Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness
a catastrophic collapse.
>
>
>
> I think Peircean semiotic is highly valuable for analyzing and
> understanding the role of communication media in this situation. They all
> deploy symbols, of course, and it's crucial to recognize that “Symbols are
> particularly remote from the Truth itself” (EP2:307
> <https://gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm#3f>). But Peirceans also have
> to use symbols in order to communicate that insight, and the message is
> submerged in the flood of mis- and disinformation. It seems that no matter
> what people believe these days, however implausible to scientific (or even
> common) sense, they can find sources online that will reinforce their
> beliefs. Personally i'm not optimistic that semiotics can do much to
> reverse the trend of the Anthropocene. Maybe we can hope that human or
> posthuman survivors of the ongoing degradation of the planet will learn
> something from whatever is left of semiotic science.
>
>
>
> Love, gary
>
> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
>
> } The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G.
> Bateson] {
>
> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/>
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu *On
> Behalf Of *Gary Richmond
> *Sent:* Saturday, April 27, 2024 6:10 PM
> *To:* g...@gnusystems.ca
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness
>
>
>
> [Note: I'd like to replace my earlier response to Gary Fuhrman's post with
> this one. The first was written in haste and, in fact, I'd forgotten I'd
> sent it as it was nothing but a rough draft of some of the ideas I wanted
> to reflect on. I hope that the present post will offer something of
> substance to discuss. GR]
>
>
>
> gary f., List,
>
>
>
> I'm sorry to have taken so long to respond, but I've been unexpectedly
> busy dealing with off List issues (plus a bout of Covid 19 -- I'm finally
> testing negative).
>
> Your post is such a rich cornucopia of ideas that I've decided to focus on
> just a short segment of it with some comments centered around the
> quotations by Merleau-Ponty, Peirce, and William James. I'll start with
> what amounts to little more than a paraphrase of the two quotations by M-P
> and Peirce which you juxtaposed.
>
> Merleau-Ponty remarks that our experiences are given as a unified whole
> with synthesis occurring, *not* because they express a fixed quality or
> identity, but because they are gathered together in an elusive 'ipseity'.
> Each perceived aspect of a thing only serves as an invitation to perceive
> beyond it. This leads to a *continual process of perception* [and of
> semiosis?] If it were possible for the thing to be fully grasped it would
> cease to be a thing since its reality lies precisely in that 'mystery'
> which prevents us from fully possessing it.
>
> On the other hand, Peirce's statement defines the real as that which
> maintains its characteristics regardless of our thoughts or perceptions. It
> suggests that the true nature of something is independent of our subjective
> interpretations or opinions about it. Even if people have diverse opinions
> regarding something, even if they want something to be different, its
> fundamental characteristics remain what they are.
>
> So while both excerpts emphasize the elusive nature of attempting to grasp
> reality within the limitations of human perception, both putting forth the
> idea that reality is not dependent on our thoughts or interpretations,
> Merlea-Ponty focuses on the *continual process of perception and the
> 'mystery' surrounding the ipseity of things*; while Peirce emphasizes the*
> intrinsic independence of reality from human consciousness*. There is
> certainly some considerable correspondence here, however.
>
> I *have* been a bit perplexed by M-P use of 'mystery' which always
> sounded rather too 'literary' for the topic. In a review of Bryan E.
> Bannon's, *From Mastery to Mystery: A Phenomenological Foundation for an
> Environmental Ethic *
> https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/from-mastery-to-mystery-a-phenomenological-foundation-for-an-environmental-ethic/
> *,* Michael E. Zimmerman finds the source of M-P's notion of 'mystery'
> in Heidegger.
>
> Counseling attunement to the "mystery" of things, a mystery that
> techno-science cannot countenance, Heidegger surmised that modernity's
> one-dimensional understanding of being is only temporary. In a few
> centuries, he prophesized, the clearing may be altered, thereby making
> possible a non-domineering relationship between human *Dasein *[and
> nature].
>
> This emphasis on the 'mystery' of nature challenges the idea of the
RE: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness
Gary R and Martin, i'm just now reading your posts in reply to the one i put up
last week.
Gary, you focus on Merleau-Ponty's reference to the “mystery” inherent in
“ipseity.” What this brings to my mind is not Heidegger, but rather Peirce's
own reference to Secondness as “the being that consists in arbitrary brute
action upon other things, not only irrational but anti-rational, since to
rationalize it would be to destroy its being” (CP 6.342
<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/slc.htm#lvgntl> , 1907; that link leads to the
context as quoted in Turning Signs).
The rationality of science is in its Thirdness, of course, but the truth of a
theory in positive science depends on the genuine Secondness, the inexplicably
real existence, of the objects of its attention. That's why Secondness is
predominant in Peirce's usage of the term “experience.” Some phenomenologists
think that scientific explanation of phenomena reduces their “mystery,” but for
Peirce, their genuine “anti-rational” Secondness is involved in the truth of a
sound theory, not eliminated by it. Rationalization, on the other hand, would
“destroy its being,” leaving the predicate of a proposition bereft of an ens
reale to which it could really apply.
Scientific reasoning is much more than rationalization because, as Martin says,
it is inherently public. No valid proposition in science is merely “true for
me”: if it is true, it is true for any suitably equipped observer of the
phenomenon which is subject of its predicate. This is what enables a science to
generalize without losing touch with experiential reality. That's why only a
refutation of a theory can be logically conclusive, as both Popper and Peirce
recognized.
Confirmations can turn out to be rationalizations, even by people who are
honestly trying to make their perceptual judgments “objectively.” But when some
of the most powerful vested interests on the planet are determined to
rationalize destructive public policies and corporate behavior based on denial
of ecological reality, and have ways of using “social media” to do it, the
practical result is the continuing degradation of the planetary life support
system. The rise of the tech giants and surveillance capitalism
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism> in the 21st century is
a major factor in humanity's failure to address, at scale, the present reality
of ecological overshoot <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecological_overshoot> .
They tend to reinforce the “domineering” attitude of the dominant culture
toward nature, as your source mentioned, Gary.
GR: Have we already passed the tipping point where our attempt to master nature
is leading to imminent ecological disaster?
GF: The science shows that we are already breaking several of the “planetary
boundaries” marking the limits of the “safe zone” for human activity. Even
Netflix has shown this in several recent documentaries. Whether we have passed
the tipping points where the damage becomes irreversible is hard to say, as the
evidence of the future isn't in yet. But the trend is unmistakable. William
Catton's Overshoot could have made this clear as far back as 1980, if anyone
had been paying attention. But collectively on the global scale, we still
appear to be ecologically blind. A new book on the subject by economist Peter
A. Victor is entitled Escape from Overshoot, which seems optimistic, although
it gives a factually realistic assessment of the present situation. It may
still be possible to manage a gradual decline of human consumption and
pollution patterns instead of a catastrophic collapse.
I think Peircean semiotic is highly valuable for analyzing and understanding
the role of communication media in this situation. They all deploy symbols, of
course, and it's crucial to recognize that “Symbols are particularly remote
from the Truth itself” (EP2:307 <https://gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm#3f>
). But Peirceans also have to use symbols in order to communicate that insight,
and the message is submerged in the flood of mis- and disinformation. It seems
that no matter what people believe these days, however implausible to
scientific (or even common) sense, they can find sources online that will
reinforce their beliefs. Personally i'm not optimistic that semiotics can do
much to reverse the trend of the Anthropocene. Maybe we can hope that human or
posthuman survivors of the ongoing degradation of the planet will learn
something from whatever is left of semiotic science.
Love, gary
Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
} The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G. Bateson] {
<https://gnusystems.ca/wp/> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{
<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/> Turning Signs
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On
Behalf Of Gary Richmond
Sent: Saturday, April 27, 2024 6:10 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc:
[PEIRCE-L] Logic in Question 11 / May 2-3 2024, Sorbonne, Paris
LiQ is an annual workshop at the Sorbonne. The first edition was in 2011, the ninth in 2019. After an interruption due to the pandemic, the workshop started again in 2023, with the 10th edition. This year 2024 it will be the 11th edition. Everybody is welcome to join. Free entrance. Details and program here: https://sites.google.com/view/liq11/ Past Editions. See the list of past speakers here: https://www.logic-in-question.org/speakers-2011-2019.html And here the resulting book: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-94452-0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness
Dear Gary and List, I'll never forget the transcendent experience I had when I read the passage in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, where he endeavors to account for his left hand's touching the right hand's touching something else. I agree that the mystery of Merleau-Ponty's continual process of perception, and Peirce's' intrinsic independence of reality from human consciousness are sibling renderings of experience, both recognizing the limitations of the Kantian Age's attachment to "Das Ding an Sich." Even the most atomic of conceptions in science have prototypes, indeterminate conditions, and histories. There are bundles of shared interests, habits, and commitments that inform them. These factors constitute what Peirce calls “the social impulse” at the base of any concept. When we treat a theory as if it were an absolutely determinate, individual state, we cover over the vagueness involved in implementing it, and we ignore its general significance. We neglect the social impulse. The essence of pragmatism, I would say, lies in grasping not only that there is no scientific practice independent of the open system, wherein we can draw probabilistic inferences based on hypotheses and inductions, but also that there is also no theory independent of the practices that inform it. Appreciative regards, Martin Kettelhut ____ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Gary Richmond Sent: Saturday, April 27, 2024 4:10 PM To: g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness [Note: I'd like to replace my earlier response to Gary Fuhrman's post with this one. The first was written in haste and, in fact, I'd forgotten I'd sent it as it was nothing but a rough draft of some of the ideas I wanted to reflect on. I hope that the present post will offer something of substance to discuss. GR] gary f., List, I'm sorry to have taken so long to respond, but I've been unexpectedly busy dealing with off List issues (plus a bout of Covid 19 -- I'm finally testing negative). Your post is such a rich cornucopia of ideas that I've decided to focus on just a short segment of it with some comments centered around the quotations by Merleau-Ponty, Peirce, and William James. I'll start with what amounts to little more than a paraphrase of the two quotations by M-P and Peirce which you juxtaposed. Merleau-Ponty remarks that our experiences are given as a unified whole with synthesis occurring, not because they express a fixed quality or identity, but because they are gathered together in an elusive 'ipseity'. Each perceived aspect of a thing only serves as an invitation to perceive beyond it. This leads to a continual process of perception [and of semiosis?] If it were possible for the thing to be fully grasped it would cease to be a thing since its reality lies precisely in that 'mystery' which prevents us from fully possessing it. On the other hand, Peirce's statement defines the real as that which maintains its characteristics regardless of our thoughts or perceptions. It suggests that the true nature of something is independent of our subjective interpretations or opinions about it. Even if people have diverse opinions regarding something, even if they want something to be different, its fundamental characteristics remain what they are. So while both excerpts emphasize the elusive nature of attempting to grasp reality within the limitations of human perception, both putting forth the idea that reality is not dependent on our thoughts or interpretations, Merlea-Ponty focuses on the continual process of perception and the 'mystery' surrounding the ipseity of things; while Peirce emphasizes the intrinsic independence of reality from human consciousness. There is certainly some considerable correspondence here, however. I have been a bit perplexed by M-P use of 'mystery' which always sounded rather too 'literary' for the topic. In a review of Bryan E. Bannon's, From Mastery to Mystery: A Phenomenological Foundation for an Environmental Ethic https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/from-mastery-to-mystery-a-phenomenological-foundation-for-an-environmental-ethic/ , Michael E. Zimmerman finds the source of M-P's notion of 'mystery' in Heidegger. Counseling attunement to the "mystery" of things, a mystery that techno-science cannot countenance, Heidegger surmised that modernity's one-dimensional understanding of being is only temporary. In a few centuries, he prophesized, the clearing may be altered, thereby making possible a non-domineering relationship between human Dasein [and nature]. This emphasis on the 'mystery' of nature challenges the idea of the "mastery" of nature. Bannon proposes that intertwining the views of Latour, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty "opens the possibility for us to experience certain kinds of feelings toward various hu
Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness
tity of the object, but in that they are all
> collected together, by the last of their number, in the ipseity of the
> thing. The ipseity is, of course, never *reached*: each aspect of the
> thing which falls to our perception is still only an invitation to perceive
> beyond it, still only a momentary halt in the perceptual process. If the
> thing itself were reached, it would be from that moment arrayed before us
> and stripped of its mystery. It would cease to exist as a thing at the very
> moment when we thought to possess it. What makes the ‘reality’ of the thing
> is therefore precisely what snatches it from our grasp. ]] (Merleau-Ponty
> 1945, 271)
>
> This is, in context, quite consistent with Peirce's definition of
> ‘reality’:
>
> [[ I define the *real* as that which holds its characters on such a
> tenure that it makes not the slightest difference what any man or men may
> have *thought* them to be, or ever will have *thought* them to be, here
> using thought to include, imagining, opining, and willing (as long as
> forcible *means* are not used); but the real thing's characters will
> remain absolutely untouched. ]] (CP 6.495, c. 1906)
>
> None of this denies that thoughts can make a difference to the *future*
> character of real things. Nor does it deny Peirce's assertion that ‘we have
> *direct
> experience of things in themselves*’ (CP 6.95). Experience is not
> knowledge, although it is *involved* in knowing, as Secondness is
> involved in Thirdness, which in turn will determine ‘future facts of
> Secondness.’ In the process of inquiry or of learning, what James called
> ‘our sense of a determinate direction’ is a feeling of being about to know
> more than we did before, or getting closer to the Truth. But semiotic
> experience teaches that our knowledge is never completely determinate.
>
> [[ No cognition and no Sign is absolutely precise, not even a Percept; and
> indefiniteness is of two kinds, indefiniteness as to what is the Object of
> the Sign, and indefiniteness as to its Interpretant, or indefiniteness in
> Breadth and in Depth. ]] (CP 4.543, 1906)
>
> Any knowledge that will prove useful as guidance into the future must be
> *general*, and thus indefinite in that sense.
>
> [[ Yet every proposition actually asserted must refer to some non-general
> subject …. Indeed, all propositions refer to one and the same determinately
> singular subject, well-understood between all utterers and interpreters;
> namely, to The Truth, which is the universe of all universes, and is
> assumed on all hands to be real. But besides that, there is some lesser
> environment of the utterer and interpreter of each proposition that
> actually gets conveyed, to which that proposition more particularly refers
> and which is not general. ]] (CP 5.506, c. 1905)
>
> That ‘lesser environment’ is evidently what Peirce elsewhere called ‘the
> common stock of knowledge of utterer and interpreter’ (EP2:310), i.e. the
> *commind* or *commens* (EP2:478). Its particular *subject* may be
> ‘determinately singular,’ but *predicates* are always general to some
> degree, so the proposition actually conveyed still involves some
> indeterminacy. Thus we can't say that a proposition is necessarily and
> absolutely either true or false unless we deny the reality of
> indeterminacy, i.e. of both generality and vagueness. This denial is
> formulated as the “principle of excluded middle.”
>
> [[ To speak of the actual state of things implies a great assumption,
> namely that there is a perfectly definite body of propositions which, if we
> could only find them out, are the truth, and that everything is really
> either true or in positive conflict with the truth. This assumption, called
> the principle of excluded middle, I consider utterly unwarranted, and do
> not believe it. ]] (Peirce, NEM 3:758, 1893)
>
> Even if the dynamic Object of a symbolic utterance is a fully determinate
> singular, the sign itself is still ‘indefinite as to its Interpretant’ (as
> explained above). ‘No communication of one person to another can be
> entirely definite, i.e., non-vague’ (CP 5.506).
>
> ________
>
> Love, gary f.
>
> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
>
> } Everything is involved which can be evolved. [Peirce] {
>
> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/>
>
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at
> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the
> links!
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should
[PEIRCE-L] Newton da Costa / CfP Book and Congress / ici-Rio-2024
https://sites.google.com/view/creativity2019/abf30 and the projection of the film "Spirit of Contradiction" in the Caixa Cultural cinema in downtown Rio de Janeiro https://sites.google.com/view/creativity2019/movie (9) JOINT WORKS WITH NEWTON DA COSTA I wrote a book and more than 10 papers with Newton da Costa: https://www.jyb-logic.org/papers.html The last one: Newton da Costa and Jean-Yves Beziau "Is God Paraconsistent?" in Beyond Faith and Rationality - Essays on Logic, Religion and Philosophy Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2020: http://www.jyb-logic.org/GOD I also translated the main book of Newton da Costa in French in 1997 with two additional appendices, one on paraconsistent logic, the first presentation of paraconsistent logic in French, and one on the theory of valuations: https://www.amazon.fr/Logiques-classiques-non-fondements-logique/dp/2225852472 (10) BOOK IN HONOR OF NEWTON DA COSTA - Call for Papers Together with Decio Krause, one of his most important friends and collaborators, we will edit and publish a book in honor of Newton da Costa in the book series Studies in Universal Logic (Birkhäuser / Springer) https://www.springer.com/series/7391 We invite all those who are interested to contribute to send a paper by September 16, 2024 (Birthday of Newton da Costa). (11) CONGRESS IN HONOR OF NEWTON DA COSTA - ICI-RIO-2024 - Call for Abstracts We are organizing the event ici-Rio-2024 in memory of Newton da Costa: Imagination, Creativity, Intelligence, Rio de Janeiro, December, 9-13, 2024. Everybody is welcome to send an abstract: https://sites.google.com/view/ici-rio-2024/ See you in Rio in December ! >- Prof. Dr. Dr. Jean-Yves Beziau Federal University of Rio de de Janeiro, Brazil https://philpeople.org/profiles/jean-yves-beziau _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] List moderator;s request for a pause in the 'mark' v. 'tone' discussion, Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
Gary was not on your recipient list but you obviously intended for him to receive it. Peirce-l doesn't receive your messages, at least for the time being. - Ben On 4/22/2024 3:53 PM, John F Sowa wrote: Gary and Ben, Why do you insist on punishing me instead of Jon? Or both? You asked me to forward any note to Jon to you for prior approval. I went one step further. I promised that I would never again send or reply to any note by Jon. As you may have seen, my notes to everybody else are perfectly fine. The reason why I continued that thread is for one very simple reason: I refused to let Jon have the last word. There are many prominent Peirce scholars, who subscribed in former years and some who continue to subscribe but do not send any notes. As some have explained (offline to me), there is one very annoying reason: Jon never allows anybody to have the last word. Just look back at many, many threads. In every thread in which Jon is involved, he has the last word. And that is not because he had he stronger argument. In many notes on very interesting threads, somebody will make one remark that Jon disagrees with. He'll respond to that point with "a barrage of quotations" (as Robert Marty said) and ignore all the other issues. And he continues on that narrow thread until the other person stops -- usually from exhaustion or disgust. You asked me to forward any note to Jon to you for prior approval. I went one step further. I promised that I would never again send or reply to any note by Jon. As you may have seen, my notes to everybody else are perfectly fine. So please restore by access to P-List. I guarantee that there will never again be any note from me that anybody might complain about. And since I cannot say anything to Jon, I recommend that you make one suggestion to him: Please imitate Socrates, especially as Plato portrays him in the early essays Socrates never contradicts anyone. He just ask questions. For people whose ideas are erroneous, inconsistent, or poorly thought out, their answers quickly get them tied up in knots. If Jon were to imitate Socrates, he could state all his comments and quotations as questions -- and often get much more interesting responses. Often from people who have very important new ways of looking at the old issues. John_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness
and indefiniteness as to its Interpretant, or indefiniteness in
> Breadth and in Depth. ]] (CP 4.543, 1906)
>
> Any knowledge that will prove useful as guidance into the future must be
> *general*, and thus indefinite in that sense.
>
> [[ Yet every proposition actually asserted must refer to some non-general
> subject …. Indeed, all propositions refer to one and the same determinately
> singular subject, well-understood between all utterers and interpreters;
> namely, to The Truth, which is the universe of all universes, and is
> assumed on all hands to be real. But besides that, there is some lesser
> environment of the utterer and interpreter of each proposition that
> actually gets conveyed, to which that proposition more particularly refers
> and which is not general. ]] (CP 5.506, c. 1905)
>
> That ‘lesser environment’ is evidently what Peirce elsewhere called ‘the
> common stock of knowledge of utterer and interpreter’ (EP2:310), i.e. the
> *commind* or *commens* (EP2:478). Its particular *subject* may be
> ‘determinately singular,’ but *predicates* are always general to some
> degree, so the proposition actually conveyed still involves some
> indeterminacy. Thus we can't say that a proposition is necessarily and
> absolutely either true or false unless we deny the reality of
> indeterminacy, i.e. of both generality and vagueness. This denial is
> formulated as the “principle of excluded middle.”
>
> [[ To speak of the actual state of things implies a great assumption,
> namely that there is a perfectly definite body of propositions which, if we
> could only find them out, are the truth, and that everything is really
> either true or in positive conflict with the truth. This assumption, called
> the principle of excluded middle, I consider utterly unwarranted, and do
> not believe it. ]] (Peirce, NEM 3:758, 1893)
>
> Even if the dynamic Object of a symbolic utterance is a fully determinate
> singular, the sign itself is still ‘indefinite as to its Interpretant’ (as
> explained above). ‘No communication of one person to another can be
> entirely definite, i.e., non-vague’ (CP 5.506).
>
>
>
> Love, gary f.
>
> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
>
> } Everything is involved which can be evolved. [Peirce] {
>
> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/>
>
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at
> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the
> links!
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
> message and nothing in the body. More at
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at
https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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[PEIRCE-L] Why the hexagon of opposition is really a triangle: logical structures as geometric shapes - Ori Milstein - LUW April 24, 2024, 4pm CET
Logica Universalis Webinar April 24, 2024 at 4pm CET Speaker: Ori Milstein https://philpeople.org/profiles/ori-milstein Title: "Why the hexagon of opposition is really a triangle: logical structures as geometric shapes" Abstract: "This paper suggests a new approach (with old roots) to the study of the connection between logic and geometry. Traditionally, most logic diagrams associate only vertices of shapes with propositions. The new approach, which can be dubbed ’full logical geometry’, aims to associate every element of a shape (edges, faces, etc.) with a proposition. The roots of this approach can be found in the works of Carroll, Jacoby, and more recently, Dubois and Prade. However, its potential has not been duly appreciated, probably because of the complexity of the diagrams in these works. The following study demonstrates how the Hexagon of Opposition can be represented as a triangle and Classical Logic as a tetrahedron (rather than a rhombic dodecahedron). It then applies the approach to modal logic, extending the tetrahedron for the logic KT into a dipyramid and a cube for KD, and finally an octahedron for K. Some possible directions for further research are also indicated.." https://link.springer.com/journal/11787 Associate event World Congress on the Square of Opposition SQUARE 8 - Costa Rica Sept 6-13, 2024 https://sites.google.com/view/square8-2024 Presented by Pablo Villalobos Morera and Lorenzo Boccafogli Chair : Arnon Avron https://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~aa/ Editorial Board LU Everybody is welcome to join, register here: https://cassyni.com/events/VF7GYYaHGPGZiFeSZDibRX Jean-Yves Beziau Editor of Logica Universalis and Organizer of LUW https://philpeople.org/profiles/jean-yves-beziau _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laboratory for phenomenological research
A scientific man is likely in the course of a long life to pick up a pretty extensive acquaintance with the results of science; but in many branches, this is so little necessary that one will meet with men of the most deserved renown in science who will tell you that, beyond their own little nooks, they hardly know anything of what others have done. (EP 2: 130) That's how science works ... Robert Marty Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* Le ven. 19 avr. 2024 à 23:47, John F Sowa a écrit : > I just came across an announcement of this laboratory at the University of > Illinois. https://institutephenom.web.illinois.edu/people/ > > Note that they mention Heidegger and Husserl, but not Peirce. > > These are the kind of people we need to educate. Fine points about > Peirce's MSS are important for Peirce scholars. But people like these are > addressing important issues for today. And they never heard of Peirce. > > Following is the web page of their leader, Thomas Byrne: > https://thomasbyrnephenomenology.com > > John > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness
hought to possess it. What makes the
‘reality’ of the thing is therefore precisely what snatches it from our grasp.
]] (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 271)
This is, in context, quite consistent with Peirce's definition of ‘reality’:
[[ I define the real as that which holds its characters on such a tenure that
it makes not the slightest difference what any man or men may have thought them
to be, or ever will have thought them to be, here using thought to include,
imagining, opining, and willing (as long as forcible means are not used); but
the real thing's characters will remain absolutely untouched. ]] (CP 6.495, c.
1906)
None of this denies that thoughts can make a difference to the future character
of real things. Nor does it deny Peirce's assertion that ‘we have direct
experience of things in themselves’ (CP 6.95). Experience is not knowledge,
although it is involved in knowing, as Secondness is involved in Thirdness,
which in turn will determine ‘future facts of Secondness.’ In the process of
inquiry or of learning, what James called ‘our sense of a determinate
direction’ is a feeling of being about to know more than we did before, or
getting closer to the Truth. But semiotic experience teaches that our knowledge
is never completely determinate.
[[ No cognition and no Sign is absolutely precise, not even a Percept; and
indefiniteness is of two kinds, indefiniteness as to what is the Object of the
Sign, and indefiniteness as to its Interpretant, or indefiniteness in Breadth
and in Depth. ]] (CP 4.543, 1906)
Any knowledge that will prove useful as guidance into the future must be
general, and thus indefinite in that sense.
[[ Yet every proposition actually asserted must refer to some non-general
subject …. Indeed, all propositions refer to one and the same determinately
singular subject, well-understood between all utterers and interpreters;
namely, to The Truth, which is the universe of all universes, and is assumed on
all hands to be real. But besides that, there is some lesser environment of the
utterer and interpreter of each proposition that actually gets conveyed, to
which that proposition more particularly refers and which is not general. ]]
(CP 5.506, c. 1905)
That ‘lesser environment’ is evidently what Peirce elsewhere called ‘the common
stock of knowledge of utterer and interpreter’ (EP2:310), i.e. the commind or
commens (EP2:478). Its particular subject may be ‘determinately singular,’ but
predicates are always general to some degree, so the proposition actually
conveyed still involves some indeterminacy. Thus we can't say that a
proposition is necessarily and absolutely either true or false unless we deny
the reality of indeterminacy, i.e. of both generality and vagueness. This
denial is formulated as the “principle of excluded middle.”
[[ To speak of the actual state of things implies a great assumption, namely
that there is a perfectly definite body of propositions which, if we could only
find them out, are the truth, and that everything is really either true or in
positive conflict with the truth. This assumption, called the principle of
excluded middle, I consider utterly unwarranted, and do not believe it. ]]
(Peirce, NEM 3:758, 1893)
Even if the dynamic Object of a symbolic utterance is a fully determinate
singular, the sign itself is still ‘indefinite as to its Interpretant’ (as
explained above). ‘No communication of one person to another can be entirely
definite, i.e., non-vague’ (CP 5.506).
Love, gary f.
Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
} Everything is involved which can be evolved. [Peirce] {
https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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[PEIRCE-L] CfP - Workshop Diagrams and Mathematical Practice - Part of DIAGRAMS 2024 - Münster, Germany, Sept 27 - Oct 1st, 2024
Organizers: Jean-Yves Beziau, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and Andrei Rodin, Nancy, France Send a 300/500 words abstract by May 15 to diamapra2...@protonmail.com https://diagrams-2024.diagrams-conference.org/workshops/diagrams-and-mathematical-practice/ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] List moderator;s request for a pause in the 'mark' v. 'tone' discussion, Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
Ben, Gary, List, As I said in my last note, this thread has wasted everybody's time for no useful purpose. The real expert on this topic is Tony Jappy, who has devoted years of research and publications to this topic. As I said in the first notes, Tony is the expert on this topic.. But he does not enjoy debates of this kind -- for very good reason . So I posted excerpts from Tony's writings. And I would have been happy to discuss those issues, which are far more important then just supporting a choice of one label (tone) vs another (mark). But Jon would never stop. He kept repeating the same claim over and over and over again. He would not even consider the issues that Tony had published in books and articles. In any case, Tony is the expert. If anybody has any doubts on these issues, discuss them with Tony offline. I have zero desire to continue. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] List moderator;s request for a pause in the 'mark' v. 'tone' discussion, Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
Well said. Joe Ransdell would be proud. - Best, Ben On 4/20/2024 6:26 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: List, As Edwina accurately commented a few days ago, this exchange between John and Jon has become less a discussion and more a debate, so much so that I have commented -- now for the third time -- that it would seem to me that Peirce-L members now (and perhaps for some time now) have enough information in the form of argumentation and accompanying textual (and other) support to make up their own minds as to who has made the stronger case, John for 'mark' or Jon for 'tone'. Or perhaps it still remains a question in some Listers' minds. Or perhaps a certain ennui has settled in for some here leading to a sense of "so what?" or "who really cares?" or "enough already!" I personally have found the exchange stimulating and valuable. In any event, I am requesting that the two principal participants in the thread, Jon Alan Schmidt and John Sowa, as well as all others who have chimed in (including me), cease this particular discussion for now, including their not commenting on my decision as moderator for* all* to take a break from it. Should there be some good reason to take up the question again in the future, I would ask that the two principals first present that reasoning me off List. I would also ask that neither of them now attempt "to have the last word" in this matter. There are many topics of potential interest to members of Peirce-L such that I would hope that other List members, given a window of opportunity to suggest new topics for discussion, will indeed introduce them whether they result in a threaded discussion or not. Rarely have I suggested that certain participants were posting too frequently. But both Joe Ransdell and I finally had to intervene as List moderators in the interest of the Peirce-L community's well-being to say *just* that and to request in this case, that John and Jon post no more than twice a week for the next two weeks. Should either of them have questions regarding this action, I would ask them to please write me off List. The ideal for both Joe and me has always been that Peirce-L be as self-moderating as possible. But sometimes forms of participant *immoderation* calls for the moderator to step in the interest of the health of the List. I am doing so now. Best, Gary Richmond (writing as Peirce-L moderator, co-manager with Ben Udell) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] List moderator;s request for a pause in the 'mark' v. 'tone' discussion, Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
List, As Edwina accurately commented a few days ago, this exchange between John and Jon has become less a discussion and more a debate, so much so that I have commented -- now for the third time -- that it would seem to me that Peirce-L members now (and perhaps for some time now) have enough information in the form of argumentation and accompanying textual (and other) support to make up their own minds as to who has made the stronger case, John for 'mark' or Jon for 'tone'. Or perhaps it still remains a question in some Listers' minds. Or perhaps a certain ennui has settled in for some here leading to a sense of "so what?" or "who really cares?" or "enough already!" I personally have found the exchange stimulating and valuable. In any event, I am requesting that the two principal participants in the thread, Jon Alan Schmidt and John Sowa, as well as all others who have chimed in (including me), cease this particular discussion for now, including their not commenting on my decision as moderator for* all* to take a break from it. Should there be some good reason to take up the question again in the future, I would ask that the two principals first present that reasoning me off List. I would also ask that neither of them now attempt "to have the last word" in this matter. There are many topics of potential interest to members of Peirce-L such that I would hope that other List members, given a window of opportunity to suggest new topics for discussion, will indeed introduce them whether they result in a threaded discussion or not. Rarely have I suggested that certain participants were posting too frequently. But both Joe Ransdell and I finally had to intervene as List moderators in the interest of the Peirce-L community's well-being to say *just* that and to request in this case, that John and Jon post no more than twice a week for the next two weeks. Should either of them have questions regarding this action, I would ask them to please write me off List. The ideal for both Joe and me has always been that Peirce-L be as self-moderating as possible. But sometimes forms of participant *immoderation* calls for the moderator to step in the interest of the health of the List. I am doing so now. Best, Gary Richmond (writing as Peirce-L moderator, co-manager with Ben Udell) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
Jon, List, On that point, we are in complete agreement: JFS: The word 'instance' is an OPTIONAL term that may be added to almost any noun in the English language. JAS: In general, this is true; but Peirce clearly and repeatedly states that it is important (if not mandatory) to recognize and maintain the distinction between a "graph" as a type and a "graph-instance" as a token, and sometimes he also advocates doing the same with "word" and "word-instance." Yes, indeed. That is also the reason why we need to use exactly the same character string with the option of adding "instance" whenever there might be any possibility of a mistake. As for the choice of Peirce's many character strings to adopt, see the attached 2-page extract from Tony Jappy's article and 2017 book on this subject. That extract contains four tables from his 2017 book, which started this lengthy thread. By the way, this is not an argument from authority. This is a citation of an expert who has done more research and publications on these issues than any of us -- in fact, more than any any subscriber to Peirce list. If anybody has any doubts on this subject, please consult Tony (email address above).Tony prefers not to debate issues on P-list because they can become interminably long (such as this one). But I am sure that he would be very gracious in answering any questions anyone may have. Meanwhile, the issues of relating Peirce's work to the 21st C are a more important topic for most subscribers to P-List. John Jappy_Tables.pdf Description: Adobe PDF document _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
e relation, but only the traits of the relation are composed of the traits of the correlates. Same with spatiotemporal and functional. Well, this is tentative, an idea of which I am not sure whether or not it would be good to further pursue it. It makes everything more complicated, but maybe it is complicated? Best regards, Helmut 16. April 2024 um 20:10 Uhr Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Helmut, List: HR: I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three relations. According to Peirce, the genuine triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating has three correlates--the sign, its (dynamical) object, and its (final) interpretant. This relation is irreducibly triadic, such that it is not composed of its constituent dyadic relations, although it involves the genuine dyadic relations between the sign and its external correlates--its dynamical object, its dynamical interpretant, and its final interpretant. HR: Each of the three relations (if it may be said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign and itself), are of one of three classes so a sign triad it is a composition of classes. According to Peirce, there is no trichotomy for the sign's relation with itself. In his 1903 taxonomy, the first trichotomy is for the sign itself as a correlate, while the second and third trichotomies are for the sign's genuine dyadic relations with its (dynamical) object and (final) interpretant. Together, these three trichotomies result in ten sign classes, not "compositions of classes"--one class of qualisigns (later tones), three classes of sinsigns (tokens), and six classes of legisigns (types); three classes of icons, four classes of indices, and three classes of symbols; six classes of rhemes (later semes), three classes of dicisigns (phemes), and one class of arguments (delomes). In his 1906-1908 taxonomies, Peirce adds trichotomies for the other five correlates, the sign's genuine dyadic relation with its dynamical interpretant, and the genuine triadic relation. Together, these ten trichotomies would result in 66 sign classes upon being arranged in their proper logical order of determination, but Peirce himself never did this. HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction. According to Peirce, one sign can be more or less iconic, indexical, or symbolic than another sign--especially since all symbols involve indices and icons, and all indices involve icons. Moreover, a sign can be predominately iconic while still having indexical and symbolic aspects, or predominately indexical while still having symbolic aspects. On the other hand, both tones as "indefinite significant characters" and types as "definitely significant Forms" are embodied in tokens, such that every type involves tokens (its instances) and every token involves tones. Most (maybe all) of the other eight trichotomies in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies are sharp distinctions, although the necessitant typically involves the existent and the possible, and the existent involves the possible. For example, every sign must be either a seme, a pheme, or a delome; but all delomes involve phemes and semes, and all phemes involve semes. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Apr 16, 2024 at 11:33 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: Jon, List, you wrote: "Classification is not always "either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp distinction. A pure icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any object, and a pure index would denote an object without signifying any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has both an object and an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a genuine sign, an index is a degenerate sign, and an icon is a doubly degenerate sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901)." I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three relations. Therefore e.g an index doesn´t come alone, it cannot be a "pure" one. So I donot see a point in guessing, what a pure icon would be like, it is not possible, can not exist. Each of the three relations (if it may be said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign and itself), are of one of three classes. so a sign triad it is a composition of classes. But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction. Best regards, Helmut _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
m (what linguists call the "unmarked form") does > not use the word 'instance'. They would call the addition of the word > 'instance' a "marked form" that is used for emphasis. Except for an > introductory tutorial, I believe that Peirce is being unnecessarily > pedantic. > > CSP: Any shape or combination of shapes that put on the Sheet of Assertion > would be an assertion, I term a *graph*, and your act of putting it on > any surface by writing or drawing or a mixture of the two I express by > saying that you *scribe *that sign on that *area*; and the result of > doing so, that is any single one among the inexhaustible multitude of > possible embodiments of the graph, I call a graph-instance. To illustrate > the utility of this distinction, I call your attention to the fact that we > most commonly use the word "word" with a meaning analogous to that of > "graph,"--for we say that hounds, beagles, curs, mastiffs, spaniels, > terriers, poodles, and an incredible variety of other stocks are alike > included under the *single word*, *dog*. Yet when an editor asks me to > write him a paragraph of a hundred words on some subject, he means to count > every occurrence of "the" as a separate word. He does not mean *words*, > but *word-instances*; but in this case the value of brevity outweighs > that of accuracy. In the case of graphs and graph-instances, it is quite > the other way. (R 650:10-11, LF 1:164-165, 1910 Jul 23) > > Mathematicians have been choosing brevity since Euclid, and they still > do. As for the question about how many identical graph instances occur on > the phemic sheet, that is a moot point -- because the rules of inference > allow copies in the same area to be made or erased at any time. It's > irrelevant how you count them, because you can change the count without > changing the meaning of what is on the phemic sheet. > > JAS: Here Peirce explicitly *denies *that a graph is a "mark," which he > explicitly *equates *with an "existent or actual individual," i.e., a > token--so "mark" is plainly unsuitable for naming a *different *member of > the same trichotomy. > > No. In a letter to Welby, he explicitly adopted the word 'mark' as a > replacement for 'potisign' (possible sign). That shows that he recognized > a standard practice in the English language: Use exactly the same word for > the abstract "may be" and the actual instance. He also admits that option > for its "value as brevity." > > GR: 1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist > in the orchestra. 2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was > angry. Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker > would understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. > > JFS: Yes, they are normal sentences because the word 'tone' in these > examples is used to refer to the actual sound that is heard, not to some > mark that might distinguish one tone of voice from another. > > JAS: No, the word "tone" in Gary's examples is used to refer to a certain > *quality *of the actual sound that is heard, which *can *distinguish one > flute from another or one utterance from another. > > We agree with everything except the tag end "or one utterance from > another". The word 'tone' is a special case of an auditory mark. It may > be used to distinguish the sound of two different flutes or certain > auditory marks of an utterance. But it is not a word that anyone would use > to distinguish marks by any other senses. Even for a spoken utterance, it > would not be used to distinguish differences in the subject matter. > > Even for Peirce's example of a camel, the sound of a camel has been > compared to a toilet flushing. Nobody would call that a tone. But it is > certainly a prominent mark of a camel. > > JAS: in my own example, all lowercase, all caps, bold, italics, and color > *can *be employed to distinguish different instances (tokens) of the same > word (type) from each other such that they have different dynamical > interpretants in their different contexts. Such an "indefinitely > significant character" is *exactly *what Peirce defines as a "tone," the > possible counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "type" (CP 4.537). > > I agree that Peirce chose the word 'tone' for that distinction. But all > of those examples are visible marks. A word that is normally used to > describe sounds is a poor choice. The fact that Peirce himself vacillated > on this choice indicates he was not completely satisfied. His choice of > 'mark' is more consistent with his definition in Baldwin's dict
[PEIRCE-L] Laboratory for phenomenological research
I just came across an announcement of this laboratory at the University of Illinois. https://institutephenom.web.illinois.edu/people/ Note that they mention Heidegger and Husserl, but not Peirce. These are the kind of people we need to educate. Fine points about Peirce's MSS are important for Peirce scholars. But people like these are addressing important issues for today. And they never heard of Peirce. Following is the web page of their leader, Thomas Byrne: https://thomasbyrnephenomenology.com John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
GR: Indeed your consistent insistence that you are right -- no discussion needed, your seemingly claiming to be the final arbiter in all Peircean terminological matters Au contraire, please note that I have not claimed any authority of my own. In my comments about Peirce's position, I have used his own words, as he stated them in L376. Nobody has found anything later (or better at any time) on this topic. To reinforce Peirce's claims, I have also added explanations based on traditional usage in geometry from the Greeks to the present. Benjamin taught Charles those topics from a very early age. My primary concern is that you and Jon have made claims abut Peirce without showing any justification. That is why I believe that the analysis above, which is based on Peirce's last words on the matter and on standard practice in mathematics from Euclid to the present, is indeed the last word on this topic. Nobody has found anything to the contrary. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
supplement: I just googled involution, but it is something medicinical. So what´s the noun of to involve, is it involution, involvement, or involvation? Jerry, List, yes, but all that doesn´t mean, that there isn´t a sharp distinction between classes. It just says, that classes can involve each other. But there still isn´t a gradient between the involving and the involved class, and neither one between two parallelly involved classes. The gradient is the degree of involution (quantitative), but not between the characteristics of e.g. indexicality and symbolicity (qualitative). For example, if there is a book about frogs with a chapter about toads in it, the topic is frogs, but the book involves toads, then there still is a sharp distinction between frogs and toads. Best regards, Helmut 19. April 2024 um 05:22 Uhr Von: "Jerry LR Chandler" List, Jon: On Apr 16, 2024, at 1:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction. According to Peirce, one sign can be more or less iconic, indexical, or symbolic than another sign--especially since all symbols involve indices and icons, and all indices involve icons. Moreover, a sign can be predominately iconic while still having indexical and symbolic aspects, or predominately indexical while still having symbolic aspects. On the other hand, both tones as "indefinite significant characters" and types as "definitely significant Forms" are embodied in tokens, such that every type involves tokens (its instances) and every token involves tones. Most (maybe all) of the other eight trichotomies in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies are sharp distinctions, although the necessitant typically involves the existent and the possible, and the existent involves the possible. For example, every sign must be either a seme, a pheme, or a delome; but all delomes involve phemes and semes, and all phemes involve semes. Returning to the 1868 metaphysical definition of substance, one can attempt to ascribe names to substances following the rhetorical guidance that would presumably follow from the agency of these manufactured descriptors. Note the three distinctions that CSP hypotheses for his metaphysics. For example, I could attempt to assign the names of the ordered sequence of saturated hydrocarbons, methane, ethane, propane, butane, pentane, hexane, septane, octane, nonane, decane, and so forth. (It is probable that CSP was aware of the relative compositions of these (the first ten) saturated hydrocarbons.). The molecular formula are given by the general formula, C(n)H(2n+2). Each of these substances has properties related to temperature, such as melting point or boiling point and flammability. Each of these substances has a graph, a specific graph of the arrangement of the (n) + (2n+2) atoms in a pattern that was determined by methodologies of chemical ANALYSIS and SYNTHESIS. Furthermore, in the late 1890’s, CSP produced a research article on acetylene, a related hydrocarbon that indicated he was knowledgable of the state of the art. Can you create any correlates between the categories ( 9, or 10, or 66 or any other integer) of the semantics you appear to believe in? Or, are semantics merely rhetoric semantics for the sake of argument that can not be related to substances? More generally, from a philosophical point of view, when and how will such terminology generate the agency need for pragmatic work of symbolic agency? Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmo
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
Jerry, List, yes, but all that doesn´t mean, that there isn´t a sharp distinction between classes. It just says, that classes can involve each other. But there still isn´t a gradient between the involving and the involved class, and neither one between two parallelly involved classes. The gradient is the degree of involution (quantitative), but not between the characteristics of e.g. indexicality and symbolicity (qualitative). For example, if there is a book about frogs with a chapter about toads in it, the topic is frogs, but the book involves toads, then there still is a sharp distinction between frogs and toads. Best regards, Helmut 19. April 2024 um 05:22 Uhr Von: "Jerry LR Chandler" List, Jon: On Apr 16, 2024, at 1:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction. According to Peirce, one sign can be more or less iconic, indexical, or symbolic than another sign--especially since all symbols involve indices and icons, and all indices involve icons. Moreover, a sign can be predominately iconic while still having indexical and symbolic aspects, or predominately indexical while still having symbolic aspects. On the other hand, both tones as "indefinite significant characters" and types as "definitely significant Forms" are embodied in tokens, such that every type involves tokens (its instances) and every token involves tones. Most (maybe all) of the other eight trichotomies in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies are sharp distinctions, although the necessitant typically involves the existent and the possible, and the existent involves the possible. For example, every sign must be either a seme, a pheme, or a delome; but all delomes involve phemes and semes, and all phemes involve semes. Returning to the 1868 metaphysical definition of substance, one can attempt to ascribe names to substances following the rhetorical guidance that would presumably follow from the agency of these manufactured descriptors. Note the three distinctions that CSP hypotheses for his metaphysics. For example, I could attempt to assign the names of the ordered sequence of saturated hydrocarbons, methane, ethane, propane, butane, pentane, hexane, septane, octane, nonane, decane, and so forth. (It is probable that CSP was aware of the relative compositions of these (the first ten) saturated hydrocarbons.). The molecular formula are given by the general formula, C(n)H(2n+2). Each of these substances has properties related to temperature, such as melting point or boiling point and flammability. Each of these substances has a graph, a specific graph of the arrangement of the (n) + (2n+2) atoms in a pattern that was determined by methodologies of chemical ANALYSIS and SYNTHESIS. Furthermore, in the late 1890’s, CSP produced a research article on acetylene, a related hydrocarbon that indicated he was knowledgable of the state of the art. Can you create any correlates between the categories ( 9, or 10, or 66 or any other integer) of the semantics you appear to believe in? Or, are semantics merely rhetoric semantics for the sake of argument that can not be related to substances? More generally, from a philosophical point of view, when and how will such terminology generate the agency need for pragmatic work of symbolic agency? Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
List, Jon: > On Apr 16, 2024, at 1:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, > index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction. > > According to Peirce, one sign can be more or less iconic, indexical, or > symbolic than another sign--especially since all symbols involve indices and > icons, and all indices involve icons. Moreover, a sign can be predominately > iconic while still having indexical and symbolic aspects, or predominately > indexical while still having symbolic aspects. On the other hand, both tones > as "indefinite significant characters" and types as "definitely significant > Forms" are embodied in tokens, such that every type involves tokens (its > instances) and every token involves tones. Most (maybe all) of the other > eight trichotomies in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies are sharp distinctions, > although the necessitant typically involves the existent and the possible, > and the existent involves the possible. For example, every sign must be > either a seme, a pheme, or a delome; but all delomes involve phemes and > semes, and all phemes involve semes. Returning to the 1868 metaphysical definition of substance, one can attempt to ascribe names to substances following the rhetorical guidance that would presumably follow from the agency of these manufactured descriptors. Note the three distinctions that CSP hypotheses for his metaphysics. For example, I could attempt to assign the names of the ordered sequence of saturated hydrocarbons, methane, ethane, propane, butane, pentane, hexane, septane, octane, nonane, decane, and so forth. (It is probable that CSP was aware of the relative compositions of these (the first ten) saturated hydrocarbons.). The molecular formula are given by the general formula, C(n)H(2n+2). Each of these substances has properties related to temperature, such as melting point or boiling point and flammability. Each of these substances has a graph, a specific graph of the arrangement of the (n) + (2n+2) atoms in a pattern that was determined by methodologies of chemical ANALYSIS and SYNTHESIS. Furthermore, in the late 1890’s, CSP produced a research article on acetylene, a related hydrocarbon that indicated he was knowledgable of the state of the art. Can you create any correlates between the categories ( 9, or 10, or 66 or any other integer) of the semantics you appear to believe in? Or, are semantics merely rhetoric semantics for the sake of argument that can not be related to substances? More generally, from a philosophical point of view, when and how will such terminology generate the agency need for pragmatic work of symbolic agency? Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
at claim confuses two very different ways of talking about two very > different topics. Teachers who are explaining how to draw, use, and talk > about EGs call them graphs, not graph instances. However, philosophers who > are distinguishing theory and practice, use a metalanguage for > distinguishing the abstract form (a might-be) from the actual visible > drawings. > > Just look at any book on geometry from Aristotle to the present. The > words such as 'circle' or 'triangle' refer to abstract forms. And > *EXACTLY *the same words are used to describe the drawings in a book or > computer screen (or even on sand, as they often did in the olden days). > > But as a philosopher, Plato made a very sharp *METALEVEL* distinction > between the abstract Platonic forms and the visible patterns drawn in ink, > chalk, wax, or sand. Nevertheless, all working mathematicians use the > simple words circle, triangle, square... when they're solving problems, > proving theorems, and writing explanations for both experts and students. > Please note how Peirce writes about EGs when he's using them to solve > problems. He does not call them graph-instances. > > In an earlier note, I commented on the last phrase by Peirce in the above > quotation: "in that respect [a graph is] just like a "*word*,"--*any* word, > say *camel*."Then I gave the following examples to show why the word > 'mark' is better than 'tone' in the trichotomy of (Mark Token Type): > > 1. A hump is a mark of a camel. > 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant. > > Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would > understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider > the following two sentences: > > 1. A hump is a tone of a camel. > 2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant. > > Those two examples not only sound silly, they show why a word like > 'tone', which is limited to sounds is much more confusing than the word > 'mark', which may be used for any sensory modality. > > GR: > 1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in > the orchestra. > 2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry. > > GR: "Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker > would understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. > > Yes, they are normal sentences because the word 'tone' in these examples > is used to refer to the actual sound that is heard, not to some mark that > might distinguish one tone of voice from another. > > GR: Now consider the following two sentences: > 1. She preferred the mark of her flute to that of the first flautist in > the orchestra. > 2. Her mark of voice changed dramatically when she was angry. > > In these two sentences, the word 'mark' is incorrect because the literal > word 'tone' would be appropriate. > > GR: Indeed your consistent insistence that you are right -- no discussion > needed, your seemingly claiming to be the final arbiter in all Peircean > terminological matters > > Au contraire, please note that I have not claimed any authority of my > own. In my comments about Peirce's position, I have used his own words, as > he stated them in L376. Nobody has found anything later (or better at any > time) on this topic. > > To reinforce Peirce's claims, I have also added explanations based on > traditional usage in geometry from the Greeks to the present. Benjamin > taught Charles those topics from a very early age. > > My primary concern is that you and Jon have made claims abut Peirce > without showing any justification. That is why I believe that the analysis > above, which is based on Peirce's last words on the matter and on standard > practice in mathematics from Euclid to the present, is indeed the last word > on this topic. > > Nobody has found anything to the contrary. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
nd anything later (or better at any time) on this topic. To reinforce Peirce's claims, I have also added explanations based on traditional usage in geometry from the Greeks to the present. Benjamin taught Charles those topics from a very early age. My primary concern is that you and Jon have made claims abut Peirce without showing any justification. That is why I believe that the analysis above, which is based on Peirce's last words on the matter and on standard practice in mathematics from Euclid to the present, is indeed the last word on this topic. Nobody has found anything to the contrary. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
Jon, List,
That 'something' which is, as Peirce writes, ". . . a mere form, an
abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e. something
which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are," I have for many
years referred to as "a would-be' *if.* . .". That "if" emphasizes the
futurity of generals, of 3ns, or rather of all that "the third Universe
comprises.: What is *necessary *in a "necessitant" is that *if* the
conditions are such -- that is, if they allow for it -- the general *will*
grow (and, of course, if such conditions are *not* in place, or *do not
come into place*, then there is no growth towards the future. This is as
much the case for linguistic symbols in semiosis ("symbols grow") as it is
for the evolution of living organisms in biosemiosis.
The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists in active
power to establish connections between different objects, especially
between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is
essentially a Sign -- not the mere body of the Sign, which is not
essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in
its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such,
too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of
a plant. Such is a living constitution -- a daily newspaper, a great
fortune, a social "movement." Peirce: CP 6.455
So, again, that *if* referred to above seems to me of paramount importance,
for lacking it there will be no growth (egs., a newspaper lacking resources
goes out of business; a catastrophic change in an environment results in
the extinction of a species), or it will be thwarted until such *necessary*
conditions doarise. Returning to our text, you wrote:
JAS: Peirce explicitly refers to the kind of sign that he is describing as
"a 'general,'' thus corresponding to 3ns not 1ns; and his two examples are
an existential graph and the word "camel,'' both of which he unambiguously
classifies as *types* in other writings, thus necessitants not possibles.
Accordingly, I suggest the following generalization instead.
Note: I tweaked your generalization for readability (Jon's original is in
the post to which I'm responding).
GR's version of JAS's 'generalization': Any observable form is called a
*type * -- if it were embodied anywhere it would be a token. If it actually
be so embodied it would be incorrect to say that the type *itself* is
embodied. For that would be an impossibility, since the *type* itself is a
mere form, an abstraction, a "general," or as Peirce calls it, a
"would-be", i.e. something which would be if conditions were otherwise than
they are; and in that respect it is just like a "*word*,"--*any* word,
say *camel
*or* rose.*
I remember Peirce once giving 'rose' as an example of this, but in a
half-hour of searching today I couldn't find it. As I recall, he remarks
that the word 'rose' doesn't refer to any particular rose present, past, or
future or, for that matter, imagined. And this is so precisely because it
"is a mere form, an abstraction', a 'general', or. . . a 'would-be'.
From all that we've been arguing, you are undoubtedly correct, Jon, in
concluding that ". . .the quoted passage in R L376 turns out to have no
relevance whatsoever to what we call the *possible* member of this
trichotomy--"tone," "mark," or some other name."
Best,
Gary
On Thu, Apr 18, 2024 at 2:10 PM Jon Alan Schmidt
wrote:
> Gary, List:
>
> Needless to say, I strongly agree. I would like to revisit what John Sowa
> quoted from Peirce in an attempt to support his claim that "'mark' is the
> best word for both the might-be and the actual" (
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00095.html).
>
> CSP: Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would
> be an assertion is called a *graph*. If it actually be so scribed, it
> would be incorrect to say that the graph *itself* is put upon the sheet.
> For that would be an impossibility, since the *graph* itself [is] a mere
> form, an abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e.
> something which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in
> that respect it [is] just like a "*word*,"--*any* word, say *camel*. (R
> L376:14-15, 1911 Dec 8)
>
>
> John also proposed the following generalization.
>
> JFS: Any [observable] form which, if it [were to be observed anywhere]
> would be [a mark] is called [a mark]. If it actually be so [observed], it
> would be incorrect to say that the [mark] itself is [observed]. For that
> would be an impossibility, since the [mark] itself [is] a mere form, an
> abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might be&q
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
Gary, List:
Needless to say, I strongly agree. I would like to revisit what John Sowa
quoted from Peirce in an attempt to support his claim that "'mark' is the
best word for both the might-be and the actual" (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00095.html).
CSP: Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would
be an assertion is called a *graph*. If it actually be so scribed, it would
be incorrect to say that the graph *itself* is put upon the sheet. For that
would be an impossibility, since the *graph* itself [is] a mere form, an
abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e. something
which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
respect it [is] just like a "*word*,"--*any* word, say *camel*. (R
L376:14-15, 1911 Dec 8)
John also proposed the following generalization.
JFS: Any [observable] form which, if it [were to be observed anywhere]
would be [a mark] is called [a mark]. If it actually be so [observed], it
would be incorrect to say that the [mark] itself is [observed]. For that
would be an impossibility, since the [mark] itself [is] a mere form, an
abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might be", i.e. something
which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel.
However, this *contradicts* John's claim instead of corroborating it, by
explicitly stating that we *cannot* say that what is being observed is the
[mark] itself--we need a *different* word for the embodiment of the [mark],
such as "graph-instance" in lieu of "graph." Alternatively, if "mark" is
the right word for the embodiment, then we need a *different* word for the
form itself.
Moreover, as I have already explained at length (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00096.html), Peirce
explicitly refers to the kind of sign that he is describing as "a
'general,'" thus corresponding to 3ns not 1ns; and his two examples are an
existential graph and the word "camel," both of which he unambiguously
classifies as *types* in other writings, thus necessitants not possibles.
Accordingly, I suggest the following generalization instead.
JAS: Any [observable] form which, if it were [embodied anywhere] would be
[a token] is called a [*type*]. If it actually be so [embodied], it would
be incorrect to say that the [type] *itself* is [embodied]. For that would
be an impossibility, since the [*type*] itself [is] a mere form, an
abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "[would]-be", i.e. something
which [would] be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
respect it [is] just like a "*word*,"--*any* word, say *camel*.
