only one of them, in he 1p view

That depends entirely on who the hell Mr. we is. Bruno Marchal is  
addicted to pronouns.



Pronouns does not introduce any problem, when you agree that after the  
duplication we are both copies, in the 3p view, and only one of them,  
in the 1p view. I am addicted to the precision needed to move on. You  
are addicted to irrelevant point to mask you absence of argument, I  
think., and this absent of *your habit to forget the precisions  
introduced.






 and everyone who can read a diary and distinguish W from M can  
understand the argument.


Apparently not. Haven't you ever wondered why your colleagues don't  
agree that you've made a world class discovery? Well this is why.


Which colleagues? If you know a scientist having trouble with this,  
give me a name. I have never met someone stopping at step 3. I have  
only heard about non convinced philosophers, but they have never  
accept to meet me, or even to reply to a letter. It is only bad  
politics and  I think you are just doing defamation, which illustrates  
again your lack of argument.
I am happy you think it is a world class discovery, but let us be  
modest, it is a reminder that the mind-body problem is not solved, and  
that science has not decided between Aristotle and Plato. The  
discovery (the thesis) is in the math part: that machines have a non  
trivial intrinsic quantum physics/logic associated with them through  
self-reference.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[John Clark]

On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 at 1:14 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


   what exactly is the question? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND
 PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.


 The question is what do you [blah blah]


 DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.

 You = the unique 1p owner of your personal memory in Helsinki


Then after the button has been pushed and the personal memory in Helsinki
is not unique anymore who is the p in the 1p ? And why 1, what is so
one-ish about it?

 In Helsinki you know that P(my experience will be the experience of
 seeing a unique city) = 1.


  Who is Mr. my? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR
 REFERENT.


  The unique 1p owner of your [blah blah]


DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.  Is Mr. p blah or blah?

 By comp we know that [blah blah]


Well good for comp.

 the question asked was about his first person experience,


  Who is Mr. his, and who exactly is the person having this first
 person experience? Be specific, give names, and DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS
 WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.


  The question is asked to John-Clark with diary H, before the pushing on
 the button.


 Who is Mr. you? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR
 REFERENT


 The owner of the H diary, before he pushes on the button


If the owner of the diary, a certain Mr. he, is John Clark then the correct
prediction would be that Mr. he will see both Washington AND Moscow.
However if Mr. he is the fellow who is experiencing Helsinki right now then
the correct prediction would be Mr. he will see neither Washington NOR
Moscow. But of course none of this really matters because predictions, good
bad or indifferent, have nothing to do with identity and the feeling of
self.

 Well comp implies [blah blah]


Well good for comp.


  Please go to step 4.


Why? Because the first 3 steps were so free of ambiguity? The entire point
of including strange but physically possible machines like duplicating
chambers in a thought experiment is that it forces (or at least it should
force) Bruno Marchal and John Clark to reexamine concepts that in a world
without such machines seem so self evidently true that they're not worth
thinking about. But even in these bizarre circumstances Bruno Marchal
continues to use pronouns in exactly the same way that Bruno Marchal does
in the everyday world when Bruno Marchal orders a pizza.  Duplicating
chambers are not everyday things and thus everyday language is not good
enough in a world that contains them; if the referent to personal pronouns
was always unambiguous then the thought experiment itself would be
unnecessary because the point it was trying to make would already be clear.

  John K Clark

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Feb 2014, at 19:30, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 1:21 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 The 3-1 view is the 3p view on the 1p views, note the plural,  
after the duplication.


That is far more convoluted than it need to be, it's really not all  
that complicated.  After the duplication both the Washington Man and  
the Moscow Man agree that they were both the Helsinki Man at one time.


OK.



A third party observer would also agree with this. After the  
duplication both the Washington Man and the Moscow Man agree that  
they are no longer each other. A third party observer would agree  
with this too. So unlike Einstein's thought experiments in this one  
everybody involved is in agreement about everything that happened,  
which is why we can learn nothing from it.


Not at all. The 3P definition of 3p and 1p allows to agree on some 3p  
accounts of the whole derivation, that is why we can do science here.  
it is the same in Einstein relativity. the 1p discourse have to be  
eliminated from the scientific account, except as data, or subject  
matter.
In our case, indeed everybody agrees on the FPI (except you, for still  
quite unclear reason).






 A typical observation will be the diary of the guy in W assess  
that he is in W, and (perhaps) that he could not have predicted that,


That is incorrect, the Helsinki Man could have successfully  
predicted that  the Washington diary will be written by the guy in  
Washington.


That is correct, but is not answering the question, which is asked to  
the H man, at a moment he has not yet been copy. At that moment,  
predicting that  the Washington diary will be written by the guy in  
Washington is tautological, and half of a 3-1 description, but the  
question is about the unique 1-1 = 1-description(s).


You make your 3-move again.

In Helsinki you know that P(my experience will be the experience of  
seeing a unique city) = 1. But if you choose in advance one city, that  
choice will be refuted by the doppelganger.







 and that the diary of the guy in M assess that he is in M and  
(perhaps) that he could not have predicted that.


