Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 26 Jun 2018, at 02:37, Russell Standish  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> 
>> I'm not using magic.  I'm asking for help.  Does anyone else understand how
>> physics is "explained by the inability of the universal machine to see the
>> equivalence between between []p <->([]p & p) and ([]p & <>p)  and ([]p & <>p
>> & p) with p (p sigma-1)."
> 
> I would guess that the idea is that there are different logics
> applicable to different types of knowledge, and these are enumerated
> by his 8 hypostases. He presumes that one of these corresponds to
> observations, and consequently is a logic of empirical knowledge.

I do not presume this. It is motivated by the UDA, or the understanding of the 
first person indeterminacy. It is the only way to be able to say “I will bring 
coffee with Probability one” when you are duplicated in W and M where coffee is 
offered in both places. []p & <>t means “p is true in all consistent 
computational continuations, and there is at least one in which t (and thus p) 
is true”.


> 
> That this is so, seems vaguely plausible, built as it were on the
> ideas of Theatetus. That it exhaustively captures all of empirical
> science is decidedly less plausible IMHO, but there you go.

On the contrary, it is the use of an ontological commitment which makes the 
physicalist explanation not working at all in the mechanist frame. That is pure 
magic.

Bruno




> 
> Cheers
> -- 
> 
> 
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 25 Jun 2018, at 19:05, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/25/2018 5:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Do our minds impose a preferred basis?
>> 
>> No. But our material brain does, and it needs to do that to become a 
>> classical machine, or to behave classically in some branch of the wave. The 
>> classicality is imposed by the fact that the key notion (the universal 
>> machine) is a classical concept, like all concept in theoretical science.
>> 
>> 
>>> and why should different minds agree on it?
>> 
>> To make sense of any conversation.
> 
> A teleological "explanation" = magic

Of course. The explanation is that []p & <>t is first person plural, because it 
does not rely on truth, but on consistency, which is 3p definable. 
The math might still lead to a form of solipsism, to be sure, but that should 
be proved before rejecting the Mechanist theory.
I formulate a problem, and solved it at the propositional level. It is up to 
the next generation to progress.

Bruno





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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 25 Jun 2018, at 18:56, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/25/2018 4:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> But then you recognize that the physical world is a necessary component 
> and must exist to make computationalism meaningful.
 
 But that is exactly what happen. The physical reality is 
 phenomenologically explained by the inability of the universal machine to 
 see the equivalence between between []p <->([]p & p) and ([]p & <>p)  and 
 ([]p & <>p & p) with p (p sigma-1). The existence of the observable is 
 explainable by the some modes of self-reference.
>>> 
>>> You'll excuse me if I don't see that as an explanation of physical reality. 
>>>  Maybe somebody else on the list does and can explain it.
>> 
>> This should be already obvious at step 7. You are the one using the magic 
>> here. I am the one asking you a question. With the UDA we know that physics 
>> has to be a statistics on many computations. To understand that this 
>> actually works until now, you need to be familiar with the logic of machine 
>> self-reference, and study the observable modes.
> 
> You often use the phrase, "...we know that X has to be..." as an invalid 
> argument; invalid because the unstated premise is "...has to be if my theory 
> is to be proven right."  It's is your theory that is in question.

It is mechanism which is in question, as it should be. But then the evidences 
are in its favour until now.


> 
> 
> I'm not using magic.  I'm asking for help.  Does anyone else understand how 
> physics is "explained by the inability of the universal machine to see the 
> equivalence between between []p <->([]p & p) and ([]p & <>p)  and ([]p & <>p 
> & p) with p (p sigma-1).”


Only those taking the time to study the mathematical part and are familiar with 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. Do you agree that 1) []p obeys the logic G, 
which makes no sense for a probability calculus. 2) adding <>t in the mode 
changes the logic (not obvious: this comes from incompleteness), but provides a 
probability notion (hopefully even the searched measure) on the sigma_1 
sentences (corresponding to the computations).

What do you want me to clarify? You might buy the book by Boolos (1979 or 1993).

Bruno




> 
> Brent
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 25 Jun 2018, at 18:49, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/25/2018 4:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 24 Jun 2018, at 21:30, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/24/2018 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:19, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/21/2018 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:47, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence theory.
 I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse theory.
>>> You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density matrix 
>>> that is diagonal FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and then you 
>>> declare it is exactly diagonal and cut the other "worlds" loose.
>> But why adding that last steps? Why to make the diagonal exact if not to 
>> cut the other worlds?
> Because if you don't, a further evolution may undo the 
> measurement/perception.
 I know it looks sad, but that is not an argument. In fact undoing some 
 measurement/perception might be required for overall consistency, and is 
 also a useful quantum gate.
 
 The squared amplitudes can be asymptotical, and get the number zero is not 
 always possible, but all what counts is to be relatively small to have 
 enough determinism to keep the partial control.
>>> And how much is that?
>> Enough to get two or three decimals right, like in all sciences. Enough to 
>> get a man on the moon, and build electronic microscope. In nanotechnology we 
>> might need more decimals correct, and what counts is the probability that 
>> the client is satisfied, or the patient cured. Only in metaphysics, we have 
>> to reject a theory if the 100^1000th decimal is wrong. Metaphysics has not 
>> the notion of “FAPP”, because the purpose is not practical at all. It 
>> concerns a possible knowledge only.
> 
> Right.  And I thought you claimed to be doing metaphysics, not engineering.  
> Hence the need to get zeroes on the off-diagonal.

I don’t see why. 

Bruno


> 
> Brent
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 25 Jun 2018, at 18:47, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/25/2018 4:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 24 Jun 2018, at 21:26, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/24/2018 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:12, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/21/2018 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:28, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/19/2018 7:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 16 Jun 2018, at 22:41, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/16/2018 10:16 AM, John Clark wrote:
>> ​> ​ Another universe comes into existence when Joe the Plumber 
>> performs, say, a spin measurement.
>> 
>> But a measurement (whatever in the world that means) does not need 
>> to be made and there is nothing special about Joe, if Everett is 
>> right the same thing happens every time an electron in Joe's skin 
>> encounters a photon, or for that matter whenever an electron 
>> anywhere encounters anything.
> 
> That's where MWI gets fuzzy. 
 
 Not more than QM itself. We can define a world by a branch of the 
 universe wave. But such world will be “world” only as part of a 
 personal history. Everett disagrees, but his “relative state” is a 
 better wording than “many-worlds” which is often confusing.
 
 
 
> Do all the submicroscopic events that make to macroscopic difference 
> create different worlds?  That can't be right because "worlds" are 
> classical things.  So the Heisenberg but problem seems to reappear in 
> different form.
 
 Heisenberg cut disappear, it is just that worlds differentiate from 
 our perspective when they make difference for us, like when they can 
 no more interfere. There is no cut, only the quantum wave (in the 
 Schroedinger picture) and relative state related to macroscopic 
 irreversibility, which needs only the classical chaos to be 
 irreversible FAPP. Histories are internal things, already a form of 
 first person plural notion. 
>>> 
>>> Right.  But how FAPP does it have to be, how irreversible, in order 
>>> that it constitutes a conscious distinct state?  That's how the 
>>> Heisenberg cut problem reappears at a different level.
>> 
>> Very quickly, like when you mix milk in the coffee. Pure statistics 
>> theory provides the numbers, like when we can use Gauss e^(-x^2) instead 
>> of Pascal triangle. You don’t need 0 on the diagonal, only tiny numbers.
> 
> I think you mean OFF the diagonal. 
 
 Indeed.
 
 
 
> But how do you know you only need tiny numbers, and how tiny?  I have 
> thought that perhaps there should be a smallest non-zero unit of 
> probability; but it has been pointed out that even tiny numbers may add 
> up when the density matrix is transformed to some other basis.
 
