kla...@bkpsecurity.com wrote:
If Quantum Immortality (QI) is true, then we can ask the question what
is the TYPICAL history for an immortal. The typical history (or the
typical time/space trajectory) would be the path most of the immortals
take (and remember that in QI all of us are
he Instant, Robin Durie (ed.) Manchester:
Clinamen Press, 2000
Subjects:
General
Relativity and Quantum Cosmology (gr-qc)
Citeas:
arXiv:gr-qc/0104097v1
Brent Meeker
The whole point of time symmetry, the very definition, is tha
Bruno Marchal wrote:
It seems to me that your reasoning illustrates well the problems with
physical supervenience and physicalism, and perhaps ASSA.
In any case the Universal Dovetailer generates all such gaz universes
generating the Boltzmann brains. Now the probability that you are
Abram Demski wrote:
Thomas,
If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
moving in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial
dimension in the same way we move through time, and in doing
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/6 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com:
Thomas,
If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
moving in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial
dimension
Lewis Carroll Epstein says the reason we can't go faster than light is that we
can't go slower than light, c is our speed along the time axis.
Brent
Günther Greindl wrote:
Abram,
an intuition I have come to concerning time is the following (it is only
qualitative and may or may not be
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/7 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com wrote:
I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical
structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level in the
stack is *always* the next life-tick, it couldn't be something else...
which
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/7 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com wrote:
I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical
structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level
John Mikes wrote:
Dear Bruno,
I decided so many times not to reflect to the esoteric sci-fi
assumptions (thought experiments?) on this list - about situations
beyond common sense, their use as templates for consequences.
Now, however, I can't control my 'mouse' - in random and
, Jan 8, 2009 at 4:14 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
John Mikes wrote:
Dear Bruno,
I decided so many times not to reflect to the esoteric sci-fi
assumptions (thought experiments?) on this list - about situations
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/9 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But in a block universe, where each frame contains all of the
information for a particular time, the order is implicit.
What makes it implicit?... increasing entropy? ...conformance to dynamical
laws
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Consider a simulation of an observer watching a falling stone, running
on a digital computer. Does the observer have any way of knowing
whether the simulation is being run serially, in parallel, on how many
and what
Kim Jones wrote:
On 10/01/2009, at 6:37 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
The question is how is the simulated observer made conscious of the
passage of
(simulated) time. If you just look a momentary machine states,
ignoring their
causal/temporal relations, how will they create
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
The question is how is the simulated observer made conscious of the passage
of
(simulated) time. If you just look a momentary machine states, ignoring
their
causal/temporal relations, how will they create
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I'm suggesting that running a state is incoherent.
A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states.
Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which give rise to several
moments
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states.
Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which give rise to several
moments of consciousness. Would you say that running the sequence s1
to s20
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
In human consciousness, as instantiated by brains, there is a process in
which
signal/information is not local, it is distributed in spacetime and is
connected
causally which means, per relativity, that you
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also requires a
set of transition rules. So in the same abstract way that the integers
are ordered by succession the computational states of a Turing
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
However a Turing machine is not just
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/15 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
In an actual physical computer the transition rules are represented by
the causal links between the states, so that a particular input will
reliably give rise to a particular output. But I return to my question
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:52, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also
requires a
set of transition rules. So in the same abstract way
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/16 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But both the electronic and the mechanical computer are implementing a
process
that is distributed in spacetime and has causal connections.
Yes, and my claim is that the causal connections are important
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
snip
in a computer program
Günther Greindl wrote:
Hi all,
the question goes primarily to Bruno but all other input is welcome :-))
Bruno, you said you have already arrived at a quantum logic in your
technical work?
May I refer to the following two paragraphs?:
We can read here:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
snip
in a computer program
Günther Greindl wrote:
Brent,
I wonder, what do you mean with materialism (I ask this having been a
materialist myself)?
I didn't use the term - it is one being attributed to me simply because I
question the adequacy of logic and mathematics to instantiate physics.
Physics only
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/24 Alberto G.Corona agocor...@gmail.com:
But the fact is that in our univese, glasses do recompose themselves,
the flame of the candles do recombines liberating oxygen and make grow
the candle, objects lighter than water sink. Why? because these events
which is a finite set of triples.