And the Helsinki Man could have successfully predicted that the  
Moscow diary will be written by the guy in Moscow.


Which is the other half of the 3-1 description. But that was not asked  
to the H-man. the question asked was about his first person  
experience, and as just said above, by comp, it can only been unique.



But of course if you're trying to ascertain the nature of personal  
identity none of this matters, it doesn't matter if the predictions  
were correct or not.


We are not trying to ascertain the nature of personal identity at all.  
I can be amnesic on who I am for example. the question is about the  
expectation of some unique 1p experience I will live soon. By comp I  
know that it must be W, or M, but not both, nor none.






 So the prediction you have often made, and never clearly  
retracted, that you will find yourself in W and M, is a correct  
prediction for the 3-1 view,


Yes, after it was all over and the smoke had cleared away a third  
party observer will say that John Clark is in Moscow and John Clark  
is in Washington.


Correct. That's the 3-1 view.





  but that is not what is asked in Helsinki, which concerns the 1- 
views, or as I said the 1-1-views (the 1-view on the 1-view).


If that is the question then the only answer the Helsinki Man can  
give is my first person view is of Helsinki.


No. that's the correct answer to what do you feel right now, but the  
question is what could you feel after pressing the button. As you know  
that by comp you don't die, and as you know that P(I will see only one  
city) is 1, you know with certainty that you, in your future 1-view  
sense, will see W, or M, and not both, and that you cannot predict  
which one, without being refuted by the doppelganger, so you can only  
say W or M, with a non constructive or. That's the FPI.


Bruno





  John K Clark





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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[John Clark]

On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 , Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  A typical observation will be the diary of the guy in W assess that
 he is in W, and (perhaps) that he could not have predicted that,



  That is incorrect, the Helsinki Man could have successfully predicted
 that  the Washington diary will be written by the guy in Washington.


  That is correct, but is not answering the question,


Then what exactly is the question? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND
PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.

 predicting that  the Washington diary will be written by the guy in
 Washington is tautological,


Exactly. Precisely. And thus we can conclude that the thought experiment is
worthless.

 In Helsinki you know that P(my experience will be the experience of
seeing a unique city) = 1.

Who is Mr. my? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR
REFERENT.

 the question asked was about his first person experience,


Who is Mr. his, and who exactly is the person having this first person
experience? Be specific, give names, and DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH
NO CLEAR REFERENT.

 By comp I know that it must be W, or M, but not both, nor none.


Well good for comp.

 the only answer the Helsinki Man can give is my first person view is of
 Helsinki.


  No. that's the correct answer to what do you feel right now, but the
 question is what could you feel after pressing the button.


Who is Mr. you? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR
REFERENT.


  As you know that by comp you don't die


Well good for comp.

  John K Clark

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Feb 2014, at 17:46, John Clark wrote:


On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 , Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  A typical observation will be the diary of the guy in W assess  
that he is in W, and (perhaps) that he could not have predicted that,


 That is incorrect, the Helsinki Man could have successfully  
predicted that  the Washington diary will be written by the guy in  
Washington.


 That is correct, but is not answering the question,

Then what exactly is the question? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND  
PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.


The question is what do you expect to live when pushing on the button.

You = the unique 1p owner of your personal memory in Helsinki (brain,  
diary, mobile, whatever you keep with you when going in the  
duplication box).







 predicting that  the Washington diary will be written by the guy  
in Washington is tautological,


Exactly. Precisely. And thus we can conclude that the thought  
experiment is worthless.


We can only conclude that your rephrasing of it was worthless.





 In Helsinki you know that P(my experience will be the experience  
of seeing a unique city) = 1.


Who is Mr. my? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO  
CLEAR REFERENT.



The unique 1p owner of your personal memory in Helsinki.  (H, say)

And the question bears on the future unique 1p owner of a consistent  
extension of that 1p owner memory.


By comp we know that after duplication, there will be two such  
extension, and we know that both 1p knower remains unique from their  
1p points of view, in each consistent extension (HW, HM).






 the question asked was about his first person experience,

Who is Mr. his, and who exactly is the person having this first  
person experience? Be specific, give names, and DON'T HIDE BEHIND  
PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.


The question is asked to John-Clark with diary H, before the pushing  
on the button.


The confirmation or invalidation is made after the pushing, by  
interviewing all copies, the John-Clark with diaries HM, and HW  
respectively.


It is an exercise in elementary propositional logic that if John-Clark- 
H cautiously writes in his H diary I predict 'W v M' will be true,  
then both JC-HM and JC-HW will confirm the prediction. W v M is a  
certain event.

You can test easily the other predictions.




 By comp I know that it must be W, or M, but not both, nor none.

Well good for comp.


Er ... that is the FPI.




 the only answer the Helsinki Man can give is my first person  
view is of Helsinki.


 No. that's the correct answer to what do you feel right now, but  
the question is what could you feel after pressing the button.


Who is Mr. you? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO  
CLEAR REFERENT.


The owner of the H diary, before he pushes on the button and  
differentiate into the one with the HM diary and the one with the HW  
diary.  In that protocol, there are no others.


OK?





