Hi Abram, Him Kim,
Kim, while answering Abram, I realised I was doing the KIM 2.3, you
can read it before KIM 2.2 without problem I think, in any case tell
me if you have follow the argument. I don't answer the questions, so
you or Abram, or anyone else can answer.
Abram, The answer to
Hi Kim,
On 20 Dec 2008, at 06:06, Kim Jones wrote:
Hmmm... My diagnostic is that you are suffering from an acute form
of math-anxiety. I can cure that!
Looks like I have to say Yes, Doctor again!
Good!
Tell me first if you have been once mentally or physically raped
or
I wrote:
Abram wrote
--When I tell you my bet about which movie I will see, I am not
minimizing the chance of being condemned to hell, I am minimizing the
number of my copies that will be so carried.
?
OK. I was distracted. To do this by altruism? And *you* (in your
sense) you
is. That is perhaps why the meditation on the question who am I (cf
Ramana Maharshi) can lead to the enlightenment. That is probably why
in the eastern art of the war, people learns to not-decide, yet act.
Bruno
--Abram
On Mon, Dec 22, 2008 at 3:16 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
the electrical impulses read in a brain system (NewScientist last
ed.)
Perhaps it is not too far from here to the thought that you and I
might swap instantiations for a short time? Maybe it would be fun to
think, walk, talk and act like Bruno Marchal, if only for 5 minutes.
In fact, I would pay
On 24 Dec 2008, at 16:41, Günther Greindl wrote:
Kim, Bruno,
Not at all. You have already done the first and last leap of faith of
the reasoning when accepting the digital brain at the first step. I
am
aware that you are not aware of that, because in the reply you seem
to
believe
On 25 Dec 2008, at 08:05, Abram Demski wrote:
Bruno,
I agree with Gunther about the two types of machine. The broader
machine is any system that can be logically described-- a system that
is governed by rules and has a definite description.
Then Church thesis entails it is not broader,
Hi Kim,
On 25 Dec 2008, at 06:21, Kim Jones wrote:
A bit of an end-of-year ramble. For the multi-lingual, illogically-
minded, lateral thinkers:
My last post was a bit self-destructive ramble as I am able to do once
a time. But that's ok. (I hope I am not shocking).
It is rather kind of
Hi Günther,
On 25 Dec 2008, at 20:01, Günther Greindl wrote:
Bruno,
This conception can, I think, be indeed taken for granted by every
scientifically minded person.
Why ? It is an assumption too. What could we taken it for granted?
Yes, it is an assumption - that is why is wrote
On 25 Dec 2008, at 20:10, Günther Greindl wrote:
Bruno,
But no weakening of comp based on nature is
known to escape the replicability. Even the non cloning theorem in QM
cannot be used to escape the UDA conclusion.
I already wanted to ask you on this one: you have said before on the
On 25 Dec 2008, at 22:27, Kim Jones wrote:
On 26/12/2008, at 5:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Dec 2008, at 08:05, Abram Demski wrote:
Bruno,
I agree with Gunther about the two types of machine. The broader
machine is any system that can be logically described-- a system
AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 25 Dec 2008, at 22:27, Kim Jones wrote:
On 26/12/2008, at 5:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Dec 2008, at 08:05, Abram Demski wrote:
Bruno,
I agree with Gunther about the two types of machine. The broader
machine is any system that can
,
Thanks for the reference. That book sounds very interesting...
unfortunately it is also very expensive.
--Abram
On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
POUR-EL M. B., RICHARD J. I., 1989, Computability in Analysis and
Physics,
Springer-Verlag, Berlin
Hi Hal,
To see if your system is a UD, the first thing to do should consist in
writing a program capable of simulating it on a computer, and then to
see for which value of some parameters (on which it is supposed to
dovetail) it simulates a universal Turing machine.
To simulate it on a
, the Mechanist
hypothesis, or even just the strong AI thesis, is not a
reductionism, it is an openness of our mind toward a peculiar Unknown
which invites itself to our table.
Bruno
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal
To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday
On 27 Dec 2008, at 20:50, Günther Greindl wrote:
I agree with Bruno that all empirical evidence in this universe
suggest
that CT = PCT. But this need not be so, in a logical sense.
