Re: The codical-material universe

[John Clark]

On Tue, Sep 25, 2018 at 1:24 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

*>If someone else can explain the problem that John Clark see, let him or
> her helps him.*
>

So even the originator of the theory can't make sense out of it and asks
third parties to figure out exactly what the question asked of the guy in
Helsinki on Monday is that is supposed to be refuted on Tuesday. You keep
telling us what the question is not but you never said what the question
IS. And yes you say the question is about various sorts of peepee but I
don't want to know what the question is about either, I want to know THE
EXACT WORDING of the question asked of the guy on Monday and the exact
wording of the answer, and I want all of this done without personal
pronouns that do nothing but hide major blunders in your logic.

I want that but I won't get that because you can't do that because your
theory is so bad it's not even wrong.

> *All points below have been answered,*
>

Except for who the referent is for all those personal pronouns you love to
throw around so loberally and  what the question asked in Helsinki is, not
what it isn't, not what it's about, but exactly what IS it.

> *I think John Clark do just very bad philosophy, asking impossible but
> irrelevant precision,*
>

And so we have the sorry spectacle of a logician who likes to sprinkle
formal equations in his posts complaining that I'm being too precise when
all I ask is the meaning of a few pronoun and the wording of the question
you keep talking about.

John K Clark
>
>
>

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

If someone else can explain the problem that John Clark see, let him or her 
helps him.

All points below have been answered, and is full or trick to makes things 
looking more complex, and simultaneously omit the definition given. 

This concerns, the step 3 of the Universal Dovetailer Argument accessible here:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 

You might print the slide to have an overview of the 8 steps. I do the 8th step 
rather differently today.

Ask any question.

I think John Clark do just very bad philosophy, asking impossible but 
irrelevant precision, once we use the definition given. I have never met 
someone not understanding this more than four years (yes some other people took 
some time, but once they got he pont admit that it is indeed a really simple 
and obvious point. 

The 8th step, as I do it today, is more demanding in computer science and 
requires the understanding that the notion of computation does not require any 
assumption on physics, nor in metaphysics.Computation is not just a 
mathematical concept but a concept that can be defined in elementary arithmetic.

Bruno



> On 25 Sep 2018, at 00:56, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Sep 24, 2018 at 9:58 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >>So you demand that the first person view of the Moscow man tomorrow predict 
> >>today
> 
> > No. I ask this, since day one, to the H-guy; before he pushes the button.
> 
> Stop talking about "the H-guy" until you tell all of us exactly what you mean 
> by the term! I mean anyone who REMEMBERS being a guy in Helsinki before a 
> button was pushed, and thus that guy still exists after the button was 
> pushed. However if a different definition is used, if the H-guy IS the person 
> before the button was pushed then obviously "the H-guy" will not exist after 
> the button was pushed, and that would be true regardless of if the button is 
> connected to a people duplicating machine or just connected to a doorbell. It 
> all depends on exactly what "the H-guy" means. I am crystal clear about all 
> this, why can't you be? What exactly do you want predicted and just as 
> important who do you want to make the prediction?
> 
> >>Nobody can ask the H-guy anything unless yesterday before any of this 
> >>started everybody agreed on exactly what "the H-guy" means, I have provided 
> >>a clear unambiguous definition of that term but you have not. 
> 
> > I cannot parse the sentence.
> 
> That surprises me because it was not a complex sentence. Which word didn't 
> you understand?
>  
> >>Asking "How many cities do you see?" would be a dumb question to ask. What 
> >>you should ask is "Given our predetermined agreement about what the term 
> >>means made before anybody was copied how many cities do you think the H-guy 
> >>ended up seeing?”.
> 
> 
> >That is simply not the question asked.
> 
> Then what the hell was the question asked?? If its a Monday do you think 
> these 2 questions asked of the Helsinki man are equivalent?
> 
> 1) How many cities will you see on Tuesday?
> 2)  How many cities will the Helsinki man see on Tuesday?
> 
> If they are not equivalent then what is the referent of "you"?
> If there are equivalent then must "the Helsinki man" be in Helsinki? And can 
> the Helsinki man of Monday exist on Tuesday? If the answers are yes then the 
> Helsinki man will see 2 cities at the same time on Tuesday.
> 
> You will no doubt respond with talk about peepee but if it makes sense you 
> should be able to insert the peepee into the question on Monday so that it 
> can be answered with a simple yes or no on Tuesday, but you don't know how to 
> do that because the entire thing makes no sense.  
>  
> >You eliminate the first person experience.
> 
> I'm not eliminating anything I just want to know exactly what is the question 
> that you ask the H-guy today before the duplication is, and what question  
> you will ask the 2 guys tomorrow after the duplication that you belive will 
> refute or confirm the correctness of the answer given by the guy on Monday. 
> And I don't think I'm being unreasonable in wanting to know what the hell 
> we're talking about. 
> 
> > If the H-guy is promise coffee at both place, he can predict clearly that 
> > after pushing the button he [...]
> 
> No, "he" can't do predict anything nor can anybody else until we know exactly 
> who "he" is.
> 
> Bruno said Bruno always knows who the referent is when personal pronouns are 
> used in this thought experiment but in John's last post John asked Bruno to 
> prove it by simply not using them, but John predicted Bruno would not do 
> that. John's prediction turned out to be correct.
>  
> >the question is about the 1p experience, not about some person is from a 3p 
> >point of view.
> 
> Stop telling me what the question is about and tell be what exactly the 
> question that you ask in Helsinki IS. I want to know the specific question 
> you ask the Helsinki 

Re: The codical-material universe

[John Clark]

On Mon, Sep 24, 2018 at 9:58 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>So you demand that the first person view of the Moscow man tomorrow
>> predict today
>
>
> *> No. I ask this, since day one, to the H-guy; before he pushes the
> button.*
>

Stop talking about "the H-guy" until you tell all of us exactly what you
mean by the term! I mean anyone who *REMEMBERS* being a guy in Helsinki
before a button was pushed, and thus that guy still exists after the button
was pushed. However if a different definition is used, if the H-guy *IS*
the person before the button was pushed then obviously "the H-guy" will not
exist after the button was pushed, and that would be true regardless of if
the button is connected to a people duplicating machine or just connected
to a doorbell. It all depends on exactly what "the H-guy" means. I am
crystal clear about all this, why can't you be? What exactly do you want
predicted and just as important who do you want to make the prediction?

>>Nobody can ask the H-guy anything unless yesterday before any of this
>> started everybody agreed on exactly what "the H-guy" means, I have provided
>> a clear unambiguous definition of that term but you have not.
>
>
> *> I cannot parse the sentence.*
>

That surprises me because it was not a complex sentence. Which word didn't
you understand?


> >>Asking "How many cities do you see?" would be a dumb question to ask.
>> What you should ask is "Given our predetermined agreement about what the
>> term means made before anybody was copied how many cities do you think the
>> H-guy ended up seeing?”.
>
>
>
> >*That is simply not the question asked. *
>

Then what the hell was the question asked?? If its a Monday do you think
these 2 questions asked of the Helsinki man are equivalent?

1) How many cities will you see on Tuesday?
2)  How many cities will the Helsinki man see on Tuesday?

If they are not equivalent then what is the referent of "you"?
If there are equivalent then must "the Helsinki man" be in Helsinki? And
can the Helsinki man of Monday exist on Tuesday? If the answers are yes
then the Helsinki man will see 2 cities at the same time on Tuesday.

You will no doubt respond with talk about peepee but if it makes sense you
should be able to insert the peepee into the question on Monday so that it
can be answered with a simple yes or no on Tuesday, but you don't know how
to do that because the entire thing makes no sense.


> *>You eliminate the first person experience.*
>

I'm not eliminating anything I just want to know exactly what is the
question that you ask the H-guy today before the duplication is, and what
question  you will ask the 2 guys tomorrow after the duplication that you
belive will refute or confirm the correctness of the answer given by the
guy on Monday. And I don't think I'm being unreasonable in wanting to know
what the hell we're talking about.

*> If the H-guy is promise coffee at both place, he can predict clearly
> that after pushing the button he* [...]
>

No, "he" can't do predict anything nor can anybody else until we know
exactly who "he" is.

Bruno said Bruno always knows who the referent is when personal pronouns
are used in this thought experiment but in John's last post John asked
Bruno to prove it by simply not using them, but John predicted Bruno would
not do that. John's prediction turned out to be correct.


> *>the question is about the 1p experience, not about some person is from a
> 3p point of view.*
>

Stop telling me what the question is about and tell be what exactly the
question that you ask in Helsinki *IS.* I want to know the specific
question you ask the Helsinki man today, what his answer is, and what
questions you will ask the copies tomorrow that you think will refute it ,
  And there must be NO PERSONAL PRONOUNS  in the question, but that
shouldn't problem as you claim to always know who the referent is. Also the
question should be about what somebody expects to happen but what somebody
predicts will happen.The statement "I expect to see Santa Claus
workshop on Tuesday" may be true but that doesn't mean I will see Santa
Claus workshop on Tuesday.

 John K Clark


>

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 24 Sep 2018, at 00:20, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> Bruno Marcha wrote:
> 
> >>Bruno, that's my definition but think long and hard before you agree with 
> >>it because if you still agree with it in your next post I give you fair 
> >>warning my next question to you will be "How many cities will the Helsinki 
> >>man see?”. 
> 
> > Only one, from its first person view.
> 
> So you demand that the first person view of the Moscow man tomorrow predict 
> today

No.

I ask this, since day one, to the H-guy; before he pushes the button.





> what will happen to him despite the fact that today the first person view of 
> the Moscow man tomorrow DOES NOT EXIST! There is one property that every good 
> oracle needs, and that is the property of existence, and the first person 
> Moscow man of tomorrow doesn't have it in Helsinki today.
>  
> I did warn you that you needed to think long and hard.

You are the only one who does not grasp this. But as you show above, you don’t 
even read the posts.



>  
> > We need to ask the H-guy reconstitute in each city[...]
> 
> Nobody can ask the H-guy anything unless yesterday before any of this started 
> everybody agreed on exactly what "the H-guy" means, I have provided a clear 
> unambiguous definition of that term but you have not. 

I cannot parse the sentence.



>  
> > and indeed, they both see one city,
> 
> Asking "How many cities do you see?" would be a dumb question to ask. What 
> you should ask is "Given our predetermined agreement about what the term 
> means made before anybody was copied how many cities do you think the H-guy 
> ended up seeing?”.


That is simply not the question asked. You eliminate the first person 
experience.

If the H-guy is promise coffee at both place, he can predict clearly that after 
pushing the button he will get some coffee. P(coffee) = 1. And he can predict 
as well that in the two places accessibles, he will drink that coffee feeling 
to be localised in only once city, so, similarly, P(“I will feel to be in one 
city”) = 1.

You put complexity ware there are none, and you dismiss the 1p notion, or the 
fact that the question is about the 1p experience, not about some person is 
from a 3p point of view.

Bruno



> Depending on what the agreement was the correct answer could be zero or two 
> or there was no agreement and thus there was no answer because there was no 
> question, there was only gibberish.   
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
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Re: The codical-material universe

[John Clark]

Bruno Marcha wrote:

>>Bruno, that's my definition but think long and hard before you agree with
>> it because if you still agree with it in your next post I give you fair
>> warning my next question to you will be "How many cities will the Helsinki
>> man see?”.
>
>
> *> Only one, from its first person view.*
>

So you demand that the first person view of the Moscow man tomorrow predict
today what will happen to him despite the fact that today the first person
view of the Moscow man tomorrow *DOES NOT EXIST*! There is one property
that every good oracle needs, and that is the property of existence, and
the first person Moscow man of tomorrow doesn't have it in Helsinki today.

I did warn you that you needed to think long and hard.


> > *We need to ask the H-guy reconstitute in each city*[...]
>

Nobody can ask the H-guy anything unless yesterday before any of this
started everybody agreed on exactly what "the H-guy" means, I have provided
a clear unambiguous definition of that term but you have not.


> > *and indeed, they both see one city*,
>

Asking "How many cities do you see?" would be a dumb question to ask. What
you should ask is "Given our predetermined agreement about what the term
means made before anybody was copied how many cities do you think the H-guy
ended up seeing?". Depending on what the agreement was the correct answer
could be zero or two or there was no agreement and thus there was no answer
because there was no question, there was only gibberish.

John K Clark


>

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 22 Sep 2018, at 19:11, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> Bruno, that's my definition but think long and hard before you agree with it 
> because if you still agree with it in your next post I give you fair warning 
> my next question to you will be "How many cities will the Helsinki man see?”. 


Only one, from its first person view.

Two in the third person description.

Verification:

We need to ask the H-guy reconstitute in each city, and indeed, they both see 
one city, confirming the fact that from there first person view, they were 
right, when in Helsinki they predicted to see only one city.



Bruno


> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
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Re: The codical-material universe

[John Clark]

On Thu, Sep 20, 2018 at 6:17 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> *you are right, computation needs a notion of change, but not of physical
> change, which emerge from the notion of relative change already definable
> in arithmetic.*
>

So you've abandoned the idea mathematics is eternal and universal.
Arithmetic will be different an hour from now and Arithmetic in Washington
is not the same as Arithmetic in Moscow.

>>You can't have a block-view of reality or of anything else without a
>> block, and time is one of the dimensions of that block, and time is the one
>> and only reason the geometry of that block is Non-Euclidean.
>
>
> *>In your religion. *
>

What are you talking about? I've said nothing controversial, its been known
for a century the block universe is Non-Euclidean because, due to the time
dimension, the Pythagorean theorem is different in Minkowski space than it
is in Euclidean geometry. If X is the spatial distance between 2 events for
an observer and T is the time it takes light to cover that distance for
that same observer and c is the speed of light then the invariant spacetime
distance S between events can be found with the formula S^2= (cT)^2 -X^2.
T and X will be different for different observers but S will be the same
for ANY observer. Notice the minus sign in there, Euclid and Pythagoras
said it should be a plus and that's why it's Non-Euclidean.

*>No problem with your theory, but it contradict your belief
> in computationalism.*
>

I know what I mean by "computationalism", intelligent behavior can be
produced by computations,  but I can't comment on the above because like
"The Helsinki man" I don't know what you mean by computationalism.


> >>And I predicted that would happen long before the experiment started.
>
>
> *>That implies the first person indeterminacy.*
>

So something is indeterminate if it is predictable? Now I don't know what
you mean by "indeterminate" either.

>   >>> *Wat I request is that you tell me what the H-guy can expect to
> live*
> >>And what I request of you
>
> >*You avoid answering.*
>

True. I can't answer until I know what the question is, and I won't know
that until you tell me exactly what you mean by "the H-guy". Remember
people duplicating machines are involved so you must be far more precise
than you are in normal everyday life.

>>Just answer the following question: "After the experiment is completed
>> and the 1 H-guy became 2 H-guys what 1 and only 1 city did the H-guy end up
>> in?”
>
>
> *>That is like building the confusion between first and third person view,
> to makes the question not answerable.*
>

If the question is not answerable then I'm not the one who is confused.
It's your idiotic "question" not mine!


> >> If you can't answer that then it was not a experiment
>
>
> *>No. It means that the H-guy (if he survives, which is the case assuming
> computationalism) cannot predict the particular outcome he will feel to
> live. *
>

Tell me exactly what the referent to the personal pronoun "he" is in the
above is and I will tell you if I agree with your statement or not.

 > *We have agreed since day one what we mean by the H-guy.*
>

Refresh my memory then, what do you mean by "the H-guy"?  This is important
because it not only involves what the prediction is about but also who is
supposed to make the prediction. Are they the same people?

>>Seeing Moscow is the one and only reason the Helsinki man became the
>> Moscow man. So why did I see Moscow? Because I'm the Moscow man. Why am
>> I the Moscow man? Because I saw Moscow.
>
>
> >*Trivially. *
>

Yep, it would be hard to find anything more trivial, but its your thought
experiment not mine.

>>Unable to predict exactly what in Helsinki?
>
>
> *>The unique city that both H-guys will see.*
>

Who do you want to make the prediction? Both H-guys didn't exist yesterday
in Helsinki there was only one. Before anybody can predict anything you
need to exist.

> *What they will write in the diary.*
>

Please tell me how that brain dead diary idea you've been pushing for years
has any relevance in this matter.

>>So which ONE did it turn out to be, Washington OR Moscow?
>
>
> *>For one copy it is W, and he could not have predicted.*
>
*For the other it is M, and he could not have predicted.*
>

True, the H man could predict all of this but the W and M men were unable
to. And there is a reason for that, it is difficult to make good
predictions or even poor ones if you don't exist.


> *>The pronouns are not ambiguous.*
>

*Then prove it!*  Just stop using goddamn personal pronouns when discussing
this issue. If Bruno knows who the referent is for all the pronouns are as
claimed then Bruno should use them. However John predicts this will not
happen because Bruno simply cannot express these ideas without copious use
of ambiguous personal pronouns. There will likely be proof that John's
prediction was correct in Bruno's very next post.

>> But even after the "exparament" is over you *STILL* don't know 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Sep 2018, at 17:09, smitra  wrote:
> 
> On 19-09-2018 22:18, John Clark wrote:
>> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 4:17 AM Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote:
>> The state of a Turing machine is matched to a number and always
 has and always will be matched that very same number forever.
 Nothing changes.
 _You can say the same for your state here and now. But
>>> consciousness is not supported by the state, but by the sequence of
>>> states, or more exactly, the logical relation brought by a universal
>>> machine relating those states._
>> The logical relationships between those states never changes, not in
>> the time dimension or in any other dimension, and consciousness, just
>> like computation, demands change; physics can provide that,
>> mathematics can't.
>>> _>Your critics invalidate any block-view of reality._
>> You can't have a block-view of reality or of anything else without a
>> block, and time is one of the dimensions of that block, and time is
>> the one and only reason the geometry of that block is Non-Euclidean.
 _Are you, like Prigogine, assuming a fundamental time?_
>> Physicists have tried for decades to develop a Theory Of Everything
>> without making use of time in any way but have not been very
>> successful. Lee Smolin in his book "Time Reborn" says the obsession so
>> many physicists have had on getting rid of time is the reason little
>> progress has been made at finding a quantum theory of gravity. Brains
>> are certainly not fundamental but are nevertheless of vital importance
>> to cognition, so if we're just talking about consciousness it doesn't
>> make any difference if time is ultimately fundamental or not because
>> nothing is more apparent and important to a consciousness than time.
>> And don't tell me time is just a illusion because that explains
>> nothing, a illusion is a perfectly respectable subjective phenomenon
>> and subjectivity is what we're talking about.
 ___Time is an internal indexical,_
>> The index never changes, but time does and so does consciousness.
>> Definitions are a bore . SHOW ME!
>>> _>That is just ridiculous._
>> I see. So if I were to define a dragon as a huge fire breathing lizard
>> that can fly it would be ridiculous of you to dispute my claim that by
>> defining them I have proven dragons exist.
>>> _> Without agreeing on what is a computation,_
>> We don't learn by reading definitions, we learn from EXAMPLES. A
>> definition is made of words and all of those words have there own
>> definitions also made of words and all of those words have there own
>> definitions also made of words and [...]
>> You seem to be very big on fundamental stuff but if we're talking
>> about meaning definitions are most certainly NOT fundamental, but
>> examples are. Where do you suppose lexicographers got the information
>> to write the definitions in their dictionary?
>> So forget definitions, just compute 2+2 without using physics and I
>> will concede defeat and nominate you for a Nobel Prize.
>> The trouble with arithmetic is it doesn't change.
>>> _>Nor do a block universe;_
>> And that is exactly why consciousness can not directly perceive the
>> block universe and in fact until a century ago nobody was conscious of
>> the idea, and even today nobody knows if it's a correct view of
>> reality. At best it's just an approximation, and it can't even
>> approximate what's going on at the center of a Black Hole or at the
>> instant of the Big Bang.
 _Just ask the copies, they know well what they are living._
>> And I predicted that would happen long before the experiment started.
 _Wat I request is that you tell me what the H-guy can expect to
>>> live_
>> And what I request of you is far far easier than a prediction, all I
>> want you to do is go somewhere look around and tell me what you see.
>> Just answer the following question: "After the experiment is completed
>> and the 1 H-guy became 2 H-guys what 1 and only 1 city did the H-guy
>> end up in?". If you can't answer that then it was not a experiment and
>> it was not even a question, it was just a series of words with a
>> question mark at the end.
 _You have already said that the H-guy survives___ [...]
>> I can make all sorts of statements about the H-guy because I know
>> exactly what I mean by "the H-guy", but you have no idea what you mean
>> by "the H-guy".
>> I predicted the guy who saw Moscow would become the Moscow guy
 and the guy who saw Washington would become the Washington guy,
 ___Sure, but that is tautological. _
>> Exactly! Seeing Moscow is the one and only reason the Helsinki man
>> became the Moscow man. So why did I see Moscow? Because I'm the Moscow
>> man. Why am I the Moscow man? Because I saw Moscow. That may not be
>> deep but like all tautologies it's true, and I remind you it's your
>> thought "experiment" not mine.
 The prediction is on which guy you can expect to be,
>> Which guy who can expect to be? Bruno is unable to 

Re: The codical-material universe

[smitra]

On 19-09-2018 22:18, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 4:17 AM Bruno Marchal 
wrote:


The state of a Turing machine is matched to a number and always

has and always will be matched that very same number forever.
Nothing changes.



_You can say the same for your state here and now. But

consciousness is not supported by the state, but by the sequence of
states, or more exactly, the logical relation brought by a universal
machine relating those states._


The logical relationships between those states never changes, not in
the time dimension or in any other dimension, and consciousness, just
like computation, demands change; physics can provide that,
mathematics can't.


_>Your critics invalidate any block-view of reality._


You can't have a block-view of reality or of anything else without a
block, and time is one of the dimensions of that block, and time is
the one and only reason the geometry of that block is Non-Euclidean.


