Brent: PS!
I did not refer to YOUR ignorance as conventional, I formulated a negligent
sentence for the ignorance of our convetnional sciences.
I am polite enough to call 'peoples' ignorance an agnosticism.
John
On Thu, Apr 19, 2012 at 12:17 AM, meekerdb wrote:
> On 4/18/2012 1:08 PM, Jo
On 4/18/2012 1:08 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Brent and Craig:
Interesting back-and-forth on conventional ignorance basis.
My ignorance isn't a convention - it's the real thing. :-)
Brent
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Brent and Craig:
Interesting back-and-forth on conventional ignorance basis.
We (in physics etc.) identified 'atoms' by mostly mathematical
treatment of poorly (if at all) understood phenomenal information (?)
limited to the capability pf the 'then' human mind.
Now 'we' invented zombies, as a ment
On Apr 17, 3:45 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> On 4/17/2012 12:27 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Apr 17, 3:05 pm, meekerdb wrote:
>
> >> But a very slight rearrangement by your local anesthesiologist and *you*
> >> don't have any
> >> sense at all - even though the atoms are still there. Of course t
On 4/17/2012 12:27 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Apr 17, 3:05 pm, meekerdb wrote:
But a very slight rearrangement by your local anesthesiologist and *you* don't
have any
sense at all - even though the atoms are still there. Of course they are
entirely
different atoms than were constituting y
On Apr 17, 3:05 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> But a very slight rearrangement by your local anesthesiologist and *you*
> don't have any
> sense at all - even though the atoms are still there. Of course they are
> entirely
> different atoms than were constituting you a year ago.
>
I can turn on the in
On 4/17/2012 11:30 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Apr 17, 1:49 pm, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/17/2012 10:44 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Apr 17, 1:36 pm, meekerdbwrote:
On 4/17/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
So you think you'll be just as conscious if your atoms are rearranged? LOL
You t
On Apr 17, 1:49 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> On 4/17/2012 10:44 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Apr 17, 1:36 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> >> On 4/17/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> So you think you'll be just as conscious if your atoms are rearranged? LOL
>
> > You think you'll be just as conscio
On 4/17/2012 10:44 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Apr 17, 1:36 pm, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/17/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
So you think you'll be just as conscious if your atoms are rearranged? LOL
You think you'll be just as conscious if I arrange you out of golf
balls instead of atoms?
On Apr 17, 1:36 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> On 4/17/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> So you think you'll be just as conscious if your atoms are rearranged? LOL
>
You think you'll be just as conscious if I arrange you out of golf
balls instead of atoms?
What you are not considering is that ju
On 4/17/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Apr 8, 2:10 pm, meekerdb wrote:
That doesn't follow. It assmes that zombieness is an attribute of components
rather than
of their functional organization. There can obviously be zombie (unconscious)
components
(e.g. quarks and electrons) whic
On Apr 8, 2:10 pm, meekerdb wrote:
>
> That doesn't follow. It assmes that zombieness is an attribute of components
> rather than
> of their functional organization. There can obviously be zombie
> (unconscious) components
> (e.g. quarks and electrons) which when properly assembled produce co
As this topic is touching on both philosophical zombies and deism, I
recommend a reading of Bernardo Kastrup's essay, The parallels of
Pandeism: http://www.bernardokastrup.com/2010/03/consciousness-and-pandeism.html
-- wherein Kastrup observes "some intriguing parallels between the
debate around th
On Tue, Apr 10, 2012 at 1:18 AM, meekerdb wrote:
>> A zombie brain component is a component that replicates the function
>> of the tissue it replaces but does not replicate its contribution to
>> consciousness, such as it may be. The visual cortex is necessary for
>> visual perception since if we
On 4/9/2012 6:20 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Mon, Apr 9, 2012 at 4:10 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/8/2012 6:04 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 6:30 AM, meekerdbwrote:
But is it an empirical question? What would it mean for "neuroscience to
find zombies"? We have
On Mon, Apr 9, 2012 at 4:10 AM, meekerdb wrote:
> On 4/8/2012 6:04 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 6:30 AM, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>> But is it an empirical question? What would it mean for "neuroscience to
