Jesse wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
The reason why you don't buy lottery tickets could just as easily be
explained in a single universe.
I short-changed my argument. I should've said, "The reason why you
don't buy lottery tickets can only be explained in a single
universe."
Tom Caylo
Tom Caylor wrote:
The reason why you don't buy lottery tickets could just as easily be
explained in a single universe.
I short-changed my argument. I should've said, "The reason why you don't
buy lottery tickets can only be explained in a single universe."
Tom Caylor
If you don't a
The reason why you don't buy lottery tickets could just as easily be
explained in a single universe.
I short-changed my argument. I should've said, "The reason why you
don't buy lottery tickets can only be explained in a single universe."
Tom Caylor
Bruno Marchal wrote:
we are "conscious" only because we belong to a continuum of infinite
never ending stories ...
...that's what the lobian machine's "guardian angel" G* says about
that: true and strictly unbelievable.
Bruno
Since you agree that the number of histories is on a continuum, y
Bruno wrote:
Le 12-déc.-05, à 18:07, Tom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) a écrit :
...
In the Plenitude, everything washes out to zero. And Bruno, I would
even say that all consistent histories wash out to zero.
I am not sure why you say this.
See below.
It's interesting that symmetry (Bruno's re
Stathis wrote:
Tom Caylor writes:
In response to Stathis' thought experiment, to speak of an experiment
being
"set up" in a certain way is to base probabilities on an "irrelevant"
subset of the whole, at least if the multiverse hypothesis is true.
In the
Plenitude, there are an additiona
Le 12-déc.-05, à 18:07, Tom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) a écrit :
In response to Stathis' thought experiment, to speak of an experiment
being "set up" in a certain way is to base probabilities on an
"irrelevant" subset of the whole, at least if the multiverse
hypothesis is true. In the Plenitude, t
Le 12-déc.-05, à 19:37, George Levy a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
In addition to the above arguments, consider the problem from the
point of view of the subject. If multiple copies of a person are
created and run in parallel for a period, what difference does this
make to his expe
Le 13-déc.-05, à 02:07, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
From the third person perspective, the annihilation of the 10^100
copies
could be seen as 10^100 dead ends. (In fact, when I originally
proposed this experiment, Hal Finney thought it represented the
ultimate in mass murder.) If I were one
Tom Caylor writes:
In response to Stathis' thought experiment, to speak of an experiment being
"set up" in a certain way is to base probabilities on an "irrelevant"
subset of the whole, at least if the multiverse hypothesis is true. In the
Plenitude, there are an additional 10^100 copies stil
From the third person perspective, the annihilation of the 10^100 copies
could be seen as 10^100 dead ends. (In fact, when I originally proposed this
experiment, Hal Finney thought it represented the ultimate in mass murder.)
If I were one of the 10^100, however, I wouldn't be worried in the sli
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
In addition to the above arguments, consider the problem
from the point of view of the subject. If multiple copies of a person
are created and run in parallel for a period, what difference does this
make to his experience? It seems to me that there is no test or
ex
Bruno wrote:
Le 11-déc.-05, à 11:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
You find yourself alone in a room with a light that alternates
red/green with a period of one minute. A letter in the room informs
you that every other minute, 10^100 copies of you are created and run
in parallel for one minut
Le 11-déc.-05, à 11:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
You find yourself alone in a room with a light that alternates
red/green with a period of one minute. A letter in the room informs
you that every other minute, 10^100 copies of you are created and run
in parallel for one minute, then shut
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 10-déc.-05, à 13:24, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
In addition to the above arguments, consider the problem from the point of
view of the subject. If multiple copies of a person are created and run in
parallel for a period, what difference does this make to his experi
Le 09-déc.-05, à 22:44, George Levy a écrit :
The crux of the matter is the concept of indistinguishability: whether you consider two identical persons (OMs) occupying two identical universes the same person (point on the road). It is clear that if you consider the problem from the information an
Le 10-déc.-05, à 13:24, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
In addition to the above arguments, consider the problem from the
point of view of the subject. If multiple copies of a person are
created and run in parallel for a period, what difference does this
make to his experience? It seems to me t
George Levy writes:
Hi Quentin, Stathis, Bruno
It all depends how you see the plenitude, OMs and the branching. Is
consciousness like a traveller in a network of roads traversing the
plenitude, some roads branching some roads merging?