_Are you, like Prigogine, assuming a fundamental time?_


Physicists have tried for decades to develop a Theory Of Everything
without making use of time in any way but have not been very
successful. Lee Smolin in his book "Time Reborn" says the obsession so
many physicists have had on getting rid of time is the reason little
progress has been made at finding a quantum theory of gravity. Brains
are certainly not fundamental but are nevertheless of vital importance
to cognition, so if we're just talking about consciousness it doesn't
make any difference if time is ultimately fundamental or not because
nothing is more apparent and important to a consciousness than time.
And don't tell me time is just a illusion because that explains
nothing, a illusion is a perfectly respectable subjective phenomenon
and subjectivity is what we're talking about.


___Time is an internal indexical,_


The index never changes, but time does and so does consciousness.


Definitions are a bore . SHOW ME!


_>That is just ridiculous._


I see. So if I were to define a dragon as a huge fire breathing lizard
that can fly it would be ridiculous of you to dispute my claim that by
defining them I have proven dragons exist.


_> Without agreeing on what is a computation,_


We don't learn by reading definitions, we learn from EXAMPLES. A
definition is made of words and all of those words have there own
definitions also made of words and all of those words have there own
definitions also made of words and [...]

You seem to be very big on fundamental stuff but if we're talking
about meaning definitions are most certainly NOT fundamental, but
examples are. Where do you suppose lexicographers got the information
to write the definitions in their dictionary?

So forget definitions, just compute 2+2 without using physics and I
will concede defeat and nominate you for a Nobel Prize.


The trouble with arithmetic is it doesn't change.


_>Nor do a block universe;_


And that is exactly why consciousness can not directly perceive the
block universe and in fact until a century ago nobody was conscious of
the idea, and even today nobody knows if it's a correct view of
reality. At best it's just an approximation, and it can't even
approximate what's going on at the center of a Black Hole or at the
instant of the Big Bang.


_Just ask the copies, they know well what they are living._


And I predicted that would happen long before the experiment started.


_Wat I request is that you tell me what the H-guy can expect to

live_


And what I request of you is far far easier than a prediction, all I
want you to do is go somewhere look around and tell me what you see.
Just answer the following question: "After the experiment is completed
and the 1 H-guy became 2 H-guys what 1 and only 1 city did the H-guy
end up in?". If you can't answer that then it was not a experiment and
it was not even a question, it was just a series of words with a
question mark at the end.


_You have already said that the H-guy survives___ [...]


I can make all sorts of statements about the H-guy because I know
exactly what I mean by "the H-guy", but you have no idea what you mean
by "the H-guy".


I predicted the guy who saw Moscow would become the Moscow guy

and the guy who saw Washington would become the Washington guy,



___Sure, but that is tautological. _


Exactly! Seeing Moscow is the one and only reason the Helsinki man
became the Moscow man. So why did I see Moscow? Because I'm the Moscow
man. Why am I the Moscow man? Because I saw Moscow. That may not be
deep but like all tautologies it's true, and I remind you it's your
thought "experiment" not mine.


The prediction is on which guy you can expect to be,


Which guy who can expect to be? Bruno is unable to say what the ASCII
sequence y-o-u means in the above sentence and that's why Bruno is so
fond of personal pronouns, when people duplicating machines are
involved they help cover up the gaping holes in logic.


___from the 1p, after pushing the button, with will admit that

Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Sep 2018, at 22:18, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 4:17 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >>The state of a Turing machine is matched to a number and always has and 
> >>always will be matched that very same number forever. Nothing changes.
> 
> > You can say the same for your state here and now. But consciousness is not 
> > supported by the state, but by the sequence of states, or more exactly, the 
> > logical relation brought by a universal machine relating those states.
> 
> The logical relationships between those states never changes, not in the time 
> dimension or in any other dimension, and consciousness, just like 
> computation, demands change; physics can provide that, mathematics can't.   

You invoke your metaphysical hypothesis. That is simply begging the question.

Then, you are right, computation needs a notion of change, but not of physical 
change, which emerge from the notion of relative change already definable in 
arithmetic.





> 
> >Your critics invalidate any block-view of reality.
> 
> You can't have a block-view of reality or of anything else without a block, 
> and time is one of the dimensions of that block, and time is the one and only 
> reason the geometry of that block is Non-Euclidean. 


In your religion. 




>  
> > Are you, like Prigogine, assuming a fundamental time?
> 
> Physicists have tried for decades to develop a Theory Of Everything without 
> making use of time in any way but have not been very successful. Lee Smolin 
> in his book "Time Reborn" says the obsession so many physicists have had on 
> getting rid of time is the reason little progress has been made at finding a 
> quantum theory of gravity. Brains are certainly not fundamental but are 
> nevertheless of vital importance to cognition, so if we're just talking about 
> consciousness it doesn't make any difference if time is ultimately 
> fundamental or not because nothing is more apparent and important to a 
> consciousness than time. And don't tell me time is just a illusion because 
> that explains nothing, a illusion is a perfectly respectable subjective 
> phenomenon and subjectivity is what we're talking about. 

With mechanism, we distinguish subjective time, which is given by S4Grz1 (the 
math of the first person), and physical time, which does seem to be no more 
than an relative parameter.

No problem with your theory, but it contradict your belief in computationalism. 




>  
> 
>  > Time is an internal indexical,
> 
> The index never changes, but time does and so does consciousness.
> 
> >>Definitions are a bore . SHOW ME! 
> 
> >That is just ridiculous.
> 
> I see. So if I were to define a dragon as a huge fire breathing lizard that 
> can fly it would be ridiculous of you to dispute my claim that by defining 
> them I have proven dragons exist.
>  
> > Without agreeing on what is a computation,
> 
> We don't learn by reading definitions, we learn from EXAMPLES. A definition 
> is made of words and all of those words have there own definitions also made 
> of words and all of those words have there own definitions also made of words 
> and [...]
> 
> You seem to be very big on fundamental stuff but if we're talking about 
> meaning definitions are most certainly NOT fundamental, but examples are. 
> Where do you suppose lexicographers got the information to write the 
> definitions in their dictionary?
> 
> So forget definitions, just compute 2+2 without using physics and I will 
> concede defeat and nominate you for a Nobel Prize.   
> 
> >>The trouble with arithmetic is it doesn't change.
> 
> >Nor do a block universe;
> 
> And that is exactly why consciousness can not directly perceive the block 
> universe and in fact until a century ago nobody was conscious of the idea, 
> and even today nobody knows if it's a correct view of reality.


If you admit it could be correct, and is consistent, then there is no reason to 
criticise the block-mindscape structure of arithmetic, which emulates all 
computations (a standard fact known since the 1930s).



> At best it's just an approximation, and it can't even approximate what's 
> going on at the center of a Black Hole or at the instant of the Big Bang.
> 
> >Just ask the copies, they know well what they are living.
> 
> And I predicted that would happen long before the experiment started.

That implies the first person indeterminacy.




> 
> > Wat I request is that you tell me what the H-guy can expect to live
> 
> And what I request of you

You avoid answering.




> is far far easier than a prediction, all I want you to do is go somewhere 
> look around and tell me what you see.
> Just answer the following question: "After the experiment is completed and 
> the 1 H-guy became 2 H-guys what 1 and only 1 city did the H-guy end up in?”

That is like building the confusion between first and third person view, to 
makes the question not answerable.





> . If you can't answer that then it 

Re: The codical-material universe

[John Clark]

On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 4:17 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>The state of a Turing machine is matched to a number and always has and
>> always will be matched that very same number forever. Nothing changes.
>
>
> > *You can say the same for your state here and now. But consciousness is
> not supported by the state, but by the sequence of states, or more exactly,
> the logical relation brought by a universal machine relating those states.*
>

The logical relationships between those states never changes, not in the
time dimension or in any other dimension, and consciousness, just like
computation, demands change; physics can provide that, mathematics can't.

*>Your critics invalidate any block-view of reality.*
>

You can't have a block-view of reality or of anything else without a block,
and time is one of the dimensions of that block, and time is the one and
only reason the geometry of that block is Non-Euclidean.


> > *Are you, like Prigogine, assuming a fundamental time?*
>

Physicists have tried for decades to develop a Theory Of Everything without
making use of time in any way but have not been very successful. Lee Smolin
in his book "Time Reborn" says the obsession so many physicists have had on
getting rid of time is the reason little progress has been made at finding
a quantum theory of gravity. Brains are certainly not fundamental but are
nevertheless of vital importance to cognition, so if we're just talking
about consciousness it doesn't make any difference if time is ultimately
fundamental or not because nothing is more apparent and important to a
consciousness than time. And don't tell me time is just a illusion because
that explains nothing, a illusion is a perfectly respectable subjective
phenomenon and subjectivity is what we're talking about.

 > *Time is an internal indexical,*
>

The index never changes, but time does and so does consciousness.

>>Definitions are a bore . SHOW ME!
>
>
> *>That is just ridiculous.*
>

I see. So if I were to define a dragon as a huge fire breathing lizard that
can fly it would be ridiculous of you to dispute my claim that by defining
them I have proven dragons exist.


> *> Without agreeing on what is a computation,*


We don't learn by reading definitions, we learn from EXAMPLES. A definition
is made of words and all of those words have there own definitions also
made of words and all of those words have there own definitions also made
of words and [...]

You seem to be very big on fundamental stuff but if we're talking about
meaning definitions are most certainly NOT fundamental, but examples are.
Where do you suppose lexicographers got the information to write the
definitions in their dictionary?

So forget definitions, just compute 2+2 without using physics and I will
concede defeat and nominate you for a Nobel Prize.

>>The trouble with arithmetic is it doesn't change.
>
>
> *>Nor do a block universe;*
>

And that is exactly why consciousness can not directly perceive the block
universe and in fact until a century ago nobody was conscious of the idea,
and even today nobody knows if it's a correct view of reality. At best it's
just an approximation, and it can't even approximate what's going on at the
center of a Black Hole or at the instant of the Big Bang.

>*Just ask the copies, they know well what they are living.*
>

And I predicted that would happen long before the experiment started.

> *Wat I request is that you tell me what the H-guy can expect to live*
>

And what I request of you is far far easier than a prediction, all I want
you to do is go somewhere look around and tell me what you see. Just answer
the following question: "After the experiment is completed and the 1 H-guy
became 2 H-guys what 1 and only 1 city did the H-guy end up in?". If you
can't answer that then it was not a experiment and it was not even a
question, it was just a series of words with a question mark at the end.


> > *You have already said that the H-guy survives* [...]
>

I can make all sorts of statements about the H-guy because I know exactly
what I mean by "the H-guy", but you have no idea what you mean by "the
H-guy".


> >> I predicted the guy who saw Moscow would become the Moscow guy and the
>> guy who saw Washington would become the Washington guy,
>
>
> >*Sure, but that is tautological. *
>

Exactly! Seeing Moscow is the one and only reason the Helsinki man became
the Moscow man. So why did I see Moscow? Because I'm the Moscow man. Why am
I the Moscow man? Because I saw Moscow. That may not be deep but like all
tautologies it's true, and I remind you it's your thought "experiment" not
mine.


> >The prediction is on which guy you can expect to be,
>

Which guy who can expect to be? Bruno is unable to say what the ASCII
sequence y-o-u means in the above sentence and that's why Bruno is so fond
of personal pronouns, when people duplicating machines are involved they
help cover up the gaping holes in logic.

 > *from the 1p, after pushing the button, with will 

Re: The codical-material universe

[John Clark]

On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 12:12 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:


> > *the uncertainty of the Helsinki man before the duplication doesn't
> have anything to do with being duplicated.  It only has to do with his lack
> of knowledge in where he will find himself in the future.  He would have
> the same uncertainty if he were anesthetized and flown to either Washington
> or Moscow.*
>

In the case where there is no duplication the question "What one and only
one city will you be at when the anesthesia wears off?" would be a
perfectly reasonable question because, unlike the case with the
duplication, the meaning of the personal pronoun "you" would be obvious.

 John K Clark

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Sep 2018, at 06:08, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/18/2018 9:17 AM, John Clark wrote:
>> It was Washington for he Helsinki guy reconstitute in Washington, and he 
>> admit he could not have predict this in Helsinki. The same for the Moscow 
>> guy.
>> 
>> Well maybe that's true, maybe the Helsinki man was unable to predict that, 
>> but then the Helsinki man is a idiot. I am not a idiot so I could have 
>> predicted it. Not that prediction has anything to do with the sense of self.
> 
> I agree that it doesn't have anything to do with sense of self, except that 
> includes knowing where one is.  But the uncertainty of the Helsinki man 
> before the duplication doesn't have anything to do with being duplicated.  It 
> only has to do with his lack of knowledge in where he will find himself in 
> the future.  He would have the same uncertainty if he were anesthetized and 
> flown to either Washington or Moscow.

Exactly. That is the First Person uncertainty. In this protocol of course, it 
*has to* do with duplication, given that his lack of knowledge is due, in this 
case to the duplication. Then you show correctly that it is equivalent with 
Being anesthetized and flown to either Washington or Moscow. 

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Sep 2018, at 18:17, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 2:00 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>  
> 
> >>Changes in what? You say electrons, atoms, photons, neutrinos, 
> >>gravitational waves, time, space and even spacetime are all matter, so the 
> >>change can't be with respect to any of them; so what's changing and with 
> >>respect to what? 
>  
> The state of a Turing machine with respect to the universal number which 
> implements it,
> 
> The state of a Turing machine is matched to a number and always has and 
> always will be matched that very same number forever. Nothing changes.


You can say the same for your state here and now. But consciousness is not 
supported by the state, but by the sequence of states, or more exactly, the 
logical relation brought by a universal machine relating those states. Your 
critics invalidate any block-view of reality. Are you, like Prigogine, assuming 
a fundamental time?



>  
> > equivalently, a computation can be defined by [...]
> 
> Definitions are a dime a dozen. I don't want you to define a computation made 
> without matter, I want you to perform a calculation without matter. 

I don’t need to perform them, but we need a correct definition so that you can 
grasp that all computations are done in arithmetic, in the block-manner. Time 
is an internal indexical, and matter arise from the relative statistics on all 
computations.






> 
> > I define a universal machinery by [blah blah]
> 
> Definitions are a bore . SHOW ME! 

That is just ridiculous. Without agreeing on what is a computation, This 
discussion can hardly no sense.

You show that your goal is mockery, and not understanding. 






> 
> >> how can you make a calculation without changing something?
> 
> >Are you assuming time to be fundamental? In GR,
> 
> GR assumes Spacetime is fundamental. 
>  
> >there is a notion of block universe, where time can be defined indexically.
> 
> Yes, the block universe is a 4D non-Euclidean shape, so every spot on the 
> time axis corresponds to a 3D shape and every 3D shape corresponds to a spot 
> on the time axis, so without time and space, which is physical, the block 
> universe would not exist.   
> 
> > >yet you agree that "even qualia is matter”.
> 
> >It is intelligible matter.
> 
> I don't think qualia is matter, I think qualia is what matter does. 
> 
> >>note that the brain is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.
> 
> >Yes, no problem with this. But that does not make the matter of our brain 
> >fundamental,
> 
> Fundamental or not a brain needs computation, and computation needs change, 
> and change needs matter.


Human computation? Yes. But as I say, that does not make matter fundamental. 
Which was the point.





> The trouble with arithmetic is it doesn't change.

Nor do a block universe;




> 
>  > If matter is primary then obviously I can't say what its made of,
> 
> >That was not asked. The question is why do you assume this for saying that 
> >material brain can have consciousness but the immaterial one in arithmetic 
> >can’t.
> 
> Because consciousness can change with time and in fact if it doesn't then 
> consciousness stops. Matter can change with time too but arithmetic can’t.


Nor do a block universe.


> 
> > You cannot invoke a God, nor any metaphysical ontological assumption, to 
> > select a computation in arithmetic
> 
> Bruno, if you want to convince me you're unlikely to do it with yet another 
> reference to God,


You were the one invoking your god.



> if you really want to do that find some dusty old ancient Greek that agrees 
> with you. Now that would do the trick! 
>  
> >Then tell me what the Helsinki guy can expect.
> 
> By "Helsinki guy" I mean anyone who remembers being the Helsinki guy, but 
> nobody INCLUDING YOU knows what you mean by "the Helsinki guy", all I know is 
> you demand the name of one and only one city even though "the Helsinki guy" 
> duplicating machines are involved.


You agreed that P(x) = 1 for the Helsinki guy if x is realised in both place. 
Cf the coffee offered to both copies.
The Helsinki guy know that he will be duplicated, and that both copies will be 
in once place. So P(x) = 1 with x = “being in once place”.






> Therefore I am unable to do what you request because I don't understand what 
> the hell you're requesting. 

Just ask the copies, they know well what they are living.

It strikes the eyes even more if you iterate the experience. 

Wat I request is that you tell me what the H-guy can expect to live as 
experience (not where his soul and bodies are from the third person 
perspective. 

You have already said that the H-guy survives, and we know that from the 1p 
view, it can only be in one place (for both copies). So, we understand that its 
diary cannot contain an exact prediction, unless it contains some (non 
constructive) “or”.






>   
> 
> >>There is no there there. If you could specify who exactly what "the 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/18/2018 9:17 AM, John Clark wrote:


/It was Washington for he Helsinki guy reconstitute in Washington,
and he admit he could not have predict this in Helsinki.The same
for the Moscow guy./


Well maybe that's true, maybe the Helsinki man was unable to predict 
that, but then the Helsinki man is a idiot. I am not a idiot so I 
could have predicted it. Not that prediction has anything to do with 
the sense of self.


I agree that it doesn't have anything to do with sense of self, except 
that includes knowing where one is.  But the uncertainty of the Helsinki 
man before the duplication doesn't have anything to do with being 
duplicated.  It only has to do with his lack of knowledge in where he 
will find himself in the future.  He would have the same uncertainty if 
he were anesthetized and flown to either Washington or Moscow.


Brent

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Chris J]

Hi all—I've been lurking for awhile and this isn't my primary field, but I 
work in digital humanities and literary studies, and I've been working on 
conceptualizing the connections between coding, 
mathematics/philosophy/logic, and literature.

I'm not convinced one way or the other yet about materialist/idealist 
ontologies, but does someone here have a sense of the role of 
symbols/letters in the equation? For example, any "code" or "math" that we 
say is computable is notated as:
2 + 2 = 4
  
print("hello world!")

...but regardless if this is "immaterial" or "material", we still say use 
letters/symbols/glyphs to represent them. Moreover, the actual notation is 
arbitrary, but for our purposes, it's not clear if humans could compute 
anything without this kind of notation-based logic.

Interestingly, letters are scalable, but they also can be homoglyphs 
—symbols that look like each other 
but aren't necessarily so. In many fonts the Greek letter 'Α', the Cyrillic 
letter 'А' and the Latin letter 'A' are visually identical, as are the 
Latin letter 'a' and the Cyrillic letter 'а', 

Using homoglyphs, we can create a trick by which 1 = 0:

     
   00   00
   00   00  
   00   00  
     ===   00   00 
   00   00  
     ===   00   00
   00   00  
   00   00  
   00   00 
     


Before you dismiss this as totally trivial, let us remember that even 
"standard" letter notation is basically the same, where "1" and "0" are 
both merely made up of the same kinds of subatomic particles and energy. 
Moreover, we might imagine a "letter" that is composed of a computable 
function in the form of a string, and if we create a different "letter" 
with the same computable string, then they would be isomorphic functions 
that are embedded in different symbols.

I have more to say, but I'm really curious if anyone here has particular 
insight into this. Thanks!



On Tuesday, September 18, 2018 at 12:18:07 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 2:00 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>  
>
> >>Changes in what? You say electrons, atoms, photons, neutrinos, 
>>> gravitational waves, time, space and even spacetime are all matter, so the 
>>> change can't be with respect to any of them; so what's changing and with 
>>> respect to what? 
>>
>>  
>
> *The state of a Turing machine with respect to the universal number which 
>> implements it,*
>>
>
> The state of a Turing machine is matched to a number and always has and 
> always will be matched that very same number forever. Nothing changes.
>  
>
>> > *equivalently, a computation can be defined by [...]*
>>
>
> Definitions are a dime a dozen. I don't want you to define a computation 
> made without matter, I want you to perform a calculation without matter. 
>
> > *I define a universal machinery by* [blah blah]
>>
>
> Definitions are a bore . SHOW ME! 
>
> >> how can you make a calculation without changing something?
>>
>>
>> *>Are you assuming time to be fundamental? In GR,*
>>
>
> GR assumes Spacetime is fundamental. 
>  
>
>> *>there is a notion of block universe, where time can be defined 
>> indexically.*
>>
>
> Yes, the block universe is a 4D non-Euclidean shape, so every spot on the 
> time axis corresponds to a 3D shape and every 3D shape corresponds to a 
> spot on the time axis, so without time and space, which is physical, the 
> block universe would not exist.   
>
> > >yet you agree that "even qualia is matter”.
>>
>>
>> >*It is intelligible matter.*
>>
>
> I don't think qualia is matter, I think qualia is what matter does. 
>
> >>note that the brain is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.
>>
>>
>> >*Yes, no problem with this. But that does not make the matter of our 
>> brain fundamental,*
>>
>
> Fundamental or not a brain needs computation, and computation needs 
> change, and change needs matter. The trouble with arithmetic is it doesn't 
> change.
>
>  > If matter is primary then obviously I can't say what its made of,
>>
>>
>> *>That was not asked. The question is why do you assume this for saying 
>> that material brain can have consciousness but the immaterial one in 
>> arithmetic can’t.*
>>
>
> Because consciousness can change with time and in fact if it doesn't then 
> consciousness stops. Matter can change with time too but arithmetic can't.
>
> *> You cannot invoke a God, nor any metaphysical ontological assumption, 
>> to select a computation in arithmetic*
>>
>
> Bruno, if you want to convince me you're unlikely to do it with yet 
> another reference to God, if you really want to do that find some dusty old 
> ancient Greek that agrees with you. Now that would do the trick! 
>  
>
>> >*Then tell me what the Helsinki guy can expect.*
>>
>
> By "Helsinki guy" I mean anyone who remembers being 

Re: The codical-material universe

[John Clark]

On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 2:00 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:


>>Changes in what? You say electrons, atoms, photons, neutrinos,
>> gravitational waves, time, space and even spacetime are all matter, so the
>> change can't be with respect to any of them; so what's changing and with
>> respect to what?
>
>

*The state of a Turing machine with respect to the universal number which
> implements it,*
>

The state of a Turing machine is matched to a number and always has and
always will be matched that very same number forever. Nothing changes.