After all, Peirce *defines* a necessitant "type" as "a definitely
significant Form" and provides *different* words for its existent
embodiments, namely, "tokens" that are "instances" of the type (CP 4.537,
1906). Hence, the quoted passage in R L376 turns out to have no relevance
whatsoever to what we call the *possible* member of this
trichotomy--"tone," "mark," or some other name.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 5:50 PM Gary Richmond
wrote:
> John, Jon, Helmut, List,
>
> JFS:
> 1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
> 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.
>
> Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
> understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider
> the following two sentences:
>
> 1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
> 2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.
>
>
> Compare this to:
>
> GR:
> 1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in
> the orchestra.
> 2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.
>
> "Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
> understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider
> the following two sentences:"
>
> 1. She preferred the mark of her flute to that of the first flautist in
> the orchestra.
> 2. Her mark of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.
>
> Again, quoting snippets of Helmut and Jon: ". . . a mark is an actual
> material sign. . " while "a possible sign. . . is never *itself *"an
> actual material sign."
>
> To which I added: "Even when 'mark' is used *figuratively* ("mark my
> words" "he made his mark in the art world" "it's a mark of collegiality to
> 'x' ") physical material is brought to mind."
>
[PEIRCE-L] Call for Participation: GOD AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN INDIAN TRADITIONS (online and in-person)
of Juiz de Fora, Brazil _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
sign's genuine dyadic relations with its (dynamical) object and (final) interpretant. Together, these three trichotomies result in ten sign classes, not "compositions of classes"--one class of qualisigns (later tones), three classes of sinsigns (tokens), and six classes of legisigns (types); three classes of icons, four classes of indices, and three classes of symbols; six classes of rhemes (later semes), three classes of dicisigns (phemes), and one class of arguments (delomes). In his 1906-1908 taxonomies, Peirce adds trichotomies for the other five correlates, the sign's genuine dyadic relation with its dynamical interpretant, and the genuine triadic relation. Together, these ten trichotomies would result in 66 sign classes upon being arranged in their proper logical order of determination, but Peirce himself never did this. HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction. According to Peirce, one sign can be more or less iconic, indexical, or symbolic than another sign--especially since all symbols involve indices and icons, and all indices involve icons. Moreover, a sign can be predominately iconic while still having indexical and symbolic aspects, or predominately indexical while still having symbolic aspects. On the other hand, both tones as "indefinite significant characters" and types as "definitely significant Forms" are embodied in tokens, such that every type involves tokens (its instances) and every token involves tones. Most (maybe all) of the other eight trichotomies in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies are sharp distinctions, although the necessitant typically involves the existent and the possible, and the existent involves the possible. For example, every sign must be either a seme, a pheme, or a delome; but all delomes involve phemes and semes, and all phemes involve semes. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Apr 16, 2024 at 11:33 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: Jon, List, you wrote: "Classification is not always "either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp distinction. A pure icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any object, and a pure index would denote an object without signifying any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has both an object and an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a genuine sign, an index is a degenerate sign, and an icon is a doubly degenerate sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901)." I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three relations. Therefore e.g an index doesn´t come alone, it cannot be a "pure" one. So I donot see a point in guessing, what a pure icon would be like, it is not possible, can not exist. Each of the three relations (if it may be said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign and itself), are of one of three classes. so a sign triad it is a composition of classes. But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction. Best regards, Helmut _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as wel
[PEIRCE-L] CfP 8th World Congress on the Square of Opposition
The 8th edition of the World Congress on the Square of Opposition will take place in Costa Rica, September 9-13, 2024. Deadline to submit an abstract is May 8 https://sites.google.com/view/square8-2024/ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Logic and Religion Webinar: The Love Commandments - Robert Audi, April 18
Dear Colleague, You are invited to participate in the next session of the Logic and Religion Webinar Series which will be held on *April 18 (THIS THURSDAY), 2024*, at *4 pm CET* with the topic: THE LOVE COMMANDMENTS: SOME LOGICAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS Speaker: Robert Audi <https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fphilosophy.nd.edu%2Fpeople%2Ffaculty%2Frobert-audi%2F=05%7C02%7Cassismariano%40missouri.edu%7C071855f1cb9542b3ba5008dc5e28de4e%7Ce3fefdbef7e9401ba51a355e01b05a89%7C0%7C0%7C638488776863080658%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C=pacOIJ%2BHkzvCt5AjxuGSaQUGTrHsZGy4dnRIlUjA4oU%3D=0> (University of Notre Dame, USA) Chair: Ricardo Sousa Silvestre <https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.logicandreligion.com%2Fsilvestre=05%7C02%7Cassismariano%40missouri.edu%7C071855f1cb9542b3ba5008dc5e28de4e%7Ce3fefdbef7e9401ba51a355e01b05a89%7C0%7C0%7C638488776863090180%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C=ComE9gIGpMip4BZl3vqGfL1vr0E5mLgVeNsQGyrLi3U%3D=0> (Federal University of Campina Grande, Brazil) Time zones: 10:00 am in New York; 12:00 pm in Brazil; 4:00 pm in Paris; 5:00 pm in Jerusalem; and 8:30 pm in New Delhi. Zoom link to access the talk: https://umsystem.zoom.us/j/96654646326?pwd=UnNwM0VMSlZlVU44KzZ6d0ZwVzRFdz09 Meeting ID: 966 5464 6326 Passcode: 810492 For more information about the webinar schedule and speakers please check the link: https://www.logicandreligion.com/webinars <https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.logicandreligion.com%2Fwebinars=05%7C02%7Cassismariano%40missouri.edu%7C071855f1cb9542b3ba5008dc5e28de4e%7Ce3fefdbef7e9401ba51a355e01b05a89%7C0%7C0%7C638488776863098097%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C=FMpwcwqSnbkzRwyjrqnjBGO5lF8Wt0gDbnfTm7cGc6c%3D=0> Abstract: This presentation explores the meaning and scope of the love commandments, especially the second, telling us to love our neighbors as ourselves. What kind of relation to God is appropriate to the command to love God with all our heart, soul, and mind? If, as is plausible, what is commanded can be intended, what is intended is action, and love is not an action or under direct positive voluntary control, how can love be commanded? If love really is impossible to achieve at will and cannot be directly commanded, what kinds of acts are appropriate to carrying out the two commandments? This question is important not only theologically (and not only for Christianity), but also for understanding moral obligation in general. With that in mind, Kant’s categorical imperative, in its Formula of Humanity version—requiring us to treat persons as ends in themselves and never merely as means—will be briefly examined. Join us 5 minutes prior to the beginning of the session! With best wishes, -- Francisco de Assis Mariano, The University of Missouri-Columbia (USA) LARA Secretary l...@logicandreligion.com _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
John, Jon, Helmut, List,
JFS:
1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.
Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider
the following two sentences:
1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.
Compare this to:
GR:
1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in the
orchestra.
2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.
"Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider
the following two sentences:"
1. She preferred the mark of her flute to that of the first flautist in the
orchestra.
2. Her mark of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.
Again, quoting snippets of Helmut and Jon: ". . . a mark is an actual
material sign. . " while "a possible sign. . . is never *itself *"an
actual material sign."
To which I added: "Even when 'mark' is used *figuratively* ("mark my words"
"he made his mark in the art world" "it's a mark of collegiality to 'x' ")
physical material is brought to mind."
That is the case for both of John's examples: 1. A hump is a mark of a
camel and 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant. These are both examples of
synecdoche, a figure of speech whereas a part represents the whole which is
the case in both these cases: the whole camel and the whole elephant.
JFS wrote: "I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it
emphasizes the profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word
'tone' as they may be used for the first term in the trichotomy (
token type)."
There is no "profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word
'tone' here" and your claiming -- rather *insisting* -- that there *is*
only weakens your argument for the use of 'mark' in the trichotomy being
discussed.
Indeed your consistent insistence that you are right -- no discussion
needed, your seemingly claiming to be the final arbiter in all Peircean
terminological matters -- itself "has no redeeming social or academic
value whatsoever." And certainly it is not a collegial stance to take on
Peirce-L. "Get rid of it."
Best,
Gary
On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 1:04 PM John F Sowa wrote:
> Jon, List,
>
> In the concluding note of the thread on (Mark Token Type}, I quoted
> Peirce's explanation why the word that names an abstract 'might be'
> should have exactly the same spelling as the word that names the actual
> thing. See below for a copy of my previous note, which includes a copy of
> Peirce's statement.
>
> But I noticed that in your recent note, you fell back on Peirce's
> unfortunate choice of 'Tone' as the first term in that trichotomy.
>
> In Peirce's explanation below (December 1911), he showed why the term
> 'existential graph', which names an abstract "might be" has exactly the
> same spelling as the term for the visible thing that is scribed on a phemic
> sheet. Then he added that "the graph itself [is] a mere form, an
> abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a 'might be' " which is "just
> like a 'word', any word, say camel".
>
> I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it emphasizes the
> profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word 'tone' as they may
> be used for the first term in the trichotomy ( token type). Consider
> the following two sentences:
>
> 1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
> 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.
>
> Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
> understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider
> the following two sentences:
>
> 1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
> 2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.
>
> Those two sentences would sound strange to anyone, even somebody who had
> read Peirce's writings. For those of us who believe that it's important to
> bring Peirce's writings to the attention of a much wider audience, we
> cannot assume that our readers are Peirce scholars (or wannabe Peirce
> scholars).
>
> In his ethics of terminology, Peirce made it clear that if nobody else
> uses one of his neologisms, he had no obligation to continue its use. It
> is abundantly clear that philosophers, linguists, and even computer
> programmers have adopted and used the pair (token type) frequently, and
> some of them even mention Peirce. But nobody, except Peirce scholars, use
> 'tone' as the first term. And even Peirce scholars never use it for a
> broad audience.
>
> Fundamental principle: We live in the 21st C. Our readers live in the
> 21st C. The word 'tone' was confu
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
LD* have exactly the same > spelling as the word that names the actual thing that we observe by any > external of internal senses. Furthermore, his explanation takes just three > sentences. > > Peirce's explanation below says that an existential graph *REALLY *is an > abstract might-be. However, we are permitted to call the perceptible > replica on a phemic sheet an existential graph *PROVIDED **THAT *we > acknowledge the distinction between the might-be and the replica. > > To generalize, following is my edit of the quotation below. My words are > enclosed in brackets (except for "[is]", which was added by the editor of > the MS): "Any [observable] form which, if it [were to be observed > anywhere] would be [a mark] is called [a mark]. If it actually be so > [observed], it would be incorrect to say that the [mark] itself is > [observed]. For that would be an impossibility, since the [mark] itself > [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might > be", i.e. something which might be if conditions were otherwise than they > are; and in that respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel". > > As for the reason why 'mark' is the best word for both the might-be and > the actual is justified by Peirce: The word that is used for the might-be > should be applicable to all the actual occurrences. Peirce's definition of > 'mark' in Baldwin's dictionary is applicable to marks observable by any or > all external and internal senses (i.e. anything that appears in the > phaneron).. But the word 'tone', which is applicable to a subset of > auditory sensations, is far less general than the word 'mark'. > > The quotation below, from December 1911, is Peirce's final word on this > subject. Although he wrote it about existential graphs, it may be > generalized to any type of might-be and actual. If the principle is > sufficiently general that it can be applied to camels, it should be > applicable to marks. > > This note answers every question, objection, and alternative that anybody > has written in all the notes on this subject. > > John > ___ > > Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would be an > assertion is called a graph. If it actually be so scribed, it would be > incorrect to say that the graph itself is put upon the sheet. For that > would be an impossibility, since the graph itself [is] a mere form, an > abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might be", i.e. something > which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that > respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel (L376, December > 1911). > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
scribed, it would be incorrect to say that the graph itself is put upon the sheet. For that would be an impossibility, since the graph itself [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might be", i.e. something which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel (L376, December 1911). _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
ith its object is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp distinction. A pure icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any object, and a pure index would denote an object without signifying any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has both an object and an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a genuine sign, an index is a degenerate sign, and an icon is a doubly degenerate sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901)." I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three relations. Therefore e.g an index doesn´t come alone, it cannot be a "pure" one. So I donot see a point in guessing, what a pure icon would be like, it is not possible, can not exist. Each of the three relations (if it may be said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign and itself), are of one of three classes. so a sign triad it is a composition of classes. But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction. Best regards, Helmut _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
Jon: On review, this comment is of possible interest to a purist! > On Feb 27, 2024, at 12:26 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > JAS: Every explicitly scribed EG is a replica (instance), a sinsign (token) > of a peculiar kind that embodies a legisign (type). > > JLRC: Frankly, I fail to find a connection between this stance regarding the > existential graphs and the prior development of the metaphysics of substance > of 1868. This reading of token and type is novel. > > Peirce does not introduce the terminology of qualisign/sinsign/legisign and > tone/token/type until 1903 and 1906, respectively, so I am puzzled by your > reference to something from nearly four decades earlier. In any case, there > is nothing novel about this reading, it is a well-known aspect of his > speculative grammar within the normative science of logic as semeiotic. The 1868 notions from metaphysics remain foundational today. History has not not changed these foundational arguments and the organization of these semes and semantics. Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
Helmut, List: HR: I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three relations. According to Peirce, the genuine triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating has three correlates--the sign, its (dynamical) object, and its (final) interpretant. This relation is *irreducibly *triadic, such that it is not *composed *of its constituent dyadic relations, although it *involves *the genuine dyadic relations between the sign and its external correlates--its dynamical object, its dynamical interpretant, and its final interpretant. HR: Each of the three relations (if it may be said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign and itself), are of one of three classes so a sign triad it is a composition of classes. According to Peirce, there is no trichotomy for the sign's *relation *with itself. In his 1903 taxonomy, the first trichotomy is for the sign itself *as a correlate*, while the second and third trichotomies are for the sign's genuine dyadic *relations *with its (dynamical) object and (final) interpretant. Together, these three trichotomies result in ten sign classes, not "compositions of classes"--one class of qualisigns (later tones), three classes of sinsigns (tokens), and six classes of legisigns (types); three classes of icons, four classes of indices, and three classes of symbols; six classes of rhemes (later semes), three classes of dicisigns (phemes), and one class of arguments (delomes). In his 1906-1908 taxonomies, Peirce adds trichotomies for the other five correlates, the sign's genuine dyadic relation with its dynamical interpretant, and the genuine triadic relation. Together, these ten trichotomies *would *result in 66 sign classes upon being arranged in their proper logical order of determination, but Peirce himself never did this. HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction. According to Peirce, one sign can be more or less iconic, indexical, or symbolic than another sign--especially since all symbols *involve *indices and icons, and all indices *involve *icons. Moreover, a sign can be *predominately *iconic while still having indexical and symbolic aspects, or *predominately* indexical while still having symbolic aspects. On the other hand, both tones as "indefinite significant characters" and types as "definitely significant Forms" are *embodied *in tokens, such that every type *involves* tokens (its instances) and every token *involves *tones. Most (maybe all) of the other eight trichotomies in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies are sharp distinctions, although the necessitant typically *involves *the existent and the possible, and the existent *involves *the possible. For example, every sign must be *either *a seme, a pheme, or a delome; but all delomes *involve *phemes and semes, and all phemes *involve *semes. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Apr 16, 2024 at 11:33 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: > > Jon, List, > > you wrote: > > "Classification is not *always *"either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 > trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object > is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp > distinction. A *pure *icon would signify an interpretant without denoting > any object, and a *pure *index would denote an object without signifying > any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has *both *an object and > an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a *genuine *sign, an index is a > *degenerate > *sign, and an icon is a *doubly degenerate* sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. > 1901)." > > I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three > relations. Therefore e.g an index doesn´t come alone, it cannot be a "pure" > one. So I donot see a point in guessing, what a pure icon would be like, it > is not possible, can not exist. Each of the three relations (if it may be > said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign > and itself), are of one of three classes. so a sign triad it is a > composition of classes. But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel > classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a > sharp distinction. > > Best regards, Helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.e
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
ords 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today." Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or, as a matter of retrospection, in the past. In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes, there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns). Best regards Helmut _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Tone, Token, Type, was, Mark Token Type
Jon, Helmut, List, This is a bald an expression of why "the word "mark" is a terrible choice--someone who is unfamiliar with the details of Peirce's semeiotic will almost certainly misunderstand and misuse it as signifying "an actual material sign," thus incorrectly treating it as virtually synonymous with "token." In my opinion (and after reviewing your extended exchange with John Sowa on the topic), it seems to me clear that you have well argued (with *considerable *textual support) as to why 'tone' is *far preferable* to 'mark' for the "possible sign" under consideration. However, if one is 'married' to a term (because, say, he's published work using that term, or plans to use it in future papers and presentations, etc.) then he will find reasons to reject any other term. Yet I am *completely* willing to admit that if he has weighed the arguments and still feels that his argumentation is superior, well, that is that. So, as I began the paragraph above, *all *of this is merely 'my opinion'. Again, I expect Peirce-L members will make up their own minds on the matter. In my thinking, it's really quite simple: either "mark" suggests "a material sign" rather than a possible one, or it does not. But, on the other hand, if one concludes that, in addition to those problematic material associations with the term 'mark', that one finds nothing connoting that which is 'material' about the term, 'tone', and for that reason, along with other reasons which have been argued for it, that it is the nature, and so, superior, term for the 'possible sign' being considered, well that is in my view but an expression of critical commonsense. Best, Gary On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 11:39 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > John, List: > > On the contrary, as Helmut and Gary have observed, that is the reason why > the word "mark" is a terrible choice--someone who is unfamiliar with the > details of Peirce's semeiotic will almost certainly misunderstand and > misuse it as signifying "an actual material sign," thus incorrectly > treating it as virtually synonymous with "token" instead of > "tone/tuone/tinge/potisign." > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 5:42 PM John F Sowa wrote: > >> Helmut, Jon, List, >> >> That is the reason why the word 'Mark' is the perfect choice: you won't >> be wrong whether or not you know the details of Peirce's semeiotic. >> >> HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I >> felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs >> too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual >> material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else. >> >> The fact that the academic meaning and the common meaning would both use >> a word with the spelling M-A-R-K makes it the ideal choice for everybody: >> academics who insist on being absolutely faithful to Peirce's technical >> sense and everybody else who doesn't know Peirce's technical sense. >> >> In fact, one reason why Peirce chose the word tone is that it would be >> correct for that subset of marks that have the sound of a tone. He also >> considered 'tuone' for a larger subset of marks that happened to have the >> sound of tones or tunes. And he considered the word 'tinge' for that >> subset of marks that could be tinges. But the word 'mark' covers all those >> sounds as well as arbitrary sights and feelings. >> >> That means that Peirce himself preferred words whose dictionary sense was >> close to or even identical to the academic sense that he intended. Since >> the overwhelming majority of professional philosophers know very little >> about the fine points of Peirce's semeiotic, it's a good idea to choose >> terms that they are capable of remembering and using correctly. >> >> John >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List: On the contrary, as Helmut and Gary have observed, that is the reason why the word "mark" is a terrible choice--someone who is unfamiliar with the details of Peirce's semeiotic will almost certainly misunderstand and misuse it as signifying "an actual material sign," thus incorrectly treating it as virtually synonymous with "token" instead of "tone/tuone/tinge/potisign." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 5:42 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Helmut, Jon, List, > > That is the reason why the word 'Mark' is the perfect choice: you won't > be wrong whether or not you know the details of Peirce's semeiotic. > > HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I > felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs > too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual > material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else. > > The fact that the academic meaning and the common meaning would both use a > word with the spelling M-A-R-K makes it the ideal choice for everybody: > academics who insist on being absolutely faithful to Peirce's technical > sense and everybody else who doesn't know Peirce's technical sense. > > In fact, one reason why Peirce chose the word tone is that it would be > correct for that subset of marks that have the sound of a tone. He also > considered 'tuone' for a larger subset of marks that happened to have the > sound of tones or tunes. And he considered the word 'tinge' for that > subset of marks that could be tinges. But the word 'mark' covers all those > sounds as well as arbitrary sights and feelings. > > That means that Peirce himself preferred words whose dictionary sense was > close to or even identical to the academic sense that he intended. Since > the overwhelming majority of professional philosophers know very little > about the fine points of Peirce's semeiotic, it's a good idea to choose > terms that they are capable of remembering and using correctly. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Helmut, Jon, List, That is the reason why the word 'Mark' is the perfect choice: you won't be wrong whether or not you know the details of Peirce's semeiotic. HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else. The fact that the academic meaning and the common meaning would both use a word with the spelling M-A-R-K makes it the ideal choice for everybody: academics who insist on being absolutely faithful to Peirce's technical sense and everybody else who doesn't know Peirce's technical sense. In fact, one reason why Peirce chose the word tone is that it would be correct for that subset of marks that have the sound of a tone. He also considered 'tuone' for a larger subset of marks that happened to have the sound of tones or tunes. And he considered the word 'tinge' for that subset of marks that could be tinges. But the word 'mark' covers all those sounds as well as arbitrary sights and feelings. That means that Peirce himself preferred words whose dictionary sense was close to or even identical to the academic sense that he intended. Since the overwhelming majority of professional philosophers know very little about the fine points of Peirce's semeiotic, it's a good idea to choose terms that they are capable of remembering and using correctly. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Helmut, List: HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else. Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned about using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by Peirce--while such a possible sign must be embodied in an existent token in order to act as a sign, it is never itself "an actual material sign." HR: Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote: The subsequent quote is actually from JFS, not me (JAS), although I agree with the gist of it in accordance with synechism. HR: Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or". Classification is not always "either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp distinction. A pure icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any object, and a pure index would denote an object without signifying any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has both an object and an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a genuine sign, an index is a degenerate sign, and an icon is a doubly degenerate sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901). HR: BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if". Determination in sign classification can be described using if-then, but not rigidly so. If the correlate or relation for one trichotomy is a necessitant, then the correlate or relation for the next trichotomy can be in any of the three universes; if it is an existent, then the next can be either existent or possible, but not necessitant; and if it is a possible, the the next is also a possible. That is why, in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a symbol can be an argument, dicisign, or rheme; an index can be a dicisign or rheme; and an icon is always a rheme. HR: I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns). Peirce explicitly associates composition with 3ns, not 1ns--"[A] triadic relationship cannot be built up from dyadic relationships. Whoever thinks it can be so composed has overlooked the fact that composition is itself a triadic relationship, between the two (or more) components and the composite whole" (CP 6.321, c. 1907). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sy
[PEIRCE-L] Tone Token Type, was Mark Token Type
, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Apr 14, 2024 at 11:18 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: > >> >> List, >> >> I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I >> felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs >> too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual >> material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else. >> Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote: >> >> "But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no >> precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world >> itself. Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be >> counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and >> shifting their meaning with changes over time. Just consider the words >> 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. The things they apply to are >> so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be >> obsolete today." >> >> Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there >> are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and >> function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or, >> as a matter of retrospection, in the past. >> >> In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of >> classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes, >> there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think >> is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" >> to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation >> of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and >> classification (3ns). >> >> Best regards >> Helmut >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Helmut, List: HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else. Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned about using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by Peirce--while such a possible sign must be *embodied *in an existent token in order to *act *as a sign, it is never *itself *"an actual material sign." HR: Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote: The subsequent quote is actually from JFS, not me (JAS), although I agree with the gist of it in accordance with synechism. HR: Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or". Classification is not *always *"either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp distinction. A *pure *icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any object, and a *pure *index would denote an object without signifying any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has *both *an object and an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a *genuine *sign, an index is a *degenerate *sign, and an icon is a *doubly degenerate* sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901). HR: BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if". Determination in sign classification can be *described *using if-then, but not rigidly so. If the correlate or relation for one trichotomy is a necessitant, then the correlate or relation for the next trichotomy can be in any of the three universes; if it is an existent, then the next can be either existent or possible, but not necessitant; and if it is a possible, the the next is also a possible. That is why, in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a symbol can be an argument, dicisign, or rheme; an index can be a dicisign or rheme; and an icon is always a rheme. HR: I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns). Peirce explicitly associates composition with 3ns, not 1ns--"[A] triadic relationship cannot be built up from dyadic relationships. Whoever thinks it can be so composed has overlooked the fact that *composition *is itself a triadic relationship, between the two (or more) components and the composite whole" (CP 6.321, c. 1907). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Apr 14, 2024 at 11:18 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: > > List, > > I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, > that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too > much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material > sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else. > Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote: > > "But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no > precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world > itself. Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be > counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and > shifting their meaning with changes over time. Just consider the words > 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. The things they apply to are > so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be > obsolete today." > > Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there > are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and > function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or, > as a matter of retrospection, in the past. > > In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of > classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes, > there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think > is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" > to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation > of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and > classification (3ns). > > Best regards > Helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L p
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
supplement: thinking about it, I am not clear anymore, if composition "is"or"". Also classification is not simply "either-or", this either-or only applies to parallel classes, but between a class and a subclass it seems more complicated. How exactly, that is how to translate composition, determination, and classification into logic (e.g. Boole, EG, EntG, Venn) I haven´t worked out yet. I even don´t know, whether it is translatable at all, as propositional logic to me seems to suit classification, but not composition. Maybe an Euler-diagram is good for composition? But how to translate one into EG? List, I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else. Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote: "But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself. Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time. Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today." Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or, as a matter of retrospection, in the past. In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes, there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns). Best regards Helmut Gesendet: Sonntag, 14. April 2024 um 03:21 Uhr Von: "John F Sowa" An: "Edwina Taborsky" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Ahti Pietarinen" , "Francesco Bellucci" , "Anthony Jappy" , "Nathan Houser" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type Edwina, Jon, List, Edwina is emphasizing points I have also been trying to get across. ET: I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues. No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in particular, in the scientific disciplines. JFS: The position [Peirce] recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming biological species. JAS: Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them. Yes, of course. As Edwina wrote, everybody knows that. And that is why Peirce's advice is irrelevant for subjects that are so precisely definable that there are national and international committees that set the standards for them. But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself. Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time. Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today. JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that the new term 'phaneroscopy' is correct, but there is enough overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'. JAS: Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out... Please note what I was trying to say. I just finished writing an article with the tite "Phaneroscopy: The Science of Diagrams". That article will appear in a book with the title "Phenomenology and Phaneroscopy". For that purpose, Peirce's subtle distinction is important, and I emphasized that distinction in my article. But I'm not convinced that Peirce made a good decision in coining the new term. There is a considerable overlap between the two words, and most people won't get the point. In fact, I have seen many Peirce scholars lumping the two words in one phrase "phenomenology and phaneroscopy". I wonder wh