 It is just that the numbers are tiny only from your (3p) personal points 
 of view. You brain needs to be enough of a mixture for consciousness to 
 differentiate into universal machine (relative) state. In the case (which 
 I doubt) that the brain is a quantum computer, we would be able to exploit 
 the numbers which are not tiny in the relevant base to exploit quantum 
 computing ability.
 
 
 
 
 
> 
>> You don’t need purely orthogonal state, the big numbers and classical 
>> chaos will lead to the right quasi classical phenomenology,
> 
> So you say.  But that requires a theory of "phenomenology", i.e. a theory 
> of how perception is realized.
 
 But I extract the quantum from such a phenomenology. Perception is mainly 
 [a]p with [a] designing a variant of the logic of self-reference G, or 
 G*.
 
 It is provably realised in all models of the consistent extensions of very 
 elementary arithmetic.
 
 (You might need to study some books on self-reference (the provability 
 logic) to get the point).
>>> 
>>> So you're claiming that you have derived QM from perception (as described 
>>> by provability). 
>> 
>> 
>> No, my main claim, and oldest result, is that IF mechanism is true THEN 
>> physics must be extracted in a very special way. You don’t need to see the 
>> derivation of physics to understand that physicalism does not work with 
>> Mechanism. But the point is to do the test before.
>> 
>> Then it took me 30 years to make the test, and I showed that when we derive 
>> physics in that very special way, we get the first evidence that mechanism 
>> is correct, as we get the 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> 
> I'm not using magic.  I'm asking for help.  Does anyone else understand how
> physics is "explained by the inability of the universal machine to see the
> equivalence between between []p <->([]p & p) and ([]p & <>p)  and ([]p & <>p
> & p) with p (p sigma-1)."

I would guess that the idea is that there are different logics
applicable to different types of knowledge, and these are enumerated
by his 8 hypostases. He presumes that one of these corresponds to
observations, and consequently is a logic of empirical knowledge.

That this is so, seems vaguely plausible, built as it were on the
ideas of Theatetus. That it exhaustively captures all of empirical
science is decidedly less plausible IMHO, but there you go.

Cheers
-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/25/2018 5:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Jun 2018, at 08:02, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/20/2018 9:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:47 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Most of these objections to CI are answered by
decoherence theory.


I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse
theory.


You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density
matrix that is diagonal FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and
then you declare it is exactly diagonal and cut the other
"worlds" loose.



What's the point of that last step, when decoherence explains why we 
don't see those other branches?


But decoherence didn't quite explain it.  You have to take the trace 
over the environment in order to justify making the reduced density 
matrix exactly diagonal (instead of FAPP diagonal) and that step is 
not unitary evolution per the SE, it's using a projection operator.


But the projection, with the MWI, is not due to a physical collapse, 
but just of a self-localisation procedure.


But I don't see "self-localisation" as one of the unitary operators in 
the Schroedinger equation.


Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/25/2018 5:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Do our minds impose a preferred basis?


No. But our material brain does, and it needs to do that to become a 
classical machine, or to behave classically in some branch of the 
wave. The classicality is imposed by the fact that the key notion (the 
universal machine) is a classical concept, like all concept in 
theoretical science.




and why should different minds agree on it?


To make sense of any conversation.


A teleological "explanation" = magic

Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/25/2018 4:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
What is the mechanism in the block universe model?  What is the 
mechanism for the UD to produce the physical world?


The UD, or simply the sigma_1 arithmetical reality generates all 
dreams (where a dream is a computation supporting a Löbian machine) 
and the physical appearances are explained by the relative statistics 
on those dreams, due to that first person indeterminacy (that no 
digital machine can avoid). That is constructive, so we can test the 
theory, and up to now, it is not refuted, at the place were 
physicalism + mechanism is refuted.


It's not refuted because  "the physical appearances are explained by the 
relative statistics on those dreams" is merely aspirational. It's one of 
those things that "must be true"...else the theory fails.


Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/25/2018 4:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But then you recognize that the physical world is a necessary 
component and must exist to make computationalism meaningful.


But that is exactly what happen. The physical reality is 
phenomenologically explained by the inability of the universal 
machine to see the equivalence between between []p <->([]p & p) and 
([]p & <>p)  and ([]p & <>p & p) with p (p sigma-1). The existence 
of the observable is explainable by the some modes of self-reference.


You'll excuse me if I don't see that as an explanation of physical 
reality.  Maybe somebody else on the list does and can explain it.


This should be already obvious at step 7. You are the one using the 
magic here. I am the one asking you a question. With the UDA we know 
that physics has to be a statistics on many computations. To 
understand that this actually works until now, you need to be familiar 
with the logic of machine self-reference, and study the observable modes.


You often use the phrase, "...we know that X has to be..." as an invalid 
argument; invalid because the unstated premise is "...has to be if my 
theory is to be proven right."  It's is your theory that is in question.



I'm not using magic.  I'm asking for help.  Does anyone else understand 
how physics is "explained by the inability of the universal machine to 
see the equivalence between between []p <->([]p & p) and ([]p & <>p)  
and ([]p & <>p & p) with p (p sigma-1)."


Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/25/2018 4:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Jun 2018, at 21:30, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 6/24/2018 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:19, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 6/21/2018 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:47, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence theory.

I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse theory.

You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density matrix that is diagonal 
FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and then you declare it is exactly diagonal and cut 
the other "worlds" loose.

But why adding that last steps? Why to make the diagonal exact if not to cut 
the other worlds?

Because if you don't, a further evolution may undo the measurement/perception.

I know it looks sad, but that is not an argument. In fact undoing some 
measurement/perception might be required for overall consistency, and is also a 
useful quantum gate.

The squared amplitudes can be asymptotical, and get the number zero is not 
always possible, but all what counts is to be relatively small to have enough 
determinism to keep the partial control.

And how much is that?

Enough to get two or three decimals right, like in all sciences. Enough to get 
a man on the moon, and build electronic microscope. In nanotechnology we might 
need more decimals correct, and what counts is the probability that the client 
is satisfied, or the patient cured. Only in metaphysics, we have to reject a 
theory if the 100^1000th decimal is wrong. Metaphysics has not the notion of 
“FAPP”, because the purpose is not practical at all. It concerns a possible 
knowledge only.


Right.  And I thought you claimed to be doing metaphysics, not 
engineering.  Hence the need to get zeroes on the off-diagonal.


Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/25/2018 4:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Jun 2018, at 21:26, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/24/2018 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:12, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/21/2018 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:28, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/19/2018 7:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Jun 2018, at 22:41, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/16/2018 10:16 AM, John Clark wrote:


​> ​
/Another universe comes into existence when Joe the
Plumber performs, say, a spin measurement./


But a measurement (whatever in the world that means) does not 
need to be made and there is nothing special about Joe, if 
Everett is right the same thing happens every time an electron 
in Joe's skin encounters a photon, or for that matter whenever 
an electron anywhere encounters anything.


That's where MWI gets fuzzy.


Not more than QM itself. We can define a world by a branch of 
the universe wave. But such world will be “world” only as part 
of a personal history. Everett disagrees, but his “relative 
state” is a better wording than “many-worlds” which is often 
confusing.




Do all the submicroscopic events that make to macroscopic 
difference create different worlds? That can't be right because 
"worlds" are classical things.  So the Heisenberg but problem 
seems to reappear in different form.


Heisenberg cut disappear, it is just that worlds differentiate 
from our perspective when they make difference for us, like when 
they can no more interfere. There is no cut, only the quantum 
wave (in the Schroedinger picture) and relative state related to 
macroscopic irreversibility, which needs only the classical 
chaos to be irreversible FAPP. Histories are internal things, 
already a form of first person plural notion.