> > *equivalently, a computation can be defined by [...]*
>

Definitions are a dime a dozen. I don't want you to define a computation
made without matter, I want you to perform a calculation without matter.

> *I define a universal machinery by* [blah blah]
>

Definitions are a bore . SHOW ME!

>> how can you make a calculation without changing something?
>
>
> *>Are you assuming time to be fundamental? In GR,*
>

GR assumes Spacetime is fundamental.


> *>there is a notion of block universe, where time can be defined
> indexically.*
>

Yes, the block universe is a 4D non-Euclidean shape, so every spot on the
time axis corresponds to a 3D shape and every 3D shape corresponds to a
spot on the time axis, so without time and space, which is physical, the
block universe would not exist.

> >yet you agree that "even qualia is matter”.
>
>
> >*It is intelligible matter.*
>

I don't think qualia is matter, I think qualia is what matter does.

>>note that the brain is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.
>
>
> >*Yes, no problem with this. But that does not make the matter of our
> brain fundamental,*
>

Fundamental or not a brain needs computation, and computation needs change,
and change needs matter. The trouble with arithmetic is it doesn't change.

 > If matter is primary then obviously I can't say what its made of,
>
>
> *>That was not asked. The question is why do you assume this for saying
> that material brain can have consciousness but the immaterial one in
> arithmetic can’t.*
>

Because consciousness can change with time and in fact if it doesn't then
consciousness stops. Matter can change with time too but arithmetic can't.

*> You cannot invoke a God, nor any metaphysical ontological assumption, to
> select a computation in arithmetic*
>

Bruno, if you want to convince me you're unlikely to do it with yet another
reference to God, if you really want to do that find some dusty old ancient
Greek that agrees with you. Now that would do the trick!


> >*Then tell me what the Helsinki guy can expect.*
>

By "Helsinki guy" I mean anyone who remembers being the Helsinki guy, but
nobody INCLUDING YOU knows what you mean by "the Helsinki guy", all I know
is you demand the name of one and only one city even though "the Helsinki
guy" duplicating machines are involved. Therefore I am unable to do what
you request because I don't understand what the hell you're requesting.

>>There is no there there. If you could specify who exactly what "the first
>> person" is in a world that contains "the first person" duplicating machines
>> I might perhaps be able to tell you what I think about it, but until then
>> the idea is far worse than just being wrong, it is gibberish.
>
>
> >*You are the only person I know who does not understand this.*
>

Then with the exception of me everybody you know is a uncritical thinker.
Understanding gibberish is not a virtue.

> *I remind you that you have agreed that the Helsinki guy does not die in
> that process,*
>

That's because I know what I mean by "the Helsinki guy" so I can figure out
if he dies or not, but if there is a God even He doesn't know what you mean
by the term.

>>I predict that before the doors open there will only be one conscious
>> mind regardless of how many brains have been duplicated. And I predict the
>> moment the doors are opened revealing 2 different things there will be 2
>> conscious minds. And I predict the mind that observes Moscow will become
>> the Moscow Man.  And I predict the mind that observes Washington will
>> become the Washington Man. And there is nothing more to predict.
>
>
> >*That is a description of the protocol which remain true for everyone,
> notably both copies. But each copies will realised that they were unable to
> predict that very city they see now,*
>

What are you talking about? I predicted the guy who saw Moscow would become
the Moscow guy and the guy who saw Washington would become the Washington
guy, and that is exactly precisely what happened. And don't complain that's
a tautology, it's your thought experiment and your question not mine.  It's
not my fault you asked a stupid question.


> >*and both identify themselves with the Helsinki guy,*
>

And that also was 100% predictable.


> > *and understand now (hopefully) what the question was about.*
>

I didn't understand the question before I was duplicated and being
duplicated will not bring enlightenment to either of us.

>>I will 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Sep 2018, at 02:17, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/17/2018 2:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 16 Sep 2018, at 22:31, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 9/16/2018 11:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 No problem. I can explain why you will need a non computationalist theory 
 of mind.
 
 Given that there is no evidence at all for primary matter, nor for a non 
 computationalist theory of mind, that seems very speculative to me.
 
 I am aware that many materialist use (explicitly or implicitly) a 
 mechanist theory of mind, but I can explain why materialism (or 
 physicalism) is (are) incompatible with Indexical Digital Mechanism. (The 
 doctrine that the brain function is Turing emulable at *some* level of 
 description).
>>> But it seems to me that a subconscious is incompatible with your theory of 
>>> mind.
>> By definition of computationalism, if there is a subconscious related to the 
>> brain, it will “survive” in the digital emulation of the brain.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>>   So far as I can see you only propose to explain conscious thought as 
>>> computation, i.e. some computations instantiate conscious thoughts and some 
>>> don't.
>> Yes, but the theory use the fact that computability is an absolute notion, 
>> and that provability, consistency, definability,  are  relative notion.
>> 
>> In the five hypostases: everything comes from the nuance imposed on []p 
>> (that is []p & p, etc.)
>> 
>> Consciousness is defined by true, non provable, non dubitable, immediately 
>> knowable, and non definable. All universal machine are confronted with this.
>> Identify a person with its set of beliefs, and I study ideally correct 
>> machine (on arithmetic and on themselves).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> But it appears that many, if not most, of our thinking is subconscious.  
>>> Where in your theory is this distinction encoded?
>> By the fact that no machine knows which machine she is, nor which number 
>> relation she is. Consciousness is only the part which is true, immediately 
>> knowable, non definable, etc.
>> 
>> The closer to consciousness, but still 3p, is “consistency”. But 
>> consciousness is even closer to the lodange of the “[]p & p” mode, that is 
>> <>p v p, or even better <>p v true(p). The or can be shown non constructive, 
>> and the true(p) is not definable, by Tarski, making consciousness (like 
>> knowledge) not definable.
>> 
>> “Subconscious” can be defined by sleeping subroutine, of by secondary 
>> activity on which attention is not focused.
> 
> Which I think is the crux of the question.  What is attention and how is it 
> implemented in your theory?


“My theory” is only that it is implemented. How? We don’t need to know this to 
derive physics and test the theory. 
The" how” is a problem in IA. It is interesting, but not relevant for shaping 
the metaphysics with Mechanism.




>   It seems that humans do most of their thinking subconsciously.

If you put the firing of the neurons in the subconscious, that becomes trivial. 
There are not much things that a brain can understand about its own 
functioning. We can only bet on some level of substitution. No need to 
understand a brain for copying it.




>   If physics is emulated in computationalism, then subconscious thinking 
> would be realized in the physics, but not in the consciouness.  Right?

Disambiguing this in a favorable interpretation, I would say yes. Anything a 
brain does, if relevant for consciousness, will be done in an apparent physical 
reality. But of course there is only numbers/combinators, and the physical 
reality becomes. A fist person plural reality, where the “duplication” are 
contagious to anything an observer can interact with, a bit like in Everett.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
>> If you have a better definition, a more freudian one, if correct, the 
>> digital copy will obey to it, unless computationalism is false.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
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Re: The codical-material universe

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/17/2018 2:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Sep 2018, at 22:31, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 9/16/2018 11:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

No problem. I can explain why you will need a non computationalist theory of 
mind.

Given that there is no evidence at all for primary matter, nor for a non 
computationalist theory of mind, that seems very speculative to me.

I am aware that many materialist use (explicitly or implicitly) a mechanist 
theory of mind, but I can explain why materialism (or physicalism) is (are) 
incompatible with Indexical Digital Mechanism. (The doctrine that the brain 
function is Turing emulable at *some* level of description).

But it seems to me that a subconscious is incompatible with your theory of mind.

By definition of computationalism, if there is a subconscious related to the 
brain, it will “survive” in the digital emulation of the brain.





   So far as I can see you only propose to explain conscious thought as 
computation, i.e. some computations instantiate conscious thoughts and some 
don't.

Yes, but the theory use the fact that computability is an absolute notion, and 
that provability, consistency, definability,  are  relative notion.

In the five hypostases: everything comes from the nuance imposed on []p (that is 
[]p & p, etc.)

Consciousness is defined by true, non provable, non dubitable, immediately 
knowable, and non definable. All universal machine are confronted with this.
Identify a person with its set of beliefs, and I study ideally correct machine 
(on arithmetic and on themselves).





But it appears that many, if not most, of our thinking is subconscious.  Where 
in your theory is this distinction encoded?

By the fact that no machine knows which machine she is, nor which number 
relation she is. Consciousness is only the part which is true, immediately 
knowable, non definable, etc.

The closer to consciousness, but still 3p, is “consistency”. But consciousness is even closer 
to the lodange of the “[]p & p” mode, that is <>p v p, or even better <>p v 
true(p). The or can be shown non constructive, and the true(p) is not definable, by Tarski, 
making consciousness (like knowledge) not definable.

“Subconscious” can be defined by sleeping subroutine, of by secondary activity 
on which attention is not focused.


Which I think is the crux of the question.  What is attention and how is 
it implemented in your theory?  It seems that humans do most of their 
thinking subconsciously.  If physics is emulated in computationalism, 
then subconscious thinking would be realized in the physics, but not in 
the consciouness.  Right?


Brent


If you have a better definition, a more freudian one, if correct, the digital 
copy will obey to it, unless computationalism is false.

Bruno





Brent

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Sep 2018, at 22:31, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/16/2018 11:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> No problem. I can explain why you will need a non computationalist theory of 
>> mind.
>> 
>> Given that there is no evidence at all for primary matter, nor for a non 
>> computationalist theory of mind, that seems very speculative to me.
>> 
>> I am aware that many materialist use (explicitly or implicitly) a mechanist 
>> theory of mind, but I can explain why materialism (or physicalism) is (are) 
>> incompatible with Indexical Digital Mechanism. (The doctrine that the brain 
>> function is Turing emulable at *some* level of description).
> 
> But it seems to me that a subconscious is incompatible with your theory of 
> mind.

By definition of computationalism, if there is a subconscious related to the 
brain, it will “survive” in the digital emulation of the brain.




>   So far as I can see you only propose to explain conscious thought as 
> computation, i.e. some computations instantiate conscious thoughts and some 
> don't. 

Yes, but the theory use the fact that computability is an absolute notion, and 
that provability, consistency, definability,  are  relative notion. 

In the five hypostases: everything comes from the nuance imposed on []p (that 
is []p & p, etc.)

Consciousness is defined by true, non provable, non dubitable, immediately 
knowable, and non definable. All universal machine are confronted with this. 
Identify a person with its set of beliefs, and I study ideally correct machine 
(on arithmetic and on themselves).




> But it appears that many, if not most, of our thinking is subconscious.  
> Where in your theory is this distinction encoded?

By the fact that no machine knows which machine she is, nor which number 
relation she is. Consciousness is only the part which is true, immediately 
knowable, non definable, etc.

The closer to consciousness, but still 3p, is “consistency”. But consciousness 
is even closer to the lodange of the “[]p & p” mode, that is <>p v p, or even 
better <>p v true(p). The or can be shown non constructive, and the true(p) is 
not definable, by Tarski, making consciousness (like knowledge) not definable.

“Subconscious” can be defined by sleeping subroutine, of by secondary activity 
on which attention is not focused. If you have a better definition, a more 
freudian one, if correct, the digital copy will obey to it, unless 
computationalism is false.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
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Re: The codical-material universe

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/16/2018 11:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. I can explain why you will need a non computationalist 
theory of mind.


Given that there is no evidence at all for primary matter, nor for a 
non computationalist theory of mind, that seems very speculative to me.


I am aware that many materialist use (explicitly or implicitly) a 
mechanist theory of mind, but I can explain why materialism (or 
physicalism) is (are) incompatible with Indexical Digital Mechanism. 
(The doctrine that the brain function is Turing emulable at *some* 
level of description).


But it seems to me that a subconscious is incompatible with your theory 
of mind.  So far as I can see you only propose to explain conscious 
thought as computation, i.e. some computations instantiate conscious 
thoughts and some don't.  But it appears that many, if not most, of our 
thinking is subconscious.  Where in your theory is this distinction encoded?


Brent

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, September 16, 2018 at 1:07:34 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 Sep 2018, at 22:56, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, September 15, 2018 at 10:27:07 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 12:22 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>  
>>
>>> >>> you claim nonphysical calculations can be performed, but you also 
 say space and time and even spacetime are physical, so how can you have 
 change without them and how can you have calculations without change?
>>>
>>>  
>>
>> >> *The changes are digital, discrete.*
>>>
>>  
>> Changes in what? You say electrons, atoms, photons, neutrinos, 
>> gravitational waves, time, space and even spacetime are all matter, so the 
>> change can't be with respect to any of them; so what's changing and with 
>> respect to what?  And how can you make a calculation without changing 
>> something?
>>
>> >>Electromagnetic waves of 650 nanometers is physical , the color red is 
 a qualia and can be produced without Electromagnetic waves of any sort.
>>>
>>>  
>>
>> >*One reason more to understand that the qualia can raise just with any 
>>> number relations mimicking the relevant brain parts relation in 
>>> arithmetic. *
>>>
>>
>> And yet you agree that "even qualia is matter". And please note that in 
>> a MRI scanner similar parts of the brain light up when one sees a red 
>> lights and when one just thinks about a red light. And also note that the 
>> brain is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.
>>  
>>
>>> *>If some primary matter is at play for consciousness, can you explain 
>>> what role it has, and what it is?*
>>
>>
>> If matter is primary then obviously I can't say what its made of, if I 
>> could it wouldn't be primary. And if it's primary then it's needed to 
>> perform calculations.  And after saying consciousness is the way that data 
>> feels when it is being processed there is simply nothing more that can be 
>> said about consciousness. 
>>
>> >>the blueprints for a 747 airliner can fly me to London. 
>>>
>>>
>>> *>The analogy does not work. A machine is more than a blueprint.*
>>>
>>
>> A machine needs 2 things, data and matter. The blueprints supply the data 
>> but I can't fly to London on half a machine.
>>
>> >*But the step 3 can be done with robots instead of human, and if you 
>>> disbelieve in first person indeterminacy,*
>>>
>>
>> I don't believe in "first person indeterminacy" and I don't 
>> disbelieve in it either because there is nothing in it to believe or 
>> disbelieve. There is no there there. If you could specify who exactly what 
>> "the first person" is in a world that contains "the first person" 
>> duplicating machines I might perhaps be able to tell you what I think about 
>> it, but until then the idea is far worse than just being wrong, it is 
>> gibberish.   
>>  
>>
>>> > tell me how you program the robot so that he []
>>>
>>
>> As always in your thought "experiments" the gibberish kicks in 
>> immediately. Right at the start you postulate a world that contains both "
>> *THE*" and "*HE*" duplicating machines so your reference to "*the*" 
>> robot and "*he*" no longer refers to anything unique.  
>>  
>>
>>> >  i*s able to predict the results of opening the door after pushing on 
>>> the button.*
>>>
>>  
>> Well I predict that before the doors open there will only be one 
>> conscious mind regardless of how many brains have been duplicated. And I 
>> predict the moment the doors are opened revealing 2 different things there 
>> will be 2 conscious minds. And I predict the mind that observes Moscow will 
>> become the Moscow Man.  And I predict the mind that observes Washington 
>> will become the Washington Man. And there is nothing more to predict.   
>>  
>>
>>> *> The robot survive, by computationalism (or even without in this 
>>> case), and the robot can predict with certainty that he will not write in 
>>> his personal diary that he is seeing both city at once,*
>>
>>
>> No, that is incorrect, "*THE* robot" can't predict that and neither can 
>> anybody else because you haven't specified what or who the prediction is 
>> supposed to be about.
>>
>> > So, if you have an algorithm just show it to us.
>>>
>>
>> I will show you such a algorithm as soon as you show me a algorithm to 
>> determine what one and only one thing will happen to 1 banana after 1 
>> banana becomes 2 bananas. But even then you'd have no way of knowing if my 
>> prediction turned out to be correct or not because even after the 
>> "exparament" is long over you *STILL* couldn't say if the correct 
>> prediction turned out to be Moscow or Washington. And that my dear Bruno is 
>> why this isn't a exparament at all and it's not even a thought exparament, 
>> it is just a showcase displaying your massive confusion and the difficulty 
>> you have in handling philosophical matters.   
>>  
>>
>>> *>The question makes sense, as you have agreed that we survive such an 
>>> experience,*
>>
>>
>> I have 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 Sep 2018, at 22:56, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, September 15, 2018 at 10:27:07 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 12:22 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>  
> >>> you claim nonphysical calculations can be performed, but you also say 
> >>> space and time and even spacetime are physical, so how can you have 
> >>> change without them and how can you have calculations without change?
>  
> >> The changes are digital, discrete.
>  
> Changes in what? You say electrons, atoms, photons, neutrinos, gravitational 
> waves, time, space and even spacetime are all matter, so the change can't be 
> with respect to any of them; so what's changing and with respect to what?  
> And how can you make a calculation without changing something?
> 
> >>Electromagnetic waves of 650 nanometers is physical , the color red is a 
> >>qualia and can be produced without Electromagnetic waves of any sort.
>  
> >One reason more to understand that the qualia can raise just with any number 
> >relations mimicking the relevant brain parts relation in arithmetic. 
> 
> And yet you agree that "even qualia is matter". And please note that in a MRI 
> scanner similar parts of the brain light up when one sees a red lights and 
> when one just thinks about a red light. And also note that the brain is made 
> of matter that obeys the laws of physics.
>  
> >If some primary matter is at play for consciousness, can you explain what 
> >role it has, and what it is?
> 
> If matter is primary then obviously I can't say what its made of, if I could 
> it wouldn't be primary. And if it's primary then it's needed to perform 
> calculations.  And after saying consciousness is the way that data feels when 
> it is being processed there is simply nothing more that can be said about 
> consciousness. 
> 
> >>the blueprints for a 747 airliner can fly me to London.
> 
> >The analogy does not work. A machine is more than a blueprint.
> 
> A machine needs 2 things, data and matter. The blueprints supply the data but 
> I can't fly to London on half a machine.
> 
> >But the step 3 can be done with robots instead of human, and if you 
> >disbelieve in first person indeterminacy,
> 
> I don't believe in "first person indeterminacy" and I don't disbelieve in it 
> either because there is nothing in it to believe or disbelieve. There is no 
> there there. If you could specify who exactly what "the first person" is in a 
> world that contains "the first person" duplicating machines I might perhaps 
> be able to tell you what I think about it, but until then the idea is far 
> worse than just being wrong, it is gibberish.   
>  
> > tell me how you program the robot so that he []
> 
> As always in your thought "experiments" the gibberish kicks in immediately. 
> Right at the start you postulate a world that contains both "THE" and "HE" 
> duplicating machines so your reference to "the" robot and "he" no longer 
> refers to anything unique.  
>  
> >  is able to predict the results of opening the door after pushing on the 
> > button.
>  
> Well I predict that before the doors open there will only be one conscious 
> mind regardless of how many brains have been duplicated.  And I predict the 
> moment the doors are opened revealing 2 different things there will be 2 
> conscious minds. And I predict the mind that observes Moscow will become the 
> Moscow Man.  And I predict the mind that observes Washington will become the 
> Washington Man. And there is nothing more to predict.   
>  
> > The robot survive, by computationalism (or even without in this case), and 
> > the robot can predict with certainty that he will not write in his personal 
> > diary that he is seeing both city at once,
> 
> No, that is incorrect, "THE robot" can't predict that and neither can anybody 
> else because you haven't specified what or who the prediction is supposed to 
> be about.
> 
> > So, if you have an algorithm just show it to us.
> 
> I will show you such a algorithm as soon as you show me a algorithm to 
> determine what one and only one thing will happen to 1 banana after 1 banana 
> becomes 2 bananas. But even then you'd have no way of knowing if my 
> prediction turned out to be correct or not because even after the 
> "exparament" is long over you STILL couldn't say if the correct prediction 
> turned out to be Moscow or Washington. And that my dear Bruno is why this 
> isn't a exparament at all and it's not even a thought exparament, it is just 
> a showcase displaying your massive confusion and the difficulty you have in 
> handling philosophical matters.   
>  
> >The question makes sense, as you have agreed that we survive such an 
> >experience,
> 
> I have agreed that if survival today means being able to remember being the 
> Helsinki Man yesterday and somebody remembers today then the Helsinki Man has 
> survived today. And obviously if that's what the word means and if we have 
> Helsinki Man duplicating machines then the 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 Sep 2018, at 17:26, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 12:22 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>  
> >>> you claim nonphysical calculations can be performed, but you also say 
> >>> space and time and even spacetime are physical, so how can you have 
> >>> change without them and how can you have calculations without change?
>  
> >> The changes are digital, discrete.
>  
> Changes in what? You say electrons, atoms, photons, neutrinos, gravitational 
> waves, time, space and even spacetime are all matter, so the change can't be 
> with respect to any of them; so what's changing and with respect to what? 


The state of a Turing machine with respect to the universal number which 
implements it, in arithmetic to fx the things.

Or equivalently, a computation can be defined by a sequence of reduction, i.e. 
an application of the two laws of combinator reduction. Again with respect to 
the universal number which implements it.

I define a universal machinery by what Rogers called “an acceptable 
enumeration”. That is a (recursively enumerable) sequence of the partial 
computable functions phi_i such that 

1) it exist a u such that phi_u() = phi_x(y)
2) it exist  computable function S such that for all i: phi_i() = 
phi_S(i,x) (y). (Curryfication on the phi_i, this is offered for free with the 
combinators).

Note that Kleene, using his famous “Kleene’s predicate” make clear how 
statement about the phi_i can be translated in purely arithmetical sense.



> And how can you make a calculation without changing something?


