Le 15-nov.-05, à 00:28, Russell Standish a écrit :
Equivalence in the sense of category theory's notion of duality. In
Venn diagrams, for instance, the empty set is the dual of the
universal set.
Most set theories does not have a universal set. Version of Quine's New
Foundations (NF) does bu
Equivalence in the sense of category theory's notion of duality. In
Venn diagrams, for instance, the empty set is the dual of the
universal set.
More particularly to the "bitstring ensemble" ASKA "Schmidhuber
ensemble"* or UD*, the empty observer moment can be identified with Nothing,
and the empt
Le 13-nov.-05, à 04:25, Russell Standish a écrit :
What do you mean by singularity in this context? It does not
parse. Getting something from nothing is usually considered
problematic. Getting something from everything is not. Demonstrating
the equivalence of nothing and everything solves the p
On Fri, Nov 11, 2005 at 10:50:23PM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> To me it's very simple, and I've already laid it out in just a few words
> below, and in more words in different ways in my previous posts on this
> thread.
> Russell, you've even said in your Why Occam's Razor paper that the
Le 12-nov.-05, à 07:46, Kim Jones a écrit :
Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem CAN be understood without reference to
the numbers. Something tells me Bruno's comp theory can as well. He
does remarkably well with his English but his acronyms make me cringe
with fright...
Well thanks for the Engl
What about the enormous legion of people like me reading this list
who are neither mathematicians OR physicists but who also have a
healthy interest in the fundamental questions?
Isn't the "Everything List" for *every* body?
Any hope of someone bringing out a lexicon of terms - I mean a
gl
Maybe true, maybe not. Nevertheless this is a more sophisticated
critique than what has been posted so far.
BTW - extracting a finite amount of information from the plenitude is
more akin to extracting a segment from an orange. Both the segment and
the orange are infinite sets of points (of course
On 11/12/05, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> But extracting something from the Plenitude is trivial, or so it seems
> to most people. If I have an infinite bin of dollar coins, and I owe
> you $10, I don't see any difficulty in paying you the $10. Do you?
>
Please quote something fro
; In the previous post I should have said, "Russell, you've even said in your
> Why Occam's Razor paper that the Plenitude is ontologically _equivalent_ to
> Nothing."
>
> Tom
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Full-name: Daddycaylor
> Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2005 22:50:
In the previous post I should have said, "Russell, you've even said in your
Why Occam's Razor paper that the Plenitude is ontologically _equivalent_ to
Nothing."
Tom
--- Begin Message ---
To me it's very simple, and I've already laid it out in just a few words
below, and in more words in
To me it's very simple, and I've already laid it out in just a few words
below, and in more words in different ways in my previous posts on this
thread.
Russell, you've even said in your Why Occam's Razor paper that the
Plenitude is ontologically to Nothing. To it follows that the following
Hi Russell,
You are very kind. Certainly translating the Lille thesis could be some
beginning.
At the same time people could be disappointed, because somehow my last
papers are better (imo) than my lille thesis. The UDA is divided in
those papers into (8) steps (no such numerotation help
It is a very nice proposition Russell. Thanks. I could even pay. Are
you thinking to "consciousness and mechanism" (750 pages!) or "
Computability, physics and cognition" (120 pages) ?
Bruno
Le 08-nov.-05, à 10:54, Russell Standish a écrit :
I wasn't talking about a machine translation, b
I wasn't talking about a machine translation, but a machine assisted
translation. I would take the machine translated text, and edit it
into idomatic English - using my knowledge of the French text and the
subject to assist. Diagrams would probably be left unchanged.
It will still be a large task,
Le 06-nov.-05, à 08:38, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Sat, Nov 05, 2005 at 03:37:52PM -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote:
physics. BTW, I am still waiting to read an English version of your
Thesis.
That, I hope, might help me. Have you considered Google's translation
services?
With a little ar
Le 07-nov.-05, à 08:29, Hal Finney writes:
Bruno writes:
OK. But the word "universe" can be misleading here. It is probably
less
misleading to say that the Universal Dovetailer generates all
computations. By assuming comp, this generates also all the (first
person) observer-moments (states/wo
Hi John M,
Bruno, fine,
do you mean that you can (with any considered means
you may apply) THINK differently from your "human
mind's" working conditions? That you can absorb and
understand the humanly unabsorbable and
ununderstandable?