Right.  But how FAPP does it have to be, how irreversible, in 
order that it constitutes a conscious distinct state?  That's how 
the Heisenberg cut problem reappears at a different level.


Very quickly, like when you mix milk in the coffee. Pure 
statistics theory provides the numbers, like when we can use Gauss 
e^(-x^2) instead of Pascal triangle. You don’t need 0 on the 
diagonal, only tiny numbers.


I think you mean OFF the diagonal.


Indeed.



But how do you know you only need tiny numbers, and how tiny?  I 
have thought that perhaps there should be a smallest non-zero unit 
of probability; but it has been pointed out that even tiny numbers 
may add up when the density matrix is transformed to some other basis.


It is just that the numbers are tiny only from your (3p) personal 
points of view. You brain needs to be enough of a mixture for 
consciousness to differentiate into universal machine (relative) 
state. In the case (which I doubt) that the brain is a quantum 
computer, we would be able to exploit the numbers which are not tiny 
in the relevant base to exploit quantum computing ability.








You don’t need purely orthogonal state, the big numbers and 
classical chaos will lead to the right quasi classical phenomenology,


So you say.  But that requires a theory of "phenomenology", i.e. a 
theory of how perception is realized.


But I extract the quantum from such a phenomenology. Perception is 
mainly [a]p with [a] designing a variant of the logic of 
self-reference G, or G*.


It is provably realised in all models of the consistent extensions 
of very elementary arithmetic.


(You might need to study some books on self-reference (the 
provability logic) to get the point).


So you're claiming that you have derived QM from perception (as 
described by provability).



No, my main claim, and oldest result, is that IF mechanism is true 
THEN physics must be extracted in a very special way. You don’t need 
to see the derivation of physics to understand that physicalism does 
not work with Mechanism. But the point is to do the test before.


Then it took me 30 years to make the test, and I showed that when we 
derive physics in that very special way, we get the first evidence 
that mechanism is correct, as we get the right logic. If we did not, 
Mechanism would be refuted.






But how does it then follow that perception is classical?


That is the easy part. Because the universal machine is a classical 
notion; like arithmetic, and … quantum computer science, or the 
multiverse. It is part of our assumption: a machine stops or does not 
stop.


As I understand your theory, you only get the indeterminancy and the 
superposition of states by invoking the infinite threads fo the UD.






Also that doesn't solve the problem of small  off-diagonal terms not 
being small when written in a different basis.


It does, we just do not use those bases, because they would evacuate 
the results we need to act in a world which has made us with classical 
brain, or at least, a classical reality. The “observable” are not 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jun 2018, at 08:02, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/20/2018 9:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:47 PM, Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence theory.
>> 
>> I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse theory.
>> 
>> You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density matrix that 
>> is diagonal FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and then you declare it is 
>> exactly diagonal and cut the other "worlds" loose.
>> 
>> 
>> What's the point of that last step, when decoherence explains why we don't 
>> see those other branches?
> 
> But decoherence didn't quite explain it.  You have to take the trace over the 
> environment in order to justify making the reduced density matrix exactly 
> diagonal (instead of FAPP diagonal) and that step is not unitary evolution 
> per the SE, it's using a projection operator.

But the projection, with the MWI, is not due to a physical collapse, but just 
of a self-localisation procedure. It *is* the quantum version of the first 
person indeterminacy, that Everett called subjective probability. 

Bruno



> 
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> 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jun 2018, at 07:53, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/20/2018 9:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:17 PM, Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/19/2018 6:55 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:16 AM, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/18/2018 4:09 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> It will take a lot of work under his approach, but I am not aware of any 
>>> other system proposed by anyone, which even has a chance at this.
>>> 
>>> Penrose's gravity induced collapse has as good a chance as Bruno's,
>>> 
>>> At least Penrose has drawn a line in the sand, which can be experimentally 
>>> refuted.  Though I don't see any motivation for any collapse base theory 
>>> since Everett provided an account of collapse without having to assume it.  
>>> (Again this is like adding appending motive demon theory, which is entirely 
>>> superfluous and adds whose sole motivation is to preserve the notion of 
>>> collapse as physically real rather than apparent)
>>>  
>>> and a better chance of predicting some surprising but true physics. Some 
>>> version of transactional QM also has a chance. 
>>> 
>>> Transactional QM is another complication of the theory, proposing things we 
>>> have no evidence for to explain things which have already been explained 
>>> from a much simpler theory.
>> 
>> You only think it's simpler because you close your eyes to the last step in 
>> going from a FAPP diagonal reduced density matrix to an actually diagonal 
>> reduced density matrix.  A step that is perfectly equivalent to Bohr and 
>> Heisenberg's collapse postulate, except it tells you where to hide the 
>> collapse.
>> 
>> 
>> Is the appearance of collapse not describable from the other postulates?
> 
> "Appearance" is a psychological concept.  So to decide what that means 
> requires a theory of mind. 

Right. But the MWI needs only mechanism. The collapse needs magic.



> Most advocates of MWI want to say that getting the off-diagonal terms of the 
> reduced density matrix "small enough" is enough to make it "appear" that the 
> wf has collapsed.  But aside from this fuzziness there is the problem that in 
> some other basis the cross-terms may not be small at all; hence the preferred 
> basis problem? 

No, the base are imposed so as to make digital machines able to evolves, and 
apparently, cross terms ahem not been exploited (meaning that our brain are not 
quantum computer). But if our brain is a quantum computer, it might as well 
rotate some bit/qubit, and exploit some cross terms. 




> Do our minds impose a preferred basis? 

No. But our material brain does, and it needs to do that to become a classical 
machine, or to behave classically in some branch of the wave. The classicality 
is imposed by the fact that the key notion (the universal machine) is a 
classical concept, like all concept in theoretical science.


> and why should different minds agree on it?

To make sense of any conversation.

Bruno





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> 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jun 2018, at 07:47, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/20/2018 9:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:14 PM, Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/19/2018 6:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:01 AM, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/18/2018 3:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
 Block time plus MWI means universes aren't created, they're all already 
 there.
 
 Seems like super-determinism to me. You're making a distinction with no 
 difference. AG
 