Are you assuming time to be fundamental? In GR, there is a notion of block 
universe, where time can be defined indexically. The same for the multi-dreams 
or multi-histories canonical interpretation by universal number in arithmetic 
occur. Computations needs a clock of some sort, and it is provided by the 
number of steps of the relative computation.

I say that x emulate y on z when phi_x(y, z) = phi_y(z).

Then we can associate to each computation of phi_i(j) a notion of number of 
step, made by i, or made by the universal u emulating i. 

At no moment we need to assume anything,ng more than some induction axioms, and 
the usual axioms I have given. More details in the combinator threads, or in 
the phi_i (Church’s thesis) thread.





> 
> >>Electromagnetic waves of 650 nanometers is physical , the color red is a 
> >>qualia and can be produced without Electromagnetic waves of any sort.
>  
> >One reason more to understand that the qualia can raise just with any number 
> >relations mimicking the relevant brain parts relation in arithmetic. 
> 
> And yet you agree that "even qualia is matter”.


It is intelligible matter. It is eventually defined by the logic of []p & <>t & 
p, with p a sigma_1 arithmetiical proposition, and this at the level of G*. The 
qualia are defined in (second order) arithmetic by qZ1*. See my papers for all 
details, or ask any question. 




> And please note that in a MRI scanner similar parts of the brain light up 
> when one sees a red lights and when one just thinks about a red light.


Yes, that is an argument in favour of Mechanism. 




> And also note that the brain is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.

Yes, no problem with this. But that does not make the matter of our brain 
fundamental, nor do that entail the identity thesis between the brain and 
consciousness, as the thought experiences illustrates and the math proves 
(assuming Mechanism of course).




>  
> >If some primary matter is at play for consciousness, can you explain what 
> >role it has, and what it is?
> 
> If matter is primary then obviously I can't say what its made of,

That was not asked. The question is why do you assume this for saying that 
material brain can have consciousness but the immaterial one in arithmetic 
can’t.




> if I could it wouldn't be primary. And if it's primary then it's needed to 
> perform calculations.  And after saying consciousness is the way that data 
> feels when it is being processed there is simply nothing more that can be 
> said about consciousness. 

But infinitely many data are processed relatively in arithmetic. That leads to 
the problem of justifying the stability of the appearances by a statistic on 
all computations. 

You cannot invoke a God, nor any metaphysical ontological assumption, to select 
a computation in arithmetic. Or you give a role to that matter, which is not 
Turing emulbale, nor representable in arithmetic (which is far rocher than the 
Turing emulable).




> 
> >>the blueprints for a 747 airliner can fly me to London.
> 
> >The analogy does not work. A machine is more than a blueprint.
> 
> A machine needs 2 things, data and matter.

That is plain wrong.




> The blueprints supply the data but I can't fly to London on half a machine.
> 
> >But the step 3 can be done with robots instead of human, and if you 
> >disbelieve in first person indeterminacy,
> 
> I don't 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, September 15, 2018 at 10:27:07 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 12:22 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>  
>
>> >>> you claim nonphysical calculations can be performed, but you also 
>>> say space and time and even spacetime are physical, so how can you have 
>>> change without them and how can you have calculations without change?
>>
>>  
>
> >> *The changes are digital, discrete.*
>>
>  
> Changes in what? You say electrons, atoms, photons, neutrinos, 
> gravitational waves, time, space and even spacetime are all matter, so the 
> change can't be with respect to any of them; so what's changing and with 
> respect to what?  And how can you make a calculation without changing 
> something?
>
> >>Electromagnetic waves of 650 nanometers is physical , the color red is 
>>> a qualia and can be produced without Electromagnetic waves of any sort.
>>
>>  
>
> >*One reason more to understand that the qualia can raise just with any 
>> number relations mimicking the relevant brain parts relation in 
>> arithmetic. *
>>
>
> And yet you agree that "even qualia is matter". And please note that in a 
> MRI scanner similar parts of the brain light up when one sees a red lights 
> and when one just thinks about a red light. And also note that the brain is 
> made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.
>  
>
>> *>If some primary matter is at play for consciousness, can you explain 
>> what role it has, and what it is?*
>
>
> If matter is primary then obviously I can't say what its made of, if I 
> could it wouldn't be primary. And if it's primary then it's needed to 
> perform calculations.  And after saying consciousness is the way that data 
> feels when it is being processed there is simply nothing more that can be 
> said about consciousness. 
>
> >>the blueprints for a 747 airliner can fly me to London. 
>>
>>
>> *>The analogy does not work. A machine is more than a blueprint.*
>>
>
> A machine needs 2 things, data and matter. The blueprints supply the data 
> but I can't fly to London on half a machine.
>
> >*But the step 3 can be done with robots instead of human, and if you 
>> disbelieve in first person indeterminacy,*
>>
>
> I don't believe in "first person indeterminacy" and I don't disbelieve in 
> it either because there is nothing in it to believe or disbelieve. There is 
> no there there. If you could specify who exactly what "the first person" is 
> in a world that contains "the first person" duplicating machines I might 
> perhaps be able to tell you what I think about it, but until then the idea 
> is far worse than just being wrong, it is gibberish.   
>  
>
>> > tell me how you program the robot so that he []
>>
>
> As always in your thought "experiments" the gibberish kicks in 
> immediately. Right at the start you postulate a world that contains both "
> *THE*" and "*HE*" duplicating machines so your reference to "*the*" robot 
> and "*he*" no longer refers to anything unique.  
>  
>
>> >  i*s able to predict the results of opening the door after pushing on 
>> the button.*
>>
>  
> Well I predict that before the doors open there will only be one conscious 
> mind regardless of how many brains have been duplicated. And I predict the 
> moment the doors are opened revealing 2 different things there will be 2 
> conscious minds. And I predict the mind that observes Moscow will become 
> the Moscow Man.  And I predict the mind that observes Washington will 
> become the Washington Man. And there is nothing more to predict.   
>  
>
>> *> The robot survive, by computationalism (or even without in this case), 
>> and the robot can predict with certainty that he will not write in his 
>> personal diary that he is seeing both city at once,*
>
>
> No, that is incorrect, "*THE* robot" can't predict that and neither can 
> anybody else because you haven't specified what or who the prediction is 
> supposed to be about.
>
> > So, if you have an algorithm just show it to us.
>>
>
> I will show you such a algorithm as soon as you show me a algorithm to 
> determine what one and only one thing will happen to 1 banana after 1 
> banana becomes 2 bananas. But even then you'd have no way of knowing if my 
> prediction turned out to be correct or not because even after the 
> "exparament" is long over you *STILL* couldn't say if the correct 
> prediction turned out to be Moscow or Washington. And that my dear Bruno is 
> why this isn't a exparament at all and it's not even a thought exparament, 
> it is just a showcase displaying your massive confusion and the difficulty 
> you have in handling philosophical matters.   
>  
>
>> *>The question makes sense, as you have agreed that we survive such an 
>> experience,*
>
>
> I have agreed that if survival today means being able to remember being 
> the Helsinki Man yesterday and somebody remembers today then the Helsinki 
> Man has survived today. And obviously if that's what the word means and if 
> we have Helsinki Man 

Re: The codical-material universe

[John Clark]

On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 12:22 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:


> >>> you claim nonphysical calculations can be performed, but you also say
>> space and time and even spacetime are physical, so how can you have change
>> without them and how can you have calculations without change?
>
>

>> *The changes are digital, discrete.*
>

Changes in what? You say electrons, atoms, photons, neutrinos,
gravitational waves, time, space and even spacetime are all matter, so the
change can't be with respect to any of them; so what's changing and with
respect to what?  And how can you make a calculation without changing
something?

>>Electromagnetic waves of 650 nanometers is physical , the color red is a
>> qualia and can be produced without Electromagnetic waves of any sort.
>
>

>*One reason more to understand that the qualia can raise just with any
> number relations mimicking the relevant brain parts relation in
> arithmetic. *
>

And yet you agree that "even qualia is matter". And please note that in a
MRI scanner similar parts of the brain light up when one sees a red lights
and when one just thinks about a red light. And also note that the brain is
made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.


> *>If some primary matter is at play for consciousness, can you explain
> what role it has, and what it is?*


If matter is primary then obviously I can't say what its made of, if I
could it wouldn't be primary. And if it's primary then it's needed to
perform calculations.  And after saying consciousness is the way that data
feels when it is being processed there is simply nothing more that can be
said about consciousness.

>>the blueprints for a 747 airliner can fly me to London.
>
>
> *>The analogy does not work. A machine is more than a blueprint.*
>

A machine needs 2 things, data and matter. The blueprints supply the data
but I can't fly to London on half a machine.

>*But the step 3 can be done with robots instead of human, and if you
> disbelieve in first person indeterminacy,*
>

I don't believe in "first person indeterminacy" and I don't disbelieve in
it either because there is nothing in it to believe or disbelieve. There is
no there there. If you could specify who exactly what "the first person" is
in a world that contains "the first person" duplicating machines I might
perhaps be able to tell you what I think about it, but until then the idea
is far worse than just being wrong, it is gibberish.


> > tell me how you program the robot so that he []
>

As always in your thought "experiments" the gibberish kicks in immediately.
Right at the start you postulate a world that contains both "*THE*" and "
*HE*" duplicating machines so your reference to "*the*" robot and "*he*" no
longer refers to anything unique.


> >  i*s able to predict the results of opening the door after pushing on
> the button.*
>

Well I predict that before the doors open there will only be one conscious
mind regardless of how many brains have been duplicated. And I predict the
moment the doors are opened revealing 2 different things there will be 2
conscious minds. And I predict the mind that observes Moscow will become
the Moscow Man.  And I predict the mind that observes Washington will
become the Washington Man. And there is nothing more to predict.


> *> The robot survive, by computationalism (or even without in this case),
> and the robot can predict with certainty that he will not write in his
> personal diary that he is seeing both city at once,*


No, that is incorrect, "*THE* robot" can't predict that and neither can
anybody else because you haven't specified what or who the prediction is
supposed to be about.

> So, if you have an algorithm just show it to us.
>

I will show you such a algorithm as soon as you show me a algorithm to
determine what one and only one thing will happen to 1 banana after 1
banana becomes 2 bananas. But even then you'd have no way of knowing if my
prediction turned out to be correct or not because even after the
"exparament" is long over you *STILL* couldn't say if the correct
prediction turned out to be Moscow or Washington. And that my dear Bruno is
why this isn't a exparament at all and it's not even a thought exparament,
it is just a showcase displaying your massive confusion and the difficulty
you have in handling philosophical matters.


> *>The question makes sense, as you have agreed that we survive such an
> experience,*


I have agreed that if survival today means being able to remember being the
Helsinki Man yesterday and somebody remembers today then the Helsinki Man
has survived today. And obviously if that's what the word means and if we
have Helsinki Man duplicating machines then the Helsinki Man will have more
than one path into the future. However I no longer know what you mean by
"survive" and I don't think you know either.


> *>and you agreed that any copies will not be directly aware of the other
> copies,*
>

Yes.

 >*they differentiate once the box is open.*
>

Yes

>  *So, there 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, September 14, 2018 at 11:22:34 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Sep 2018, at 16:09, John Clark > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> *>Still the same confusion between a computation (a purely mathematical 
>> notion) and a physical computation, *
>>
>
> I'm not confused at all, I'm very clear on the fact that a "purely 
> mathematical notion of computation" can't compute a damn thing
>
>
> A notion of computation does not compute. 
>
> A Turing machine or a number, or a combinator compute, with respect to 
> some universal number. That follows from the definition of Turing, Post, 
> Kleene, Davis, etc.
>
> You are not criticising me. You are criticising the whole field of 
> mathematical logic.
>
>
>
>
> anymore than the blueprints for a 747 airliner can fly me to London. 
>
>
> The analogy does not work. A machine is more than a blueprint. The 
> proposition phi_i(j) converge is a (sigma_1) proposition of arithmetic, and 
> it is true or false, independently of your or me.
>
>
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> John K Clark
>
>
 
I come back to that this sort of dispute is basically about what "school" 
of *philosophy of mathematics* does one come from.

(One may be from a school and not be aware of it, or don't see the need to 
state it; they sort of think everyone went there.)

A reference commonly cited: 
*Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics*
https://books.google.com/books/about/Platonism_and_Anti_Platonism_in_Mathemat.html?id=hbGhsAJIdEQC

An interesting reference worth checking out:
*The Meaning of Pure Mathematics*
Jan Mycielski
https://www.jstor.org/stable/30227216


If one is from a Platonist school, one is going to have a different spin on 
what mathematics actually is and does than one from one of the 
anti-Platonist schools.

So knowing what school someone is from indicates how they will view these 
issues.

 - pt

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 14 Sep 2018, at 16:09, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 4:28 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >>> Speed is a physical attribute. 
> 
> >>Then numbers are physical attributes too because 1 Hydrogen atom behaves 
> >>differently than 2 Hydrogen atoms.
>  
> >The number of atoms is physical, yes, but that does not mean that a number 
> >is physical per se.
> 
> Why not? You say speed is physical and speed modifies matter (2 electrons 
> that collide slowly behave differently than 2 electrons that collide swiftly) 
> and its exactly the same with numbers, they also modify matter (2 electrons 
> behave differently than 1 electron).
> 
> I also note that you claim nonphysical calculations can be performed, but you 
> also say space and time and even spacetime are physical, so how can you have 
> change without them and how can you have calculations without change?


The changes are digital, discrete. You can use the natural numbers to quantify 
them. No need to presuppose a physical universe.




>> 
>> Wow, even qualia is matter!
>>  
>> >>>Yes, 
>> 
>> >>So now qualia, the last remaining holdout, joins the ranks of "physical 
>> >>attributes" and the term loses the last shred of meaning it had.
>>  
>>  >Please quote the whole sentence. Qualia are physical sensatio
> Electromagnetic waves of 650 nanometers is physical , the color red is a 
> qualia and can be produced without Electromagnetic waves of any sort.

One reason more to understand that the qualia can raise just with any number 
relations mimicking the relevant brain parts relation in arithmetic. 



>  
> >The greeks...
> 
> were ignoramuses that only the foolish believe can cast any light on 
> modern cutting edge scientific questions.
>  
> >In your Aristotelian metaphysics, I guess 
> 
> ... I guess Aristotle was the worst physicist who ever lived and only fools 
> with crackpot ideas think that referring to him and other ancient Greeks in 
> every other sentence helps to bolster their cause.

Yes, and in the frame of mechanism his theology is as bad, but then it seems 
you accept it. 

If some primary matter is at play for consciousness, can you explain what role 
it has, and what it is?

You, see , the problem is that either your explanation is based on 
computationalism, but then it will work also to explain consciousness in 
arithmetic, or you will introduce something non Turing emulable, but then you 
can no more say “yes”to the doctor.




> 
> >Still the same confusion between a computation (a purely mathematical 
> >notion) and a physical computation,
> 
> I'm not confused at all, I'm very clear on the fact that a "purely 
> mathematical notion of computation" can't compute a damn thing

A notion of computation does not compute. 

A Turing machine or a number, or a combinator compute, with respect to some 
universal number. That follows from the definition of Turing, Post, Kleene, 
Davis, etc.

You are not criticising me. You are criticising the whole field of mathematical 
logic.




> anymore than the blueprints for a 747 airliner can fly me to London. 

The analogy does not work. A machine is more than a blueprint. The proposition 
phi_i(j) converge is a (sigma_1) proposition of arithmetic, and it is true or 
false, independently of your or me.



>   
> 
> I must say I was disappointed you didn't comment on my discovery of "banana 
> indeterminacy" that stands with your own discovery of "first person 
> indeterminacy. I repeat it here: 
> 
> This is not limited just to issues concerning mind or consciousness. There is 
> also no algorithm for answering the question "what one and only one thing 
> will happen to one banana after one banana  becomes 2 bananas?". And the 
> reason there is no such algorithm for a mind or a banana is exactly the same, 
> it is a idiotic question.


That analogy does not work either, because there is no notion of first person 
associated with banana. 

But the step 3 can be done with robots instead of human, and if you disbelieve 
in first person indeterminacy, tell me how you program the robot so that he is 
able to predict the results of opening the door after pushing on the button. 
The robot survive, by computationalism (or even without in this case), and the 
robot can predict with certainty that he will not write in his personal diary 
that he is seeing both city at once, so the prediction can only be W or M, as 
“W”  (res. “M”) alone will be contradicted by the corresponding doppelgänger, 
which we have to take into account by the definition given of first person.

So, if you have an algorithm just show it to us. The question makes sense, as 
you have agreed that we survive such an experience, and you agreed that any 
copies will not be directly aware of the other copies,  —they differentiate 
once the box is open.  So, there is no first person experience of being in the 
two cities. To be in only one city is thus true for both copies, and 

Re: The codical-material universe

[John Clark]

On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 4:28 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>> *Speed is a physical attribute.*
>>>
>>
> >>Then numbers are physical attributes too because 1 Hydrogen atom
>> behaves differently than 2 Hydrogen atoms.
>>
>

*>The number of atoms is physical, yes, but that does not mean that a
> number is physical per se.*
>

Why not? You say speed is physical and speed modifies matter (2 electrons
that collide slowly behave differently than 2 electrons that collide
swiftly) and its exactly the same with numbers, they also modify matter (2
electrons behave differently than 1 electron).

I also note that you claim nonphysical calculations can be performed, but
you also say space and time and even spacetime are physical, so how can you
have change without them and how can you have calculations without change?


Wow, even qualia is matter!



>>>*Yes,*


> >>So now qualia, the last remaining holdout, joins the ranks of "physical
> attributes" and the term loses the last shred of meaning it had.



 >*Please quote the whole sentence. Qualia are physical sensatio*

Electromagnetic waves of 650 nanometers is physical , the color red is a
qualia and can be produced without Electromagnetic waves of any sort.


> >The greeks...
>

were ignoramuses that only the foolish believe can cast any light on
modern cutting edge scientific questions.


> >In your Aristotelian metaphysics, I guess 
>

... I guess Aristotle was the worst physicist who ever lived and only fools
with crackpot ideas think that referring to him and other ancient Greeks in
every other sentence helps to bolster their cause.

*>Still the same confusion between a computation (a purely mathematical
> notion) and a physical computation, *
>

I'm not confused at all, I'm very clear on the fact that a "purely
mathematical notion of computation" can't compute a damn thing anymore than
the blueprints for a 747 airliner can fly me to London.

I must say I was disappointed you didn't comment on my discovery of "banana
indeterminacy" that stands with your own discovery of "first person
indeterminacy. I repeat it here:

This is not limited just to issues concerning mind or consciousness. There
is also no algorithm for answering the question "what one and only one
thing will happen to one banana after one banana  becomes 2 bananas?". And
the reason there is no such algorithm for a mind or a banana is exactly the
same, it is a idiotic question.

John K Clark

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 13 Sep 2018, at 19:54, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Sep 12, 2018  Bruno Marchal  > wrote
> 
>>>>Matter = observable
>  
> >>So adjectives are made of matter
> 
> > Speed is a physical attribute. 
> 
> Then numbers are physical attributes too because 1 Hydrogen atom behaves 
> differently than 2 Hydrogen atoms.

The number of atoms is physical, yes, but that does not mean that a number is 
physical per se.



> 
> > Speed is based on physical notion, like position and time, which are 
> > material things, like space-time.
> 
> So you say nouns, verbs, adjectives, numbers, time and space are all matter.  

That does not follow. Are you playing dumb?



> 
> >>Wow, even qualia is matter!
>  
> 
> >Yes, 
> 
> So now qualia, the last remaining holdout, joins the ranks of "physical 
> attributes" and the term loses the last shred of meaning it had.

Please quote the whole sentence. Qualia are physical sensation. The greeks, and 
the universal machine have two notions of matter: intelligible matter and 
sensible matter, which are given by two different modes of self-reference by 
immaterial machine. 



> 
> > The point is that mechanism is incompatible with the idea that  the 
> > physical notion have to be primitive, that is: assumed in the fundamental 
> > theory.
> 
> An assumption, just like a theory or a brain, can't exist without matter and 
> the laws of physics that govern how it moves. 

In your Aristotelian metaphysics, I guess.




>  
> > you just read with one goal: to mock a theory. That is very easy. 
> 
> Yes, some theories are very easy to mock.
> 
> > A Turing machine is finite set of quadruplets,
> 
> A finite set of quadruplets can't compute a thing because it can not change 
> in time or space without the help of matter that obeys the laws of physics, 
> if they could Intel wouldn't be so interested in the element with atomic 
> number 14.


Still the same confusion between a computation (a purely mathematical notion) 
and a physical computation, which assumes a universe, and a Turing universal 
subpart of that universe, capable of implementing the computation relatively to 
us. That does not makes those relative implementations physical. Physical 
becomes a relative notion when we assume mechanism, a bit like the distinction 
software/hardware, which is made relative by the Turing-Kleene enumeration 
theorem.





> 
> > Please inform yourself. There is no physical assumption in any of the 
> > papers trading this subject.
> 
> I don't give a damn what any paper assumes, if you know how to make a 
> calculation without using a neuron or a microchip or a vacuum tube or a bunch 
> of gears and ratchets or matter of any sort then stop talking about it and 
> just do it and become the greatest scientist and richest man who ever lived. 

I think you just play dumb.

Bruno 



>  
> 
> >You beg the question by defining a machine and a computation by the physical 
> >machine and the physical computations, 
> 
> Until you show us otherwise  with a  example (not another definition!) the 
> term "physical computation" is redundant because all computation is physical. 
> And if you know how to make a non-physical machine then give us all a 
> non-physical car and put Ford, General Motors and Toyota out of business.  
> 
> >Robison arithmetic can prove the existence of richer theories like PA and 
> >ZF. 
> 
> How happy for Mr. Robison.
> 
> >That “colossal blunder” has been debunked more than once,
> 
> Bullshit.
> 
> >I use an idea that you have even defended yourself, which is that if two 
> >computers are computing the same (supporting consciousness) program, there 
> >is only one consciousness, and it is not localised.
> 
> Yes.
> 
> >Then I use the fact that if the subject is aware of that situation, like the 
> >H-man, after the reconstitution has been done, but the doors are still 
> >closed, and there is only one person, 
> OK.
> 
> >which has no algorithm to decide what she will see when opening the door.
> 
> This is not limited just to issues concerning mind or consciousness. There is 
> also no algorithm for answering the question "what one and only one thing 
> will happen to one banana after one banana  becomes 2 bananas?". And the 
> reason there is no such algorithm for a mind of a banana is exactly the same, 
> it is a idiotic question.
> 
> John K Clark
> 
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Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 12 Sep 2018, at 16:44, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 5:32 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>> >>> Matter = observable
> >>Speed is observable, is speed matter?
>  
> >Yes, 
> 
> So adjectives are made of matter.