>>> find zombies"? We have some idea what it would mean to find
On 4/8/2012 5:52 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/4/8 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
On 4/8/2012 6:04 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 6:30 AM, meekerdbmailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
But is it an empirical question? What would it me
2012/4/8 meekerdb
> On 4/8/2012 6:04 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 6:30 AM, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>> But is it an empirical question? What would it mean for "neuroscience to
>>> find zombies"? We have some idea what it would mean to find a soul: some
>>> seemingly pu
On 4/8/2012 6:04 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 6:30 AM, meekerdb wrote:
But is it an empirical question? What would it mean for "neuroscience to
find zombies"? We have some idea what it would mean to find a soul: some
seemingly purposeful sequence of brain processes b
On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 6:30 AM, meekerdb wrote:
> But is it an empirical question? What would it mean for "neuroscience to
> find zombies"? We have some idea what it would mean to find a soul: some
> seemingly purposeful sequence of brain processes begin without any physical
> cause. But I'm n
On 4/7/2012 6:18 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Fri, Apr 6, 2012 at 2:37 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 05.04.2012 01:59 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 5:56 AM, Evgenii Rudnyiwrote:
On 03.04.2012 02:06 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
Since ther
On Fri, Apr 6, 2012 at 2:37 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> On 05.04.2012 01:59 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
>
>> On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 5:56 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>>>
>>> On 03.04.2012 02:06 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
>>
>>
Since there is no evolutionary advantage to
Evgenii,
I believe that you are unfair to Jeffery Gray. As I have mentioned,
his conclusion was that the modern science (here as accepted by a
majority of scientists) cannot explain conscious phenomena. Hence,
in a way he was ready to reconsider the accepted scientific framework.
I can ap
On 4/6/2012 9:26 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Bruno,
I believe that you are unfair to Jeffery Gray. As I have mentioned, his conclusion was
that the modern science (here as accepted by a majority of scientists) cannot explain
conscious phenomena. Hence, in a way he was ready to reconsider the acc
Bruno,
I believe that you are unfair to Jeffery Gray. As I have mentioned, his
conclusion was that the modern science (here as accepted by a majority
of scientists) cannot explain conscious phenomena. Hence, in a way he
was ready to reconsider the accepted scientific framework.
The differenc
On Apr 5, 12:41 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> We do not know what kind of computing brain does. It well might be that
> at the level of neuron nets it was simpler to create a conscious display
> than to employ other means.
That assumes that such a means was a prori possible. Why would it be?
It w
On 05 Apr 2012, at 22:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 05.04.2012 21:44 meekerdb said the following:
On 4/5/2012 11:49 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Display to whom? the homunculus?
No, he creates an interesting scheme to escape the homunculus:
p. 110. “(1) the unconscious brain constructs a disp
On 05.04.2012 21:44 meekerdb said the following:
On 4/5/2012 11:49 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Display to whom? the homunculus?
No, he creates an interesting scheme to escape the homunculus:
p. 110. “(1) the unconscious brain constructs a display in a medium,
that of conscious perception, fund
On 5 April 2012 20:58, meekerdb wrote:
>> Comp + consciousness (the "internal view" of arithmetical truth)
>> implies an infinity of possible histories, in which natural selection,
>> of features advantageous to macroscopic entities inhabiting a
>> macroscopic environment, is a particularly consi
On 05.04.2012 21:39 David Nyman said the following:
On 5 April 2012 19:56, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Yet, this does not change his hypothesis about why "consciousness display"
could be advantageous for evolution. We do not know what it is, but if is
there, it certainly can help to organize servome
On 05.04.2012 21:38 meekerdb said the following:
On 4/5/2012 11:56 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 05.04.2012 20:39 David Nyman said the following:
On 5 April 2012 17:37, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
(a) It is impossible to make a philosophical zombie as consciousness
is just a side-effect of intellige
On 4/5/2012 12:39 PM, David Nyman wrote:
I confess this smells to me like the wrong sort of theory. On the
other hand, if comp is true the story can be somewhat more subtle.
