Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Nov 2015, at 20:21, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Nov 5, 2015 at 4:15 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​>​ it is true independently of me verify it or not. That is why  
I can say that I am sure that Goldbach conjecture is true or not,  
that Riemann hypothesis is true or not. I accept the excluded middle


​I agree, but that doesn't guarantee that we will ever find a way  
to determine if they are true or not even in theory.


But that is not relevant.





And truth alone can't DO anything,



If it is true that there is a continuation of my computational history  
where I will want coffee, then it is true that I may want coffee,  
independently of my ability to compute that state by myself, and,  
independently of the fact that such a computation is run by this or  
that universal number.


For a computaionalist: to say that physics must prevails, is like  
saying that only this universal number plays a role, and if it is  
another, then consciousness does not appear. But then how could I say  
yes to a doctor who will not care about which universal nulber will  
implement the relevant loop for my consciousness.


That idea can only be based on some non Turing emulable primary  
matter, but computationalism explains why we do have that impression,  
given that below our substitution level, we can see the trace of the  
infinite set of computations going to my state, and that is like a  
primary non emulable matter, without committing oneself ontologically.


If, you have to explain the role of that primary matter, and I doubt  
you can do this without abandoning Digital Mechanism.







and yet we know for certain that stuff gets done.


I can admit that we know for certain that we are conscious. But  
nothing more.





Without  matter that obeys the laws of physics the truth or  
falsehood of Goldbach or Riemann is irrelevant, neither can DO  
diddly squat​.


Proof?






​>> ​But without access to matter that obeys the laws of physics  
truth alone can't  DO anything.


​>​Why?

​Because of induction. In the entire history of the world nobody  
has ever made even the simplest calculation without using matter  
that obeys the laws of physics and nobody has even come close to  
doing so; I therefore use induction to conclude that more likely  
than not nobody ever will. As to why existence is organized in this  
way I don't pretend to understand, all I know is that it probably  
is. ​


Don't confuse "doing a physical computation" and "computations exists  
in arithmetic".


With computationalism, we have to explain the phenomenology of the  
first from the second.







 ​>> ​The relationship that a truth has with another truth, or  
even with a untruth, never changes, it's completely static.  And  
consciousness is not static and neither is intelligence.


​> ​I never herad you defending the idea that time is primitive?

​I don't know if time is a primitive


Then you should not use it in an argument.



or not but I do know that time is just one dimension, there are at  
least 3 more. ​


​> ​You are arguing aganist any notion of block universe, like  
Prigogine, and Stephen Paul King.


​If the block universe were homogeneous then neither consciousness  
nor intelligence could exist but obviously it is not, there are  
variations.  ​


​>> ​​It would be trivially easy to write a program that would  
generate all correct textbooks in mathematics and physics of 1000  
pages or less, but it would be ASTRONOMICALLY more difficult to  
generate *only* correct textbooks in mathematics and physics of 1000  
pages or less; and it could not even be attempted without matter  
that obeys the laws of physics.


​> ​You confuse babel library with the universal dovetailer,  
which write only correct programs,


​I don't confuse a damn thing. Neither a "​universal dovetailer"  
nor anything else can write ONLY correct programs (or ONLY correct  
anything) without the use of matter that obeys the laws of physics.


You keep confusing "physical computation" with "computation" in the  
sense of Church, Post, Turing, ...


Bruno





 John K Clark




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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 04 Nov 2015, at 18:35, John Clark wrote:




On Tue, Nov 3, 2015 at 4:32 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​>> ​If sentence X says "2+2=5" then sentence X expresses a  
numerical relationship, that association may or may not belong to  
the category "true" but it's certainly a relationship. The problem  
isn't that true mathematical relationships don't exist it's that  
false ones do too,


​> ​In physics and the everyday life too, but why should we take  
into account false proposition into account?


​But it's not false! It's true to say that "2+2" and "=5" ​ are  
in a relationship, they are both in a sentence that says ​ "2+2 =5".


Then "2+2=5" has nothing to do with what I am talking about, and in  
your sense it is just another arithmetical truth using bad notation.  
But, OK, if it is true, then my point remains correct. You should just  
use less confusing notation.





But if you want to determine if what that sentence says is true or  
not, then you will need to make a calculation, and that can only be  
done with matter that obeys the laws of physics.


Not at all. If it is true, it is true independently of me verify it or  
not. That is why I can say that I am sure that Goldbach conjecture is  
true or not, that Riemann hypothesis is true or not. I accept the  
excluded middle principle for the arithmetical proposition. [](A v B)  
just doesn't imply that []A or []B is true, but that A is true or B is  
true.







​>> ​and the only way anybody has ever been able to separate true  
statements from false statements is by using matter that obeys the  
laws of physics.


​> ​The whole point of realism is that the truth is independent  
of the fact that we verify them.


But without access to matter that obeys the laws of physics truth  
alone can't  DO anything.


Why? I think that this comes from your assumption, but that is refuted  
with Mechanism.





The relationship that a truth has with another truth, or even with a  
untruth, never changes, it's completely static.  And consciousness  
is not static and neither is intelligence.


I never herad you defending the idea that time is primitive? You are  
arguing aganist any notion of block universe, like Prigogine, and  
Stephen Paul King.


No (logical) problem, but it can't work with the computationalist  
assumption.







​> ​If not, you could say anything, both in physics and in  
arithmetic.


​It would be trivially easy to write a program that would generate  
all correct textbooks in mathematics and physics of 1000 pages or  
less, but it would be ASTRONOMICALLY more difficult to generate  
*only* correct textbooks in mathematics and physics of 1000 pages or  
less; and it could not even be attempted without matter that obeys  
the laws of physics.


You confuse babel library with the universal dovetailer, which write  
only correct programs, and correctly emulate them.
Then the laws of physics appears as stable appearances on the "border"  
of the universal mind attached to the universal person defined by the  
universal machine.







​>> ​And that is my explanation for why INTEL makes  
microprocessors out of silicon and not out of definitions and  
theorems;


​> ​INTEL use silicon because he wants that the object or people  
supported by its computation can manifest itself relatively to our  
most probable computations in arithmetic.


​If mathematics is more fundamental than physics then you have no  
explanation why all numerical relationships can not manifest  
themselves directly to ​people without the need of silicon as a  
middleman.



No, it is false. I do have the explanation, but you need to stop  
denying your understanding of step 3, to begin with.




But if physics is more fundamental than mathematics then it's easy  
for me to explain why silicon is needed.


Only by adding actual infinities in the mind and matter, and an ad hoc  
dualist link between.






​> ​Comp predicted​ [...]​

​I'm not interested in what "comp" predicted.


Comp is mechanism, and you are the most interested one on this as you  
are the comp-practionner of the group here.


You just deny that comp -> step 3, but nobody understand your way of  
reasoning on this, as we toild you before.


bruno





John K Clark​


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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[John Clark]

On Thu, Nov 5, 2015 at 4:15 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> ​>​
>  it is true independently of me verify it or not. That is why I can say
> that I am sure that Goldbach conjecture is true or not, that Riemann
> hypothesis is true or not. I accept the excluded middle
>

​I agree, but that doesn't guarantee that we will ever find a way to
determine if they are true or not even in theory. And truth alone can't DO
anything, and yet we know for certain that stuff gets done.
Without  matter that obeys the laws of physics the truth or falsehood of
Goldbach or Riemann is irrelevant, neither can DO diddly squat​.



> ​>> ​
>> But without access to matter that obeys the laws of physics truth alone
>> can't  DO anything.
>
>
> ​>​
> Why?
>

​Because of induction. In the entire history of the world nobody has ever
made even the simplest calculation without using matter that obeys the laws
of physics and nobody has even come close to doing so; I therefore use
induction to conclude that more likely than not nobody ever will. As to why
existence is organized in this way I don't pretend to understand, all I
know is that it probably is. ​


>> ​>> ​
>> The relationship that a truth has with another truth, or even with a
>> untruth, never changes, it's completely static.  And consciousness is not
>> static and neither is intelligence.
>
>
> ​> ​
> I never herad you defending the idea that time is primitive?
>

​I don't know if time is a primitive or not but I do know that time is just
one dimension, there are *at least* 3 more. ​


> ​> ​
> You are arguing aganist any notion of block universe, like Prigogine, and
> Stephen Paul King.
>

​If the block universe were homogeneous then neither consciousness nor
intelligence could exist but obviously it is not, there are variations.  ​


​>> ​
>> ​It would be trivially easy to write a program that would generate all
>> correct textbooks in mathematics and physics of 1000 pages or less, but it
>> would be *ASTRONOMICALLY* more difficult to generate **only** correct
>> textbooks in mathematics and physics of 1000 pages or less; and it could
>> not even be attempted without matter that obeys the laws of physics.
>
>

​> ​
> You confuse babel library with the universal dovetailer, which write only
> correct programs,
>

​I don't confuse a damn thing. Neither a "​universal dovetailer" nor
anything else can write *ONLY* correct programs (or *ONLY* correct
anything) without the use of matter that obeys the laws of physics.

 John K Clark


>

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 6 November 2015 at 06:21, John Clark  wrote:

>
> ​I don't confuse a damn thing. Neither a "​universal dovetailer" nor
> anything else can write *ONLY* correct programs (or *ONLY* correct
> anything) without the use of matter that obeys the laws of physics.
>

But those programs which are conscious will not have their consciousness
cancelled out by the gibberish.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thursday, 5 November 2015, John Clark  wrote:

​It would be trivially easy to write a program that would generate all
> correct textbooks in mathematics and physics of 1000 pages or less, but it
> would be *ASTRONOMICALLY* more difficult to generate **only** correct
> textbooks in mathematics and physics of 1000 pages or less; and it could
> not even be attempted without matter that obeys the laws of physics.
>

But if rather than textbooks the program is generating virtual worlds
containing observers, it wouldn't make any difference to the inhabitants of
those worlds that you, the external observer, could not recognise and
interact with them.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Russell Standish]

On Wed, Nov 04, 2015 at 03:15:51PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 4/11/2015 1:26 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
> >On Wed, Nov 04, 2015 at 11:59:41AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >>I disagree. I do not think the quantum mechanics /ab initio/ is in
> >>any way possible.
> >This is what I do in appendix D of my book. It then behooves you to
> >point out where exactly that is wrong.
> 
> You don't actually derive QM /ab initio/ there:  you know where you
> want to get and then make a series of appropriate assumptions. You

It is not illegal to have a target in mind when deriving
something. The important point is not to sneak the target into the
assumptions. Provided the assumptions stand on their own, that's fine.


> postulate that the observer can choose an observable, which has a
> discrete set of possible outcomes.

Yes - I can't image what observation means otherwise. Even when
measuring a supposedly continuous variable, the outcome of the
measurement will still be discrete - such as somewhere in the discrete
interval 1.345 +/- 0.001.

> You then assume a probability
> interpretation. 

The axioms are there to give a definition of the term "probability". I
haven't heard of them being controversial.

> The relationship to observations is simply assumed.

Given that observation is a matter of turning possible into actual,
or selecting a particular measurment outcome from the range of
possible, there will be a probability associated with each possible outcome.

> I do not see any derivation of the fact that possible outcomes of
> measurements are the eigenvalues of the corresponding operator. 

That the outcomes of observables are encoded as eigenvalues is a
convention that has some calculation convenience, but no further
significance. One can formulate QM entirely in terms of projection
operators without the need of the notion of Observable being a
hermitian operator with eigenvalues being the set of outcomes.

To get from one to other, in my derivation you have a set of
projection operators {Pₐ}, where ∪ a = S, the certain event. The
observable A is simply given by summing over the projection operators:

   A = ∑ a Pₐ

The reverse decomposition of A is easy also - and goes by the name of
Gram-Schmidt orthonormalisation.


> You
> have a major basis problem because the best you have is that a state
> (vector) is a linear sum over some complete basis set, but you don't
> know what that basis set might be, or what it might represent.
> 

That comes from the observer's choice. Not a problem if the observer
actually has free will. A bit more of a problem if you want the
observer's choice to be determined by the physics.

> The derivation of a time evolution equation depends on the
> assumption of a classical time variable, which you assume is uniform
> and universal. 

It neither assumed uniform nor universal. It is a subjective notion
(making sense only to the observer), satisfying the axioms of a
timescale.

However, to get the usual Schrӧdinger equation, your timescale needs
to be the real numbers. Quite whether that difference makes a
difference physically, I leave to the interested student :).

> You do not demonstrate that the 'Hamiltonian' you
> have in your time evolution equation is the energy operator. 

It is by virtue of Noether's theorem. In my work I don't address the
correspondence principle at all, but if it's going to be addressed,
then Vic Stenger's gauge invariance approach is most likely to be how
it is done.

> In fact
> you show nothing at all about H, or about any dynamics -- which
> presumably you take over from classical mechanics or something
> similar.
> 

Not at all. I stop before anything to with classical mechanics, or the
correpondence principle comes into play.

> This scarcely counts as a derivation of any useful physics at all,
> much less of quantum mechanics that relates to observational
> results.
> 

It is a derivation of quantum mechanics, from simple assumptions about
what it means to observe stuff. That quantum mechanics needs
a correspondence principle to make contact with classical measuring
apparatuses goes beyond what I was attempting to do.


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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruce Kellett]

On 5/11/2015 11:03 am, Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, Nov 04, 2015 at 03:15:51PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:

This scarcely counts as a derivation of any useful physics at all,
much less of quantum mechanics that relates to observational
results.

It is a derivation of quantum mechanics, from simple assumptions about
what it means to observe stuff. That quantum mechanics needs
a correspondence principle to make contact with classical measuring
apparatuses goes beyond what I was attempting to do.


But, without this contact with experiment, it is not a derivation of 
quantum mechanics. You have merely developed a formalism -- a formalism 
that could be applied to almost anything. For example, you could apply 
this to the 24 runners in the Melbourne Cup. Each horse has some 
probability of winning -- the race is an observer moment with a set of 
possibilities consistent with what is known at that point in time  
etc, etc, etc. So your formalism would apply to this, as well as to most 
other things that we experience. There is nothing in the formalism to 
distinguish quantum events from anything else, so it is not quantum 
mechanics.


Bruce

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/4/2015 5:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 5/11/2015 11:03 am, Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, Nov 04, 2015 at 03:15:51PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:

This scarcely counts as a derivation of any useful physics at all,
much less of quantum mechanics that relates to observational
results.

It is a derivation of quantum mechanics, from simple assumptions about
what it means to observe stuff. That quantum mechanics needs
a correspondence principle to make contact with classical measuring
apparatuses goes beyond what I was attempting to do.


But, without this contact with experiment, it is not a derivation of 
quantum mechanics. You have merely developed a formalism -- a 
formalism that could be applied to almost anything. For example, you 
could apply this to the 24 runners in the Melbourne Cup. Each horse 
has some probability of winning -- the race is an observer moment with 
a set of possibilities consistent with what is known at that point in 
time  etc, etc, etc. So your formalism would apply to this, as 
well as to most other things that we experience. There is nothing in 
the formalism to distinguish quantum events from anything else, so it 
is not quantum mechanics.


Scott Aaronson describes how QM could have been invented by armchair 
philosophizing about extending probability theory to negative values.  
He then says the fact that nobody did this is the best argument he knows 
for the importance of experimental science.


Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Russell Standish]

On Thu, Nov 05, 2015 at 12:17:23PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 5/11/2015 11:03 am, Russell Standish wrote:
> >On Wed, Nov 04, 2015 at 03:15:51PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >>This scarcely counts as a derivation of any useful physics at all,
> >>much less of quantum mechanics that relates to observational
> >>results.
> >It is a derivation of quantum mechanics, from simple assumptions about
> >what it means to observe stuff. That quantum mechanics needs
> >a correspondence principle to make contact with classical measuring
> >apparatuses goes beyond what I was attempting to do.
> 
> But, without this contact with experiment, it is not a derivation of
> quantum mechanics. You have merely developed a formalism -- a
> formalism that could be applied to almost anything. For example, you
> could apply this to the 24 runners in the Melbourne Cup. Each horse
> has some probability of winning -- the race is an observer moment
> with a set of possibilities consistent with what is known at that
> point in time  etc, etc, etc. So your formalism would apply to
> this, as well as to most other things that we experience. There is
> nothing in the formalism to distinguish quantum events from anything
> else, so it is not quantum mechanics.
> 

Insofar as the Melbourne cup is describable by quantum mechanics, that
is true. If not, then it is not applicable. Probably classical
probability theory only works in the special case of observers drawn
from a set with positive real measure.

Quantum mechanics has plenty of contact with experiment. What I was
doing was finding where that mathematical structure comes from. It
also points to generalisations - such as non-continuous timescales,
and quaternionic measures, that would be interesting to work out what
the experimental consequences are.

The issue of why classical mechanics "corresponds" via the
correspondence principle is not addressed. I think it a very
interesting question, and Vic Stenger's work with Noether's theorem is
part of the answer. Also Bruno's observation that classical
computation (or classical logic) might be a requirement for
computationalism is potentially an important hint.

But modulo the correspondence principle, the mysteries and
counterintuitiveness of QM is well explained - including the
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle .


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Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[John Clark]

On Tue, Nov 3, 2015 at 4:32 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​>> ​
>> If sentence X says "2+2=5" then sentence X expresses a numerical
>> relationship, that association may or may not belong to the category "true"
>> but it's certainly a relationship. The problem isn't that true mathematical
>> relationships don't exist it's that false ones do too,
>
>
> ​> ​
> In physics and the everyday life too, but why should we take into account
> false proposition into account?
>

​But it's not false! It's true to say that
"2+2" and "=5" ​

are in a relationship, they are both in a sentence that says ​ "2+2 =5".
But if you want to determine if what that sentence says is true or not,
then you will need to make a calculation, and that can only be done with
matter that obeys the laws of physics.


> ​>> ​
>> and the only way anybody has ever been able to separate true statements
>> from false statements is by using matter that obeys the laws of physics.
>
>

​> ​
> The whole point of realism is that the truth is independent of the fact
> that we verify them.
>

But without access to matter that obeys the laws of physics truth alone
can't  DO anything. The relationship that a truth has with another truth,
or even with a untruth, never changes, it's completely static.  And
consciousness is not static and neither is intelligence.


> ​> ​
> If not, you could say anything, both in physics and in arithmetic.
>

​It would be trivially easy to write a program that would generate all
correct textbooks in mathematics and physics of 1000 pages or less, but it
would be *ASTRONOMICALLY* more difficult to generate **only** correct
textbooks in mathematics and physics of 1000 pages or less; and it could
not even be attempted without matter that obeys the laws of physics.

​>> ​
>> And that is my explanation for why INTEL makes microprocessors out of
>> silicon and not out of definitions and theorems;
>
>
> ​> ​
> INTEL use silicon because he wants that the object or people supported by
> its computation can manifest itself relatively to our most probable
> computations in arithmetic.
>

​If mathematics is more fundamental than physics then you have no
explanation why all numerical relationships can not manifest themselves
directly to ​people without the need of silicon as a middleman. But if
physics is more fundamental than mathematics then it's easy for me to
explain why silicon is needed.

​> ​
> Comp predicted
> ​ [...]​
>
>
​I'm not interested in what "comp" predicted.

John K Clark​

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 04 Nov 2015, at 00:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 4/11/2015 4:49 am, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/3/2015 4:49 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 3/11/2015 8:50 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Nov 2015, at 11:23, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 2/11/2015 7:10 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The choice of the bases is what Zurek have explained. That  
extends Everett.


I think you should study Zurek at little more closely. He did  
not actually explain the choice of basis. His result was that  
the basis had to be robust against environmental decoherence --  
which is true, but does not give the actual basis. Position  
space is a Hilbert space, not a basis for a Hilbert space.


?

Position provides a basis for the Hilbert space, which is  
independent of the choice of that basis. we could use momentum  
instead, and described the position by linear combination of  
momentum, and Zurek wil still justify that the subject with a  
brain will handle the position more easily than using the momentum.


I am not sure I can make sense of "Position space is a Hilbert  
space". An Hilbert space is closed for linear combination (even  
infinite) of any element belonging to any bases chosen in the  
Hilbert space.


Basic quantum mechanics. Observables are represented by hermitian  
operators, possible measurement results are the eigenvalues of  
such operators. The operators act in the Hilbert space spanned by  
the complete orthonormal set of eigenvectors. The problem is that  
the form of the operator is not determined by the theory, and the  
eigenvectors of each possible operator in the space provide a  
different possible basis. By completeness, each possible basis can  
be expressed as linear combinations of the vectors of any other  
basis -- these are the (infamous) quantum superpositions.


The choice of basis (or equivalently, the choice for the form of  
the operator) is the basis problem of quantum mechanics. Zurek's  
einselection is an attempt to solve this problem by finding a  
basis (and associated set of eigenvalues) that is robust against  
environmental disturbance. It turns out, by Bohr's Correspondence  
Principle, that the basis corresponding to the classical position  
variable is robust in this sense, but that scarcely solves the  
general basis problem because it is essentially a circular  
argument -- stable classical values come out if we build in  
classical variables.


I think that would have been better expressed if you had noted that  
the robust basis is not necessarily the position basis.  As  
Schlosshauer notes, for atomic size things it is often the energy  
eigenvalues that are robust.   But we didn't predict that; we have  
discovered it empirically.


This is the mistake made by both Zurek and Schlosshauer: Position  
and energy are variables, not bases, and for both you have the same  
basis problem (both are operators in infinite dimensional Hilbert 
spaces, but *different* spaces). The question as to whether a  
measurement is primarily one of position or of energy is  depends on  
the system under study and the experimental set up. But the basis in  
either position or energy space still has to be chosen. Einselection  
then turns out to be rather trivial because all the measurements and  
interaction Hamiltonians are always expressed in terms of the  
classical counterparts of the relevant variables.



So would it be a complete solution of the measurement problem if we  
could predict which basis choice would provide robust eigenvalues?  
Would this prediction start from a very complex instrument/ 
environment interaction Hamiltonian?  It seems that if it did we'd  
be in the position of having to do stat mech on the interaction,  
which would again involve assumptions about chaos and averaging?  I  
think we might run into Chris'es "cat in the tree" problem.


The argument that is made is that the 'classical' world emerges from  
the quantum, in the sense that the quantum is more fundamental. But  
when we look into it, we find that Bohr was quite perceptive with  
his Correspondence Principle: since we are essentially 'classical'  
beings, we have to start with classical concepts even to begin to  
build a quantum theory. I doubt that it would be even possible to  
construct a quantum theory ab initio, without reference to classical  
ideas.


OK.

Now, with computationalism, we assume classical logic, but only on the  
arithmetical propositions, and the quantum is retrieved from the logic  
of "probability one" on the sigma_1 sentences (the pieces of  
computation), or the logic of the yes/no experimental question in that  
context. The quantum appears as describing our first person (plural)  
view emerging from our distribution in the Universal Dovetailing.


The quantum is given by the digital seen from inside by digital finite  
creature. We can get an intuition of this directly from the UD  
Argument, and the math confirms that we get a quantum logic, a priori  
different 

Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 03 Nov 2015, at 18:33, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 11/3/2015 1:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Nov 2015, at 11:23, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 2/11/2015 7:10 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Nov 2015, at 06:17, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Which is just your idiosyncratic way of saying that we have to  
apply a projection operator.


No, we have to recover the "projection operator" from the  
computationalist quantization. It is a math problem.


So do it.


That has been the subject of the PhD thesis. I can explain all the  
detail, but you will need to invest more time in computer science/ 
mathematical logic. It is not a simple problem. UDA took a flash in  
my childhood, AUDA took 30 years of works (in part because some  
people makes me doubt of some results or conjecture I made for  
years, until I saw them solved and published by others, to which I  
refer. The problem now is that those interested in metaphysics seem  
to be not enough patient to do the math. Philosophy attracts often  
people who dislike a lot math and "exact" science. My whole main  
point is that with computationalism, the mind body problem is  
translated into a problem in math.

And the solution is given by the
[i]p, p sigma_1, with i = 1, 2, 3, and [1]p = []p & p, [2]p =  
[]p & <>t,
and [3]p = [2]p & p  (and [] is Gödel's beweisbar, and <>t = ~[]~t  
= ~[]f).


The solution to what?  And what does it mean "given by".


The solution of the problem of recovering a projection operator in the  
mechanist context, and here in the quantum logic that you obtain by  
inverting Goldblatt modal quantum logic from the sigma_1 arithmetical  
proposition.
Roughly speaking, you recover an arithmetical interpretation of some  
quantum logic by interpreting the atomic p by []<>p in a modal logic  
obeying the axioms of the modal logic B (normal modal logic + the  
axiom p -> []<>p, + []p -> p), by a result by Goldblatt.
The [i]p obeys to a similar logic than B (B without the  
necessitation rule + a "Löbian" corresponding axioms, derived by  
Vandenbusch for [3]<3>p), so we get a quantum logic on the sigma_1  
sentences (which play the role of the finite pieces of computations)  
with "[]<>p" playing the role of the "projection operator", which  
plays the role of the "yes-no" experiences in the UD measure problem.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 02 Nov 2015, at 11:23, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 2/11/2015 7:10 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Nov 2015, at 06:17, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Which is just your idiosyncratic way of saying that we have to  
apply a projection operator.


No, we have to recover the "projection operator" from the  
computationalist quantization. It is a math problem.


So do it.