Speed is a physical attribute. Matter is used in this context for physical.

Speed is based on physical notion, like position and time, which are material 
things, like space-time.

It should be clear that we have used matter and physical as quasi synonym. That 
is why I say always that mechanism is incompatible with materialism or 
physicalism. 

The point is that mechanism is incompatible with the idea that  the physical 
notion have to be primitive, that is: assumed in the fundamental theory.

I think you know that, and are only joking.



> 
> >and it belong to the realm of the quanta. 
> 
> So numbers are made of numbers too. 

In some set theoretical rendering of the numbers, that is true, like when n is 
the set of m with m < n.
But usually, numbers are simply the (transitive) successor of zero, and are not 
conceived as being made of something.



>  
> >>The qualia red is observable, is red matter?
> 
> >Yes,
> 
> Wow, even qualia is matter!


Yes, sensible matter, indeed. They appear in the material hypostase. With 
mechanism physics is immaterial ontologically, and material phenomenologically. 
 Cf (with [] = Gödel’s arithmetical provability predicate, and of course <> = 
~[]~. (And p is a sigma_1 proposition).

  p   truth
[]p  belief
[]p & p (knowledge)
[]p & <>t (observable)
[]p & <>t & p (sensible)



> Meaning needs contrast, if everything is X then X means nothing.


Sure.


> 
> >There is no evidence that a brain, or an amoeba, is made of primary matter.
> 
> In a way that's true, you say everything is made of matter

I did not say that. You inferred this wrongly. Just study the paper or read the 
Post, but you just read with one goal: to mock a theory. That is very easy. Try 
perhaps to understand instead.




> and that is equivalent to saying nothing is made of matter. 
>  
> >It is “physical”, but not in physics.
> 
> That sounds like something you'd read in a fortune cookie but if true then 
> art is not in artistic, politics is not in political, number theory is not in 
> numbers, and intellect is not in intelligence. 
>  
> >>You can't have a Turing Machine without a machine
> 
> >That contradicts all papers on Turing machine.
> 
> I have no doubt it contradicts all your papers, but not those of Mr. Turing’s.


Not at all. I meant that your definition of machine and computation contradicts 
the paper of Turing, and all books and papers in the domain. 



>  
> > A Turing machine is finite set of quadruplets,
> 
> A finite set of quadruplets can't compute a thing or do anything else without 
> the help of matter that obeys the laws of physics, if they could Intel 
> wouldn't be so interested in the element with atomic number 14.


Please inform yourself. There is no physical assumption in any of the papers 
trading this subject.
I suspect you do again the confusion of level that I have decorticated in 
detail before.  You beg the question by defining a machine and a computation by 
the physical machine and the physical computations, but that is your theory. 




>   
>  
> >Robison arithmetic can prove the existence of richer theories like PA and 
> >ZF. 
> 
> Without the help of a brain made of matter, like the one in Mr. Robinson's 
> head, Robinson arithmetic can't prove PA or ZF or anything else. If you want 
> something to happen, like completing a proof, mathematics is not enough, 
> you're going to need physics to help you.  
> 
> >You commit an ontological commitment to defeat a theory. That is how the 
> >creationist criticise the theory of evolution. 
> 
> Yeah yeah we've heard that stale insult a thousand times before, I'm just one 
> super religious dude. Bruno, you've really got to get some new material.

It is hard as you repeat the same confusion. I wait argument, not insults.





>  
> > Quantum mechanics shows, at the least, that the notion of matter is unclear,
> 
> There is a lot about Quantum Mechanics that is unclear, but you are not 
> helping to clarify things.
> 
> > There is no atoms, once we postulate Mechanism.
> 
> So you advise if physics is to advance it should first move backwards about 
> 130 years. I think I'll pass on that.
>  
> >That is the result of the informal UDA,
> 
> You have forgotten IHA.
> 
>   > That is not obvious, especially if you are stuck at the easiest step 
> (step 3).
> 
> So I guess the other steps are even dumber, but I'll never know for sure 
> because I'll never read them until you fix the colossal blunder you made in 
> step 3. 

That “colossal blunder” has been debunked more than once, but if you want 
ridicule yourself once more for the newbees, you are my guess. We can ask 
Grayson to be the arbiter, for example. All the others have got the point.




> 
> >my 

Re: The codical-material universe

[John Clark]

On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 5:32 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> *>>> Matter = observable*
>>
>> >>Speed is observable, is speed matter?
>
>

*>Yes, *
>

So adjectives are made of matter.

>*and it belong to the realm of the quanta. *


So numbers are made of numbers too.


> >>The qualia red is observable, is red matter?
>
>
> >Yes,
>

Wow, even qualia is matter! Meaning needs contrast, if everything is X then
X means nothing.

>*There is no evidence that a brain, or an amoeba, is made of primary
> matter.*
>

In a way that's true, you say everything is made of matter and that is
equivalent to saying nothing is made of matter.


> *>It is “physical”, but not in physics.*
>

That sounds like something you'd read in a fortune cookie but if true then
art is not in artistic, politics is not in political, number theory is not
in numbers, and intellect is not in intelligence.


> >>You can't have a Turing Machine without a machine
>
>
> >*That contradicts all papers on Turing machine. *
>

I have no doubt it contradicts all your papers, but not those of Mr.
Turing's.


> > *A Turing machine is finite set of quadruplets,*
>

A finite set of quadruplets can't compute a thing or do anything else
without the help of matter that obeys the laws of physics, if they could
Intel wouldn't be so interested in the element with atomic number 14.


> >*Robison arithmetic can prove the existence of richer theories like PA
> and ZF. *
>

Without the help of a brain made of matter, like the one in Mr. Robinson's
head, Robinson arithmetic can't prove PA or ZF or anything else. If you
want something to happen, like completing a proof, mathematics is not
enough, you're going to need physics to help you.

>*You commit an ontological commitment to defeat a theory. That is how the
> creationist criticise the theory of evolution. *
>

Yeah yeah we've heard that stale insult a thousand times before, I'm just
one super religious dude. Bruno, you've really got to get some new material.


> > *Quantum mechanics shows, at the least, that the notion of matter is
> unclear,*
>

There is a lot about Quantum Mechanics that is unclear, but you are not
helping to clarify things.

*> There is no atoms, once we postulate Mechanism. *
>

So you advise if physics is to advance it should first move backwards about
130 years. I think I'll pass on that.


> >*That is the result of the informal UDA,*
>

You have forgotten IHA.

  > *That is not obvious, especially if you are stuck at the easiest step
> (step 3).*


So I guess the other steps are even dumber, but I'll never know for sure
because I'll never read them until you fix the colossal blunder you made in
step 3.

>*my conscious experience cannot be associate with any particular
> computational state, but with an infinity of them,*
>

There is no evidence that at the fundamental level the human mind works on
analog principles, and given the large amount of noise in the brain its
very hard to see how it could. Noise is the mortal enemy of analog
computing.

John K Clark

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/11/2018 2:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Sep 2018, at 01:54, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 9/10/2018 9:34 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 3:25:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift > wrote:



On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
wrote:



On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark 
wrote:


Bruno MarchalWrote:

/> I cannot see primary matter.In fact I am not sure
what you mean by matter, or by “mathematical-material
universe”.[...] I have proven (40 years ago) that
materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or
physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible./


If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly
don't know what "primary matter" means, so what the hell
did you prove 40 years ago?


That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a
sophisticated “sum” on all computations.

Matter = observable

Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to
which there is a primary physical universe, or a primary
sort of (non mathematical) reality from which those
observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it can be
shown that the laws pertaining on the observable have to be
reduced to some mode of arithmetical self-reference.




I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means
because any such answer has to include physics and physics
has to involve matter which you admit confuses you.


No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent
to believe that we have to assume its existence. A realm is
primary if it cannot be reduced to some other field”. May
believe that biology is not primary, because it can be
reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly,
with Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or
Turing equivalent.






And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about
"Mechanism" , the reply would only contain yet more words
you can neither define nor give examples of.


Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of
description of our body such that we can survive with a
(physical) digital brain or body, if it faithfully
represents our body’s functionality at that description level.

Bruno



I seems /possible /to me that there could be a matter
decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes *me*, decompiles
*me* into some code, transports that code, and compiles that
code into a digital-technology-based "brain" in some sort of
"body". And it would be *me 2*. and "I" would exist again.

But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output
-  I don't think I would exist anymore.


How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to
distinguish (without observable clue, by personal introspection)
if it has been recompiled in a physical reality or in a
number-theoretical reality imitating my brain below my
substitution level?
It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role
in consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything
Turing-emulable, but then mechanism is false.But invoking
(primitive) Matter in this way seems arbitrary, and it
re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding
something difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only
because the physical stuff emulate correctly the computations
associated to your experience, then you will survive also in
arithmetic, which emulates all computations. Indeed the notion
of “emulation” of a machine by another has been discovered in
arithmetic.

Bruno



If my (material) body was decompiled into some compressed code, that 
code was stored, and then later that code was compiled (with a 
biocompiler - https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler - for 
example) I might be able to check if my new body was different from 
my old body by comparing medical records.


If the person who compiled my code into my new body told me that my 
code  had been compiled - not into my previous material reality - 
but into a numerical reality. I'm not sure how that would change my 
life. I'd probably say, "Yeah, sure" and still be a materialist.


- pt


That's a point I've made before.  It's all very well to say that you 
could be replaced by an abstract machine (e.g. arithmetic) running 
your code; but to make that work there would also have to be an 
emulation of your environment, including its physics.  So then it's 
not clear that anything is different.  It becomes a metaphysical 
just-so story.



It makes everything different. It entails that Aristotelian physics is 
wrong, that Newtonian 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Sep 2018, at 12:43, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, September 11, 2018 at 4:18:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 10 Sep 2018, at 18:34, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 3:25:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark > wrote:
 
 
 Bruno Marchal Wrote:
 
 > I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by 
 > matter, or by “mathematical-material universe”. [...] I have proven (40 
 > years ago) that materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or 
 > physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible.
 
 If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly don't know what 
 "primary matter" means, so what the hell did you prove 40 years ago? 
>>> 
>>> That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a sophisticated 
>>> “sum” on all computations. 
>>> 
>>> Matter = observable
>>> 
>>> Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to which there is a 
>>> primary physical universe, or a primary sort of (non mathematical) reality 
>>> from which those observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it can be 
>>> shown that the laws pertaining on the observable have to be reduced to some 
>>> mode of arithmetical self-reference.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means because any 
 such answer has to include physics and physics has to involve matter which 
 you admit confuses you. 
>>> 
>>> No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to believe that 
>>> we have to assume its existence. A realm is primary if it cannot be reduced 
>>> to some other field”. May believe that biology is not primary, because it 
>>> can be reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly, with 
>>> Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about "Mechanism" , the reply 
 would only contain yet more words you can neither define nor give examples 
 of.
>>> 
>>> Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of description of 
>>> our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or body, 
>>> if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that description 
>>> level.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I seems possible to me that there could be a matter 
>>> decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes me, decompiles me into some 
>>> code, transports that code, and compiles that code into a 
>>> digital-technology-based "brain" in some sort of "body". And it would be me 
>>> 2. and "I" would exist again.
>>> 
>>> But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output -  I don't  
>>> think I would exist anymore.
>> 
>> How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to distinguish 
>> (without observable clue, by personal introspection) if it has been 
>> recompiled in a physical reality or in a number-theoretical reality 
>> imitating my brain below my substitution level?
>> It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role in 
>> consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything Turing-emulable, but 
>> then mechanism is false.But invoking (primitive) Matter in this way seems 
>> arbitrary, and it re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding 
>> something difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only because the 
>> physical stuff emulate correctly the computations associated to your 
>> experience, then you will survive also in arithmetic, which emulates all 
>> computations. Indeed the notion of “emulation” of a machine by another has 
>> been discovered in arithmetic.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>>  
>>  
>> If my (material) body was decompiled into some compressed code,
> 
> What do you mean by decompiling a material body? I cannot make sense of this 
> expression. 
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> "Decompiling" just means reverse engineering, as the synthetic biologists do 
> for simple life now.
> 
>  An actual , simple biomolecular form (like DNA) is reversed engineered into 
> some software code (a chemical language, like an XML for chemistry), That 
> might be modified. and then a molecular assembler makes an actual new life 
> form.
> 
> This is extrapolated to more complicated life forms.

That is basically how I discovered the notion of computation by studying the 
molecular genetics of bacteria and virus. But then I found Gödel’s theorem, and 
saw that the recursion tricks illustrated by the bacterial genome is done ad 
infinitum already in arithmetic. I will still take some time to digest the 
discovery of the universal machine and why it makes all this possible. I took 
time to really understand the Church-Turing thesis: it is a miracle, Gödel is 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, September 11, 2018 at 4:18:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 10 Sep 2018, at 18:34, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 3:25:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Bruno Marchal Wrote:
>>>
>>> *> I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by 
 matter, or by “mathematical-material universe”. [...] I have proven (40 
 years ago) that materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or 
 physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible.*
>>>
>>>
>>> If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly don't know what 
>>> "primary matter" means, so what the hell did you prove 40 years ago?  
>>>
>>>
>>> That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a sophisticated 
>>> “sum” on all computations. 
>>>
>>> Matter = observable
>>>
>>> Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to which there is 
>>> a primary physical universe, or a primary sort of (non mathematical) 
>>> reality from which those observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it 
>>> can be shown that the laws pertaining on the observable have to be reduced 
>>> to some mode of arithmetical self-reference.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means because any 
>>> such answer has to include physics and physics has to involve matter which 
>>> you admit confuses you. 
>>>
>>>
>>> No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to believe 
>>> that we have to assume its existence. A realm is primary if it cannot be 
>>> reduced to some other field”. May believe that biology is not primary, 
>>> because it can be reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly, 
>>> with Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about "Mechanism" , the 
>>> reply would only contain yet more words you can neither define nor give 
>>> examples of.
>>>
>>>
>>> Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of description 
>>> of our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or 
>>> body, if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that 
>>> description level.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> I seems *possible *to me that there could be a matter 
>> decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes *me*, decompiles *me* into 
>> some code, transports that code, and compiles that code into a 
>> digital-technology-based "brain" in some sort of "body". And it would be *me 
>> 2*. and "I" would exist again.
>>
>> But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output -  I 
>> don't  think I would exist anymore.
>>
>>
>> How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to distinguish 
>> (without observable clue, by personal introspection) if it has been 
>> recompiled in a physical reality or in a number-theoretical reality 
>> imitating my brain below my substitution level?
>> It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role in 
>> consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything Turing-emulable, but 
>> then mechanism is false.But invoking (primitive) Matter in this way seems 
>> arbitrary, and it re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding 
>> something difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only because the 
>> physical stuff emulate correctly the computations associated to your 
>> experience, then you will survive also in arithmetic, which emulates all 
>> computations. Indeed the notion of “emulation” of a machine by another has 
>> been discovered in arithmetic.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>  
>  
> If my (material) body was decompiled into some compressed code,
>
>
> What do you mean by decompiling a material body? I cannot make sense of 
> this expression. 
>
>
>
 

"Decompiling" just means* reverse engineering*, as the synthetic biologists 
do for simple life now.

 An actual , simple biomolecular form (like DNA) is reversed engineered 
into some software code (a chemical language, like an XML for chemistry), 
That might be modified. and then a molecular assembler makes an actual new 
life form.

This is extrapolated to more complicated life forms.

 
- Philip Thrift

that code was stored, and then later that code was compiled (with a 
> biocompiler - https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler - for example) I 
> might be able to check if my new body was different from my old body by 
> comparing medical records.
>
> If the person who compiled my code into my new body told me that my code  
> had been compiled - not into my previous material reality - but into a 
> numerical reality. I'm not sure how that would change my life. I'd probably 
> say, "Yeah, sure" and still be a materialist.
>
>
> Yes, the whole point is that it will 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Sep 2018, at 01:54, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/10/2018 9:34 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 3:25:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift > 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark > wrote:
 
 
 Bruno Marchal Wrote:
 
 > I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by 
 > matter, or by “mathematical-material universe”. [...] I have proven (40 
 > years ago) that materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or 
 > physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible.
 
 If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly don't know what 
 "primary matter" means, so what the hell did you prove 40 years ago? 
>>> 
>>> That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a sophisticated 
>>> “sum” on all computations. 
>>> 
>>> Matter = observable
>>> 
>>> Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to which there is a 
>>> primary physical universe, or a primary sort of (non mathematical) reality 
>>> from which those observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it can be 
>>> shown that the laws pertaining on the observable have to be reduced to some 
>>> mode of arithmetical self-reference.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means because any 
 such answer has to include physics and physics has to involve matter which 
 you admit confuses you. 
>>> 
>>> No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to believe that 
>>> we have to assume its existence. A realm is primary if it cannot be reduced 
>>> to some other field”. May believe that biology is not primary, because it 
>>> can be reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly, with 
>>> Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about "Mechanism" , the reply 
 would only contain yet more words you can neither define nor give examples 
 of.
>>> 
>>> Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of description of 
>>> our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or body, 
>>> if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that description 
>>> level.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I seems possible to me that there could be a matter 
>>> decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes me, decompiles me into some 
>>> code, transports that code, and compiles that code into a 
>>> digital-technology-based "brain" in some sort of "body". And it would be me 
>>> 2. and "I" would exist again.
>>> 
>>> But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output -  I don't  
>>> think I would exist anymore.
>> 
>> How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to distinguish 
>> (without observable clue, by personal introspection) if it has been 
>> recompiled in a physical reality or in a number-theoretical reality 
>> imitating my brain below my substitution level?
>> It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role in 
>> consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything Turing-emulable, but 
>> then mechanism is false.But invoking (primitive) Matter in this way seems 
>> arbitrary, and it re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding 
>> something difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only because the 
>> physical stuff emulate correctly the computations associated to your 
>> experience, then you will survive also in arithmetic, which emulates all 
>> computations. Indeed the notion of “emulation” of a machine by another has 
>> been discovered in arithmetic.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>>  
>>  
>> If my (material) body was decompiled into some compressed code, that code 
>> was stored, and then later that code was compiled (with a biocompiler 
>> -https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler 
>>  - for example) I might be able 
>> to check if my new body was different from my old body by comparing medical 
>> records.
>> 
>> If the person who compiled my code into my new body told me that my code  
>> had been compiled - not into my previous material reality - but into a 
>> numerical reality. I'm not sure how that would change my life. I'd probably 
>> say, "Yeah, sure" and still be a materialist.
>> 
>> - pt
> 
> That's a point I've made before.  It's all very well to say that you could be 
> replaced by an abstract machine (e.g. arithmetic) running your code; but to 
> make that work there would also have to be an emulation of your environment, 
> including its physics.  So then it's not clear that anything is different.  
> It becomes a metaphysical just-so story.


It makes everything different. It entails that Aristotelian physics is wrong, 
that Newtonian physics is 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 10 Sep 2018, at 20:54, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 6:28 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > Matter = observable
> 
> Speed is observable, is speed matter?


Yes, and it belong to the realm of the quanta. It is observable and sharable.



> The qualia red is observable, is red matter?

Yes, but it is not sharable. It is “physical”, but not in physics. The length 
wave might belong to sharable physics, but the qualia itself is private and non 
sharable. It will be in Z1* minus Z1, if you have read the papers I mentioned. 




>  
> > Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle
> 
> If I never hear another word about Aristotle I will not in any way feel 
> deprived. 

That might explain why you seem unable to conceive reality in a different way 
than Aristotle. 

Plato: what we see might not be real.
Aristotle; real is defined by what we see.




>  
> >A realm is primary if it cannot be reduced to some other field”.
> 
> OK
> 
> >May believe that biology is not primary, because it can be reduced 
> >(apparently) to chemistry and physics.
> 
> Yes
>  
> > with Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent.
> 
> No. You can't have a Turing Machine without a machine


That contradicts all papers on Turing machine. A Turing machine is finite set 
of quadruplets, as I have recalled more or less recently.



> and you can't have a number theory, or a theory of any sort, without a brain 
> made of matter.


Gödel greatest contribution is the arithmetization of arithmetical theories 
(and others). Even Robison arithmetic can prove the existence of richer 
theories like PA and ZF. 

You commit an ontological commitment to defeat a theory. That is how the 
creationist criticise the theory of evolution. 

There is no evidence that a brain, or an amoeba, is made of primary matter. 
Quantum mechanics shows, at the least, that the notion of matter is unclear, 
but all serious philosopher of mind knew this since Plato.




> 
> > Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of description of 
> > our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or body, 
> > if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that description 
> > level.
> 
> Digits are numbers

Not really, but OK.



> so I guess you believe in Digital Mechanism,

It is my working hypothesis.



> unless you believe there is something special about the atoms that happen to 
> occupy your body right


There is no atoms, once we postulate Mechanism. That is the result of the 
informal UDA, and that is what all machine understand soon or later in 
arithmetic, or in any of its consistent extensions. To have *ontological* 
atoms, you need a non computational theory of mind. That is not obvious, 
especially if you are stuck at the easiest step (step 3).




> now so that they "cannot be reduced to some other field", that is to say 
> unless you believe the matter in your body is primary.

In arithmetic, my conscious experience cannot be associate with any particular 
computational state, but with an infinity of them, making matter into a 
statistics on computations (a term which I use always in the sense of Turing, 
Church, Post, Kleene: that is in the mathematical sense).

