- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: John M everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday, August 07, 2006 9:25 PM
Subject: RE: Bruno's argument - Comp
John,
Perhaps I have misunderstood if you were presenting an alternative theory:
it's easy to misunderstand
From: Brent Meeker
...
But I like to eat. I like to eat steak. A world in which I can't eat
steak is not perfect for me.
People with common intelligence can easily *imagine* (or dream) what a
PU will be.
I guess I have uncommon intelligence :-) since I can't imagine what a PU
would be.
W. C. wrote:
From: Brent Meeker
...
But I like to eat. I like to eat steak. A world in which I can't eat
steak is not perfect for me.
People with common intelligence can easily *imagine* (or dream) what a
PU will be.
I guess I have uncommon intelligence :-) since I can't imagine what a
]
To: John M everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 7:22 AM
Subject: RE: Bruno's argument - Comp
John M writes:
Earlier we lived in a telephone central switchboard, further back in a
steam-engine. Not to mention the Turtle.
The 'cat' specifies IMO ignorance
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
To All:
I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read (and
write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask:
is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require juice
to
work and if unplugged
- Original Message -
From: 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Saturday, August 05, 2006 2:43 PM
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Norman Samish wrote:
I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit may be
a quantum
PROTECTED]
To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 5:35 AM
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Norman Samish wrote:
1Z,
I don't know what you mean.
That is unfortunate, because as far as I am concerned everyhting
I am saying is obvious. (Have you read
Norman Samish wrote:
Thanks - with your help plus Wikipedia I now have an hypothesis about your
statement. It seems to boil down to Schrodinger's Cat has nothing to do
with quantum computers other than they both depend on quantum
superpositions.
Correct.
Fair enough.
When I read
s and
listen.Norman~~- Original
Message - From: "1Z" [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: "Everything
List" everything-list@googlegroups.comSent: Sunday, August 06, 2006
11:06 AMSubject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Norman Samish wrote: Thanks - with your help
Norman Samish wrote:
I read Fabric of Reality several years ago, but didn't understand it
well. I intuitively agree with Asher Peres that Deutsch's version of
MWI too-flagrantly violates Occam's Razor. Perhaps I should read it
again.
I even attended a lecture by John Wheeler, David
Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: John M everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 7:22 AM
Subject: RE: Bruno's argument - Comp
John M writes:
Earlier we lived in a telephone central switchboard, further back in a
steam-engine. Not to mention the Turtle.
The 'cat' specifies IMO
'original' and lost text, it was snatched
away and mailed.
The two are pretty different.
Redface John
- Original Message -
From: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 8:12 AM
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Stathis:
I know
Norman Samish wrote:
I read Fabric of Reality several years ago, but didn't understand it well. I
intuitively agree with Asher Peres that Deutsch's version of MWI
too-flagrantly violates Occam's Razor. Perhaps I should read it again.
This is diusputed, e.g. in
From: Brent Meeker
I don't think it's possible, because perfect is subjective. Perfect for
the lion is bad for the antelope.
Such problem doesn't exist in PU.
In PU, there is no food chain like A eats B; B eats C; C eats D ... etc..
Perfect beings (both living and non-living) mean no
W. C. wrote:
From: Brent Meeker
I don't think it's possible, because perfect is subjective. Perfect for
the lion is bad for the antelope.
Such problem doesn't exist in PU.
In PU, there is no food chain like A eats B; B eats C; C eats D ... etc..
Perfect beings (both living and
I think it's always good to have all different kinds of theories to explain
our universe.
Whatever current theories are, our understanding could be always limited by
our limitations
(as designed by the so-called Creator if any).
So I always think it's possible to produce a perfect universe by
Hi,
The problem with perfection is that this word has *no* absolute meaning.
Then depending on your culture/history it can have a different meaning.
Stupid example: Imagine you are a serial killer... perfect world for you would
be a world were you can kill at will ;) But you would say that a
Good question. But I don't think we need to define perfect.