Indeed. UDA shows that PCT is a mysterious, if not *the* mystery with
CT. Logicaly, and a priori, CT
them, first
this one:
On Dec 27, 11:51 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
...
Then I propose an argument that IF we say yes to the doctor, that is,
IF there is a level of self-description such that a digital
substitution preserves my identity feeling and my consciousness THEN
numbers
have that impression, but your next post put a slight doubt on
that impression.
Perhaps your partner understands better! I comment it below.
---
On 28/12/2008, at 12:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
With
Everett everything becomes clearer: nature does not collapse the
wave
It seems to me that your reasoning illustrates well the problems with
physical supervenience and physicalism, and perhaps ASSA.
In any case the Universal Dovetailer generates all such gaz universes
generating the Boltzmann brains. Now the probability that you are
implemented by a
Ronald,
On 21 Dec 2008, at 15:40, Bruno Marchal wrote:
How is there any mathematics with nothing to
conceive of it?
Let me try a straightest answer from math, with an example. Take the
digital or discrete line. You can map it on the integers. It is the
symmetrical extension
On 01 Jan 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
It seems to me that your reasoning illustrates well the problems with
physical supervenience and physicalism, and perhaps ASSA.
In any case the Universal Dovetailer generates all such gaz universes
generating
On 31 Dec 2008, at 23:53, Brent Meeker wrote:
The present moment in quantum cosmology: challenges to the arguments
for the elimination of time
Authors: Lee Smolin
(Submitted on 29 Apr 2001)
Abstract: Barbour, Hawking, Misner and others have argued that time
cannot play an essential
Hi Günther,
On 01 Jan 2009, at 23:58, Günther Greindl wrote:
Bruno,
I have also wanted to ask how you come to 2^aleph_zero
Well, in part this results from the unbounded dumbness of the
universal doevtailing procedure which dovetails on all programs but
also on all non interacting
On 02 Jan 2009, at 16:01, Abram Demski wrote:
Hal,
I went back and reviewed some of your old postings. My interpretation
of your system was closer to the mark than I'd suspected!
I think enumeration via inconsistency can be equivalent to enumeration
by incompleteness... depending on
pattern, like we cannot define it, we cannot explain it that you
can (with luck) recognize in the (more geometrical) marks.
Bruno Marchal
On 03 Jan 2009, at 06:46, Thomas Laursen wrote:
If I understand the standard MWI right (with my layman brain) Abram
Demski's view of time is very much
On 04 Jan 2009, at 03:09, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Hi Günther,
Nice post! Coments soon.
Speaking of Svozil's work, please see: Cristian S. Calude, Peter H.
Hertling and Karl Svozil, ``Embedding Quantum Universes in Classical
Ones'',
Foundations of Physics 29(3), 349-390 (1999)
On 03 Jan 2009, at 12:59, Kim Jones wrote:
Bruno,
In this step, one of me experiences (or actually does not experience)
the delay prior to reconstitution. In Step 2, it was proven to me that
I cannot know that any extra time (other than the 4 minutes necessary
transmission interval) has
representable in Robinson arithmetic, or by a universal (in
the sense of Church Turing) immaterial (number-theoretical) machine.
Bruno
On Jan 3, 10:39 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I disagree, and your remark singles out the problem with the bird's
eye/frog view of Tegmark. Those
Hi Günther,
I agree with your main point. My comments below concerns only details.
On 03 Jan 2009, at 23:53, Günther Greindl wrote:
Hi Bruno,
first of all thanks for the long answer, and yes, it was very helpful.
You described the production of all reals with a very vivid imagery;
it
Abram,
I agree with Brent. In relativity theory space and time are
intermingled in a geometrical way to give the Minkowski structure.
Actually you can make it into an Euclidian space by introducing an
imaginary time t' = sqr(-1)*t = it. The metrics becomes dx^2 + dy^2 +
dz^2 + dt'^2.
In
On 06 Jan 2009, at 14:07, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/6 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com:
Thomas,
If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
moving in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
the past and not the future? Could a being
2009, at 12:51, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Abram,
I agree with Brent. In relativity theory space and time are
intermingled in a geometrical way to give the Minkowski structure.