That has been the subject of the PhD thesis. I can explain all the  
detail, but you will need to invest more time in computer science/ 
mathematical logic. It is not a simple problem. UDA took a flash in my  
childhood, AUDA took 30 years of works (in part because some people  
makes me doubt of some results or conjecture I made for years, until I  
saw them solved and published by others, to which I refer. The problem  
now is that those interested in metaphysics seem to be not enough  
patient to do the math. Philosophy attracts often people who dislike a  
lot math and "exact" science. My whole main point is that with  
computationalism, the mind body problem is translated into a problem  
in math.

And the solution is given by the
[i]p, p sigma_1, with i = 1, 2, 3, and [1]p = []p & p, [2]p = []p &  
<>t,
and [3]p = [2]p & p  (and [] is Gödel's beweisbar, and <>t = ~[]~t =  
~[]f).






The trouble with your FPI approach is that it does not explain the  
inter-subjective agreement that is an essential part of our  
experience. All people experience the same "classical" world (in  
which they agree about the observed basis vectors that are robust  
against environmental decoherence)


The indexical quantization provides the path toward the solution or  
the lack of solution. Don't confuse the intuitive FPI of the UDA,  
and its translation in math based on the Gödel-Post-Turing-Kleene  
technic which makes the self-reference mathematically precise.


Don't confuse it with what?


Sorry, it is my bad english. Don't confuse the intuitive FPI of the  
UDA *with* its translation in math (based on the Gödel-Post-Turing- 
Kleene technic which makes the self-reference povs mathematically  
precise).









The full space might well still be 'there' (in whatever sense  
you like), but the fact that the observer is conscious of only  
part of that space involves a projection operator. And  
projection operators are not time symmetric or unitary. This is  
the partial trace problem, and it remains unsolved.


It is exactly what Everett solved, assuming mechanism, by taking  
into account the personal point of view of the isolated system  
with respect to what it is isolated and not isolated. Everett  
shows this does not depend on the bases.


He showed no such thing. The basis according to which the  
"classical" world is projected out is absolutely crucial. We would  
not observe the same world in any other basis. The basis we do  
observe is the one that is robust against environmental  
decoherence -- any other basis is not robust, so rapidly devolves  
into the robust (einselected) basis.


The choice of the bases is what Zurek have explained. That extends  
Everett.


I think you should study Zurek at little more closely. He did not  
actually explain the choice of basis. His result was that the basis  
had to be robust against environmental decoherence -- which is true,  
but does not give the actual basis. Position space is a Hilbert  
space, not a basis for a Hilbert space.


?

Position provides a basis for the Hilbert space, which is independent  
of the choice of that basis. we could use momentum instead, and  
described the position by linear combination of momentum, and Zurek  
wil still justify that the subject with a brain will handle the  
position more easily than using the momentum.


I am not sure I can make sense of "Position space is a Hilbert space".  
An Hilbert space is closed for linear combination (even infinite) of  
any element belonging to any bases chosen in the Hilbert space.


Bruno



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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 02 Nov 2015, at 18:36, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Nov 2, 2015 at 3:15 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​>> ​​2+2=5 is a numerical relationship as is 2+2=4, the only  
way to segregate the​ numerical​ relationships that express a  
truth from the many that don't is to make a calculation, and the  
only way anybody has ever​ made a calculation​ in the entire  
history of the world is by using matter that obeys the laws of  
physics.


​> ​Then you reject the excluded middle principle.

​No. If sentence X says "2+2=5" then sentence X expresses a  
numerical relationship, that association may or may not belong to  
the category "true" but it's certainly a relationship. The problem  
isn't that true mathematical relationships don't exist it's that  
false ones do too,


In physics and the everyday life too, but why should we take into  
account false proposition into account?





and the only way anybody has ever been able to separate true  
statements from false statements is by using matter that obeys the  
laws of physics.


The whole point of realism is that the truth is independent of the  
fact that we verify them. If not, you could say anything, both in  
physics and in arithmetic.


In G we have [](p & q) <-> ([]p & []q), but we don't have [](p v q) <- 
>([]p v []q). Indeed, we have [](<>t v ~<>t) trivially, but we don't  
have []<>t v []~<>t.





And that is my explanation for why INTEL makes microprocessors out  
of silicon and not out of definitions and theorems;


INTEL use silicon because he wants that the object or people supported  
by its computation can manifest itself relatively to our most probable  
computations in arithmetic.




Bruno, you have no coherent explanation for that fact.


That is why this is part of the hard problem of consciousness, and my  
goal was to show exactly this.
That is far from being enough to refute computationalism and its  
consequence, as the alternate theories do not exist or are fairy  
tales. Then, the math part shows indeed that the logic of the  
observable obeys a non trivial quantum logic, which shows that the  
normality of silicon/or-similar, and its local necessity to have  
physical stable computations, might still be a consequence of  
computationalism, as it should indeed.


Comp predicted the many-computations, which arguably are confirmed by  
the fact that physicist came up with the idea independently of the  
computationalist reasoning, then the math confirms the quantum  
mathematical structure, and the symmetries of physics at the bottom,  
and perhaps the linearity of evolution. From the symmetries, and  
Noether-like theorem, we might get enough to have the unicity of the  
standard model (like recent works in quantum logic suggest). Anyway, I  
do not defend the truth of computationalism, I just point on the  
difficulties, that you seem to begin to comprehend.


Bruno



​

​ John K Clark​





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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Oct 2015, at 23:28, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/27/2015 3:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On 28 Oct 2015, at 1:30 AM, John Clark  wrote:




On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 5:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:


​ >> ​ ​From examples in the physical world. You can give as  
many botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it  
will just be a word defined by other words that are themselves  
defined by yet more words that are If you tried to dig for  
meaning all you'd find is a endless loop, it would just be a game  
where words aremanipulated  
according to the rules of botany until somebody forgot about  
definitions and pointed to the ​ASCII string "t-r-e-e" and then  
pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism made largely of  
cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then even a martian  
would notice a correspondence between this game of manipulating  
symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and the way these  
large photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose live.


​ > ​ What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and  
no I/O devices connecting it to outside trees?


There would ​ still be I/O devices connected to the ​virtual  
trees made by a computer that operated according to the laws of  
physics, if not the trees wouldn't even be virtual.  And the books  
on both virtual botany and real botany would still be more than a  
just a symbol manipulation game, they would have  semantic  
content ​ because there would be a ​ correspondence between ​  
the way the  symbols ​ are manipulated and the way the virtual  
(or real)   large photosynthesizing organism live. ​ Regardless  
of if they are virtual or real ​if you want to know how trees  
live studying those botany symbols in virtual (or real) books will  
help, so they must have  semantic content ​ .


The requirement that a computation be able to interact with the  
real world puts a restriction on what qualifies as a computation.  
You've challenged Bruno many times to perform a difficult  
computation using his Platonic computer. Well, that computation is  
occurring in front of you now in the thermal motion of the atoms in  
your desk, which under an appropriate interpretation are  
implementing a Turing machine. But you and Bruno don't have that  
appropriate interpretation, and if you did, you would have the  
result of the calculation already. In other words, the thermal  
motion computation is not understandable as such in, and cannot  
interact with, the world at the level of the substrate of its  
implementation; so it would usually be said that either there is no  
computation being implemented, or it is being implemented only in a  
trivial and useless sense. But remove the requirement for  
interaction in the real world, and this objection falls down. The  
computation is being implemented, your difficult calculation has  
been completed, and it is being appreciated by the virtual  
observers who are clapping and cheering - even though you can't  
hear them.


That's essentially Bruno's MGA, except it stops one step short.   
Bruno takes the last step and says even if the atoms of your desk  
were doing absolutely nothing there is an interpretation in which  
that is a computation; hence the atoms are superfluous.   But  
clearly then it is the interpretation which is providing the  
computation.




I do not agree with this. We might have something like that with  
analogical computation, if that could ever mean something, but with a  
computation in the sense of Church, you must be able to name the  
universal number doing the computation, and there are virtually no  
chance that a sequence of digital states constitute a computation  
(which does have the right counterfactuals). In the MGA we arrive at  
the idea that nothing do any specific computation by assuming  
materialism and mechanism, but that is what is judged absurd in the  
reductio ad absurdum to show the incompatibility between materialism  
and mechanism.


If someone pretend that a rock or something do a computation, I will  
ask here which one, and what is the universal number doing it, and  
what is the program (or how to justify that there is a program, even  
in principle).


Some physicist estimates that there is no computation at all in  
nature: only continuous analogical partial imitation of computation.  
For them, computations exists *only* in arithmetic, which is not  
implemented in nature, which use real numbers, and which approximates  
the natural numbers by infinite trigonometrical functions. I am open  
to that idea, but I think we just don't know. Computationalism might  
entaill something like that.


Bruno




Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruce Kellett]

On 3/11/2015 8:50 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Nov 2015, at 11:23, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 2/11/2015 7:10 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The choice of the bases is what Zurek have explained. That extends 
Everett.


I think you should study Zurek at little more closely. He did not 
actually explain the choice of basis. His result was that the basis 
had to be robust against environmental decoherence -- which is true, 
but does not give the actual basis. Position space is a Hilbert 
space, not a basis for a Hilbert space.


?

Position provides a basis for the Hilbert space, which is independent 
of the choice of that basis. we could use momentum instead, and 
described the position by linear combination of momentum, and Zurek 
wil still justify that the subject with a brain will handle the 
position more easily than using the momentum.


I am not sure I can make sense of "Position space is a Hilbert space". 
An Hilbert space is closed for linear combination (even infinite) of 
any element belonging to any bases chosen in the Hilbert space.


Basic quantum mechanics. Observables are represented by hermitian 
operators, possible measurement results are the eigenvalues of such 
operators. The operators act in the Hilbert space spanned by the 
complete orthonormal set of eigenvectors. The problem is that the form 
of the operator is not determined by the theory, and the eigenvectors of 
each possible operator in the space provide a different possible basis. 
By completeness, each possible basis can be expressed as linear 
combinations of the vectors of any other basis -- these are the 
(infamous) quantum superpositions.


The choice of basis (or equivalently, the choice for the form of the 
operator) is the basis problem of quantum mechanics. Zurek's 
einselection is an attempt to solve this problem by finding a basis (and 
associated set of eigenvalues) that is robust against environmental 
disturbance. It turns out, by Bohr's Correspondence Principle, that the 
basis corresponding to the classical position variable is robust in this 
sense, but that scarcely solves the general basis problem because it is 
essentially a circular argument -- stable classical values come out if 
we build in classical variables.


Bruce

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/3/2015 4:49 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 3/11/2015 8:50 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Nov 2015, at 11:23, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 2/11/2015 7:10 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The choice of the bases is what Zurek have explained. That extends 
Everett.


I think you should study Zurek at little more closely. He did not 
actually explain the choice of basis. His result was that the basis 
had to be robust against environmental decoherence -- which is true, 
but does not give the actual basis. Position space is a Hilbert 
space, not a basis for a Hilbert space.


?

Position provides a basis for the Hilbert space, which is independent 
of the choice of that basis. we could use momentum instead, and 
described the position by linear combination of momentum, and Zurek 
wil still justify that the subject with a brain will handle the 
position more easily than using the momentum.


I am not sure I can make sense of "Position space is a Hilbert 
space". An Hilbert space is closed for linear combination (even 
infinite) of any element belonging to any bases chosen in the Hilbert 
space.


Basic quantum mechanics. Observables are represented by hermitian 
operators, possible measurement results are the eigenvalues of such 
operators. The operators act in the Hilbert space spanned by the 
complete orthonormal set of eigenvectors. The problem is that the form 
of the operator is not determined by the theory, and the eigenvectors 
of each possible operator in the space provide a different possible 
basis. By completeness, each possible basis can be expressed as linear 
combinations of the vectors of any other basis -- these are the 
(infamous) quantum superpositions.


The choice of basis (or equivalently, the choice for the form of the 
operator) is the basis problem of quantum mechanics. Zurek's 
einselection is an attempt to solve this problem by finding a basis 
(and associated set of eigenvalues) that is robust against 
environmental disturbance. It turns out, by Bohr's Correspondence 
Principle, that the basis corresponding to the classical position 
variable is robust in this sense, but that scarcely solves the general 
basis problem because it is essentially a circular argument -- stable 
classical values come out if we build in classical variables.


I think that would have been better expressed if you had noted that the 
robust basis is not necessarily the position basis.  As Schlosshauer 
notes, for atomic size things it is often the energy eigenvalues that 
are robust.   But we didn't predict that; we have discovered it 
empirically.


So would it be a complete solution of the measurement problem if we 
could predict which basis choice would provide robust eigenvalues? Would 
this prediction start from a very complex instrument/environment 
interaction Hamiltonian?  It seems that if it did we'd be in the 
position of having to do stat mech on the interaction, which would again 
involve assumptions about chaos and averaging?  I think we might run 
into Chris'es "cat in the tree" problem.


Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/3/2015 1:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Nov 2015, at 11:23, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 2/11/2015 7:10 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Nov 2015, at 06:17, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Which is just your idiosyncratic way of saying that we have to 
apply a projection operator.


No, we have to recover the "projection operator" from the 
computationalist quantization. It is a math problem.


So do it.


That has been the subject of the PhD thesis. I can explain all the 
detail, but you will need to invest more time in computer 
science/mathematical logic. It is not a simple problem. UDA took a 
flash in my childhood, AUDA took 30 years of works (in part because 
some people makes me doubt of some results or conjecture I made for 
years, until I saw them solved and published by others, to which I 
refer. The problem now is that those interested in metaphysics seem to 
be not enough patient to do the math. Philosophy attracts often people 
who dislike a lot math and "exact" science. My whole main point is 
that with computationalism, the mind body problem is translated into a 
problem in math.

And the solution is given by the
[i]p, p sigma_1, with i = 1, 2, 3, and [1]p = []p & p, [2]p = []p & 
<>t,
and [3]p = [2]p & p  (and [] is Gödel's beweisbar, and <>t = ~[]~t = 
~[]f).


The solution to what?  And what does it mean "given by".

Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 03 Nov 2015, at 13:49, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 3/11/2015 8:50 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Nov 2015, at 11:23, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 2/11/2015 7:10 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The choice of the bases is what Zurek have explained. That  
extends Everett.


I think you should study Zurek at little more closely. He did not  
actually explain the choice of basis. His result was that the  
basis had to be robust against environmental decoherence -- which  
is true, but does not give the actual basis. Position space is a  
Hilbert space, not a basis for a Hilbert space.


?

Position provides a basis for the Hilbert space, which is  
independent of the choice of that basis. we could use momentum  
instead, and described the position by linear combination of  
momentum, and Zurek wil still justify that the subject with a brain  
will handle the position more easily than using the momentum.


I am not sure I can make sense of "Position space is a Hilbert  
space". An Hilbert space is closed for linear combination (even  
infinite) of any element belonging to any bases chosen in the  
Hilbert space.


Basic quantum mechanics. Observables are represented by hermitian  
operators, possible measurement results are the eigenvalues of such  
operators. The operators act in the Hilbert space spanned by the  
complete orthonormal set of eigenvectors. The problem is that the  
form of the operator is not determined by the theory, and the  
eigenvectors of each possible operator in the space provide a  
different possible basis. By completeness, each possible basis can  
be expressed as linear combinations of the vectors of any other  
basis -- these are the (infamous) quantum superpositions.


OK.




The choice of basis (or equivalently, the choice for the form of the  
operator) is the basis problem of quantum mechanics. Zurek's  
einselection is an attempt to solve this problem by finding a basis  
(and associated set of eigenvalues) that is robust against  
environmental disturbance. It turns out, by Bohr's Correspondence  
Principle, that the basis corresponding to the classical position  
variable is robust in this sense, but that scarcely solves the  
general basis problem because it is essentially a circular argument  
-- stable classical values come out if we build in classical  
variables.


I don't think this is circular if you accept classical  
computationalism (even without its immaterialist consequence). To  
develop cognitive ability, the machine needs to be able to make enough  
clear distinction between its mental states, its memories, and that  
with Everett+Zurek justifies the classical behavior of what we are  
usually talking about, like when believing that it rains, or not.


The evolution of the brains in our branches has selected the base for  
us, from our point of view. That whole process does not depend on the  
choice of the basis. We can write the universal wave in any base, or  
in any picture, but some base and picture will be preferred for  
practical reason, as we do have a long history behind us. Then the  
robustness of the position base against environmental disturbance is  
explained by the necessity of having the classical means of the  
computationalist constraint.


Classical logic (at least for arithmetic) is part of the  
computationalist assumption, although that assumption can be weakened  
a lot (but then the proofs get longer and more complex).


Bruno






Bruce

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruce Kellett]

On 4/11/2015 11:33 am, Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, Nov 04, 2015 at 10:55:56AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 4/11/2015 4:49 am, Brent Meeker wrote:

I think that would have been better expressed if you had noted
that the robust basis is not necessarily the position basis.  As
Schlosshauer notes, for atomic size things it is often the energy
eigenvalues that are robust.   But we didn't predict that; we have
discovered it empirically.

This is the mistake made by both Zurek and Schlosshauer: Position
and energy are variables, not bases, and for both you have the same
basis problem (both are operators in infinite dimensional Hilbert
spaces, but *different* spaces). The question as to whether a

Not different spaces - unless you're talking about completely
different experiments.


Generally one is talking about different experiments.


The basis problem is that position and energy
do not commute, so along which basis has reality decohered to? Why
does it seem to depend on what we're interested in measuring?


The position operator does not generally commute with the full 
Hamiltonian, though it may commute with the specific interaction 
Hamiltonian. It depends on what we are measuring precisely because the 
interaction Hamiltonian depends on the experimental set up. In some 
cases the interaction will be independent of the energy and momentum, in 
which case the interaction Hamiltonian commutes with the position 
operator. If the interaction is energy dependent, then generally only 
the Hamiltonian will commute with the interaction Hamiltonian (an energy 
measurement).


As I continue to stress, this is not the basis problem, this is a 
problem of which variable might have a stable basis. A basis is not an 
operator, it is a complete set of eigenvalues.



measurement is primarily one of position or of energy is  depends on
the system under study and the experimental set up. But the basis in
either position or energy space still has to be chosen. Einselection
then turns out to be rather trivial because all the measurements and
interaction Hamiltonians are always expressed in terms of the
classical counterparts of the relevant variables.



So would it be a complete solution of the measurement problem if
we could predict which basis choice would provide robust
eigenvalues? Would this prediction start from a very complex
instrument/environment interaction Hamiltonian?  It seems that if
it did we'd be in the position of having to do stat mech on the
interaction, which would again involve assumptions about chaos and
averaging?  I think we might run into Chris'es "cat in the tree"
problem.

The argument that is made is that the 'classical' world emerges from
the quantum, in the sense that the quantum is more fundamental. But
when we look into it, we find that Bohr was quite perceptive with
his Correspondence Principle: since we are essentially 'classical'
beings, we have to start with classical concepts even to begin to
build a quantum theory. I doubt that it would be even possible to
construct a quantum theory /ab initio/, without reference to
classical ideas.


Quantum theory ab-initio is fine, but I strongly suspect you will
never get the classical world emerging out of it with some extra
ingredient (which I believe is your critique). That extra ingredient I
think has been identified as the subjective - and the subjective is
possibly constrained to having to implement classical computation
(Bruno's idea), which explains why it is the classical world that
emerges from the quantum, not something else.


I disagree. I do not think the quantum mechanics /ab initio/ is in any 
way possible. Physics is done with respect to observations and 
experiments. Without prior observations we would not even know what 
variables we might want to write down, much less how they behave 
dynamically. I know it is the belief of most on this list that the 
subjective plays a central role in all of this, but I disagree. I do not 
think you can do physics, or even understand consciousness (the 
subjective) without reference to experience of the objective world.


Bruce

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Russell Standish]

On Wed, Nov 04, 2015 at 10:55:56AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 4/11/2015 4:49 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >I think that would have been better expressed if you had noted
> >that the robust basis is not necessarily the position basis.  As
> >Schlosshauer notes, for atomic size things it is often the energy
> >eigenvalues that are robust.   But we didn't predict that; we have
> >discovered it empirically.
> 
> This is the mistake made by both Zurek and Schlosshauer: Position
> and energy are variables, not bases, and for both you have the same
> basis problem (both are operators in infinite dimensional Hilbert
> spaces, but *different* spaces). The question as to whether a

Not different spaces - unless you're talking about completely
different experiments. The basis problem is that position and energy
do not commute, so along which basis has reality decohered to? Why
does it seem to depend on what we're interested in measuring?


> measurement is primarily one of position or of energy is  depends on
> the system under study and the experimental set up. But the basis in
> either position or energy space still has to be chosen. Einselection
> then turns out to be rather trivial because all the measurements and
> interaction Hamiltonians are always expressed in terms of the
> classical counterparts of the relevant variables.
> 
> 
> >So would it be a complete solution of the measurement problem if
> >we could predict which basis choice would provide robust
> >eigenvalues? Would this prediction start from a very complex
> >instrument/environment interaction Hamiltonian?  It seems that if
> >it did we'd be in the position of having to do stat mech on the
> >interaction, which would again involve assumptions about chaos and
> >averaging?  I think we might run into Chris'es "cat in the tree"
> >problem.
> 
> The argument that is made is that the 'classical' world emerges from
> the quantum, in the sense that the quantum is more fundamental. But
> when we look into it, we find that Bohr was quite perceptive with
> his Correspondence Principle: since we are essentially 'classical'
> beings, we have to start with classical concepts even to begin to
> build a quantum theory. I doubt that it would be even possible to
> construct a quantum theory /ab initio/, without reference to
> classical ideas.
> 

Quantum theory ab-initio is fine, but I strongly suspect you will
never get the classical world emerging out of it with some extra
ingredient (which I believe is your critique). That extra ingredient I
think has been identified as the subjective - and the subjective is
possibly constrained to having to implement classical computation
(Bruno's idea), which explains why it is the classical world that
emerges from the quantum, not something else.


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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruce Kellett]

On 4/11/2015 4:49 am, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/3/2015 4:49 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 3/11/2015 8:50 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Nov 2015, at 11:23, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 2/11/2015 7:10 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The choice of the bases is what Zurek have explained. That extends 
Everett.


I think you should study Zurek at little more closely. He did not 
actually explain the choice of basis. His result was that the basis 
had to be robust against environmental decoherence -- which is 
true, but does not give the actual basis. Position space is a 
Hilbert space, not a basis for a Hilbert space.


?

Position provides a basis for the Hilbert space, which is 
independent of the choice of that basis. we could use momentum 
instead, and described the position by linear combination of 
momentum, and Zurek wil still justify that the subject with a brain 
will handle the position more easily than using the momentum.


I am not sure I can make sense of "Position space is a Hilbert 
space". An Hilbert space is closed for linear combination (even 
infinite) of any element belonging to any bases chosen in the 
Hilbert space.


Basic quantum mechanics. Observables are represented by hermitian 
operators, possible measurement results are the eigenvalues of such 
operators. The operators act in the Hilbert space spanned by the 
complete orthonormal set of eigenvectors. The problem is that the 
form of the operator is not determined by the theory, and the 
eigenvectors of each possible operator in the space provide a 
different possible basis. By completeness, each possible basis can be 
expressed as linear combinations of the vectors of any other basis -- 
these are the (infamous) quantum superpositions.


The choice of basis (or equivalently, the choice for the form of the 
operator) is the basis problem of quantum mechanics. Zurek's 
einselection is an attempt to solve this problem by finding a basis 
(and associated set of eigenvalues) that is robust against 
environmental disturbance. It turns out, by Bohr's Correspondence 
Principle, that the basis corresponding to the classical position 
variable is robust in this sense, but that scarcely solves the 
general basis problem because it is essentially a circular argument 
-- stable classical values come out if we build in classical variables.


I think that would have been better expressed if you had noted that 
the robust basis is not necessarily the position basis.  As 
Schlosshauer notes, for atomic size things it is often the energy 
eigenvalues that are robust.   But we didn't predict that; we have 
discovered it empirically.


This is the mistake made by both Zurek and Schlosshauer: Position and 
energy are variables, not bases, and for both you have the same basis 
problem (both are operators in infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces, but 
*different* spaces). The question as to whether a measurement is 
primarily one of position or of energy is  depends on the system under 
study and the experimental set up. But the basis in either position or 
energy space still has to be chosen. Einselection then turns out to be 
rather trivial because all the measurements and interaction Hamiltonians 
are always expressed in terms of the classical counterparts of the 
relevant variables.



So would it be a complete solution of the measurement problem if we 
could predict which basis choice would provide robust eigenvalues? 
Would this prediction start from a very complex instrument/environment 
interaction Hamiltonian?  It seems that if it did we'd be in the 
position of having to do stat mech on the interaction, which would 
again involve assumptions about chaos and averaging?  I think we might 
run into Chris'es "cat in the tree" problem.


The argument that is made is that the 'classical' world emerges from the 
quantum, in the sense that the quantum is more fundamental. But when we 
look into it, we find that Bohr was quite perceptive with his 
Correspondence Principle: since we are essentially 'classical' beings, 
we have to start with classical concepts even to begin to build a 
quantum theory. I doubt that it would be even possible to construct a 
quantum theory /ab initio/, without reference to classical ideas.