 Superdeterminism says you and a remote partner could decide to use the 
 digits of Pi to pseudorandomly select angles of measurement in a Bell 
 experiment, then decide to use the digits of Euler's number. Yet somehow, 
 the universe knew you and your friend had this agreement to use these 
 digits of these constants,
>>> 
>>> You keep anthropomorphizing the universe to make super-determinism sound 
>>> ridiculous.  It's nothing more that taking determinism completely 
>>> seriously, no free will by experimenters.  The choice of you and your 
>>> friend was determined by the past.  That's all determinism means.  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> It's not just me.  The first person who proposed this loophole around Bell 
>>> also immediately discarded it as ridiculous.  If super-determinism means 
>>> the same thing as determinism, why add the "super-" qualifier?
>>> 
>>> Here is a write up 
>>> 
>>>  in scientific american about t'Hooft's idea:
>>> 
>>> The dramatic version is that free will 
>>> 
>>>  is an illusion. Worse, actually. Even regular determinism–without the 
>>> “super”–subverts our sense of free will. Through the laws of physics, you 
>>> can trace every choice you make to the arrangement of matter at the dawn of 
>>> time. Superdeterminism adds a twist of the knife. Not only is everything 
>>> you do preordained, the universe reaches into your brain and stops you from 
>>> doing an experiment that would reveal its true nature. The universe is not 
>>> just set up in advance. It is set up in advance to fool you. As a 
>>> conspiracy theory, this leaves Roswell and the Priory of Sion in the dust.
>> 
>> Yes, they explain that the "super" means Alice and Bob cannot make 
>> independent spacelike decisions because their decisions are the product of 
>> common events in the (distant) past and that product is determined.
>> 
>> 
>> I sometimes can't tell if you're playing devil's advocate or not.
>>  
>> 
>>> 
>>> I've taken it one step further.  By using the digits of Pi or Euler's 
>>> number, it's not just reaching into your brain, since our brain did not 
>>> determine those digits. It requires a universe setup in advance to know the 
>>> digits of Pi,
>> 
>> Why is that a problem? The digits are determined and the choice to use them 
>> is determined.  Bruno's theory requires "the universe to know" the solutions 
>> to sets of Diophantine equations.
>> 
>> 
>> It requires only an independent existence of arithmetical truth.
>>  
>> 
>> 
>>> and to take into account the knowledge that you are using the digits of Pi 
>>> to pseudorandomly set the angles of the measurement devices, and produce 
>>> statistics (that were super determined at the time of the big bang) to fool 
>>> you by reproducing the quantum statistics with super-determined hidden 
>>> variables. 
>> 
>> Again with the anthropomorphizing.  The universe is just following its 
>> deterministic laws; it's not fooling anybody.
>> 
>> It's fooling us into believing in non-locality QM when QM isn't really true.
>> 
>> In that sense super-determinism is self-defeating, to believe it means one 
>> is forced to discard the very theory it is meant to explain.  It is a bit 
>> like epiphenominalism that way.
> 
> You are so invested in MWI you think the purpose of theories is to explain it.
> 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> 
>>> If you see super-determinism as nothing more than determinism I think you 
>>> are missing something.  This is a pre-established harmony of the highest 
>>> order, requiring a massive information content per particle interaction
>> 
>> No, it certainly requires no more information than required to define a 
>> block universe and potentially much less since all results flow from the 
>> past, and being deterministic means it's reversible, so the information 
>> content is fixed (as it is for SWE).
>> 
>> super-determinism is so ill-defined of a theory it is hardly worth debating.
>>  
>> 
>> 
>>> (each particle has to contain knowledge, presumably up to and including all 
>>> other knowledge about the entire universe up to that point).  For example:
>>> 
>>> 1. Take the deep-field image 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jun 2018, at 06:41, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:14 PM, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On 6/19/2018 6:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:01 AM, Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/18/2018 3:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> Block time plus MWI means universes aren't created, they're all already 
>>> there.
>>> 
>>> Seems like super-determinism to me. You're making a distinction with no 
>>> difference. AG
>>> 
>>> Superdeterminism says you and a remote partner could decide to use the 
>>> digits of Pi to pseudorandomly select angles of measurement in a Bell 
>>> experiment, then decide to use the digits of Euler's number. Yet somehow, 
>>> the universe knew you and your friend had this agreement to use these 
>>> digits of these constants,
>> 
>> You keep anthropomorphizing the universe to make super-determinism sound 
>> ridiculous.  It's nothing more that taking determinism completely seriously, 
>> no free will by experimenters.  The choice of you and your friend was 
>> determined by the past.  That's all determinism means.  
>> 
>> 
>> It's not just me.  The first person who proposed this loophole around Bell 
>> also immediately discarded it as ridiculous.  If super-determinism means the 
>> same thing as determinism, why add the "super-" qualifier?
>> 
>> Here is a write up 
>> 
>>  in scientific american about t'Hooft's idea:
>> 
>> The dramatic version is that free will 
>> 
>>  is an illusion. Worse, actually. Even regular determinism–without the 
>> “super”–subverts our sense of free will. Through the laws of physics, you 
>> can trace every choice you make to the arrangement of matter at the dawn of 
>> time. Superdeterminism adds a twist of the knife. Not only is everything you 
>> do preordained, the universe reaches into your brain and stops you from 
>> doing an experiment that would reveal its true nature. The universe is not 
>> just set up in advance. It is set up in advance to fool you. As a conspiracy 
>> theory, this leaves Roswell and the Priory of Sion in the dust.
> 
> Yes, they explain that the "super" means Alice and Bob cannot make 
> independent spacelike decisions because their decisions are the product of 
> common events in the (distant) past and that product is determined.
> 
> 
> I sometimes can't tell if you're playing devil's advocate or not.
>  
> 
>> 
>> I've taken it one step further.  By using the digits of Pi or Euler's 
>> number, it's not just reaching into your brain, since our brain did not 
>> determine those digits. It requires a universe setup in advance to know the 
>> digits of Pi,
> 
> Why is that a problem? The digits are determined and the choice to use them 
> is determined.  Bruno's theory requires "the universe to know" the solutions 
> to sets of Diophantine equations.
> 
> 
> It requires only an independent existence of arithmetical truth.
>  
> 
> 
>> and to take into account the knowledge that you are using the digits of Pi 
>> to pseudorandomly set the angles of the measurement devices, and produce 
>> statistics (that were super determined at the time of the big bang) to fool 
>> you by reproducing the quantum statistics with super-determined hidden 
>> variables. 
> 
> Again with the anthropomorphizing.  The universe is just following its 
> deterministic laws; it's not fooling anybody.
> 
> It's fooling us into believing in non-locality QM when QM isn't really true.
> 
> In that sense super-determinism is self-defeating, to believe it means one is 
> forced to discard the very theory it is meant to explain.  It is a bit like 
> epiphenominalism that way.


I agree. Super-determinism is like epiphenomenalism, and eventually, it 
“explains" everything without explaining anything. It is also like using the 
metaphysical notion of primary matter, or of god, to hide the conceptual 
problem of a conception of reality. 
Humans do that a lot. It is ratiocination, and it is irrational.

Bruno


> 
>  
> 
> 
>> If you see super-determinism as nothing more than determinism I think you 
>> are missing something.  This is a pre-established harmony of the highest 
>> order, requiring a massive information content per particle interaction
> 
> No, it certainly requires no more information than required to define a block 
> universe and potentially much less since all results flow from the past, and 
> being deterministic means it's reversible, so the information content is 
> fixed (as it is for SWE).
> 
> super-determinism is so ill-defined of a theory it is hardly worth debating.
>  
> 
> 
>> (each particle has to contain knowledge, presumably up to and including all 
>> other knowledge about 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 25 Jun 2018, at 04:31, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/24/2018 9:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 22 Jun 2018, at 02:26, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/21/2018 3:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
 
 
 On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Brent Meeker >>> > wrote:
 
 
 On 6/21/2018 7:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
 
 
 On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker >>> > wrote:
 
 
 On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
 On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,  >>> > wrote:
 
 On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
 
 
 On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM, >>> > wrote:
 
 
   why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional 
 Interpretation?
 I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just epistemic, 
 and/or
 that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG
 
 --
 
 
 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation,
 nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies 
 sometimes,
 or only at certain scales)
 
 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance of
 collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's 
 razor)
 
 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear, 
 reversible
 (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require 
 faster than
 light influences nor retrocausalities
 
 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is real" 
 with
 MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of quantum
 computers (now up to 51 qubits)
 
 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special physical
 abilities to observers or measurement devices
 
 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality containing
 all possible observers and observations lead directly to 
 laws/postulates of
 quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing, Chapter 7 
 and
 Appendix D).
 
 Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that should
 convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many worlds 
 (an
 infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains 
 all the
 weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type
 everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of quantum
 mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of 
 explanation.
 With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and
 understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite reality.
 
 Jason
 
 You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an 
 observer,
 replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple 
 quantum
 experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the 
 disease,
 CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG
 It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and
 common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the
 latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that
 this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just
 present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable
 fact.
 