Actually you can make it into an Euclidian space by introducing an
imaginary time t' = sqr(-1)*t = it. The metrics becomes
On 06 Jan 2009, at 20:18, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/6 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com:
Thomas,
If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we
experience
moving in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
the past and not the
Hi Günther,
On 07 Jan 2009, at 22:47, Günther Greindl wrote:
thanks for your comments, I interleave my response.
showed a glimpse of the vastness of the UD. And, I agree, _in the
limit_
there will be an infinite number of histories. So, as we have to
also
take into account infinite
, it depends
at which level we look at, and through which notion of person we make
the observation, also.
Thanks for an interesting reading.
*I* thank you for your kind attention,
Best,
Bruno
On Mon, Jan 5, 2009 at 1:48 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 03 Jan
On 09 Jan 2009, at 20:12, Günther Greindl wrote:
Hi Bruno,
and Cantor get a contradiction from that. You assume the diagram is
indeed a piece of an existing bijection in Platonia, or known by God.
No, you misunderstand me there - I just meant that we need to take the
step to infinity -
Gosh, you make me realize that I have lost my book by Steinhart. . I
did appreciated it some time ago. Thanks for the references.
Best,
Bruno
On 09 Jan 2009, at 21:26, Günther Greindl wrote:
Hello,
My domain is theology. scientific and thus agnostic theology. I
specialized my self in
On 10 Jan 2009, at 02:26, Kim Jones wrote:
On 10/01/2009, at 5:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I admire too. Kim is courageous.
Well, for the tenacity we will see :)
Gee thanks Doctor! I'll try not disappoint you. At the moment I am
devoting an egregious amount of time to searching
Le 11-janv.-09, à 17:55, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I'm suggesting that running a state is incoherent.
A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states.
Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which
with a quantum computer the really infinite
counting algorithm by a purely unitary transformation? The one which
generates without stopping 0, 1, 2, 3, ... That would already be a big
help.
Bruno
(*) Marchal B., 2005, Theoretical computer science and the natural
sciences, Physics of Life Reviews
On 12 Jan 2009, at 17:24, Mirek Dobsicek wrote:
Thank you for a quick answer! I'll take a look at it, my curiosity
approves additional items on my TODO list :-)
Manage keeping finite your todo list :)
I have finished the reading of the paper I mentioned (Deutsch's
Universal Quantum
On 13 Jan 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
In human consciousness, as instantiated by brains, there is a
process in which
signal/information is not local, it is distributed in spacetime
and is connected
On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also
requires a
set of transition rules. So in the same abstract way that the
integers
are
On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:52, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also
requires a
set of transition rules.
Le 15-janv.-09, à 20:55, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Stathis is not wrong but seems unclear on what a computation
mathematically is perhaps.
Many miss Church thesis. The fact that there is a purely mathematical
notion of computation at all.
I thought the Church's thesis was that all
On 16 Jan 2009, at 22:04, Günther Greindl wrote:
Hi all,
the question goes primarily to Bruno but all other input is
welcome :-))
Bruno, you said you have already arrived at a quantum logic in your
technical work?
Yes. The hypostases, with p restrict to the Sigma-1 sentences (the
On 17 Jan 2009, at 07:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
Günther Greindl wrote:
Hi all,
the question goes primarily to Bruno but all other input is
welcome :-))
Bruno, you said you have already arrived at a quantum logic in your
technical work?
May I refer to the following two paragraphs?:
On 18 Jan 2009, at 06:38, Brent Meeker wrote:
Are you stopping at UDA step 1?
No. There's a difference between your idea of running a world and
making a copy
of me within this world. I think the latter will necessarily incur
a gap in my
consciousness because of the need to gather
On 17 Jan 2009, at 04:10, fragamus (Michael Gough) wrote:
I would like to ask the board:
Are ALL possible quantum histories realized in the multiverse?
I would say yes. Even as the superposition states of the vacuum.