Comp + consciousness (the "internal view" of arithmetical truth)
implies an infinity of possible histories, in which natur
On 4/5/2012 11:49 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Display to whom? the homunculus?
No, he creates an interesting scheme to escape the homunculus:
p. 110. “(1) the unconscious brain constructs a display in a medium, that of conscious
perception, fundamentally different from its usual medium of elec
On 5 April 2012 19:56, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> Yet, this does not change his hypothesis about why "consciousness display"
> could be advantageous for evolution. We do not know what it is, but if is
> there, it certainly can help to organize servomechanisms in the body.
Sure, if it is there, it c
On 4/5/2012 11:56 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 05.04.2012 20:39 David Nyman said the following:
On 5 April 2012 17:37, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
(a) It is impossible to make a philosophical zombie as consciousness
is just a side-effect of intelligent behaviour;
(b) It is possible to make a philos
On 05.04.2012 20:39 David Nyman said the following:
On 5 April 2012 17:37, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
(a) It is impossible to make a philosophical zombie as consciousness
is just a side-effect of intelligent behaviour;
(b) It is possible to make a philosophical zombie but the mechanism
for intellig
On 05.04.2012 20:10 meekerdb said the following:
On 4/5/2012 9:41 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 05.04.2012 01:43 Craig Weinberg said the following:
On Apr 4, 2:58 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
The term late error detection as such could be employed without
consciousness indeed. Yet, Jeffrey Gray gi
On 05.04.2012 20:07 meekerdb said the following:
On 4/4/2012 11:58 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
The term late error detection as such could be employed without
consciousness indeed. Yet, Jeffrey Gray gives it some special meaning
that I will try briefly describe below.
Jeffrey Gray in his book spe
On 5 April 2012 17:37, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>> (a) It is impossible to make a philosophical zombie as consciousness
>> is just a side-effect of intelligent behaviour;
>> (b) It is possible to make a philosophical zombie but the mechanism
>> for intelligent behaviour that nature chanced upon has
On 4/5/2012 9:41 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 05.04.2012 01:43 Craig Weinberg said the following:
On Apr 4, 2:58 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
The term late error detection as such could be employed without
consciousness indeed. Yet, Jeffrey Gray gives it some special meaning
that I will try brief
On 4/4/2012 11:58 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
The term late error detection as such could be employed without consciousness indeed.
Yet, Jeffrey Gray gives it some special meaning that I will try briefly describe below.
Jeffrey Gray in his book speaks about conscious experience, that is, exactly
On 05.04.2012 01:43 Craig Weinberg said the following:
On Apr 4, 2:58 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
The term late error detection as such could be employed without
consciousness indeed. Yet, Jeffrey Gray gives it some special meaning
that I will try briefly describe below.
Jeffrey Gray in his book
On 05.04.2012 01:59 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 5:56 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 03.04.2012 02:06 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
Since there is no evolutionary advantage to consciousness it must be a
side-effect of the sort of behaviour that consc
On Apr 4, 3:01 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 04 Apr 2012, at 19:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Apr 4, 3:31 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 03 Apr 2012, at 22:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >>> It is not the fact that matter detects and responds to itself that
> >>> is
> >>> in question, it is
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 5:56 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> On 03.04.2012 02:06 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
>> Since there is no evolutionary advantage to consciousness it must be a
>> side-effect of the sort of behaviour that conscious organisms display.
>> Otherwise, why did we not evol
On Apr 4, 2:58 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> The term late error detection as such could be employed without
> consciousness indeed. Yet, Jeffrey Gray gives it some special meaning
> that I will try briefly describe below.
>
> Jeffrey Gray in his book speaks about conscious experience, that is,
> ex
On 04 Apr 2012, at 19:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Apr 4, 3:31 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Apr 2012, at 22:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
It is not the fact that matter detects and responds to itself that
is
in question, it is the presentation of an interior realism which
cannot be expla
The term late error detection as such could be employed without
consciousness indeed. Yet, Jeffrey Gray gives it some special meaning
that I will try briefly describe below.