Bruce

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruce Kellett]

On 4/11/2015 1:26 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, Nov 04, 2015 at 11:59:41AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:

I disagree. I do not think the quantum mechanics /ab initio/ is in
any way possible.

This is what I do in appendix D of my book. It then behooves you to
point out where exactly that is wrong.


You don't actually derive QM /ab initio/ there:  you know where you want 
to get and then make a series of appropriate assumptions. You postulate 
that the observer can choose an observable, which has a discrete set of 
possible outcomes. You then assume a probability interpretation. The 
relationship to observations is simply assumed. I do not see any 
derivation of the fact that possible outcomes of measurements are the 
eigenvalues of the corresponding operator. You have a major basis 
problem because the best you have is that a state (vector) is a linear 
sum over some complete basis set, but you don't know what that basis set 
might be, or what it might represent.


The derivation of a time evolution equation depends on the assumption of 
a classical time variable, which you assume is uniform and universal. 
You do not demonstrate that the 'Hamiltonian' you have in your time 
evolution equation is the energy operator. In fact you show nothing at 
all about H, or about any dynamics -- which presumably you take over 
from classical mechanics or something similar.


This scarcely counts as a derivation of any useful physics at all, much 
less of quantum mechanics that relates to observational results.


Bruce




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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Russell Standish]

On Wed, Nov 04, 2015 at 11:59:41AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> 
> I disagree. I do not think the quantum mechanics /ab initio/ is in
> any way possible. 

This is what I do in appendix D of my book. It then behooves you to
point out where exactly that is wrong. 

> Physics is done with respect to observations and
> experiments. Without prior observations we would not even know what
> variables we might want to write down, much less how they behave
> dynamically. I know it is the belief of most on this list that the
> subjective plays a central role in all of this, but I disagree. I do
> not think you can do physics, or even understand consciousness (the
> subjective) without reference to experience of the objective world.
> 

Modulo the fact that "objective world" is a controversial concept, I
agree. Of course one needs to refer to experience, or observation in
general. But one doesn't need to refer to specific experience, unless
one specifically needs to invoke a position basis, or an energy basis
or whatever.


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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/3/2015 8:15 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 4/11/2015 1:26 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, Nov 04, 2015 at 11:59:41AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:

I disagree. I do not think the quantum mechanics /ab initio/ is in
any way possible.

This is what I do in appendix D of my book. It then behooves you to
point out where exactly that is wrong.


You don't actually derive QM /ab initio/ there:  you know where you 
want to get and then make a series of appropriate assumptions. You 
postulate that the observer can choose an observable, which has a 
discrete set of possible outcomes. You then assume a probability 
interpretation. The relationship to observations is simply assumed. I 
do not see any derivation of the fact that possible outcomes of 
measurements are the eigenvalues of the corresponding operator. You 
have a major basis problem because the best you have is that a state 
(vector) is a linear sum over some complete basis set, but you don't 
know what that basis set might be, or what it might represent.


The derivation of a time evolution equation depends on the assumption 
of a classical time variable, which you assume is uniform and 
universal. You do not demonstrate that the 'Hamiltonian' you have in 
your time evolution equation is the energy operator. In fact you show 
nothing at all about H, or about any dynamics -- which presumably you 
take over from classical mechanics or something similar.


This scarcely counts as a derivation of any useful physics at all, 
much less of quantum mechanics that relates to observational results.


Bruce


It's interesting that there seem to be many different ways to "derive" 
QM.  Vic Stenger, in his book "The Comprehensible Cosmos" derives it as 
a gauge transformation.


http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/Nothing/Laws.pdf

Scott Aaronson in his book "Quantum Computing Since Democritus" derives 
it as the natural extension to probability theory that allows negative 
probability.   Of course partly this is possible because QM isn't really 
a physical theory, it's a schema for theories or a kind of meta-theory 
the way classical mechanics is a meta-theory of mechanisms.


Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 02 Nov 2015, at 02:12, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Nov 1, 2015 at 12:36 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​> ​The computations are emulated in virtue of the truth of  
number relationship,


​2+2=5 is a numerical relationship as is 2+2=4, the only way to  
segregate the​ numerical​ relationships that express a truth from  
the many that don't is to make a calculation, and the only way  
anybody has ever​ made a calculation​ in the entire history of  
the world is by using matter that obeys the laws of physics.


Then you reject the excluded middle principle. With A representing an  
arbitrary arithmetical sentence, you stop believing that (A or ~A) is  
true independently of our means to prove A or to prove ~A. You abandon  
arithmetical realism (and thus Church thesis, and computationalisme)  
which gives the reductio ad absurdum conclusion.


Bruno






 John K Clark


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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 02 Nov 2015, at 06:17, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 2/11/2015 4:53 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 30 Oct 2015, at 01:17, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 30/10/2015 3:47 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 27 Oct 2015, at 06:54, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 27/10/2015 9:37 am, Russell Standish wrote:
The only clarification I would make is that (with  
computationalism) the system is formal, but the observer  
(individual in your terminology) and environment (universe with  
its physics in your terminology) are a non formal partition of  
the system.


How is that partition into observer and universe made? If it is  
purely formal then it doesn't do the necessary work. But then,  
how does a purely formal system generate a non-formal division?  
I think your division builds in semantic content from the  
outside by fiat -- not in a principled way.


This is similar to my objection to the many worlds  
interpretation of QM. You have to distinguish between the  
different worlds in some way -- unitary evolution cannot do  
this. Decoherence always leaves residual correlations, and  
although these may be small, there are a very large number of  
them, so the original superposition is, in fact, still intact.  
Everett wants to make the world relative to the particular  
observer (hence 'relative state' interpretation). But to make  
sense of this mathematically you have to get rid of the unwanted  
correlations.


I don't see why. We can fuse again by amnesia, and exploit the  
unwanted correlation. They disappears only relatively, nothing is  
lost, evolution is time symmetric.


No, amnesia does not reconnect the separate worlds -- it merely  
indicates a confused individual. The world is not defined by what  
one person sees or thinks. Inter-subjective agreement is essential  
to understanding what is going on. You confuse the 1p and 3p, yet  
again.


?

Most do this by fiat -- the worlds are orthogonal FAPP. But that  
is not principled either. Mathematically, we take a partial  
trace. But we take the trace, it is not in Schroedinger's  
equation.


It is in the relative choice made by our histories (long  
computations), relatively to us. Zurek explains this rather well  
in my opinion, I mean why our type of brain needs orthogonal  
positioning, why position is favored by brain-like structures,  
for consciousness to stabilize enough to make prediction in our  
deep environment(universal computations).


Zurek does not explain the point that I am making. Zurek's  
einselection is designed to explain the preferred basis problem.  
But he misses the mark by quite a wide margin. He explains why the  
position operator is often relevant, but that merely selects a  
Hilbert space, it does not select a basis in that space.


?


If you do not understand that, then you need a refresher course in  
linear algebra and vector spaces.


The basis has to be robust against environmental interactions, not  
just the operator itself. Einselection, like decoherence, is part  
of the solution, but it is not the full solution.


But even if you have actually solved the basis problem, you still  
have not solved the problem of quantum measurement. In order to  
get just one result for an experiment with only probabilistic  
results, you have to project a subspace out of the full Hilbert  
space.


You get it by the indexical FPI, so you can define it in  
arithmetic, and in QM, with the usual machine's self-reference (à- 
la Gödel).


Which is just your idiosyncratic way of saying that we have to apply  
a projection operator.


No, we have to recover the "projection operator" from the  
computationalist quantization. It is a math problem.




The trouble with your FPI approach is that it does not explain the  
inter-subjective agreement that is an essential part of our  
experience. All people experience the same "classical" world (in  
which they agree about the observed basis vectors that are robust  
against environmental decoherence)


The indexical quantization provides the path toward the solution or  
the lack of solution. Don't confuse the intuitive FPI of the UDA, and  
its translation in math based on the Gödel-Post-Turing-Kleene technic  
which makes the self-reference mathematically precise.








The full space might well still be 'there' (in whatever sense you  
like), but the fact that the observer is conscious of only part of  
that space involves a projection operator. And projection  
operators are not time symmetric or unitary. This is the partial  
trace problem, and it remains unsolved.


It is exactly what Everett solved, assuming mechanism, by taking  
into account the personal point of view of the isolated system with  
respect to what it is isolated and not isolated. Everett shows this  
does not depend on the bases.


He showed no such thing. The basis according to which the  
"classical" world is projected out is absolutely crucial. We would  
not observe the same world in any other basis. The basis we do  

Re: Carroll's Paradox

[John Clark]

On Mon, Nov 2, 2015 at 3:15 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​>> ​
>> ​2+2=5 is a numerical relationship as is 2+2=4, the only way to
>> segregate the
>> ​
>> numerical
>> ​
>> relationships that express a truth from the many that don't is to make a
>> calculation, and the only way anybody has ever
>> ​
>> made a calculation
>> ​
>> in the entire history of the world is by using matter that obeys the laws
>> of physics.
>
>
> ​> ​
> Then you reject the excluded middle principle.
>

​No. If sentence X says "2+2=5" then sentence X expresses a numerical
relationship, that association may or may not belong to the category "true"
but it's certainly a relationship. The problem isn't that true mathematical
relationships don't exist it's that false ones do too, and the only way
anybody has ever been able to separate true statements from false
statements is by using matter that obeys the laws of physics. And that is
my explanation for why INTEL makes microprocessors out of silicon and not
out of definitions and theorems; Bruno, you have no coherent explanation
for that fact.  ​


​ John K Clark​

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruce Kellett]

On 2/11/2015 7:10 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Nov 2015, at 06:17, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Which is just your idiosyncratic way of saying that we have to apply 
a projection operator.


No, we have to recover the "projection operator" from the 
computationalist quantization. It is a math problem.


So do it.

The trouble with your FPI approach is that it does not explain the 
inter-subjective agreement that is an essential part of our 
experience. All people experience the same "classical" world (in 
which they agree about the observed basis vectors that are robust 
against environmental decoherence)


The indexical quantization provides the path toward the solution or 
the lack of solution. Don't confuse the intuitive FPI of the UDA, and 
its translation in math based on the Gödel-Post-Turing-Kleene technic 
which makes the self-reference mathematically precise.


Don't confuse it with what?

The full space might well still be 'there' (in whatever sense you 
like), but the fact that the observer is conscious of only part of 
that space involves a projection operator. And projection operators 
are not time symmetric or unitary. This is the partial trace 
problem, and it remains unsolved.


It is exactly what Everett solved, assuming mechanism, by taking 
into account the personal point of view of the isolated system with 
respect to what it is isolated and not isolated. Everett shows this 
does not depend on the bases.


He showed no such thing. The basis according to which the "classical" 
world is projected out is absolutely crucial. We would not observe 
the same world in any other basis. The basis we do observe is the one 
that is robust against environmental decoherence -- any other basis 
is not robust, so rapidly devolves into the robust (einselected) basis.


The choice of the bases is what Zurek have explained. That extends 
Everett.


I think you should study Zurek at little more closely. He did not 
actually explain the choice of basis. His result was that the basis had 
to be robust against environmental decoherence -- which is true, but 
does not give the actual basis. Position space is a Hilbert space, not a 
basis for a Hilbert space.


Bruce

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Oct 2015, at 01:17, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 30/10/2015 3:47 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 27 Oct 2015, at 06:54, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 27/10/2015 9:37 am, Russell Standish wrote:
The only clarification I would make is that (with  
computationalism) the system is formal, but the observer  
(individual in your terminology) and environment (universe with  
its physics in your terminology) are a non formal partition of  
the system.


How is that partition into observer and universe made? If it is  
purely formal then it doesn't do the necessary work. But then, how  
does a purely formal system generate a non-formal division? I  
think your division builds in semantic content from the outside by  
fiat -- not in a principled way.


This is similar to my objection to the many worlds interpretation  
of QM. You have to distinguish between the different worlds in  
some way -- unitary evolution cannot do this. Decoherence always  
leaves residual correlations, and although these may be small,  
there are a very large number of them, so the original  
superposition is, in fact, still intact. Everett wants to make the  
world relative to the particular observer (hence 'relative state'  
interpretation). But to make sense of this mathematically you have  
to get rid of the unwanted correlations.


I don't see why. We can fuse again by amnesia, and exploit the  
unwanted correlation. They disappears only relatively, nothing is  
lost, evolution is time symmetric.


No, amnesia does not reconnect the separate worlds -- it merely  
indicates a confused individual. The world is not defined by what  
one person sees or thinks. Inter-subjective agreement is essential  
to understanding what is going on. You confuse the 1p and 3p, yet  
again.


?






Most do this by fiat -- the worlds are orthogonal FAPP. But that  
is not principled either. Mathematically, we take a partial trace.  
But we take the trace, it is not in Schroedinger's equation.


It is in the relative choice made by our histories (long  
computations), relatively to us. Zurek explains this rather well in  
my opinion, I mean why our type of brain needs orthogonal  
positioning, why position is favored by brain-like structures, for  
consciousness to stabilize enough to make prediction in our deep  
environment(universal computations).


Zurek does not explain the point that I am making. Zurek's  
einselection is designed to explain the preferred basis problem. But  
he misses the mark by quite a wide margin. He explains why the  
position operator is often relevant, but that merely selects a  
Hilbert space, it does not select a basis in that space.



?



The basis has to be robust against environmental interactions, not  
just the operator itself. Einselection, like decoherence, is part of  
the solution, but it is not the full solution.


But even if you have actually solved the basis problem, you still  
have not solved the problem of quantum measurement. In order to get  
just one result for an experiment with only probabilistic results,  
you have to project a subspace out of the full Hilbert space.


You get it by the indexical FPI, so you can define it in arithmetic,  
and in QM, with the usual machine's self-reference (à-la Gödel).





The full space might well still be 'there' (in whatever sense you  
like), but the fact that the observer is conscious of only part of  
that space involves a projection operator. And projection operators  
are not time symmetric or unitary. This is the partial trace  
problem, and it remains unsolved.


It is exactly what Everett solved, assuming mechanism, by taking into  
account the personal point of view of the isolated system with respect  
to what it is isolated and not isolated. Everett shows this does not  
depend on the bases. It corresponds with the eigen value of the  
frequency operator, justifying the "squaring" of the amplitude  
(something seen by Paulette Février-Destouches, a student of De  
Broglie, and by Finkelstein).
It is not solve for a computationalist as we have to justify the ortho- 
structure, but we get one (well, 3) at the propositional level already.


Bruno





Bruce

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Oct 2015, at 17:56, John Clark wrote:


On Fri, Oct 30, 2015  Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

I'll try again... fooling myself again in believing you're honest here

​Oh dear, I feared that "bye" in your last post didn't mean  
much. ​


​> ​So let's pretend our "AI" is in fact a Nintendo Entertainment  
System game... that game, can be run on a physical NES, or can be  
run in an emulator running on a physical computer... or on an  
emulator running on an emulator running on a physical computer...


​That's OK provided one of 2 things is true:

1) The sequence of simulations of simulations of simulations  
eventually terminates with a physical computer.


Amen.

Actually it could terminate in any Turing universal system, the  
physical one (if they exist) or the arithmetical one, the group  
theoretical one, the set theoretical one, the list-theoretical one,  
the combinators, etc.


The computations are emulated in virtue of the truth of number  
relationship, and emulation itself can be defined by a relation  
between a universal number, another number (the data), and the  
numbering of the steps of the computations (an injection in N). The  
computation is in the truth of such relation, not in the description  
of such relations (to avoid Bruce Kellet dismissing the semantic of  
programs behavior and (self)-reference.





2) The sequence is infinite and never terminates; in which case  
mathematics really would be more fundamental than physics.  ​


If you think a little bit farer (than step 3, alas) you can expect  
something close to this being a consequence of us surviving in Turing  
physical machines: below our substitution level, the sequence is  
infinite a priori. For any computation going through your states in  
arithmetic, there is a more simpler, and more efficacious, yet bigger  
one which do it to. (That can be deduce from speeding-up theorem in  
theoretical computer science)


Bruno





​> ​From the POV of the game, it is unable to distinguish those  
cases


​Agreed. ​

​> ​Same thing with the AI, the information it has access to, it  
cannot tell the ontological status of what that information  
represent... those informations could come from a really real  
ontological physical world... or an emulation of the  really real  
ontological physical world or an emulation of an emulation of the   
really real ontological physical world it has no way to decide  
the ontological status of that "external world".


​Agreed.​ ​

 John K Clark​






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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 31 Oct 2015, at 02:42, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/30/2015 11:36 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-10-30 19:20 GMT+01:00 Brent Meeker :


On 10/30/2015 9:30 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-10-30 17:13 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux :


2015-10-30 17:01 GMT+01:00 John Clark :
On Thu, Oct 29, 2015 at 11:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:


​ >>​ And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter  
that obeys the laws of physics can't sense **any** information in  
the AI program then the AI program is not running, it's​ not  
intelligent it's just a inert list of instructions DOING nothing.


​ > ​ Re-read what is written above...
​
​OK​   ​ :​

​ "​ And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that  
obeys the laws of physics can't sense **any** information in the  
AI program then the AI program is not running, it's​ not  
intelligent it's just a inert list of instructions DOING  
nothing. ​ "​


​ > ​ how can that affect if ? how can it knows that external  
world ?*


​ ​ >> ​ It could have memories of that external world before  
the sensors were ​detached, if they were never attached then it  
could have no knowledge of that world


​ > ​ That's the point... as no information of that "external"  
world is fed to it.


​Not true. The AI's physical memory banks are in that external  
world and the information in it is sure as hell fed into it, as  
are the results of calculations made  
by  the physical  
microprocessors that are also in that external physical world.


That's *not* information *about the physical world*... you are  
confusing level as usual.


I'll try again... fooling myself again in believing you're honest  
here... with a simple real life example.


So let's pretend our "AI" is in fact a Nintendo Entertainment  
System game... that game, can be run on a physical NES, or can be  
run in an emulator running on a physical computer... or on an  
emulator running on an emulator running on a physical computer...


From the POV of the game, it is unable to distinguish those cases  
because all informations it has from the substrate(machine running  
it) is the same, the NES game cannot know it is not really running  
on a physical NES...


Same thing with the AI, the information it has access to, it  
cannot tell the ontological status of what that information  
represent... those informations could come from a really real  
ontological physical world... or an emulation of the  really real  
ontological physical world or an emulation of an emulation of the   
really real ontological physical world it has no way to decide  
the ontological status of that "external world".


I think you are confusing a virtual world with an AI.

No I'm not.

An AI must be embedded in a world, a context, which it interacts  
with.


where this "must" come from ? an AI has to have a context sure... a  
world "as in our everyday world"... why would it ?



It can only be intelligent in the sense of interacting intelligently.

Either it is conscious or it is not... if it is conscious, it knows  
it, it doesn't care if you see it behaving "intelligently" or not.


A virtual world can't be intelligent.

What are you talking about ? I'm talking about the ability for an  
AI to give an ontological status about the information it has on  
something external to it... it has simply no way of doing it, as my  
example with the game program illustrate it, the program cannot  
know if it is run directly on the "metal" or on an emulation of  
it... which means from it's POV, the direct "metal" or a virtual  
"metal" has the same "realness"... which makes the "metal" from  
it's POV an hypothetical (it can or not be ontological, the AI as  
simply no way to tell).


OK.  I thought you were saying the video game was intelligent.  I  
agree that the AI within a virtual reality must form theories about  
what it interacts with and can't know that it's reality is  
virtual.   But I doubt that there is anything that can be inferred  
from "we might be in the Matrix".  It's just another way of saying  
we can't know Kant's ding an sich.


Not really, because if we are in the matrix, then we are in infinities  
of matrices, and we get information from the theories.


The math of the universal numbers does not depend on the choice of the  
universal number used to talk about the difference and interactions in  
between the universal numbers, and possible oracles.


Then, by studying this coming from machine's psychology and theology,  
we can distinguish nuances like qualia and quanta, or divine (true)  
and terrestrial (emulable by some universal machine).


Assuming a primary physical universe makes things more difficult, both  
for matter and mind, not to talk on the relationship.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[John Clark]

On Sun, Nov 1, 2015 at 12:36 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​> ​
> The computations are emulated in virtue of the truth of number
> relationship,


​2+2=5 is a numerical relationship as is 2+2=4, the only way to segregate
the
​
numerical
​
relationships that express a truth from the many that don't is to make a
calculation, and the only way anybody has ever
​
made a calculation
​
in the entire history of the world is by using matter that obeys the laws
of physics.

 John K Clark

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruce Kellett]

On 2/11/2015 4:53 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 30 Oct 2015, at 01:17, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 30/10/2015 3:47 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 27 Oct 2015, at 06:54, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 27/10/2015 9:37 am, Russell Standish wrote:
The only clarification I would make is that (with 
computationalism) the system is formal, but the observer 
(individual in your terminology) and environment (universe with 
its physics in your terminology) are a non formal partition of the 
system.


How is that partition into observer and universe made? If it is 
purely formal then it doesn't do the necessary work. But then, how 
does a purely formal system generate a non-formal division? I think 
your division builds in semantic content from the outside by fiat 
-- not in a principled way.


This is similar to my objection to the many worlds interpretation 
of QM. You have to distinguish between the different worlds in some 
way -- unitary evolution cannot do this. Decoherence always leaves 
residual correlations, and although these may be small, there are a 
very large number of them, so the original superposition is, in 
fact, still intact. Everett wants to make the world relative to the 
particular observer (hence 'relative state' interpretation). But to 
make sense of this mathematically you have to get rid of the 
unwanted correlations.


I don't see why. We can fuse again by amnesia, and exploit the 
unwanted correlation. They disappears only relatively, nothing is 
lost, evolution is time symmetric.


No, amnesia does not reconnect the separate worlds -- it merely 
indicates a confused individual. The world is not defined by what one 
person sees or thinks. Inter-subjective agreement is essential to 
understanding what is going on. You confuse the 1p and 3p, yet again.


?

Most do this by fiat -- the worlds are orthogonal FAPP. But that is 
not principled either. Mathematically, we take a partial trace. But 
*we *take the trace*,* it is not in Schroedinger's equation.


It is in the relative choice made by our histories (long 
computations), relatively to us. Zurek explains this rather well in 
my opinion, I mean why our type of brain needs orthogonal 
positioning, why position is favored by brain-like structures, for 
consciousness to stabilize enough to make prediction in our deep 
environment(universal computations).


Zurek does not explain the point that I am making. Zurek's 
einselection is designed to explain the preferred basis problem. But 
he misses the mark by quite a wide margin. He explains why the 
position operator is often relevant, but that merely selects a 
Hilbert space, it does not select a basis in that space.


?


If you do not understand that, then you need a refresher course in 
linear algebra and vector spaces.


The basis has to be robust against environmental interactions, not 
just the operator itself. Einselection, like decoherence, is part of 
the solution, but it is not the full solution.


But even if you have actually solved the basis problem, you still 
have not solved the problem of quantum measurement. In order to get 
just one result for an experiment with only probabilistic results, 
you have to project a subspace out of the full Hilbert space.


You get it by the indexical FPI, so you can define it in arithmetic, 
and in QM, with the usual machine's self-reference (à-la Gödel).


Which is just your idiosyncratic way of saying that we have to apply a 
projection operator. The trouble with your FPI approach is that it does 
not explain the inter-subjective agreement that is an essential part of 
our experience. All people experience the same "classical" world (in 
which they agree about the observed basis vectors that are robust 
against environmental decoherence)


The full space might well still be 'there' (in whatever sense you 
like), but the fact that the observer is conscious of only part of 
that space involves a projection operator. And projection operators 
are not time symmetric or unitary. This is the partial trace problem, 
and it remains unsolved.


It is exactly what Everett solved, assuming mechanism, by taking into 
account the personal point of view of the isolated system with respect 
to what it is isolated and not isolated. Everett shows this does not 
depend on the bases.


He showed no such thing. The basis according to which the "classical" 
world is projected out is absolutely crucial. We would not observe the 
same world in any other basis. The basis we do observe is the one that 
is robust against environmental decoherence -- any other basis is not 
robust, so rapidly devolves into the robust (einselected) basis.


It corresponds with the eigen value of the frequency operator, 
justifying the "squaring" of the amplitude (something seen by Paulette 
Février-Destouches, a student of De Broglie, and by Finkelstein).
It is not solve for a computationalist as we have to justify the 
ortho-structure, but we get one (well, 3) at the propositional level 

Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/30/2015 11:36 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-10-30 19:20 GMT+01:00 Brent Meeker >:




On 10/30/2015 9:30 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-10-30 17:13 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux >:



2015-10-30 17:01 GMT+01:00 John Clark >:

On Thu, Oct 29, 2015 at 11:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux
>wrote:

​ >>​
And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of
matter that obeys the laws of physics can't sense
**any** information in the AI program then the AI
program is not running, it's​ not intelligent
it's just a inert list of instructions DOING
nothing.


​ > ​
Re-read what is written above...

​
​OK​
​ :​

​ "​
And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that
obeys the laws of physics can't sense **any** information
in the AI program then the AI program is not running,
it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert list of
instructions DOING nothing.
​ "​

​ > ​
how can that affect if ? how can it knows
that external world ?*


​
​ >> ​
It could have memories of that external world
before the sensors were ​detached, if they were
never attached then it could have no knowledge of
that world


​ > ​
That's the point... as no information of that
"external" world is fed to it.