When I wrote my sci-fi, I wanted to apply something
'real
Le 05-nov.-05, à 21:37, Stephen Paul King a écrit :
And it is that timelessness that I am basing my argument against
your
thesis! YOu are ignoring the vast number of arguments that have been
found
in physics and even the reasoning comming from computer science, for
example
the Calude et
Hi Stephen,
That is a fascinating claim! "...we could argue the UD is 0 dimensional: it computes an undefined function with 0 arguments."
What is the quantity of computational resources required for such a computation?
Probably null. Provably so with the QM hypothesis or the comp hyp.
I don't agree that your original query was left unanswered - it was
answered by several people, in possibly contradictory ways (that
remains to be seen - I tend to see the commonality). Perhaps you mean
the answers were unsatisfactory for you, in which case I'd be
interested in hearing from you why
Hi Jesse,
I think the point is that arithmetical realism is a faith. That every number
has a successor is an axiom, thus considered as true. But while I believe in
arithmetical realism I can conceive that other people don't and see
arithmetical realism/plantonism has not true/real... that someh
Tom wrote:
Perhaps there needs to be a new thread for the new topic (Game of Life,
etc.).
It seems my original inquiry has been left unanswered, but this is my
point. My challenge was that multiverse theory is just pulling things out
of thin air just as much as any other metaphysical theor
Perhaps there needs to be a new thread for the new topic (Game of Life,
etc.).
It seems my original inquiry has been left unanswered, but this is my
point. My challenge was that multiverse theory is just pulling things
out of thin air just as much as any other metaphysical theory. At each
po
Bruno writes:
> OK. But the word "universe" can be misleading here. It is probably less
> misleading to say that the Universal Dovetailer generates all
> computations. By assuming comp, this generates also all the (first
> person) observer-moments (states/worlds/...).
> The physical reality will
On Sun, Nov 06, 2005 at 05:01:03AM -0500, Bob Hearn wrote:
>
> On Nov 6, 2005, at 2:34 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >On Sat, Nov 05, 2005 at 09:57:17AM -0500, Bob Hearn wrote:
> >>However, one can easily imagine a perceptual 2D world existing for
> >>conscious entities. Even if there is no sel
On Nov 6, 2005, at 2:34 AM, Russell Standish wrote:On Sat, Nov 05, 2005 at 09:57:17AM -0500, Bob Hearn wrote:However, one can easily imagine a perceptual 2D world existing for conscious entities. Even if there is no self-consistent 2D physics leading to atoms, planets, etc., one can computational
On Sat, Nov 05, 2005 at 03:37:52PM -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> physics. BTW, I am still waiting to read an English version of your Thesis.
> That, I hope, might help me. Have you considered Google's translation
> services?
>
With a little arm twisting, I might be tempted into assisting in
On Sat, Nov 05, 2005 at 09:57:17AM -0500, Bob Hearn wrote:
>
> On Nov 5, 2005, at 2:22 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >Game of Life is an example 2D system capable of universal
> >computation. I'm not sure this implies consciousness is possible in
> >2D, but it needs to be considered.
>
> It do
Yes - that's exactly what I meant. Assuming computationalism,
consciousness is implied. I do not always assume computationalism :) ...
On Sat, Nov 05, 2005 at 02:51:24PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 05-nov.-05, ? 08:22, Russell Standish a ?crit :
>
> >Game of Life is an example 2D system c
Bruno, fine,
do you mean that you can (with any considered means
you may apply) THINK differently from your "human
mind's" working conditions? That you can absorb and
understand the humanly unabsorbable and
ununderstandable?
When I wrote my sci-fi, I wanted to apply something
'really' esoteric (
estion is born from your comment: Is
> your notion of a "dimension" flow from linear
> independence, like that of vectors? How does one
> define the notion of a "basis" in this computational
> dimension?
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> - Original
Dear Bruno,
- Original Message - From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Cc: "Everything-List
List" Sent: Saturday,
November 05, 2005 10:31 AMSubject: Re: Let There Be
SomethingLe 05-nov.-05, à 15:57, Stephen Paul
Le 05-nov.-05, à 15:57, Stephen Paul King a écrit :
Again, Bruno, your theory prohibits *any* kind of notion that
involves *change*. That is its Achilles Heel.