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
List, I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else. Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote: "But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself. Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time. Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today." Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or, as a matter of retrospection, in the past. In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes, there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns). Best regards Helmut Gesendet: Sonntag, 14. April 2024 um 03:21 Uhr Von: "John F Sowa" An: "Edwina Taborsky" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Ahti Pietarinen" , "Francesco Bellucci" , "Anthony Jappy" , "Nathan Houser" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type Edwina, Jon, List, Edwina is emphasizing points I have also been trying to get across. ET: I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues. No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in particular, in the scientific disciplines. JFS: The position [Peirce] recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming biological species. JAS: Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them. Yes, of course. As Edwina wrote, everybody knows that. And that is why Peirce's advice is irrelevant for subjects that are so precisely definable that there are national and international committees that set the standards for them. But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself. Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time. Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today. JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that the new term 'phaneroscopy' is correct, but there is enough overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'. JAS: Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out... Please note what I was trying to say. I just finished writing an article with the tite "Phaneroscopy: The Science of Diagrams". That article will appear in a book with the title "Phenomenology and Phaneroscopy". For that purpose, Peirce's subtle distinction is important, and I emphasized that distinction in my article. But I'm not convinced that Peirce made a good decision in coining the new term. There is a considerable overlap between the two words, and most people won't get the point. In fact, I have seen many Peirce scholars lumping the two words in one phrase "phenomenology and phaneroscopy". I wonder whether they could explain the difference if anyone asked them. Since the word 'phenomenology' is so much more common, very few people will ever learn or use Peirce's word. I believe that Peirce's theories would be easier for teachers to explain and students to learn if he had NOT coined the word 'phaneroscopy'. It would have been better to say that the subject of phenomenology addresses three major issues: (1) the analysis of external phenomena; (2) the analysis of the internal phaneron, and (3) the relations of each to the other, to the world, and to the experiencer. I use the word phaneroscopy because it is essential to expl
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
ense against the inventor of the >> symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat >> the act with contempt and indignation. (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903) >> >> That is why the portion of "A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic" where >> this passage appears bears the title, "The Ethics of Terminology"--it >> advocates voluntary cooperation by the practitioners of any particular >> branch of science to use scrupulously consistent terminology. In fact, >> Peirce acknowledges up-front that it would violate his own principles "to >> make the smallest pretension to dictate the conduct of others in this >> matter" (CP 2.219, EP 2:263; emphasis mine). Our disagreement over "tone" >> vs. "mark" is a good example--we have each attempted to persuade the other >> (and those reading along) to adopt one of these and abandon the other, but >> since Peirce himself considered both without definitively choosing one, >> neither of us can rightly impose his preference on the other (or anyone >> else). >> >> JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' >> with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that he was >> justified in coining the new term 'phaneroscopy', but there is enough >> overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'. >> >> Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was >> perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out--"for >> philosophical conceptions which vary by a hair's breadth from those for >> which suitable terms exist, to invent terms with a due regard for the usages >> of philosophical terminology and those of the English language, but yet with >> a distinctly technical appearance" (CP 2.226, EP 2:266; emphasis mine). He >> coined "the phaneron" for whatever is or could be present to any mind in any >> way because this is a slightly different conception from "the phenomenon" as >> introduced by Hegel and later adopted by Husserl, and he renamed the >> corresponding science "phaneroscopy" because it is more about direct >> observation than systematic study. >> >> JFS: It is the practice of taking the advice of an expert in a field for >> choosing terminology for that field. I recommend that practice. >> >> In the field of Peirce scholarship, the expert whose advice on choosing >> terminology should be given the most weight is obviously Peirce himself. >> Otherwise, how can we legitimately claim to be expounding his ideas and >> applying his framework? Unfortunately, when the terminology of modern >> research fields is used instead, it is not always clear that those different >> terms really have the same meanings as Peirce's terms. Consequently, it can >> be inaccurate or at least misleading to describe the resulting framework as >> Peircean--the terminological differences reflect underlying conceptual >> differences. Frankly, that is one of my concerns about "mark"--perhaps it >> seems congenial to audiences today because they already have a sense of what >> it means, but in fact they do not have in mind "Objects which are Signs so >> far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP >> 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25). >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - >> > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
ly Peirce himself. Otherwise, how can we legitimately claim to be expounding his ideas and applying his framework? Unfortunately, when the terminology of modern research fields is used instead, it is not always clear that those different terms really have the same meanings as Peirce's terms. Consequently, it can be inaccurate or at least misleading to describe the resulting framework as Peircean--the terminological differences reflect underlying conceptual differences. Frankly, that is one of my concerns about "mark"--perhaps it seems congenial to audiences today because they already have a sense of what it means, but in fact they do not have in mind "Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's ethics
n the peculiar force a general word may have in a proposition or argument. (CP 2.265, EP 2:297, 1903) On the other hand, since Peirce never spells out the proper logical order of the ten trichotomies in his 1906-1908 taxonomies, he also provides no corresponding text with examples of the 66 classes. I am inclined to think that this would be too granular for practical purposes anyway, but it can nevertheless be useful to look at different subsets. I have done so in a recent post (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00015.html) for the three interpretant trichotomies because I find the ten classes that result from arranging them as final/dynamical/immediate to be more plausible than the ten classes that result from arranging them as immediate/dynamical/final. I also suggested the following a couple of months ago (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00082.html ). - A question is a suggestive phemic actuous symbol, a proposition presented for contemplation whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce action (elicit an answer). - A command is an imperative phemic actuous symbol, a proposition urged by an act of insistence whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce action. - A hypothesis is a suggestive phemic temperative, a proposition presented for contemplation whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce self-control. - An assertion is an imperative phemic temperative, a proposition urged by an act of insistence whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce self-control. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Apr 13, 2024 at 1:06 PM Claudio Guerri wrote: > Dear Etwina, Gary, List > It has been a long time since I last wrote to the List, however, I still > receive the corresponding information and from time to time I find precise > indications on the possibility of deepening in some Peircean concept in my > extensive library on Peirce. > > Coming from architecture and design disciplines in general, I am > interested in being able to use the Peircean approach to better understand > the design project (as a semiotic process) and to be able to take practical > design decisions... and the same with respect to qualitative market > research... another discipline with a necessary practical scope. > > However, in both cases it is a matter of developing to the maximum the > aspects of the *enabling Firstness*: the *design* and the understanding > of the problem... a difficult subject if there are any... or… our world > would be a little better than what we have. > > I consider Peirce's *ethics* (2ness) to be directly related to his > training in chemistry where every element in Mendeleev's table must > necessarily be precisely nominated: H=1 cannot be confused with Pb=207. > This is not the case with other matters such as color where there may be a > subtle variation, unnameable with precision, in a [blue] or a [red]. > > However, this *ethical concern* (Peirce?) entails a serious contradiction > with respect to the Peircean triadic semiotics proposal where the main task > should not be the positive essence but the inter-relational construction of > a semiotic concept or process (Lizska wrote something about this). > > I believe that the exegesis of Peirce's work is still necessary given the > vastness and the difficult access to his writings. However, semiotics, as a > discipline with pretensions of *scientific methodology* (Magariños de > Morentin) does not deal with any exegesis, but with cognitive-semiotic > processes that are important in order to understand something about any > subject and to be able to make decisions of different kinds, for example: > > 1. *to make possible* the formal description of the logic of a > theoretical concept in order to improve it, change it or discard it > (1ness); > > 2. to analyze a concrete product or behavior to *determine* its relative > economic validity (2ness); and > > 3. to allow the analysis of any socio-cultural-political value in order to > make a *decision* (Althusser) coherent with the *needs* (Peirce) of a > given time and context (3ness). > > On the other hand, while the proposal to take the classification to 128 or > hundreds of thousands of different sign-subsigns is absolutely logical, I > wonder if there is a single person in the world who has developed that > immense semiotic process applied to any object, problem or concrete case. > Probably AI programs will be able to do it... but will anyone really be > able to understand and review it for practical purposes? > > This is why I have developed the *Semiotic Nonagon* as a practical tool > for qualitative analysis
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
gt; vacillation nullifies any obligation to continue his practice. >>> >>> Another poor choice on Peirce's part was to make 'logic' a synonym for >>> 'logic as semeiotic'. Until 1902, he used 'logic' as a synonym for the >>> symbolic logic of Boole and his followers (of which he was one). Instead, >>> he chose the usage for the title of books, such as Whateley's. I believe >>> that Peirce made a serious mistake, and Fisch (in his 1986 book) >>> deliberately chose the term 'semeiotic' as the abbreviation for 'logic as >>> semeiotic'. In my recent article on phaneroscopy, I adopted Fisch's >>> recommendation. >>> >>> And by the way, my citation of Fisch is NOT an appeal to authority. It is >>> the practice of taking the advice of an expert in a field for choosing >>> terminology for that field. I recommend that practice. >>> >>> John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com <https://cspeirce.com/> and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com <https://www.cspeirce.com/> . It'll take a while to > repair / update all the links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of > the message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
ave similar or even different > analyses of these realities…even though they use different terms for the > same phenomena. > > I think it is vital to move the Peircean framework into modern research > fields; It is a powerful analytic framework and has a great deal to teach > us - and to do so, I feel, requires that we use terminology that these > other fields feel comfortable with. … > > Edwina > > On Apr 13, 2024, at 12:53 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Edwina, Gary, Robert, List, > > I'm sure that we're all familiar with Peirce's note about the ethics of > terminology. But it's not clear whether its influence was good, bad, or > indifferent. The position he recommended was the Linnaean conventions for > naming biological species. But very few things in the world are so rigidly > classifiable. And those that are have been classified by international > conventions: the integers, the chemical elements, and the chemical > compounds. > > And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with > 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that he was > justified in coining the new term 'phaneroscopy', but there is enough > overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'. As for the > choice of 'mark' vs 'tone', I believe that 'tone' was a poor choice, and > his vacillation in 1908 indicates that he had some misgivings. That > vacillation nullifies any obligation to continue his practice. > > Another poor choice on Peirce's part was to make 'logic' a synonym for > 'logic as semeiotic'. Until 1902, he used 'logic' as a synonym for the > symbolic logic of Boole and his followers (of which he was one). Instead, > he chose the usage for the title of books, such as Whateley's. I believe > that Peirce made a serious mistake, and Fisch (in his 1986 book) > deliberately chose the term 'semeiotic' as the abbreviation for 'logic as > semeiotic'. In my recent article on phaneroscopy, I adopted Fisch's > recommendation. > > And by the way, my citation of Fisch is *NOT *an appeal to authority. It > is the practice of taking the advice of an expert in a field for choosing > terminology for that field. I recommend that practice. > > John > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
I accidentally hit the send button and I apologize for the incompleteness of my previous post. In response to the question about the definition of nominalism, I must admit that I have always been fascinated by Peirce’s discussion of the difference between nominalism and realism. Max H. Fisch writes the following about nominalism and realism in Published Works I: Electric Edition: Part Three. 1901-1908. The following is from pages xxviii-xxvix of the introduction. I use the blue coloring to focus Fisch's text, as opposed to his footnotes. Now for the hairsplitting. The Berkeley review is much more emphatic than the cognition series on the distinction between the [7 <https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=peirce_w/peirce_w.02.xml;chunk.id=writings.charles.v2.d010;toc.id=writings.charles.v2.d010;brand=default;query=nominalism#writings.charles.v2.11tm> For details see Max H. Fisch, "Peirce's Progress from <https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=peirce_w/peirce_w.02.xml;query=nominalism;brand=default;hit.rank=14#15> Nominalism <https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=peirce_w/peirce_w.02.xml;query=nominalism;brand=default;hit.rank=14#17> toward Realism," Monist 51(1967):159–78, at 160–65.] [8 <https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=peirce_w/peirce_w.02.xml;chunk.id=writings.charles.v2.d010;toc.id=writings.charles.v2.d010;brand=default;query=nominalism#writings.charles.v2.12tm> For details see Max H. Fisch, "Peirce's General Theory of Signs," in Sight, Sound, and Sense, edited by Thomas A. Sebeok (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. 31–70 at 33–38 and, for Berkeley, pp. 57,63,65. For Peirce's early <https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=peirce_w/peirce_w.02.xml;query=nominalism;brand=default;hit.rank=14#16> nominalism <https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=peirce_w/peirce_w.02.xml;query=nominalism;brand=default;hit.rank=14#18> and its probable derivation from Whately, see also pp. 60–63. (It is worth adding here that Boole in An Investigation of the Laws of Thought after an introductory first chapter begins the investigation with Chapter II "Of Signs in General, and of the Signs appropriate to the science of Logic in particular; also of the Laws to which that class of signs are Subject"; and that Chapter III is headed "Derivation of the Laws of the Symbols of Logic from the Laws of the Operations of the Human Mind.”)] ― xxviii ― forward and the backward reference of the term "reality" and the identification of <https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=peirce_w/peirce_w.02.xml;query=nominalism;brand=default;hit.rank=14#17> nominalism <https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=peirce_w/peirce_w.02.xml;query=nominalism;brand=default;hit.rank=14#19> with the backward and of realism with the forward reference. Which amounts to a semeiotic resolution of the controversy. Of the three central categories, quality is monadic, relation dyadic, and representation irreducibly triadic. The sign represents an object to or for an interpretant. But we may focus on the sign-object or on the sign-interpretant. If the question is whether there are real universals, the nominalists turn backward to the sign-object and do not find them; the realists turn forward to the sign-interpretant and find them (pp. 467 ff. below). That is primarily because the backward reference to the object is more individualistic, and the forward reference to the interpretant is more social. So realism goes with what has been called the social theory of logic, or "logical socialism."9 <https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=peirce_w/peirce_w.02.xml;chunk.id=writings.charles.v2.d010;toc.id=writings.charles.v2.d010;brand=default;query=nominalism#writings.charles.v2.13fm> If we were selecting key sentences from the Peirce texts in the present volume, they might well include these two: (1) "Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of an indefinite increase of knowledge" (p. 239). (2) "Whether men really have anything in common, so that the community is to be considered as an end in itself, and if so, what the relative value of the two factors is, is the most fundamental practical question in regard to every public institution the constitution of which we have it in our power to influence" (p. 487). The question about whether there are real universals can be answered via nominalism or realism, as explained above. Peirce grappled with the terms. He moved from being a nominalist to a realist during his life. See his review of Berkeley’s Collected Works where he explains his move from nominalism to realism. Another place where Peirce discusses the term is in “A Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives.” I find that fascinating and can quot
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
nd John (and I and many others) claim that it > is for possible future advances in a host of sciences, and if there is no > already established terminology in a given one, that in the interest of > introducing Peirce's often breakthrough work to ever more scientists, that it > behooves us to do so whenever and wherever possible; that is, when it is > feasible to use his terminology. For example, this is precisely what Claudio > Guerri is doing in the semiotics of urban ecology, art, architecture and > design. > > It is true that, in what I consider one of the darkest periods of Peirce-L, > there was a heated exchange of off List emails in May 2021 involving several > forum members including both of us, Jon and John, and several others. > Unpleasant things were said, not always intended to be seen by others (and > yet some inadvertently or purposefully were). I will admit that during that > intense exchange I did indeed use such words as "pseudo-Peircean" to describe > you, but that I promptly apologized, and that you accepted my apology. [I > will not comment here on the unpleasant expressions which were directed at me > (and others) by you (and others) in that fusilade of off List exchanges since > I would hope that the List is well on its way to putting that difficult > period behind us. In any event, I am truly sorry for anything I said then > that was offensive.] > > If your use of "purist" was meant to describe Jon, I would say that he does > indeed consider himself a "textualist" and, especially regarding Peirce's > terminology, a "literalist"; and he has said as much on the List. As for my > referencing his accomplishments in structural engineering, it was meant > primarily to show that he has not just been discussing theory "in the seminar > room" (as you occasionally phrase it), but that he has also put Peirce's > ideas into practical applications. I'm sure I embarrassed him with those > accolades as he has never so much as hinted at his accomplishments in > structural engineering on the List. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > On Sat, Apr 13, 2024 at 7:29 AM Edwina Taborsky <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> Gary R, List >> >> 1] Yes - I am aware of Peirce’s insistence on accurate terminology. I am >> also aware of the many different terms he used for the same thing. I am >> also aware of the many different terms that other scholars use to refer to >> the same situations as Peirce describes. My point is that we cannot isolate >> scholars and research from each other by insisting that use only the terms >> that specific scholar used. We should, rather, understand that these >> different scholars were trying to examine the same situations - and should >> be open to using these different terms for the SAME situation. >> >> 2] Yes - I am indeed suggesting that the focus on terminology - and the >> insistence that one can use only Peirce’s terminology - because, for some >> reason, the meaning of Peirce’s terms cannot be considered as similar to the >> meanings yet with different terms used by others - - is a reduction into >> nominalism. And by nominalism - I mean a focus rejecting commonality - aka >> universals, such that one rejects the fact that, despite the different >> terms, there can be a commonality of existence….This can also be known as >> conceptualism. >> >> Of course - different terminology can mean different meanings….but that’s >> not my point, is it? >> >> 3] You yourself referred to me as ‘pseudo-Peircean. As well as ‘dogmatic, >> idiosyncratic- and your claim that my work ‘has ‘long been discredited’. >> >> 4] A ‘purist’ in my view is someone who is unwilling to acknowledge that the >> work of some scholar can be similar in its analysis to the work of another >> scholar - but - that the terms used are different. ..and above all - it is >> perfectly acceptable to , for example, examine the work of Peirce using the >> terms used by other scholars. >> >> 5] I’m not sure what your point is with your outline that JAS is an >> ‘accomplished andn distinguished structural engineer’ - and has given >> conference papers and published papers on Peirce. The same accolades can be >> made about most others on this List - and, apart from it being an example of >> the logical fallacy of 'appeal to authority’ to which you have made >> reference, - such doesn’t make his comments any more valid than those of >> other people on the list. >> >> Edwina >> >>> On Apr 12, 2024, at 11:21 PM, Gary Richmond &
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Gary, List 1] With regard to terminology - the question becomes - whose terms are to be used? My point is that there are other researchers who are focused on similar issues, each unknown to the others, [such as complex adaptive systems, the development of information, anticipation processes, the development of norms of behaviour; genetic developments etc and etc - the list is enormous]…I don’t think that anyone can be certain of ‘who thought it first’ -and therefore we must use The First Person's terminology’. Most certainly, as has been pointed out, when we are referring to objective sciences such as chemistry and referring to empirically observable chemicals and molecules and interactions etc… the Community of Scholars develops the terminology, over time, together. But- cognitive and semiosic processes are different - and as I’ve said, there are multiple scholars working in these fields - each unknown to the other, and there is no reason why, in my view, that we cannot use their terms when we refer to the Peircean framework…I think we should acknowledge the analytic work that is being done in other fields that, unknown to the researcher, fits in perfectly within the Peircean framework. …And I don’t see why we should insist that they use Peircan terminology! 2] I think that ‘purist’ could describe Jon’s approach to Peirce, but I wasn’t referencing him in particular - I was referencing my view that it is a fact that other research is being done in the same areas that Peirce focused on - albeit with different terminology - and I consider it important that Peircean research acknowledge this work and see where these analysis, using different terms, align within the Peircean framework. And of course, I always emphasize pragmatic applications of theory. Edwina > On Apr 13, 2024, at 2:13 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Edwina, List, > > I would prefer not to get into a back and forth with you on this matter. I > will comment briefly, and if you care to respond, I will give you the last > word. > > We disagree on the matter of the use of different terms for the same > situation. I would argue that Peirce held that to do so fosters confusion, > that within a scientific community that a shared shared terminology is a > desideratum which affords clarity in discussions of specific subject matter > if and when such a shared terminology is adopted. Of course such a > desideratum is a kind of ideal for a given scientific discipline, for any > scientific community, one that is not always possible, but desirable where > and when it is possible. > > My point today would be that if Peirce's work in semeiotic, etc. is as > important as, for example, Jon and John (and I and many others) claim that it > is for possible future advances in a host of sciences, and if there is no > already established terminology in a given one, that in the interest of > introducing Peirce's often breakthrough work to ever more scientists, that it > behooves us to do so whenever and wherever possible; that is, when it is > feasible to use his terminology. For example, this is precisely what Claudio > Guerri is doing in the semiotics of urban ecology, art, architecture and > design. > > It is true that, in what I consider one of the darkest periods of Peirce-L, > there was a heated exchange of off List emails in May 2021 involving several > forum members including both of us, Jon and John, and several others. > Unpleasant things were said, not always intended to be seen by others (and > yet some inadvertently or purposefully were). I will admit that during that > intense exchange I did indeed use such words as "pseudo-Peircean" to describe > you, but that I promptly apologized, and that you accepted my apology. [I > will not comment here on the unpleasant expressions which were directed at me > (and others) by you (and others) in that fusilade of off List exchanges since > I would hope that the List is well on its way to putting that difficult > period behind us. In any event, I am truly sorry for anything I said then > that was offensive.] > > If your use of "purist" was meant to describe Jon, I would say that he does > indeed consider himself a "textualist" and, especially regarding Peirce's > terminology, a "literalist"; and he has said as much on the List. As for my > referencing his accomplishments in structural engineering, it was meant > primarily to show that he has not just been discussing theory "in the seminar > room" (as you occasionally phrase it), but that he has also put Peirce's > ideas into practical applications. I'm sure I embarrassed him with those > accolades as he has never so much as hinted at his accomplishments in > structural engineering on th
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Edwina, List, I would prefer not to get into a back and forth with you on this matter. I will comment briefly, and if you care to respond, I will give you the last word. We disagree on the matter of the use of different terms for the same situation. I would argue that Peirce held that to do so fosters confusion, that within a scientific community that a shared shared terminology is a* desideratum* which affords clarity in discussions of specific subject matter *if and when such a shared terminology is adopted*. Of course such a *desideratum *is a kind of ideal for a given scientific discipline, for any scientific community, one that is not always possible, but desirable where and when it is possible. My point today would be that if Peirce's work in semeiotic, etc. is as important as, for example, Jon and John (and I and many others) claim that it is for possible future advances in a host of sciences, and *if* there is no already established terminology in a given one, that in the interest of introducing Peirce's often breakthrough work to ever more scientists, that it behooves us to do so whenever and wherever possible; that is, when it is feasible to use his terminology. For example, this is precisely what Claudio Guerri is doing in the semiotics of urban ecology, art, architecture and design. It is true that, in what I consider one of the darkest periods of Peirce-L, there was a heated exchange of off List emails in May 2021 involving several forum members including both of us, Jon and John, and several others. Unpleasant things were said, not always intended to be seen by others (and yet some inadvertently or purposefully were). I will admit that during that intense exchange I did indeed use such words as "pseudo-Peircean" to describe you, but that I promptly apologized, and that you accepted my apology. [I will not comment here on the unpleasant expressions which were directed at me (and others) by you (and others) in that fusilade of off List exchanges since I would hope that the List is well on its way to putting that difficult period behind us. In any event, I am truly sorry for anything I said then that was offensive.] If your use of "purist" was meant to describe Jon, I would say that he does indeed consider himself a "textualist" and, especially regarding Peirce's terminology, a "literalist"; and he has said as much on the List. As for my referencing his accomplishments in structural engineering, it was meant primarily to show that he has not just been discussing theory "in the seminar room" (as you occasionally phrase it), but that he has also put Peirce's ideas into practical applications. I'm sure I embarrassed him with those accolades as he has never so much as hinted at his accomplishments in structural engineering on the List. Best, Gary On Sat, Apr 13, 2024 at 7:29 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Gary R, List > > 1] Yes - I am aware of Peirce’s insistence on accurate terminology. I am > also aware of the many different terms he used for the same thing. I am > also aware of the many different terms that other scholars use to refer to > the same situations as Peirce describes. My point is that we cannot > isolate scholars and research from each other by insisting that use only > the terms that specific scholar used. We should, rather, understand that > these different scholars were trying to examine the same situations - and > should be open to using these different terms for the SAME situation. > > 2] Yes - I am indeed suggesting that the focus on terminology - and the > insistence that one can use only Peirce’s terminology - because, for some > reason, the meaning of Peirce’s terms cannot be considered as similar to > the meanings yet with different terms used by others - - is a reduction > into nominalism. And by nominalism - I mean a focus rejecting commonality - > aka universals, such that one rejects the fact that, despite the different > terms, there can be a commonality of existence….This can also be known as > conceptualism. > > Of course - different terminology can mean different meanings….but that’s > not my point, is it? > > 3] You yourself referred to me as ‘pseudo-Peircean. As well as ‘dogmatic, > idiosyncratic- and your claim that my work ‘has ‘long been discredited’. > > 4] A ‘purist’ in my view is someone who is unwilling to acknowledge that > the work of some scholar can be similar in its analysis to the work of > another scholar - but - that the terms used are different. ..and above all > - it is perfectly acceptable to , for example, examine the work of Peirce > using the terms used by other scholars. > > 5] I’m not sure what your point is with your outline that JAS is an > ‘accomplished andn distinguished structural engineer’ - and has given > conference papers and published papers on Peirce. The same
[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's ethics
Dear Etwina, Gary, List It has been a long time since I last wrote to the List, however, I still receive the corresponding information and from time to time I find precise indications on the possibility of deepening in some Peircean concept in my extensive library on Peirce. Coming from architecture and design disciplines in general, I am interested in being able to use the Peircean approach to better understand the design project (as a semiotic process) and to be able to take practical design decisions... and the same with respect to qualitative market research... another discipline with a necessary practical scope. However, in both cases it is a matter of developing to the maximum the aspects of the /enabling Firstness/: the /design/ and the understanding of the problem... a difficult subject if there are any... or… our world would be a little better than what we have. I consider Peirce's /ethics/ (2ness) to be directly related to his training in chemistry where every element in Mendeleev's table must necessarily be precisely nominated: H=1 cannot be confused with Pb=207. This is not the case with other matters such as color where there may be a subtle variation, unnameable with precision, in a [blue] or a [red]. However, this /ethical concern/ (Peirce?) entails a serious contradiction with respect to the Peircean triadic semiotics proposal where the main task should not be the positive essence but the inter-relational construction of a semiotic concept or process (Lizska wrote something about this). I believe that the exegesis of Peirce's work is still necessary given the vastness and the difficult access to his writings. However, semiotics, as a discipline with pretensions of /scientific methodology/ (Magariños de Morentin) does not deal with any exegesis, but with cognitive-semiotic processes that are important in order to understand something about any subject and to be able to make decisions of different kinds, for example: 1. /to make possible/ the formal description of the logic of a theoretical concept in order to improve it, change it or discard it (1ness); 2. to analyze a concrete product or behavior to /determine/ its relative economic validity (2ness); and 3. to allow the analysis of any socio-cultural-political value in order to make a /decision/ (Althusser) coherent with the /needs/ (Peirce) of a given time and context (3ness). On the other hand, while the proposal to take the classification to 128 or hundreds of thousands of different sign-subsigns is absolutely logical, I wonder if there is a single person in the world who has developed that immense semiotic process applied to any object, problem or concrete case. Probably AI programs will be able to do it... but will anyone really be able to understand and review it for practical purposes? This is why I have developed the /Semiotic Nonagon/ as a practical tool for qualitative analysis in sufficient and recursive logical sub-aspects: 3, 9, 27 or 81. Although, as Liszka says the SN “is not strictly Peircean”, 40 years of its use in academia with doctoral theses and professional practice as a qualitative market researcher have long demonstrated its efficacy. Thanks to Gary Richmond I found out yesterday that there is a long list of articles on this topic both in English and Spanish: https://uba.academia.edu/CGuerri <https://uba.academia.edu/CGuerri>This allows me not to go into further details about this ‘strictly’ semiotic tool. Because, it seems to me (as far as I know) worth noting that Peirce NEVER performed any semiotic analysis using his own proposed classification of signs, except for his unhappy decision to repeatedly name only the weather vane as an index. And since, as Saussure explains, verbal language develops in a sequential line (which prevents us from saying more than one stupid thing at a time), every object, behavior, or concept is always a complete triadic and always a complex SIGN... of which we may name one aspect anyway, as basic rhetoric teaches us. All the best CL *Dr. Arch. Claudio F. Guerri* Consultant Professor Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo Universidad de Buenos Aires Home address: Gral. Lemos 270 (1427) Buenos Aires – Argentina Telefax: (0054-11) 4553-7976 Cell phone: (0054-9-11) 6289-8123 E-mail: claudiogue...@gmail.com _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