​Not true. The AI's physical memory banks are in that
external world and the information in it is sure as hell
fed into it, as are the results of calculations made by
the physical microprocessors that are also in that
external physical world.


That's *not* information *about the physical world*... you
are confusing level as usual.


I'll try again... fooling myself again in believing you're honest
here... with a simple real life example.

So let's pretend our "AI" is in fact a Nintendo Entertainment
System game... that game, can be run on a physical NES, or can be
run in an emulator running on a physical computer... or on an
emulator running on an emulator running on a physical computer...

From the POV of the game, it is unable to distinguish those cases
because all informations it has from the substrate(machine
running it) is the same, the NES game cannot know it is not
really running on a physical NES...

Same thing with the AI, the information it has access to, it
cannot tell the ontological status of what that information
represent... those informations could come from a really real
ontological physical world... or an emulation of the  really real
ontological physical world or an emulation of an emulation of the
 really real ontological physical world it has no way to
decide the ontological status of that "external world".


I think you are confusing a virtual world with an AI.


No I'm not.

An AI must be embedded in a world, a context, which it interacts
with.


where this "must" come from ? an AI has to have a context sure... a 
world "as in our everyday world"... why would it ?



It can only be intelligent in the sense of interacting intelligently.


Either it is conscious or it is not... if it is conscious, it knows 
it, it doesn't care if you see it behaving "intelligently" or not.


A virtual world can't be intelligent.


What are you talking about ? I'm talking about the ability for an AI 
to give an ontological status about the information it has on 
something external to it... it has simply no way of doing it, as my 
example with the game program illustrate it, the program cannot know 
if it is run directly on the "metal" or on an emulation of it... which 
means from it's POV, the direct "metal" or a virtual "metal" has the 
same "realness"... which makes the "metal" from it's POV an 
hypothetical (it can or not be ontological, the AI as simply no way to 
tell).


OK.  I thought you were saying the video game was intelligent.  I agree 
that the AI within a virtual reality must form theories about what it 
interacts with and can't know that it's reality is virtual.   But I 
doubt that there is anything that can be inferred from "we might be in 
the Matrix".  It's just another way of saying we can't know Kant's ding 
an sich.


Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Quentin Anciaux]

2015-10-30 17:01 GMT+01:00 John Clark :

> On Thu, Oct 29, 2015 at 11:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>
> ​>>​
>>> And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that obeys the laws
>>> of physics can't sense **any** information in the AI program then the AI
>>> program is not running, it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert list of
>>> instructions DOING nothing.
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> Re-read what is written above...
>>
> ​
> ​OK​
>
> ​:​
>
> ​"​
> And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that obeys the laws of
> physics can't sense **any** information in the AI program then the AI
> program is not running, it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert list of
> instructions DOING nothing.
> ​"​
>
>
>
>> ​> ​
 how can that affect if ? how can it knows that external world ?*

>>>
>>> ​
>>> ​>> ​
>>> It could have memories of that external world before the sensors were
>>> ​detached, if they were never attached then it could have no knowledge of
>>> that world
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> That's the point... as no information of that "external" world is fed to
>> it.
>>
>
> ​Not true. The AI's physical memory banks are in that external world and
> the information in it is sure as hell fed into it, as are the results of
> calculations made by the physical microprocessors that are also in that
> external physical world.
>

That's *not* information *about the physical world*... you are confusing
level as usual.

Bye


>
>
>> ​>> ​
>>> but it would still have knowledge of some virtual world in its memory
>>> banks.
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> Who cares ?
>>
>
> ​Well I care, and you should too it you ever want to remember anything or
> calculate anything. ​
>
>
>
>> ​>
>> he question was about the "external" world.
>>
>
> ​I know, and the external world is exactly where every single bit of the
> hardware that the AI needs
>
> ​to function is located. ​
>
>   John K Clark
>
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> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Quentin Anciaux]

2015-10-30 17:13 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux :

>
>
> 2015-10-30 17:01 GMT+01:00 John Clark :
>
>> On Thu, Oct 29, 2015 at 11:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux 
>> wrote:
>>
>> ​>>​
 And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that obeys the laws
 of physics can't sense **any** information in the AI program then the AI
 program is not running, it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert list of
 instructions DOING nothing.

>>>
>>> ​> ​
>>> Re-read what is written above...
>>>
>> ​
>> ​OK​
>>
>> ​:​
>>
>> ​"​
>> And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that obeys the laws
>> of physics can't sense **any** information in the AI program then the AI
>> program is not running, it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert list of
>> instructions DOING nothing.
>> ​"​
>>
>>
>>
>>> ​> ​
> how can that affect if ? how can it knows that external world ?*
>

 ​
 ​>> ​
 It could have memories of that external world before the sensors were
 ​detached, if they were never attached then it could have no knowledge of
 that world

>>>
>>> ​> ​
>>> That's the point... as no information of that "external" world is fed to
>>> it.
>>>
>>
>> ​Not true. The AI's physical memory banks are in that external world and
>> the information in it is sure as hell fed into it, as are the results of
>> calculations made by the physical microprocessors that are also in that
>> external physical world.
>>
>
> That's *not* information *about the physical world*... you are confusing
> level as usual.
>

I'll try again... fooling myself again in believing you're honest here...
with a simple real life example.

So let's pretend our "AI" is in fact a Nintendo Entertainment System
game... that game, can be run on a physical NES, or can be run in an
emulator running on a physical computer... or on an emulator running on an
emulator running on a physical computer...

>From the POV of the game, it is unable to distinguish those cases because
all informations it has from the substrate(machine running it) is the same,
the NES game cannot know it is not really running on a physical NES...

Same thing with the AI, the information it has access to, it cannot tell
the ontological status of what that information represent... those
informations could come from a really real ontological physical world... or
an emulation of the  really real ontological physical world or an emulation
of an emulation of the  really real ontological physical world it has
no way to decide the ontological status of that "external world".

Quentin




>
> Bye
>
>
>>
>>
>>> ​>> ​
 but it would still have knowledge of some virtual world in its memory
 banks.

>>>
>>> ​> ​
>>> Who cares ?
>>>
>>
>> ​Well I care, and you should too it you ever want to remember anything
>> or calculate anything. ​
>>
>>
>>
>>> ​>
>>> he question was about the "external" world.
>>>
>>
>> ​I know, and the external world is exactly where every single bit of the
>> hardware that the AI needs
>>
>> ​to function is located. ​
>>
>>   John K Clark
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
>



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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[John Clark]

On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 at 12:13 PM, Quentin Anciaux 
wrote:

​
>> ​>>​
>> The AI's physical memory banks are in that external world and the
>> information in it is sure as hell fed into it, as are the results of
>> calculations made by the physical microprocessors that are also in that
>> external physical world.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> That's *not* information *about the physical world*
>

​The physical​ memory banks are without the slightest doubt in the external
physical world and therefore information about the physical state of those
memory banks in them is knowledge of and a connection with that external
physical world.


> ... you are confusing level as usual.
>

​Speaking of confusion, if you Quentin Anciaux were not effected by the
physical state of the neurons in your brain you would be far too confused
to post a reply to my post, in fact you wouldn't even remember what I wrote
or who I was or what this list is or how the English language worked; you
wouldn't remember anything at all.

​> ​
> Bye
>

​I'd love to believe the above really is a final goodbye from you but
somehow I don't think so. Apparently you ​find me irresistible.

​

 John K Clark​

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[John Clark]

On Thu, Oct 29, 2015 at 11:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux 
wrote:

​>>​
>> And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that obeys the laws
>> of physics can't sense **any** information in the AI program then the AI
>> program is not running, it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert list of
>> instructions DOING nothing.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> Re-read what is written above...
>
​
​OK​

​:​

​"​
And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that obeys the laws of
physics can't sense **any** information in the AI program then the AI
program is not running, it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert list of
instructions DOING nothing.
​"​



> ​> ​
>>> how can that affect if ? how can it knows that external world ?*
>>>
>>
>> ​
>> ​>> ​
>> It could have memories of that external world before the sensors were
>> ​detached, if they were never attached then it could have no knowledge of
>> that world
>>
>
> ​> ​
> That's the point... as no information of that "external" world is fed to
> it.
>

​Not true. The AI's physical memory banks are in that external world and
the information in it is sure as hell fed into it, as are the results of
calculations made by the physical microprocessors that are also in that
external physical world.


> ​>> ​
>> but it would still have knowledge of some virtual world in its memory
>> banks.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> Who cares ?
>

​Well I care, and you should too it you ever want to remember anything or
calculate anything. ​



> ​>
> he question was about the "external" world.
>

​I know, and the external world is exactly where every single bit of the
hardware that the AI needs

​to function is located. ​

  John K Clark

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[John Clark]

On Fri, Oct 30, 2015  Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

I'll try again... fooling myself again in believing you're honest here
>

​Oh dear, I feared that "bye" in your last post didn't mean much. ​



> ​> ​
> So let's pretend our "AI" is in fact a Nintendo Entertainment System
> game... that game, can be run on a physical NES, or can be run in an
> emulator running on a physical computer... or on an emulator running on an
> emulator running on a physical computer...
>

​That's OK provided one of 2 things is true:

1) The sequence of simulations of simulations of simulations eventually
terminates with a physical computer.

2) The sequence is infinite and never terminates; in which case mathematics
really would be more fundamental than physics.  ​



​> ​
> From the POV of the game, it is unable to distinguish those cases
>

​Agreed. ​


​> ​
> Same thing with the AI, the information it has access to, it cannot tell
> the ontological status of what that information represent... those
> informations could come from a really real ontological physical world... or
> an emulation of the  really real ontological physical world or an emulation
> of an emulation of the  really real ontological physical world it has
> no way to decide the ontological status of that "external world".
>

​Agreed.​

​

 John K Clark​

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/30/2015 9:30 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-10-30 17:13 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux >:




2015-10-30 17:01 GMT+01:00 John Clark >:

On Thu, Oct 29, 2015 at 11:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux
>wrote:

​ >>​
And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter
that obeys the laws of physics can't sense **any**
information in the AI program then the AI program is
not running, it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert
list of instructions DOING nothing.


​ > ​
Re-read what is written above...

​
​OK​
​ :​

​ "​
And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that obeys
the laws of physics can't sense **any** information in the AI
program then the AI program is not running, it's​ not
intelligent it's just a inert list of instructions DOING nothing.
​ "​

​ > ​
how can that affect if ? how can it knows that
external world ?*


​
​ >> ​
It could have memories of that external world before
the sensors were ​detached, if they were never
attached then it could have no knowledge of that world


​ > ​
That's the point... as no information of that "external"
world is fed to it.


​Not true. The AI's physical memory banks are in that external
world and the information in it is sure as hell fed into it,
as are the results of calculations made by the physical
microprocessors that are also in that external physical world.


That's *not* information *about the physical world*... you are
confusing level as usual.


I'll try again... fooling myself again in believing you're honest 
here... with a simple real life example.


So let's pretend our "AI" is in fact a Nintendo Entertainment System 
game... that game, can be run on a physical NES, or can be run in an 
emulator running on a physical computer... or on an emulator running 
on an emulator running on a physical computer...


From the POV of the game, it is unable to distinguish those cases 
because all informations it has from the substrate(machine running it) 
is the same, the NES game cannot know it is not really running on a 
physical NES...


Same thing with the AI, the information it has access to, it cannot 
tell the ontological status of what that information represent... 
those informations could come from a really real ontological physical 
world... or an emulation of the  really real ontological physical 
world or an emulation of an emulation of the  really real ontological 
physical world it has no way to decide the ontological status of 
that "external world".


I think you are confusing a virtual world with an AI.   An AI must be 
embedded in a world, a context, which it interacts with.  It can only be 
intelligent in the sense of interacting intelligently.  A virtual world 
can't be intelligent.  An AI will have some internal model of the world 
within which it interacts and that model has an ontology.


Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Quentin Anciaux]

2015-10-30 19:20 GMT+01:00 Brent Meeker :

>
>
> On 10/30/2015 9:30 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2015-10-30 17:13 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux :
>
>>
>>
>> 2015-10-30 17:01 GMT+01:00 John Clark < 
>> johnkcl...@gmail.com>:
>>
>>> On Thu, Oct 29, 2015 at 11:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux < 
>>> allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> ​ >>​
> And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that obeys the
> laws of physics can't sense **any** information in the AI program then the
> AI program is not running, it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert list of
> instructions DOING nothing.
>

 ​ > ​
 Re-read what is written above...

>>> ​
>>> ​OK​
>>>
>>> ​ :​
>>>
>>> ​ "​
>>> And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that obeys the laws
>>> of physics can't sense **any** information in the AI program then the AI
>>> program is not running, it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert list of
>>> instructions DOING nothing.
>>> ​ "​
>>>
>>>
>>>
 ​ > ​
>> how can that affect if ? how can it knows that external world ?*
>>
>
> ​
> ​ >> ​
> It could have memories of that external world before the sensors were
> ​detached, if they were never attached then it could have no knowledge of
> that world
>

 ​ > ​
 That's the point... as no information of that "external" world is fed
 to it.

>>>
>>> ​Not true. The AI's physical memory banks are in that external world and
>>> the information in it is sure as hell fed into it, as are the results of
>>> calculations made by the physical microprocessors that are also in that
>>> external physical world.
>>>
>>
>> That's *not* information *about the physical world*... you are confusing
>> level as usual.
>>
>
> I'll try again... fooling myself again in believing you're honest here...
> with a simple real life example.
>
> So let's pretend our "AI" is in fact a Nintendo Entertainment System
> game... that game, can be run on a physical NES, or can be run in an
> emulator running on a physical computer... or on an emulator running on an
> emulator running on a physical computer...
>
> From the POV of the game, it is unable to distinguish those cases because
> all informations it has from the substrate(machine running it) is the same,
> the NES game cannot know it is not really running on a physical NES...
>
> Same thing with the AI, the information it has access to, it cannot tell
> the ontological status of what that information represent... those
> informations could come from a really real ontological physical world... or
> an emulation of the  really real ontological physical world or an emulation
> of an emulation of the  really real ontological physical world it has
> no way to decide the ontological status of that "external world".
>
>
> I think you are confusing a virtual world with an AI.
>

No I'm not.


> An AI must be embedded in a world, a context, which it interacts with.
>

where this "must" come from ? an AI has to have a context sure... a world
"as in our everyday world"... why would it ?



> It can only be intelligent in the sense of interacting intelligently.
>

Either it is conscious or it is not... if it is conscious, it knows it, it
doesn't care if you see it behaving "intelligently" or not.


> A virtual world can't be intelligent.
>

What are you talking about ? I'm talking about the ability for an AI to
give an ontological status about the information it has on something
external to it... it has simply no way of doing it, as my example with the
game program illustrate it, the program cannot know if it is run directly
on the "metal" or on an emulation of it... which means from it's POV, the
direct "metal" or a virtual "metal" has the same "realness"... which makes
the "metal" from it's POV an hypothetical (it can or not be ontological,
the AI as simply no way to tell).

Quentin


> An AI will have some internal model of the world within which it interacts
> and that model has an ontology.
>
> Brent
>
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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[John Clark]

On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 12:40 PM, Quentin Anciaux 
wrote:

​>> ​
>> Matter always matters.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> I repeat if there is *absolutely no sensors writing **any** information in
> a *memory location* readable by the AI program
>

And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that obeys the laws of
physics can't sense **any** information in the AI program then the AI
program is not running, it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert list of
instructions DOING nothing.


> ​> ​
> how can that affect if ? how can it knows that external world ?*
>

​It could have memories of that external world before the sensors were
​detached, if they were never attached then it could have no knowledge of
that world but it would still have knowledge of some virtual world in its
memory banks. If the stuff in its memory bank is not rich enough to be
called a world then it wouldn't be a AI program, it would just be a program.

​> ​
> yes the AI program runs on a physical computer if you want,
>

​It's not what I want that's important, it's the universe that insists that
the AI program be running on a computer made of matter that obeys the laws
of physics; nobody has ever made a calculation without physical matter.


> ​> ​
> and stopping it, stops the program
>

​Agreed. ​


> >
> ​
> from the POV of the AI program, that physical world has no bearing on it
> nor even existence, as *nothing from it* absolutely *no information about
> that external world* is passed to it,
>

​Regardless of how abstract the AI's thoughts may be you can bet money that
the physical state of its memory banks and the physical state of its
microprocessors ​WILL have a bearing on it!

 John K Clark

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Quentin Anciaux]

2015-10-29 16:33 GMT+01:00 John Clark :

> On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 12:40 PM, Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>
> ​>> ​
>>> Matter always matters.
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> I repeat if there is *absolutely no sensors writing **any** information
>> in a *memory location* readable by the AI program
>>
>
> And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that obeys the laws of
> physics can't sense **any** information in the AI program then the AI
> program is not running, it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert list of
> instructions DOING nothing.
>

Re-read what is written above...

>
>
>> ​> ​
>> how can that affect if ? how can it knows that external world ?*
>>
>
> ​It could have memories of that external world before the sensors were
> ​detached, if they were never attached then it could have no knowledge of
> that world
>

That's the point... as no information of that "external" world is fed to it.


> but it would still have knowledge of some virtual world in its memory
> banks.
>

Who cares ? the question was about the "external" world.


> If the stuff in its memory bank is not rich enough to be called a world
> then it wouldn't be a AI program, it would just be a program.
>
> ​> ​
>> yes the AI program runs on a physical computer if you want,
>>
>
> ​It's not what I want that's important, it's the universe that insists
>

You're the one insisting... didn't heard the universe complaining.


> that the AI program be running on a computer made of matter that obeys the
> laws of physics; nobody has ever made a calculation without physical
> matter.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> and stopping it, stops the program
>>
>
> ​Agreed. ​
>
>
>> >
>> ​
>> from the POV of the AI program, that physical world has no bearing on it
>> nor even existence, as *nothing from it* absolutely *no information about
>> that external world* is passed to it,
>>
>
> ​Regardless of how abstract the AI's thoughts may be you can bet money
> that the physical state of its memory banks and the physical state of its
> microprocessors ​WILL have a bearing on it!
>

The point is not there, it's the fact that that hypothetical AI *could have
no knowledge about an hypothetical external world*, and as such from its
POV, it has only an hypothetical existense... and it's existence (of that
external world) is as real as any hypothetical.

Quentin


>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[John Clark]

On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

​> ​
> You've challenged Bruno many times to perform a difficult computation
> using his Platonic computer.
>

​Forget difficult, I've challenged Bruno to perform ANY computation with
ANY
Platonic computer
​ he can find, but he can't add 2 and 2 on ANY Platonic computer, nor can
anybody else.


> ​> ​
> Well, that computation is occurring in front of you now in the thermal
> motion of the atoms in your desk, which under an appropriate interpretation
> are implementing a Turing machine.
>

​The physical wooden desk in front of me is undoubtedly making calculations
but it's too complicated and convoluted for me to understand; I don't know
the language to ask it questions nor do I know how to read its answers.
However there is an object on top of that desk that is just as physical as
the desk, it's made by the Apple Corporation and unlike the desk I do know
the language to ask it questions and the language to read its answers.  ​


​> ​
> But you and Bruno don't have that appropriate interpretation,
>

​The difference is I have the
 appropriate interpretation
​ for **some** physical computers, Bruno has the ​
appropriate interpretation
​ for **no** Platonic computer nor does anybody else.​

  John K Clark



>

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Oct 2015, at 19:16, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/26/2015 11:57 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-10-27 7:44 GMT+01:00 Brent Meeker :


On 10/26/2015 3:37 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 10:44:28AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 10/26/2015 2:43 AM, Russell Standish wrote:

Assuming computationalism, our everyday experience _is_ internal to  
the

system. That doesn't make it any less meaningful.
I think that's a confusion.  The system is the universe with it's
physics.   So in a sense everything is internal to it.  But
experience is individual and it's meaningful because the individual
has values and memory and so incorporates experiences into decisions
about future actions...that's what constitutes giving them
semantics.

Hi Brent, I appreciate your point of view very much, but I fail to  
see

how what you say is incompatible with my claim. Where is the
confusion?

I think our everyday experience is given meaning as referring to  
things outside ourselves.  So it's not internal to "the system"  
that is the experiencer.  It is only because the observer is  
distinct from the rest of the world that he can form meaningful  
symbolic representations of it.



The only clarification I would make is that (with computationalism)
the system is formal, but the observer (individual in your
terminology) and environment (universe with its physics in your
terminology) are a non formal partition of the system.

I'm not sure what you mean by non-formal partition.  If your brain  
is replaced by a I/O functionally equivalent digital computer it  
will still be in an environment and will have internal  
representations that refer to the environment.


In a computer... an io, is just a memory location... as anything  
else is... that the value of that memory location reflect or not an  
external world... doesn't change anything from the POV of the  
program  reading it... so as the meaning must somehow be internal  
to the program as to what that value at that memory location means  
for it.


That's like saying a neuron in your brain doesn't know anything.
In a sense it's true, but it obfuscates the source of meaning.  What  
your neurons, as a brain, know are things about the external world  
(external to the brain) with which they interact.  The "meaning" is  
internal in the sense that it is represented by a pattern in the  
brain - but it is only meaning because it has referents outside the  
brain.  A brain that had never had an environment with which to  
interact would not have anything to represent and would contain no  
"meaning".  It would be like the computer running a random or  
unknowable program, or the rock that computes everything.


?

It would be like a computer running a program, and if that is a self- 
referential program looking inward (in the precise Gödel's sense and  
its intensional variants), he will describe, and attribute meaning, to  
what Parmenides, Moderatus of Gades and Poltinus describe (which is  
not a coincidence as Parmenides, Moderatus of Gades and Poltinus are  
rationalist open, not to irrationalism, but surrationalism).


You too, do this by invoking some "World". Universal machines are  
compelled to assume that. It is a theorem of arithmetic.


That is the beauty of Gödel's theorem, it shows that reason can  
understand the necessity of something extending reason, without  
contradicting it, but justifying it. Provably so, if we assume we are  
(enough arithmetically correct) machine.


Bruno





Brent



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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Oct 2015, at 23:14, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:




Sent from my iPhone

On 28 Oct 2015, at 4:49 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:




On 10/26/2015 11:00 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 27 October 2015 at 16:57, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

On 27/10/2015 4:50 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 October 2015 at 14:22, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

On 27/10/2015 1:13 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 Oct 2015, at 12:15 PM, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

On 27/10/2015 12:05 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 7:37 PM, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

On 27/10/2015 10:52 am, Jason Resch wrote:
On Monday, October 26, 2015, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On 27/10/2015 8:16 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, John Clark  
 wrote:

>>
>>> so where does semantic content come from?
>>
>> From examples in the physical world. You can give as many  
botanical definitions  
ofthe  
word  "tree" as you want but it will just be a word defined  
by other words that are themselves defined by yet more words  
that are If you tried to dig for meaning all you'd find  
is a endless loop, it would just be a game where words are  
manipulated according to the rules of botany until somebody  
forgot about definitions and pointed to the ASCII string "t-r- 
e-e" and then pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism  
made 
largely of cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then  
even a martian would notice a correspondence between this  
game of manipulating symbols called "botany" that humans had  
invented and the way these large photosynthesizing organism  
made largely of cellulose live.

>
> What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no  
I/O devices connecting it to outside trees?

>
> I think Brent answered this in his response to Russell. The  
trees of the ordinary physical world do not connect with  
anything outside this world either in order to have semantic  
content. A virtual world would be no different in this  
respect. The point is that the content comes from something  
other formal symbol manipulation -- things such as pointing  
and sensory responses. There has to be something other than  
the consciousness with which the consciousness can interact.


I take it you've never played video games.
Not with any regularity. But I take it that when you play such  
games, you interact with the simulated environment via the  
provided interface -- the game only interacts with itself in  
so far as the original programmers designed it to. The  
semantic content is provided from outside in either case.


So what do you think would happen if an AI, or uploaded mind  
were uploaded into a virtual reality that was fully  
disconnected from the physical world? Would that mind no  
longer be conscious?
Difficult to tell because, by construction, you can't ask it.  
But if both the AI and the VR are programmed by some external  
intelligence, semantic content might be provided in that way.


But once programmed, there may be no further evidence of  
semantic content. The computer could be fired into space, and  
the programmers and their entire civilisation might die. If  
aliens find it and somehow work out the syntax, there is no way  
for them to work out the meaning behind it, since there is no  
intrinsic meaning in circuits turning on and off. So what is the  
explanation here: the meaning is still there because the long- 
dead programmers had thought about it in a particular way?


Could be. If the program is no longer running, the meaning might  
not be recoverable.



The program is running, but the programmers and their  
civilisation are gone. How is the meaning recoverable?


Not by the outsider, certainly. But to the insider..who can  
tell? It depends on what the programmers originally built in.


Then that means that there is meaning intrinsic to a certain  
pattern of circuits turning on and off.


I take your meaning, but I think that's a misleading way of putting  
it.  If we are living in The Matrix then everything is patterns of  
circuits switching on and off.  Whether the is some meaning to that  
switching can only be known by the programmer of The Matrix.  But  
as denizens within The Matrix each of us finds meaning in  
interaction with other parts of The Matrix.   That meaning is not  
intrinsic to the The Matrix, it's intrinsic to each of us as a part  
of The Matrix.   The subset of patterns that instantiates Brent  
within The Matrix "understands" other parts of The Matrix by  
interacting with them.