We already discussed this. When you define the first person by the
Theaetetical trick you get freely, from the self-reference lo
ything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, November 05, 2005 8:47
AM
Subject: Re: Let There Be Something
Le 05-nov.-05, à 04:52, Stephen Paul King wrote( to
George):
It seems to me that the notion of
"storing" and communication 1 bit explicitly requires some form of sta
ot; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Everything-List List"
Sent: Saturday, November 05, 2005 9:01 AM
Subject: Re: Let There Be Something
Hi Stephen,
Can atoms exist in a 2D universe?
I remember having read that 17 sort of atoms can exist in some natural
2-dimensional QM.
I don't know if
On Nov 5, 2005, at 2:22 AM, Russell Standish wrote:Game of Life is an example 2D system capable of universalcomputation. I'm not sure this implies consciousness is possible in2D, but it needs to be considered.It does imply that if the Game of Life is the laws of physics of your universe, then consc
Hi Stephen,
Can atoms exist in a 2D universe?
I remember having read that 17 sort of atoms can exist in some natural
2-dimensional QM.
I don't know if this is related to the anyons and Hall effects where
particles are squeezed in two dimensional trap (by powerful magnetic
field).
I have i
Le 05-nov.-05, à 08:22, Russell Standish a écrit :
Game of Life is an example 2D system capable of universal
computation. I'm not sure this implies consciousness is possible in
2D, but it needs to be considered.
It is easy, although very tedious, to program a Universal Dovetailer,
in the gam
Le 05-nov.-05, à 04:52, Stephen Paul King wrote( to George):
It seems to me that the notion of "storing" and communication 1 bit explicitly requires some form of stable structure over multiple queries. Does this not lead to the requirement of some form of physicality, a physicality that is ep
Le 03-nov.-05, à 19:29, Hal Finney a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
And that illustrates the advantage of the comp theory, it gives by
construction the correct physics, without any need, for a comp
"believer" to verify it. Except, of course, that comp need to be
postulated and we must be open
Le 03-nov.-05, à 17:13, John M a écrit :
Bruno,
I love your closing sentence! I am not a physicist.
Why do you think that philosophers don't use some
anthropocentric mind-work in identifying 'principles'?
They use that indeed. But they use also deeper xxx-thropocentric
principle. To focus o
Saturday, November 05, 2005 2:22 AM
Subject: Re: Let There Be Something
Game of Life is an example 2D system capable of universal
computation. I'm not sure this implies consciousness is possible in
2D, but it needs to be considered.
I think Turing machines are impossible in 1D, however...
>
> Stephen
>
> - Original Message -
> From: George Levy
> To: Everything List
> Sent: Friday, November 04, 2005 6:17 PM
> Subject: Re: Let There Be Something
>
>
> I conjecture that if one can design physical laws for a universe capable
Everything List
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2005 6:17
PM
Subject: Re: Let There Be Something
I conjecture that if one can design physical laws for a
universe capable of 1) supporting the NAND function 2) storing (locally) 1
bit, 3) transmitting 1 bit from one point to another point
I conjecture that if one can design physical laws for a universe
capable of 1) supporting the NAND function 2) storing (locally) 1 bit,
3) transmitting 1 bit from one point to another point, then one could
also generate a Turing machine in this universe which would then be
capable of supporting
On Thu, Nov 03, 2005 at 03:21:50PM -0800, "Hal Finney" wrote:
> Russell Standish writes:
> > It predicts that either a) there is no conscious life in a GoL
> > universe (thus contradicting computationalism) or b) the physics as
> > seen by conscious GoL observers will be quantum mechanical in natur
On Fri, Nov 04, 2005 at 12:18:01AM +0100, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi Russel,
>
> Le Jeudi 03 Novembre 2005 22:11, Russell Standish a ??crit??:
>
> >
> > Even then, there is still a loophole. I suspect that 3D environment
> > are far more likely to evolve the complex structures needed for
> > con
Hi Tom:
One of the goals of my search for a model was to explain why there is
an observed dynamic. The Somethings that are launched from my
Nothing/All pair include evolving Somethings [due to their
incompleteness]. This evolution causes states of universes resident
in the All to be given a
Russell Standish writes:
> It predicts that either a) there is no conscious life in a GoL
> universe (thus contradicting computationalism) or b) the physics as
> seen by conscious GoL observers will be quantum mechanical in nature.