You can check the dictionary to know its meaning.
Your killing example won't exist in the PU. Otherwise it won't be PU.
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com The problem with perfection is that
this word has *no* absolute meaning.
Hi, I've checked and I do not see an absolute meaning to perfection.
Le Samedi 5 Août 2006 13:12, W. C. a écrit :
Good question. But I don't think we need to define perfect.
You can check the dictionary to know its meaning.
Your killing example won't exist in the PU. Otherwise it won't be PU.
Le 03-août-06, à 23:05, John M a écrit :
Are we reinventing the religion?
Yes.
Now, it is not that science is suddenly so clever that it can solve the
problem in religion. It is (justifiably assuming comp) that we can
approach some religion's problem with the modesty inherent in the
OK John, I say more on your post.
Le 03-août-06, à 23:05, John M a écrit :
To All:
I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read
(and
write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask:
is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require
: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Saturday, August 05, 2006 9:04 AM
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Le 03-août-06, à 23:05, John M a écrit :
Are we reinventing the religion?
Yes.
Now, it is not that science is suddenly so clever that it can solve
, August 04, 2006 9:04 PM
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit is may
be
a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat
simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the quantum
computer in action
Norman Samish wrote:
I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit is may be
a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat
simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the quantum
computer in action.
Quantum computers are only
From: Quentin Anciaux
Hi, I've checked and I do not see an absolute meaning to perfection.
OK. If you want more, I will say perfection in PU is *every being is perfect
and feels perfect (if it has feeling)*.
This doesn't mean that every being is exactly the same. They may have
different
is Schrodinger's Cat possible in quantum universes without
computational assistance?
Norman
- Original Message -
From: 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Saturday, August 05, 2006 2:43 PM
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Norman Samish wrote
I think if you stack all possible recordings together in the way you
suggest, connected in such as way as to be indistinguishable from a
computation occuring with all its counterfactuals in the Multiverse,
then what you have is a computation.
Cheers
On Fri, Aug 04, 2006 at 02:55:18PM +1000,
To All:
I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read (and
write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask:
is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require juice to
work and if unplugged they represent a very expensive paperweight.
What
Message -
From: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2006 2:05 PM
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
To All:
I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read (and
write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled
Brent Meeker writes:
The brain-with-wires-attached cannot interact with the environment, because
all its sense organs have been removed and the stimulation is just coming
from
a recording. Instead of the wires + recording we could say that there is a
special
group of neurons
Russell Standish writes:
In the Multiverse, there is a huge difference between a recording and
the actual computation. Only in one single universe (or history) of
the ensemble do the two coincide.
The recording is a computation issue is only a problem for single
universe theory IMHO.
Do
Brent Meeker writes:
Consider a computer which is doing something (whether it is dreaming or
musing or just running is the point in question). If there is no
interaction between what it's running and the rest of the world I'd say
it's not conscious. It doesn't necessarily need an
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
Consider a computer which is doing something (whether it is dreaming or
musing or just running is the point in question). If there is no
interaction between what it's running and the rest of the world I'd say
it's not conscious. It
A useful model of computation is the Turing Machine. A TM has a tape
with symbols on it; a head which moves along the tape and which can read
and write symbols, and a state machine with a fixed number of states
that controls head movement and symbol writing based on the current
state and the
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
Consider a computer which is doing something (whether it is dreaming or
musing or just running is the point in question). If there is no
interaction between what it's running and the rest of the world I'd say
it's not conscious. It doesn't
Brent Meeker wrote:
And evolution constructs brains to be essentially deterministic for the
same reason. So is it your theory that any deterministic sequence of
states constitutes computation and the reason a rock doesn't instantiate
computation is that, at the microscopic level its state
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be
distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the
computation. I don't think you can make the idea of information hidden
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
John M writes:
Peter Jones writes:
Hmm. Including limitations in time?
Yes, if an infinite number of finite computations are run simultaneously on
a system with a finite number of physical states.