If yes then you could have several independent conscious
Hi Quentin, Stathis, Bruno
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi Georges,
if you start from OMs as basic, then a branch is a set of OMs (only
"consistent"/ordered set ?). Then it means a branch is unique. Some part of
different branches could overlap, but as I don't understand what could be an
abs
Le 08-déc.-05, à 22:21, George Levy a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 05-déc.-05, à 02:46, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
I still think that if you double everything and then annihilate only the
doubled person, the probability will be 1.
Actually I agree with this.
So far we have been talking ab
Hi (again) Brent,
So Brent you were right, if I understood you correctly, in quantum
logic the negation can be interpreted as an orthogonality relations
classifying alternative results of an experiment. The vectors of the
base corresponds to the observables under scrutiny.
Le 09-déc.-05, à
Hi Brent,
This is perhaps a slightly more advanced answer relatively to the
current thread, so don't be astonished if you don't get the end, I
should recall the notion of "theory" before. My current conversation
with Stathis is based directly on the "multiverse (Kripke) semantics",
but I stil
George Levy writes:
So far we have been talking about splitting universes and people. Let's
consider the case where two branches of the universe merge. In other words,
two different paths eventually happen to become identical - Of course when
this happens all their branching futures also becom
Hi Georges,
if you start from OMs as basic, then a branch is a set of OMs (only
"consistent"/ordered set ?). Then it means a branch is unique. Some part of
different branches could overlap, but as I don't understand what could be an
absolute measure (meaning it never change and is fixed foreve
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 05-déc.-05, à 02:46, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
I still think that if you double everything
and then annihilate only the
doubled person, the probability will be 1.
Actually I agree with this.
So far we have been talking about spli
Bruno Marchal wrote:
...
What could this mean in a real world example?
Take W as the set of places in Brussels. Take R to be "accessible by
walking in a finite number of foot steps". Then each places at Brussels
is accessible from itself, giving that you can access it with zero
steps, or
Hi Stathis,
Hi Bruno,
I replied to the first part of your post earlier, but it took a bit
more time to digest the rest. For what it is worth, I have included my
"thinking out loud" below.
Thanks for replying, and thanks for authorizing me to comment online.
Mhh I know
Le 03-déc.-05, à 11:12, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 01-déc.-05, à 07:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Why does an OM need to contain so much information to link it to
other OMs making up a person? [the complete message is below].
I am not sure I understand. A
Le 05-déc.-05, à 02:46, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
I still think that if you double everything and then annihilate only
the
doubled person, the probability will be 1.
Actually I agree with this.
This is simply a consequence of
using the absolute measure.
Ah ? I am not sure this makes
Le 05-déc.-05, à 22:49, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Mon, Dec 05, 2005 at 03:58:20PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Well at least this isn't a problem of translation. But I still have
difficulty in understanding why Pp=Bp & -B-p should be translated
into
English as "to bet on p" (or for tha
On Mon, Dec 05, 2005 at 03:58:20PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >Well at least this isn't a problem of translation. But I still have
> >difficulty in understanding why Pp=Bp & -B-p should be translated into
> >English as "to bet on p" (or for that matter pourquoi on devrait
> >le traduire par
Le 03-déc.-05, à 11:06, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Mon, Nov 21, 2005 at 03:39:58PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Observation is implicitly defined here by measurement capable of
selecting alternatives on which we are able to bet (or to gamble ?).
The french word is "parier".
Well at least
I'm perhaps missing something here. In a no-collapse interpretation of QM,
doesn't "everything double" every moment? So, if only one of the doubled
versions of a person is annihilated, doesn't this mean the probability of
survival is 1?