>
> If one could establish that a given GoL structure is conscious,
Hi Russel,
Le Jeudi 03 Novembre 2005 22:11, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> Even then, there is still a loophole. I suspect that 3D environment
> are far more likely to evolve the complex structures needed for
> consciousness, so that conscious GoL observers are indeed a rare
> thing. I don't know
On Thu, Nov 03, 2005 at 12:39:27PM -0800, "Hal Finney" wrote:
> Russell Standish writes:
> > Lack of convincing is perhaps due to lack of understanding. Even I do
> > not fully understand the true worth of my "derivation". It seems to me
> > that I show that any physical theory that takes into acco
Russell Standish writes:
> Lack of convincing is perhaps due to lack of understanding. Even I do
> not fully understand the true worth of my "derivation". It seems to me
> that I show that any physical theory that takes into account
> observation must have that Hilbert space structure, with that fo
Bruno Marchal writes:
> And that illustrates the advantage of the comp theory, it gives by
> construction the correct physics, without any need, for a comp
> "believer" to verify it. Except, of course, that comp need to be
> postulated and we must be open it is could be false. With comp, you
>
than any
Intelligent-Being-opic Principle would dictate.
But what about the other points and challenges in my post, below?
Tom
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wed, 2 Nov 2005 08:53:30 EST
Subject: Re: Let There Be Something
Hal Finney
Thanks Russell, for the testimony for our not being
omniscient.
I concur with Hal in his assumption that recent-day
physics is "close-to-right" - because it is within the
model-view of what we identified (over centuries) as
the "physical view of the world" strictly within our
actual (and continual
Note: forwarded message attached.
--- Begin Message ---
--- Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Le 02-nov.-05, à 21:06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit
> :
>
> > I should make another point, that it seems very
> likely that the worm
> > has no way of developing the in-apple technology
>
Le 03-nov.-05, à 12:12, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
Hi Bruno,
Le Jeudi 3 Novembre 2005 11:14, vous avez écrit :
Le 02-nov.-05, à 21:23, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
I could'nt imagine what would it be for a human to knows the why and
being
able to prove it...
Then you should like comp (and its
On Wed, Nov 02, 2005 at 09:03:21PM -0800, "Hal Finney" wrote:
>
> I don't think most of our versions of multiverse theories depend on the
> assumption that present-day physics is close to being right. It's true
> that we have some efforts such as those of Russell Standish to derive QM
> from a mu
Le 03-nov.-05, à 06:03, Hal Finney a écrit :
In short, if there really exists a simple mathematical explanation
of our universe, which IMO is a prediction of multiverse theories, I
don't see our present physical models as being very close to that goal.
That doesn't mean that multiverse theories
Le 02-nov.-05, à 21:06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I should make another point, that it seems very likely that the worm
has no way of developing the in-apple technology to find out about
quantum mechanics or DNA. This emphasizes the fact that we, with our
quantum theories, M-theories, and l
Le 02-nov.-05, à 21:23, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
I could'nt imagine what would it be for a human to knows the why and
being
able to prove it...
Then you should like comp (and its generalisation) because it explain
the why, and it justifies completely wxhy we cannot and will never been
abl
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> We're very ambitious on this list, aiming for the One True Theory which will
> explain the universe. It's fair enough to keep this in mind as the ultimate
> goal, but you have to remember that every generation of scientists has
> thought this goal was just in reach,
Hi Hal,
Indeed, if intellectual progress had continued at the rate it had in ancient
Athens, for example, and provided that the Greeks overcame their disdain for
technology (which promotes as well as feeds off "pure" science), we would
have colonised the stars by now, and who knows where our p
I heard a quote today [source I did not hear] that may add flavor to
this discussion: [to paraphrase]
"Irrationality is not an argument against the existence of a thing,
it is merely a condition of a thing."