Note that all computational histories are in Arithmetic, or are
On 19 Jan 2009, at 13:56, Kim Jones wrote:
But Brent was momentarily speaking of materialism - materialism
doesn't acknowledge any form of comp immateriality except
according to the (probably) false mind/body dualism, where the mind
is allowed to be an ethereal emanation of the
Hi Günther,
The paper is not online, but I found it in this book which is at our
University Library, maybe interesting also for other people:
Goldblatt, Mathematics of Modality
Hi Mirek,
Please be more specific about what do you mean by a quantum counting
algorithm. Sometimes I'm not too bright guy :-)
Really? Not here I think. The question *was* and *is* fuzzy.
Is this what you mean?
step 1\ |0
step 2\ |0 + |1
step 3\ |0 + |1 + |2
On 20 Jan 2009, at 05:22, Brent Meeker wrote:
Günther Greindl wrote:
snip
The question is, why the quantum (as Wheeler, I think, put it)?
Bruno's
COMP gives a very elegant _explanation_.
I agree it is elegant, but whether it can really explain the world
remains to be
seen.
I am
On 21 Jan 2009, at 05:46, Kim Jones wrote:
OK. But keep in mind that consciousness is unique in the sense of
knowing that it cannot know its Turing emulability level (yet can
bet).
Footnote - (parenthetical digression): I know the above thought is
native to your schema, and up
On 21 Jan 2009, at 20:19, Mirek Dobsicek wrote:
My question has perhaps no sense at all. Is there a notion of quantum
computation done without any measurement?
Quantum lambda calculus by Andre van Tonder does not containt
measurement.
http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0307150v5
From the
On 21 Jan 2009, at 22:15, Kim Jones wrote:
On 22/01/2009, at 3:50 AM, Günther Greindl wrote:
Kim,
the uncomputability of this issue. Why should the mind be limited
to the
computable? Clearly it is not.
So you deny Step 1 again? You say no to the doctor?
In fact I have 'multiple
On 22 Jan 2009, at 13:21, Kim Jones wrote:
Bruno,
I found this an incredibly moving reply. I also see clearly your
points. I am glad to have given you an opportunity to state so
clearly some profoundly important ideas. Thank you, and let's
continue the voyage.
OK, thanks. ASAP (I am
I will think about it. Somehow, the best layman intro to UDA and
AUDA are in this list. The first 15-step version of UDA was a reply to
Russell Standish a long time ago. UDA is the logical guide to AUDA,
which is just a deeper second pass on UDA.
AUDA *is* UDA explained to the dummy, with
Günther,
AUDA is based on the self-reference logic of axiomatizable or
recursively enumerable theories, of machine. Those machines or
theories must be rich enough. In practice this means their theorems or
beliefs are close for induction.This is the work of Gödel and
followers, notably
On 28 Jan 2009, at 18:07, Günther Greindl wrote:
Bruno,
theoretical computer science and mathematical logic. Rereading
Conscience et Mécanisme I realize Russell Standish was right, and
that
book should be translated in english because it contains an almost
complete (self-contained)
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Günther,
AUDA is based on the self-reference logic of axiomatizable or
recursively enumerable theories, of machine. Those machines or
theories
must be rich enough. In practice this means their theorems or beliefs
are close for induction.This is the work of Gödel
Hi again Günther,
Again a question for Bruno ;-)
There are certain arguments (Deutsch, Wallace, Greaves) that propose
that they can derive probabilites (and the Born rule) from decision
theory - although I am not convinced (see for instance Price 2008 -
http://arxiv.org/abs/0802.1390).
Hi Quentin,
I was thinking about the movie graph and its conclusions. It
concludes that it is absurd for the connsciousness to supervene on
the movie hence physical supervenience is false.
OK. It is a reductio ad absurdo. It assumes that consciousness
supervenes on the physical
On 28 Jan 2009, at 21:16, Pete Carlton wrote:
What is wrong? In my opinion, it is that you are thinking that
anything at all exists in addition to or supervening on the
gates, or the movie, or the functions.
I think you have a picture in your mind like this: let's say there
are two
On 28 Jan 2009, at 21:25, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/1/28 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
Hi Quentin,
I was thinking about the movie graph and its conclusions. It
concludes that it is absurd for the connsciousness to supervene on
the movie hence physical supervenience is false
John,
Who is self-referencing, or even acknowledging self-reference?
Gödel and All. It is a major discovery of the 20th century: a
completely clear notion of third person self-reference.