Brent Meeker
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Kim Jones wrote:
The Templeton Foundation gives sizeable grants to projects for
reconciling science and religion, and awards a yearly prize of two
million dollars to a philosopher or scientist whose work highlights
the spiritual dimension of scientific progress.
Go for it, Bruno! If
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com:
This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading and is
exactly why I broke down the roles of effective probability into the four
categories I did in the paper.
If you are considering future versions
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Feb 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com:
This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading
and is exactly why I broke down the roles of effective probability
into the four
be implemented by
different physics and hence different causation.
Brent Meeker
3) If I am defined as an observer-moment, then I am
part of either A1 or A2, not even the whole thing - just my
current experience. This is the most conservative
definition and thus may be the least misleading
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com:
3) If I am defined as an observer-moment, then I am
part of either A1 or A2, not even the whole thing - just my
current experience. This is the most conservative
definition and thus may be the least misleading.
This
exists or it doesn't.
Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector
in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it.
Brent Meeker
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Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:38, Günther Greindl wrote:
I'm with Mike and Brent.
Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff
violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you
can't go out of the system.
See my answer to Brent.
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of
consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which
implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces
the
measure of each
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/2/11 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com
mailto:laserma...@hotmail.com
Brent Meeker wrote:
Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the
feeling of
consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total
Saibal Mitra wrote:
Welcome back Jack Mallah!
I have a different argument against QTI.
I had a nice dream last night, but unfortunately it suddenly ended.
Now, this is empirical evidence against QTI because, according to the
QTI, the life expectancy of the version of me simulated in
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:38, Günther Greindl wrote:
I'm with Mike and Brent.
Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff
violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you
can't go out of the system.
See my answer to Brent.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But the same could be said about everyday life. The person who wakes
up in my bed tomorrow won't be me, he will be some guy who thinks he's
me and shares my memories, personality traits, physical
characteristics
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
If continuity is fundamental then personal identity could be defined in
terms of
it and there could be a real difference between you and someone with the same
memories, but without continuity to your past
Review of a book that may be of interest to the list.
Brent Meeker
Original Message
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
2009-02-26 : View this Review Online
http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15326 : View Other NDPR Reviews
http://ndpr.nd.edu/
David Shoemaker, /Personal Identity
between the universe being quantum mechanical,
while human thought processes are essentially classical. The classical
world emerges from the quantum in the limit of large action.
Brent Meeker
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You received this message because you
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/22 Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net:
Ok, my difficulty lies in the notion of copying. If we are going to
use a method X to derive a conclusion, does it not make sense that X must be
sound? QM forbids the cloning or copying of states:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be
The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
new memories, including false souvenirs. But
Stephen Paul King wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 11:51 AM
Subject: Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A
Brief Introduction]
Quentin
russell standish wrote:
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 07:00:39PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:
I think I am often *not* self-aware. But aside from that, I have definitely
been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though
probably not Stathis) were unconscious
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be
The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote:
Hi,
Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living.
Here
I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be
The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you
even
John Mikes wrote:
Brent:
who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why?
Ask Bruno, he's the one who brought it up.
Brent
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Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/28 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com:
The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years
old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply
the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten
not fit here, to make a copy of my brain,
wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at
one time to quantum resolution (TNG transporter term).
Ronald
On Feb 23, 9:04 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/2/24 Brent Meeker meeke
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/3/6 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com wrote:
If you're not worried about the fair trade, then to be consistent you
shouldn't be worried about the unfair trade either. In the fair trade, one
version of you A disappears overnight, and a new version of you B is
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/3/8 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com wrote:
It's not the addition then loss that's bad (since you end up with the same
measure you started with); it's the loss.
In the culling teleportation, both people are lost, which is doubly bad.
Elsewhere, one new
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/3/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
And if it went to zero you certainly wouldn't know and wouldn't care.
If I died I wouldn't be around to know or care, but I would care in
anticipation of dying, since it would radically alter my future
experiences
-fuzzy
factual) knowledge can be downloaded from the Net.
Along with an enormous amount of fuzzy, non-factual ignorance.
Education can now only have a future by teaching skills
Like B.S. detection.