Hal Ruhl
Tom Caylor writes:
I should make another point, that it seems very likely that the worm has no
way of developing the in-apple technology to find out about quantum
mechanics or DNA. This emphasizes the fact that we, with our quantum
theories, M-theories, and loop gravity etc. could be just as
Hi Tom:
At 08:53 AM 11/2/2005, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
> So as in the case of my Nothing and my All it seems
> the apex of causation may be neither infinite regression
> "or" termination but rather both [an "and"].
I'm saying that the "All" is on equal ontological footing with the
"Nothing"
Tom Caylor writes:
> I disagree. How can the worm apply a probability distribution over
> things that he knows nothing of, such as trees, people, and evolution?
The same way that we can reason about things we know nothing of, such
as blinkers, puffer trains, glider guns and other objects in Co
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> By the way, I recently read an article about astonometers finding
> aromatic hydrocarbons in outer space. This totally baffles them, since
> they don't know how things like this could've gotten there or survived.
> This lends more weight to the possibility that maybe t
1:23:47 +0100
Subject: Re: Let There Be Something
Hi,
I don't think the super-intelligent worm is a good analogy... first
because
you made to much assumption of his way of thinking, second I don't see
the
relevance of a super-intelligent worm in an apple compared to the myth
of the
ent: Wed, 02 Nov 2005 14:58:30 -0500
> Subject: Re: Let There Be Something
>
> Hal,
>
> I disagree. How can the worm apply a probability distribution over
> things that he knows nothing of, such as trees, people, and evolution?
> Using the Wormopic Principle, when the wor
explaining the universe as the worm is.
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wed, 02 Nov 2005 14:58:30 -0500
Subject: Re: Let There Be Something
Hal,
I disagree. How can the worm apply a probability distribution over
things that
;t, resulting in being totally disabled in being able to
explain everything in biology (to our satisfaction).
Tom
-Original Message-
From: Hal Finney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wed, 2 Nov 2005 10:13:09 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Re: Let There Be Something
Tom C
Tom Caylor writes:
> To look at this from a different perspective, suppose there was a worm that
> lived in an apple, and the worm was super-intelligent to the point of being
> able to grasp all of our mathematical concepts that Tegmark claims are
> sufficient to describe all of reality. The
Hal Finney wrote:
> Are you saying that you don't agree that the anthropic principle
> applied to an ensemble of instances has greater explanatory
> power than when applied to a single instance?
Russell wrote:
> Perhaps I'm missing your argument here, but I gather you are
> claiming that the a
PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2005 3:23 PM
Subject: Re: Let There Be Something
Unfortunately lately I do not have the time to read and think through
each post but I would like to briefly point out that my approach has
the Godelian ingredients of completeness/incompleteness,
consistency/inconsistency and self reference. The power set of
divisions of the list provides [I t
Hi,
as I said before I don't think/feel that single universe is on the same level
as multiverse... Just by using "absurd" feeling I was talking about. If there
is a single reality, you have to anwser why this one ? why like this ? what
is the ultimate reason for the reality to be limited to thi
Perhaps I'm missing your argument here, but I gather you are claiming
that the assumption of a plenitude is on an equal ontological footing
as the assumption of a single reality, as both are ab initio moves,
not derived from any other principle.
Whilst I agree that nothing mandates one case or the
Tom Caylor writes:
> I believe that my statement before:
>
> >...simply bringing in the hypothetical set of all unobservable things
> >doesn't explain rationally in any way (deeper than our direct
> >experience) the existence of observable things.
>
> applies to the multiverse as well, since
> the
My phrase "something from nothing" was not meant
to restrict my inquiry to origins, in the sense of time or causality,
but can be viewed in terms of information in general.
It seems that the discussion has not contradicted my initial idea that,
when it comes to explaining why things are the way t
Le 29-oct.-05, à 00:57, Hal Finney a écrit :
I would suggest that the multiverse concept is better thought of in
somewhat different terms. It's goal is not really to explain where the
universe comes from. (In fact, that question does not even make sense
to me.)
I think we should not confu
Kim Jones writes:
Then in making that assertion it follows surely that we (x) are all God
(y) and God has no particular attributes that we do not possess, being in
some sense equivalent.
God would then be equivalent to Life.
Stathis may have unwittingly "proven" the existence of the big G
Then in making that assertion it follows surely that we (x) are all
God (y) and God has no particular attributes that we do not possess,
being in some sense equivalent.