ral engineer’ - and has given > conference papers and published papers on Peirce. The same accolades can be > made about most others on this List - and, apart from it being an example of > the logical fallacy of 'appeal to authority’ to which you have made > reference, - such doesn’t make his comments any more valid than those of > other people on the list. > > Edwina > >> On Apr 12, 2024, at 11:21 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: >> >> Edwina, List, >> >> This is in response to your message to the List today as well as your >> addendum to that message. For now I mainly have just a few questions: >> >> You are no doubt aware of Peirce's insistence on a rigorous ethics of >> terminology. Are you suggesting that he is incorrect in his insistence that >> terminology matters, and can matter significantly -- that is, that it can >> constitute a difference which makes a difference? If you disagree (which you >> appear to), why? >> >> And are you suggesting that scholars and scientists who may occasionally >> focus on terminology -- recently, on the List, John Sowa, Jon Alan Schmidt, >> and myself -- are slipping into nominalism? I myself cannot see how a >> rigorous insistence on the importance of terminology has anything to do with >> nominalism. Please explain how it does. And please also include your >> definition of nominalism. >> >> And do you disagree that using different terminology can correlate with >> having different concepts? >> >> Further, if my memory isn't too diminished, I don't recall anyone on the >> List referring to you as a "pseudo-Peircean," something which would indeed >> constitute unacceptable 'name calling' on Peirce-L. However, today you >> suggested that some on this list are "Purists" which, had that expression >> been directed at particular List participants would indeed constitute a mild >> kind of 'name calling' depending on the context. However, I have no idea >> what you mean by alleging that some here are 'purists' -- please explain >> what you mean by this. >> >> It seems to be that there are many rooms in the houses of Peircean >> semeiotic, of Peircean pragmaticism -- more generally, of semiotic and >> pragmatism -- and that they are not mutually exclusive, that a >> scholar/scientist can be interested both in theory and practice (and >> although Peirce once denied it, he himself accomplished much in both theory >> and practice). >> >> So it would be quite helpful if you would clarify your comments today. >> >> And I will add, although he might prefer that I not, that Jon Alan Schmidt, >> not infrequently accused by some here as being a sort of Peircean >> theoretical 'purist' simply because, as he wrote yesterday, his "own >> priority is accurately understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully >> building on Peirce's views by carefully studying and adhering to his words," >> is an accomplished and distinguished structural engineer, often invited to >> speak at conventions and other gatherings because of his expertise. >> >> And among the 44 papers of his cited on Google Scholar one will find, along >> with the specifically Peircean ones, some papers in which Peircean thought >> is applied in various ways, including engineering reasoning and ethics. >> https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=EfQhY7cJ=en >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 10:38 AM Edwina Taborsky > <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> List >> >> As an addendum - I wonder if this tortured focus on ‘ which term is the >> correct one’ has shades of nominalism in it…ie, that focus on the >> particular, the individual, [ ie the exact term] and an difference to ‘what >> is real’. [ ie the meaning and function]. >> >> Edwina >> >>> On Apr 12, 2024, at 9:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky >> <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>> >>> Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ >>> of the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s a >>> debate not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a more >>> basic requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function of >>> the triad which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on >>> ‘which term to use’ - and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. . >>> >>> Therefore , as you point out, we g
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
ith having different concepts? Further, if my memory isn't too diminished, I don't recall anyone on the List referring to you as a "pseudo-Peircean," something which would indeed constitute unacceptable 'name calling' on Peirce-L. However, today you suggested that some on this list are "Purists" which, had that expression been directed at particular List participants would indeed constitute a mild kind of 'name calling' depending on the context. However, I have no idea what you mean by alleging that some here are 'purists' -- please explain what you mean by this. It seems to be that there are many rooms in the houses of Peircean semeiotic, of Peircean pragmaticism -- more generally, of semiotic and pragmatism -- and that they are not mutually exclusive, that a scholar/scientist can be interested both in theory and practice (and although Peirce once denied it, he himself accomplished much in both theory and practice). So it would be quite helpful if you would clarify your comments today. And I will add, although he might prefer that I not, that Jon Alan Schmidt, not infrequently accused by some here as being a sort of Peircean theoretical 'purist' simply because, as he wrote yesterday, his "own priority is accurately understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on Peirce's views by carefully studying and adhering to his words," is an accomplished and distinguished structural engineer, often invited to speak at conventions and other gatherings because of his expertise. And among the 44 papers of his cited on Google Scholar one will find, along with the specifically Peircean ones, some papers in which Peircean thought is applied in various ways, including engineering reasoning and ethics. https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=EfQhY7cJ=en Best, Gary On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 10:38 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote: List As an addendum - I wonder if this tortured focus on ‘ which term is the correct one’ has shades of nominalism in it…ie, that focus on the particular, the individual, [ ie the exact term] and an difference to ‘what is real’. [ ie the meaning and function]. Edwina On Apr 12, 2024, at 9:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ of the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s a debate not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a more basic requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function of the triad which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on ‘which term to use’ - and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. . Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce prefer’ with the result as you point out that “imaginary distinctions are often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression - the wrangling which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally according to Peirce - these are ‘false distinctions’…. Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which Peirce used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your analysis, it better explains the operative function of what is semiotically taking place - without the heavens opening up with a downpour of rejection??? I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the terms ‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the Dynamic object and the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the semiosic mediation….[Peirce never used those words!! You’re a pseudo-Peircean; you are…” . But without such modernization and explanation of the function of semiosis, and the insistence by ’The Purists’ on using only Peircean terms - and above all, his ‘favourite terms’ - , we will never be able to move the real analytic power of Peircean semiosis into the modern world. And that - - is where I believe the focus should be. Edwina On Apr 12, 2024, at 6:29 AM, robert marty wrote: List,I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind. https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens Regards, Robert Marty Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt a écrit : John, List: JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark. Again, the key difference is between Peirce's definition of "mark" in Baldwin's dictionary and his definition of "tone"--as well as "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places. JFS: But some words
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Gary R, List 1] Yes - I am aware of Peirce’s insistence on accurate terminology. I am also aware of the many different terms he used for the same thing. I am also aware of the many different terms that other scholars use to refer to the same situations as Peirce describes. My point is that we cannot isolate scholars and research from each other by insisting that use only the terms that specific scholar used. We should, rather, understand that these different scholars were trying to examine the same situations - and should be open to using these different terms for the SAME situation. 2] Yes - I am indeed suggesting that the focus on terminology - and the insistence that one can use only Peirce’s terminology - because, for some reason, the meaning of Peirce’s terms cannot be considered as similar to the meanings yet with different terms used by others - - is a reduction into nominalism. And by nominalism - I mean a focus rejecting commonality - aka universals, such that one rejects the fact that, despite the different terms, there can be a commonality of existence….This can also be known as conceptualism. Of course - different terminology can mean different meanings….but that’s not my point, is it? 3] You yourself referred to me as ‘pseudo-Peircean. As well as ‘dogmatic, idiosyncratic- and your claim that my work ‘has ‘long been discredited’. 4] A ‘purist’ in my view is someone who is unwilling to acknowledge that the work of some scholar can be similar in its analysis to the work of another scholar - but - that the terms used are different. ..and above all - it is perfectly acceptable to , for example, examine the work of Peirce using the terms used by other scholars. 5] I’m not sure what your point is with your outline that JAS is an ‘accomplished andn distinguished structural engineer’ - and has given conference papers and published papers on Peirce. The same accolades can be made about most others on this List - and, apart from it being an example of the logical fallacy of 'appeal to authority’ to which you have made reference, - such doesn’t make his comments any more valid than those of other people on the list. Edwina > On Apr 12, 2024, at 11:21 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Edwina, List, > > This is in response to your message to the List today as well as your > addendum to that message. For now I mainly have just a few questions: > > You are no doubt aware of Peirce's insistence on a rigorous ethics of > terminology. Are you suggesting that he is incorrect in his insistence that > terminology matters, and can matter significantly -- that is, that it can > constitute a difference which makes a difference? If you disagree (which you > appear to), why? > > And are you suggesting that scholars and scientists who may occasionally > focus on terminology -- recently, on the List, John Sowa, Jon Alan Schmidt, > and myself -- are slipping into nominalism? I myself cannot see how a > rigorous insistence on the importance of terminology has anything to do with > nominalism. Please explain how it does. And please also include your > definition of nominalism. > > And do you disagree that using different terminology can correlate with > having different concepts? > > Further, if my memory isn't too diminished, I don't recall anyone on the List > referring to you as a "pseudo-Peircean," something which would indeed > constitute unacceptable 'name calling' on Peirce-L. However, today you > suggested that some on this list are "Purists" which, had that expression > been directed at particular List participants would indeed constitute a mild > kind of 'name calling' depending on the context. However, I have no idea what > you mean by alleging that some here are 'purists' -- please explain what you > mean by this. > > It seems to be that there are many rooms in the houses of Peircean semeiotic, > of Peircean pragmaticism -- more generally, of semiotic and pragmatism -- and > that they are not mutually exclusive, that a scholar/scientist can be > interested both in theory and practice (and although Peirce once denied it, > he himself accomplished much in both theory and practice). > > So it would be quite helpful if you would clarify your comments today. > > And I will add, although he might prefer that I not, that Jon Alan Schmidt, > not infrequently accused by some here as being a sort of Peircean theoretical > 'purist' simply because, as he wrote yesterday, his "own priority is > accurately understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on > Peirce's views by carefully studying and adhering to his words," is an > accomplished and distinguished structural engineer, often invited to speak at > conventions and other gatherings because of his expertise. &
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List, In the same vein, I also published another article in Academia.edu, which consists of a commented reading of CP 265, the item that follows his diagram of affinities between classes of signs of 2.264 (a sort of intuition that Peirce had of the structure of order that is a lattice, which I have shown many times). Probably I wasn't convincing enough. Perhaps this comment will be more convincing. There is no mention of Tone/Mark, Token, or Type, but of course, they are present in other names. https://www.academia.edu/44462107/Other_subdivisions_of_signs <https://www.academia.edu/44462107/Other_subdivisions_of_signs> As for hypoicons, which I, too, have noted appear only once in MS 478, I am in the process of finalizing a solid argument, at my peril, of course, to the effect that this notion should be abandoned because it is invalidated by the contents of MS 540. My conclusion is that these hypoicons, wrongly considered as a sort of subdivisions of icons (which I myself erroneously theorized) are a kind of shadow image of the trichotomy of the object of the sign, forgotten by Peirce in MS 478. But that's another story. Regards, Robert Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 21:19, John F Sowa a écrit : > Robert, Jon, List, > > Thanks for the note. There is nothing controversial about it, and I agree > with Jon's comments. > > But I would note that Peirce's later shift to semes, phemes, and delomes > enabled him to simplify, some of the issues, and generalize others. For > example, the idea of hypoicons seemed to be a powerful new concept that > Peirce discussed in only one MS.He didn't need it later because he > introduced semes as a generalization of rhemes. > > This is just one of many ways that Peirce's system developed during the > decade of 1903 to 1913. To avoid disturbing this moment of agreement, I > won't say anything more. > > John > > > > ------ > *From*: "Jon Alan Schmidt" > *Sent*: 4/12/24 1:18 PM > *To*: Peirce-L > *Cc*: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci < > bellucci.france...@googlemail.com>, Anthony Jappy , > "Houser, Nathan R." > *Subject*: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type > > Robert, List: > > Thanks for the reminder about this brief paper, which we discussed on the > List back in November 2021. As I said at that time, it is based on Peirce's > 1903 taxonomy with three trichotomies and ten sign classes, not his > 1906-1908 taxonomies with ten trichotomies and 66 sign classes; and my only > quibble with it is that it seems to equate "token" with "replica," which is > why it identifies only six classes of tokens. Instead, "token" directly > replaces "sinsign," while "instance" directly replaces "replica" (CP 4.537, > 1906). Accordingly, there are six classes of replicas/instances and three > additional classes of sinsigns/tokens, which correspond to the outermost > oval in each Venn diagram--iconic sinsigns/tokens, rhematic indexical > sinsigns/tokens, and dicent sinsigns/tokens. > > RM: I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the same methodology should > make it possible to conclude that each of the six types of token involves a > tone/mark of a particular kind. > > > Indeed, here is what Peirce himself says about this. > > CSP: A *Qualisign *is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act > as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with > its character as a sign. > A *Sinsign ...* is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. It > can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or > rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and > only form a sign through being actually embodied. (CP 2:244-245, EP 2:291, > 1903) > > CSP: Second, an Iconic Sinsign is any object of experience in so far as > some quality of it makes it determine the idea of an Object. Being an Icon, > and thus a sign by likeness purely, of whatever it may be like, it can only > be interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme. It will embody a Qualisign. > (CP 2.255, EP 2:294, 1903) > > > Although qualisigns/tones as "indefinite significant characters" must be > carefully distinguished from legisigns/types as "definitely significant > Forms" (CP 4.537; cf. R 339:276r-277r, 1906 Apr 2), both must be embodied > in sinsigns/tokens in order to *act *as signs. In fact, every > sinsign/token *involves *qualisigns/tones of a peculiar kind, and every > iconic sinsign/token *embodies *a qualisign. > > Regards, > >
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Edwina, List, This is in response to your message to the List today as well as your addendum to that message. For now I mainly have just a few questions: You are no doubt aware of Peirce's insistence on a rigorous ethics of terminology. Are you suggesting that he is incorrect in his insistence that terminology matters, and can matter significantly -- that is, that it can constitute a difference which makes a difference? If you disagree (which you appear to), why? And are you suggesting that scholars and scientists who may occasionally focus on terminology -- recently, on the List, John Sowa, Jon Alan Schmidt, and myself -- are slipping into nominalism? I myself cannot see how a rigorous insistence on the importance of terminology has *anything* to do with nominalism. Please explain how it does. And please also include your definition of nominalism. And do you disagree that using different terminology can correlate with having different concepts? Further, if my memory isn't too diminished, I don't recall anyone on the List referring to you as a "pseudo-Peircean," something which would indeed constitute unacceptable 'name calling' on Peirce-L. However, today *you* suggested that some on this list are "Purists" which, had that expression been directed at particular List participants would indeed constitute a mild *kind* of 'name calling' depending on the context. However, I have no idea what you mean by alleging that some here are 'purists' -- please explain what you mean by this. It seems to be that there are many rooms in the houses of Peircean semeiotic, of Peircean pragmaticism -- more generally, of semiotic and pragmatism -- and that they are not mutually exclusive, that a scholar/scientist can be interested both in theory and practice (and although Peirce once denied it, he himself accomplished much in both theory and practice). So it would be quite helpful if you would clarify your comments today. And I will add, although he might prefer that I not, that Jon Alan Schmidt, not infrequently accused by some here as being a sort of Peircean theoretical 'purist' simply because, as he wrote yesterday, his "own priority is accurately understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on *Peirce's *views by carefully studying and adhering to *his * words," is an accomplished and distinguished structural engineer, often invited to speak at conventions and other gatherings because of his expertise. And among the 44 papers of his cited on Google Scholar one will find, along with the specifically Peircean ones, some papers in which Peircean thought is applied in various ways, including engineering reasoning and ethics. https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=EfQhY7cJ=en Best, Gary On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 10:38 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote: > List > > As an addendum - I wonder if this tortured focus on ‘ which term is the > correct one’ has shades of nominalism in it…ie, that focus on the > particular, the individual, [ ie the exact term] and an difference to > ‘what is real’. [ ie the meaning and function]. > > Edwina > > On Apr 12, 2024, at 9:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > > Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ > of the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s > a debate not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a > more basic requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function > of the triad which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on > ‘which term to use’ - and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. . > > Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce > prefer’ with the result as you point out that “imaginary distinctions are > often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression - > the wrangling which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally > according to Peirce - these are ‘false distinctions’…. > > Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which > Peirce used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your > analysis, it better explains the operative function of what is > semiotically taking place - without the heavens opening up with a downpour > of rejection??? > > I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the > terms ‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the Dynamic > object and the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the semiosic > mediation….[*Peirce never used those words!! You’re a pseudo-Peircean; > you are…*” . But without such modernization and explanation of the > function of semiosis, and the insistence by ’The Purists’ on using only > Peircean terms - and above all, his ‘favourite terms’ - , we will never be > able to move the real analytic power of Peircean
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Jon, To begin, I'll quote a highly respected authority about arguments from authority. The following passage about authority comes from Wikiquote, a source that is widely considered an authoritative source of information: "Appeal to an authority which depends on human reason is the weakest kind of proof. - Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica ...when we engage in argument we must look to the weight of reason rather than authority. Indeed, students who are keen to learn often find the authority of those who claim to be teachers to be an obstacle, for they cease to apply their own judgement and regard as definitive the solution offered by the mentor of whom they approve. I myself tend to disapprove of the alleged practice of the Pythagoreans: the story goes that if they were maintaining some position in argument, and were asked why, they would reply: "The master said so", the master being Pythagoras. Prior judgement exercised such sway that authority prevailed even when unsupported by reason." My argument for the word 'mark' as a better choice than 'tone' is based on my own reasoning long before I noticed that Tony Jappy had made the same choice. And in the discussions, I supported every point with my own reasons. However, I realized that some readers, such as you, might disagree. So I said that if you don't believe me, go to another Peirce scholar who has spent years of research on these issues. That is the kind of citation that is REQUIRED in peer-reviewed publications in every field. The author is expected to cite related research. Instead of criticizing me, you should thank me for providing that additional information. JAS: That is not my understanding of why scrupulously citing references is required by academic publications these days, unlike in Peirce's time. Instead, it is primarily to give credit where it is due for ideas that are not the author's. I suggest that you read (or reread) some of the articles in the Summa Theologiae by Aquinas. In every article, he cites what other scholars have written pro and con each of the statements he is trying to prove. He then explains the arguments he agrees with and refutes the ones he disagrees with. The methods of citation by Aquinas established the polices for scholarly writing for universities for the next 800 years. At the top, I quoted Aquinas. I suggest that you read (or reread) a few of his articles. My citations of Jappy's writings are the same kind of references that Aquinas used to cite authors who supported the points he was trying to prove. And by the way, Peirce had also read quite a bit of the writings by Aquinas (in Latin, of course). In fact, the commentary about Aristotle by Aquinas is still regarded as a good introduction today. In fact, Hilary Putnam recommended it. Those recommendations are very respectable. They're the kind of references I made to Jappy. Anybody who criticizes that as a fallacy deserves a huge amount of criticism. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 4/11/24 10:28 PM John, List: JFS: First, let me dismiss a false claim: "appeal to authority is a logical fallacy". Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or an encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority. Appeal to authority is a logical fallacy when "the opinion of an influential figure is used as evidence to support an argument" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_authority). Quoting a dictionary or encyclopedia--including Wikipedia, as in this case--is not a fallacious appeal to authority because such references contain facts on which there is broad consensus, not opinions whose persuasiveness depends primarily on the eminence and purported expertise of a particular person who holds them. JFS: The requirement to cite references in an academic publication shows that authors are required to show the experts whose authority they depend on for their own claims. That is not my understanding of why scrupulously citing references is required by academic publications these days, unlike in Peirce's time. Instead, it is primarily to give credit where it is due for ideas that are not the author's. JFS: In fact, when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are appealing to him as an authority. Quoting Peirce to support scholarly claims about his own views is also not a fallacious appeal to authority. On the contrary, as I have said before, his is the only authority that matters in such a context. As someone once said, "Anything other than an exact quotation is the opinion of the author. Nobody can claim that his or her ideas are what Peirce intended" (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00085.html). JFS: The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are terms in exactly the same way that the word 'mark' is a term. Obvio
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Panel on Semiotic Exploration of Ecology at the 2024 Warsaw IASS-AIS World Congress
Dear Claudio, This is exciting news indeed, and in an area of semiotics which I know holds considerable interest to at least several members of the Peirce-L forum including me. Thank you for all the excellent work you have done and continue to do in the Peircean semiotics -- including his three categories -- of design and ecology, including the semiotics of art, architecture, etc. I'm delighted that many of your works are available in English; were my Spanish better, I'd delve into some of your work written in that beautiful language. https://uba.academia.edu/CGuerri I have plans to be in Europe from September 9 through the 24th (Brussels, Amsterdam/Tilburg, and Berlin) and will see if it is still possible to adjust my schedule to include your Warsaw panel. Warm regards, Gary On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 2:27 PM Claudio Guerri wrote: > Dear Friends and colleagues, we have some excellent news to share with you! > > The network "SPACE SEMIOTICS [Design, Architecture, Urbanism, Landscaping]" > https://significant.design/subscribe is organizing a *panel *titled: *Semiotic > Explorations of Ecology (in Design, Architecture, Urbanism, Landscaping)* > (Isabel > Marcos & Claudio Guerri) this year within the framework of the *16th > IASS-AIS World Congress devoted to Signs and Realities, 2-6 September 2024 > in Warsaw, Poland.* > > *The call is open until the 15th April 2024, you can submit your paper > here:* *https://www.semcon2024.com/abstrakty* > <https://www.semcon2024.com/abstrakty> > > * How the registration process works:* > > *1. You pre-register without paying.* > > *2. You get your registration ID (RegID).* > > *3. With your RegID you can submit your paper abstracts until 15 April > 2024.* > > At the end of the panel, we will include a round-table to discuss the > unresolved problems of *Signs and Realities*, *Ecology in Design* and > *Design* and *Morphology* in general. With this call we are asking all > interested scholars to participate in this round-table and to propose their > own point of view on applied semiotics. > > We will finally meet in person! > > Isabel Marcos & Claudio Guerri > > *Description of the panel proposal:* > > Ecology, when examined from a semiotic perspective, reveals itself as a > complex reality, intertwining tangible environmental phenomena with > theoretical, physical and symbolic representations. This manifestation > possibilities invites us to explore the interconnections between semiotics, > design, architecture, urbanism and landscaping. Thus, ecology, connecting > the tangible aspects of the environment to the different semiotic > constructions shape our understanding and interaction with this reality. > > *1. Semiotics in Environmental Communication:* Explore how semiotic > systems contribute to the communication of environmental issues. > > *2. Semiotic Analysis of the Ecological Crisis:* Investigation of > semiotic representations of the ecological crisis in different discourses. > > *3. Ecological Language and Technological Innovation:* Study of the > creation of a specific semiotic language to discuss ecological issues, with > an analysis of the impact of technological innovations. > > *4. Semiotic Ethics in Design:* Explore the ethical implications of > semiotics related to growth in the fields of design. How do signs > contribute to the formulation of new ecological ethics in design? > > *5. Semiotics in Bioclimatic Architecture:* Examine the role of > bioclimatic architecture and how the signifying elements of this approach > are used to create the maximum ecological impact of natural resources. > > *6. Urban Semiotics and Environmental Policy: *Examining how new > ecological practices in the urban context impact environmental policies. > What is the ecological significance of these urban practices and how do > they shape environmental policies? > > *7. Landscape Semiotics and Ecological Impact:* Study of sign usage in > vegetal, urban, and architectural landscapes, taking into account their > ecological impact. How does landscape semiotics influence environmental > awareness and sustainable practices? > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-si
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Robert, Jon, List, Thanks for the note. There is nothing controversial about it, and I agree with Jon's comments. But I would note that Peirce's later shift to semes, phemes, and delomes enabled him to simplify, some of the issues, and generalize others. For example, the idea of hypoicons seemed to be a powerful new concept that Peirce discussed in only one MS.He didn't need it later because he introduced semes as a generalization of rhemes. This is just one of many ways that Peirce's system developed during the decade of 1903 to 1913. To avoid disturbing this moment of agreement, I won't say anything more. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 4/12/24 1:18 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci , Anthony Jappy , "Houser, Nathan R." Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type Robert, List: Thanks for the reminder about this brief paper, which we discussed on the List back in November 2021. As I said at that time, it is based on Peirce's 1903 taxonomy with three trichotomies and ten sign classes, not his 1906-1908 taxonomies with ten trichotomies and 66 sign classes; and my only quibble with it is that it seems to equate "token" with "replica," which is why it identifies only six classes of tokens. Instead, "token" directly replaces "sinsign," while "instance" directly replaces "replica" (CP 4.537, 1906). Accordingly, there are six classes of replicas/instances and three additional classes of sinsigns/tokens, which correspond to the outermost oval in each Venn diagram--iconic sinsigns/tokens, rhematic indexical sinsigns/tokens, and dicent sinsigns/tokens. RM: I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind. Indeed, here is what Peirce himself says about this. CSP: A Qualisign is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign. A Sinsign ... is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied. (CP 2:244-245, EP 2:291, 1903) CSP: Second, an Iconic Sinsign is any object of experience in so far as some quality of it makes it determine the idea of an Object. Being an Icon, and thus a sign by likeness purely, of whatever it may be like, it can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme. It will embody a Qualisign. (CP 2.255, EP 2:294, 1903) Although qualisigns/tones as "indefinite significant characters" must be carefully distinguished from legisigns/types as "definitely significant Forms" (CP 4.537; cf. R 339:276r-277r, 1906 Apr 2), both must be embodied in sinsigns/tokens in order to act as signs. In fact, every sinsign/token involves qualisigns/tones of a peculiar kind, and every iconic sinsign/token embodies a qualisign. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 5:30 AM robert marty wrote: List,I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind. https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens Regards, Robert Marty Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Robert, List: Thanks for the reminder about this brief paper, which we discussed on the List back in November 2021. As I said at that time, it is based on Peirce's 1903 taxonomy with three trichotomies and ten sign classes, not his 1906-1908 taxonomies with ten trichotomies and 66 sign classes; and my only quibble with it is that it seems to equate "token" with "replica," which is why it identifies only six classes of tokens. Instead, "token" directly replaces "sinsign," while "instance" directly replaces "replica" (CP 4.537, 1906). Accordingly, there are six classes of replicas/instances and three additional classes of sinsigns/tokens, which correspond to the outermost oval in each Venn diagram--iconic sinsigns/tokens, rhematic indexical sinsigns/tokens, and dicent sinsigns/tokens. RM: I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind. Indeed, here is what Peirce himself says about this. CSP: A *Qualisign *is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign. A *Sinsign ...* is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied. (CP 2:244-245, EP 2:291, 1903) CSP: Second, an Iconic Sinsign is any object of experience in so far as some quality of it makes it determine the idea of an Object. Being an Icon, and thus a sign by likeness purely, of whatever it may be like, it can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme. It will embody a Qualisign. (CP 2.255, EP 2:294, 1903) Although qualisigns/tones as "indefinite significant characters" must be carefully distinguished from legisigns/types as "definitely significant Forms" (CP 4.537; cf. R 339:276r-277r, 1906 Apr 2), both must be embodied in sinsigns/tokens in order to *act *as signs. In fact, every sinsign/token *involves *qualisigns/tones of a peculiar kind, and every iconic sinsign/token *embodies *a qualisign. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 5:30 AM robert marty wrote: > List, > I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a > few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but > the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the > six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind. > https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens > Regards, > Robert Marty > Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy > fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty > *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
List As an addendum - I wonder if this tortured focus on ‘ which term is the correct one’ has shades of nominalism in it…ie, that focus on the particular, the individual, [ ie the exact term] and an difference to ‘what is real’. [ ie the meaning and function]. Edwina > On Apr 12, 2024, at 9:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > > Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ of > the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s a > debate not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a more > basic requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function of the > triad which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on ‘which term > to use’ - and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. . > > Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce > prefer’ with the result as you point out that “imaginary distinctions are > often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression - > the wrangling which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally > according to Peirce - these are ‘false distinctions’…. > > Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which > Peirce used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your > analysis, it better explains the operative function of what is semiotically > taking place - without the heavens opening up with a downpour of rejection??? > > I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the terms > ‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the Dynamic object > and the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the semiosic > mediation….[Peirce never used those words!! You’re a pseudo-Peircean; you > are…” . But without such modernization and explanation of the function of > semiosis, and the insistence by ’The Purists’ on using only Peircean terms - > and above all, his ‘favourite terms’ - , we will never be able to move the > real analytic power of Peircean semiosis into the modern world. And that - - > is where I believe the focus should be. > > Edwina > > >> On Apr 12, 2024, at 6:29 AM, robert marty wrote: >> >> List, >> I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a >> few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but >> the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the >> six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind. >> https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens >> Regards, >> Robert Marty >> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy >> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty >> <https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty> >> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ >> >> >> >> Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt > <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> a écrit : >>> John, List: >>> >>> JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and >>> 'tone' as a term for a possible mark. >>> >>> Again, the key difference is between Peirce's definition of "mark" in >>> Baldwin's dictionary and his definition of "tone"--as well as "tuone," >>> "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places. >>> >>> JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be >>> considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable. >>> >>> Peirce famously preferred an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so >>> that it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion, >>> then "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and >>> "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting >>> with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device." >>> >>> JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly >>> in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement. >>> >>> It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is >>> the only word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times >>> between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and >>> necessitant "type." It is also the only one that was published during his >>> lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries and >>> the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, wi