OK, but that removes the requirement that a computation must be a  
computation relative to the real world, which makes it difficult to  
place limits on what can 

Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Oct 2015, at 04:12, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/28/2015 2:14 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 28 Oct 2015, at 9:28 AM, Brent Meeker   
wrote:





On 10/27/2015 3:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On 28 Oct 2015, at 1:30 AM, John Clark   
wrote:





On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 5:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:


​ >> ​ ​From examples in the physical world. You can give  
as many botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as you want  
but it will just be a word defined by other words that are  
themselves defined by yet more words that are If you tried  
to dig for meaning all you'd find is a endless loop, it would  
just be a game where words are manipulated according to the  
rules of botany until somebody forgot about definitions and  
pointed to the ​ASCII string "t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a  
large photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose that  
exists in the physical world. Then even a martian would notice a  
correspondence between this game of manipulating symbols called  
"botany" that humans had invented and the way these large  
photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose live.


​ > ​ What about a virtual world with trees and observers,  
and no I/O devices connecting it to outside trees?


There would ​ still be I/O devices connected to the ​virtual  
trees made by a computer that operated according to the laws of  
physics, if not the trees wouldn't even be virtual.  And the  
books on both virtual botany and real botany would still be more  
than a just a symbol manipulation game, they would have   
semantic content ​ because there would be a ​ correspondence  
between ​ the way the  symbols ​ are manipulated and the way  
the virtual (or real)   large photosynthesizing organism  
live.  ​ Regardless of if they are virtual  
or real ​if you want to know how trees live studying those  
botany symbols in virtual (or real) books will help, so they  
must have  semantic content ​ .


The requirement that a computation be able to interact with the  
real world puts a restriction on what qualifies as a computation.  
You've challenged Bruno many times to perform a difficult  
computation using his Platonic computer. Well, that computation  
is occurring in front of you now in the thermal motion of the  
atoms in your desk, which under an appropriate interpretation are  
implementing a Turing machine. But you and Bruno don't have that  
appropriate interpretation, and if you did, you would have the  
result of the calculation already. In other words, the thermal  
motion computation is not understandable as such in, and cannot  
interact with, the world at the level of the substrate of its  
implementation; so it would usually be said that either there is  
no computation being implemented, or it is being implemented only  
in a trivial and useless sense. But remove the requirement for  
interaction in the real world, and this objection falls down. The  
computation is being implemented, your difficult calculation has  
been completed, and it is being appreciated by the virtual  
observers who are clapping and cheering - even though you can't  
hear them.


That's essentially Bruno's MGA, except it stops one step short.   
Bruno takes the last step and says even if the atoms of your desk  
were doing absolutely nothing there is an interpretation in which  
that is a computation; hence the atoms are superfluous.   But  
clearly then it is the interpretation which is providing the  
computation.


I agree; if anything at all can be seen as a computation, it is not  
the thing that matters, but the interpretation.


There are two ways to avoid this conclusion. One is to say that  
consciousness is not computable. The other is to say that a  
computation can only be implemented relative to the real world.


I take the latter.  But it doesn't have to be relative the real  
(i.e. our) world.  There can be a virtual consciousness relative to  
a virtual world...but I don't think "virtual" and "real" add  
anything to this.  So when Bruno answers my criticism that the MG  
relys on its relation to the world for its consciousness by saying  
he can just expand the program to simulate the world too this  
doesn't answer my point.   The consciousness is still only relative  
to a world; whether it's this world or a virtual world.


Then we do agree, but the only "word" I need, in virtue of betting on  
computationalism, is the structure (N, +, *). I cannot define it in  
RA, nor in PA, but I can define it in ZF (as in "usual mathematics").  
It is not forbidden to the entities emulated by RA to add axioms, and  
be believers in richer things than RA, as it is the case from inside.


The point is that "this world" emerges from the arithmetic virtual  
world. (in a testable way).


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Oct 2015, at 02:15, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 27/10/2015 12:05 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 7:37 PM, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

On 27/10/2015 10:52 am, Jason Resch wrote:
On Monday, October 26, 2015, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On 27/10/2015 8:16 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, John Clark   
wrote:

>>
>>
>>>
>>> >
>>> so where does semantic content come from?
>>
>> From examples in the physical world. You can give as many  
botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it will  
just be a word defined by other words that are themselves defined  
by yet more words that are If you tried to dig for meaning all  
you'd find is a endless loop, it would just be a game where words  
are manipulated according to the rules of botany until somebody  
forgot about definitions and pointed to the ASCII string "t-r-e-e"  
and then pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism made  
largely of cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then even  
a martian would notice a correspondence between this game of  
manipulating symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and  
the way these large photosynthesizing organism made largely of  
cellulose live.

>
> What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O  
devices connecting it to outside trees?

>
> I think Brent answered this in his response to Russell. The  
trees of the ordinary physical world do not connect with anything  
outside this world either in order to have semantic content. A  
virtual world would be no different in this respect. The point is  
that the content comes from something other  
formalsymbol manipulation -- things such as  
pointing and sensory responses. There has to be something other  
than the consciousness with which the consciousness can interact.


I take it you've never played video games.
Not with any regularity. But I take it that when you play such  
games, you interact with the simulated environment via the provided  
interface -- the game only interacts with itself in so far as the  
original programmers designed it to. The semantic content is  
provided from outside in either case.


So what do you think would happen if an AI, or uploaded mind were  
uploaded into a virtual reality that was fully disconnected from  
the physical world? Would that mind no longer be conscious?



Difficult to tell because, by construction, you can't ask it. But if  
both the AI and the VR are programmed by some external intelligence,  
semantic content might be provided in that way.



That is a creationist argument.

It is also a God-of-the-gap non valid argument if that is presented  
against computationalism (or again its consequences).


Bruno





Bruce

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Oct 2015, at 23:28, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/27/2015 3:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On 28 Oct 2015, at 1:30 AM, John Clark  wrote:




On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 5:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:


​ >> ​ ​From examples in the physical world. You can give as  
many botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it  
will just be a word defined by other words that are themselves  
defined by yet more words that are If you tried to dig for  
meaning all you'd find is a endless loop, it would just be a game  
where words aremanipulated  
according to the rules of botany until somebody forgot about  
definitions and pointed to the ​ASCII string "t-r-e-e" and then  
pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism made largely of  
cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then even a martian  
would notice a correspondence between this game of manipulating  
symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and the way these  
large photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose live.


​ > ​ What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and  
no I/O devices connecting it to outside trees?


There would ​ still be I/O devices connected to the ​virtual  
trees made by a computer that operated according to the laws of  
physics, if not the trees wouldn't even be virtual.  And the books  
on both virtual botany and real botany would still be more than a  
just a symbol manipulation game, they would have  semantic  
content ​ because there would be a ​ correspondence between ​  
the way the  symbols ​ are manipulated and the way the virtual  
(or real)   large photosynthesizing organism live. ​ Regardless  
of if they are virtual or real ​if you want to know how trees  
live studying those botany symbols in virtual (or real) books will  
help, so they must have  semantic content ​ .


The requirement that a computation be able to interact with the  
real world puts a restriction on what qualifies as a computation.  
You've challenged Bruno many times to perform a difficult  
computation using his Platonic computer. Well, that computation is  
occurring in front of you now in the thermal motion of the atoms in  
your desk, which under an appropriate interpretation are  
implementing a Turing machine. But you and Bruno don't have that  
appropriate interpretation, and if you did, you would have the  
result of the calculation already. In other words, the thermal  
motion computation is not understandable as such in, and cannot  
interact with, the world at the level of the substrate of its  
implementation; so it would usually be said that either there is no  
computation being implemented, or it is being implemented only in a  
trivial and useless sense. But remove the requirement for  
interaction in the real world, and this objection falls down. The  
computation is being implemented, your difficult calculation has  
been completed, and it is being appreciated by the virtual  
observers who are clapping and cheering - even though you can't  
hear them.


That's essentially Bruno's MGA, except it stops one step short.   
Bruno takes the last step and says even if the atoms of your desk  
were doing absolutely nothing there is an interpretation in which  
that is a computation; hence the atoms are superfluous.


I do that in a context to prove something by a reductio ad absurdo.  
The whole resoning showsh that the "atoms" have to be necessary, and  
explain them by the logic of self-reference, which provides the needed  
quantization exactly where computationalism predicts they must appear.




But clearly then it is the interpretation which is providing the  
computation.


Exactly. And that is what universal numbers do, they interpret numbers  
as programs and data, and do computations.


We just need to choose one universal number, to get a "base" in which  
we describe all programs by numbers (to ease the things at the  
fundamental level).


As Robinson arithmetic is already universal, we don't need to assume  
anything more, beside Church-thesis, and the invariance of  
consciousness for some digital transformation.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Oct 2015, at 23:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 28 Oct 2015, at 1:30 AM, John Clark  wrote:




On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 5:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:


​>> ​​From examples in the physical world. You can give as  
many botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it  
will just be a word defined by other words that are themselves  
defined by yet more words that are If you tried to dig for  
meaning all you'd find is a endless loop, it would just be a game  
where words are manipulated according to the rules of botany until  
somebody forgot about definitions and pointed to the ​ASCII string  
"t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism  
made largely of cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then  
even a martian would notice a correspondence between this game of  
manipulating symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and  
the way these large photosynthesizing organism made largely of  
cellulose live.


​> ​What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no  
I/O devices connecting it to outside trees?


There would ​still be I/O devices connected to the ​virtual  
trees made by a computer that operated according to the laws of  
physics, if not the trees wouldn't even be virtual.  And the books  
on both virtual botany and real botany would still be more than a  
just a symbol manipulation game, they would have semantic content​  
because there would be a ​correspondence between ​the way the  
symbols ​are manipulated and the way the virtual (or real)  large  
photosynthesizing organism live.​ Regardless of if they are  
virtual or real ​if you want to know how trees live studying those  
botany symbols in virtual (or real) books will help, so they must  
have semantic content​.


The requirement that a computation be able to interact with the real  
world puts a restriction on what qualifies as a computation. You've  
challenged Bruno many times to perform a difficult computation using  
his Platonic computer. Well, that computation is occurring in front  
of you now in the thermal motion of the atoms in your desk, which  
under an appropriate interpretation are implementing a Turing machine.



I doubt this. (Even assuming a physical reality in which that make  
sense: the part which is digital enough might compute little piece of  
programs, but nothing as specific as a brain state. It can do it like  
a monkey can type the work of shakespeare.

This might not been important for your argument, though.



But you and Bruno don't have that appropriate interpretation, and if  
you did, you would have the result of the calculation already.


But here Clark would say, non problem as "thermal motion of atoms" is  
physical.




In other words, the thermal motion computation is not understandable  
as such in, and cannot interact with, the world at the level of the  
substrate of its implementation; so it would usually be said that  
either there is no computation being implemented, or it is being  
implemented only in a trivial and useless sense. But remove the  
requirement for interaction in the real world, and this objection  
falls down.


OK. But no need of lucky thermal atoms. The necessary relations  
between natural numbers, if you agree with the laws of addition and  
multiplication, guaranties the realization of the computations by  
virtue of being true or false.




The computation is being implemented, your difficult calculation has  
been completed, and it is being appreciated by the virtual observers  
who are clapping and cheering - even though you can't hear them.


OK.

Bruno






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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Oct 2015, at 06:54, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 27/10/2015 9:37 am, Russell Standish wrote:
The only clarification I would make is that (with computationalism)  
the system is formal, but the observer (individual in your  
terminology) and environment (universe with its physics in your  
terminology) are a non formal partition of the system.


How is that partition into observer and universe made? If it is  
purely formal then it doesn't do the necessary work. But then, how  
does a purely formal system generate a non-formal division? I think  
your division builds in semantic content from the outside by fiat --  
not in a principled way.


This is similar to my objection to the many worlds interpretation of  
QM. You have to distinguish between the different worlds in some way  
-- unitary evolution cannot do this. Decoherence always leaves  
residual correlations, and although these may be small, there are a  
very large number of them, so the original superposition is, in  
fact, still intact. Everett wants to make the world relative to the  
particular observer (hence 'relative state' interpretation). But to  
make sense of this mathematically you have to get rid of the  
unwanted correlations.


I don't see why. We can fuse again by amnesia, and exploit the  
unwanted correlation. They disappears only relatively, nothing is  
lost, evolution is time symmetric.





Most do this by fiat -- the worlds are orthogonal FAPP. But that is  
not principled either. Mathematically, we take a partial trace. But  
we take the trace, it is not in Schroedinger's equation.




It is in the relative choice made by our histories (long  
computations), relatively to us. Zurek explains this rather well in my  
opinion, I mean why our type of brain needs orthogonal positioning,  
why position is favored by brain-like structures, for consciousness to  
stabilize enough to make prediction in our deep environment(universal  
computations).


Bruno






Similar problem, afaict.

Bruce

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/28/2015 11:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 29 Oct 2015, at 2:12 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:





On 10/28/2015 2:14 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 28 Oct 2015, at 9:28 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:




On 10/27/2015 3:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On 28 Oct 2015, at 1:30 AM, John Clark  wrote:




On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 5:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
 wrote:


​ >> ​
​From examples in the physical world. You can give as
many botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as you
want but it will just be a word defined by other words
that are themselves defined by yet more words that
are If you tried to dig for meaning all you'd find is
a endless loop, it would just be a game where words are
manipulated according to the rules of botany until
somebody forgot about definitions and pointed to the ​
ASCII string "t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large
photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose that
exists in the physical world. Then even a martian would
notice a correspondence between this game of manipulating
symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and the
way these large photosynthesizing organism made largely
of cellulose live.


​ > ​
What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no
I/O devices connecting it to outside trees?


There would
​ still be I/O devices connected to the ​virtual trees made by a 
computer that operated according to the laws of physics, if not 
the trees wouldn't even be virtual.  And the books on both 
virtual botany and real botany would still be more than a just a 
symbol manipulation game, they would have

semantic content
​ because there would be a ​
correspondence between
​ the way the
 symbols
​ are manipulated and the way the virtual (or real)
 large photosynthesizing organism live.
​ Regardless of if they are virtual or real ​if you want to know 
how trees live studying those botany symbols in virtual (or real) 
books will help, so they must have

semantic content
​ .


The requirement that a computation be able to interact with the 
real world puts a restriction on what qualifies as a computation. 
You've challenged Bruno many times to perform a difficult 
computation using his Platonic computer. Well, that computation is 
occurring in front of you now in the thermal motion of the atoms 
in your desk, which under an appropriate interpretation are 
implementing a Turing machine. But you and Bruno don't have that 
appropriate interpretation, and if you did, you would have the 
result of the calculation already. In other words, the thermal 
motion computation is not understandable as such in, and cannot 
interact with, the world at the level of the substrate of its 
implementation; so it would usually be said that either there is 
no computation being implemented, or it is being implemented only 
in a trivial and useless sense. But remove the requirement for 
interaction in the real world, and this objection falls down. The 
computation is being implemented, your difficult calculation has 
been completed, and it is being appreciated by the virtual 
observers who are clapping and cheering - even though you can't 
hear them.


That's essentially Bruno's MGA, except it stops one step short.  
Bruno takes the last step and says even if the atoms of your desk 
were doing absolutely nothing there is an interpretation in which 
that is a computation; hence the atoms are superfluous.   But 
clearly then it is the interpretation which is providing the 
computation.


I agree; if anything at all can be seen as a computation, it is not 
the thing that matters, but the interpretation.


There are two ways to avoid this conclusion. One is to say that 
consciousness is not computable. The other is to say that a 
computation can only be implemented relative to the real world.


I take the latter.  But it doesn't have to be relative the real (i.e. 
our) world.  There can be a virtual consciousness relative to a 
virtual world...but I don't think "virtual" and "real" add anything 
to this.  So when Bruno answers my criticism that the MG relys on its 
relation to the world for its consciousness by saying he can just 
expand the program to simulate the world too this doesn't answer my 
point.   The consciousness is still only relative to a world; whether 
it's this world or a virtual world.


If the virtual world is at the same level as the consciousness there 
is nothing to prevent us saying the whole simulation is in Platonia.


Or that it is a real world.  The problem with saying it's "in" Platonia 
is that it adds nothing testable.  It's like saying this world is a 
dream of the Lotus eater.


Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Oct 2015, at 19:43, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2015-10-27 19:16 GMT+01:00 Brent Meeker :


On 10/26/2015 11:57 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-10-27 7:44 GMT+01:00 Brent Meeker :


On 10/26/2015 3:37 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 10:44:28AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 10/26/2015 2:43 AM, Russell Standish wrote:

Assuming computationalism, our everyday experience _is_ internal to  
the

system. That doesn't make it any less meaningful.
I think that's a confusion.  The system is the universe with it's
physics.   So in a sense everything is internal to it.  But
experience is individual and it's meaningful because the individual
has values and memory and so incorporates experiences into decisions
about future actions...that's what constitutes giving them
semantics.

Hi Brent, I appreciate your point of view very much, but I fail to  
see

how what you say is incompatible with my claim. Where is the
confusion?

I think our everyday experience is given meaning as referring to  
things outside ourselves.  So it's not  internal to  
"the system" that is the experiencer.  It is only because the  
observer is distinct from the rest of the world that he can form  
meaningful symbolic representations of it.



The only clarification I would make is that (with computationalism)
the system is formal, but the observer (individual in your
terminology) and environment (universe with its physics in your
terminology) are a non formal partition of the system.

I'm not sure what you mean by non-formal partition.  If your brain  
is replaced by a I/O functionally equivalent digital computer it  
will still be in an environment and will have internal  
representations that refer to the environment.


In a computer... an io, is just a memory location... as anything  
else is... that the value of that memory location reflect or not an  
external world... doesn't change anything from the POV of the  
program  reading it... so as the meaning must somehow be internal  
to the program as to what that value at that memory location means  
for it.


That's like saying a neuron in your brain doesn't know anything.

I don't know about neurons and interactions with the environment...  
but as far as a program is concerned, a program has only access to  
memory locations... so if meaning must arise from the POV of the  
program (ie: what we could call a conscious program), it must be  
internal to itself... What you could say I could agree, is that IO  
of our "real" world do provide regularity pattern to those memory  
locations when fed with the sensor data... what random value would  
not... so one can say that meaning arise from stable pattern...  
where they come from and the fact they represent something  
ontologically real is unknown to the program...


Yes, that's valid.

Now, the program (or the person attach to it) can bet that it is a  
program, and then derive the consequence that it is plausible that he  
lives "in arithmetic", and that the physical is the result of an  
infinity of universal machine/number competing in producing its  
continuation, below its substitution level.


It can also intuit something like that by direct first person  
introspection, with different technics.



Bruno






In a sense it's true, but it obfuscates the source of meaning.  What  
your neurons, as a brain, know are things about the external world  
(external to the brain) with which they interact.  The "meaning" is  
internal in the sense that it is represented by a pattern in the  
brain - but it is only meaning because it has referents outside the  
brain.  A brain that had never had an environment with which to  
interact would not have anything to represent and would contain no  
"meaning".  It would be like the computer running a random or  
unknowable program, or the rock that computes everything.


Brent



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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Oct 2015, at 10:14, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:




On 28 Oct 2015, at 9:28 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:




On 10/27/2015 3:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On 28 Oct 2015, at 1:30 AM, John Clark  wrote:




On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 5:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:


​ >> ​ ​From examples in the physical world. You can give as  
many botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it  
will just be a word defined by other words that are themselves  
defined by yet more words that are If you tried to dig for  
meaning all you'd find is a endless loop, it would just be a game  
where words are manipulated according to the rules of botany  
until somebody forgot about definitions and pointed to the ​ 
ASCII string "t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large  
photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose that exists  
in the physical world. Then even a martian would notice a  
correspondence between this game of manipulating symbols called  
"botany" that humans had invented and the way these large  
photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose live.


​ > ​ What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and  
no I/O devices connecting it to outside trees?


There would ​ still be I/O devices connected to the ​virtual  
trees made by a computer that operated according to the laws of  
physics, if not the trees wouldn't even be virtual.  And the  
books on both virtual botany and real botany would still be more  
than a just a symbol manipulation game, they would have  semantic  
content ​ because there would be a ​ correspondence  
between ​ the way the  symbols ​ are manipulated and the way  
the virtual (or real)   large photosynthesizing organism live. ​  
Regardless of if they are virtual or real ​if you want to know  
how trees live studying those botany symbols in virtual (or real)  
books will help, so they must have  semantic content ​ .


The requirement that a computation be able to interact with the  
real world puts a restriction on what qualifies as a computation.  
You've challenged Bruno many times to perform a difficult  
computation using his Platonic computer. Well, that computation is  
occurring in front of you now in the thermal motion of the atoms  
in your desk, which under an appropriate interpretation are  
implementing a Turing machine. But you and Bruno don't have that  
appropriate interpretation, and if you did, you would have the  
result of the calculation already. In other words, the thermal  
motion computation is not understandable as such in, and cannot  
interact with, the world at the level of the substrate of its  
implementation; so it would usually be said that either there is  
no computation being implemented, or it is being implemented only  
in a trivial and useless sense. But remove the requirement for  
interaction in the real world, and this objection falls down. The  
computation is being implemented, your difficult calculation has  
been completed, and it is being appreciated by the virtual  
observers who are clapping and cheering - even though you can't  
hear them.


That's essentially Bruno's MGA, except it stops one step short.   
Bruno takes the last step and says even if the atoms of your desk  
were doing absolutely nothing there is an interpretation in which  
that is a computation; hence the atoms are superfluous.   But  
clearly then it is the interpretation which is providing the  
computation.


I agree; if anything at all can be seen as a computation,



But anything at all cannot be seen as a computation. A computation ïs*  
the doing of some universal numbers. For all bases, most things will  
not be computation. They are very specific object/relation in  
arithmetic. They are determined by a universal number, and the data,  
having decided on some base to describe them.





it is not the thing that matters, but the interpretation.


Usually done by some universal number (in arithmetic, for example).





There are two ways to avoid this conclusion. One is to say that  
consciousness is not computable. The other is to say that a  
computation can only be implemented relative to the real world.


The first negate computationalism, and the second use a god-of-the-gap  
(real world) to use a never defined notion (physical implementation of  
a computation) and this to hide a problem instead of trying to solve it.


Bruno





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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruce Kellett]

On 30/10/2015 3:47 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 27 Oct 2015, at 06:54, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 27/10/2015 9:37 am, Russell Standish wrote:
The only clarification I would make is that (with computationalism) 
the system is formal, but the observer (individual in your 
terminology) and environment (universe with its physics in your 
terminology) are a non formal partition of the system.


How is that partition into observer and universe made? If it is 
purely formal then it doesn't do the necessary work. But then, how 
does a purely formal system generate a non-formal division? I think 
your division builds in semantic content from the outside by fiat -- 
not in a principled way.


This is similar to my objection to the many worlds interpretation of 
QM. You have to distinguish between the different worlds in some way 
-- unitary evolution cannot do this. Decoherence always leaves 
residual correlations, and although these may be small, there are a 
very large number of them, so the original superposition is, in fact, 
still intact. Everett wants to make the world relative to the 
particular observer (hence 'relative state' interpretation). But to 
make sense of this mathematically you have to get rid of the unwanted 
correlations.


I don't see why. We can fuse again by amnesia, and exploit the 
unwanted correlation. They disappears only relatively, nothing is 
lost, evolution is time symmetric.


No, amnesia does not reconnect the separate worlds -- it merely 
indicates a confused individual. The world is not defined by what one 
person sees or thinks. Inter-subjective agreement is essential to 
understanding what is going on. You confuse the 1p and 3p, yet again.


Most do this by fiat -- the worlds are orthogonal FAPP. But that is 
not principled either. Mathematically, we take a partial trace. But 
*we *take the trace*,* it is not in Schroedinger's equation.


It is in the relative choice made by our histories (long 
computations), relatively to us. Zurek explains this rather well in my 
opinion, I mean why our type of brain needs orthogonal positioning, 
why position is favored by brain-like structures, for consciousness to 
stabilize enough to make prediction in our deep environment(universal 
computations).


Zurek does not explain the point that I am making. Zurek's einselection 
is designed to explain the preferred basis problem. But he misses the 
mark by quite a wide margin. He explains why the position operator is 
often relevant, but that merely selects a Hilbert space, it does not 
select a basis in that space. The basis has to be robust against 
environmental interactions, not just the operator itself. Einselection, 
like decoherence, is part of the solution, but it is not the full solution.


But even if you have actually solved the basis problem, you still have 
not solved the problem of quantum measurement. In order to get just one 
result for an experiment with only probabilistic results, you have to 
project a subspace out of the full Hilbert space. The full space might 
well still be 'there' (in whatever sense you like), but the fact that 
the observer is conscious of only part of that space involves a 
projection operator. And projection operators are not time symmetric or 
unitary. This is the partial trace problem, and it remains unsolved.


Bruce

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruce Kellett]

On 29/10/2015 4:25 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Oct 2015, at 05:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:

I think Carroll's Paradox (or 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles') 
effectively undermines computationalism, or any argument that 
arithmetic is prior to physics.


See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_the_Tortoise_Said_to_Achilles

In order to escape the paradox, you have to resort to a formalist 
approach, and that renders the formalism devoid of semantic content.


Only because we forget one half of computer science.