 I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:
 
 https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326 
 
 
 
 As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000 
 of his own money on the future construction of large scale quantum 
 computers), I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about 
 running a conscious AI on such a quantum computer.  

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 24 Jun 2018, at 21:30, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/24/2018 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:19, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/21/2018 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:47, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence theory.
>> I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse theory.
> You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density matrix 
> that is diagonal FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and then you 
> declare it is exactly diagonal and cut the other "worlds" loose.
 But why adding that last steps? Why to make the diagonal exact if not to 
 cut the other worlds?
>>> Because if you don't, a further evolution may undo the 
>>> measurement/perception.
>> I know it looks sad, but that is not an argument. In fact undoing some 
>> measurement/perception might be required for overall consistency, and is 
>> also a useful quantum gate.
>> 
>> The squared amplitudes can be asymptotical, and get the number zero is not 
>> always possible, but all what counts is to be relatively small to have 
>> enough determinism to keep the partial control.
> And how much is that?

Enough to get two or three decimals right, like in all sciences. Enough to get 
a man on the moon, and build electronic microscope. In nanotechnology we might 
need more decimals correct, and what counts is the probability that the client 
is satisfied, or the patient cured. Only in metaphysics, we have to reject a 
theory if the 100^1000th decimal is wrong. Metaphysics has not the notion of 
“FAPP”, because the purpose is not practical at all. It concerns a possible 
knowledge only.

Bruno





> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 24 Jun 2018, at 21:26, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/24/2018 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:12, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/21/2018 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:28, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/19/2018 7:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 16 Jun 2018, at 22:41, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/16/2018 10:16 AM, John Clark wrote:
 ​> ​ Another universe comes into existence when Joe the Plumber 
 performs, say, a spin measurement.
 
 But a measurement (whatever in the world that means) does not need to 
 be made and there is nothing special about Joe, if Everett is right 
 the same thing happens every time an electron in Joe's skin encounters 
 a photon, or for that matter whenever an electron anywhere encounters 
 anything.
>>> 
>>> That's where MWI gets fuzzy. 
>> 
>> Not more than QM itself. We can define a world by a branch of the 
>> universe wave. But such world will be “world” only as part of a personal 
>> history. Everett disagrees, but his “relative state” is a better wording 
>> than “many-worlds” which is often confusing.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Do all the submicroscopic events that make to macroscopic difference 
>>> create different worlds?  That can't be right because "worlds" are 
>>> classical things.  So the Heisenberg but problem seems to reappear in 
>>> different form.
>> 
>> Heisenberg cut disappear, it is just that worlds differentiate from our 
>> perspective when they make difference for us, like when they can no more 
>> interfere. There is no cut, only the quantum wave (in the Schroedinger 
>> picture) and relative state related to macroscopic irreversibility, 
>> which needs only the classical chaos to be irreversible FAPP. Histories 
>> are internal things, already a form of first person plural notion. 
> 
> Right.  But how FAPP does it have to be, how irreversible, in order that 
> it constitutes a conscious distinct state?  That's how the Heisenberg cut 
> problem reappears at a different level.
 
 Very quickly, like when you mix milk in the coffee. Pure statistics theory 
 provides the numbers, like when we can use Gauss e^(-x^2) instead of 
 Pascal triangle. You don’t need 0 on the diagonal, only tiny numbers.
>>> 
>>> I think you mean OFF the diagonal. 
>> 
>> Indeed.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> But how do you know you only need tiny numbers, and how tiny?  I have 
>>> thought that perhaps there should be a smallest non-zero unit of 
>>> probability; but it has been pointed out that even tiny numbers may add up 
>>> when the density matrix is transformed to some other basis.
>> 
>> It is just that the numbers are tiny only from your (3p) personal points of 
>> view. You brain needs to be enough of a mixture for consciousness to 
>> differentiate into universal machine (relative) state. In the case (which I 
>> doubt) that the brain is a quantum computer, we would be able to exploit the 
>> numbers which are not tiny in the relevant base to exploit quantum computing 
>> ability.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
 You don’t need purely orthogonal state, the big numbers and classical 
 chaos will lead to the right quasi classical phenomenology,
>>> 
>>> So you say.  But that requires a theory of "phenomenology", i.e. a theory 
>>> of how perception is realized.
>> 
>> But I extract the quantum from such a phenomenology. Perception is mainly 
>> [a]p with [a] designing a variant of the logic of self-reference G, or G*.
>> 
>> It is provably realised in all models of the consistent extensions of very 
>> elementary arithmetic.
>> 
>> (You might need to study some books on self-reference (the provability 
>> logic) to get the point).
> 
> So you're claiming that you have derived QM from perception (as described by 
> provability). 


No, my main claim, and oldest result, is that IF mechanism is true THEN physics 
must be extracted in a very special way. You don’t need to see the derivation 
of physics to understand that physicalism does not work with Mechanism. But the 
point is to do the test before.

Then it took me 30 years to make the test, and I showed that when we derive 
physics in that very special way, we get the first evidence that mechanism is 
correct, as we get the right logic. If we did not, Mechanism would be refuted. 




> But how does it then follow that perception is classical?  

That is the easy part. Because the universal machine is a classical notion; 
like arithmetic, and … quantum computer science, or the multiverse. It is part 
of our assumption: a machine stops or does not stop.



> Also that doesn't solve the problem of small  

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 24 Jun 2018, at 21:21, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/24/2018 8:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 I agree. To change QM, and getting the correct spin measurement in all 
 directions, you would need to de-linearise slightly the SWE, but this 
 makes the many worlds able to interact (Weinberg showed this, and Plaga in 
 this list a long time ago). Problem: it makes thermodynamical laws wrong. 
 Well, it makes almost all physical laws wrong).
>>> 
>>> "Wrong" comes in degrees.
>> 
>> The Löbian machine agrees with you, like f, []f, [][]f, [][][]f, …. There 
>> are big lies and small lies in the machine’s mind.
>> 
>> 
>>> QM made all physical laws wrong at the time.
>> 
>> Not really. QM on the contrary consolidate them in their scale on more solid 
>> base. QM made only the metaphysical interpretation of those theories wrong.
> 
> I take your point that where classical physics saved the phenomenon so did 
> QM.  But QM did more than that; for example it showed why atoms were stable 
> and had discrete emission spectra.

No problem with this. I agree. Then mechanism explain why we can see physical 
things, and why it can hurt. Physicalism use an identity thesis which simply 
does not work with mechanism, and use some axiom of infinity, never stated 
clearly. In fact, physicalism just dismiss the mind-body problem.



> 
>> The same can be said with computationalism: it should (and seems to give) a 
>> very solid base of the quantum physical laws, with much less ontological 
>> requirement.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> GR made Newtonian gravity and spacetime wrong.
>> 
>> I would not say that. It shows them to be approximation. That’s the 
>> advantage for Platonism: it bets at the start that what we see is not the 
>> real thing, but approximation due to our finite abilities.
> 
> It shows Newtonian gravity is an approximation in a certain domain (the weak 
> field limit).  But it's not even approximately right for a black hole.  The 
> possibility of gravitational waves or a wormhole is a fundamental difference, 
> as is the idea of a dynamic geometry.