A first person self-reference theory follows naturally, accepting
Theaetetus' definition of
On 29 Jan 2009, at 16:29, Günther Greindl wrote:
Hi Quentin,
So when do the AI becomes a zombie when I run it relatively to me ?
after how much stub subpart (I'm talking about function in a program,
not about a physical computer on which the said program is run) have
been replaced ?
Hi Mirek,
I would certainly like to read the book - I managed a bit the Lille
thesis (with my French), but it was hard going and I think I only
understood the stuff because we have had many discussions here on
the
list - so it was easy to translate. I am not so sure I can manage
the
should be able to prosecute those who
makes the *same* error again, and again, and again, and again, ...
(generally to rise fear about something or someone or somepeople).
Best regards,
Bruno
On 31 Jan 2009, at 03:20, Kim Jones wrote:
On 31/01/2009, at 3:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote
On 02 Feb 2009, at 18:20, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 Jan 2009, at 12:47, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Ok then for the particular run I describe, the two programs (the
original and the one modified by stub subpart) have the same
states...
So for this particular run
Hi Kim,
Still interested?
I must say I was wrong. I cannot explain to you the functioning of a
computer without doing math. Orally, drawing on a black board, I would
have been able to explain a big part of it, and simultaneously hiding
the mathematics. But I realize now that even this
And your namesake, Giordano Bruno.
Brent
(among others) also helped to prepare the terrain for this
'desanthropomorphisation' process. Embedding the subject into the
object of study. Embedding the spectator in the spectacles, as the
Hindu says. - Bruno Marchal
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal
Hi Kim,
I have not the time to think deeply on zero, so I will answer your
last post instead :)
On 05 Feb 2009, at 12:30, Kim Jones wrote:
On 05/02/2009, at 4:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Kim,
Still interested?
I must say I was wrong.
Only a scientist admits he can be wrong
Le 06-févr.-09, à 12:06, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
Hi,
2009/2/6 russell standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
He also mentions Tegmark's amoeba croaks argument, which is not
actually an argument against QI, but rather a discussion of what QI
might actually mean. Contrary to what some people
On 07 Feb 2009, at 04:47, Kim Jones wrote:
(see Broukère 1982),
It is (see de Brouckère 1982) Note the c, and the de.
Phenomena of genetic regulation with regard to mechanism are
eloquent [elegant?=poss. error:] Kim)
It is eloquent (indeed). Perhaps it would be clearer to say:
On 07 Feb 2009, at 19:05, Jack Mallah wrote:
Bruno is still pushing his crackpot UDA.
What is it that you (still) don't understand? (good idea to resume UDA
again, and so the question is asked also to the newbies).
Please help yourself by printing the PDF slide
1) The (re)definition
Hi Jack,
On 09 Feb 2009, at 18:19, Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Mon, 2/9/09, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
good idea to resume UDA again
Bruno, I will post on the subject - but not yet. I do not want to
get sidetracked from improving my paper.
I guess you understand that I do
On 10 Feb 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com:
This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading
and is exactly why I broke down the roles of effective probability
into the four categories I did in
Kim,
Thanks for the corrections - not only did I improve my understanding
of the thesis in closely translating the language, but had enormous
fun! I am up to the diagrammatic part and will stop here for the
time being, to catch my breath and also to try and understand the
Jaques
On 10 Feb 2009, at 20:11, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Feb 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com:
This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading
and is exactly why I broke down
of The Seattle Seven?
- Mmm.
- That was me... and six other guys.
2009/2/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Feb 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com
On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:48, Günther Greindl wrote:
Kim,
Günther recommends recently the book Eveything Must Go by Ladyman
et al. This looks like heavy going but seems like a good and a
relevant tome to get into, possibly circling around the mechanist
idea. Do you also recommend it?
The
Hi Kim,
I told you that to grasp the seventh step we have to do some little
amount of math.
Now math is a bit like consciousness or time, we know very well what
it is, but we cannot really define it, and such an encompassing
definition can depend on the philosophical view you can have on
On 11 Feb 2009, at 20:47, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:38, Günther Greindl wrote:
I'm with Mike and Brent.
Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff
violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you
can't go
On 11 Feb 2009, at 18:30, Saibal Mitra wrote:
Welcome back Jack Mallah!