It is already a problem when engineers do that, but if the 
philosophers do that, where are we going (grin)


Typically the machine itself when ideally correct avoid the mistakes, 
and separate G from G*, proof and truth, and consistency. The machine 
has the resource to understand the difference between syntax and 
semantics.


Only if that comes from outside the machine. Otherwise you are merely 
shuffling symbols, and Carroll's paradox hits with full force.


Bruce

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Stathis Papaioannou]

> On 29 Oct 2015, at 2:12 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> On 10/28/2015 2:14 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 28 Oct 2015, at 9:28 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 On 10/27/2015 3:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 On 28 Oct 2015, at 1:30 AM, John Clark  wrote:
 
> 
> 
> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 5:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou  
> wrote:
> 
>>> ​ >> ​ ​From examples in the physical world. You can give as many 
>>> botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it will   
>>> just be a word defined by other words 
>>> that are themselves defined by yet more words that are If you tried 
>>> to dig for meaning all you'd find is a endless loop, it would just be a 
>>> game where words are manipulated according to the rules of botany until 
>>> somebody forgot about definitions and pointed to the ​ASCII string 
>>> "t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism made 
>>> largely of cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then even a 
>>> martian would notice a correspondence between this game of manipulating 
>>> symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and the way these 
>>> large photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose live.
>> 
>> ​ > ​ What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O 
>> devices connecting it to outside trees?
> 
> There would ​ still be I/O devices connected to the ​virtual trees made 
> by a computer that operated according to the laws of physics, if not the 
> trees wouldn't even be virtual.  And the books on both virtual botany and 
> real botany would still be more than a just a symbol manipulation game, 
> they would have  semantic content ​ because there would be a ​ 
> correspondence between ​ the way the  symbols ​ are manipulated and the 
> way the virtual (or real)   large photosynthesizing organism live. ​ 
> Regardless of if they are virtual or real ​if you want to know how trees 
> live studying those botany symbols in virtual (or real) books will help, 
> so they must have  semantic content ​ .
 
 The requirement that a computation be able to interact with the real world 
 puts a restriction on what qualifies as a computation. You've challenged 
 Bruno many times to perform a difficult computation using his Platonic 
 computer. Well, that computation is occurring in front of you now in the 
 thermal motion of the atoms in your desk, which under an appropriate 
 interpretation are implementing a Turing machine. But you and Bruno don't 
 have that appropriate interpretation, and if you did, you would have the 
 result of the calculation already. In other words, the thermal motion 
 computation is not understandable as such in, and cannot interact with, 
 the world at the level of the substrate of its implementation; so it would 
 usually be said that either there is no computation being implemented, or 
 it is being implemented only in a trivial and useless sense. But remove 
 the requirement for interaction in the real world, and this objection 
 falls down. The computation is being implemented, your difficult 
 calculation has been completed, and it is being appreciated by the virtual 
 observers who are clapping and cheering - even though you can't hear them.
>>> 
>>> That's essentially Bruno's MGA, except it stops one step short.  Bruno 
>>> takes the last step and says even if the atoms of your desk were doing 
>>> absolutely nothing there is an interpretation in which that is a 
>>> computation; hence the atoms are superfluous.   But clearly then it is the 
>>> interpretation which is providing the computation.
>> 
>> I agree; if anything at all can be seen as a computation, it is not the 
>> thing that matters, but the interpretation. 
>> 
>> There are two ways to avoid this conclusion. One is to say that 
>> consciousness is not computable. The other is to say that a computation can 
>> only be implemented relative to the real world.
> 
> I take the latter.  But it doesn't have to be relative the real (i.e. our) 
> world.  There can be a virtual consciousness relative to a virtual 
> world...but I don't think "virtual" and "real" add anything to this.  So when 
> Bruno answers my criticism that the MG relys on its relation to the world for 
> its consciousness by saying he can just expand the program to simulate the 
> world too this doesn't answer my point.   The consciousness is still only 
> relative to a world; whether it's this world or a virtual world.

If the virtual world is at the same level as the consciousness there is nothing 
to prevent us saying the whole simulation is in Platonia.

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Oct 2015, at 07:32, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:




On 26 October 2015 at 17:08, Bruce Kellett  
 wrote:

On 26/10/2015 5:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 03:40:45PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
I think Carroll's Paradox (or 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles')
effectively undermines computationalism, or any argument that
arithmetic is prior to physics.

See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_the_Tortoise_Said_to_Achilles

In order to escape the paradox, you have to resort to a formalist
approach, and that renders the formalism devoid of semantic content.

I don't see why that undermines computationalism. Could you please  
expand?


Modus ponens is only a formal manipulation of symbols, with no  
semantic content.


This is an argument John Searle has made. The problem is, the brain  
can also be described as manipulating symbols with no semantic  
content - so where does semantic content come from?



It can be see as a not to bad formulation of the mind body problem.  
And a large part of theoretical computer science and mathematical  
logic studies just that. The semantics is the theory of models. The  
proof theory, or the computation theory is related with rule  
preserving truth. So a rule, like the modus ponens, preserve the  
tautologicalness (truth in all worlds/models/interpretation)?


There is a semantical notion of entailment. A entails semantically B  
when All models which satisfies A satisfies B. A theory is "complete"  
when this makes the (theory + A) capable of deducing B.


The main of logic consists in the relation between theories/machines  
with their proofs/computations and their semantic and semantic  
preserving transformations.


With computationalism, we have the math of the ideal case of a simple  
(Löbian, self-referentially correct in a Gödel+Tarski sense) machine.


This per se does not solve the mind-body problem, but it helps to make  
clearer the formulation, with the beginning of the reason why the  
universal machine can't solve it in a communicable way, for its  
"ultimate" first person view (eventually describing []p & p, but with  
some weakening on "[]".


Price: super Everett vertigo, I guess. But in this list, I mean we are  
supposed to be every-thingers not fearing Everett, or the more  
"obvious" multiplications of the computations in the elementary  
arithmetical reality.


It is up to someone believing in any thing not definable in arithmetic  
used for consciousness support to show what it is, and how does it  
select the computation: how can a universal number distinguish a  
physical universal number emulated by an arithmetical universal number  
from a physical universal number emulated by a physical universal  
number?


Bruce Kellet is right. If you believe that a physical numbers can do  
that, but not a digital number, then say no to the computationalist  
surgeon.


I don't know the truth, I just look at the consequences.

Bruno




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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Oct 2015, at 07:43, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 10/25/2015 11:32 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 26 October 2015 at 17:08, Bruce Kellett  
 wrote:

On 26/10/2015 5:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 03:40:45PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
I think Carroll's Paradox (or 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles')
effectively undermines computationalism, or any argument that
arithmetic is prior to physics.

See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_the_Tortoise_Said_to_Achilles

In order to escape the paradox, you have to resort to a formalist
approach, and that renders the formalism devoid of semantic content.

I don't see why that undermines computationalism. Could you please  
expand?


Modus ponens is only a formal manipulation of symbols, with no  
semantic content.


This is an argument John Searle has made. The problem is, the brain  
can also be described as manipulating symbols with no semantic  
content - so where does semantic content come from?


From interaction with a world.


That is the heart of mysticism. To belief, apparently partially  
realized, that there is a God that we can talk with.


You are right the semantic comes from the existence of a world, or a  
model (a structure which satisfies the constraints of the theory  
(which are often demanding, especially the babies!)


But with computationalism, we, in the 3p communicable way, are finite  
theories, and as far as we are consistent, we cannot prove that there  
is a world, or that there is a model, or that there is God, or that  
there is a truth.


That is the problem for the universal machines, they cannot prove that  
worlds satisfying them exists.
Yet, they can develop such beliefs, as it can be shown, for much  
simpler machines than ourselves, that such structures exists for them.


Arithmetic gives a law level non trivial notion of truth for the  
execution of the programs, and we can actually accelerate the  
interview of the universal machine by the use of the logic G (et all  
its intensional variants).


Thanks to S4Grz, the first person is not a machine, nor anything that  
the machine can describe in any third person way. Computationalism  
saves the soul from any reductionist complete theory or even  
definitions. It is a theorem of the machine, once you define the soul  
by the "knower", and knowable by Theatetus's applied to Gödels'  
beweisvar "beweisbar('p') & p".


A semantic is a reality. It is a structure which realize, satisfies a  
proposition or a belief.


(Rational) knowledge would be when our (rational) belief are true. (in  
this computationalist case: satisfied by the usual model (N, +, *)).


I have to go. (almost)

Bruno







Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/28/2015 2:14 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 28 Oct 2015, at 9:28 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:





On 10/27/2015 3:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On 28 Oct 2015, at 1:30 AM, John Clark  wrote:




On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 5:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
 wrote:


​ >> ​
​From examples in the physical world. You can give as many
botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but
it will just be a word defined by other words that are
themselves defined by yet more words that are If you
tried to dig for meaning all you'd find is a endless loop,
it would just be a game where words are manipulated
according to the rules of botany until somebody forgot
about definitions and pointed to the ​ASCII string
"t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large photosynthesizing
organism made largely of cellulose that exists in the
physical world. Then even a martian would notice a
correspondence between this game of manipulating symbols
called "botany" that humans had invented and the way these
large photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose
live.


​ > ​
What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O
devices connecting it to outside trees?


There would
​ still be I/O devices connected to the ​virtual trees made by a 
computer that operated according to the laws of physics, if not the 
trees wouldn't even be virtual.  And the books on both virtual 
botany and real botany would still be more than a just a symbol 
manipulation game, they would have

semantic content
​ because there would be a ​
correspondence between
​ the way the
 symbols
​ are manipulated and the way the virtual (or real)
 large photosynthesizing organism live.
​ Regardless of if they are virtual or real ​if you want to know 
how trees live studying those botany symbols in virtual (or real) 
books will help, so they must have

semantic content
​ .


The requirement that a computation be able to interact with the real 
world puts a restriction on what qualifies as a computation. You've 
challenged Bruno many times to perform a difficult computation using 
his Platonic computer. Well, that computation is occurring in front 
of you now in the thermal motion of the atoms in your desk, which 
under an appropriate interpretation are implementing a Turing 
machine. But you and Bruno don't have that appropriate 
interpretation, and if you did, you would have the result of the 
calculation already. In other words, the thermal motion computation 
is not understandable as such in, and cannot interact with, the 
world at the level of the substrate of its implementation; so it 
would usually be said that either there is no computation being 
implemented, or it is being implemented only in a trivial and 
useless sense. But remove the requirement for interaction in the 
real world, and this objection falls down. The computation is being 
implemented, your difficult calculation has been completed, and it 
is being appreciated by the virtual observers who are clapping and 
cheering - even though you can't hear them.


That's essentially Bruno's MGA, except it stops one step short.  
Bruno takes the last step and says even if the atoms of your desk 
were doing absolutely nothing there is an interpretation in which 
that is a computation; hence the atoms are superfluous.   But clearly 
then it is the interpretation which is providing the computation.


I agree; if anything at all can be seen as a computation, it is not 
the thing that matters, but the interpretation.


There are two ways to avoid this conclusion. One is to say that 
consciousness is not computable. The other is to say that a 
computation can only be implemented relative to the real world.


I take the latter.  But it doesn't have to be relative the real (i.e. 
our) world.  There can be a virtual consciousness relative to a virtual 
world...but I don't think "virtual" and "real" add anything to this.  So 
when Bruno answers my criticism that the MG relys on its relation to the 
world for its consciousness by saying he can just expand the program to 
simulate the world too this doesn't answer my point.   The consciousness 
is still only relative to a world; whether it's this world or a virtual 
world.


Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Oct 2015, at 05:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:

I think Carroll's Paradox (or 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles')  
effectively undermines computationalism, or any argument that  
arithmetic is prior to physics.


See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_the_Tortoise_Said_to_Achilles

In order to escape the paradox, you have to resort to a formalist  
approach, and that renders the formalism devoid of semantic content.



Only because we forget one half of computer science.

It is already a problem when engineers do that, but if the  
philosophers do that, where are we going (grin)


Typically the machine itself when ideally correct avoid the mistakes,  
and separate G from G*, proof and truth, and consistency. The machine  
has the resource to understand the difference between syntax and  
semantics.



Bruno





Bruce

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Stathis Papaioannou]

> On 28 Oct 2015, at 9:28 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> On 10/27/2015 3:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> 
>> On 28 Oct 2015, at 1:30 AM, John Clark  wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 5:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou  
>>> wrote:
>>> 
> ​ >> ​ ​From examples in the physical world. You can give as many 
> botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it will just be 
> a word defined by other words that are themselves defined by yet more 
> words that are If you tried to dig for meaning all you'd find is a 
> endless loop, it would just be a game where words are manipulated 
> according to the rules of botany until somebody forgot about definitions 
> and pointed to the ​ASCII string "t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large 
> photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose that exists in the 
> physical world. Then even a martian would notice a correspondence between 
> this game of manipulating symbols called "botany" that humans had 
> invented and the way these large photosynthesizing organism made largely 
> of cellulose live.
 
 ​ > ​ What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O 
 devices connecting it to outside trees?
>>> 
>>> There would ​ still be I/O devices connected to the ​virtual trees made by 
>>> a computer that operated according to the laws of physics, if not the trees 
>>> wouldn't even be virtual.  And the books on both virtual botany and real 
>>> botany would still be more than a just a symbol manipulation game, they 
>>> would have  semantic content ​ because there would be a ​ 
>>> correspondence between ​ the way the  symbols ​ are manipulated and the way 
>>> the virtual (or real)   large photosynthesizing organism live. ​ Regardless 
>>> of if they are virtual or real ​if you want to know how trees live studying 
>>> those botany symbols in virtual (or real) books will help, so they must 
>>> have  semantic content ​ .
>> 
>> The requirement that a computation be able to interact with the real world 
>> puts a restriction on what qualifies as a computation. You've challenged 
>> Bruno many times to perform a difficult computation using his Platonic 
>> computer. Well, that computation is occurring in front of you now in the 
>> thermal motion of the atoms in your desk, which under an appropriate 
>> interpretation are implementing a Turing machine. But you and Bruno don't 
>> have that appropriate interpretation, and if you did, you would have the 
>> result of the calculation already. In other words, the thermal 
>> motion computation is not understandable as such in, and cannot interact 
>> with, the world at the level of the substrate of its implementation; so it 
>> would usually be said that either there is no computation being implemented, 
>> or it is being implemented only in a trivial and useless sense. But remove 
>> the requirement for interaction in the real world, and this objection falls 
>> down. The computation is being implemented, your difficult calculation has 
>> been completed, and it is being appreciated by the virtual observers who are 
>> clapping and cheering - even though you can't hear them.
> 
> That's essentially Bruno's MGA, except it stops one step short.  Bruno takes 
> the last step and says even if the atoms of your desk were doing absolutely 
> nothing there is an interpretation in which that is a computation; hence the 
> atoms are superfluous.   But clearly then it is the interpretation which is 
> providing the computation.

I agree; if anything at all can be seen as a computation, it is not the thing 
that matters, but the interpretation. 

There are two ways to avoid this conclusion. One is to say that consciousness 
is not computable. The other is to say that a computation can only be 
implemented relative to the real world.

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Stathis Papaioannou]

> On 28 Oct 2015, at 9:39 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> On 10/27/2015 3:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Sent from my iPhone
>> 
>> On 28 Oct 2015, at 4:49 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 On 10/26/2015 11:00 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 
 On 27 October 2015 at 16:57, Bruce Kellett  
 wrote:
> On 27/10/2015 4:50 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> On 27 October 2015 at 14:22, Bruce Kellett  
>> wrote:
 On 27/10/2015 1:13 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 27 Oct 2015, at 12:15 PM, Bruce Kellett 
>  wrote:
>> On 27/10/2015 12:05 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 7:37 PM, Bruce Kellett 
>>  wrote:
 On 27/10/2015 10:52 am, Jason Resch wrote:
 On Monday, October 26, 2015, Bruce Kellett 
  wrote:
 > On 27/10/2015 8:16 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 >
 > On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, John Clark  
 > wrote:
 >>
 >>> so where does semantic content come from?
 >>
 >> From examples in the physical world. You can give as many 
 >> botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it 
 >> will just be a word defined by other words that are themselves 
 >> defined by yet more words that are If you tried to dig for 
 >> meaning all you'd find is a endless loop, it would just be a 
 >> game where words are manipulated according to the rules of 
 >> botany until somebody forgot about definitions and pointed to 
 >> the ASCII string "t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large 
 >> photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose that 
 >> exists in the physical world. Then even a martian would notice 
 >> a correspondence between this game of manipulating symbols 
 >> called "botany" that humans had invented and the way these 
 >> large photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose live.
 >
 > What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O 
 > devices connecting it to outside trees?
 >
 > I think Brent answered this in his response to Russell. The 
 > trees of the ordinary physical world do not connect with 
 > anything outside this world either in order to have semantic 
 > content. A virtual world would be no different in this respect. 
 > The point is that the content comes from something other formal 
 > symbol manipulation -- things such as pointing and sensory 
 > responses. There has to be something other than the 
 > consciousness with which the consciousness can interact.
 
 I take it you've never played video games.
>>> Not with any regularity. But I take it that when you play such 
>>> games, you interact with the simulated environment via the provided 
>>> interface -- the game only interacts with itself in so far as the 
>>> original programmers designed it to. The semantic content is 
>>> provided from outside in either case.
>> 
>> So what do you think would happen if an AI, or uploaded mind were 
>> uploaded into a virtual reality that was fully disconnected from the 
>> physical world? Would that mind no longer be conscious?
> Difficult to tell because, by construction, you can't ask it. But if 
> both the AI and the VR are programmed by some external intelligence, 
> semantic content might be provided in that way.
 
 But once programmed, there may be no further evidence of semantic 
 content. The computer could be fired into space, and the programmers 
 and their entire civilisation might die. If aliens find it and somehow 
 work out the syntax, there is no way for them to work out the meaning 
 behind it, since there is no intrinsic meaning in circuits turning on 
 and off. So what is the explanation here: the meaning is still there 
 because the long-dead programmers had thought about it in a particular 
 way?
>>> 
>>> Could be. If the program is no longer running, the meaning might not be 
>>> recoverable.
>> 
>>  
>> The program is running, but the programmers and their civilisation are 
>> gone. How is the meaning recoverable?
> 
> Not by the outsider, certainly. But to the insider..who can tell? It 
> depends on what the programmers originally built in.
 
 Then that means that there is 

Re: Carroll's Paradox

[scerir via Everything List]

From: Bruce Kellett
Sent: Tuesday, October 27, 2015 6:54 AM

[] But to make sense of this mathematically you have to get rid of the 
unwanted correlations. Most do this by fiat -- the worlds are orthogonal 
FAPP.  But that is not principled either. Mathematically, we take a partial 
trace. But we take the trace, it is not in Schroedinger's equation.


### There are interesting difficulties when two (or more) observers have 
knowledge of one physical system.

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0107151
"Whose Knowledge" by Mermin 


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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 1:50 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/26/2015 4:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, October 26, 2015, Bruce Kellett < 
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> > On 27/10/2015 8:16 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, John Clark < 
> johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>>
> >>> >
> >>> so where does semantic content come from?
> >>
> >> From examples in the physical world. You can give as many botanical
> definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it will just be a word
> defined by other words that are themselves defined by yet more words that
> are If you tried to dig for meaning all you'd find is a endless loop,
> it would just be a game where words are manipulated according to the rules
> of botany until somebody forgot about definitions and pointed to the ASCII
> string "t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism
> made largely of cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then even a
> martian would notice a correspondence between this game of manipulating
> symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and the way these large
> photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose live.
> >
> > What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O devices
> connecting it to outside trees?
> >
> > I think Brent answered this in his response to Russell. The trees of the
> ordinary physical world do not connect with anything outside this world
> either in order to have semantic content. A virtual world would be no
> different in this respect. The point is that the content comes from
> something other formal symbol manipulation -- things such as pointing and
> sensory responses. There has to be something other than the consciousness
> with which the consciousness can interact.
>
> I take it you've never played video games.
>
>
> Can you play a video game "in your head" in an environment whose elements
> have no referents in the world of your experience?
>

Sure I think so. People see pretty crazy things on various drugs.


> All the video games I've ever seen have environments very much like this
> one with just a some mixing up of attributes.
>
>
2001: A Space Odyssey was pretty out there. How different does a movie/game
have to be from our reality before it becomes something that turns anyone
who watches it into a p-zombie?

Jason

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/26/2015 2:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, John Clark > wrote:


Russell Standish wrote:

Modus ponens is only a formal manipulation of symbols, with no
semantic content.



​ I agree.​

Stathis Papaioannou
​ Wrote:​


This is an argument John Searle has made.


​ Unfortunately yes.​

The problem is, the brain can also be described as
manipulating symbols with no semantic content


​Yes.​

​ > ​
so where does semantic content come from?


​From examples in the physical world. You can give as many
botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it will
just be a word defined by other words that are themselves defined
by yet more words that are If you tried to dig for meaning all
you'd find is a endless loop, it would just be a game where words
are manipulated according to the rules of botany until somebody
forgot about definitions and pointed to the ​ASCII string
"t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism
made largely of cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then
even a martian would notice a correspondence between this game of
manipulating symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and
the way these large photosynthesizing organism made largely of
cellulose live.


What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O 
devices connecting it to outside trees?


The observer's use of the word "tree" would have the semantic content of 
referring to a (virtual) tree.


Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/26/2015 4:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Monday, October 26, 2015, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

> On 27/10/2015 8:16 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, John Clark > wrote:

>>
>>
>>>
>>> >
>>> so where does semantic content come from?
>>
>> From examples in the physical world. You can give as many botanical 
definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it will just be a word 
defined by other words that are themselves defined by yet more words 
that are If you tried to dig for meaning all you'd find is a 
endless loop, it would just be a game where words are manipulated 
according to the rules of botany until somebody forgot about 
definitions and pointed to the ASCII string "t-r-e-e" and then pointed 
to a large photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose that 
exists in the physical world. Then even a martian would notice a 
correspondence between this game of manipulating symbols called 
"botany" that humans had invented and the way these large 
photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose live.

>
> What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O 
devices connecting it to outside trees?

>
> I think Brent answered this in his response to Russell. The trees of 
the ordinary physical world do not connect with anything outside this 
world either in order to have semantic content. A virtual world would 
be no different in this respect. The point is that the content comes 
from something other formal symbol manipulation -- things such as 
pointing and sensory responses. There has to be something other than 
the consciousness with which the consciousness can interact.


I take it you've never played video games.


Can you play a video game "in your head" in an environment whose 
elements have no referents in the world of your experience?  All the 
video games I've ever seen have environments very much like this one 
with just a some mixing up of attributes.


Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruce Kellett]

On 27/10/2015 5:00 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 October 2015 at 16:57, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 27/10/2015 4:50 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 27 October 2015 at 14:22, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 27/10/2015 1:13 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 27 Oct 2015, at 12:15 PM, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 27/10/2015 12:05 pm, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 7:37 PM, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 27/10/2015 10:52 am, Jason Resch wrote:

On Monday, October 26, 2015, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
> On 27/10/2015 8:16 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, John Clark
>
wrote:
>>
>>> so where does semantic content come from?
>>
>> From examples in the physical world. You can give
as many botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as
you want but it will just be a word defined by other
words that are themselves defined by yet more words
that are If you tried to dig for meaning all
you'd find is a endless loop, it would just be a game
where words are manipulated according to the rules of
botany until somebody forgot about definitions and
pointed to the ASCII string "t-r-e-e" and then
pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism made
largely of cellulose that exists in the physical
world. Then even a martian would notice a
correspondence between this game of manipulating
symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and
the way these large photosynthesizing organism made
largely of cellulose live.
>
> What about a virtual world with trees and
observers, and no I/O devices connecting it to
outside trees?
>
> I think Brent answered this in his response to
Russell. The trees of the ordinary physical world do
not connect with anything outside this world either
in order to have semantic content. A virtual world
would be no different in this respect. The point is
that the content comes from something other formal
symbol manipulation -- things such as pointing and
sensory responses. There has to be something other
than the consciousness with which the consciousness
can interact.

I take it you've never played video games.

Not with any regularity. But I take it that when you
play such games, you interact with the simulated
environment via the provided interface -- the game
only interacts with itself in so far as the original
programmers designed it to. The semantic content is
provided from outside in either case.


So what do you think would happen if an AI, or uploaded
mind were uploaded into a virtual reality that was fully
disconnected from the physical world? Would that mind no
longer be conscious?

Difficult to tell because, by construction, you can't ask
it. But if both the AI and the VR are programmed by some
external intelligence, semantic content might be provided
in that way.


But once programmed, there may be no further evidence of
semantic content. The computer could be fired into space,
and the programmers and their entire civilisation might die.
If aliens find it and somehow work out the syntax, there is
no way for them to work out the meaning behind it, since
there is no intrinsic meaning in circuits turning on and
off. So what is the explanation here: the meaning is still
there because the long-dead programmers had thought about it
in a particular way?


Could be. If the program is no longer running, the meaning
might not be recoverable.


The program is running, but the programmers and their
civilisation are gone. How is the meaning recoverable?


Not by the outsider, certainly. But to the insider..who can
tell? It depends on what the programmers originally built in.


Then that means that there is meaning intrinsic to a certain pattern 
of circuits turning on and off.