I agree.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> 
>>>   So if we reconcile our theories of spacetime and quantum fields the 
>>> result will likely be a theory that makes "all physical laws wrong”.
>> 
>> Yes, as the physical laws have to be deduced from simpler ideas, and with 
>> Mechanism, the physicals arise from the unique measure on computational 
>> histories that we must extracted from a logic of bet on sigma_1 sentences, 
>> which we get with the adjunction of the consistency condition (<>t).
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
> 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/24/2018 9:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 22 Jun 2018, at 02:26, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/21/2018 3:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/21/2018 7:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:



On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On 17 June 2018 at 13:26, 
mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05
AM UTC, Jason wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12
AM, mailto:agrays...@gmail.com>> wrote:



  why do you prefer the MWI
compared to the
Transactional Interpretation?
I see both as absurd. so I
prefer to assume the wf is
just epistemic, and/or
that we have some holes in
the CI which have yet to be
resolved. AG

--



1. It's the simplest theory:
"MWI" is just the Schrodinger
equation,
nothing else. (it doesn't say
Schrodinger's equation only
applies sometimes,
or only at certain scales)

2. It explains more while
assuming less (it explains the
appearance of
collapse, without having to
assume it, thus is preferred by
Occam's razor)

3. Like every other successful
physical theory, it is linear,
reversible
(time-symmetric), continuous,
deterministic and does not
require faster than
light influences nor
retrocausalities

4. Unlike single-universe or
epistemic interpretations, "WF
is real" with
MWI is the only way we know how
to explain the functioning of
quantum
computers (now up to 51 qubits)

5. Unlike copenhagen-type
theories, it attributes no
special physical
abilities to observers or
measurement devices

6. Most of all, theories of
everything that assume a reality
containing
all possible observers and
observations lead directly to
laws/postulates of
quantum mechanics (see Russell
Standish's Theory of Nothing,
Chapter 7 and
Appendix D).

Given #6, we should revise our
view. It is not MWI and QM that
should
convince us of many worlds, but
rather the assumption of many
worlds (an
infinite and infinitely varied
reality) that gives us, and
explains all the
weirdness of QM. This should
overwhelmingly convince us of
 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/24/2018 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:19, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 6/21/2018 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:47, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence theory.

I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse theory.

You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density matrix that is diagonal 
FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and then you declare it is exactly diagonal and cut 
the other "worlds" loose.

But why adding that last steps? Why to make the diagonal exact if not to cut 
the other worlds?

Because if you don't, a further evolution may undo the measurement/perception.

I know it looks sad, but that is not an argument. In fact undoing some 
measurement/perception might be required for overall consistency, and is also a 
useful quantum gate.

The squared amplitudes can be asymptotical, and get the number zero is not 
always possible, but all what counts is to be relatively small to have enough 
determinism to keep the partial control.

And how much is that?

Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/24/2018 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:12, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/21/2018 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:28, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/19/2018 7:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Jun 2018, at 22:41, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/16/2018 10:16 AM, John Clark wrote:


​> ​
/Another universe comes into existence when Joe the Plumber
performs, say, a spin measurement./


But a measurement (whatever in the world that means) does not 
need to be made and there is nothing special about Joe, if 
Everett is right the same thing happens every time an electron 
in Joe's skin encounters a photon, or for that matter whenever 
an electron anywhere encounters anything.


That's where MWI gets fuzzy.


Not more than QM itself. We can define a world by a branch of the 
universe wave. But such world will be “world” only as part of a 
personal history. Everett disagrees, but his “relative state” is a 
better wording than “many-worlds” which is often confusing.




Do all the submicroscopic events that make to macroscopic 
difference create different worlds? That can't be right because 
"worlds" are classical things.  So the Heisenberg but problem 
seems to reappear in different form.


Heisenberg cut disappear, it is just that worlds differentiate 
from our perspective when they make difference for us, like when 
they can no more interfere. There is no cut, only the quantum wave 
(in the Schroedinger picture) and relative state related to 
macroscopic irreversibility, which needs only the classical chaos 
to be irreversible FAPP. Histories are internal things, already a 
form of first person plural notion.


Right.  But how FAPP does it have to be, how irreversible, in order 
that it constitutes a conscious distinct state?  That's how the 
Heisenberg cut problem reappears at a different level.


Very quickly, like when you mix milk in the coffee. Pure statistics 
theory provides the numbers, like when we can use Gauss e^(-x^2) 
instead of Pascal triangle. You don’t need 0 on the diagonal, only 
tiny numbers.


I think you mean OFF the diagonal.


Indeed.



But how do you know you only need tiny numbers, and how tiny?  I have 
thought that perhaps there should be a smallest non-zero unit of 
probability; but it has been pointed out that even tiny numbers may 
add up when the density matrix is transformed to some other basis.


It is just that the numbers are tiny only from your (3p) personal 
points of view. You brain needs to be enough of a mixture for 
consciousness to differentiate into universal machine (relative) 
state. In the case (which I doubt) that the brain is a quantum 
computer, we would be able to exploit the numbers which are not tiny 
in the relevant base to exploit quantum computing ability.








You don’t need purely orthogonal state, the big numbers and 
classical chaos will lead to the right quasi classical phenomenology,


So you say.  But that requires a theory of "phenomenology", i.e. a 
theory of how perception is realized.


But I extract the quantum from such a phenomenology. Perception is 
mainly [a]p with [a] designing a variant of the logic of 
self-reference G, or G*.


It is provably realised in all models of the consistent extensions of 
very elementary arithmetic.


(You might need to study some books on self-reference (the provability 
logic) to get the point).


So you're claiming that you have derived QM from perception (as 
described by provability).  But how does it then follow that perception 
is classical?   Also that doesn't solve the problem of small  
off-diagonal terms not being small when written in a different basis.


Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/24/2018 8:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I agree. To change QM, and getting the correct spin measurement in 
all directions, you would need to de-linearise slightly the SWE, but 
this makes the many worlds able to interact (Weinberg showed this, 
and Plaga in this list a long time ago). Problem: it makes 
thermodynamical laws wrong. Well, it makes almost all physical laws 
wrong).


"Wrong" comes in degrees.


The Löbian machine agrees with you, like f, []f, [][]f, [][][]f, …. 
There are big lies and small lies in the machine’s mind.




QM made all physical laws wrong at the time.


Not really. QM on the contrary consolidate them in their scale on more 
solid base. QM made only the metaphysical interpretation of those 
theories wrong.


I take your point that where classical physics saved the phenomenon so 
did QM.  But QM did more than that; for example it showed why atoms were 
stable and had discrete emission spectra.


The same can be said with computationalism: it should (and seems to 
give) a very solid base of the quantum physical laws, with much less 
ontological requirement.





GR made Newtonian gravity and spacetime wrong.


I would not say that. It shows them to be approximation. That’s the 
advantage for Platonism: it bets at the start that what we see is not 
the real thing, but approximation due to our finite abilities.


It shows Newtonian gravity is an approximation in a certain domain (the 
weak field limit).  But it's not even approximately right for a black 
hole.  The possibility of gravitational waves or a wormhole is a 
fundamental difference, as is the idea of a dynamic geometry.


Brent




  So if we reconcile our theories of spacetime and quantum fields the 
result will likely be a theory that makes "all physical laws wrong”.


Yes, as the physical laws have to be deduced from simpler ideas, and 
with Mechanism, the physicals arise from the unique measure on 
computational histories that we must extracted from a logic of bet on 
sigma_1 sentences, which we get with the adjunction of the consistency 
condition (<>t).