Although the plenitude is timeless, containing all poss
age -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Sunday, December 04, 2005 05:32 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
>
> There is, of course, a diff
have
many outcomes, all leading to death except one, the probability of
experiencing that branch is very small.
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2005 11:38 AM
Subject:
- Original Message -
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2005 03:06 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
> Saibal Mitra wrote:
> > - Original Messag
have
many outcomes, all leading to death except one, the probability of
experiencing that branch is very small.
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2005 11:38 AM
Subject:
Well, I did actually intend my example to be analogous to the Tegmark QS
experiment. Are you saying that if there is only one world and magically an
identical, separate world comes into being this is fundamentally different
to what happens in quantum branch splitting? It seems to me that in both
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 01-déc.-05, à 07:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Why does an OM need to contain so much information to link it to other OMs
making up a person? [the complete message is below].
I am not sure I understand. Are you saying, like Saibal Mitra, that OMs
(Observer-Mom
On Mon, Nov 21, 2005 at 03:39:58PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Observation is implicitly defined here by measurement capable of
> selecting alternatives on which we are able to bet (or to gamble ?).
> The french word is "parier".
>
Well at least this isn't a problem of translation. But I stil
Hi Saibal,
Le Samedi 3 Décembre 2005 02:15, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
> Correction, I seem to have misunderstood Statis' set up. If you really
> create a new world and then create and kill the person there then the
> probability of survival is 1. This is different from quantum mechanical
> branch sp
Saibal Mitra wrote:
Correction, I seem to have misunderstood Statis' set up. If you really
create a new world and then create and kill the person there then the
probability of survival is 1. This is different from quantum mechanical
branch splitting.
To see this, consider first what would
AIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 02:25 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
> The answer must be a) because (and
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "Stathis Papaioannou"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Monday, November 28, 2005 04:47 P
- Original Message -
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 10:02 PM
Subject: RE: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
>
> Saibal wrote:
> > > > The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
>
- Original Message -
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Cc:
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 07:41 PM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
> Saibal Mitra wrote:
> > - Original Message -
> > From: "Jonatha
Le 01-déc.-05, à 07:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Why does an OM need to contain so much information to link it to other
OMs making up a person? [the complete message is below].
I am not sure I understand. Are you saying, like Saibal Mitra, that OMs
(Observer-Moments) are not related?
Why does an OM need to contain so much information to link it to other OMs
making up a person? I certainly don't spend every waking moment reminding
myself of who I am, let alone going over my entire past history, and I still
think all my thoughts are my thoughts. I don't think that the fact t
An observer a1 at time t1 undergoes destructive scanning, and two exact
copies, observers a2 and a3, are created. If we ask a2 and a3, they will
each claim to remember "being" a1. We could say that as a result of the
duplication we have two people, a1a2 and a1a3, each with equal claim to have
Saibal Mitra writes:
The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with Jesse), all that
exists is an ensemble of isolated observer moments. The future, the past,
alternative histories, etc. they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't
see how some states can be more ''real'' than other st
Le 27-nov.-05, à 02:25, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with Jesse), all
that
exists is an ensemble of isolated observer moments. The future, the
past,
alternative histories, etc. they all exist in a symmetrical way. It
don't
see how some states can
Le 27-nov.-05, à 02:18, Kim Jones a écrit :
The search for a "consistent meaning to life" is then the search for
certainty about that pattern one recognises as the 1st person
experience, or the self. I assume that this is not so much for
confirmation of solipsism but for the knowledge that ou
Le 27-nov.-05, à 00:07, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
Why are we looking for a consistent meaning of our own life ?
What would be an inconsistent meaning? (i'm just trying to figure out
what you ask)
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
[quoting Saibal Mitra]
There exists an observer moment representing you at N seconds, at N + 4
seconds and at all possible other states. They all ''just exist'' in the
plenitude, as Stathis wrote. The OM representing you at N + 4 has the
memory
Brent Meeker writes:
[quoting Saibal Mitra]
There exists an observer moment representing you at N seconds, at N + 4
seconds and at all possible other states. They all ''just exist'' in the
plenitude, as Stathis wrote. The OM representing you at N + 4 has the
memory of being the OM at N.