In the right context.

Bruce

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 27 October 2015 at 17:32, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/26/2015 2:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, John Clark < 
> johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Russell Standish wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Modus ponens is only a formal manipulation of symbols, with no semantic
>>> content.
>>>
>>
>>
>> ​ I agree.​
>>
>>
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>> ​ Wrote:​
>>
>>
>> This is an argument John Searle has made.
>>>
>>
>> ​ Unfortunately yes.​
>>
>>
>>
>>> The problem is, the brain can also be described as manipulating symbols
>>> with no semantic content
>>>
>>
>> ​Yes.​
>>
>>
>>> ​ > ​
>>> so where does semantic content come from?
>>>
>>
>> ​From examples in the physical world. You can give as many botanical
>> definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it will just be a word
>> defined by other words that are themselves defined by yet more words that
>> are If you tried to dig for meaning all you'd find is a endless loop,
>> it would just be a game where words are manipulated according to the rules
>> of botany until somebody forgot about definitions and pointed to the ​ASCII
>> string "t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism
>> made largely of cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then even a
>> martian would notice a correspondence between this game of manipulating
>> symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and the way these large
>> photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose live.
>>
>
> What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O devices
> connecting it to outside trees?
>
>
> The observer's use of the word "tree" would have the semantic content of
> referring to a (virtual) tree.
>

In effect, intrinsically meaningless symbols would bootstrap themselves
into being meaningful, without reference to outside reality.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 12:07 AM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 27/10/2015 3:12 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 10:25 PM, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>
>> On 27/10/2015 12:27 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 8:15 PM, Bruce Kellett <
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>> On 27/10/2015 12:05 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 7:37 PM, Bruce Kellett <
>>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>
 On 27/10/2015 10:52 am, Jason Resch wrote:

 On Monday, October 26, 2015, Bruce Kellett <
 bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
 > On 27/10/2015 8:16 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 >
 > On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, John Clark < 
 johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
 >>
 >>
 >>>
 >>> >
 >>> so where does semantic content come from?
 >>
 >> From examples in the physical world. You can give as many botanical
 definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it will just be a word
 defined by other words that are themselves defined by yet more words that
 are If you tried to dig for meaning all you'd find is a endless loop,
 it would just be a game where words are manipulated according to the rules
 of botany until somebody forgot about definitions and pointed to the ASCII
 string "t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism
 made largely of cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then even a
 martian would notice a correspondence between this game of manipulating
 symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and the way these large
 photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose live.
 >
 > What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O
 devices connecting it to outside trees?
 >
 > I think Brent answered this in his response to Russell. The trees of
 the ordinary physical world do not connect with anything outside this world
 either in order to have semantic content. A virtual world would be no
 different in this respect. The point is that the content comes from
 something other formal symbol manipulation -- things such as pointing and
 sensory responses. There has to be something other than the consciousness
 with which the consciousness can interact.

 I take it you've never played video games.

 Not with any regularity. But I take it that when you play such games,
 you interact with the simulated environment via the provided interface --
 the game only interacts with itself in so far as the original programmers
 designed it to. The semantic content is provided from outside in either
 case.

>>>
>>> So what do you think would happen if an AI, or uploaded mind were
>>> uploaded into a virtual reality that was fully disconnected from the
>>> physical world? Would that mind no longer be conscious?
>>>
>>> Difficult to tell because, by construction, you can't ask it. But if
>>> both the AI and the VR are programmed by some external intelligence,
>>> semantic content might be provided in that way.
>>>
>>
>> So what you're saying is that depending on what is on the mind of the
>> programmer, the AI within the virtual reality may or may not be conscious?
>>
>>
>> Of course. You wouldn't want to be the result of an incompetent
>> programmer now, would you?
>>
>
> My desires are irrelevant in the matter. I think I would be conscious in
> the same way whether God, or evolution programmed our DNA.
>
> The name of the programmer is irrelevant -- his competence is not. You
> would not be conscious in the same way if your brain operated only on
> Tuesday afternoons.
>

But then it would be a different program. If the program is the same, it
doesn't matter who wrote it nor how it was written nor what the programmer
had for breakfast.


>
>
> Does what is on the mind of makers of video games make a difference to the
>> game playing experience (assuming the same code was written either way)?
>>
>>
>> But you are providing the meaning to the game you are playing.
>>
>
> As it would to an AI within such a game of an entirely isolated computer.
>
>
> But you are assuming that there is a clear distinction between the AI and
> the encompassing VR. How is this accomplished?
>
>
Not necessarily.

Is there a clear distinction between the atoms of your brain and the atoms
of your environment? How is that accomplished? Moreover, how is it relevant?

The AI and the environment (or perhaps more accurately described as the
sensory input generating program) might be separate processes, or they
might be subprocesses of some larger program. From the conscious AI's
perspective, it cannot differentiate between either of the two
possibilities.

Jason

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 1:59 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/26/2015 6:15 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On 27/10/2015 12:05 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 7:37 PM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 27/10/2015 10:52 am, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> On Monday, October 26, 2015, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>> > On 27/10/2015 8:16 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >
>> > On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, John Clark < 
>> johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>>
>> >>> >
>> >>> so where does semantic content come from?
>> >>
>> >> From examples in the physical world. You can give as many botanical
>> definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it will just be a word
>> defined by other words that are themselves defined by yet more words that
>> are If you tried to dig for meaning all you'd find is a endless loop,
>> it would just be a game where words are manipulated according to the rules
>> of botany until somebody forgot about definitions and pointed to the ASCII
>> string "t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism
>> made largely of cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then even a
>> martian would notice a correspondence between this game of manipulating
>> symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and the way these large
>> photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose live.
>> >
>> > What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O devices
>> connecting it to outside trees?
>> >
>> > I think Brent answered this in his response to Russell. The trees of
>> the ordinary physical world do not connect with anything outside this world
>> either in order to have semantic content. A virtual world would be no
>> different in this respect. The point is that the content comes from
>> something other formal symbol manipulation -- things such as pointing and
>> sensory responses. There has to be something other than the consciousness
>> with which the consciousness can interact.
>>
>> I take it you've never played video games.
>>
>> Not with any regularity. But I take it that when you play such games, you
>> interact with the simulated environment via the provided interface -- the
>> game only interacts with itself in so far as the original programmers
>> designed it to. The semantic content is provided from outside in either
>> case.
>>
>
> So what do you think would happen if an AI, or uploaded mind were uploaded
> into a virtual reality that was fully disconnected from the physical world?
> Would that mind no longer be conscious?
>
> Difficult to tell because, by construction, you can't ask it. But if both
> the AI and the VR are programmed by some external intelligence, semantic
> content might be provided in that way.
>
>
> The AI, assuming it interacted with it's virtual world, would be conscious
> of things in the virtual world.
>

Interesting, I didn't expect you to take this position. We agree then.

Jason

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/26/2015 3:37 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 10:44:28AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 10/26/2015 2:43 AM, Russell Standish wrote:


Assuming computationalism, our everyday experience _is_ internal to the
system. That doesn't make it any less meaningful.

I think that's a confusion.  The system is the universe with it's
physics.   So in a sense everything is internal to it.  But
experience is individual and it's meaningful because the individual
has values and memory and so incorporates experiences into decisions
about future actions...that's what constitutes giving them
semantics.


Hi Brent, I appreciate your point of view very much, but I fail to see
how what you say is incompatible with my claim. Where is the
confusion?


I think our everyday experience is given meaning as referring to things 
outside ourselves.  So it's not internal to "the system" that is the 
experiencer.  It is only because the observer is distinct from the rest 
of the world that he can form meaningful symbolic representations of it.




The only clarification I would make is that (with computationalism)
the system is formal, but the observer (individual in your
terminology) and environment (universe with its physics in your
terminology) are a non formal partition of the system.


I'm not sure what you mean by non-formal partition.  If your brain is 
replaced by a I/O functionally equivalent digital computer it will still 
be in an environment and will have internal representations that refer 
to the environment.


Brent




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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Quentin Anciaux]

2015-10-27 7:44 GMT+01:00 Brent Meeker :

>
>
> On 10/26/2015 3:37 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 10:44:28AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>> On 10/26/2015 2:43 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
>>>
>>> Assuming computationalism, our everyday experience _is_ internal to the
 system. That doesn't make it any less meaningful.

>>> I think that's a confusion.  The system is the universe with it's
>>> physics.   So in a sense everything is internal to it.  But
>>> experience is individual and it's meaningful because the individual
>>> has values and memory and so incorporates experiences into decisions
>>> about future actions...that's what constitutes giving them
>>> semantics.
>>>
>>> Hi Brent, I appreciate your point of view very much, but I fail to see
>> how what you say is incompatible with my claim. Where is the
>> confusion?
>>
>
> I think our everyday experience is given meaning as referring to things
> outside ourselves.  So it's not internal to "the system" that is the
> experiencer.  It is only because the observer is distinct from the rest of
> the world that he can form meaningful symbolic representations of it.
>
>
>> The only clarification I would make is that (with computationalism)
>> the system is formal, but the observer (individual in your
>> terminology) and environment (universe with its physics in your
>> terminology) are a non formal partition of the system.
>>
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by non-formal partition.  If your brain is
> replaced by a I/O functionally equivalent digital computer it will still be
> in an environment and will have internal representations that refer to the
> environment.


In a computer... an io, is just a memory location... as anything else is...
that the value of that memory location reflect or not an external world...
doesn't change anything from the POV of the program  reading it... so as
the meaning must somehow be internal to the program as to what that value
at that memory location means for it.

Quentin

>
>
> Brent
>
>
>>
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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/26/2015 6:15 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 27/10/2015 12:05 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 7:37 PM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:


On 27/10/2015 10:52 am, Jason Resch wrote:

On Monday, October 26, 2015, Bruce Kellett
>
wrote:
> On 27/10/2015 8:16 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, John Clark 
wrote:
>>
>>
>>>
>>> >
>>> so where does semantic content come from?
>>
>> From examples in the physical world. You can give as many
botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it
will just be a word defined by other words that are themselves
defined by yet more words that are If you tried to dig for
meaning all you'd find is a endless loop, it would just be a
game where words are manipulated according to the rules of
botany until somebody forgot about definitions and pointed to
the ASCII string "t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large
photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose that exists
in the physical world. Then even a martian would notice a
correspondence between this game of manipulating symbols called
"botany" that humans had invented and the way these large
photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose live.
>
> What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no
I/O devices connecting it to outside trees?
>
> I think Brent answered this in his response to Russell. The
trees of the ordinary physical world do not connect with
anything outside this world either in order to have semantic
content. A virtual world would be no different in this respect.
The point is that the content comes from something other formal
symbol manipulation -- things such as pointing and sensory
responses. There has to be something other than the
consciousness with which the consciousness can interact.

I take it you've never played video games.

Not with any regularity. But I take it that when you play such
games, you interact with the simulated environment via the
provided interface -- the game only interacts with itself in so
far as the original programmers designed it to. The semantic
content is provided from outside in either case.


So what do you think would happen if an AI, or uploaded mind were 
uploaded into a virtual reality that was fully disconnected from the 
physical world? Would that mind no longer be conscious?
Difficult to tell because, by construction, you can't ask it. But if 
both the AI and the VR are programmed by some external intelligence, 
semantic content might be provided in that way.


The AI, assuming it interacted with it's virtual world, would be 
conscious of things in the virtual world.


Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 27 October 2015 at 16:57, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 27/10/2015 4:50 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 27 October 2015 at 14:22, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 27/10/2015 1:13 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 27 Oct 2015, at 12:15 PM, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>> On 27/10/2015 12:05 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 7:37 PM, Bruce Kellett <
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>> On 27/10/2015 10:52 am, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>> On Monday, October 26, 2015, Bruce Kellett < 
>>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>> > On 27/10/2015 8:16 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>> >
>>> > On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, John Clark < 
>>> johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >>> so where does semantic content come from?
>>> >>
>>> >> From examples in the physical world. You can give as many botanical
>>> definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it will just be a word
>>> defined by other words that are themselves defined by yet more words that
>>> are If you tried to dig for meaning all you'd find is a endless loop,
>>> it would just be a game where words are manipulated according to the rules
>>> of botany until somebody forgot about definitions and pointed to the ASCII
>>> string "t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism
>>> made largely of cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then even a
>>> martian would notice a correspondence between this game of manipulating
>>> symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and the way these large
>>> photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose live.
>>> >
>>> > What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O
>>> devices connecting it to outside trees?
>>> >
>>> > I think Brent answered this in his response to Russell. The trees of
>>> the ordinary physical world do not connect with anything outside this world
>>> either in order to have semantic content. A virtual world would be no
>>> different in this respect. The point is that the content comes from
>>> something other formal symbol manipulation -- things such as pointing and
>>> sensory responses. There has to be something other than the consciousness
>>> with which the consciousness can interact.
>>>
>>> I take it you've never played video games.
>>>
>>> Not with any regularity. But I take it that when you play such games,
>>> you interact with the simulated environment via the provided interface --
>>> the game only interacts with itself in so far as the original programmers
>>> designed it to. The semantic content is provided from outside in either
>>> case.
>>>
>>
>> So what do you think would happen if an AI, or uploaded mind were
>> uploaded into a virtual reality that was fully disconnected from the
>> physical world? Would that mind no longer be conscious?
>>
>> Difficult to tell because, by construction, you can't ask it. But if both
>> the AI and the VR are programmed by some external intelligence, semantic
>> content might be provided in that way.
>>
>>
>> But once programmed, there may be no further evidence of semantic
>> content. The computer could be fired into space, and the programmers and
>> their entire civilisation might die. If aliens find it and somehow work out
>> the syntax, there is no way for them to work out the meaning behind it,
>> since there is no intrinsic meaning in circuits turning on and off. So what
>> is the explanation here: the meaning is still there because the long-dead
>> programmers had thought about it in a particular way?
>>
>>
>> Could be. If the program is no longer running, the meaning might not be
>> recoverable.
>>
>
>
> The program is running, but the programmers and their civilisation are
> gone. How is the meaning recoverable?
>
>
> Not by the outsider, certainly. But to the insider..who can tell? It
> depends on what the programmers originally built in.
>

Then that means that there is meaning intrinsic to a certain pattern of
circuits turning on and off.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Quentin Anciaux]

2015-10-27 17:29 GMT+01:00 John Clark :

> On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 11:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>
> ​
>>> ​>> ​
>>> If it is *FULLY*
>>>  disconnected from the physical world
>>> ​ then what sort of computer is the AI running on, and what is
>>> generating the virtual reality environment?​
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> If no sensor of the real world write anything  at all in the memory
>> available to the AI program... then how on earth does the fact it runs on a
>> physical computer matter ?
>>
>
> ​
> Matter always matters.
>

I repeat if there is *absolutely no sensors writing **any** information in
a *memory location* readable by the AI program how can that affect if ? how
can it knows that external world ?*


> ​ ​
> If it is FULLY
> ​ ​
> disconnected from the physical world
> ​ so
>
> there is no processor
> ​ made of matter that obeys the laws of physics​
>  and
> ​no ​
> memory
> ​ made of matter to write the outcome of a calculation
> ​
> ​to ​
> then how on earth can
> ​a​
>  AI
> ​
> program *DO* anything?
>

That's not what I'm talking about, yes the AI program runs on a physical
computer if you want, and stopping it, stops the program... but from the
POV of the AI program, that physical world has no bearing on it nor even
existence, as *nothing from it* absolutely *no information about that
external world* is passed to it, so *how on earth could it knows it, be
influenced by it* ?


>
> ​  John K Clark​
>
>>
>>
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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Quentin Anciaux]

2015-10-27 15:39 GMT+01:00 John Clark :

>
> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 9:05 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> So what do you think would happen if an AI, or uploaded mind were
>> uploaded into a virtual reality that was fully disconnected from the
>> physical world? Would that mind no longer be conscious?
>>
>
> ​If it is *FULLY*
>  disconnected from the physical world
> ​ then what sort of computer is the AI running on, and what is generating
> the virtual reality environment?​
>
>
>
If no sensor of the real world write anything  at all in the memory
available to the AI program... then how on earth does the fact it runs on a
physical computer matter ? The AI has no way to have access to that
world...

Quentin


>   John K Clark
>
>
> --
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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[John Clark]

On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 11:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux 
wrote:

​
>> ​>> ​
>> If it is *FULLY*
>>  disconnected from the physical world
>> ​ then what sort of computer is the AI running on, and what is generating
>> the virtual reality environment?​
>>
>
> ​> ​
> If no sensor of the real world write anything  at all in the memory
> available to the AI program... then how on earth does the fact it runs on a
> physical computer matter ?
>

​
Matter always matters.
​ ​
If it is FULLY
​ ​
disconnected from the physical world
​ so

there is no processor
​ made of matter that obeys the laws of physics​
 and
​no ​
memory
​ made of matter to write the outcome of a calculation
​
​to ​
then how on earth can
​a​
 AI
​
program *DO* anything?

​  John K Clark​

>
>

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/26/2015 11:57 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-10-27 7:44 GMT+01:00 Brent Meeker >:




On 10/26/2015 3:37 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 10:44:28AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 10/26/2015 2:43 AM, Russell Standish wrote:

Assuming computationalism, our everyday experience
_is_ internal to the
system. That doesn't make it any less meaningful.

I think that's a confusion.  The system is the universe
with it's
physics.   So in a sense everything is internal to it.  But
experience is individual and it's meaningful because the
individual
has values and memory and so incorporates experiences into
decisions
about future actions...that's what constitutes giving them
semantics.

Hi Brent, I appreciate your point of view very much, but I
fail to see
how what you say is incompatible with my claim. Where is the
confusion?


I think our everyday experience is given meaning as referring to
things outside ourselves.  So it's not internal to "the system"
that is the experiencer.  It is only because the observer is
distinct from the rest of the world that he can form meaningful
symbolic representations of it.


The only clarification I would make is that (with
computationalism)
the system is formal, but the observer (individual in your
terminology) and environment (universe with its physics in your
terminology) are a non formal partition of the system.


I'm not sure what you mean by non-formal partition.  If your brain
is replaced by a I/O functionally equivalent digital computer it
will still be in an environment and will have internal
representations that refer to the environment.


In a computer... an io, is just a memory location... as anything else 
is... that the value of that memory location reflect or not an 
external world... doesn't change anything from the POV of the program 
 reading it... so as the meaning must somehow be internal to the 
program as to what that value at that memory location means for it.


That's like saying a neuron in your brain doesn't know anything. In a 
sense it's true, but it obfuscates the source of meaning.  What your 
neurons, as a brain, know are things about the external world (external 
to the brain) with which they interact.  The "meaning" is internal in 
the sense that it is represented by a pattern in the brain - but it is 
only meaning because it has referents outside the brain.  A brain that 
had never had an environment with which to interact would not have 
anything to represent and would contain no "meaning".  It would be like 
the computer running a random or unknowable program, or the rock that 
computes everything.


Brent


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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/27/2015 12:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 1:50 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 10/26/2015 4:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Monday, October 26, 2015, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
> On 27/10/2015 8:16 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, John Clark > wrote:
>>
>>
>>>
>>> >
>>> so where does semantic content come from?
>>
>> From examples in the physical world. You can give as many
botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it will
just be a word defined by other words that are themselves defined
by yet more words that are If you tried to dig for meaning
all you'd find is a endless loop, it would just be a game where
words are manipulated according to the rules of botany until
somebody forgot about definitions and pointed to the ASCII string
"t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism
made largely of cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then
even a martian would notice a correspondence between this game of
manipulating symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and
the way these large photosynthesizing organism made largely of
cellulose live.
>
> What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O
devices connecting it to outside trees?
>
> I think Brent answered this in his response to Russell. The
trees of the ordinary physical world do not connect with anything
outside this world either in order to have semantic content. A
virtual world would be no different in this respect. The point is
that the content comes from something other formal symbol
manipulation -- things such as pointing and sensory responses.
There has to be something other than the consciousness with which
the consciousness can interact.

I take it you've never played video games.


Can you play a video game "in your head" in an environment whose
elements have no referents in the world of your experience?


Sure I think so. People see pretty crazy things on various drugs.


I doubt that.  "Crazy" things usually consist of mixed attributes from 
real things.  If I try I can think of "crazy" things in this sense, but 
mostly in verbal terms.  It's difficult to imagine even a dragon in 
detail - and a dragon is just a large, flying, fire breathing lizard.  
To imagine a whole environment of "crazy" things in the detail I 
experience real things, or even in the detail of a realistic video game 
is beyond my powers.  Add the condition that the "crazy" things not just 
be rearrange components of real things and I don't think anyone can do it.



All the video games I've ever seen have environments very much
like this one with just a some mixing up of attributes.


2001: A Space Odyssey was pretty out there. How different does a 
movie/game have to be from our reality before it becomes something 
that turns anyone who watches it into a p-zombie?


See above.

Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/27/2015 12:10 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 27 October 2015 at 17:32, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 10/26/2015 2:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, John Clark > wrote:

Russell Standish wrote:

Modus ponens is only a formal manipulation of symbols,
with no semantic content.



​ I agree.​

Stathis Papaioannou
​ Wrote:​


This is an argument John Searle has made.


​ Unfortunately yes.​

The problem is, the brain can also be described as
manipulating symbols with no semantic content


​Yes.​

​ > ​
so where does semantic content come from?


​From examples in the physical world. You can give as many
botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it
will just be a word defined by other words that are
themselves defined by yet more words that are If you
tried to dig for meaning all you'd find is a endless loop, it
would just be a game where words are manipulated according to
the rules of botany until somebody forgot about definitions
and pointed to the ​ASCII string "t-r-e-e" and then pointed
to a large photosynthesizing organism made largely of
cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then even a
martian would notice a correspondence between this game of
manipulating symbols called "botany" that humans had invented
and the way these large photosynthesizing organism made
largely of cellulose live.


What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O
devices connecting it to outside trees?


The observer's use of the word "tree" would have the semantic
content of referring to a (virtual) tree.


In effect, intrinsically meaningless symbols would bootstrap 
themselves into being meaningful, without reference to outside reality.


Sure.  Do you think the meaning you assign to "tree" requires some 
supernatural reality above and beyond the existence of trees in this 
world.  It's not that there were meaningless symbols and then they did 
something to become meaningful.  They were invented to convey meaning 
about things that were already observed.


Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Quentin Anciaux]

2015-10-27 19:16 GMT+01:00 Brent Meeker :

>
>
> On 10/26/2015 11:57 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2015-10-27 7:44 GMT+01:00 Brent Meeker :
>
>>
>>
>> On 10/26/2015 3:37 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 10:44:28AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>
 On 10/26/2015 2:43 AM, Russell Standish wrote:

 Assuming computationalism, our everyday experience _is_ internal to the
> system. That doesn't make it any less meaningful.
>
 I think that's a confusion.  The system is the universe with it's
 physics.   So in a sense everything is internal to it.  But
 experience is individual and it's meaningful because the individual
 has values and memory and so incorporates experiences into decisions
 about future actions...that's what constitutes giving them
 semantics.

 Hi Brent, I appreciate your point of view very much, but I fail to see
>>> how what you say is incompatible with my claim. Where is the
>>> confusion?
>>>
>>
>> I think our everyday experience is given meaning as referring to things
>> outside ourselves.  So it's not internal to "the system" that is the
>> experiencer.  It is only because the observer is distinct from the rest of
>> the world that he can form meaningful symbolic representations of it.
>>
>>
>>> The only clarification I would make is that (with computationalism)
>>> the system is formal, but the observer (individual in your
>>> terminology) and environment (universe with its physics in your
>>> terminology) are a non formal partition of the system.
>>>
>>
>> I'm not sure what you mean by non-formal partition.  If your brain is
>> replaced by a I/O functionally equivalent digital computer it will still be
>> in an environment and will have internal representations that refer to the
>> environment.
>
>
> In a computer... an io, is just a memory location... as anything else
> is... that the value of that memory location reflect or not an external
> world... doesn't change anything from the POV of the program  reading it...
> so as the meaning must somehow be internal to the program as to what that
> value at that memory location means for it.
>
>
> That's like saying a neuron in your brain doesn't know anything.
>

I don't know about neurons and interactions with the environment... but as
far as a program is concerned, a program has only access to memory
locations... so if meaning must arise from the POV of the program (ie: what
we could call a conscious program), it must be internal to itself... What
you could say I could agree, is that IO of our "real" world do provide
regularity pattern to those memory locations when fed with the sensor
data... what random value would not... so one can say that meaning arise
from stable pattern... where they come from and the fact they represent
something ontologically real is unknown to the program...