Bruno



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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 22 Jun 2018, at 02:26, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/21/2018 3:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/21/2018 7:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
 
 
 On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker >>> > wrote:
 
 
 On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>> On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,  > > wrote:
>> 
>> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM, > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>>   why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional Interpretation?
>> I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just epistemic, 
>> and/or
>> that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG
>> 
>> --
>> 
>> 
>> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation,
>> nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies 
>> sometimes,
>> or only at certain scales)
>> 
>> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance of
>> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's 
>> razor)
>> 
>> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear, reversible
>> (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require faster 
>> than
>> light influences nor retrocausalities
>> 
>> 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is real" with
>> MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of quantum
>> computers (now up to 51 qubits)
>> 
>> 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special physical
>> abilities to observers or measurement devices
>> 
>> 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality containing
>> all possible observers and observations lead directly to laws/postulates 
>> of
>> quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing, Chapter 7 
>> and
>> Appendix D).
>> 
>> Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that should
>> convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many worlds (an
>> infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains all 
>> the
>> weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type
>> everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of quantum
>> mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of 
>> explanation.
>> With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and
>> understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite reality.
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an observer,
>> replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple quantum
>> experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the 
>> disease,
>> CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG
>> It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and
>> common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the
>> latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that
>> this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just
>> present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable
>> fact.
>> 
>> I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:
>> 
>> https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000 of 
>> his own money on the future construction of large scale quantum 
>> computers), I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about 
>> running a conscious AI on such a quantum computer.  That trivially leads 
>> to "many worlds" at least as seen by that AI.
> 
> If it's so trivial maybe you can explain it. 
> 
> 1. A quantum computer is isolated from the environment so as to remain in 
> a super position of many possible states.
> 2. Quantum computers are Turing universal, anything that can be 
> programmed on a classical computer can be programmed on a quantum computer
> 3. Assuming 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:19, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/21/2018 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:47, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence theory.
 I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse theory.
>>> You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density matrix that 
>>> is diagonal FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and then you declare it is 
>>> exactly diagonal and cut the other "worlds" loose.
>> But why adding that last steps? Why to make the diagonal exact if not to cut 
>> the other worlds?
> 
> Because if you don't, a further evolution may undo the measurement/perception.

I know it looks sad, but that is not an argument. In fact undoing some 
measurement/perception might be required for overall consistency, and is also a 
useful quantum gate.

The squared amplitudes can be asymptotical, and get the number zero is not 
always possible, but all what counts is to be relatively small to have enough 
determinism to keep the partial control.

Bruno





> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:12, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/21/2018 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:28, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/19/2018 7:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 16 Jun 2018, at 22:41, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/16/2018 10:16 AM, John Clark wrote:
>> ​> ​ Another universe comes into existence when Joe the Plumber 
>> performs, say, a spin measurement.
>> 
>> But a measurement (whatever in the world that means) does not need to be 
>> made and there is nothing special about Joe, if Everett is right the 
>> same thing happens every time an electron in Joe's skin encounters a 
>> photon, or for that matter whenever an electron anywhere encounters 
>> anything.
> 
> That's where MWI gets fuzzy. 
 
 Not more than QM itself. We can define a world by a branch of the universe 
 wave. But such world will be “world” only as part of a personal history. 
 Everett disagrees, but his “relative state” is a better wording than 
 “many-worlds” which is often confusing.
 
 
 
> Do all the submicroscopic events that make to macroscopic difference 
> create different worlds?  That can't be right because "worlds" are 
> classical things.  So the Heisenberg but problem seems to reappear in 
> different form.
 
 Heisenberg cut disappear, it is just that worlds differentiate from our 
 perspective when they make difference for us, like when they can no more 
 interfere. There is no cut, only the quantum wave (in the Schroedinger 
 picture) and relative state related to macroscopic irreversibility, which 
 needs only the classical chaos to be irreversible FAPP. Histories are 
 internal things, already a form of first person plural notion. 
>>> 
>>> Right.  But how FAPP does it have to be, how irreversible, in order that it 
>>> constitutes a conscious distinct state?  That's how the Heisenberg cut 
>>> problem reappears at a different level.
>> 
>> Very quickly, like when you mix milk in the coffee. Pure statistics theory 
>> provides the numbers, like when we can use Gauss e^(-x^2) instead of Pascal 
>> triangle. You don’t need 0 on the diagonal, only tiny numbers.
> 
> I think you mean OFF the diagonal. 

Indeed.



> But how do you know you only need tiny numbers, and how tiny?  I have thought 
> that perhaps there should be a smallest non-zero unit of probability; but it 
> has been pointed out that even tiny numbers may add up when the density 
> matrix is transformed to some other basis.

It is just that the numbers are tiny only from your (3p) personal points of 
view. You brain needs to be enough of a mixture for consciousness to 
differentiate into universal machine (relative) state. In the case (which I 
doubt) that the brain is a quantum computer, we would be able to exploit the 
numbers which are not tiny in the relevant base to exploit quantum computing 
ability.





> 
>> You don’t need purely orthogonal state, the big numbers and classical chaos 
>> will lead to the right quasi classical phenomenology,
> 
> So you say.  But that requires a theory of "phenomenology", i.e. a theory of 
> how perception is realized.

But I extract the quantum from such a phenomenology. Perception is mainly 
[a]p with [a] designing a variant of the logic of self-reference G, or G*.

It is provably realised in all models of the consistent extensions of very 
elementary arithmetic.

(You might need to study some books on self-reference (the provability logic) 
to get the point).

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
>> for most relative observers. We don’t need to kill all white rabbits, just 
>> to make them relatively rare. 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
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>> 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jun 2018, at 18:55, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/21/2018 1:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 19 Jun 2018, at 16:10, Jason Resch >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
 
 
 On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker >>> > wrote:
 
 
 On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
 On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,  >>> > wrote:
 
 On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
 
 
 On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM, >>> > wrote:
 
 
   why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional Interpretation?
 I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just epistemic, 
 and/or
 that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG
 
 --
 
 
 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation,
 nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies 
 sometimes,
 or only at certain scales)
 
 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance of
 collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's razor)
 
 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear, reversible
 (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require faster 
 than
 light influences nor retrocausalities
 
 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is real" with
 MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of quantum
 computers (now up to 51 qubits)
 
 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special physical
 abilities to observers or measurement devices
 
 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality containing
 all possible observers and observations lead directly to laws/postulates of
 quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing, Chapter 7 and
 Appendix D).
 
 Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that should
 convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many worlds (an
 infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains all the
 weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type
 everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of quantum
 mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of explanation.
 With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and
 understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite reality.
 
 Jason
 
 You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an observer,
 replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple quantum
 experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the disease,
 CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG
 It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and
 common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the
 latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that
 this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just
 present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable
 fact.
 
 I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:
 
 https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326 
 
 
 
 As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000 of 
 his own money on the future construction of large scale quantum 
 computers), I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about 
 running a conscious AI on such a quantum computer.  That trivially leads 
 to "many worlds" at least as seen by that AI.
>>> 
>>> If it's so trivial maybe you can explain it. 
>>> 
>>> 1. A quantum computer is isolated from the environment so as to remain in a 
>>> super position of many possible states.
>>> 2. Quantum computers are Turing universal, anything that can be programmed 
>>> on a classical computer can be programmed on a quantum computer
>>> 3. Assuming Computational Theory of mind, a quantum computer can execute 
>>> the same conscious program as "Brent Meeker's Brain"
>>> 4. The quantum computer can be arranged to entangle an unmeasured particle 
>>> with Brent Meeker's quantum brain emulation,
>>> a) by feeding in spin up as an auditory tone in Brent Meeker's left 
>>> auditory nerve
>>> b) by feeding in spin down as an auditory tone in Brent Meeker's right 
>>> auditory nerve
>>> 5. The quantum brain simulation, being isolated from the environment, 
>>> remains in a super position of the Brent Meeker brain emulation hearing an 
>>> auditory tone in his left and 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jun 2018, at 18:51, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/21/2018 1:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 19 Jun 2018, at 07:24, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/18/2018 4:33 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
 
 
 On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 12:01 AM, Brent Meeker >>> > wrote:
 