Bruno






> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
> 
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Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 10 Sep 2018, at 18:34, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 3:25:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Bruno Marchal Wrote:
>>> 
>>> > I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by 
>>> > matter, or by “mathematical-material universe”. [...] I have proven (40 
>>> > years ago) that materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or 
>>> > physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible.
>>> 
>>> If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly don't know what 
>>> "primary matter" means, so what the hell did you prove 40 years ago? 
>> 
>> That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a sophisticated 
>> “sum” on all computations. 
>> 
>> Matter = observable
>> 
>> Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to which there is a 
>> primary physical universe, or a primary sort of (non mathematical) reality 
>> from which those observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it can be 
>> shown that the laws pertaining on the observable have to be reduced to some 
>> mode of arithmetical self-reference.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means because any such 
>>> answer has to include physics and physics has to involve matter which you 
>>> admit confuses you. 
>> 
>> No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to believe that we 
>> have to assume its existence. A realm is primary if it cannot be reduced to 
>> some other field”. May believe that biology is not primary, because it can 
>> be reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly, with Mechanism, 
>> physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about "Mechanism" , the reply 
>>> would only contain yet more words you can neither define nor give examples 
>>> of.
>> 
>> Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of description of 
>> our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or body, 
>> if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that description 
>> level.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> I seems possible to me that there could be a matter 
>> decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes me, decompiles me into some code, 
>> transports that code, and compiles that code into a digital-technology-based 
>> "brain" in some sort of "body". And it would be me 2. and "I" would exist 
>> again.
>> 
>> But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output -  I don't  
>> think I would exist anymore.
> 
> How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to distinguish 
> (without observable clue, by personal introspection) if it has been 
> recompiled in a physical reality or in a number-theoretical reality imitating 
> my brain below my substitution level?
> It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role in 
> consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything Turing-emulable, but then 
> mechanism is false.But invoking (primitive) Matter in this way seems 
> arbitrary, and it re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding 
> something difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only because the 
> physical stuff emulate correctly the computations associated to your 
> experience, then you will survive also in arithmetic, which emulates all 
> computations. Indeed the notion of “emulation” of a machine by another has 
> been discovered in arithmetic.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
>  
>  
> If my (material) body was decompiled into some compressed code,

What do you mean by decompiling a material body? I cannot make sense of this 
expression. 



> that code was stored, and then later that code was compiled (with a 
> biocompiler - https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler - for example) I 
> might be able to check if my new body was different from my old body by 
> comparing medical records.
> 
> If the person who compiled my code into my new body told me that my code  had 
> been compiled - not into my previous material reality - but into a numerical 
> reality. I'm not sure how that would change my life. I'd probably say, "Yeah, 
> sure" and still be a materialist.

Yes, the whole point is that it will not change your life, but now you need to 
explain the appearance of the physical reality without any ontological 
commitment, except for some numerical reality (but that is already done when 
hypothesising Mechanism (with or without matter at the start).

Bruno

> 
> - pt
> 
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Re: The codical-material universe

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/10/2018 9:34 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 3:25:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift > wrote:



On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
wrote:



On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark  wrote:


Bruno MarchalWrote:

/> I cannot see primary matter.In fact I am not sure
what you mean by matter, or by “mathematical-material
universe”.[...] I have proven (40 years ago) that
materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or
physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible./


If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly
don't know what "primary matter" means, so what the hell did
you prove 40 years ago?


That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a
sophisticated “sum” on all computations.

Matter = observable

Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to
which there is a primary physical universe, or a primary sort
of (non mathematical) reality from which those observable
would have emerge. With mechanism, it can be shown that the
laws pertaining on the observable have to be reduced to some
mode of arithmetical self-reference.




I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means
because any such answer has to include physics and physics
has to involve matter which you admit confuses you.


No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to
believe that we have to assume its existence. A realm is
primary if it cannot be reduced to some other field”. May
believe that biology is not primary, because it can be
reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly,
with Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or
Turing equivalent.






And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about
"Mechanism" , the reply would only contain yet more words
you can neither define nor give examples of.


Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of
description of our body such that we can survive with a
(physical) digital brain or body, if it faithfully represents
our body’s functionality at that description level.

Bruno



I seems /possible /to me that there could be a matter
decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes *me*, decompiles *me*
into some code, transports that code, and compiles that code into
a digital-technology-based "brain" in some sort of "body". And it
would be *me 2*. and "I" would exist again.

But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output - 
I don't  think I would exist anymore.


How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to
distinguish (without observable clue, by personal introspection)
if it has been recompiled in a physical reality or in a
number-theoretical reality imitating my brain below my
substitution level?
It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role
in consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything
Turing-emulable, but then mechanism is false.But invoking
(primitive) Matter in this way seems arbitrary, and it
re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding something
difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only because the
physical stuff emulate correctly the computations associated to
your experience, then you will survive also in arithmetic, which
emulates all computations. Indeed the notion of “emulation” of a
machine by another has been discovered in arithmetic.

Bruno



If my (material) body was decompiled into some compressed code, that 
code was stored, and then later that code was compiled (with a 
biocompiler - https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler - for 
example) I might be able to check if my new body was different from my 
old body by comparing medical records.


If the person who compiled my code into my new body told me that my 
code  had been compiled - not into my previous material reality - but 
into a numerical reality. I'm not sure how that would change my life. 
I'd probably say, "Yeah, sure" and still be a materialist.


- pt


That's a point I've made before.  It's all very well to say that you 
could be replaced by an abstract machine (e.g. arithmetic) running your 
code; but to make that work there would also have to be an emulation of 
your environment, including its physics.  So then it's not clear that 
anything is different.  It becomes a metaphysical just-so story.


Brent

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Re: The codical-material universe

[John Clark]

On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 6:28 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

*> Matter = observable*
>

Speed is observable, is speed matter? The qualia red is observable, is red
matter?


> > Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle
>

If I never hear another word about Aristotle I will not in any way feel
deprived.


> >A realm is primary if it cannot be reduced to some other field”.
>

OK

*>May believe that biology is not primary, because it can be reduced
> (apparently) to chemistry and physics. *
>

Yes


> > *with Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or Turing
> equivalent.*
>

No. You can't have a Turing Machine without a machine and you can't have a
number theory, or a theory of any sort, without a brain made of matter.

> *Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of description
> of our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or
> body, if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that
> description level.*
>

Digits are numbers so I guess you believe in Digital Mechanism, unless you
believe there is something special about the atoms that happen to occupy
your body right now so that they "cannot be reduced to some other field",
that is to say unless you believe the matter in your body is primary.

John K Clark

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 3:25:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal Wrote:
>>
>> *> I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by 
>>> matter, or by “mathematical-material universe”. [...] I have proven (40 
>>> years ago) that materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or 
>>> physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible.*
>>
>>
>> If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly don't know what 
>> "primary matter" means, so what the hell did you prove 40 years ago?  
>>
>>
>> That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a sophisticated 
>> “sum” on all computations. 
>>
>> Matter = observable
>>
>> Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to which there is a 
>> primary physical universe, or a primary sort of (non mathematical) reality 
>> from which those observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it can be 
>> shown that the laws pertaining on the observable have to be reduced to some 
>> mode of arithmetical self-reference.
>>
>>
>>
>> I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means because any 
>> such answer has to include physics and physics has to involve matter which 
>> you admit confuses you. 
>>
>>
>> No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to believe that 
>> we have to assume its existence. A realm is primary if it cannot be reduced 
>> to some other field”. May believe that biology is not primary, because it 
>> can be reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly, with 
>> Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about "Mechanism" , the 
>> reply would only contain yet more words you can neither define nor give 
>> examples of.
>>
>>
>> Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of description 
>> of our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or 
>> body, if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that 
>> description level.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> I seems *possible *to me that there could be a matter 
> decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes *me*, decompiles *me* into 
> some code, transports that code, and compiles that code into a 
> digital-technology-based "brain" in some sort of "body". And it would be *me 
> 2*. and "I" would exist again.
>
> But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output -  I don't  
> think I would exist anymore.
>
>
> How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to distinguish 
> (without observable clue, by personal introspection) if it has been 
> recompiled in a physical reality or in a number-theoretical reality 
> imitating my brain below my substitution level?
> It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role in 
> consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything Turing-emulable, but 
> then mechanism is false.But invoking (primitive) Matter in this way seems 
> arbitrary, and it re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding 
> something difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only because the 
> physical stuff emulate correctly the computations associated to your 
> experience, then you will survive also in arithmetic, which emulates all 
> computations. Indeed the notion of “emulation” of a machine by another has 
> been discovered in arithmetic.
>
> Bruno
>
>
 
 
If my (material) body was decompiled into some compressed code, that code 
was stored, and then later that code was compiled (with a biocompiler - 
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler - for example) I might be able 
to check if my new body was different from my old body by comparing medical 
records.

If the person who compiled my code into my new body told me that my code  
had been compiled - not into my previous material reality - but into a 
numerical reality. I'm not sure how that would change my life. I'd probably 
say, "Yeah, sure" and still be a materialist.

- pt

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Bruno Marchal Wrote:
>> 
>> > I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by 
>> > matter, or by “mathematical-material universe”. [...] I have proven (40 
>> > years ago) that materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or 
>> > physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible.
>> 
>> If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly don't know what 
>> "primary matter" means, so what the hell did you prove 40 years ago? 
> 
> That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a sophisticated 
> “sum” on all computations. 
> 
> Matter = observable
> 
> Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to which there is a 
> primary physical universe, or a primary sort of (non mathematical) reality 
> from which those observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it can be 
> shown that the laws pertaining on the observable have to be reduced to some 
> mode of arithmetical self-reference.
> 
> 
> 
>> I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means because any such 
>> answer has to include physics and physics has to involve matter which you 
>> admit confuses you. 
> 
> No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to believe that we 
> have to assume its existence. A realm is primary if it cannot be reduced to 
> some other field”. May believe that biology is not primary, because it can be 
> reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly, with Mechanism, 
> physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about "Mechanism" , the reply 
>> would only contain yet more words you can neither define nor give examples 
>> of.
> 
> Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of description of 
> our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or body, if 
> it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that description level.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> I seems possible to me that there could be a matter 
> decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes me, decompiles me into some code, 
> transports that code, and compiles that code into a digital-technology-based 
> "brain" in some sort of "body". And it would be me 2. and "I" would exist 
> again.
> 
> But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output -  I don't  
> think I would exist anymore.

How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to distinguish 
(without observable clue, by personal introspection) if it has been recompiled 
in a physical reality or in a number-theoretical reality imitating my brain 
below my substitution level?
It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role in 
consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything Turing-emulable, but then 
mechanism is false.But invoking (primitive) Matter in this way seems arbitrary, 
and it re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding something 
difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only because the physical 
stuff emulate correctly the computations associated to your experience, then 
you will survive also in arithmetic, which emulates all computations. Indeed 
the notion of “emulation” of a machine by another has been discovered in 
arithmetic.

Bruno




> 
> - pt
> 
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Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark > 
> wrote:
>
>
> Bruno Marchal Wrote:
>
> *> I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by 
>> matter, or by “mathematical-material universe”. [...] I have proven (40 
>> years ago) that materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or 
>> physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible.*
>
>
> If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly don't know what 
> "primary matter" means, so what the hell did you prove 40 years ago?  
>
>
> That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a sophisticated 
> “sum” on all computations. 
>
> Matter = observable
>
> Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to which there is a 
> primary physical universe, or a primary sort of (non mathematical) reality 
> from which those observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it can be 
> shown that the laws pertaining on the observable have to be reduced to some 
> mode of arithmetical self-reference.
>
>
>
> I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means because any 
> such answer has to include physics and physics has to involve matter which 
> you admit confuses you. 
>
>
> No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to believe that 
> we have to assume its existence. A realm is primary if it cannot be reduced 
> to some other field”. May believe that biology is not primary, because it 
> can be reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly, with 
> Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent.
>
>
>
>
>
> And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about "Mechanism" , the reply 
> would only contain yet more words you can neither define nor give examples 
> of.
>
>
> Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of description of 
> our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or body, 
> if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that description 
> level.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
I seems *possible *to me that there could be a matter 
decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes *me*, decompiles *me* into some 
code, transports that code, and compiles that code into a 
digital-technology-based "brain" in some sort of "body". And it would be *me 
2*. and "I" would exist again.

But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output -  I don't  
think I would exist anymore.

- pt

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> Bruno Marchal Wrote:
> 
> > I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by matter, 
> > or by “mathematical-material universe”. [...] I have proven (40 years ago) 
> > that materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or physicalism) and 
> > Mechanism are incompatible.
> 
> If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly don't know what 
> "primary matter" means, so what the hell did you prove 40 years ago? 

That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a sophisticated “sum” 
on all computations. 

Matter = observable

Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to which there is a 
primary physical universe, or a primary sort of (non mathematical) reality from 
which those observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it can be shown that 
the laws pertaining on the observable have to be reduced to some mode of 
arithmetical self-reference.



> I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means because any such 
> answer has to include physics and physics has to involve matter which you 
> admit confuses you. 

No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to believe that we 
have to assume its existence. A realm is primary if it cannot be reduced to 
some other field”. May believe that biology is not primary, because it can be 
reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly, with Mechanism, 
physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent.





> And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about "Mechanism" , the reply 
> would only contain yet more words you can neither define nor give examples of.

Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of description of our 
body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or body, if it 
faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that description level.

Bruno



> 
> John K Clark
> 
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Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 8 Sep 2018, at 14:57, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, September 8, 2018 at 4:00:41 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 7 Sep 2018, at 14:43, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, September 7, 2018 at 3:59:08 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Sep 2018, at 21:48, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 11:47:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 6 Sep 2018, at 17:04, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 4:23:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 5 Sep 2018, at 18:58, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
 Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
 essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could offer 
 some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. 
 
 Brent 
 
 On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
 > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 
 
 Also thought WHAT? 
  
 
 
 
 In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @JDHamkins 
    (the set-theorist now at Oxford) 
 considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":
 
 http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/ 
 
 
 If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs 
 are "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.
 
>>> I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s thesis 
>>> (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non computable. 
>>> Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is 
>>> reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a 
>>> priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by 
>>> showing that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that 
>>> nature is not computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is 
>>> incompatible with Mechanism in physics. Now, it could be that the only 
>>> not computable things is just a random oracle, but this does not change 
>>> the class of computable function. It would change the class of 
>>> polynomial-time computable function, as we suspect nature do, but that 
>>> confirms mechanism which predicts this.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether 
 ITTMs are "realizable" remains to be seen.
 
>>> 
>>> The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with 
>>> functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what 
>>> the physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the 
>>> existence of non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with 
 non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic 
 biology, could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not 
 equivalently replicable in a simulation.
 
 
>>> 
>>> Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than a 
>>> classical computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can 
>>> read the basic explanation in my paper here if interested. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
>>> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, 
>>> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  (sane04)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the 
>>> fact that if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in 
>>> arithmetic, and whatever we predict about our first person experience 
>>> is indeterminate on the set of all computations (in arithmetic) which 
>>> go through our local and actual state of mind (that is: an infinity). 
>>> Physicalism is refuted 

Re: The codical-material universe

[John Clark]

Philip Thrift 

> *A working definition of matter: That which stores, transmits, or
> executes code.*


That's not bad, that's not bad at all. I wish I'd said that!

John K Clark

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, September 8, 2018 at 4:00:41 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 7 Sep 2018, at 14:43, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 7, 2018 at 3:59:08 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6 Sep 2018, at 21:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 11:47:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6 Sep 2018, at 17:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 4:23:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 5 Sep 2018, at 18:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
> On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

 Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
 essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could 
 offer 
 some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. 

 Brent 

 On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
 > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 

 Also thought WHAT? 

>>>  
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @*JDHamkins* 
>>>    (the set-theorist now at Oxford) 
>>> considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":
>>>
>>>
>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/
>>>
>>> If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs 
>>> are "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.
>>>
>>> I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s 
>>> thesis (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non 
>>> computable. 
>>> Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is 
>>> reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a 
>>> priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by 
>>> showing 
>>> that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that nature is not 
>>> computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with 
>>> Mechanism 
>>> in physics. Now, it could be that the only not computable things is 
>>> just a 
>>> random oracle, but this does not change the class of computable 
>>> function. 
>>> It would change the class of polynomial-time computable function, as we 
>>> suspect nature do, but that confirms mechanism which predicts this.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether 
>>> ITTMs are "realizable" remains to be seen.
>>>
>>>
>>> The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with 
>>> functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what 
>>> the 
>>> physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the existence 
>>> of 
>>> non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with 
>>> non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic 
>>> biology, 
>>> could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not equivalently 
>>> replicable in a simulation.
>>>
>>>
>>> Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than 
>>> a classical computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can 
>>> read 
>>> the basic explanation in my paper here if interested. 
>>>
>>>
>>> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
>>> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, 
>>> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>>>  
>>> (sane04)
>>>
>>>
>>> The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the 
>>> fact that if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in 
>>> arithmetic, and whatever we predict about our first person experience 
>>> is 
>>> indeterminate on the set of all computations (in arithmetic) which go 
>>> through our local and actual state of mind (that is: an infinity). 
>>> Physicalism is refuted with mechanism, and becomes a branch of machine 
>>> psychology, or better machine theology (the study of the non provable 
>>> true 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Sep 2018, at 14:43, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 7, 2018 at 3:59:08 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 6 Sep 2018, at 21:48, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 11:47:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Sep 2018, at 17:04, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 4:23:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 5 Sep 2018, at 18:58, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
>>> essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could offer 
>>> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. 
>>> 
>>> Brent 
>>> 
>>> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>>> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 
>>> 
>>> Also thought WHAT? 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @JDHamkins 
>>>    (the set-theorist now at Oxford) 
>>> considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":
>>> 
>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/ 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs are 
>>> "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.
>>> 
>> I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s thesis 
>> (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non computable. 
>> Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is 
>> reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a 
>> priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by 
>> showing that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that nature 
>> is not computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with 
>> Mechanism in physics. Now, it could be that the only not computable 
>> things is just a random oracle, but this does not change the class of 
>> computable function. It would change the class of polynomial-time 
>> computable function, as we suspect nature do, but that confirms 
>> mechanism which predicts this.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether 
>>> ITTMs are "realizable" remains to be seen.
>>> 
>> 
>> The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with 
>> functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what the 
>> physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the existence 
>> of non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with 
>>> non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic 
>>> biology, could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not 
>>> equivalently replicable in a simulation.
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than a 
>> classical computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can read 
>> the basic explanation in my paper here if interested. 
>> 
>> 
>> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
>> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, 
>> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>>  
>> 
>>  (sane04)
>> 
>> 
>> The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the 
>> fact that if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in 
>> arithmetic, and whatever we predict about our first person experience is 
>> indeterminate on the set of all computations (in arithmetic) which go 
>> through our local and actual state of mind (that is: an infinity). 
>> Physicalism is refuted with mechanism, and becomes a branch of machine 
>> psychology, or better machine theology (the study of the non provable 
>> true propositions).
>> 
>> I am just know writing a post on why Church’s thesis is a quasi-miracle 
>> in 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, September 7, 2018 at 8:07:51 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9/7/2018 5:35 PM, Martin Abramson wrote:
>
> Are you saying that galaxies etc. moving away  ftl  are not moving 
> relative to spacetime because spacetime is expanding at the same scale 
> factor? Is the universe, as it expands, creating vast new amounts of 
> spacetime 
>
>
> Yes.
>
> Brent
>
> or just stretching existing spacetime thinner and thinner? Are there any 
> theories as to the limits of spacetime that can be created? Could spacetime 
> be like a soap bubble that bursts when it reaches a certain elastic limit? 
> Are these dumb questions? Sorry, I'm imposing on your patience. Thanks for 
> replying.  
>
> On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 5:53 PM Brent Meeker  > wrote:
>
>> I said *stuff* (galaxies, galaxy clusters) was moving away faster than 
>> light, but not relative to the spacetime it's embedded in. 
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>  
"or just stretching existing [some] spacetime thinner and thinner?"

Couldn't something like that be (more) right? 

cf.
Scale relativity and fractal space-time: theory and applications
https://arxiv.org/abs/0812.3857

- pt

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/7/2018 5:35 PM, Martin Abramson wrote:
Are you saying that galaxies etc. moving away  ftl  are not moving 
relative to spacetime because spacetime is expanding at the same scale 
factor? Is the universe, as it expands, creating vast new amounts of 
spacetime


Yes.

Brent

or just stretching existing spacetime thinner and thinner? Are there 
any theories as to the limits of spacetime that can be created? Could 
spacetime be like a soap bubble that bursts when it reaches a certain 
elastic limit? Are these dumb questions? Sorry, I'm imposing on your 
patience. Thanks for replying.


On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 5:53 PM Brent Meeker > wrote:


I said /*stuff*/ (galaxies, galaxy clusters) was moving away
faster than light, but not relative to the spacetime it's embedded
in.

Brent



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Re: The codical-material universe

[Martin Abramson]

Are you saying that galaxies etc. moving away  ftl  are not moving relative
to spacetime because spacetime is expanding at the same scale factor? Is
the universe, as it expands, creating vast new amounts of spacetime or just
stretching existing spacetime thinner and thinner? Are there any theories
as to the limits of spacetime that can be created? Could spacetime be like
a soap bubble that bursts when it reaches a certain elastic limit? Are
these dumb questions? Sorry, I'm imposing on your patience. Thanks for
replying.