I have a different argument against QTI.
I had a nice dream last night, but unfortunately it suddenly ended.
Now, this is empirical evidence against QTI because, according to the
QTI, the life expectancy of the
On 11 Feb 2009, at 21:51, Brent Meeker wrote:
Saibal Mitra wrote:
Welcome back Jack Mallah!
I have a different argument against QTI.
I had a nice dream last night, but unfortunately it suddenly ended.
Now, this is empirical evidence against QTI because, according to the
QTI, the life
On 11 Feb 2009, at 22:19, Brent Meeker wrote:
This idea seems inconsistent with MWI. In QM the split is uncaused
so it's
hard to see why its influence extends into the past and increases
the measure of
computations that were identical before the split.
I got the inspiration from
?)
Thanks for those kind and funny remarks and questions,
Best,
Bruno
John M
On Wed, Feb 11, 2009 at 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Hi Kim,
I told you that to grasp the seventh step we have to do some little
amount of math.
Now math is a bit like consciousness or time
Excellent post Johnatan.
Of course those who know a bit of AUDA (which I have already explained
on the list) know that from the third person self-reference views we
have cul-de-sac everywhere (we die all the times, cf the
Papaioannou multiverses), and this is what forces us, when we want a
On 12 Feb 2009, at 02:59, Jack Mallah wrote:
Hi George. The everything list feels just like old times, no?
I am afraid we are just a bit bactracking 10 years ago.
No problem. After all, concerning theology, I am asking people to
backtrack 1500 years ago (1480 to be precise).
Which
Ronald,
Thanks for the reference. Of course Lobo implicitly assume
physicalism, so we cannot really built from that.
I guess you know that Gödel is the first one showing that there exist
solutions of Einstein's GR equations with closed time loop.
Circling computations exist (trivially) in
On 12 Feb 2009, at 05:38, Tom Caylor wrote:
But of course you would worry just as much if the clone were replaced
by a zombie... I guess that gets back to the distinction between
first person and third person.
It seems to me that is the problem indeed. At the same time, it seems
On 12 Feb 2009, at 14:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/12 Johnathan Corgan jcor...@aeinet.com:
It is an open question (to me at least) whether there are any
observer
moments without successors, i.e., where the amplitude of the SW
goes to
zero. If it does not, then this implies
On 12 Feb 2009, at 18:05, Tom Caylor wrote:
Today is Charles Darwin's 200th birthday (the 150th anniversay of the
publication of On the Origin of Species, and we Americans at least
are also celebrating the 200th birthday of Abraham Lincoln.
Perhaps at this milestone it would be good to
On 12 Feb 2009, at 18:17, John Mikes wrote:
My present inserts in Italics - some parts of the posts erased for
brevity
John
On Thu, Feb 12, 2009 at 10:32 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 11 Feb 2009, at 23:46, John Mikes wrote:
(...)
Not that if I see 'I
On 12 Feb 2009, at 22:12, russell standish wrote:
On Thu, Feb 12, 2009 at 04:48:22PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Excellent post Johnatan.
Of course those who know a bit of AUDA (which I have already
explained
on the list) know that from the third person self-reference views we
have
Hi Russel,
On 15 Feb 2009, at 03:41, russell standish wrote:
On Fri, Feb 13, 2009 at 07:31:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I'm a little confused. Did you mean Dp here? Dp = -B-p
Fair question, given my sometimes poor random typo!
...
deduce Bp) , well, if you remind the definition
On 15 Feb 2009, at 23:00, russell standish wrote:
On Sun, Feb 15, 2009 at 06:41:08PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
A good and important exercise is to understand that with the Kripke
semantics, ~Dt, that is B~t, that is Bf, that is I prove 0=1, is
automatically true in all cul-de-sac world
Hi Günther,
Nice work Günther. Now my comment is longer than I wish. I really
would insist on one change. See (**) below.
On 16 Feb 2009, at 22:54, Günther Greindl wrote:
Hi guys,
I finally got around to writing the AUDA references page:
On 20 Feb 2009, at 14:01, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/20 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Review of a book that may be of interest to the list.
Brent Meeker
Original Message
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
2009-02-26 : View this Review Online
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