> In a sense it's true, but it obfuscates the source of meaning.  What your
> neurons, as a brain, know are things about the external world (external to
> the brain) with which they interact.  The "meaning" is internal in the
> sense that it is represented by a pattern in the brain - but it is only
> meaning because it has referents outside the brain.  A brain that had never
> had an environment with which to interact would not have anything to
> represent and would contain no "meaning".  It would be like the computer
> running a random or unknowable program, or the rock that computes
> everything.
>
> Brent
>
>
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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/26/2015 11:00 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 27 October 2015 at 16:57, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 27/10/2015 4:50 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 27 October 2015 at 14:22, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 27/10/2015 1:13 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 27 Oct 2015, at 12:15 PM, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 27/10/2015 12:05 pm, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 7:37 PM, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 27/10/2015 10:52 am, Jason Resch wrote:

On Monday, October 26, 2015, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
> On 27/10/2015 8:16 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, John Clark
>
wrote:
>>
>>> so where does semantic content come from?
>>
>> From examples in the physical world. You can give
as many botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as
you want but it will just be a word defined by other
words that are themselves defined by yet more words
that are If you tried to dig for meaning all
you'd find is a endless loop, it would just be a game
where words are manipulated according to the rules of
botany until somebody forgot about definitions and
pointed to the ASCII string "t-r-e-e" and then
pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism made
largely of cellulose that exists in the physical
world. Then even a martian would notice a
correspondence between this game of manipulating
symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and
the way these large photosynthesizing organism made
largely of cellulose live.
>
> What about a virtual world with trees and
observers, and no I/O devices connecting it to
outside trees?
>
> I think Brent answered this in his response to
Russell. The trees of the ordinary physical world do
not connect with anything outside this world either
in order to have semantic content. A virtual world
would be no different in this respect. The point is
that the content comes from something other formal
symbol manipulation -- things such as pointing and
sensory responses. There has to be something other
than the consciousness with which the consciousness
can interact.

I take it you've never played video games.

Not with any regularity. But I take it that when you
play such games, you interact with the simulated
environment via the provided interface -- the game
only interacts with itself in so far as the original
programmers designed it to. The semantic content is
provided from outside in either case.


So what do you think would happen if an AI, or uploaded
mind were uploaded into a virtual reality that was fully
disconnected from the physical world? Would that mind no
longer be conscious?

Difficult to tell because, by construction, you can't ask
it. But if both the AI and the VR are programmed by some
external intelligence, semantic content might be provided
in that way.


But once programmed, there may be no further evidence of
semantic content. The computer could be fired into space,
and the programmers and their entire civilisation might die.
If aliens find it and somehow work out the syntax, there is
no way for them to work out the meaning behind it, since
there is no intrinsic meaning in circuits turning on and
off. So what is the explanation here: the meaning is still
there because the long-dead programmers had thought about it
in a particular way?


Could be. If the program is no longer running, the meaning
might not be recoverable.


The program is running, but the programmers and their
civilisation are gone. How is the meaning recoverable?


Not by the outsider, certainly. But to the insider..who can
tell? It depends on what the programmers originally built in.


Then that means that there is meaning intrinsic to a certain pattern 
of circuits turning on and off.


I take your meaning, but I think that's a misleading way of putting it.  
If we are living in The 

Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Stathis Papaioannou]

> On 28 Oct 2015, at 1:30 AM, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 5:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou  
>> wrote:
> 
>>> ​>> ​​From examples in the physical world. You can give as many botanical 
>>> definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it will just be a word 
>>> defined by other words that are themselves defined by yet more words that 
>>> are If you tried to dig for meaning all you'd find is a endless loop, 
>>> it would just be a game where words are manipulated according to the rules 
>>> of botany until somebody forgot about definitions and pointed to the ​ASCII 
>>> string "t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism 
>>> made largely of cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then even a 
>>> martian would notice a correspondence between this game of manipulating 
>>> symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and the way these large 
>>> photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose live.
>> 
>> ​> ​What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O devices 
>> connecting it to outside trees?
> 
> There would ​still be I/O devices connected to the ​virtual trees made by a 
> computer that operated according to the laws of physics, if not the trees 
> wouldn't even be virtual.  And the books on both virtual botany and real 
> botany would still be more than a just a symbol manipulation game, they would 
> have semantic content​ because there would be a ​correspondence between ​the 
> way the symbols ​are manipulated and the way the virtual (or real)  large 
> photosynthesizing organism live.​ Regardless of if they are virtual or real 
> ​if you want to know how trees live studying those botany symbols in virtual 
> (or real) books will help, so they must have semantic content​.

The requirement that a computation be able to interact with the real world puts 
a restriction on what qualifies as a computation. You've challenged Bruno many 
times to perform a difficult computation using his Platonic computer. Well, 
that computation is occurring in front of you now in the thermal motion of the 
atoms in your desk, which under an appropriate interpretation are implementing 
a Turing machine. But you and Bruno don't have that appropriate interpretation, 
and if you did, you would have the result of the calculation already. In other 
words, the thermal motion computation is not understandable as such in, and 
cannot interact with, the world at the level of the substrate of its 
implementation; so it would usually be said that either there is no computation 
being implemented, or it is being implemented only in a trivial and useless 
sense. But remove the requirement for interaction in the real world, and this 
objection falls down. The computation is being implemented, your difficult 
calculation has been completed, and it is being appreciated by the virtual 
observers who are clapping and cheering - even though you can't hear them.

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/27/2015 3:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On 28 Oct 2015, at 1:30 AM, John Clark > wrote:





On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 5:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:


​ >> ​
​From examples in the physical world. You can give as many
botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it
will just be a word defined by other words that are
themselves defined by yet more words that are If you
tried to dig for meaning all you'd find is a endless loop, it
would just be a game where words are manipulated according to
the rules of botany until somebody forgot about definitions
and pointed to the ​ASCII string "t-r-e-e" and then pointed
to a large photosynthesizing organism made largely of
cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then even a
martian would notice a correspondence between this game of
manipulating symbols called "botany" that humans had invented
and the way these large photosynthesizing organism made
largely of cellulose live.


​ > ​
What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O
devices connecting it to outside trees?


There would
​ still be I/O devices connected to the ​virtual trees made by a 
computer that operated according to the laws of physics, if not the 
trees wouldn't even be virtual.  And the books on both virtual botany 
and real botany would still be more than a just a symbol manipulation 
game, they would have

semantic content
​ because there would be a ​
correspondence between
​ the way the
 symbols
​ are manipulated and the way the virtual (or real)
 large photosynthesizing organism live.
​ Regardless of if they are virtual or real ​if you want to know how 
trees live studying those botany symbols in virtual (or real) books 
will help, so they must have

semantic content
​ .


The requirement that a computation be able to interact with the real 
world puts a restriction on what qualifies as a computation. You've 
challenged Bruno many times to perform a difficult computation using 
his Platonic computer. Well, that computation is occurring in front of 
you now in the thermal motion of the atoms in your desk, which under 
an appropriate interpretation are implementing a Turing machine. But 
you and Bruno don't have that appropriate interpretation, and if you 
did, you would have the result of the calculation already. In other 
words, the thermal motion computation is not understandable as such 
in, and cannot interact with, the world at the level of the substrate 
of its implementation; so it would usually be said that either there 
is no computation being implemented, or it is being implemented only 
in a trivial and useless sense. But remove the requirement for 
interaction in the real world, and this objection falls down. The 
computation is being implemented, your difficult calculation has been 
completed, and it is being appreciated by the virtual observers who 
are clapping and cheering - even though you can't hear them.


That's essentially Bruno's MGA, except it stops one step short. Bruno 
takes the last step and says even if the atoms of your desk were doing 
absolutely nothing there is an interpretation in which that is a 
computation; hence the atoms are superfluous.   But clearly then it is 
the interpretation which is providing the computation.


Brent

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Sent from my iPhone

> On 28 Oct 2015, at 4:49 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> On 10/26/2015 11:00 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> 
>> 
>>> On 27 October 2015 at 16:57, Bruce Kellett  
>>> wrote:
 On 27/10/2015 4:50 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 On 27 October 2015 at 14:22, Bruce Kellett  
 wrote:
>> On 27/10/2015 1:13 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>> On 27 Oct 2015, at 12:15 PM, Bruce Kellett  
>>> wrote:
 On 27/10/2015 12:05 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
 On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 7:37 PM, Bruce Kellett 
  wrote:
>> On 27/10/2015 10:52 am, Jason Resch wrote:
>> On Monday, October 26, 2015, Bruce   
>>   Kellett  wrote:
>> > On 27/10/2015 8:16 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >
>> > On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, John Clark  
>> > wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> so where does semantic content come from?
>> >>
>> >> From examples in the physical world. You can give as many 
>> >> botanical definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it will 
>> >> just be a word defined by other words that are
>> >>  themselves defined by yet 
>> >> more words that are If you tried to dig for meaning all you'd 
>> >> find is a endless loop, it would just be a game where words are 
>> >> manipulated according to the rules of botany until somebody 
>> >> forgot about definitions and pointed to the ASCII string 
>> >> "t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism 
>> >> made largely of cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then 
>> >> even a martian would notice a correspondence between this game of 
>> >> manipulating symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and 
>> >> the way these large photosynthesizing organism made largely of 
>> >> cellulose live.
>> >
>> > What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O 
>> > devices connecting it to outside trees?
>> >
>> > I think Brent answered this in his response to Russell. The trees 
>> > of the 
>> > ordinary physical world do not connect with anything outside this 
>> > world either in order to have semantic content. A virtual world 
>> > would be no different in this respect. 
>> > The point is that the content comes 
>> > from something other formal symbol manipulation -- things such as 
>> > pointing and sensory responses. There has to be something other 
>> > than the consciousness with which the consciousness can interact.
>> 
>> I take it you've never played video games.
> Not with any regularity. But I take it that when you play such games, 
> you interact with the simulated environment via the provided 
> interface -- the game only interacts with itself in so far as the 
> original programmers designed it to. The semantic content is provided 
> from outside in either case.
 
 So what do you think would happen if an AI, or uploaded mind were 
 uploaded into a virtual reality that was fully disconnected from the 
 physical world? Would that mind no longer be conscious?
>>> Difficult to tell because, by construction, you can't ask it. But if 
>>> both the AI and the VR are programmed by some external intelligence, 
>>> semantic content might be provided in that way.
>> 
>> But once programmed, there may be no further evidence of semantic 
>> content. The computer could be fired into space, and the programmers and 
>> their entire civilisation might die. If aliens find it and somehow work 
>> out the syntax, there is no way for them to work out the meaning behind 
>> it, since there is no intrinsic meaning in circuits turning on and off. 
>> So what is the explanation here: the meaning is still there because the 
>> long-dead programmers had thought about it in a particular way?
> 
> Could be. If the program is no longer running, the meaning might not be 
> recoverable.
 
  
 The program is running, but the programmers and their civilisation are 
 gone. How is the meaning recoverable?
>>> 
>>> Not by the outsider, certainly. But to the insider..who can tell? It 
>>> depends on what the programmers originally built in.
>> 
>> Then that means that there is meaning intrinsic to 

Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/27/2015 3:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



Sent from my iPhone

On 28 Oct 2015, at 4:49 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:





On 10/26/2015 11:00 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 27 October 2015 at 16:57, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:


On 27/10/2015 4:50 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 27 October 2015 at 14:22, Bruce Kellett
 wrote:

On 27/10/2015 1:13 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 27 Oct 2015, at 12:15 PM, Bruce Kellett
 wrote:

On 27/10/2015 12:05 pm, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 7:37 PM, Bruce Kellett
 wrote:

On 27/10/2015 10:52 am, Jason Resch wrote:

On Monday, October 26, 2015, Bruce Kellett
 wrote:
> On 27/10/2015 8:16 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, John Clark
 wrote:
>>
>>> so where does semantic content come from?
>>
>> From examples in the physical world. You can
give as many botanical definitions of the word
 "tree" as you want but it will just be a word
defined by other words that are themselves defined
by yet more words that are If you tried to dig
for meaning all you'd find is a endless loop, it
would just be a game where words are manipulated
according to the rules of botany until somebody
forgot about definitions and pointed to the ASCII
string "t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large
photosynthesizing organism made largely of
cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then
even a martian would notice a correspondence
between this game of manipulating symbols called
"botany" that humans had invented and the way these
large photosynthesizing organism made largely of
cellulose live.
>
> What about a virtual world with trees and
observers, and no I/O devices connecting it to
outside trees?
>
> I think Brent answered this in his response to
Russell. The trees of the ordinary physical world
do not connect with anything outside this world
either in order to have semantic content. A virtual
world would be no different in this respect. The
point is that the content comes from something
other formal symbol manipulation -- things such as
pointing and sensory responses. There has to be
something other than the consciousness with which
the consciousness can interact.

I take it you've never played video games.

Not with any regularity. But I take it that when you
play such games, you interact with the simulated
environment via the provided interface -- the game
only interacts with itself in so far as the original
programmers designed it to. The semantic content is
provided from outside in either case.


So what do you think would happen if an AI, or uploaded
mind were uploaded into a virtual reality that was fully
disconnected from the physical world? Would that mind no
longer be conscious?

Difficult to tell because, by construction, you can't ask
it. But if both the AI and the VR are programmed by some
external intelligence, semantic content might be provided
in that way.


But once programmed, there may be no further evidence of
semantic content. The computer could be fired into space,
and the programmers and their entire civilisation might
die. If aliens find it and somehow work out the syntax,
there is no way for them to work out the meaning behind
it, since there is no intrinsic meaning in circuits
turning on and off. So what is the explanation here: the
meaning is still there because the long-dead programmers
had thought about it in a particular way?


Could be. If the program is no longer running, the meaning
might not be recoverable.


The program is running, but the programmers and their
civilisation are gone. How is the meaning recoverable?


Not by the outsider, certainly. But to the insider..who can
tell? It depends on what the programmers originally built in.


Then that means that there is meaning intrinsic to a certain pattern 
of circuits turning on and off.


I take your meaning, but I think that's a misleading way of putting 
it.  If we are living in The Matrix then everything 

Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/27/2015 11:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-10-27 19:16 GMT+01:00 Brent Meeker >:




On 10/26/2015 11:57 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-10-27 7:44 GMT+01:00 Brent Meeker >:



On 10/26/2015 3:37 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 10:44:28AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 10/26/2015 2:43 AM, Russell Standish wrote:

Assuming computationalism, our everyday
experience _is_ internal to the
system. That doesn't make it any less meaningful.

I think that's a confusion.  The system is the
universe with it's
physics.   So in a sense everything is internal to
it.  But
experience is individual and it's meaningful because
the individual
has values and memory and so incorporates experiences
into decisions
about future actions...that's what constitutes giving
them
semantics.

Hi Brent, I appreciate your point of view very much, but
I fail to see
how what you say is incompatible with my claim. Where is the
confusion?


I think our everyday experience is given meaning as referring
to things outside ourselves.  So it's not internal to "the
system" that is the experiencer.  It is only because the
observer is distinct from the rest of the world that he can
form meaningful symbolic representations of it.


The only clarification I would make is that (with
computationalism)
the system is formal, but the observer (individual in your
terminology) and environment (universe with its physics
in your
terminology) are a non formal partition of the system.


I'm not sure what you mean by non-formal partition.  If your
brain is replaced by a I/O functionally equivalent digital
computer it will still be in an environment and will have
internal representations that refer to the environment.


In a computer... an io, is just a memory location... as anything
else is... that the value of that memory location reflect or not
an external world... doesn't change anything from the POV of the
program  reading it... so as the meaning must somehow be internal
to the program as to what that value at that memory location
means for it.


That's like saying a neuron in your brain doesn't know anything.


I don't know about neurons and interactions with the environment... 
but as far as a program is concerned, a program has only access to 
memory locations... so if meaning must arise from the POV of the 
program (ie: what we could call a conscious program), it must be 
internal to itself...


Only if it isolated from its environment.  To say it only has access to 
memory locations obfuscates the fact that those memory locations may be 
influenced via sensors that provide interaction with the world.


What you could say I could agree, is that IO of our "real" world do 
provide regularity pattern to those memory locations when fed with the 
sensor data... what random value would not... so one can say that 
meaning arise from stable pattern... where they come from and the fact 
they represent something ontologically real is unknown to the program...


Right. Although I would go a little further and say that the AI needs to 
be able to act in the world, to experiment, not just passively accept input.


Brent

In a sense it's true, but it obfuscates the source of meaning. 
What your neurons, as a brain, know are things about the external

world (external to the brain) with which they interact.  The
"meaning" is internal in the sense that it is represented by a
pattern in the brain - but it is only meaning because it has
referents outside the brain.  A brain that had never had an
environment with which to interact would not have anything to
represent and would contain no "meaning".  It would be like the
computer running a random or unknowable program, or the rock that
computes everything.

Brent


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All those moments 

Re: Carroll's Paradox

[John Clark]

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 5:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

>
​>> ​
>> ​From examples in the physical world. You can give as many botanical
>> definitions of the word  "tree" as you want but it will just be a word
>> defined by other words that are themselves defined by yet more words that
>> are If you tried to dig for meaning all you'd find is a endless loop,
>> it would just be a game where words are manipulated according to the rules
>> of botany until somebody forgot about definitions and pointed to the ​ASCII
>> string "t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism
>> made largely of cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then even a
>> martian would notice a correspondence between this game of manipulating
>> symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and the way these large
>> photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose live.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O devices
> connecting it to outside trees?
>

There would
​still be I/O devices connected to the ​virtual trees made by a computer
that operated according to the laws of physics, if not the trees wouldn't
even be virtual.  And the books on both virtual botany and real botany
would still be more than a just a symbol manipulation game, they would have
semantic content
​ because there would be a ​
correspondence between
​the way the
 symbols
​are manipulated and the way the virtual (or real)
 large photosynthesizing organism live.
​ Regardless of if they are virtual or real ​if you want to know how trees
live studying those botany symbols in virtual (or real) books will help, so
they must have
semantic content
​.

​  John K Clark​

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[John Clark]

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 9:05 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

​> ​
> So what do you think would happen if an AI, or uploaded mind were uploaded
> into a virtual reality that was fully disconnected from the physical world?
> Would that mind no longer be conscious?
>

​If it is *FULLY*
 disconnected from the physical world
​ then what sort of computer is the AI running on, and what is generating
the virtual reality environment?​


  John K Clark

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 03:40:45PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> I think Carroll's Paradox (or 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles')
> effectively undermines computationalism, or any argument that
> arithmetic is prior to physics.
> 
> See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_the_Tortoise_Said_to_Achilles
> 
> In order to escape the paradox, you have to resort to a formalist
> approach, and that renders the formalism devoid of semantic content.
> 

I don't see why that undermines computationalism. Could you please expand?

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Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 05:54:03PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 26/10/2015 5:30 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
> >On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 05:08:21PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >>On 26/10/2015 5:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
> >>>On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 03:40:45PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> I think Carroll's Paradox (or 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles')
> effectively undermines computationalism, or any argument that
> arithmetic is prior to physics.
> 
> See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_the_Tortoise_Said_to_Achilles
> 
> In order to escape the paradox, you have to resort to a formalist
> approach, and that renders the formalism devoid of semantic content.
> 
> >>>I don't see why that undermines computationalism. Could you please expand?
> >>Modus ponens is only a formal manipulation of symbols, with no
> >>semantic content.
> >>
> >Are you trying to say that modus ponens is not valid of reality, hence
> >computionalism is false (but that's employing modus ponens, so you've
> >tied yourself up in a knot)?
> >
> >Or, are you trying to say that computationalism has no semantic
> >content because it is formal? That argument has already been run by
> >someone on this list - the trouble is the only semantics required are
> >internal to the system.
> 
> In which case, the 'semantics' have no bearing on our everyday
> experience. One can act on the basis of the weight of evidence
> without believing that modus ponens is truth-preserving.
> 


Assuming computationalism, our everyday experience _is_ internal to the
system. That doesn't make it any less meaningful.

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruce Kellett]

On 26/10/2015 8:43 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 05:54:03PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 26/10/2015 5:30 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 05:08:21PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 26/10/2015 5:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 03:40:45PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:

I think Carroll's Paradox (or 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles')
effectively undermines computationalism, or any argument that
arithmetic is prior to physics.

See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_the_Tortoise_Said_to_Achilles

In order to escape the paradox, you have to resort to a formalist
approach, and that renders the formalism devoid of semantic content.


I don't see why that undermines computationalism. Could you please expand?

Modus ponens is only a formal manipulation of symbols, with no
semantic content.


Are you trying to say that modus ponens is not valid of reality, hence
computionalism is false (but that's employing modus ponens, so you've
tied yourself up in a knot)?

Or, are you trying to say that computationalism has no semantic
content because it is formal? That argument has already been run by
someone on this list - the trouble is the only semantics required are
internal to the system.

In which case, the 'semantics' have no bearing on our everyday
experience. One can act on the basis of the weight of evidence
without believing that modus ponens is truth-preserving.

Assuming computationalism, our everyday experience _is_ internal to the
system. That doesn't make it any less meaningful.
That is the assumption, sure, but you have not provided a way to break 
free of the limitations of formalism -- of Carroll's paradox. This 
formalism must be related to everyday experience, and this has not been 
done. You have not derived even an elementary physics text, to say 
nothing of quantum field theory. The semantic content can only come from 
actual contact with the external world of everyday experience.


Bruce

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 26 October 2015 at 17:43, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/25/2015 11:32 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 26 October 2015 at 17:08, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 26/10/2015 5:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 03:40:45PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
 I think Carroll's Paradox (or 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles')
 effectively undermines computationalism, or any argument that
 arithmetic is prior to physics.

 See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_the_Tortoise_Said_to_Achilles

 In order to escape the paradox, you have to resort to a formalist
 approach, and that renders the formalism devoid of semantic content.

 I don't see why that undermines computationalism. Could you please
>>> expand?
>>>
>>
>> Modus ponens is only a formal manipulation of symbols, with no semantic
>> content.
>
>
> This is an argument John Searle has made. The problem is, the brain can
> also be described as manipulating symbols with no semantic content - so
> where does semantic content come from?
>
>
> From interaction with a world.
>

And the same could be said for a computer - a real or virtual world.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruce Kellett]

On 26/10/2015 5:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 03:40:45PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:

I think Carroll's Paradox (or 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles')
effectively undermines computationalism, or any argument that
arithmetic is prior to physics.

See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_the_Tortoise_Said_to_Achilles

In order to escape the paradox, you have to resort to a formalist
approach, and that renders the formalism devoid of semantic content.


I don't see why that undermines computationalism. Could you please expand?


Modus ponens is only a formal manipulation of symbols, with no semantic 
content.


Bruce

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 26 October 2015 at 17:08, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 26/10/2015 5:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 03:40:45PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>> I think Carroll's Paradox (or 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles')
>>> effectively undermines computationalism, or any argument that
>>> arithmetic is prior to physics.
>>>
>>> See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_the_Tortoise_Said_to_Achilles
>>>
>>> In order to escape the paradox, you have to resort to a formalist
>>> approach, and that renders the formalism devoid of semantic content.
>>>
>>> I don't see why that undermines computationalism. Could you please
>> expand?
>>
>
> Modus ponens is only a formal manipulation of symbols, with no semantic
> content.


This is an argument John Searle has made. The problem is, the brain can
also be described as manipulating symbols with no semantic content - so
where does semantic content come from?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruce Kellett]

On 26/10/2015 5:32 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 October 2015 at 17:08, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 26/10/2015 5:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 03:40:45PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:

I think Carroll's Paradox (or 'What the Tortoise Said to
Achilles')
effectively undermines computationalism, or any argument that
arithmetic is prior to physics.

See:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_the_Tortoise_Said_to_Achilles

In order to escape the paradox, you have to resort to a
formalist
approach, and that renders the formalism devoid of
semantic content.

I don't see why that undermines computationalism. Could you
please expand?


Modus ponens is only a formal manipulation of symbols, with no
semantic content.


This is an argument John Searle has made. The problem is, the brain 
can also be described as manipulating symbols with no semantic content 
- so where does semantic content come from?

I can point at it, or when I kick the dog, he yelps.

Bruce

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Bruce Kellett]

On 26/10/2015 5:30 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 05:08:21PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 26/10/2015 5:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 03:40:45PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:

I think Carroll's Paradox (or 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles')
effectively undermines computationalism, or any argument that
arithmetic is prior to physics.

See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_the_Tortoise_Said_to_Achilles

In order to escape the paradox, you have to resort to a formalist
approach, and that renders the formalism devoid of semantic content.


I don't see why that undermines computationalism. Could you please expand?

Modus ponens is only a formal manipulation of symbols, with no
semantic content.


Are you trying to say that modus ponens is not valid of reality, hence
computionalism is false (but that's employing modus ponens, so you've
tied yourself up in a knot)?

Or, are you trying to say that computationalism has no semantic
content because it is formal? That argument has already been run by
someone on this list - the trouble is the only semantics required are
internal to the system.


In which case, the 'semantics' have no bearing on our everyday 
experience. One can act on the basis of the weight of evidence without 
believing that modus ponens is truth-preserving.


Bruce

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Re: Carroll's Paradox

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 26 October 2015 at 17:51, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 26/10/2015 5:32 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 26 October 2015 at 17:08, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 26/10/2015 5:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 03:40:45PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
 I think Carroll's Paradox (or 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles')
 effectively undermines computationalism, or any argument that
 arithmetic is prior to physics.

 See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_the_Tortoise_Said_to_Achilles

 In order to escape the paradox, you have to resort to a formalist
 approach, and that renders the formalism devoid of semantic content.

 I don't see why that undermines computationalism. Could you please
>>> expand?
>>>
>>
>> Modus ponens is only a formal manipulation of symbols, with no semantic
>> content.
>
>
> This is an argument John Searle has made. The problem is, the brain can
> also be described as manipulating symbols with no semantic content - so
> where does semantic content come from?
>
> I can point at it, or when I kick the dog, he yelps.
>

The same with an appropriately specified and programmed computer.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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