On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 5:53 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> I said *stuff* (galaxies, galaxy clusters) was moving away faster than
> light, but not relative to the spacetime it's embedded in.
>
> Brent
>
> On 9/7/2018 6:46 AM, Martin Abramson wrote:
>
> Thanks Brent. You say the space is growing faster than light in a sense
> but not relative to spacetime. How can space not be relative to spacetime?
>
> On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 12:49 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>> The expansion of the universe is not a speed.  It's not even measured in
>> the units of speed.  It's a dimensionless scale  factor as a function of
>> time.  So if the scale factor increases by 0.1% over some time interval,
>> say a year, the stuff that was 10 lightyears away will now be 10.01
>> lightyears away. Something that was 1000 lightyears away will now be 1001
>> lightyears away.  So in a year it got to be a lightyear further away.  Is
>> it going at the speed of light?  No.  The space between us and it just got
>> bigger.  So in a sense it's "going as fast as light", but not relative to
>> it's spacetime.  Something that was 2000 lightyears away is now 2002
>> lightyears away.  It's moved 2 lightyears away in one year.   Is it "going
>> faster than light"?  in a sense, but not relative to spacetime.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>> On 9/6/2018 7:21 PM, Martin Abramson wrote:
>>
>> I'm confused about the universe expanding faster than light speed. Anyone
>> care to explain or cite a ref? Thanks, m.a.
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 4:01 PM Philip Thrift 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 2:48:53 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 11:47:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
 wrote:
>
>
> On 6 Sep 2018, at 17:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 4:23:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 18:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
>>> wrote:


 On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
 wrote:
>
>
> On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's
>> essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could
>> offer
>> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang
>>
>> Also thought WHAT?
>>
>
>
>
>
> In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @*JDHamkins*
>    (the set-theorist now at
> Oxford) considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":
>
>
> http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/
>
> If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and
> ITTMs are "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude 
> ITTMs.
>
> I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s
> thesis (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non 
> computable.
> Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is
> reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a
> priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by 
> showing
> that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that nature is 
> not
> computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with 
> Mechanism
> in physics. Now, it could be that the only not computable things is 
> just a
> random oracle, but this does not change the class of computable 
> function.
> It would change the class of polynomial-time 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

This question is something I've wondered about, and it still seems *odd*, 
but maybe this is the best answer?

As the universe expands, why don't galaxies get stretched out? 

*There is enough matter in a galaxy that the matter within the galaxy is 
not affected by the expansion of the universe. You can think of this as the 
gravity of the galaxy holding it together, but really it's more fundamental 
than that. The rate of the expansion of the universe depends on the amount 
of matter (and dark energy) in the universe. If you just consider a tiny 
fraction of the universe which just includes a galaxy and total the matter 
in that region, it's more than enough to have already stopped the expansion 
in that region.*

http://curious.astro.cornell.edu/about-us/97-the-universe/galaxies/cosmology/538-as-the-universe-expands-why-don-t-galaxies-get-stretched-out-intermediate

- Philip Thrift




On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 11:49:48 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> The expansion of the universe is not a speed.  It's not even measured in 
> the units of speed.  It's a dimensionless scale  factor as a function of 
> time.  So if the scale factor increases by 0.1% over some time interval, 
> say a year, the stuff that was 10 lightyears away will now be 10.01 
> lightyears away. Something that was 1000 lightyears away will now be 1001 
> lightyears away.  So in a year it got to be a lightyear further away.  Is 
> it going at the speed of light?  No.  The space between us and it just got 
> bigger.  So in a sense it's "going as fast as light", but not relative to 
> it's spacetime.  Something that was 2000 lightyears away is now 2002 
> lightyears away.  It's moved 2 lightyears away in one year.   Is it "going 
> faster than light"?  in a sense, but not relative to spacetime.  
>
> Brent
>
> On 9/6/2018 7:21 PM, Martin Abramson wrote:
>
> I'm confused about the universe expanding faster than light speed. Anyone 
> care to explain or cite a ref? Thanks, m.a.
>
> On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 4:01 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 2:48:53 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 11:47:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal 
>>> wrote: 


 On 6 Sep 2018, at 17:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 4:23:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote: 
>
>
> On 5 Sep 2018, at 18:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal 
> wrote: 
>>
>>
>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal 
>>> wrote: 


 On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>
> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
> essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could 
> offer 
> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. 
>
> Brent 
>
> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 
>
> Also thought WHAT? 
>
  



 In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @*JDHamkins* 
    (the set-theorist now at Oxford) 
 considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":


 http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/

 If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs 
 are "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.

 I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s 
 thesis (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non 
 computable. 
 Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is 
 reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a 
 priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by 
 showing 
 that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that nature is 
 not 
 computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with 
 Mechanism 
 in physics. Now, it could be that the only not computable things is 
 just a 
 random oracle, but this does not change the class of computable 
 function. 
 It would change the class of polynomial-time computable function, as 
 we 
 suspect nature do, but that confirms mechanism which predicts 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Martin Abramson]

Thanks Brent. You say the space is growing faster than light in a sense but
not relative to spacetime. How can space not be relative to spacetime?

On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 12:49 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> The expansion of the universe is not a speed.  It's not even measured in
> the units of speed.  It's a dimensionless scale  factor as a function of
> time.  So if the scale factor increases by 0.1% over some time interval,
> say a year, the stuff that was 10 lightyears away will now be 10.01
> lightyears away. Something that was 1000 lightyears away will now be 1001
> lightyears away.  So in a year it got to be a lightyear further away.  Is
> it going at the speed of light?  No.  The space between us and it just got
> bigger.  So in a sense it's "going as fast as light", but not relative to
> it's spacetime.  Something that was 2000 lightyears away is now 2002
> lightyears away.  It's moved 2 lightyears away in one year.   Is it "going
> faster than light"?  in a sense, but not relative to spacetime.
>
> Brent
>
> On 9/6/2018 7:21 PM, Martin Abramson wrote:
>
> I'm confused about the universe expanding faster than light speed. Anyone
> care to explain or cite a ref? Thanks, m.a.
>
> On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 4:01 PM Philip Thrift 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 2:48:53 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 11:47:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
>>> wrote:


 On 6 Sep 2018, at 17:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 4:23:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
 wrote:
>
>
> On 5 Sep 2018, at 18:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
>>> wrote:


 On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's
> essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could
> offer
> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable.
>
> Brent
>
> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang
>
> Also thought WHAT?
>




 In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @*JDHamkins*
    (the set-theorist now at Oxford)
 considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":


 http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/

 If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs
 are "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.

 I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s
 thesis (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non 
 computable.
 Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is
 reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a
 priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by 
 showing
 that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that nature is not
 computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with 
 Mechanism
 in physics. Now, it could be that the only not computable things is 
 just a
 random oracle, but this does not change the class of computable 
 function.
 It would change the class of polynomial-time computable function, as we
 suspect nature do, but that confirms mechanism which predicts this.





 But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis?
 Whether ITTMs are "realizable" remains to be seen.


 The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions
 with functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on 
 what
 the physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the 
 existence
 of non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”.




 In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with
 non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic 
 biology,
 could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not equivalently
 replicable in a 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, September 7, 2018 at 3:59:08 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 6 Sep 2018, at 21:48, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 11:47:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6 Sep 2018, at 17:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 4:23:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 18:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
> On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
>>> essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could offer 
>>> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. 
>>>
>>> Brent 
>>>
>>> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>>> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 
>>>
>>> Also thought WHAT? 
>>>
>>  
>>
>>
>>
>> In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @*JDHamkins* 
>>    (the set-theorist now at Oxford) 
>> considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":
>>
>>
>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/
>>
>> If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs 
>> are "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.
>>
>> I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s thesis 
>> (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non computable. 
>> Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is 
>> reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a 
>> priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by 
>> showing 
>> that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that nature is not 
>> computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with 
>> Mechanism 
>> in physics. Now, it could be that the only not computable things is just 
>> a 
>> random oracle, but this does not change the class of computable 
>> function. 
>> It would change the class of polynomial-time computable function, as we 
>> suspect nature do, but that confirms mechanism which predicts this.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether 
>> ITTMs are "realizable" remains to be seen.
>>
>>
>> The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with 
>> functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what the 
>> physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the existence 
>> of 
>> non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with 
>> non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic 
>> biology, 
>> could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not equivalently 
>> replicable in a simulation.
>>
>>
>> Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than a 
>> classical computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can read 
>> the basic explanation in my paper here if interested. 
>>
>>
>> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
>> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, 
>> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>>  
>> (sane04)
>>
>>
>> The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the 
>> fact that if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in 
>> arithmetic, and whatever we predict about our first person experience is 
>> indeterminate on the set of all computations (in arithmetic) which go 
>> through our local and actual state of mind (that is: an infinity). 
>> Physicalism is refuted with mechanism, and becomes a branch of machine 
>> psychology, or better machine theology (the study of the non provable 
>> true 
>> propositions).
>>
>> I am just know writing a post on why Church’s thesis is a 
>> quasi-miracle in mathematics and epistemology. In particular it entails 
>> the 
>> incompleteness phenomenon, from which we can derive mathematically the 
>> physical laws. That makes Mechanism 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 Sep 2018, at 22:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 2:48:53 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 11:47:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 6 Sep 2018, at 17:04, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 4:23:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 18:58, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
>> essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could offer 
>> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. 
>> 
>> Brent 
>> 
>> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 
>> 
>> Also thought WHAT? 
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @JDHamkins 
>>    (the set-theorist now at Oxford) 
>> considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":
>> 
>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/ 
>> 
>> 
>> If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs are 
>> "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.
>> 
> I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s thesis 
> (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non computable. 
> Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is 
> reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a 
> priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by 
> showing that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that nature 
> is not computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with 
> Mechanism in physics. Now, it could be that the only not computable 
> things is just a random oracle, but this does not change the class of 
> computable function. It would change the class of polynomial-time 
> computable function, as we suspect nature do, but that confirms mechanism 
> which predicts this.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether 
>> ITTMs are "realizable" remains to be seen.
>> 
> 
> The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with 
> functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what the 
> physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the existence of 
> non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with 
>> non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic 
>> biology, could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not 
>> equivalently replicable in a simulation.
>> 
>> 
> 
> Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than a 
> classical computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can read 
> the basic explanation in my paper here if interested. 
> 
> 
> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, 
> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>  
> 
>  (sane04)
> 
> 
> The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the fact 
> that if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in arithmetic, 
> and whatever we predict about our first person experience is 
> indeterminate on the set of all computations (in arithmetic) which go 
> through our local and actual state of mind (that is: an infinity). 
> Physicalism is refuted with mechanism, and becomes a branch of machine 
> psychology, or better machine theology (the study of the non provable 
> true propositions).
> 
> I am just know writing a post on why Church’s thesis is a quasi-miracle 
> in mathematics and epistemology. In particular it entails the 
> incompleteness phenomenon, from which we can derive mathematically the 
> physical laws. That makes Mechanism 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 Sep 2018, at 21:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 11:47:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 6 Sep 2018, at 17:04, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 4:23:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 18:58, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
>> essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could offer 
>> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. 
>> 
>> Brent 
>> 
>> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 
>> 
>> Also thought WHAT? 
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @JDHamkins 
>>    (the set-theorist now at Oxford) 
>> considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":
>> 
>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/ 
>> 
>> 
>> If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs are 
>> "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.
>> 
> I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s thesis 
> (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non computable. 
> Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is 
> reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a 
> priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by 
> showing that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that nature 
> is not computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with 
> Mechanism in physics. Now, it could be that the only not computable 
> things is just a random oracle, but this does not change the class of 
> computable function. It would change the class of polynomial-time 
> computable function, as we suspect nature do, but that confirms mechanism 
> which predicts this.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether 
>> ITTMs are "realizable" remains to be seen.
>> 
> 
> The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with 
> functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what the 
> physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the existence of 
> non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with 
>> non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic 
>> biology, could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not 
>> equivalently replicable in a simulation.
>> 
>> 
> 
> Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than a 
> classical computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can read 
> the basic explanation in my paper here if interested. 
> 
> 
> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, 
> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>  
> 
>  (sane04)
> 
> 
> The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the fact 
> that if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in arithmetic, 
> and whatever we predict about our first person experience is 
> indeterminate on the set of all computations (in arithmetic) which go 
> through our local and actual state of mind (that is: an infinity). 
> Physicalism is refuted with mechanism, and becomes a branch of machine 
> psychology, or better machine theology (the study of the non provable 
> true propositions).
> 
> I am just know writing a post on why Church’s thesis is a quasi-miracle 
> in mathematics and epistemology. In particular it entails the 
> incompleteness phenomenon, from which we can derive mathematically the 
> physical laws. That makes Mechanism testable, and indeed, we recover 
> already the quantum logical core of the 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Brent Meeker]

The expansion of the universe is not a speed.  It's not even measured in 
the units of speed.  It's a dimensionless scale  factor as a function of 
time.  So if the scale factor increases by 0.1% over some time interval, 
say a year, the stuff that was 10 lightyears away will now be 10.01 
lightyears away. Something that was 1000 lightyears away will now be 
1001 lightyears away.  So in a year it got to be a lightyear further 
away.  Is it going at the speed of light?  No.  The space between us and 
it just got bigger. So in a sense it's "going as fast as light", but not 
relative to it's spacetime.  Something that was 2000 lightyears away is 
now 2002 lightyears away.  It's moved 2 lightyears away in one year.   
Is it "going faster than light"?  in a sense, but not relative to 
spacetime.


Brent

On 9/6/2018 7:21 PM, Martin Abramson wrote:
I'm confused about the universe expanding faster than light speed. 
Anyone care to explain or cite a ref? Thanks, m.a.


On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 4:01 PM Philip Thrift > wrote:




On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 2:48:53 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift
wrote:



On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 11:47:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno
Marchal wrote:



On 6 Sep 2018, at 17:04, Philip Thrift
 wrote:



On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 4:23:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno
Marchal wrote:



On 5 Sep 2018, at 18:58, Philip Thrift
 wrote:



On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5,
Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift
 wrote:



On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM
UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift
 wrote:



On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM
UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip
Thrift  wrote:



On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at
4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

Do you have some evidence for
doubting CT? It seems that it's
essentially a definition of
digital computation. So you could
offer
some other definition, but it
would need to be realisable.

Brent

On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip
Thrift wrote:
> also thought by some in what I
call the UCNC gang

Also thought WHAT?





In terms of theory, Joel David
Hamkins @*JDHamkins*
  
(the set-theorist now at Oxford)
considers infinite-time TMs to be a
part of "computation":


http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/

If computation is the fundamental
"substrate" of nature, and ITTMs are
"natural" extensions of TMs, there is
no reason to exclude ITTMs.


I have explained in this list, and in
my papers, that Church’s thesis (with
Mechanism) entails that matter and
nature are non computable. Elementary
arithmetic realise/emulate all
computations, and physics is reduced
into a statistic on all computations,
which is not something a priori
computable. If mechanism is refuted
some day, it will be by showing that
nature is “too much computable”, not
by showing that nature is not
computable. Mechanism in cognitive
science is incompatible with Mechanism
in physics. Now, it could be that the
only not computable things is just a
random oracle, but this does not
change the class of computable
function. It would change the class of
polynomial-time computable function,
as we suspect nature do, but that

Re: The codical-material universe

[Martin Abramson]

I'm confused about the universe expanding faster than light speed. Anyone
care to explain or cite a ref? Thanks, m.a.

On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 4:01 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 2:48:53 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 11:47:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6 Sep 2018, at 17:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 4:23:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 5 Sep 2018, at 18:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
 wrote:
>
>
> On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

 Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's
 essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could
 offer
 some other definition, but it would need to be realisable.

 Brent

 On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
 > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang

 Also thought WHAT?

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @*JDHamkins*
>>>    (the set-theorist now at Oxford)
>>> considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":
>>>
>>>
>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/
>>>
>>> If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs
>>> are "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.
>>>
>>> I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s
>>> thesis (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non 
>>> computable.
>>> Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is
>>> reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a
>>> priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by 
>>> showing
>>> that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that nature is not
>>> computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with 
>>> Mechanism
>>> in physics. Now, it could be that the only not computable things is 
>>> just a
>>> random oracle, but this does not change the class of computable 
>>> function.
>>> It would change the class of polynomial-time computable function, as we
>>> suspect nature do, but that confirms mechanism which predicts this.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether
>>> ITTMs are "realizable" remains to be seen.
>>>
>>>
>>> The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with
>>> functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what the
>>> physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the existence 
>>> of
>>> non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with
>>> non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic 
>>> biology,
>>> could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not equivalently
>>> replicable in a simulation.
>>>
>>>
>>> Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than
>>> a classical computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can 
>>> read
>>> the basic explanation in my paper here if interested.
>>>
>>>
>>> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th
>>> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference,
>>> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>>> (sane04)
>>>
>>>
>>> The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the
>>> fact that if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in
>>> arithmetic, and whatever we predict about our first person experience is
>>> indeterminate on the set of all computations (in arithmetic) which go
>>> through our local and actual state of mind (that is: an infinity).
>>> Physicalism is refuted with mechanism, and becomes a branch of machine
>>> psychology, or better machine theology (the study of the non provable 
>>> true
>>> propositions).
>>>
>>> I am just know writing a post on why Church’s 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 2:48:53 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 11:47:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6 Sep 2018, at 17:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 4:23:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 18:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
> On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
>>> essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could offer 
>>> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. 
>>>
>>> Brent 
>>>
>>> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>>> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 
>>>
>>> Also thought WHAT? 
>>>
>>  
>>
>>
>>
>> In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @*JDHamkins* 
>>    (the set-theorist now at Oxford) 
>> considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":
>>
>>
>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/
>>
>> If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs 
>> are "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.
>>
>> I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s thesis 
>> (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non computable. 
>> Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is 
>> reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a 
>> priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by 
>> showing 
>> that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that nature is not 
>> computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with 
>> Mechanism 
>> in physics. Now, it could be that the only not computable things is just 
>> a 
>> random oracle, but this does not change the class of computable 
>> function. 
>> It would change the class of polynomial-time computable function, as we 
>> suspect nature do, but that confirms mechanism which predicts this.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether 
>> ITTMs are "realizable" remains to be seen.
>>
>>
>> The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with 
>> functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what the 
>> physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the existence 
>> of 
>> non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with 
>> non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic 
>> biology, 
>> could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not equivalently 
>> replicable in a simulation.
>>
>>
>> Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than a 
>> classical computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can read 
>> the basic explanation in my paper here if interested. 
>>
>>
>> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
>> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, 
>> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>>  
>> (sane04)
>>
>>
>> The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the 
>> fact that if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in 
>> arithmetic, and whatever we predict about our first person experience is 
>> indeterminate on the set of all computations (in arithmetic) which go 
>> through our local and actual state of mind (that is: an infinity). 
>> Physicalism is refuted with mechanism, and becomes a branch of machine 
>> psychology, or better machine theology (the study of the non provable 
>> true 
>> propositions).
>>
>> I am just know writing a post on why Church’s thesis is a 
>> quasi-miracle in mathematics and epistemology. In particular it entails 
>> the 
>> incompleteness phenomenon, from which we can derive mathematically the 
>> physical laws. That makes Mechanism testable, and indeed, we recover 
>> already the quantum 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 11:47:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 6 Sep 2018, at 17:04, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 4:23:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 18:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
>> essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could offer 
>> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. 
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 
>>
>> Also thought WHAT? 
>>
>  
>
>
>
> In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @*JDHamkins* 
>    (the set-theorist now at Oxford) 
> considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":
>
>
> http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/
>
> If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs 
> are "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.
>
> I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s thesis 
> (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non computable. 
> Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is 
> reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a 
> priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by 
> showing 
> that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that nature is not 
> computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with Mechanism 
> in physics. Now, it could be that the only not computable things is just 
> a 
> random oracle, but this does not change the class of computable function. 
> It would change the class of polynomial-time computable function, as we 
> suspect nature do, but that confirms mechanism which predicts this.
>
>
>
>
>
> But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether 
> ITTMs are "realizable" remains to be seen.
>
>
> The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with 
> functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what the 
> physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the existence of 
> non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”.
>
>
>
>
> In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with 
> non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic 
> biology, 
> could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not equivalently 
> replicable in a simulation.
>
>
> Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than a 
> classical computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can read 
> the basic explanation in my paper here if interested. 
>
>
> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, 
> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>  
> (sane04)
>
>
> The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the 
> fact that if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in 
> arithmetic, and whatever we predict about our first person experience is 
> indeterminate on the set of all computations (in arithmetic) which go 
> through our local and actual state of mind (that is: an infinity). 
> Physicalism is refuted with mechanism, and becomes a branch of machine 
> psychology, or better machine theology (the study of the non provable 
> true 
> propositions).
>
> I am just know writing a post on why Church’s thesis is a 
> quasi-miracle in mathematics and epistemology. In particular it entails 
> the 
> incompleteness phenomenon, from which we can derive mathematically the 
> physical laws. That makes Mechanism testable, and indeed, we recover 
> already the quantum logical core of the formalism.
>
> Bruno
>
>  

 This is very interesting. (I've written about the irreducibility of 
 "matter" to physics, e.g.,
 [ 
 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 Sep 2018, at 17:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 4:23:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 18:58, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
> essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could offer 
> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. 
> 
> Brent 
> 
> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 
> 
> Also thought WHAT? 
>  
> 
> 
> 
> In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @JDHamkins 
>    (the set-theorist now at Oxford) 
> considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":
> 
> http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/ 
> 
> 
> If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs are 
> "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.
> 
 I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s thesis 
 (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non computable. 
 Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is 
 reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a 
 priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by showing 
 that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that nature is not 
 computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with Mechanism 
 in physics. Now, it could be that the only not computable things is just a 
 random oracle, but this does not change the class of computable function. 
 It would change the class of polynomial-time computable function, as we 
 suspect nature do, but that confirms mechanism which predicts this.
 
 
 
 
> 
> But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether 
> ITTMs are "realizable" remains to be seen.
> 
 
 The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with 
 functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what the 
 physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the existence of 
 non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”.
 
 
 
> 
> In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with 
> non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic 
> biology, could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not 
> equivalently replicable in a simulation.
> 
> 
 
 Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than a 
 classical computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can read 
 the basic explanation in my paper here if interested. 
 