Stathis Papaioannou
of it' which was not addressed in your
reply: mixing finite and infinite. Those marks drive me crazy. too.
John
- Original Message -
From: 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, August 01, 2006 9:17 AM
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
Would you allow that one machine or computation may be emulated by another
following some sort of mapping rule, and that consciousness may be preserved
in this process? This would seem to be an assumption at the basis of
functionalism
and
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
John M writes:
Peter Jones writes:
Hmm. Including limitations in time?
Yes, if an infinite number of finite computations are run simultaneously on
a system with a finite number of physical states.
Stathis Papaioannou
-
So
1Z wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
John M writes:
Peter Jones writes:
Hmm. Including limitations in time?
Yes, if an infinite number of finite computations are run simultaneously on
a system with a finite number of physical states.
Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes:
A computation is not a series of states. A computation is an
implementation
of an algorithm, and algorithms include conditional statements which
must be modelled by something with counterfactual behaviour --
by something which *could have* execute the other branch.
On Wed, Aug 02, 2006 at 10:05:37AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Another question: I can see why a computer should be able to handle
counterfactuals if it is to be of practical use, but what is wrong with
saying that a recording implements a computation, whether that is
adding two
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
I don't think intelligence is meaningful without an environment with
which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes
computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its
environment.
What about an
Brent meeker writes:
[If] a computatation only dreams then how could you know whether it was
intelligence, or just noise?
We wouldn't know, but the computation itself would know if it were
conscious,
creating its own observer. If we say that noise contains hidden information
Brent Meeker wrote:
I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be
distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the
computation. I don't think you can make the idea of information hidden
in noise well defined. By Shannon's measure noise is information.
You
Brent Meeker wrote:
I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be
distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the
computation. I don't think you can make the idea of information hidden
in noise well defined. By Shannon's measure noise is information.
You
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be
distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the
computation. I don't think you can make the idea of information hidden
in noise well defined. By Shannon's measure noise is
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be
distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the
computation. I don't think you can make the idea of information hidden
in noise well defined. By Shannon's
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
[If] a computatation only dreams then how could you know whether it was
intelligence, or just noise?
We wouldn't know, but the computation itself would know if it were
conscious,
creating its own observer. If we say that noise
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be
distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the
computation. I don't think you can make the idea of information hidden
in noise well defined. By
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou
Yes, that's roughly my idea. Of course you can't insist that a
computation interact continuously to count as computation, only that it
does occasionally or potentially.
Most of the counterfactuals that make up a computation
are
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
The underlying physics of the thing will tell youwhether
it is capable of supporting countefactuals without
running a programme at all. There is something objectively
machine-like about machines -- complex , but predictable
Stathis,
excuse my naive ignorance: (below your reply)
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 1Z everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, July 30, 2006 5:12 AM
Subject: RE: Bruno's argument
Peter Jones writes:
Hmm. Including limitations in time
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be
distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the
computation. I don't think you can make the idea of information
hidden
in noise well defined.
Brent Meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an
unnecessary complication. Suppose Klingon computers change their
internal code every clock cycle according to the well-documented
Peter Jones writes:
I can say that a hydrogen atom can't compute an entire virtual
universe,
because there isn't enough room.
If you can map multiple computation states to one physical state, then all
the requisite computations can be run in parallel on a very limited
physical
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an
unnecessary complication. Suppose Klingon computers change their
internal code every clock cycle according to the
Brent Meeker writes:
I don't think intelligence is meaningful without an environment with
which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes
computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its
environment.
What about an intelligent, conscious being
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
I don't think intelligence is meaningful without an environment with
which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes
computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its
environment.
What about an
Brent meeker writes:
I don't think intelligence is meaningful without an environment with
which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes
computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its
environment.