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ of the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s a debate not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a more basic requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function of the triad which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on ‘which term to use’ - and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. . Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce prefer’ with the result as you point out that “imaginary distinctions are often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression - the wrangling which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally according to Peirce - these are ‘false distinctions’…. Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which Peirce used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your analysis, it better explains the operative function of what is semiotically taking place - without the heavens opening up with a downpour of rejection??? I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the terms ‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the Dynamic object and the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the semiosic mediation….[Peirce never used those words!! You’re a pseudo-Peircean; you are…” . But without such modernization and explanation of the function of semiosis, and the insistence by ’The Purists’ on using only Peircean terms - and above all, his ‘favourite terms’ - , we will never be able to move the real analytic power of Peircean semiosis into the modern world. And that - - is where I believe the focus should be. Edwina > On Apr 12, 2024, at 6:29 AM, robert marty wrote: > > List, > I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a few > years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the > same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the six > types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind. > https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens > Regards, > Robert Marty > Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy > fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty > <https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty> > https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ > > > > Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> a écrit : >> John, List: >> >> JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and >> 'tone' as a term for a possible mark. >> >> Again, the key difference is between Peirce's definition of "mark" in >> Baldwin's dictionary and his definition of "tone"--as well as "tuone," >> "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places. >> >> JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be >> considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable. >> >> Peirce famously preferred an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so that >> it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion, then >> "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and >> "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting >> with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device." >> >> JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly >> in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement. >> >> It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is >> the only word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times >> between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and >> necessitant "type." It is also the only one that was published during his >> lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries and >> the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, with "mark" and "potisign" found >> solely in the latter, although she subsequently endorsed "tone." As someone >> once said, "She had a solid intuitive way of explaining principles that he >> tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and difficult to >> understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more convincing >> explanations for his abstract ideas" >> (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html). >> >> JFS: That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single >> non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. I
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
List, I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind. https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens Regards, Robert Marty Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt a écrit : > John, List: > > JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and > 'tone' as a term for a possible mark. > > > Again, the key difference is between Peirce's *definition *of "mark" in > Baldwin's dictionary and his *definition *of "tone"--as well as "tuone," > "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places. > > JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be > considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable. > > > Peirce famously *preferred *an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so > that it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion, > then "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and > "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting > with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device." > > JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, > mainly in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement. > > > It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is > the *only *word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times > between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and > necessitant "type." It is also the *only *one that was published during > his lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries > and the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, with "mark" and "potisign" > found solely in the latter, although *she *subsequently endorsed "tone." > As someone once said, "She had a solid intuitive way of explaining > principles that he tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and > difficult to understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more > convincing explanations for his abstract ideas" ( > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html). > > JFS: That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single > non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. If anybody > else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) one way or > the other, please let us know. > > > Gary already provided anecdotal evidence to the contrary and expressed his > personal preference for "tone." As always, my own priority is accurately > understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on *Peirce's > *views by carefully studying and adhering to *his *words. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 6:10 PM John F Sowa wrote: > >> Gary, Jon, List, >> >> My note crossed in the mail with Gary's. I responded to the previous >> notes by Jon and Gary (q.v.). >> >> My conclusion: As words, there is no logical difference between the >> words 'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark. In fact, any word >> pulled out of thin air could be chosen as a term for a possible mark. But >> some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be considered >> ugly. They are certainly not memorable. >> >> Peirce at one point suggested the word 'mark' as a word for 'possible >> mark'. That shows he was not fully convinced that 'tone' was the best word >> for the future. Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more >> often, mainly in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement. >> >> But we must remember that Tony Jappy also chose the word 'mark' for the >> triad (mark token type). And he has devoted years of research to the >> issues. As I pointed out, authorities are not infallible, but they are >> more likely to be authorities than T. C. Mits (The Common Man in the >> street). >> >> And I myself have been cited as an authority for quite a few issues in >> logic, including Peirce's logic. See https://jfsowa.com/pubs/
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List: JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark. Again, the key difference is between Peirce's *definition *of "mark" in Baldwin's dictionary and his *definition *of "tone"--as well as "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places. JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable. Peirce famously *preferred *an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so that it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion, then "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device." JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement. It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is the *only *word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "type." It is also the *only *one that was published during his lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries and the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, with "mark" and "potisign" found solely in the latter, although *she *subsequently endorsed "tone." As someone once said, "She had a solid intuitive way of explaining principles that he tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and difficult to understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more convincing explanations for his abstract ideas" ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html). JFS: That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. If anybody else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) one way or the other, please let us know. Gary already provided anecdotal evidence to the contrary and expressed his personal preference for "tone." As always, my own priority is accurately understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on *Peirce's *views by carefully studying and adhering to *his *words. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 6:10 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Gary, Jon, List, > > My note crossed in the mail with Gary's. I responded to the previous > notes by Jon and Gary (q.v.). > > My conclusion: As words, there is no logical difference between the words > 'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark. In fact, any word pulled > out of thin air could be chosen as a term for a possible mark. But some > words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be considered ugly. > They are certainly not memorable. > > Peirce at one point suggested the word 'mark' as a word for 'possible > mark'. That shows he was not fully convinced that 'tone' was the best word > for the future. Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more > often, mainly in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement. > > But we must remember that Tony Jappy also chose the word 'mark' for the > triad (mark token type). And he has devoted years of research to the > issues. As I pointed out, authorities are not infallible, but they are > more likely to be authorities than T. C. Mits (The Common Man in the > street). > > And I myself have been cited as an authority for quite a few issues in > logic, including Peirce's logic. See https://jfsowa.com/pubs/ for > publications. There are even more lecture slides. (Copies upon request.) > > But the ultimate judges for the vocabulary are the speakers of the > future. The overwhelming majority of knowledgeable logicians, linguists, > and philosophers who know the pair (token type) but not the first term, > find mark far more congenial and memorable than tone. I discovered that > point while talking to them. That is not a scientific survey, but I could > not find a single non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word > 'tone'. > > If anybody else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) > one way or the other, please let us know. > > John > > -- > *From*: "Gary Richmond" > List, > > While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going as > it has continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of hi
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List: JFS: First, let me dismiss a false claim: "appeal to authority is a logical *fallacy*". Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or an encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority. Appeal to authority is a logical fallacy when "the opinion of an influential figure is used as evidence to support an argument" ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_authority). Quoting a dictionary or encyclopedia--including Wikipedia, as in this case--is *not *a fallacious appeal to authority because such references contain *facts *on which there is broad consensus, not *opinions *whose persuasiveness depends primarily on the eminence and purported expertise of a particular person who holds them. JFS: The requirement to cite references in an academic publication shows that authors are *required *to show the experts whose authority they depend on for their own claims. That is not my understanding of why scrupulously citing references is required by academic publications these days, unlike in Peirce's time. Instead, it is primarily to give credit where it is due for ideas that are not the author's. JFS: In fact, when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are appealing to him as an authority. Quoting Peirce to support scholarly claims about *his own views* is also not a fallacious appeal to authority. On the contrary, as I have said before, his is the *only *authority that matters in such a context. As someone once said, "Anything other than an exact quotation is the opinion of the author. Nobody can claim that his or her ideas are what Peirce intended" (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00085.html). JFS: The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are *terms *in exactly the same way that the word 'mark' is a *term*. Obviously, all these English words *are *terms--no one is disputing that. The issue here is whether they *signify *a certain kind of term. As defined by Peirce in Baldwin's dictionary, that is *precisely *what "mark" signifies; but as defined by Peirce in the various passages that I have repeatedly cited and quoted, that is *not at all* what "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign" signify. JFS: Please note that Jon keeps accusing me of making a mistake. I am just pointing out that he is making a mistake by claiming that i am making a mistake. I have not accused anyone of anything, nor have I claimed that anyone is making a mistake. I have simply spelled out *Peirce's *relevant views, as amply supported by exact quotations. Besides, as someone once said, "we should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a competition. If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank them for the correction" (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00089.html)--not treat it as an accusation. JFS: If I agree with other Peirce scholars that 'mark' is a better word, I have a right to do so without being criticized for doing so. I have not criticized anyone for believing that "mark" is a better choice than "tone" for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "type," even though I strongly disagree. On the contrary, I have explicitly stated more than once that anyone is welcome to hold that opinion and make a case for it. Nevertheless, as I have also stated more than once, no one can accurately claim that it was *Peirce's *final and definitive choice. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 5:15 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, Gary, List, > > First, let me dismiss a false claim: "appeal to authority is a logical > *fallacy".* > > Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or an > encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority. The requirement to > cite references in an academic publication shows that authors are > *required *to show the experts whose authority they depend on for their > own claims. In fact , when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are > appealing to him as an authority. Of course, everybody is fallible, even > authorities. But rejection of an authority requires some evidence. > > Note the first sentence of Peirce's definition of 'mark' (as quoted > below): "To say that a term or thing has a mark is to say that of whatever > it can be predicated something else (the mark) can be predicated; and to > say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one > term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or > things can be predicated". > > The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are *terms *in > exa
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Gary, Jon, List, My note crossed in the mail with Gary's. I responded to the previous notes by Jon and Gary (q.v.). My conclusion: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark. In fact, any word pulled out of thin air could be chosen as a term for a possible mark. But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable. Peirce at one point suggested the word 'mark' as a word for 'possible mark'. That shows he was not fully convinced that 'tone' was the best word for the future. Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement. But we must remember that Tony Jappy also chose the word 'mark' for the triad (mark token type). And he has devoted years of research to the issues. As I pointed out, authorities are not infallible, but they are more likely to be authorities than T. C. Mits (The Common Man in the street). And I myself have been cited as an authority for quite a few issues in logic, including Peirce's logic. See https://jfsowa.com/pubs/ for publications. There are even more lecture slides. (Copies upon request.) But the ultimate judges for the vocabulary are the speakers of the future. The overwhelming majority of knowledgeable logicians, linguists, and philosophers who know the pair (token type) but not the first term, find mark far more congenial and memorable than tone. I discovered that point while talking to them. That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. If anybody else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) one way or the other, please let us know. John From: "Gary Richmond" List, While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going as it has continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of his reminded me that the principal issue being considered has not been resolved unless you want to accept John's word that it has been and, by the way, completely along the lines of his analysis. In other words, the 'tone' v. 'mark' question has been settled because John says it has and, so, there's no need for further discussion. I have followed this exchange very closely and find that Jon's argumentation is bolstered by textual and other support. For example, contra John, he has repeatedly demonstrated -- again, with more than sufficient textual support - that any use of 'mark' consistent with Peirce's Baldwin Dictionary definition is contrary to Peirce's discussion of 'tone' (and related terms, such as. 'potisign'). For 'mark' is viewed by Peirce as a kind of term and, so, decidedly not a possible sign. Indeed, the very image that comes to my mind for 'mark' is always an existential one, say a mark on a blackboard, or a beauty mark. Conversely, as Jon has repeatedly shown, all of Peirce's definitions of a possible sign include the idea that its being is a significant "quality of feeling," a "Vague Quality," a sign that while "merely possible, [is] felt to be positively possible." John says that when he uses 'mark' as having Peirce's meaning of a "Vague Quality" that his listeners, typically not schooled in Peircean thought, "find it quite congenial" and, so he uses it in all his talks and written work. I can only say that that has not been my experience over the years. For example, earlier this year I gave an invited talk at a session of the George Santayana Society at the Eastern APA on the trichotomic structure of Peirce's Classification of the Sciences where I found that in discussing tone, token, type that my interlocutors -- almost none of whom were familiar with Peirce's semeiotic -- found 'tone' to be most genial and, indeed, one suggested that the three all starting with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device. Well, be that as it may, that notion is certainly trivial (pun intended). Again, it bears repeating that John's remark that, because Tony Jappy used the term 'mark' rather than 'tone', he has adopted it is nothing but the logical fallacy of an appeal to authority. I have had any number of discussions with Peirceans over the past several years, none of whom have faulted my use of 'tone' for that "merely possible" sign. Mark my words! Furthermore, I have found Jon more than willing to learn from his disagreements with others on the List. For example, in several of his papers he has expressed appreciation for the engagement with several Peirce-L members with whom he has 'contended' on the List, including John. And despite John's claim that having read Jon's post prior to this most recent one and finding "nothing new," Jon has clearly shown th
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Jon, Gary, List, First, let me dismiss a false claim: "appeal to authority is a logical fallacy". Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or an encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority. The requirement to cite references in an academic publication shows that authors are required to show the experts whose authority they depend on for their own claims. In fact , when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are appealing to him as an authority. Of course, everybody is fallible, even authorities. But rejection of an authority requires some evidence. Note the first sentence of Peirce's definition of 'mark' (as quoted below): "To say that a term or thing has a mark is to say that of whatever it can be predicated something else (the mark) can be predicated; and to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be predicated". The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are terms in exactly the same way that the word 'mark' is a term. Whatever those terms may be predicated of, something else (a mark) can be predicated. Therefore, the word 'mark' may be used in the same way as the words 'tone' or 'potisign' to refer to a possible mark. In conclusion, the word 'mark' may be used to refer to a possible mark. In fact, it's the simplest and most obvious word for the purpose. In 1908, Peirce recognized that point. Whether or not he vacillated on that point is irrelevant. He did not deny that it may be so used, and many or perhaps most speakers of 21st C English find it more natural and more memorable. That is sufficient justification for preferring it. JFS: All I'm saying is that there is no reason to continue discussing this issue. JAS: Then why keep posting about it? Because I believe that it's important to avoid confusing the subscribers to Peirce list. I will stop correcting your mistakes as soon as you stop sending them to the list. Remark to Gary: Please note that Jon keeps accusing me of making a mistake. I am just pointing out that he is making a mistake by claiming that i am making a mistake. If he wants to continue using the word 'tone', he has a right to do so. If I agree with other Peirce scholars that 'mark' is a better word, I have a right to do so without being criticized for doing so. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" John, List: JFS: The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point in its favor. As I have noted twice before, with exact quotations as explicit support, any use of "mark" that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) is inconsistent with his various explanations of what he means by "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign." Again, a mark is a certain kind of term--"to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be predicated"--which entails that it is a necessitant type embodied in existent tokens, not a possible sign. On the other hand, Peirce defines the latter as "what has all its being whether it exists or not" (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31), "a quality of feeling which is significant" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2), "a character in its nature incapable of exact identification" (ibid), "an indefinite significant character" (CP 4.537, 1906), a "Vague Quality" (R 339:285r, 1906 Aug 31), and "Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25). JFS: But when I use the word 'mark', they find it quite congenial. That is why I adopted it in my writings on this topic. The problem with this alleged congeniality is that anyone unfamiliar with Peirce's speculative grammar almost certainly misunderstands the word "mark" when it is used for a possible sign, the counterpart of an existent "token" and a necessitant "type." For example, as a candidate to replace "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign," it is definitely not "that part of an image that determines it as a token of some type" (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00035.html). Again, among other differences, a type "is absolutely identical in all its Instances or embodiments, while a Tuone cannot have any identity, it has only similarity" (R 339:277r, 1906 Apr 2). JFS: Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been studying and analyzing the evolution of Peirce's writings during
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
List, While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going as it has continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of his reminded me that the principal issue being considered has *not *been resolved unless you want to accept John's word that it has been and, by the way, completely along the lines of *his* analysis. In other words, the 'tone' v. 'mark' question has been settled *because* John says it has and, so, there's no need for further discussion. I have followed this exchange very closely and find that Jon's argumentation is bolstered by textual and other support. For example, contra John, he has repeatedly demonstrated -- again, with more than sufficient textual support - that any use of 'mark' consistent with Peirce's Baldwin Dictionary definition is contrary to Peirce's discussion of 'tone' (and related terms, such as. 'potisign'). For 'mark' is viewed by Peirce as a kind of *term* and, so, decidedly *not *a *possible sign*. Indeed, the very image that comes to my mind for 'mark' is always an *existential* one, say a mark on a blackboard, or a beauty mark. Conversely, as Jon has repeatedly shown, all of Peirce's definitions of a *possible sign* include the idea that its being is a significant "quality of feeling," a "Vague Quality," a sign that while "merely possible, [is] felt to be positively possible." John says that when he uses 'mark' as having Peirce's meaning of a "Vague Quality" that his listeners, typically *not* schooled in Peircean thought, "find it quite congenial" and, so he uses it in all his talks and written work. I can only say that that has not been my experience over the years. For example, earlier this year I gave an invited talk at a session of the George Santayana Society at the Eastern APA on the trichotomic structure of Peirce's Classification of the Sciences where I found that in discussing tone, token, type that my interlocutors -- almost none of whom were familiar with Peirce's semeiotic -- found 'tone' to be most genial and, indeed, one suggested that the three all starting with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device. Well, be that as it may, that notion is certainly trivial (pun intended). Again, it bears repeating that John's remark that, because Tony Jappy used the term 'mark' rather than 'tone', he has adopted it is nothing but the logical fallacy of an appeal to authority. I have had any number of discussions with Peirceans over the past several years, none of whom have faulted my use of 'tone' for that "merely possible" sign. Mark my words! Furthermore, I have found Jon more than willing to learn from his disagreements with others on the List. For example, in several of his papers he has expressed appreciation for the engagement with* several* Peirce-L members with whom he has 'contended' on the List, including John. And despite John's claim that having read Jon's post prior to this most recent one and finding "nothing new," Jon has clearly shown that he in fact did provide, and "for the first time," a list of all the passages where Peirce uses not only 'tone', but its variants (such as 'tuone' and 'potisgin'). John, on the other hand, has kept repeating his opinions with little textual support. So I ask each member of this forum who has an interest in this topic to honestly weigh the arguments presented by Jon and John and determine for themself who has made the stronger case, John for 'mark' or Jon for 'tone'. Perhaps then we can put the matter to rest (at least for a time). Best, Gary Richmond On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 2:55 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > John, List: > > JFS: The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent > with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point > in its favor. > > > As I have noted twice before, with exact quotations as explicit support, > any use of "mark" that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's > dictionary (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) is > *inconsistent *with his various explanations of what he means by "tone," > "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign." Again, a mark is a certain kind of > term--"to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to > say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these > terms or things can be predicated"--which entails that it is a > *necessitant *type embodied in *existent *tokens, not a *possible *sign. > On the other hand, Peirce defines the latter as "what has all its being > whether it exists or not" (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31), "a quality of feeling > which is significant" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2), "a character in its nature > incapable of exact identification" (ibid), "an indefinite significant
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List: JFS: The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point in its favor. As I have noted twice before, with exact quotations as explicit support, any use of "mark" that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) is *inconsistent *with his various explanations of what he means by "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign." Again, a mark is a certain kind of term--"to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be predicated"--which entails that it is a *necessitant *type embodied in *existent *tokens, not a *possible *sign. On the other hand, Peirce defines the latter as "what has all its being whether it exists or not" (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31), "a quality of feeling which is significant" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2), "a character in its nature incapable of exact identification" (ibid), "an indefinite significant character" (CP 4.537, 1906), a "Vague Quality" (R 339:285r, 1906 Aug 31), and "Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25). JFS: But when I use the word 'mark', they find it quite congenial. That is why I adopted it in my writings on this topic. The problem with this alleged congeniality is that anyone unfamiliar with Peirce's speculative grammar almost certainly *misunderstands *the word "mark" when it is used for a *possible *sign, the counterpart of an *existent *"token" and a *necessitant *"type." For example, as a candidate to replace "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign," it is definitely *not *"that part of an image that determines it as a token of some type" ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00035.html). Again, among other differences, a type "is absolutely identical in all its *Instances *or embodiments, while a Tuone cannot have any identity, it has only similarity" (R 339:277r, 1906 Apr 2). JFS: Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been studying and analyzing the evolution of Peirce's writings during the last decade of his life. I find his analyses quite compatible with my own studies. Therefore, I am pleased to note that he has reached a similar conclusion about adopting 'mark' rather than 'tone'. Tony Jappy *uses *"mark" rather than "tone," but does he ever give a *reason *for doing so? Maybe it is just for convenience when quoting the *only *sentence where Peirce himself employs it without qualification--"Consequently an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must be a Collective, which shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives" (CP 8.367, EP 2:489, 1908 Dec 25). Either way, as Gary already observed, appeal to authority is a logical *fallacy*, and we also need to be mindful of the danger of confirmation bias. Over the years, I have benefited greatly from my *disagreements *with others on the List because they have prompted me to go back to *Peirce's *relevant writings and then either bolster my arguments (as in this case) or revise my position accordingly, although I never find bald assertions to be persuasive. JFS: I have also read Jon's recent note on this subject. There is nothing new. On the contrary, in my last post ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00049.html), I listed for the first time *all *the different passages where Peirce uses "tone" as well as "tuone," "tinge," "potisign," and even "idea"; and I provided a long excerpt from his Logic Notebook that has not previously appeared in this or any other recent List thread, where he describes what he has in mind (using "tuone") and carefully distinguishes it from a type. By contrast, much of the post below is repetition of previously expressed opinions, with no exact quotations from Peirce to support them. JFS: All I'm saying is that there is no reason to continue discussing this issue. Then why keep posting about it? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 9:02 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Gary, Jon, List > > To develop a complete and consistent set of terminology, some decisions > have to be made. I have stated the reasons why I believe that the > trichotomy (potisign, actisighn, famisign) is based on Peirce's best and > most detailed reasoning. I also agree with him that (mark token type) are > simpler English words that would
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Gary, Jon, List To develop a complete and consistent set of terminology, some decisions have to be made. I have stated the reasons why I believe that the trichotomy (potisign, actisighn, famisign) is based on Peirce's best and most detailed reasoning. I also agree with him that (mark token type) are simpler English words that would be better for widespread use. The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point in its favor. The words 'tone', 'tinge', or 'tuone' are too narrow. They might be useful for sounds, but they are not as general as 'mark' for images in other sensory modalities. I have also lectured and written articles for a larger audience of professionals who are familiar with the terms 'token' and 'type', but have never used, read, or heard the word 'tone' for the first member. The most likely reason is that nobody except Peirce scholars would ever use the word 'tone'. But when I use the word 'mark', they find it quite congenial. That is why I adopted it in my writings on this topic. Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been studying and analyzing the evolution of Peirce's writings during the last decade of his life. I find his analyses quite compatible with my own studies. Therefore, I am pleased to note that he has reached a similar conclusion about adopting 'mark' rather than 'tone'. I have also read Jon's recent note on this subject. There is nothing new. I am not asking him to do anything he doesn't want to do. All I'm saying is that there is no reason to continue discussing this issue. John From: "Gary Richmond" John, Jon, List, JFS: I'm sorry, but I don't understand why you're jumping through all kinds of hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce happened to mention just once. (Except for once more in the LNB.) GR: It appears to me that if Jon has been 'jumping through hoops' to argue his position, then you have been doing no less hoop jumping. But more to the point, it is your mere opinion that 'tone' is Peirce's "rather poor choice of terminology' whereas, as I see it, it has been argued rather convincingly by Jon that there is a strong case for preferring 'tone' to 'mark'. Since you have settled on 'mark' in your own work, I can see why you might want to argue for it exclusively. But -- and as I've followed this discussion closely -- in my estimation, Jon's argument for 'tone' is stronger than yours for 'mark'. And I know I am not alone in that opinion. This is brought home especially when you throw up your arms and argue from authority, principally, your own. But not exclusively your own: JFS: "I find Tony's [Jappy's] analyses convincing and compatible with my own studies and with other studies of Peirce's last decade." GR: Far different from this approach, Peirce made a whole hearted effort to solicit criticism of his own views. Even more than that, he called for scientists and other scholars to try to refute his work where possible in the interest of correcting possible errors. That seems to me to be almost a corollary of the method of science as opposed to the other methods of inquiry. With the exception of well-prepared scientists offering testable hypotheses, inquiry is, for Peirce, essentially a communal affair, and the methods of tenacity (mere stubborn clinging to a position), the a Priori method (pretty much a 'taste' or a 'feel' that some way of looking at some matter is 'right' ), and that of authority are assiduously avoided in scientific inquiry. Of course I needn't remind you, or any logician, that the appeal to authority is a well-known logical fallacy. JFS: There is nothing further to discuss about this topic. GR: Perhaps not; we shall see. But in any event, it is not for you to determine. After all, this is Peirce-L, not Sowa-L, nor Schmidt-L nor, for that matter, Richmond-L, but Peirce-L. Still, I must agree with you that the arguments for 'mark' and 'tone' have been fairly fully laid out and List members can decide for themselves which argumentation has been strongest, most convincing. This is to say that they needn't take your, or Jon's, or my word for it. JFS: You [Jon] said that you had read Tony's writings. i strongly urge you to study them. GR: Your now repeated request that JAS read and study Jappy's works (which he clearly does) appears to me as condescending as your appeal to authority is unscientific from the standpoint of Peirce's four methods of fixing belief. It is my opinion as List moderator that in light of Peirce's ethics of inquiry, and along with Joe Ransdell's notes on the Peirce-L page of Arisbe meant to apply facets of that ethics to conduct in this forum, that reflecting on those ought give you -- and everyone -- pause as to they consider what conduct is and is not appropriate here. As did