 
 B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
 International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, 
 SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
 
  (sane04)
 
 
 The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the fact 
 that if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in arithmetic, 
 and whatever we predict about our first person experience is indeterminate 
 on the set of all computations (in arithmetic) which go through our local 
 and actual state of mind (that is: an infinity). Physicalism is refuted 
 with mechanism, and becomes a branch of machine psychology, or better 
 machine theology (the study of the non provable true propositions).
 
 I am just know writing a post on why Church’s thesis is a quasi-miracle in 
 mathematics and epistemology. In particular it entails the incompleteness 
 phenomenon, from which we can derive mathematically the physical laws. 
 That makes Mechanism testable, and indeed, we recover already the quantum 
 logical core of the formalism.
 
 Bruno
 
  
 
 This is very interesting. (I've written about the irreducibility of 
 "matter" to physics, e.g.,
 [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/20/materialism-vs-physicalism/ 
 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 4:23:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 5 Sep 2018, at 18:58, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
> essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could offer 
> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. 
>
> Brent 
>
> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 
>
> Also thought WHAT? 
>
  



 In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @*JDHamkins* 
    (the set-theorist now at Oxford) 
 considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":


 http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/

 If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs are 
 "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.

 I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s thesis 
 (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non computable. 
 Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is 
 reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a 
 priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by showing 
 that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that nature is not 
 computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with Mechanism 
 in physics. Now, it could be that the only not computable things is just a 
 random oracle, but this does not change the class of computable function. 
 It would change the class of polynomial-time computable function, as we 
 suspect nature do, but that confirms mechanism which predicts this.





 But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether 
 ITTMs are "realizable" remains to be seen.


 The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with 
 functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what the 
 physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the existence of 
 non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”.




 In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with 
 non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic biology, 
 could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not equivalently 
 replicable in a simulation.


 Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than a 
 classical computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can read 
 the basic explanation in my paper here if interested. 


 B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
 International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, 
 SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
 (sane04)


 The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the 
 fact that if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in 
 arithmetic, and whatever we predict about our first person experience is 
 indeterminate on the set of all computations (in arithmetic) which go 
 through our local and actual state of mind (that is: an infinity). 
 Physicalism is refuted with mechanism, and becomes a branch of machine 
 psychology, or better machine theology (the study of the non provable true 
 propositions).

 I am just know writing a post on why Church’s thesis is a quasi-miracle 
 in mathematics and epistemology. In particular it entails the 
 incompleteness phenomenon, from which we can derive mathematically the 
 physical laws. That makes Mechanism testable, and indeed, we recover 
 already the quantum logical core of the formalism.

 Bruno

  
>>>
>>> This is very interesting. (I've written about the irreducibility of 
>>> "matter" to physics, e.g.,
>>> [ 
>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/20/materialism-vs-physicalism/ 
>>> ].)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I will take a look, but feel free to explain the basic. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Do you see what role a "multiverse perspective of mathematical truth" 
>>> could play in your theory?
>>>
>>> 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 5 Sep 2018, at 18:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
 Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
 essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could offer 
 some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. 
 
 Brent 
 
 On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
 > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 
 
 Also thought WHAT? 
  
 
 
 
 In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @JDHamkins 
    (the set-theorist now at Oxford) 
 considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":
 
 http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/ 
 
 
 If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs are 
 "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.
 
>>> I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s thesis (with 
>>> Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non computable. Elementary 
>>> arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is reduced into a 
>>> statistic on all computations, which is not something a priori computable. 
>>> If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by showing that nature is “too 
>>> much computable”, not by showing that nature is not computable. Mechanism 
>>> in cognitive science is incompatible with Mechanism in physics. Now, it 
>>> could be that the only not computable things is just a random oracle, but 
>>> this does not change the class of computable function. It would change the 
>>> class of polynomial-time computable function, as we suspect nature do, but 
>>> that confirms mechanism which predicts this.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether ITTMs 
 are "realizable" remains to be seen.
 
>>> 
>>> The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with 
>>> functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what the 
>>> physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the existence of 
>>> non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with 
 non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic biology, 
 could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not equivalently 
 replicable in a simulation.
 
 
>>> 
>>> Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than a 
>>> classical computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can read 
>>> the basic explanation in my paper here if interested. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
>>> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, 
>>> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
>>> 
>>>  (sane04)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the fact 
>>> that if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in arithmetic, 
>>> and whatever we predict about our first person experience is indeterminate 
>>> on the set of all computations (in arithmetic) which go through our local 
>>> and actual state of mind (that is: an infinity). Physicalism is refuted 
>>> with mechanism, and becomes a branch of machine psychology, or better 
>>> machine theology (the study of the non provable true propositions).
>>> 
>>> I am just know writing a post on why Church’s thesis is a quasi-miracle in 
>>> mathematics and epistemology. In particular it entails the incompleteness 
>>> phenomenon, from which we can derive mathematically the physical laws. That 
>>> makes Mechanism testable, and indeed, we recover already the quantum 
>>> logical core of the formalism.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> This is very interesting. (I've written about the irreducibility of 
>>> "matter" to physics, e.g.,
>>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/20/materialism-vs-physicalism/ 
>>>  
>>> ].)
>> 
>> 
>> I will take a look, but feel free to explain the basic. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Do you see what role a "multiverse perspective of mathematical truth" could 
>>> play in your theory?
>>> 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

 Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
 essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could offer 
 some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. 

 Brent 

 On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
 > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 

 Also thought WHAT? 

>>>  
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @*JDHamkins* 
>>>    (the set-theorist now at Oxford) 
>>> considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":
>>>
>>>
>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/
>>>
>>> If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs are 
>>> "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.
>>>
>>> I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s thesis 
>>> (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non computable. 
>>> Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is 
>>> reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a 
>>> priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by showing 
>>> that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that nature is not 
>>> computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with Mechanism 
>>> in physics. Now, it could be that the only not computable things is just a 
>>> random oracle, but this does not change the class of computable function. 
>>> It would change the class of polynomial-time computable function, as we 
>>> suspect nature do, but that confirms mechanism which predicts this.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether 
>>> ITTMs are "realizable" remains to be seen.
>>>
>>>
>>> The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with 
>>> functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what the 
>>> physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the existence of 
>>> non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with 
>>> non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic biology, 
>>> could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not equivalently 
>>> replicable in a simulation.
>>>
>>>
>>> Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than a 
>>> classical computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can read 
>>> the basic explanation in my paper here if interested. 
>>>
>>>
>>> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
>>> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, 
>>> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
>>> (sane04)
>>>
>>>
>>> The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the 
>>> fact that if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in 
>>> arithmetic, and whatever we predict about our first person experience is 
>>> indeterminate on the set of all computations (in arithmetic) which go 
>>> through our local and actual state of mind (that is: an infinity). 
>>> Physicalism is refuted with mechanism, and becomes a branch of machine 
>>> psychology, or better machine theology (the study of the non provable true 
>>> propositions).
>>>
>>> I am just know writing a post on why Church’s thesis is a quasi-miracle 
>>> in mathematics and epistemology. In particular it entails the 
>>> incompleteness phenomenon, from which we can derive mathematically the 
>>> physical laws. That makes Mechanism testable, and indeed, we recover 
>>> already the quantum logical core of the formalism.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>  
>>
>> This is very interesting. (I've written about the irreducibility of 
>> "matter" to physics, e.g.,
>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/20/materialism-vs-physicalism/ 
>> ].)
>>
>>
>>
>> I will take a look, but feel free to explain the basic. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Do you see what role a "multiverse perspective of mathematical truth" 
>> could play in your theory?
>>
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joel_David_Hamkins#Philosophy_of_set_theory
>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223
>>
>>
>> I am not sure why you say that the the universe of set is well defined. 
>> To be franc, although I am realist on arithmetic, I am not for set theory, 
>> nor analysis, second ordre arithmetic.
>>
>> Most set 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
>>> essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could offer 
>>> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. 
>>> 
>>> Brent 
>>> 
>>> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>>> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 
>>> 
>>> Also thought WHAT? 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @JDHamkins 
>>>    (the set-theorist now at Oxford) 
>>> considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":
>>> 
>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/ 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs are 
>>> "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.
>>> 
>> I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s thesis (with 
>> Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non computable. Elementary 
>> arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is reduced into a 
>> statistic on all computations, which is not something a priori computable. 
>> If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by showing that nature is “too 
>> much computable”, not by showing that nature is not computable. Mechanism in 
>> cognitive science is incompatible with Mechanism in physics. Now, it could 
>> be that the only not computable things is just a random oracle, but this 
>> does not change the class of computable function. It would change the class 
>> of polynomial-time computable function, as we suspect nature do, but that 
>> confirms mechanism which predicts this.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether ITTMs 
>>> are "realizable" remains to be seen.
>>> 
>> 
>> The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with 
>> functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what the 
>> physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the existence of 
>> non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with 
>>> non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic biology, 
>>> could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not equivalently 
>>> replicable in a simulation.
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than a 
>> classical computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can read the 
>> basic explanation in my paper here if interested. 
>> 
>> 
>> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th International 
>> System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, SANE 2004, 
>> Amsterdam, 2004.
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
>>  
>> (sane04)
>> 
>> 
>> The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the fact 
>> that if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in arithmetic, and 
>> whatever we predict about our first person experience is indeterminate on 
>> the set of all computations (in arithmetic) which go through our local and 
>> actual state of mind (that is: an infinity). Physicalism is refuted with 
>> mechanism, and becomes a branch of machine psychology, or better machine 
>> theology (the study of the non provable true propositions).
>> 
>> I am just know writing a post on why Church’s thesis is a quasi-miracle in 
>> mathematics and epistemology. In particular it entails the incompleteness 
>> phenomenon, from which we can derive mathematically the physical laws. That 
>> makes Mechanism testable, and indeed, we recover already the quantum logical 
>> core of the formalism.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> This is very interesting. (I've written about the irreducibility of "matter" 
>> to physics, e.g.,
>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/20/materialism-vs-physicalism/ 
>>  ].)
> 
> 
> I will take a look, but feel free to explain the basic. 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Do you see what role a "multiverse perspective of mathematical truth" could 
>> play in your theory?
>> 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joel_David_Hamkins#Philosophy_of_set_theory 
>> 
>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223 
>> 
> 
> I am not sure why you say that 

Re: The codical-material universe

[John Clark]

On Sun, Sep 2, 2018 at 9:15 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>* Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with Mechanism in
physics. *

There is a mountain of experimental evidence that much of physics is
mechanistic and all of cognition is. If you want to prove me wrong all you
have to do is tell me what the 7918th Busy Beaver number is, its finite and
well defined but we know for a fact that no mechanistic process can ever
find it, so if you can then your cognition must be non-mechanistic. Or just
tell me what the 5th Busy Beaver number is, that wouldn't be rock solid
proof as the 7918th  would be but I'd still be enormously impressed!

But I'll tell you 2 things that really are incompatible, Darwin's theory
and a non-mechanistic cause for consciousness. One of them must be wrong
and its not Darwin.

John K Clark

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
>> essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could offer 
>> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. 
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 
>>
>> Also thought WHAT? 
>>
>  
>
>
>
> In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @*JDHamkins* 
>    (the set-theorist now at Oxford) 
> considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":
>
>
> http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/
>
> If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs are 
> "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.
>
> I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s thesis 
> (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non computable. 
> Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is 
> reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a 
> priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by showing 
> that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that nature is not 
> computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with Mechanism 
> in physics. Now, it could be that the only not computable things is just a 
> random oracle, but this does not change the class of computable function. 
> It would change the class of polynomial-time computable function, as we 
> suspect nature do, but that confirms mechanism which predicts this.
>
>
>
>
>
> But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether ITTMs 
> are "realizable" remains to be seen.
>
>
> The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with 
> functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what the 
> physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the existence of 
> non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”.
>
>
>
>
> In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with 
> non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic biology, 
> could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not equivalently 
> replicable in a simulation.
>
>
> Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than a 
> classical computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can read 
> the basic explanation in my paper here if interested. 
>
>
> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, 
> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
> (sane04)
>
>
> The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the fact 
> that if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in arithmetic, 
> and whatever we predict about our first person experience is indeterminate 
> on the set of all computations (in arithmetic) which go through our local 
> and actual state of mind (that is: an infinity). Physicalism is refuted 
> with mechanism, and becomes a branch of machine psychology, or better 
> machine theology (the study of the non provable true propositions).
>
> I am just know writing a post on why Church’s thesis is a quasi-miracle in 
> mathematics and epistemology. In particular it entails the incompleteness 
> phenomenon, from which we can derive mathematically the physical laws. That 
> makes Mechanism testable, and indeed, we recover already the quantum 
> logical core of the formalism.
>
> Bruno
>
>  

This is very interesting. (I've written about the irreducibility of 
"matter" to physics, e.g.,
[ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/20/materialism-vs-physicalism/ 
].)



Do you see what role a "multiverse perspective of mathematical truth" could 
play in your theory?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joel_David_Hamkins#Philosophy_of_set_theory
https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223

- pt

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
> essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could offer 
> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. 
> 
> Brent 
> 
> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 
> 
> Also thought WHAT? 
>  
> 
> 
> 
> In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @JDHamkins 
>    (the set-theorist now at Oxford) considers 
> infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":
> 
> http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/ 
> 
> If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs are 
> "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.
> 
I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s thesis (with 
Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non computable. Elementary 
arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is reduced into a 
statistic on all computations, which is not something a priori computable. If 
mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by showing that nature is “too much 
computable”, not by showing that nature is not computable. Mechanism in 
cognitive science is incompatible with Mechanism in physics. Now, it could be 
that the only not computable things is just a random oracle, but this does not 
change the class of computable function. It would change the class of 
polynomial-time computable function, as we suspect nature do, but that confirms 
mechanism which predicts this.




> 
> But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether ITTMs 
> are "realizable" remains to be seen.
> 

The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with functions 
programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what the physical reality 
can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the existence of non emulable phenomena 
by computer “in real time”.



> 
> In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with non-standard 
> materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic biology, could have 
> novel computational (behavioural) abilities not equivalently replicable in a 
> simulation.
> 
> 

Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than a classical 
computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can read the basic 
explanation in my paper here if interested. 


B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th International 
System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 
2004.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
(sane04)


The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the fact that 
if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in arithmetic, and 
whatever we predict about our first person experience is indeterminate on the 
set of all computations (in arithmetic) which go through our local and actual 
state of mind (that is: an infinity). Physicalism is refuted with mechanism, 
and becomes a branch of machine psychology, or better machine theology (the 
study of the non provable true propositions).

I am just know writing a post on why Church’s thesis is a quasi-miracle in 
mathematics and epistemology. In particular it entails the incompleteness 
phenomenon, from which we can derive mathematically the physical laws. That 
makes Mechanism testable, and indeed, we recover already the quantum logical 
core of the formalism.

Bruno




> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

If one identifies "arithmetic" with "computation" (or "code"):


To get out of the matter/computation vs. *c*omputation/m*atter* "debate", I 
have written about how

  * All is catter!  *   (Caterialism)
 
... so the baby isn't split.

And then move on.

*Matter as code*
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/03/22/material-as-code/

catter

  *To thrive.*

https://www.wordnik.com/words/catter


from The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Century_Dictionary


- pt

On Friday, August 31, 2018 at 5:59:23 PM UTC-5, ronaldheld wrote:
>
> AR : Arithmatic Reality 
>   Ronald
>
> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 12:08:28 PM UTC-4, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>> The codical-material universe:
>>
>> The Babel of Languages and the Substrate of Nature
>>
>>   https://codicalist.wordpress.com/contents/
>>
>>
>> I'm in the "process" is writing an ebook as a collection of"Notes", now a 
>> list of 94.
>>
>> The simple thesis: All is matter, but a;; matter has codicality (a 
>> codical, programmatic nature).
>>
>> Some of these Notes might be of interest.
>>
>>
>> - Philip Thrift
>>
>

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Re: The codical-material universe

[ronaldheld]

AR : Arithmatic Reality 
  Ronald

On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 12:08:28 PM UTC-4, Philip Thrift wrote:

> The codical-material universe:
>
> The Babel of Languages and the Substrate of Nature
>
>   https://codicalist.wordpress.com/contents/
>
>
> Im in the "process" is writing an ebook as a collection of"Notes", now a 
> list of 94.
>
> The simple thesis: All is matter, but a;; matter has codicality (a 
> codical, programmatic nature).
>
> Some of these Notes might be of interest.
>
>
> - Philip Thrift
>

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

It dawned on me: AR = anti-reductionist.

The codicalist view allows for AR-physicalism, or AR-materialism.

- pt

On Thursday, August 30, 2018 at 2:25:09 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> What does "AR" stand for?
>
> - Philip Thrift
>
> On Thursday, August 30, 2018 at 1:11:12 PM UTC-5, ronaldheld wrote:
>>
>> This is a hypothesis a non AR, Physicalist can accept?
>>   Ronald
>>
>> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 12:08:28 PM UTC-4, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>> The codical-material universe:
>>>
>>> The Babel of Languages and the Substrate of Nature
>>>
>>>   https://codicalist.wordpress.com/contents/
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm in the "process" is writing an ebook as a collection of"Notes", now 
>>> a list of 94.
>>>
>>> The simple thesis: All is matter, but all matter has codicality (a 
>>> codical, programmatic nature).
>>>
>>> Some of these Notes might be of interest.
>>>
>>>
>>> - Philip Thrift
>>>
>>

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

What does "AR" stand for?

- Philip Thrift

On Thursday, August 30, 2018 at 1:11:12 PM UTC-5, ronaldheld wrote:
>
> This is a hypothesis a non AR, Physicalist can accept?
>   Ronald
>
> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 12:08:28 PM UTC-4, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>> The codical-material universe:
>>
>> The Babel of Languages and the Substrate of Nature
>>
>>   https://codicalist.wordpress.com/contents/
>>
>>
>> I'm in the "process" is writing an ebook as a collection of"Notes", now a 
>> list of 94.
>>
>> The simple thesis: All is matter, but all matter has codicality (a 
>> codical, programmatic nature).
>>
>> Some of these Notes might be of interest.
>>
>>
>> - Philip Thrift
>>
>

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Re: The codical-material universe

[ronaldheld]

This is a hypothesis a non AR, Physicalist can accept?
  Ronald

On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 12:08:28 PM UTC-4, Philip Thrift wrote:

> The codical-material universe:
>
> The Babel of Languages and the Substrate of Nature
>
>   https://codicalist.wordpress.com/contents/
>
>
> Im in the "process" is writing an ebook as a collection of"Notes", now a 
> list of 94.
>
> The simple thesis: All is matter, but a;; matter has codicality (a 
> codical, programmatic nature).
>
> Some of these Notes might be of interest.
>
>
> - Philip Thrift
>

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 6:15:50 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 8/29/2018 4:04 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
>> essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could offer 
>> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. 
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 
>>
>> Also thought WHAT? 
>>
>  
>
>
>
> In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @*JDHamkins* 
>    (the set-theorist now at Oxford) 
> considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":
>
>
> http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/
>
> If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs are 
> "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.
>
> But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether ITTMs 
> are "realizable" remains to be seen.
>
>
> In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with 
> non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic biology, 
> could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not equivalently 
> replicable in a simulation.
>
>
> And John Searle thinks only wetware can be conscious.  The question is, do 
> they have evidence for this?  After all a simulation can go all the way 
> down to subatomic level.  There's nothing in principle requiring it to stop 
> at the neuron level, although that's where most AI researchers assume the 
> information processing happens.
>
> Brent
>
 

Then in a practical sense it is a race to see who can make the first 
conscious "robot": a synthetic-bio wetware team, and the alternative teams. 
And even then we may not be sure.

- pt

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/29/2018 4:04 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's
essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could offer
some other definition, but it would need to be realisable.

Brent

On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
> also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang

Also thought WHAT?





In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins @*JDHamkins* 
   (the set-theorist now at Oxford) 
considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":



http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/

If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs 
are "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.


But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether 
ITTMs are "realizable" remains to be seen.



In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with 
non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic 
biology, could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not 
equivalently replicable in a simulation.




And John Searle thinks only wetware can be conscious.  The question is, 
do they have evidence for this?  After all a simulation can go all the 
way down to subatomic level.  There's nothing in principle requiring it 
to stop at the neuron level, although that's where most AI researchers 
assume the information processing happens.


Brent

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
> essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could offer 
> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. 
>
> Brent 
>
> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 
>
> Also thought WHAT? 
>
 



In terms of theory, Joel David  Hamkins  @*JDHamkins* 
   (the set-theorist now at Oxford) 
considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation":


http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/

If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and  ITTMs are 
"natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs.

But what does the presence of ITTMs  mean for the CT thesis? Whether ITTMs 
are "realizable" remains to be seen.


In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with 
non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic biology, 
could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not equivalently 
replicable in a simulation.


- pt



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Re: The codical-material universe

[Brent Meeker]

Do you have some evidence for doubting CT?  It seems that it's 
essentially a definition of digital computation.  So you could offer 
some other definition, but it would need to be realisable.


Brent

On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang 


Also thought WHAT?

Brent

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

This is just a repeat of the  message I posted yesterday. but didn't 
appear. 

My proposition is that  *Matter precedes computation*, but also that the 
Church-Turing thesis is doubtable, also thought by some in what I call the 
UCNC gang [ International Conference on Unconventional Computation and 
Natural Computation : https://ucnc2018.lacl.fr/ ].

- Philip Thrift

On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 11:08:28 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
> The codical-material universe:
>
> The Babel of Languages and the Substrate of Nature
>
>   https://codicalist.wordpress.com/contents/
>
>
> I'm in the "process" is writing an ebook as a collection of"Notes", now a 
> list of 94.
>
> The simple thesis: All is matter, but a;; matter has codicality (a 
> codical, programmatic nature).
>
> Some of these Notes might be of interest.
>
>
> - Philip Thrift
>

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