What about an intelligent, conscious being
PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
I don't think intelligence is meaningful without an environment with
which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes
computation and noise is a context
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an
unnecessary complication. Suppose Klingon computers change their
internal code every clock cycle according to the well-documented
radioactive decay pattern of a sacred
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an unnecessary
complication. Suppose Klingon
computers change their internal code every clock cycle according to the
well-documented radioactive
decay pattern of
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
There is a very impoertant difference between computations do
not require a physical basis and computations do not
require any *particular* physical basis (ie computations can be
physical
implemented by a wide
Please see after your remark/question at the end
John
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, July 28, 2006 10:48 AM
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument
Le 28-juil.-06, à 02:52, John M a écrit :
Then again
'as - if'? It is a cheap excuse that we have no better
one G.
Sorry for just multiplying the words in this exchange.
John M
- Original Message -
From: Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2006 10:32 PM
Subject: RE: Bruno's argument
John M
Colin
Thanks, Colin,
I feel we also agree in your last sentence statement, however I could
not
decide whether abstraction is reductionist model forming or a
generalization into wider horizons? Patterns - I feel - are IMO
definitely reductive.
Abstraction I would characterise as a mapping into a
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an unnecessary
complication. Suppose Klingon
computers change their internal code every clock cycle according to the
well-documented radioactive
decay pattern of a sacred stone 2000 years ago. If
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Well, I think I have a better understanding now of the ideas leading me to
start this thread - thanks to Bruno, Quentin and the other contributors.
Moreover, I am leaning towards fundamentally changing my views on the
implementation problem: if computationalism
Peter Jones writes:
There is a very impoertant difference between computations do
not require a physical basis and computations do not
require any *particular* physical basis (ie computations can be
physical
implemented by a wide variety of systems)
Yes, but any physical system can be seen
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
There is a very impoertant difference between computations do
not require a physical basis and computations do not
require any *particular* physical basis (ie computations can be
physical
implemented by a wide variety of systems)
Yes, but
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
There is a very impoertant difference between computations do
not require a physical basis and computations do not
require any *particular* physical basis (ie computations can be
physical
implemented by a wide variety of systems)
Yes,
Brent Meeker wrote:
d the computations are implemented
anyway by virtue of their status as mathematical objects.
Or by virtue of there being universes.
Something, anyway. You don't get implementation for free.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Well, I think I have a better understanding now of the ideas leading me
to start this thread - thanks to Bruno, Quentin and the other
contributors. Moreover, I am leaning towards fundamentally changing my
views on the implementation problem: if computationalism is
Brent Meeker writes:
Yes, but any physical system can be seen as implementing any computation
with the appropriate
rule mapping physical states to computational states.
I think this is doubtful. For one thing there must be enough distinct
states. It's all very well
to imagine a
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
There is a very impoertant difference between computations do
not require a physical basis and computations do not
require any *particular* physical basis (ie computations can be
physical
implemented by a wide variety of systems)
Yes, but any
computation of qualia and meaning? Certainly not the Turing
or Church ways and not on Intel etc. processors.
John M
- Original Message -
From: Colin Geoffrey Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2006 6:11 PM
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument
John M
Colin,
the entire discussion is too much for me, I pick some remarks of yours and
ask only about them. I am glad to see that others are also struggling to
find better and more fitting words...
(I search for better fitting concepts as well to be expressed by those
better fitting
Le 26-juil.-06, à 07:55, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
But certain computations are selected out through being isomorphic
with physical structures and processes (or simulations thereof):
I would have said that certain computations are selected out by
this preserves
computationalism either.