Brent Meeker
The internet is a pornography delivery medium occasionally used for
other purposes
require invoking time-reversal invariance of the state of whole universe (or at
least all of it entangled with the particle spin via the measuring apparatus).
Brent Meeker
although you cannot directly verify it here. But that means that you cannot
rule out an alternative theory in which
russell standish wrote:
On Sun, Mar 15, 2009 at 11:06:42AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
Saibal Mitra wrote:
If we consider measuring the spin of a particle, you could also say that the
two possible outcomes just exist and thatthere are two possible future
versions of me. There is no meaningful
,
But does not MWI imply that if we could somehow erase all (retrivable!)
records of a measurement, that we would - in effect - be culling that
branch from the Tree?
- Original Message -
From: Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday
Kim Jones wrote:
On 23/03/2009, at 1:56 AM, John Mikes wrote:
Russell,
you are not alone as the target of this remark...
Many people consider 'creativity' (like change, quality etc.) a
POSITIVE concept. - WRONG. -
Just consider the recent creative financial genius Maddoff, with his
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Kelly, and others,
Well, thanks for your report. Did you smoke the extract? It usually
last for 4 minutes. It is amazing it did last so long with you, I know
only one case of an experience lasting 20 minutes. I am happy you found
your experience interesting. You
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Mar 2009, at 14:02, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/3/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi Kelly, and others,
Well, thanks for your report. Did you smoke the extract? It usually
last for 4 minutes. It is amazing it did last so long with you, I
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/3/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 30 Mar 2009, at 17:03, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2009/3/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be
Hi Kelly, and others,
Well, thanks for
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hello Quentin,
Le 30-mars-09, à 20:03, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
2009/3/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 30 Mar 2009, at 17:03, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2009/3/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be
Hi Kelly,
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/2 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
I would say that if you are at a fork where one version of you loses
all memories and another does not, then you will find yourself going
down the no memory loss path.
At which point? Also, why is it that we
There might be something in this that is of interest to the list.
Brent
Original Message
Subject:NDPR Kim Atkins / / / Kim Atkins and Catriona Mackenzie
(eds.), Narrative Identity and Moral Identity: A Practical Perspective /
/ / Practical Identity and Narrative
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/3 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But if you're going to derive physics from consciousness you need to
explain what connects across the gap - why is it still you. I
appreciate that part of the answer is memories, although Bruno seems to
think
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/4 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The probability that I go from state A to state B is given by the
number of computations going from A to B.
The problem with amnesic teleportation, that is teleportation with
partial amnesia in the reconstituted
Kelly wrote:
What is the advantage of assigning consciousness to computational
processes (e.g. UDA), as opposed to just assigning it to the
information that is produced by computational processes?
For example, to take Maudlin's Computation and Consciousness paper,
if you just say that the
Jason Resch wrote:
I think in regards to conscious, you can't have one without the other.
Both information and computation are needed, as the computation
imparts meaning to the information, and the information accumulates
meaning making each computation and its result more meaningful.
If I
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
I think meaning ultimately must be grounded in action. That's why
it's hard to see where the meaning lies in a computation, something
that
is just the manipulation of strings. People tend to say the meaning is
in the interpretation, noting
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Apr 2009, at 14:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
Jason Resch wrote:
I think in regards to conscious, you can't have one without the
other.
Both information and computation are needed, as the computation
imparts meaning to the information, and the information
or even explicitly depends on a process, over and
above the information:
...sensory data is instead apparently heavily *processed*...
...we *represent* that experience internally...
... and still get *behavior*...
Brent
Kelly wrote:
On Apr 20, 2:04 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Apr 2009, at 17:41, Brent Meeker wrote:
A computation is a sequence of numbers (or of strings, or of
combinators, etc.) as resulting by an interpretation. For such an
interpretation, you don't need a world, only an interpreter that
is a universal system
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Apr 2009, at 18:59, Brent Meeker wrote:
The question was whether information was enough, or whether something
else is needed for consciousness. I think that sequence is needed,
which we experience as the passage of time. When you speak of
computations going
Kelly wrote:
On Apr 21, 11:31 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
We could say that a state A access to a state B if there is a
universal machine (a universal number relation) transforming A into B.