This
I agree with everything Jesse says here.
Stathis Papaioannou
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I was thinking of people who accept some ensemble theory such as MWI, but
don't believe in QTI. I must admit, I find it difficult to understand how
even a dualist might justify (a) as being correct. Would
Saibal wrote:
> > > The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
> > > Jesse), all that exists is an ensemble of isolated observer
> > > moments. The future, the past, alternative histories, etc.
> > > they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't see how some
> > > states can be more
Saibal Mitra wrote:
- Original Message -
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 05:49 AM
Subject: RE: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
Saibal wrote:
The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
Jesse), al
- Original Message -
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 05:49 AM
Subject: RE: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
> Saibal wrote:
> > The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
> > Jesse), al
Jonathan Colvin writes:
Saibal wrote:
> The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
> Jesse), all that exists is an ensemble of isolated observer
> moments. The future, the past, alternative histories, etc.
> they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't see how some
> states can be
Saibal Mitra writes:
The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with Jesse), all that
exists is an ensemble of isolated observer moments. The future, the past,
alternative histories, etc. they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't
see how some states can be more ''real'' than other s
Please disregard previous post. The b and c cases were inverted.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I
am instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there
are several possible ways this m
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I
am instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there
are several possible ways this might be interpreted from the 1st
person viewpoint:
(a) Pr(I live
Saibal wrote:
> The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
> Jesse), all that exists is an ensemble of isolated observer
> moments. The future, the past, alternative histories, etc.
> they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't see how some
> states can be more ''real'' than o
aving done the experiment were wiped out form
your memory.
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:
Sent: Saturday, November 26, 2005 11:51 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
>
>
On 27/11/2005, at 10:07 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
While I agree it is quite of topic.. this is something that I got
lot of
interest into. Why are we looking for a consistent meaning of our
own life ?
Quentin
How can anything be off-topic on a list calling itself
"Everything"? ;
Le Samedi 26 Novembre 2005 18:47, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>I was thinking of people who accept some ensemble theory such as MWI, but
>don't believe in QTI. I must admit, I find it difficult to understand how
>even a dualist might justify (a) as being correct. Would anyon
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I was thinking of people who accept some ensemble theory such as MWI, but
don't believe in QTI. I must admit, I find it difficult to understand how
even a dualist might justify (a) as being correct. Would anyone care to
help?
What do you think of my argument here?
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I am
instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there are
several possible ways this might be interpreted from the 1st person
viewpoint:
(a) Pr(I live) = Pr(I die) = 0.5
(b) Pr(I
Le 25-nov.-05, à 01:10, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I
am instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living,
there are several possible ways this might be interpreted from the
1st person view
Bruno Marchal writes:
If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I am
instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there are
several possible ways this might be interpreted from the 1st person
viewpoint:
(a) Pr(I live) = Pr(I die) = 0.5
I hope every
Le 24-nov.-05, à 08:52, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
The main idea of Kripke has consisted in saying that the modal
formula Bp (also written []p) is true at world a, if p is true in all
the worlds you can access from a. p is relatively necessary at a.
For example, if t
Bruno Marchal writes:
The main idea of Kripke has consisted in saying that the modal formula Bp
(also written []p) is true at world a, if p is true in all the worlds you
can access from a. p is relatively necessary at a.
For example, if the world are countries and if you have to pay taxes in al
Le 19-nov.-05, à 22:56, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Sat, Nov 19, 2005 at 04:22:58PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Now observation and knowledge are defined in the logics of
self-reference, i.e. by transformation of G and G*, and so are each
multiplied by two. Actually and amazingly for the kn
On Sat, Nov 19, 2005 at 04:22:58PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Now observation and knowledge are defined in the logics of
> self-reference, i.e. by transformation of G and G*, and so are each
> multiplied by two. Actually and amazingly for the knower (the first
> person) G and G* give the same
Le 18-nov.-05, à 20:39, Stephen Paul King a écrit :
Dear Bruno,
Are you claiming that the communicable part is to the
non-communicable
part as the classical is to the quantum?