Stathis Papaioannou
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument
Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2006 16:32:03 +0200
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Le 26-juil.-06, à 07:55, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit
Le 24-juil.-06, à 09:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
x-tad-bigger It's only a coincidence in the literal sense of the word, i.e. two things happening simultaneously. My point was to explore the idea of supervenience, which (to me, at any rate) at first glance seems a mysterious process, and we
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
But certain computations are selected out through being isomorphic
with physical structures and processes (or simulations thereof):
I would have said that certain computations are selected out by giving
high relative measure for locally stable
Russell Standish writes (quoting SP):
Whatifwejustsaythatthereisnomoretothesupervenienceofthe mentalonthephysicalthanthereistothesupervenienceofa parabolaonthetrajectoryofaprojectileundergravity?The projectiledoesn't"create"theparabola,whichexistsinPlatoniain
Jesse Mazer writes (quoting SP):
Whatyouseemtobesuggestingisthatnotallcomputationsareequivalent: somegiverisetomind,whileothers,apparentlysimilar,donot.Isn't thissimilartothereasoningofpeoplewhosaythatacomputercould neverbeconsciousbecauseevenifitexactlyemulatedahumanbrain,itis
Russell Standish writes:
Torefinetheproblemalittlefurther-weseeabraininour observedrealityonwhichourmindsupervenes.Andweseeother brains,forwhichwemustassumesupervenienceofotherpersons(the nozombiesassumption). Whatisthecauseofthissupervenience?Itisasymptomofthe
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
In other words it is not justified, based on our limited understanding of
brains, to say we'll never
be able to know how another feels based on observation of their brain.
We don't know how insects or amoebae feel, either.
Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Jul 23, 2006 at 06:53:50PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Russell Standish writes:
To refine the problem a little further - we see a brain in our observed
reality on which our mind supervenes. And we see other brains, for which
we must assume
Le 22-juil.-06, à 22:02, Brent Meeker a écrit :
No bigger than the assumption that other minds exists (a key
assumption in comp if only through the trust to the doctor).
Aren't those two propositions independent - that there are other minds
and that we cannot possibly
know what their
On Mon, Jul 24, 2006 at 12:35:02PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
What if we just say that there is no more to the supervenience of the
mental on the physical than there is to the supervenience of a
parabola on the trajectory of a projectile under gravity? The
projectile doesn't create
Le Samedi 22 Juillet 2006 04:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
But in this case what is the difference between knowing how and having
the experience ?
Seems to me there's a lot of difference between knowing how to shoot myself
in the foot and having the experience of doing
Le 21-juil.-06, à 17:52, Brent Meeker a écrit :
If there is anything left over. I don't think it is sufficiently
appreciated that this
unknowability is an assumption.
No bigger than the assumption that other minds exists (a key
assumption in comp if only through the trust to the doctor).
Le 20-juil.-06, à 13:46, Russell Standish a écrit :
Bruno, I know in your theory that introspection is a vital component
(the Goedel-like constructions), but I didn't see how this turns back
onto the self-awareness issue. Did you develop this side of the
argument?
Yes sure. The
.
This is for today. We may learn more by tomorrow.
John M
- Original Message -
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 4:40 PM
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Vendredi 21 Juillet 2006 22:08, Brent Meeker
John M wrote:
Brent,
there is wisdom in your views - b u t -...
Does anybody really 'know'- 'experience'-and indeed: ' feel' what and how
another person idenfifies internally feeling the color red?
I think 'know' and 'experience' are different. We all think that we know how
another
Brent Meeker wrote:
In other words it is not justified, based on our limited understanding of
brains, to say we'll never
be able to know how another feels based on observation of their brain.
We don't know how insects or amoebae feel, either.
It is not just an issue of complexity.
We
Le 20-juil.-06, à 22:38, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
So, do you think that the idea of psychophysical laws whose sole
purpose
is to decide if larger computations contain instantiations of smaller
ones,
and therefore contribute to their overall measure, violates
computationalism as you
Le 20-juil.-06, à 22:38, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
OK, but my feeling is that you need to abandon comp to be able to cut
down such form of reasoning. Or you should perhaps point on some
precise step you judge not convincing.
Can you repost that link to the steps of your argument in order?
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
AlotofthestuffcriticisingChalmer'sthesisisquitestrident,atleastbytheusualacademic standards.It'snotquiteassevereasthereactiontoRogerPenrose'stheoriesonthemind,but almost.Manycognitivescientistsseemtotakeanythingnotclearlystraightforwardmaterialism
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