This works at the ontological level, or for the third person point of
view. But if
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/22 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
The question was whether information was enough, or whether something
else is needed for consciousness. I think that sequence is needed,
which we experience as the passage of time. When you speak
Kelly wrote:
On Apr 21, 2:33 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
These states can belong to more than one sequence of
conscious experience. But the question is whether the order of the
states in the computation is always the same as their order in any
sequence of conscious
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/23 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Say a machine is in two separate parts M1 and M2, and the information
on M1 in state A is written to a punchcard, walked over to M2, loaded,
and M2 goes into state B. Then what you are suggesting
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/23 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Say a machine is in two separate parts M1 and M2, and the information
on M1 in state A is written to a punchcard, walked
Kelly wrote:
On Apr 22, 2:02 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
I was with you up to that last sentence. Forward or backward, we just
experience increasing entropy as increasing time, but that doesn't
warrant the conclusion that no process is required and an instant
within
Kelly wrote:
On Apr 22, 12:24 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
So for that to be a plausible scenario we have to
say that a person at a particular instant in time can be fully
described by some set of data.
Not fully. I agree with Brent that you need an interpreter to
Jason Resch wrote:
Kelly,
Your arguments are compelling and logical, you have put a lot of doubt
in my mind about computationalism. I have actually been in somewhat
of a state of confusion since Bruno's movie graph argument coupled
with a paper by Max Tegmark. In Tegmark's paper, he was
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Boltzmann brains are improbable, but the example of the punchcards is
not. The operator could have two punchcards in his pocket, have a
conversation with someone on the way from M1 to M2 and end up
forgetting
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/25 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
This implicitly assumes that you can dispense with the continuum and
treat the process as a succession of discrete states. I question that.
So are you saying that, because we are conscious
Kelly wrote:
On Apr 24, 2:41 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
In the materialist view, my mental state is just the
state of the particles of my brain at that instant.
I think we need some definition of state.
Hmmm. Well, I think my view of the word
Kelly wrote:
On Apr 26, 1:08 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
These are edges in time, i.e. a future boundary and a past boundary.
If these two boundaries are different then we are not longer talking
about a state, we're talking about an interval, furthermore an interval
Kelly wrote:
On Sun, Apr 26, 2009 at 9:00 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
wrote:
In fact I used that same argument with Russell
Standish when he said that ants aren't conscious because if they were
then we should expect to be experiencing life as ants and not humans.
Did you
Kelly wrote:
On Apr 27, 2:27 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
An untestable theory. But that's OK since if it's true it's also useless.
Ha! True, true. But it being true AND useless would have a certain
aesthetic/poetic appeal. Which makes me even more inclined
Kelly wrote:
On Apr 26, 12:47 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
No, I think you're missing my point. Consider your analogy of fitting
together images to make a complete picture. You present this as a
spatial representation of the sequential flow of consciousness. Now
Kelly wrote:
On Apr 27, 12:23 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
So you have indeed the necessity to abandon comp to maintain your form
of immaterialist platonism, but then you lose the tool for questioning
nature. It almost look like choosing a theory because it does not even
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/25 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But is it the information in consciousness and is it discrete? If you
include the information that is in the brain, but not in consciousness,
I can buy the concept of relating states by similarity of content
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/29 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I'm not sure I understand. Are you saying that the information in most
physical processes, but not consciousness, can be discrete? I would
have said just the opposite: that even if it turns out that physics
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/29 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com:
In Bruno's Washington/Moscow thought experiment that information isn't
in your consciousness, although it's available via third persons. My
view of the experiment is that you would lose a bit of consciousness,
that
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/30 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I see no contradiction in a noticeable gap in consciousness. Whether
noticing such a gap depends on having some theory of the world or is
intrinsic seems to be the question.
You would notice a gap
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Putnam and Searle use the Rock argument to suggest
that computationalism is false: they consider it absurd that any
conscious computation supervenes on any physical activity (or
equivalently no physical activity,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Apr 2009, at 15:49, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/4/30 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Putnam and Searle use the Rock argument to suggest
that computationalism is false: they consider it absurd that any
conscious computation supervenes on any
ZeroSum wrote:
The Wiki article Quantum suicide and immortality (http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_suicide_and_immortality) states:
Also, the philosopher David Lewis, in How Many Lives Has
Schrödinger's Cat?, remarked that in the vast majority of the worlds
in which an immortal
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