Oops, no, sorry. My fault. I was trying to be short. You can see Godel,
Lob, Solovay discovery as the discove
: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Everything-List List"
Sent: Friday, November 18, 2005 10:03 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
snip
Well, actually I hope it will gives the qubits.
I am not contesting the
Le 17-nov.-05, à 12:40, Brian Scurfield concluded :
OK, I see what you are getting at here, but as you pointed out later
in your post the problem is that "junk" can be consistent! You want to
"throw away" the junk by showing it has zero measure without a-priori
assuming some kind of casual str
Le 15-nov.-05, à 10:56, Brian Scurfield a écrit :
--- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
It has often been pointed out on this list that universes are those
parts of the multiverse down which information flows. So Harry
Potter "universes" are not in fact universes
Le 10-nov.-05, à 05:45, Brian Scurfield a écrit (for-list):
Bruno -
To summarise, the quantum theory of immortality arises from the
following considerations:
1. You cannot distinguish among all your identical first-person
observer moments.
2. From a first-person perspective, you cannot exper
Le 01-nov.-05, à 21:05, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Bruno,
So why is it that from the 3rd person point of view everyone dies?
Because incompleteness in its 3-person "probabilistic" meaning is that:
IF you are alive THEN there is a non negligible probability that you
will die.
This means
Bruno Marchal writes:
I believe that the quantum theory does not allow cul-de-sac branches.
I also believe that the Godel-Lob theory of self-reference not only allow
cul-de-sac branches, but it imposes them everywhere: from all alive states
you can reach a dead end.
The Universal Dovetailer Ar
I should have said "a countable set of countable histories".
Tom
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tue, 01 Nov 2005 15:05:39 -0500
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality (was Re: Quantum Suicide)
Bruno,
So why
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Everything-List List
Sent: Tue, 1 Nov 2005 13:27:27 +0100
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality (was Re: Quantum Suicide)
Le 28-oct.-05, à 17:54, GottferDamnt a écrit (for-list):
Hi,
I would like talk about this quote from an old topic:
This is a rather shocking conclu
Le 28-oct.-05, à 17:54, GottferDamnt a écrit (for-list):
Hi,
I would like talk about this quote from an old topic:
This is a rather shocking conclusion. We are conscious here and
now because our (computational state) belongs to aleph_1 (or
2^aleph_0 for those who doesn't want to rely on Ca
All this talk of quantum immortality seems like anthropocentric wishful
thinking to me.
You are a process. All physical objects are best understood as slow
processes.
A life process is a very complex physical pattern, which is an
arrangement of matter and energy in space-time,
that has propert
At 10:14 12/06/03 -0400, Charles wrote:
What is this thing called consciousness, anyway?
It could be the unconscious, instinctive, automatic, abductive
inference of some consistent sets of "neighborhood-histories".
It is related to some high level description of ourselves
relatively to what w
On 08-Jun-01, Russell Standish wrote:
> Saibal Mitra wrote:
>> I would go even further: The person I was when I was 3 years old is
>> dead. He died because too much new information was added to his
>> brain.
>>
>
> This view would align you with Jacques Mallah and James Higgo with
> their "obse
Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
> Yes, you can save the ``conventional´´ quantum immortality theorem by
> extending the definition of a person, but is a person with an astronomical
> amount of data stored in his brain plus all of my memory really me? I would
> say not.
>
If that person remembers being yo
Yes, you can save the ``conventional´´ quantum immortality theorem by
extending the definition of a person, but is a person with an astronomical
amount of data stored in his brain plus all of my memory really me? I would
say not.
I would go even further: The person I was when I was 3 years old is
h implies. In all events,
you should invest for universes where you are alive, rather than dead,
unless you care about other people.
> -Original Message-
> From: Wei Dai [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: 09 December 1998 09:50
> To: Higgo James; '[EMAIL PROTECTED]'
&
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