Jeffrey Gray in his book speaks about conscious experience, that is,
exactly about qualia. Self, mind, and intellect as
On Apr 4, 3:31 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 03 Apr 2012, at 22:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > It is not the fact that matter detects and responds to itself that is
> > in question, it is the presentation of an interior realism which
> > cannot be explained in a mechanistic context.
>
> This is
On 03 Apr 2012, at 22:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Apr 3, 3:56 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 03.04.2012 02:06 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 6:08 AM, Craig
Weinberg wrote:
From blindsight, synesthesia, and anosognosia we know that
particular
qua
On Apr 3, 3:56 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> On 03.04.2012 02:06 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 6:08 AM, Craig Weinberg
> > wrote:
>
> >> From blindsight, synesthesia, and anosognosia we know that particular
> >> qualia are not inevitably asso
On 03.04.2012 05:29 meekerdb said the following:
On 4/2/2012 7:28 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Apr 2, 9:02 pm, meekerdb wrote:
I like Julian Jaynes idea that it is a side-effect of using the same
parts of the brain
for cogitation as are used for perception. That would be the kind of
thing that
On 03.04.2012 02:06 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 6:08 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
From blindsight, synesthesia, and anosognosia we know that particular
qualia are not inevitably associated with the conditions they usually
represent for us, so it seems impossibl
On Apr 2, 11:29 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> On 4/2/2012 7:28 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >> I like Julian Jaynes idea that it is a side-effect of using the same parts
> >> of the brain
> >> for cogitation as are used for perception. That would be the kind of
> >> thing that evolution
> >> would do,
On 03 Apr 2012, at 02:06, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 6:08 AM, Craig Weinberg
wrote:
From blindsight, synesthesia, and anosognosia we know that particular
qualia are not inevitably associated with the conditions they usually
represent for us, so it seems impossible to
On Apr 3, 3:20 am, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Apr 2, 8:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 6:08 AM, Craig Weinberg
> > wrote:
> > > From blindsight, synesthesia, and anosognosia we know that particular
> > > qualia are not inevitably associated with
On 4/2/2012 7:28 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Apr 2, 9:02 pm, meekerdb wrote:
I like Julian Jaynes idea that it is a side-effect of using the same parts of
the brain
for cogitation as are used for perception. That would be the kind of thing
that evolution
would do, jury rigged but efficient
On Apr 2, 9:02 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> I like Julian Jaynes idea that it is a side-effect of using the same parts of
> the brain
> for cogitation as are used for perception. That would be the kind of thing
> that evolution
> would do, jury rigged but efficient.
I like what I've read of Jaynes t
On Apr 2, 8:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 6:08 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > From blindsight, synesthesia, and anosognosia we know that particular
> > qualia are not inevitably associated with the conditions they usually
> > represent for us, so it seems impossible to
On 4/2/2012 5:06 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 6:08 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
From blindsight, synesthesia, and anosognosia we know that particular
qualia are not inevitably associated with the conditions they usually
represent for us, so it seems impossible to justify
On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 6:08 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> From blindsight, synesthesia, and anosognosia we know that particular
> qualia are not inevitably associated with the conditions they usually
> represent for us, so it seems impossible to justify qualia on a
> functionalist basis. Just as a
Hi William,
On Apr 2, 1:02 pm, "William R. Buckley"
wrote:
> Craig:
>
> Please explain a little further what you mean by *accomplished through
> presentation* and in
> particular, what you mean by presentation.
What I mean by that is that to make something seem like something
else, it has to app
Craig:
Please explain a little further what you mean by *accomplished through
presentation* and in
particular, what you mean by presentation.
Your point number 5 fits clearly within the purview of semiotics.
wrb
On Mon, Apr 2, 2012 at 9:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> 1. We cannot doubt that
1. We cannot doubt that we are aware.
2. Our awareness may represent realities which are independent from
our own existence.
3. Our awareness may represent ideas and fantasies which have no
existence independent from our experience of it (and whatever
neurological processes are behind it)
4. Rep
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