[PEIRCE-L] The central executive
Dima, Yes, they were in the same field as George Miller (psychology). But they also hung out with enough neuroscientists that some of the blood and guts rubbed off on them. Right now, the major research on the topic depends on neuroscience. That is one among many reasons why I prefer to use the term 'Cognitive Science'. The subject is so complex that collaboration among the different fields is essential. John From: "Dima, Alden A. (Fed)' via ontolog-forum" Hi John, A certain large language model tells me that Alan Baddeley and Graham Hitch were psychologists and not neuroscientists. Alden _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] The central executive
;Artificial General Intelligence" (AGI). That's > why I have very little faith in anything called AGI. > > John > > > From: "doug foxvog" > Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] The central executive > > On Wed, April 10, 2024 14:07, John F Sowa wrote: >> In today's ZOOM meeting, I objected to the term 'neuro-symbolic hybrid' >> of >> artificial neural networks (ANNs) with symbols. Hybrids simply relate >> two >> (sometimes more) distinctly different things. But all the processes in >> the mind and brain are integrated, and they all operate continuously in >> different parts of the brain, which are all monitored and controlled by >> a >> central executive. ... > > This seems to me to be modeling the body as a machine and not an accurate > description. > > There are a wide variety of processes in the mind and brain -- many > processes in the brain occur independently without being integrated either > with each other or with the mind. I am excluding standard cellular level > processes that go on in every cell and the processes of the circulatory > system in the brain. Every neuron regularly chemically interacts with > adjacent neurons & passes electrical signals along its surface. > > As far as i understand, much that goes on in the brain we are unaware of, > neurohormone production, for example. Sensory input processing does not > seem to be integrated with a number of other processes. I have seen no > evidence of a central executive in the brain that monitors and controls > all the other processes. I'm not sure how such a central executive could > have evolved. > > -- > All contributions to this forum are covered by an open-source license. > For information about the wiki, the license, and how to subscribe or > unsubscribe to the forum, see http://ontologforum.org/info/ > --- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "ontolog-forum" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to ontolog-forum+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/4fb66bcbfa3545089754dd611e29f604%40bestweb.net. > -- All contributions to this forum are covered by an open-source license. For information about the wiki, the license, and how to subscribe or unsubscribe to the forum, see http://ontologforum.org/info/ --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "ontolog-forum" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to ontolog-forum+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ontolog-forum/ac888bfe4447f5a5e57d1cfd17c5a284.squirrel%40emailmg.ipage.com. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] The central executive
Doug, The central executive was proposed by the neuroscientists Baddeley & Hitch, not by AI researchers. There is nothing "machine-like" in the idea, by itself. Without something like it, there is no way to explain how a huge tangle of neurons could act together and coordinate their efforts to support a common effort. It reminds me of a neighboring town (to my residence in Croton on Hudson, NY), which was doing some major developments without hiring a general contractor. They thought that their local town employees could schedule all the processes. It turned out to be a total disaster. All the subcontractors did their tasks in a random order, each one interfering with some of the others, and causing a major mess. There were lawsuits back and forth, and the town management was found guilty and had losses that were many times greater than the cost of hiring a general contractor. It is certainly true that there is a huge amount of computation going on in the brain that is below conscious awareness. Most of that is done by the cerebellum (little brain), which is physically much smaller than the cerebral cortex. But it contains over four times the number of neurons. In effect, the cerebellum behaves like a GPU (Graphics Processing Unit) which is a superfast, highly specialized processor for all the perception and action that takes place without conscious awareness. For example, when you're walking down the street talking on your cell phone, the cerebellum is monitoring your vision, muscles, and strides -- until you step off the curb and get run over by a bus. That's why you need a central controller to monitor and coordinate all the processes. Sharks and dolphins are about the same size and they eat the same kind of prey. Sharks have a huge cerebellum and a small lump for a cerebellum. Dolphins have a huge cerebral cortex and a huge cerebellum. They are as agile as sharks, but they can plan, communicate, and coordinate their activities. When the food is plentiful, they can both eat their fill. But when it's scarce, the dolphins are much more successful. Please look at the citations in my previous note and the attached Section7.pdf. The cycle of abduction, induction, testing, and induction depends on a central executive that is responsible for planning, coordinating, and integrating those steps of conscious feeling, thinking, reasoning, and acting. With a central executive, an AI system would be more intelligent. But much, much more R & D would be required before anything could be called "Artificial General Intelligence" (AGI). That's why I have very little faith in anything called AGI. John From: "doug foxvog" Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] The central executive On Wed, April 10, 2024 14:07, John F Sowa wrote: > In today's ZOOM meeting, I objected to the term 'neuro-symbolic hybrid' of > artificial neural networks (ANNs) with symbols. Hybrids simply relate two > (sometimes more) distinctly different things. But all the processes in > the mind and brain are integrated, and they all operate continuously in > different parts of the brain, which are all monitored and controlled by a > central executive. ... This seems to me to be modeling the body as a machine and not an accurate description. There are a wide variety of processes in the mind and brain -- many processes in the brain occur independently without being integrated either with each other or with the mind. I am excluding standard cellular level processes that go on in every cell and the processes of the circulatory system in the brain. Every neuron regularly chemically interacts with adjacent neurons & passes electrical signals along its surface. As far as i understand, much that goes on in the brain we are unaware of, neurohormone production, for example. Sensory input processing does not seem to be integrated with a number of other processes. I have seen no evidence of a central executive in the brain that monitors and controls all the other processes. I'm not sure how such a central executive could have evolved. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Panel on Semiotic Exploration of Ecology at the 2024 Warsaw IASS-AIS World Congress
Dear Friends and colleagues, we have some excellent news to share with you! The network "SPACE SEMIOTICS [Design, Architecture, Urbanism, Landscaping]"https://significant.design/subscribe <https://significant.design/subscribe>is organizing a *panel *titled:*Semiotic Explorations of Ecology (in Design, Architecture, Urbanism, Landscaping)*(Isabel Marcos & Claudio Guerri) this year within the framework of the *16th IASS-AIS World Congress devoted to/Signs and Realities/, 2-6 September 2024 in Warsaw, Poland.* **The call is open until the 15th April 2024*, you can submit your paper here:**https://www.semcon2024.com/abstrakty* <https://www.semcon2024.com/abstrakty>* * *How the registration process works:* *1. You pre-register without paying.* *2. You get your registration ID (RegID).* *3. With your RegID you can submit your paper abstracts until 15 April 2024.* At the end of the panel, we will include a round-table to discuss the unresolved problems of*/Signs and Realities/*,*/Ecology in Design/*and*/Design/*and*/Morphology/*in general. With this call we are asking all interested scholars to participate in this round-table and to propose their own point of view on applied semiotics. We will finally meet in person! Isabel Marcos & Claudio Guerri *Description of the panel proposal:* Ecology, when examined from a semiotic perspective, reveals itself as a complex reality, intertwining tangible environmental phenomena with theoretical, physical and symbolic representations. This manifestation possibilities invites us to explore the interconnections between semiotics, design, architecture, urbanism and landscaping. Thus, ecology, connecting the tangible aspects of the environment to the different semiotic constructions shape our understanding and interaction with this reality. *1. Semiotics in Environmental Communication:*Explore how semiotic systems contribute to the communication of environmental issues. *2. Semiotic Analysis of the Ecological Crisis:*Investigation of semiotic representations of the ecological crisis in different discourses. *3. Ecological Language and Technological Innovation:*Study of the creation of a specific semiotic language to discuss ecological issues, with an analysis of the impact of technological innovations. *4. Semiotic Ethics in Design:*Explore the ethical implications of semiotics related to growth in the fields of design. How do signs contribute to the formulation of new ecological ethics in design? *5. Semiotics in Bioclimatic Architecture:*Examine the role of bioclimatic architecture and how the signifying elements of this approach are used to create the maximum ecological impact of natural resources. *6. Urban Semiotics and Environmental Policy:*Examining how new ecological practices in the urban context impact environmental policies. What is the ecological significance of these urban practices and how do they shape environmental policies? *7. Landscape Semiotics and Ecological Impact:*Study of sign usage in vegetal, urban, and architectural landscapes, taking into account their ecological impact. How does landscape semiotics influence environmental awareness and sustainable practices? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List: JFS: I don't understand why you're jumping through hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce happened to mention just once. (Except for once more in the LNB.) I am not the one who is jumping through hoops--the textual evidence plainly *supports* my position. For example, it is blatantly false that Peirce mentions "tone" just once or twice; on the contrary, he uses it as the counterpart of "token" and "type" more often than any other candidate after abandoning qualisign/sinsign/legisign (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31; CP 4.537, 1906; SS 83, EP 2:480, 1908 Dec 23; CP 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25; R 339:340, 1908 Dec 27). In one of the few exceptions, he instead uses "tuone," which "is a blend of Tone and Tune" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2); more on that below. By contrast, the December 1908 letter to Lady Welby is the *sole* place where "mark" and "potisign" appear as alternatives, and the only other variants are "tinge" (R 339:285r, 1906 Aug 31) and "idea" (R 795, c. 1908). JFS: The word 'mark' is much more natural, more general, more consistent with his definition in Baldwin's dictionary, and much, much easier to explain to intelligent listeners and readers who are not Peirce scholars. Please review my last post, especially the exact quotations that I provided (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00043.html). In Baldwin's dictionary, Peirce explicitly defines a "mark" as a certain kind of *term*, which is a symbol and thus a *necessitant* sign (type) that is embodied in *existent* signs (tokens)--utterly inconsistent with his various definitions of a *possible* sign, including the following lengthy discussion of a tuone and how it differs from a type. CSP: It means a quality of feeling which is significant, whether it be simple, like a Tone or complex, like a Tune. But the latter is not *pure* feeling. By a Token, I mean an existing thing or an historical event which serves as a Sign. By a Type, I mean a general form which can be repeated indefinitely, and is in all its repetitions one and the same Sign. Thus the word *the* is a Type. It is likely to occur over a score of times on a page of an English book; but it is only one word twenty times repeated. The distinction between a Type and a Token is obvious. There may be some confusion between the Tuone and the Type. They may, however, be distinguished in various ways. In the first place, a Type is absolutely identical in all its *Instances* or embodiments, while a Tuone cannot have any identity, it has only similarity. Thus the sound of any word will be slightly different every two times it is pronounced and in so far as it is so, it is two Tuones. But any two vowels in so far as they are alike are the same Tuone, in the only sense in which there can be any sameness to a Tuone. Any thing then that could conceivably be made absolutely definite, bearing in mind that no two things can be exactly alike in any quality whatever, cannot be a Tuone. Another test is that Tuone though it may be composed of many ingredients is, like a chemical compound of many elements, perfectly homogeneous and structureless in effect; while a Type, though it may be indecomposable, must be more or less complex in its relations. Tests might be multiplied; yet after all, it will often require subtlety to decide whether a given Sign is a Tuone or a Type. Take for example a given melody, say "The Last Rose of Summer." Considered as to its structure it is a Type; but considered as a whole in its esthetic effect which is not composed of one part due to one note and another to another, it is a Tuone. As ordinarily conceived it is a Tuone, slightly different however every time it is sung, but from the point of view of counterpoint, it is absolutely the same every time it is rendered with substantial correctness (though it be a table out of tune and time) and so it is a Type. But any one singing of it is neither Tuone nor Type but a Token. Notwithstanding these difficulties in many cases there is no room for an instant’s hesitation, and the distinction is not only useful but practically indispensible. (R 339:276r-277r, 1906 Apr 2) A type is a "definitely significant Form" (CP 4.537) such that it is *identical*--one and the same sign--in all its embodied instances (tokens), while a tuone is "an indefinite significant character" (ibid) such that it can only exhibit *similarity* to other tuones. The *sound* of a word is a tuone, but the spoken word *itself* is a token of a type. JFS: There is nothing further to discuss about this topic. In that case, please do not feel obligated to reply to this post. JFS: You said that you had read Tony's writings. I strongly urge you to study them. I said that I have likewise read *and *carefully studied about a dozen articles by Tony Jappy, as well as his 2017 book, *Peirce's
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, Jon, List, JFS: I'm sorry, but I don't understand why you're jumping through all kinds of hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce happened to mention just once. (Except for once more in the LNB.) GR: It appears to me that *if* Jon has been 'jumping through hoops' to argue his position, then you have been doing no less hoop jumping. But more to the point, it is your mere opinion that 'tone' is Peirce's "rather poor choice of terminology' whereas, as I see it, it has been argued rather convincingly by Jon that there is a strong case for preferring 'tone' to 'mark'. Since you have settled on 'mark' in your own work, I can see why you might want to argue for it exclusively. But -- and as I've followed this discussion closely -- in my estimation, Jon's argument for 'tone' is stronger than yours for 'mark'. And I know I am not alone in that opinion. This is brought home especially when you throw up your arms and argue from authority, principally, your own. But not exclusively your own: JFS: "I find Tony's [Jappy's] analyses convincing and compatible with my own studies and with other studies of Peirce's last decade." GR: Far different from this approach, Peirce made a whole hearted effort to solicit criticism of his own views. Even more than that, he called for scientists and other scholars to try to *refute* his work where possible in the interest of correcting possible errors. That seems to me to be almost a corollary of the method of science as opposed to the other methods of inquiry. With the exception of well-prepared scientists offering testable hypotheses, inquiry is, for Peirce, essentially a communal affair, and the methods of tenacity (mere stubborn clinging to a position), the a Priori method (pretty much a 'taste' or a 'feel' that some way of looking at some matter is 'right' ), and that of authority are assiduously avoided in scientific inquiry. Of course I needn't remind you, or any logician, that the *appeal* to authority is a well-known logical fallacy. JFS: There is nothing further to discuss about this topic. GR: Perhaps not; we shall see. But in any event, it is not for you to determine. After all, this is Peirce-L, not Sowa-L, nor Schmidt-L nor, for that matter, Richmond-L, but Peirce-L. Still, I must agree with you that the arguments for 'mark' and 'tone' have been fairly fully laid out and List members can decide for themselves which argumentation has been strongest, most convincing. This is to say that they needn't take your, or Jon's, or my word for it. JFS: You [Jon] said that you had read Tony's writings. i strongly urge you to study them. GR: Your now repeated request that JAS read and study Jappy's works (which he clearly does) appears to me as condescending as your appeal to authority is unscientific from the standpoint of Peirce's four methods of fixing belief. It is my opinion as List moderator that in light of Peirce's ethics of inquiry, and along with Joe Ransdell's notes on the Peirce-L page of Arisbe meant to apply facets of that ethics to conduct in this forum, that reflecting on those ought give you -- and everyone -- pause as to they consider what conduct is and is not appropriate here. As did Joe, I have always wanted Peirce-L to be essentially self-moderated. But in the past few years I have seen that there are participants who rather flaunt their independence from such ethical and collegial practices as Ransdell outlined. It will no longer be tolerated, and those who have previously been warned their anti-collegial conduct on the List jeopardizes their continuation on Peirce-L. In short, they will be removed without further on or off List discussion. Gary Richmond (writing as forum moderator) On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 12:15 AM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, List, > > I'm sorry, but I don't understand why you're jumping through all kinds of > hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce happened to > mention just once. (Except for once more in the LNB.) > > First, the terms potisign, actisign, and famisign are the kinds of words > that Peirce frequently coined. The three pages of EP2 show a great deal of > thought, which is much more than he wrote about that trichotomy in 1906. > It's also very closely reasoned thought, which is consistent with many > issues he had been discussing for years. Except for the fact that those > words are rather ugly, they are the result of deep thinking. > > By contrast, the word 'tone' in 1906 sounds like a quick choice based on > one rather rare kind of sign (a tone of voice). The word 'mark' is much > more natural, more general, more consistent with his definition in > Baldwin's dictionary, and much, much easier to explain to intelligent > listeners and readers who are not Peirce scholars. (And I believe that > those people are the most important audience for Peirce scholars to > address.) > > F
[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [teadus.biosemiotics:9385] ONE-DAY CONFERENCE ON SEMIOTIC AGENCY IN CELEBRATION OF ALEXEI SHAROV´S 70TH ANNIVERSARY
FYI: GR Dear all, on Wednesday April 10th (tomorrow) at 10.00-14.10 CET the one-day international conference “The active forces of development and semiotic agency (Developmental and semiotic agency)" will be held at the Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION RAN) in Moscow, Russia, and online. The conference, which is held in Russian (mainly) and English, is organized in celebration of the 70th anniversary of Alexei Sharov and hosted by Mikhail Ilyin. The conference starts with a presentation of the book *Semiotic agency: Science beyond mechanism <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-89484-9> *(Sharov & Tønnessen 2021), and features talks by Alexei Sharov, Morten Tønnessen, S.T. Zolyan, S.V. Chebanov, V.I. Arshinov and M.V. Ilyin. The event can be attended digitally by following this Zoom link: https://us06web.zoom.us/j/88090035919?pwd=UUqbzYrUYJ64gAGrgVLhqUyLCR0mkK.1 (identificator: 880 9003 5919; password: 222986) My best, -- *Morten Tønnessen* Professor of philosophy at University of Stavanger´s Department of social studies <https://www.uis.no/en/department-social-studies> — Secretary of Nordic Association for Semiotic Studies <http://nordicsemiotics.org/> — Member of Norway´s Council for Animal Ethics <http://www.radetfordyreetikk.no> --- ADDRESS Nådlandsbråtet 25, 4034 Stavanger, Norway — PHONE NO. (+47) 9423 7093 --- Academic blog: Utopian Realism <http://UtopianRealism.blogspot.com> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Catalogues of Conceptual Structures?
Greetings from the Lithuanian countryside! Please, does anybody know of any websites that list or catalogue examples of conceptual structures, cognitive frameworks, polychotomies and so on? I am interested not only in Peirce but in all manner of thinkers, disciplines and worldviews. I am also interested in books, papers and databases. I have found some pages at Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trichotomy_(philosophy) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Dichotomies https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Dilemmas https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Philosophical_problems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structuralism And, of course, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categories_(Peirce) I have also found this list of metatheories https://www.arc.voyage/um-library I am curious what has already done because I intend to create my own online database. It would be nice for that to be a collaborative project. Currently, I have in mind a simple work flow where relevant links can be dumped https://www.math4wisdom.com/wiki/Exposition/FrameworkDump perhaps curated further, then placed into tables https://www.math4wisdom.com/wiki/Exposition/FrameworkTables and then each scholar could organize them further according to their own system. For example, I have a theory of three minds (Unconscious, Conscious, Consciousness) and here are about 15 examples: https://www.math4wisdom.com/wiki/Exposition/FrameworkCatalogue This is relevant for me because, since childhood, in my quest to know everything and apply that knowledge usefully, I have developed a private language of concepts, which I call Wondrous Wisdom https://www.math4wisdom.com/wiki/Exposition/Vocabulary Here is an overview of the basic structures https://www.math4wisdom.com/wiki/Research/20170929TimeSpaceDecisionMaking I speak of it as a private language but, from my own point of view, I am inquiring into absolute truth. Similarly, I think of Peirce, Jesus, Plato, Kant, Hume, Christopher Alexander, Buckminster Fuller, Karl Friston, and so on, as having developed their own private languages which their enthusiasts became fluent in. In my case, I have started Math 4 Wisdom, http://www.math4wisdom.com as a language club for learning Wondrous Wisdom, but in particular, showing where the conceptual structures arise in advanced mathematics. For example, here is a presentation "The Yoneda Embedding Expresses Whether, What, How, Why" https://www.math4wisdom.com/wiki/Research/YonedaEmbeddingFoursome Another presentation is "Bott Periodicity Models Consciousness? Preliminary Exploration" https://www.math4wisdom.com/wiki/Exposition/20231126BottPeriodicity My goal is that my own private language could be understood by others as scientifically useful and meaningful. Ultimately, I want to work toward a shared language that would be relevant for the many private languages. Thus I want to start by learning what catalogues already exist, if any. Peirce's ideas - iicon, index, symbol - abduction, deduction, induction - firstness, secondness, thirdness - are important in my own philosophy and have also come up in our study groups on Sociology https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lUsVCfB5P-A=PL4jG0jj6NdI1DMOhSMYjQVSg_9-E72x7H and also Ecotechnology, through the work of Jere Northrop and John Roy Hammann and the AutoGnomics project. Thank you for helping me! Andrius Andrius Kulikauskas math4wis...@gmail.com http://www.math4wisdom.com Eiciunai, Lithuania _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Modern vs. classical structures of opposition: A discussion - LUW April 10, 4pm CET
Logica Universalis Webinar April 10, 2024 at 4pm CET Speakers: Didier Dubois, Henri Prade & Agnès Rico Title: "Modern vs. classical structures of opposition: A discussion" Abstract: "The aim of this work is to revisit the proposal made by Dag Westerst° ahl a decade ago when he provided a modern reading of the traditional square of opposition and of related structures. We propose a formalization of this modern view and contrast it with the classical one.We discuss what may be a modern hexagon of opposition and a modern cube, and show their interest in particular for relating quantitative expressions." https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11787-024-00347-1 Associate organization: ADRIA-IRIT, CNRS https://www.irit.fr/en/departement/dep-artificial-intelligence/adria-team/ Presented by Didier Dubois and Henri Prade Chair : Sayantan Roy, Assistant Editor LU Everybody is welcome to join, register here: https://cassyni.com/events/LMSPiEvqN9JUsvzryqD1f3 Jean-Yves Beziau Editor of Logica Universalis and Organizer of LUW https://philpeople.org/profiles/jean-yves-beziau _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
elf, his definition in Baldwin's dictionary should be considered and compared to what he wrote about Potisign. I also strongly recommend the writings by Tony Jappy, since he has made far deeper and more extensive analysis of the "evolving" thoughts and writings by Peirce in the decade from 1903 to 1908. As you know, his existential graphs also evolved during that time, and they didn't reach their fully complete specification until the June 1911 for Alpha and Beta. For Gamma, the 1903 version was quickly cobbled together for the Lowell lectures. Peirce used metalanguage for specifying modality and a version of higher-order logic in 1903. But he made a major revolution for his Delta graphs of 1911. There is much more to say. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
chmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 9:11 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, List, > > We acknowledge that Peirce introduced the trichotomy (Tone Token Type) in > the Prolegomena article of 1906, and his choice of the name 'Tone' was > based on one example, "a tone of voice". After two more years of intensive > study, analysis, and writings, he presented a more precise specification of > the trichotomy (Potisign, Actisign, and Famisign) in a letter to Welby > (EP2, p. > > "Thirdly, that which is stored away in one's Memory; Familiar, and as > such, General. Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible > Presentation, are divisible (o) into: > > "A. Potisigns, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely > possible, but felt to be positively possible; as for eample the seventh ray > that passes through the three intersections of opposite sides of Pascal's > hexagram.8 > > "B. Actisigns, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced hie et nunc; such > as any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single > paragraph of a single page of a single copy of a Book. There may be > repetition of the whole paragraph, this word included, in another place. > But that other occurrence is not this word. The book may be printed in an > edition of ten thousand; but THIS word is only in my copy." > Peirce defined this trichotomy without making any reference to (Tone Token > Type). We don't know what he was thinking when he specified it. But > later (EP2, pp. 485-488) he continued to discuss Potisigns, Actisigns, and > Famisigns without making any references to the signs he defined in 2006. > He also discussed universes in considerable detail. That is a topic he > began to discuss in the Prolegomena, where he introduced (Tone Token > Type). But he is now introducing this new triad without making any > reference to it. But he is discussing this new version in quite a bit of > detail, and he is referring to universes repeatedly. > > Then on p. 488, he writes: "From the summer of 1905 to the same time in > 1906,1 devoted much study > to my ten trichotomies of signs.9 It is time I reverted to the subject, as > I know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former > names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge > or Tone,an Actisign a Token. a Famisign a Type I think Potisign > Actisign Famisign might be called Mark Token Type (?)... > > Then he continues: "I have now given as much time to this letter as I can > afford and I cannot now reexamine the remaining Trichotomies, although I > must do so as soon as possible. So I just give them as they stood two years > and more ago. In particular, the relations I assumed between the different > classes were the wildest guesses and cannot be altogether right I think... > > In short, Peirce himself called some of his earlier discussions of > trichotomies "the wildest guesses". That should not encourage anyone to > consider them as having any reliable status. The best definition of (Mark > Token Type) should be considered the equivalent of (Potisign Actisign > Famisign) with the definitions stated in EP pp. 485-488. For the > definition of Mark, by itself, his definition in Baldwin's dictionary > should be considered and compared to what he wrote about Potisign. > > I also strongly recommend the writings by Tony Jappy, since he has made > far deeper and more extensive analysis of the "evolving" thoughts and > writings by Peirce in the decade from 1903 to 1908. As you know, his > existential graphs also evolved during that time, and they didn't reach > their fully complete specification until the June 1911 for Alpha and Beta. > For Gamma, the 1903 version was quickly cobbled together for the Lowell > lectures. Peirce used metalanguage for specifying modality and a version > of higher-order logic in 1903. > > But he made a major revolution for his Delta graphs of 1911. > > There is much more to say. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
Jeff, There seem to be quite a few people who are interested in discussing applications of Peirce's logic and philosophy to current issues. That was certainly a hot topic in the various Peirce -ennials. I believe that it would be a topic of general interest. John From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" Sent: 4/8/24 12:35 AM To: "Michael J.J. Tiffany" , "s...@bestweb.net" Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) Hello Michael and John, Nice to hear from you on the List, Michael. I agree with your suggestions in (1) and (2). How might we further draw out some of Peirce’s suggestions for explaining the evolution of cooperation in a wide variety of systems, ranging from ecosystems to human economic and political systems? Complex emergent phenomena, such as the flow of information across the world wide web, provide us with fruitful case studies for modeling and explaining the growth of order in systems having parts that stand in relations of reciprocity and interdependence. I think Peirce’s central model for explaining the growth of order in physical, chemical, biological, and human social systems is the cycle of logical inquiry. Let me know if you are interested in exploring these ideas further on the list or as part of a small research and discussion group. Yours, Jeff Downard Flagstaff, AZ Philosophy, NAU From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Michael J.J. Tiffany Date: Sunday, April 7, 2024 at 10:57 AM To: s...@bestweb.net Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) John, List: I agree with John regarding the urgent relevance of Peirce to this century. I have been a subscriber to this list for 17 years (since I was 26). In that time, among other things, I co-founded a billion dollar cybersecurity company (HUMAN Security, also one of the TIME100 Most Influential Companies 2023). Two personal observations: 1. Agapism has greater predictive power than the "Gospel of Greed" Peirce railed against in "Evolutionary Love", his fifth article for the Open Court. In evolutionary biology, I think this is substantially clearer now than in Peirce's time, with the careful study of countless cases of group selection > individual selection. However, Peirce's insight is still underappreciated in today's thinking about socio-economic evolution. Wealth creation -- distinct from zero sum wealth transfer -- comes from a kind of sustainable generosity. There are many examples of successful wealth aggregators whose success could be predicted with naive selection pressure heuristics like "survival of the fittest" or even "greed is good." However, those heuristics cannot account for the extraordinary wealth creation of the past 200 years nor the motivations of the most successful creators and the massive amount of cooperation they shepherded. Peirce's model isn't just nicer or more inspiring. It's a literally more useful model for understanding and predicting reality, especially complex emergent phenomena (the "worlds hidden in plain sight" as the Santa Fe Institute once put it). 2. An understanding of Peirce's notion of abduction dramatically accelerates understanding of the (surprising!) emergent functionality of large pretrained transformer models like GPT-4. (BTW it is a CRAZY tragedy that there's another, vastly less useful, meaning of "abduction" now, hence having to write qualifiers like "Peirce's notion of...".) In fact, I don't see how you can understand how this emergent behavior arises -- what we're calling the reasoning capabilities of these models -- without an understanding of abduction as a kind of activity that you could be better or worse at. Warm regards, Michael J.J. Tiffany Portsmouth, New Hampshire On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 11:58 AM John F Sowa wrote: Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses Jerry's note about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of Peirce's writings for our time (the 21st C). Basic point: Peirce was writing for the future. Those of us who value his contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which is our present. John Sent: 4/7/24 10:36 AM To: John Sowa Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) John, I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s ‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the beachhead in philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to the global existential crisis we’re facing today at the event
[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [teadus.biosemiotics:9384] Unresolved problems in biosemiotics
FYI: GR Dear friends and colleagues, We invite you to join the panel on biosemiotics which will take place at the world congress of semiotics „Signs and Realities“ in Warsaw, Poland, 2–6 September this year. <https://www.semcon2024.com/> The biosemiotics panel – “Unresolved problems in biosemiotics” – was proposed by Don Favareau and me (description below). Deadline for abstracts is 15 April. Please submit <https://www.semcon2024.com/abstrakty> your abstract. With all best wishes Kalevi & Don Fundamentals of semiotics are not yet concisely formulated, theory of meaning making requires still much work in clarification. Biosemiotics has the major responsibility in this work inasmuch biosemiotics concerns the general semiotics. Among the unresolved problems we can recognize, for instance, the following: (a) the minimal conditions for a metabolic system to carry semiosis; (b) the relationship between interpretation, free choice, subjective present, umwelt, agency, logical paradox, and semiosis; (c) the operational typology of prelinguistic signs; (d) the nature of (sign) modality as such; (e) existence (and description) of forms of semiosis that never appear in human communication or in human bodies; etc. We should also pay attention to the perspective methods to be used for providing the solutions. In particular, this concerns the role of mathematical and empirical study methods. This includes several problems, for instance: (x) whether the fundamental semiotic theory can be formulated in mathematical terms; (y) which are the general methods to be used for testing semiotic models. The panel will include a roundtable to discuss the unresolved problems in biosemiotics. We ask all interested scholars to participate in this roundtable and to propose the ideas for solutions. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