 As you know that by comp you don't die

Well good for comp.


Well comp implies you don't die in that duplication, and that you (the  
guy in Helsinki) will survive in both city. It predicts also with  
probability 1 that you (the H-guy) will feel to be in only one city.
Do the simple math, with the precision made above, but it is rather  
obvious that in H, you can't predict your specific next future 1p  
experience.


W  M is false in the two consistent extensions
W is false in one of them
M is false in one of them
W v M is true in all of them

Likewise, in the iterated self-duplication, with some high frequency,  
if the initial H guys predicts, in his H diary, white noise, then  
the very vast majority of results of the copies will confirm the  
predictions.


If the H-guy is asked about the number of W experiences to be  
expected, in such systematic iterated self-duplication, the best he  
(the H-guy) can do, if only to maximize the confirmation of his  
descendants, is to use Newton Binomial, or Pascal triangle.


I don't think there is anything controversial here. Please go to step 4.

Bruno




  John K Clark




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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[John Clark]

On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 1:21 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


  The 3-1 view is the 3p view on the 1p views, note the plural, after the
 duplication.


That is far more convoluted than it need to be, it's really not all that
complicated.  After the duplication both the Washington Man and the Moscow
Man agree that they were both the Helsinki Man at one time. A third party
observer would also agree with this. After the duplication both the
Washington Man and the Moscow Man agree that they are no longer each other.
A third party observer would agree with this too. So unlike Einstein's
thought experiments in this one everybody involved is in agreement about
everything that happened, which is why we can learn nothing from it.

 A typical observation will be the diary of the guy in W assess that he
 is in W, and (perhaps) that he could not have predicted that,


That is incorrect, the Helsinki Man could have successfully predicted that
the Washington diary will be written by the guy in Washington.

 and that the diary of the guy in M assess that he is in M and (perhaps)
 that he could not have predicted that.


And the Helsinki Man could have successfully predicted that the Moscow
diary will be written by the guy in Moscow. But of course if you're trying
to ascertain the nature of personal identity none of this matters, it
doesn't matter if the predictions were correct or not.

 So the prediction you have often made, and never clearly retracted, that
 you will find yourself in W and M, is a correct prediction for the 3-1 view,


Yes, after it was all over and the smoke had cleared away a third party
observer will say that John Clark is in Moscow and John Clark is in
Washington.

  but that is not what is asked in Helsinki, which concerns the 1-views,
 or as I said the 1-1-views (the 1-view on the 1-view).


If that is the question then the only answer the Helsinki Man can give is
my first person view is of Helsinki.

  John K Clark

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3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

John, I add a comment to my preview post.


On 11 Feb 2014, at 19:47, John Clark wrote:

Then the 1p is of no use to anyone and neither is the 3-1 view  
whatever the hell that is supposed to be.


It is a bit unfair, as I introduced that 3-1 notation exactly to  
reply to your first attempt of refutation.


But I will explain, may be for the benefits of others, the 3-1 view.

Tell me what you don't understand in the following.

We are at step 3, that is in Helsinki. I am there with you, and you  
will undergo the duplication. That is, you will be read, that is  
scanned, then annihilated, and pasted in W and M.
Then you might both come back to Helsinki, and we can reiterate the  
experience.


By definition, here, actually at the start of the UDA, the 1p  
statements are the content written in the diary that the experiencer  
take with her/him.


So, of course, as you have often mentioned yourself, you are  
duplicated, and this means obviously that the 1p diary, contrarily to  
the 3p diary, is duplicated itself.


The 3-1 view is the 3p view on the 1p views, note the plural, after  
the duplication. A typical observation will be the diary of the guy  
in W assess that he is in W, and (perhaps) that he could not have  
predicted that, and that the diary of the guy in M assess that he is  
in M and (perhaps) that he could not have predicted that.


A 3-1 view is just a description made by the observer of the  
experience, the one who does not enter in the box, of the experiences,  
and the evolution of the contents in the multiplying diaries.


The 1-view are unique, and remains unique *from* each of their points  
of 1p-view, as in all duplications, the guy is forced to write either  
W *or* M, after self-localizing himself after the localization. It is  
the comp equivalent of Everett's observer inability to feel the split.


So the prediction you have often made, and never clearly retracted,  
that you will find yourself in W and M, is a correct prediction for  
the 3-1 view, but that is not what is asked in Helsinki, which  
concerns the 1-views, or as I said the 1-1-views (the 1-view on the 1- 
view).


Then again, you can consult only the math part. The 3p view is  
axiomatized by the modal logic G, the 1-views are axiomatized by  
S4Grz. For example, the fact that the 1-views are equivalent with the  
1-1 views can be expressed by the fact that S4Grz proves [°]p - [°] 
[°]p   (with [°]p defined by []p  p, p arithmetical, and [] =  
Gödel's beweisbar).


There the 3-1 view can be handled in the bimodal logic of G and S4Grz,  
which is easily simulated by G, so you can handle mixture of the  
points of view, like for example, the 3-view: [][°]p.


But content of diary entering or not into duplication boxes is usually  
easier to understand than bimodal self-referential logic.


Hope this helps.

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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