God would then be equivalent to Life.
Stathis may have unwittingly "proven" the existence of the big G
Kim Jones
On 31/
Hi Stathis:
At 08:19 PM 10/30/2005, you wrote:
The same objection to the quest for a first cause applies to the
quest for ultimate meaning: you can always ask, if the meaning (or
cause, or purpose) of x is y, what's the meaning (or cause, or
purpose) of y? If you assert that y is special beca
Norman Samish writes:
If the multiverse concept, as I understand it, is true, then anything
that can exist does exist, and anything that can happen has happened and
will continue to happen, ad infinitum. The sequence of events that we
observe has been played in the past, and will be played in
Hi John:
At 12:02 PM 10/30/2005, you wrote:
Stathis,
let me address first Tom C's objection addressing the
"nothing" (from which nothing can come out) - and I
wonder how Hal will feel about this:
All we can talk about as "N O TH I N G" is that it
does not contain anything we know about. It woul
AIL PROTECTED]>
> To: "Norman Samish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
>
> Sent: Sunday, October 30, 2005 11:17 AM
> Subject: Re: Let There Be Something
>
>
> snip
> > -(excerpts):
> >> a "fuzzy feeling" that there "should" be a po
Stathis,
let me address first Tom C's objection addressing the
"nothing" (from which nothing can come out) - and I
wonder how Hal will feel about this:
All we can talk about as "N O TH I N G" is that it
does not contain anything we know about. It would make
Tom's absolute no-no if we were omniscien
o:
Sent: Sunday, October 30, 2005 10:03 AM
Subject: Re: Let There Be Something
In my view the entire system we discuss is self referential. For example
a line item on my list is the "features" of the list and thus the list
itself. The list is a member of itself. There is no "outside&
erely an ansatz of some 1st
person aspect.
Onward!
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Norman Samish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Sunday, October 30, 2005 11:17 AM
Subject: Re: Let There Be Something
snip
-(excer
--- Norman Samish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
...
> > --Stathis Papaioannou:
> >
> > I'll grant you it may be strange, but how is it
> any more pointless than
> > anything that can happen (or a subset thereof)
> happening only once, or a
> > finite number of times?
> >
> > Norman Samish writes:
--- John M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2005 08:17:12 -0800 (PST)
> From: John M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: Let There Be Something
> To: Norman Samish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> everything-list@eskimo.com
>
>
>
>
In my view the entire system we discuss is self referential. For
example a line item on my list is the "features" of the list and thus
the list itself. The list is a member of itself. There is no
"outside" and thus I see no opportunity for, or a need for, a meaning
or point.
Of course in o
Norman Samish writes:
If the multiverse concept, as I understand it, is true, then anything that
can exist does exist, and anything that can happen has happened and will
continue to happen, ad infinitum. The sequence of events that we observe
has been played in the past, and will be playe
Norman Samish writes:
If the multiverse concept, as I understand it, is true, then anything that
can exist does exist, and anything that can happen has happened and will
continue to happen, ad infinitum. The sequence of events that we observe
has been played in the past, and will be played in
Tom Caylor writes:
I just don't get how it can be rationally justified that you can get
something out of nothing. To me, combining the multiverse with a selection
principle does not explain anything. I see no reason why it is not
mathematically equivalent to our universe appearing out of not
I want to make it clear that in my sentence and re the details of my
post that in my corrected sentence:
"Universes do not arise out of nothing but rather out of the mere
possibility of Nothing and All."
the "... mere possibility of Nothing and All." is a simultaneous
possibility since as I
~
>
> - Original Message -
> From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
>
> Sent: Friday, October 28, 2005 3:57 PM
> Subject: Re: Let There Be Something
>
>
> > Tom Caylor writes:
> >> I
Hal Finney wrote:
Anthropic reasoning is only explanatory if you assume the
actual existence of an ensemble of universes, as multiverse models do.
The multiverse therefore elevates anthropic reasoning from something of
a tautology, a form of circular reasoning, up to an actual explanatory
princi
Sorry my last sentence should have been:
Universes do not arise out of nothing but rather out of the mere
possibility of Nothing
and All.
Hal
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