Hello Michael and John, Nice to hear from you on the List, Michael. I agree with your suggestions in (1) and (2). How might we further draw out some of Peirce’s suggestions for explaining the evolution of cooperation in a wide variety of systems, ranging from ecosystems to human economic and political systems? Complex emergent phenomena, such as the flow of information across the world wide web, provide us with fruitful case studies for modeling and explaining the growth of order in systems having parts that stand in relations of reciprocity and interdependence. I think Peirce’s central model for explaining the growth of order in physical, chemical, biological, and human social systems is the cycle of logical inquiry. Let me know if you are interested in exploring these ideas further on the list or as part of a small research and discussion group. Yours, Jeff Downard Flagstaff, AZ Philosophy, NAU From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Michael J.J. Tiffany Date: Sunday, April 7, 2024 at 10:57 AM To: s...@bestweb.net Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) John, List: I agree with John regarding the urgent relevance of Peirce to this century. I have been a subscriber to this list for 17 years (since I was 26). In that time, among other things, I co-founded a billion dollar cybersecurity company (HUMAN Security, also one of the TIME100 Most Influential Companies 2023). Two personal observations: 1. Agapism has greater predictive power than the "Gospel of Greed" Peirce railed against in "Evolutionary Love", his fifth article for the Open Court. In evolutionary biology, I think this is substantially clearer now than in Peirce's time, with the careful study of countless cases of group selection > individual selection. However, Peirce's insight is still underappreciated in today's thinking about socio-economic evolution. Wealth creation -- distinct from zero sum wealth transfer -- comes from a kind of sustainable generosity. There are many examples of successful wealth aggregators whose success could be predicted with naive selection pressure heuristics like "survival of the fittest" or even "greed is good." However, those heuristics cannot account for the extraordinary wealth creation of the past 200 years nor the motivations of the most successful creators and the massive amount of cooperation they shepherded. Peirce's model isn't just nicer or more inspiring. It's a literally more useful model for understanding and predicting reality, especially complex emergent phenomena (the "worlds hidden in plain sight" as the Santa Fe Institute once put it). 2. An understanding of Peirce's notion of abduction dramatically accelerates understanding of the (surprising!) emergent functionality of large pretrained transformer models like GPT-4. (BTW it is a CRAZY tragedy that there's another, vastly less useful, meaning of "abduction" now, hence having to write qualifiers like "Peirce's notion of...".) In fact, I don't see how you can understand how this emergent behavior arises -- what we're calling the reasoning capabilities of these models -- without an understanding of abduction as a kind of activity that you could be better or worse at. Warm regards, Michael J.J. Tiffany Portsmouth, New Hampshire On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 11:58 AM John F Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote: Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses Jerry's note about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of Peirce's writings for our time (the 21st C). Basic point: Peirce was writing for the future. Those of us who value his contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which is our present. John ____ Sent: 4/7/24 10:36 AM To: John Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) John, I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s ‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the beachhead in philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to the global existential crisis we’re facing today at the event horizon of mass extinction. Similarly, perhaps if Karl Popper had succeeded more widely in his opposition to the “Scientific World Conception” of the Vienna Circle in his day and since, the affinities of those two men’s philosophical views would have led to a radically different paradigmatic foundation of the sciences than the ‘value-free’ paradigm that apparently remains entrenched nearly a century later. I imagine Kuhn would agree we’re long overdue for a revolution. In this paragraph from his 2021 article on Peirce in the Stanford E
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Jon, List, We acknowledge that Peirce introduced the trichotomy (Tone Token Type) in the Prolegomena article of 1906, and his choice of the name 'Tone' was based on one example, "a tone of voice". After two more years of intensive study, analysis, and writings, he presented a more precise specification of the trichotomy (Potisign, Actisign, and Famisign) in a letter to Welby (EP2, p. "Thirdly, that which is stored away in one's Memory; Familiar, and as such, General. Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible Presentation, are divisible (o) into: "A. Potisigns, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible; as for eample the seventh ray that passes through the three intersections of opposite sides of Pascal's hexagram.8 "B. Actisigns, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced hie et nunc; such as any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single paragraph of a single page of a single copy of a Book. There may be repetition of the whole paragraph, this word included, in another place. But that other occurrence is not this word. The book may be printed in an edition of ten thousand; but THIS word is only in my copy." Peirce defined this trichotomy without making any reference to (Tone Token Type). We don't know what he was thinking when he specified it. But later (EP2, pp. 485-488) he continued to discuss Potisigns, Actisigns, and Famisigns without making any references to the signs he defined in 2006. He also discussed universes in considerable detail. That is a topic he began to discuss in the Prolegomena, where he introduced (Tone Token Type). But he is now introducing this new triad without making any reference to it. But he is discussing this new version in quite a bit of detail, and he is referring to universes repeatedly. Then on p. 488, he writes: "From the summer of 1905 to the same time in 1906,1 devoted much study to my ten trichotomies of signs.9 It is time I reverted to the subject, as I know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge or Tone,an Actisign a Token. a Famisign a Type I think Potisign Actisign Famisign might be called Mark Token Type (?)... Then he continues: "I have now given as much time to this letter as I can afford and I cannot now reexamine the remaining Trichotomies, although I must do so as soon as possible. So I just give them as they stood two years and more ago. In particular, the relations I assumed between the different classes were the wildest guesses and cannot be altogether right I think... In short, Peirce himself called some of his earlier discussions of trichotomies "the wildest guesses". That should not encourage anyone to consider them as having any reliable status. The best definition of (Mark Token Type) should be considered the equivalent of (Potisign Actisign Famisign) with the definitions stated in EP pp. 485-488. For the definition of Mark, by itself, his definition in Baldwin's dictionary should be considered and compared to what he wrote about Potisign. I also strongly recommend the writings by Tony Jappy, since he has made far deeper and more extensive analysis of the "evolving" thoughts and writings by Peirce in the decade from 1903 to 1908. As you know, his existential graphs also evolved during that time, and they didn't reach their fully complete specification until the June 1911 for Alpha and Beta. For Gamma, the 1903 version was quickly cobbled together for the Lowell lectures. Peirce used metalanguage for specifying modality and a version of higher-order logic in 1903. But he made a major revolution for his Delta graphs of 1911. There is much more to say. John ---- From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 4/7/24 6:27 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type John, List: JFS: A tone or mark is not "opposed to a token". It is that part of an image that determines it as a token of some type. The image, the mark, and the token are the same physical "thing". They are not three separable things. Whatever these sentences are supposed to be describing, it is certainly not what Peirce ever defines as the first member of the trichotomy for sign classification "according to the Mode of Apprehension of the Sign itself" (CP 8.344, EP 2:482, 1908 Dec 24), the other two members of which are "token" and "type." A tone (or mark) is "an indefinite significant character" (CP 4.537, 1906)--it is not itself a physical thing, but it can be possessed by a token, which is a physical thing (or event) that exists (or occurs) at a single place and time (ibid). A type is "a definitely s
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
Jerry This section is, I believe,from 1868 - and there are more descriptions of the categories elsewhere., eg. 8/328 1904. The three terms you reference - quality, relation, representation] can be understood to refer to Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.The categories, are ‘modes of being’, or the form of the substance in which information is functioning, and are basic to the Peircean framework. And he explains them in the preceding and following paragrdaphs. But you can also see his outline in 5.41 and on-150. And 1.23; And 1.300 and on [1894] 1:277 and on…. I am not sure of your agenda re: icon, index, symbol…which are Relations between the Represetnamen and Object in the mode of Firstness, Secondness and thirdness [ but I assume you know that already]… I think my analogy of the three categorical modes of chance/freedom; current state interaction; and new habits of organization [aka Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness] ae pretty obvious within an economic process. After all- an economy operates within entrepreneurship [ Firstness] where novel ideas are generated and developed. It operates within a steady state daily life process of local interactions [Secondness] - which process takes up most of the ‘energy’ of an economic mode. And - it operates within the development of new economic modes and goods and services - which require the development of new‘habits of organization’ to produce and deliver the products. Even such a system as the use of symbolic units [ money[ went through these three categories, with the introduction of the symbol [Firstness]; and then, the common use in local interactions [ Secondness] and the legislated overseeing of the common value of these ‘bits of metal and paper’ [Thirdness]. And now -we are developing new symbols and new habits of the use of ‘money’..as a symbol of value. .. I analyze economic modes with a triad of Investment/Production/Consumption [and these can even. E understood within 3ns, 2ns, 1ns!!! Edwina > On Apr 7, 2024, at 8:45 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > Dear Edwinia, List > >> On Apr 7, 2024, at 1:09 PM, Edwina Taborsky >> wrote: >> >> And I also am a strong supporter of Peirce’s three categories, with the >> interplay between Firstnerss [ randomnness, chance, freedom]; steady-state >> interaction [Secondness] and the development of new habits of organization [ >> Thirdness]. One can explain a capitalist economy using all three categories. >> > > Your exuberant assertions are a bit beyond my amateurish reach. > > I am curious about these theses from the perspective of CSP theory of > categories with respect to your understandings of semiosis and semantic > closures. > > In the “A New List of Categories”, CSP describes the meaning of his terms and > then asserts: > > "BEING > Quality (Reference to a Ground) > Relation(Reference to a Correlate) > Representation (Reference to an Interpretant) > SUBSTANCE > > The three intermediate conceptions may be termed accidents.” > > (The punctuation is reproduced from the Essential Peirce, Vol 1., page 6) > > I am attempting to sort through the terms in light of “icons, indices, and > symbols”. > > Can you briefly connect to an understanding of “BEING”? > Can you briefly elucidate the threads of reasoning that connect this view of > “SUBSTANCE” to the conclusions in economics? > > Yes, I know that you may find these to be “Philosophy 101” questions, but I > have been reading a bit of Metaphysics in recent months… > > Michael, your thoughts are equally welcomed. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > > > > > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
Dear Edwinia, List > On Apr 7, 2024, at 1:09 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > And I also am a strong supporter of Peirce’s three categories, with the > interplay between Firstnerss [ randomnness, chance, freedom]; steady-state > interaction [Secondness] and the development of new habits of organization [ > Thirdness]. One can explain a capitalist economy using all three categories. > Your exuberant assertions are a bit beyond my amateurish reach. I am curious about these theses from the perspective of CSP theory of categories with respect to your understandings of semiosis and semantic closures. In the “A New List of Categories”, CSP describes the meaning of his terms and then asserts: "BEING Quality (Reference to a Ground) Relation(Reference to a Correlate) Representation (Reference to an Interpretant) SUBSTANCE The three intermediate conceptions may be termed accidents.” (The punctuation is reproduced from the Essential Peirce, Vol 1., page 6) I am attempting to sort through the terms in light of “icons, indices, and symbols”. Can you briefly connect to an understanding of “BEING”? Can you briefly elucidate the threads of reasoning that connect this view of “SUBSTANCE” to the conclusions in economics? Yes, I know that you may find these to be “Philosophy 101” questions, but I have been reading a bit of Metaphysics in recent months… Michael, your thoughts are equally welcomed. Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
corations or images of some significant things. But > linguists discovered that they could be interpreted as a notation for Mayan > words. By assuming that ancient Mayan was an earlier stage of modern > spoken Mayan, linguists learned to read those "decorations" as a notation > for the words of the Mayan language. The same images from one point of > view are marks of tokens of decorations. From another point of view, they > are marks of tokens of morphemes of the Mayan language. > > In textual criticism, Peirce's exact words in any MS must be recorded > exactly. But in publications about Peirce's intentions, the terminology > must be adapted to the way modern readers would interpret the words. Max > Fisch, for example, realized that Peirce's decision to use the word 'logic' > as an abbreviation for 'logic as semeiotic'. In his 1986 book, Fisch > stated that he was using the word 'semeiotic' as the abbreviation for > 'logic as semeiotic". > > Fisch is certainly a respectable authority on the subject, and I believe > that we should follow his example in choosing which of Peirce's options to > consider as a standard for the 21st C.. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
unlike icon/index/symbol, this trichotomy is not a matter of degree. Consider its terminological predecessor--a qualisign cannot also be a replica (sinsign) of some legisign. Instead, a qualisign must be embodied in a sinsign, and likewise, a mark/tone must be embodied in a token. Regards, Jon On Fri, Apr 5, 2024 at 4:55 PM John F Sowa wrote: On this issue, the evidence for the trichotomy (Mark Token Type) is overwhelming.Just look at the first instance in the Prolegomena, or the copy in CP 4.537 where Peirce adopts 'Tone' as the name of the first item in the trichotomy: "An indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token." The word 'tone' in that example is a very special case that is limited to the sound of a voice that is speaking something. I have a high regard for Peirce's choices, but the word 'tone' applies to a tiny subset of marks. Just look at Peirce's definition of mark in Baldwin's dictionary. Every tone is a mark, which may also be a token of some type. But only a tiny subset of marks are tones. I have a high regard for Peirce's decisions, but when he himself has doubts about his previous choice, that is not a solid endorsement. There is no ethical reason for keeping it. Now go to the letter to Welby (also CP 8.363): "From the summer of 1905 to the same time in 1906, I devoted much study to my ten trichotomies of signs. It is time I reverted to the subject, as I know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge or Tone, an Actisign a Token, a Famisign a Type;... CP 367. "an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must be a Collective, which shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives... Note Peirce's choice of Mark. That is consistent with his definition of 'mark' in Baldwin's dictionary. That was written before 1903, when the only trichotomy was "Icon Index Symbol". Every tone of voice is a mark, but most marks are not tones of voice or tones of anything else. Note that Peirce had also considered the word 'tinge' instead of 'tone'. Every tinge is also a mark. JAS: his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i). I admit that he slipped back to an old (bad) habit in that example two days later. But that example does not negate (1) the fact that a tone of voice is a limited special case of a mark, as in his own definition in Balwin's dictionary; (2) the fact that he had coined the word 'potisign' as a general technical term for the first item in the trichotomy; (3) the fact that he selected 'mark', not 'tone', as the replacement for potisign; and finally (4) the modern world has adopted Peirce's terms 'token' and 'type', but not 'tone'. But I have found from my lectures and writings that modern logicians, philosophers, and computer scientists very readily accept the trichotomy (mark token type), but not (tone token type). Since Peirce was always writing for the future, that makes 'mark' the choice for the future. A tone is a limited and confusing special case of mark. On this point, Tony made the correct choice. The word 'tone' should be used ONLY in exact quotations of Peirce's MSS. In all discussions of Peirce's system in the 21st C, (Mark Token Type) is the recommended choice. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
Michale Thank you for this excellent post. You are exactly right Peirce's agapastic semiosis is a dynamic and generative process- and it explains not merely the increasing complexity of the physicochemical and biological realms [which are, indeed, complex adaptive systems,] but also, explains the socioeconomic world of our species. As you say - wealth creation, which is all about a growth economy- - is quite different from the no-growth zero sum wealth transfer which is found in all no growth steady state populations [ before the industrial age]. And I also am a strong supporter of Peirce’s three categories, with the interplay between Firstnerss [ randomnness, chance, freedom]; steady-state interaction [Secondness] and the development of new habits of organization [ Thirdness]. One can explain a capitalist economy using all three categories. Again - thank you for an excellent post, and moving Peirce out of the seminar room into the real world. Edwina > On Apr 7, 2024, at 1:57 PM, Michael J.J. Tiffany > wrote: > > John, List: > > I agree with John regarding the urgent relevance of Peirce to this century. > > I have been a subscriber to this list for 17 years (since I was 26). In that > time, among other things, I co-founded a billion dollar cybersecurity company > (HUMAN Security, also one of the TIME100 Most Influential Companies 2023). > Two personal observations: > > 1. Agapism has greater predictive power than the "Gospel of Greed" Peirce > railed against in "Evolutionary Love", his fifth article for the Open Court. > In evolutionary biology, I think this is substantially clearer now than in > Peirce's time, with the careful study of countless cases of group selection > > individual selection. > > However, Peirce's insight is still underappreciated in today's thinking about > socio-economic evolution. Wealth creation -- distinct from zero sum wealth > transfer -- comes from a kind of sustainable generosity. There are many > examples of successful wealth aggregators whose success could be predicted > with naive selection pressure heuristics like "survival of the fittest" or > even "greed is good." However, those heuristics cannot account for the > extraordinary wealth creation of the past 200 years nor the motivations of > the most successful creators and the massive amount of cooperation they > shepherded. Peirce's model isn't just nicer or more inspiring. It's a > literally more useful model for understanding and predicting reality, > especially complex emergent phenomena (the "worlds hidden in plain sight" as > the Santa Fe Institute once put it). > > 2. An understanding of Peirce's notion of abduction dramatically accelerates > understanding of the (surprising!) emergent functionality of large pretrained > transformer models like GPT-4. (BTW it is a CRAZY tragedy that there's > another, vastly less useful, meaning of "abduction" now, hence having to > write qualifiers like "Peirce's notion of...".) In fact, I don't see how you > can understand how this emergent behavior arises -- what we're calling the > reasoning capabilities of these models -- without an understanding of > abduction as a kind of activity that you could be better or worse at. > > > Warm regards, > > Michael J.J. Tiffany > Portsmouth, New Hampshire > > > On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 11:58 AM John F Sowa <mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote: >> Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses Jerry's note >> about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of >> Peirce's writings for our time (the 21st C). >> >> Basic point: Peirce was writing for the future. Those of us who value his >> contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which is our >> present. >> >> John >> >> >> Sent: 4/7/24 10:36 AM >> To: John Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> >> Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of >> science (U Pitt) >> John, >> >> I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s >> ‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical >> positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the beachhead >> in philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to the global >> existential crisis we’re facing today at the event horizon of mass >> extinction. Similarly, perhaps if Karl Popper had succeeded more widely in >> his opposition to the “Scientific World Conception” of the Vienna Circle in >> his day and since, the affinities of those two men’s
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
John, List: I agree with John regarding the urgent relevance of Peirce to this century. I have been a subscriber to this list for 17 years (since I was 26). In that time, among other things, I co-founded a billion dollar cybersecurity company (HUMAN Security, also one of the TIME100 Most Influential Companies 2023). Two personal observations: 1. Agapism has *greater predictive power* than the "Gospel of Greed" Peirce railed against in "Evolutionary Love", his fifth article for the Open Court. In evolutionary biology, I think this is substantially clearer now than in Peirce's time, with the careful study of countless cases of group selection > individual selection. However, Peirce's insight is still underappreciated in today's thinking about socio-economic evolution. Wealth *creation* -- distinct from zero sum wealth transfer -- comes from a kind of sustainable generosity. There are many examples of successful wealth *aggregators* whose success could be predicted with naive selection pressure heuristics like "survival of the fittest" or even "greed is good." However, those heuristics cannot account for the extraordinary wealth creation of the past 200 years nor the motivations of the most successful creators and the massive amount of cooperation they shepherded. Peirce's model isn't just nicer or more inspiring. It's a literally more useful model for understanding and predicting reality, especially complex emergent phenomena (the "worlds hidden in plain sight" as the Santa Fe Institute once put it). 2. An understanding of Peirce's notion of abduction dramatically accelerates understanding of the (surprising!) emergent functionality of large pretrained transformer models like GPT-4. (BTW it is a CRAZY tragedy that there's another, vastly less useful, meaning of "abduction" now, hence having to write qualifiers like "Peirce's notion of...".) In fact, I don't see how you can understand how this emergent behavior arises -- what we're calling the reasoning capabilities of these models -- without an understanding of abduction as a kind of activity that you could be better or worse at. Warm regards, Michael J.J. Tiffany Portsmouth, New Hampshire On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 11:58 AM John F Sowa wrote: > Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses Jerry's note > about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of > Peirce's writings for our time (the 21st C). > > Basic point: Peirce was writing for the future. Those of us who value > his contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which > is our present. > > John > > > -- > *Sent*: 4/7/24 10:36 AM > *To*: John Sowa > *Subject*: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of > science (U Pitt) > > John, > > I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s > ‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical > positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the > beachhead in philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to > the global existential crisis we’re facing today at the event horizon of > mass extinction. Similarly, perhaps if Karl Popper had succeeded more > widely in his opposition to the “Scientific World Conception” of the Vienna > Circle in his day and since, the affinities of those two men’s > philosophical views would have led to a radically different paradigmatic > foundation of the sciences than the ‘value-free’ paradigm that apparently > remains entrenched nearly a century later. I imagine Kuhn would agree we’re > long overdue for a revolution. > > In this paragraph from his 2021 article on Peirce in the *Stanford > Encyclopedia of Philosophy <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/>*, > Rober Burch seems to report some similar thoughts about Peirce’s > perspective … > > An especially intriguing and curious twist in Peirce’s evolutionism is > that in Peirce’s view evolution involves what he calls its “agapeism.” > Peirce speaks of evolutionary love. According to Peirce, the most > fundamental engine of the evolutionary process is not struggle, strife, > greed, or competition. Rather it is nurturing love, in which an entity is > prepared to sacrifice its own perfection for the sake of the wellbeing of > its neighbor. This doctrine had a social significance for Peirce, who > apparently had the intention of arguing against the morally repugnant but > extremely popular socio-economic Darwinism of the late nineteenth century. > The doctrine also had for Peirce a cosmic significance, which Peirce > associated with the doctrine of the Gospel of John and with the mystical > ideas of Swedenborg and Henry James. In Part IV of the third of Peirc
[PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses Jerry's note about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of Peirce's writings for our time (the 21st C). Basic point: Peirce was writing for the future. Those of us who value his contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which is our present. John Sent: 4/7/24 10:36 AM To: John Sowa Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) John, I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s ‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the beachhead in philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to the global existential crisis we’re facing today at the event horizon of mass extinction. Similarly, perhaps if Karl Popper had succeeded more widely in his opposition to the “Scientific World Conception” of the Vienna Circle in his day and since, the affinities of those two men’s philosophical views would have led to a radically different paradigmatic foundation of the sciences than the ‘value-free’ paradigm that apparently remains entrenched nearly a century later. I imagine Kuhn would agree we’re long overdue for a revolution. In this paragraph from his 2021 article on Peirce in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Rober Burch seems to report some similar thoughts about Peirce’s perspective … An especially intriguing and curious twist in Peirce’s evolutionism is that in Peirce’s view evolution involves what he calls its “agapeism.” Peirce speaks of evolutionary love. According to Peirce, the most fundamental engine of the evolutionary process is not struggle, strife, greed, or competition. Rather it is nurturing love, in which an entity is prepared to sacrifice its own perfection for the sake of the wellbeing of its neighbor. This doctrine had a social significance for Peirce, who apparently had the intention of arguing against the morally repugnant but extremely popular socio-economic Darwinism of the late nineteenth century. The doctrine also had for Peirce a cosmic significance, which Peirce associated with the doctrine of the Gospel of John and with the mystical ideas of Swedenborg and Henry James. In Part IV of the third of Peirce’s six papers in Popular Science Monthly, entitled “The Doctrine of Chances,” Peirce even argued that simply being logical presupposes the ethics of self-sacrifice: “He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his inferences, collectively.” To social Darwinism, and to the related sort of thinking that constituted for Herbert Spencer and others a supposed justification for the more rapacious practices of unbridled capitalism, Peirce referred in disgust as “The Gospel of Greed.” All merely hypothetical or purely conjectural, of course. But your admonition to relate Peirce to our 21st century world nudged me into sharing the idea. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of John F Sowa Sent: Saturday, April 6, 2024 5:53 PM To: Jerry LR Chandler ; Peirce List Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) Jerry, Thanks for that note. The following sentence shows why we need to relate Peirce's writings to the latest and greatest work that is being done today: >From the abstract: "C.S. Peirce, however, is not generally considered a >canonical figure in the history of philosophy of science." I have attended a few APA conferences where I gave a talk in a Peirce session and attended other talks in more general sessions. And I have not heard anybody mention Peirce (except me in the discussions after a talk). The logicians are constantly talking about Frege, despite the fact that nobody else had ever used his notation for logic. But they don't mention Peirce, despite the fact that every logician uses his algebra of logic (with minor notational changes by Peano). In fact, the reason why Peano changed the notation was for ease of publication. Peirce used the Greek letters, sigma and pi, for the quantifiers, which were rarely available in those days. But any typesetter could easily turn letters upside down and backwards. So instead of mentioning Peirce, they give credit to Peano for the algebraic notation. It's essential for Peirce scholars to relate his writings to the big, wide, modern world. Susan Haack does that very well. Some others do that. And it's essential for Peirce scholars to do much, much more to relate Peirce's work to the hot topics of the 21st century. Peirce himself expected his writings to be hot issues for 400 years. We're almost halfway there, and we need to heat up the discussions. John --
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
Jerry, Thanks for that note. The following sentence shows why we need to relate Peirce's writings to the latest and greatest work that is being done today: >From the abstract: "C.S. Peirce, however, is not generally considered a >canonical figure in the history of philosophy of science." I have attended a few APA conferences where I gave a talk in a Peirce session and attended other talks in more general sessions. And I have not heard anybody mention Peirce (except me in the discussions after a talk). The logicians are constantly talking about Frege, despite the fact that nobody else had ever used his notation for logic. But they don't mention Peirce, despite the fact that every logician uses his algebra of logic (with minor notational changes by Peano). In fact, the reason why Peano changed the notation was for ease of publication. Peirce used the Greek letters, sigma and pi, for the quantifiers, which were rarely available in those days. But any typesetter could easily turn letters upside down and backwards. So instead of mentioning Peirce, they give credit to Peano for the algebraic notation. It's essential for Peirce scholars to relate his writings to the big, wide, modern world. Susan Haack does that very well. Some others do that. And it's essential for Peirce scholars to do much, much more to relate Peirce's work to the hot topics of the 21st century. Peirce himself expected his writings to be hot issues for 400 years. We're almost halfway there, and we need to heat up the discussions. John From: "Jerry LR Chandler" Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) FYI JLRC Friday, April 12th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EDT This talk will also be available live streamed on: Zoom at https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94576817686 Title: Peirce Disappears: C.S. Peirce and Early Logical Empiricism Abstract: Scholars of the history of philosophy of science read and hear a lot about Duhem, Mach, Poincaré, and the members of the Vienna Circle. C.S. Peirce, however, is not generally considered a canonical figure in the history of philosophy of science. But in the early years of the logical empiricist movement in the United States, Peirce received a warm reception from prominent representatives, proponents, and sympathizers of logical empiricism including Charles Morris, Ernst Nagel, Herbert Feigl, Phillip Frank, and W.V.O. Quine. This reception was short-lived though and Peirce gradually disappeared from the mainstream philosophy of science while logical empiricism turned into a formidable movement. In this talk, I begin by discussing examples of the early reception of Peirce’s philosophy in the works of Morris, Nagel (and his student Justus Buchler), Feigl, and Frank. I show the variety of topics (including logic, probability theory, theories of truth and meaning, and social dimensions of science) in which Peirce received a warm (though not uncritical) reception. We see that the engagements with his works are persistent from the late 1920s to the 1950s and get more refined over time. I then provide some explanations for the eventual marginalization of Peirce in mainstream philosophy of science. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
FYI JLRC Friday, April 12th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EDT This talk will also be available live streamed on: Zoom at https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94576817686 Title: Peirce Disappears: C.S. Peirce and Early Logical Empiricism Abstract: Scholars of the history of philosophy of science read and hear a lot about Duhem, Mach, Poincaré, and the members of the Vienna Circle. C.S. Peirce, however, is not generally considered a canonical figure in the history of philosophy of science. But in the early years of the logical empiricist movement in the United States, Peirce received a warm reception from prominent representatives, proponents, and sympathizers of logical empiricism including Charles Morris, Ernst Nagel, Herbert Feigl, Phillip Frank, and W.V.O. Quine. This reception was short-lived though and Peirce gradually disappeared from the mainstream philosophy of science while logical empiricism turned into a formidable movement. In this talk, I begin by discussing examples of the early reception of Peirce’s philosophy in the works of Morris, Nagel (and his student Justus Buchler), Feigl, and Frank. I show the variety of topics (including logic, probability theory, theories of truth and meaning, and social dimensions of science) in which Peirce received a warm (though not uncritical) reception. We see that the engagements with his works are persistent from the late 1920s to the 1950s and get more refined over time. I then provide some explanations for the eventual marginalization of Peirce in mainstream philosophy of science. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
out > the purely physical world”. 4.551. That is, cognition does not require a > separate brain. Therefore, even a semiosic triad operating in total > Secondness, is a ‘cognitive act, based on the nature of the materials of > the interaction [eg, a Dicent Sinsign, a weathervane’. > > 7] ET: I fully agree - nothing is independent of semiosis and I don’t > think I have ever argued for such a view. > > 8] ET: Again - I have often quoted this section and fully agree. Please > note - ’signs’ is plural. > > 9] ET: My discussion has primarily been around your positioning of the > Final Interpretant before the Dynamic and Immediate Interpretants - In my > post of today, I outlined what I consider to be the function of the FI - > and note that it is not always part of the semiosic action. > > Edwina > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
uture. A > tone is a limited and confusing special case of mark. > > On this point, Tony made the correct choice. The word 'tone' should be > used *ONLY *in exact quotations of Peirce's MSS. In all discussions of > Peirce's system in the 21st C, (Mark Token Type) is the recommended choice. > > > John > > -- > *From*: "Jon Alan Schmidt" > > John, List: > > JFS: That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two > tokens of the same type. > > > This is another reason why "tone" is a better choice than "mark" for "an > indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice." Two things can > have *different *tones, yet be tokens of the *same *type; and two things > can have (some of) the *same *tones, yet be tokens of *different *types. > > JFS: It confirms Peirce's final choice. > > > Indeed--his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, > https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 8:14 PM John F Sowa wrote: > > Jon, > > I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of > 'mark': > > Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's *Dictionary of > Philosophy and Psychology* (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) > > Yes indeed. That definition shows that two things that have the same > mark are two tokens of the same type. > > It confirms Peirce's final choice. > > John > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