 
 On 6/17/2018 2:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday, June 17, 2018,  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 12:29:35 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 6:26 AM, > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM, > wrote:
> 
> 
>  why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional Interpretation? 
> I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just epistemic, 
> and/or that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. 
> AG 
> -- 
> 
> 
> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation, 
> nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies 
> sometimes, or only at certain scales)
> 
> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance of 
> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's razor)
> 
> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear, reversible 
> (time-symmetric), 
>   continuous, deterministic and does not require faster than light 
> influences nor retrocausalities
> 
> 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is real" with 
> MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of quantum 
> computers (now up to 51 qubits)
> 
> 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special physical 
> abilities to observers or measurement devices
> 
> 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality containing 
> all possible observers and observations lead directly to laws/postulates 
> of quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing 
> , Chapter 7 and 
> Appendix D).
> 
> Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that should 
> convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many worlds (an 
> infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains all 
> the weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type 
> everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of quantum 
> mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of 
> explanation. With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made 
> explainable and understandable: as a theory of observation within an 
> infinite reality.
> 
> Jason
> 
> You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an observer, 
> replete with   memories, 
> are created when an observer does a simple quantum experiment. So IMO the 
> alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the disease, CI, that is, just 
> plain   idiotic. AG 
> 
> 
> There are many atoms, many planets, many solar systems, many galaxies, 
> many Hubble volumes, and it is believed many universes.  On what basis 
> are you so certain there aren't many histories? (That is, other states in 
> the wave function that are predicted to be there by our well established 
> scientific theories, but which the theory explains we cannot see or 
> interact with except in very limited controlled manners)?
>  
> If you find MWI distasteful you might prefer to think of it as the 
> many-minds interpretation as described by Heinz-Dieter Zeh, or the 
> "zero-universe interpretation" as explained by Ron Garrett: 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc 
> 
> 
> I think you are hung up on the "creation", I think it is conceptually 
> easier to grasp under the understanding that it is all already there.  If 
> you look at the homepage of Wei Dai (who founded this e-mailing list 
>  20 years ago) he outlines what he 
> calls "a very simple interpretation of quantum mechanics 
> " which is basically this: 
> all the states are already there.
> 
> Sounds like Super-Determinism proposed by t'Hooft, and referenced 
> yesterday by Brent, which proposes the universe knows beforehand what 
> kind of experiment Joe the Plumber will perform. Too ridiculous for my 
> tastes, and of 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruce Kellett]

I give up. This is going nowhere.

Bruce


From: *Jason Resch* mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>>


On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 11:48 PM, Bruce Kellett 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:


From: *Jason Resch* mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>>


On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:56 AM, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:


There are only two photons, but each has two possible
polarizations. When you measure the polarization, you split
into two branches, one for each possible result.  The
partner photon reaches the other person on each of your
branches, but if everything is purely local, the photon that
is remotely measured cannot know which result you obtained
(it cannot know which of your branches it is actually on),
so it has indeterminate polarization, and when measured,
there is necessarily equal probability for either result.



I think this is the heart of our disagreement. You are seeing the
entangled photons are still distinct objects without a correlation.


The entangled photons are a non-separable unity. But if everything
is local, the measurements by Alice and Bob, being space-like
separated, must be equivalent. If Alice splits into two branches,
so must Bob. The correlation arises because the entangled pair is
not a local object -- it has no purely local description.



Something that spreads at <= speed of light, and effects and interacts 
with only the local particles/fields is not a non-local phenomenon.  
Here the photon pair (under many worlds) matches both of these 
qualifiers perfectly.





There are two events where some human experimenter gets entangled
with a photon (you could saw under MWI that two splits occur). 
Now I think you ask why does the second measurement know to

"split the right way", but it doesn't, and doesn't need to. Both
experimenters contagiously contract the superposition of the
photon they measure (entangle themselves with).


What on earth does that mean? "contagiously contract the
superposition". It can only mean that the superposition is
non-local, and that you are actually making use of this
non-locality without being aware of it.


The superposition starts with the creation of the photon pair, and 
spreads to everything that measures/interacts with it, and anything 
that measures/interacts with the thing that measured it, ad infinitum.




This means that the photon that is on the branch in which
your photon passed the polarizer can either pass the remote
polarizer, or be absorbed, with 50% probability for each.
Similarly for the photon that is on the branch in which your
photon was absorbed. The outcome by considering both branches
is four possible worlds, one for each combination of 'pass'
and 'absorb' results. Two of these worlds violate angular
momentum conservation. How do you rule out these worlds with
only local interactions?


The photon pair was created at one point in space time, it
traveled only at light speed to two locations, where its
superpositional state became entangled with the local environment
at its point(s) of measurement.

To say there are 4 possible worlds here, I think is to assume
measuring the same photon twice using the same polarization
angle, can produce inconsistent results.


You are confusing measurements on the entangled pair with repeated
measurement of the same single photon. The entangled state is a
unity, but it is not the same as a single photon.



They are analogous, and by rotating the picture of space-time when 
looking at the electron-positron pair in the original EPR thought 
experiment, you can view the electron-positron pair as the same 
particle.  In the conventional view we see it as a pi meson decaying 
into e- and e+, with opposite spins.  But rotate things about 
90-degrees and you see it as an electron interacting with a Pi meson 
and changing directions.



Look at it this way. The two measurements are made at
space-like separation. If everything is local, the
measurements must be independent.


There is where I disagree.  The actions are independent, but the
results are not.


Then there must be a non-local effect! If the measurements are
made independently at a space-like separation, there can be no
correlation without either a common cause or non-locality. Common
cause is ruled out by the statistics of repeated measurements of
such entangled pairs at different angles.


Common cause isn't ruled out by Bell for measurements that have more 
than one outcome.






If the measurements are independent they cannot be correlated
-- that is one possible operational definition of independence.


But when measuring an entangled photon pair, they must be correlated.

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 11:48 PM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> From: Jason Resch < jasonre...@gmail.com>
>
>
> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:56 AM, Bruce Kellett <
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
>> There are only two photons, but each has two possible polarizations. When
>> you measure the polarization, you split into two branches, one for each
>> possible result.  The partner photon reaches the other person on each of
>> your branches, but if everything is purely local, the photon that is
>> remotely measured cannot know which result you obtained (it cannot know
>> which of your branches it is actually on), so it has indeterminate
>> polarization, and when measured, there is necessarily equal probability for
>> either result.
>>
>>
> I think this is the heart of our disagreement. You are seeing the
> entangled photons are still distinct objects without a correlation.
>
>
> The entangled photons are a non-separable unity. But if everything is
> local, the measurements by Alice and Bob, being space-like separated, must
> be equivalent. If Alice splits into two branches, so must Bob. The
> correlation arises because the entangled pair is not a local object -- it
> has no purely local description.
>


Something that spreads at <= speed of light, and effects and interacts with
only the local particles/fields is not a non-local phenomenon.  Here the
photon pair (under many worlds) matches both of these qualifiers perfectly.


>
>
> There are two events where some human experimenter gets entangled with a
> photon (you could saw under MWI that two splits occur).  Now I think you
> ask why does the second measurement know to "split the right way", but it
> doesn't, and doesn't need to. Both experimenters contagiously contract the
> superposition of the photon they measure (entangle themselves with).
>
>
> What on earth does that mean? "contagiously contract the superposition".
> It can only mean that the superposition is non-local, and that you are
> actually making use of this non-locality without being aware of it.
>
>
The superposition starts with the creation of the photon pair, and spreads
to everything that measures/interacts with it, and anything that
measures/interacts with the thing that measured it, ad infinitum.


>
> This means that the photon that is on the branch in which your photon
>> passed the polarizer can either pass the remote polarizer, or be absorbed,
>> with 50% probability for each. Similarly for the photon that is on the
>> branch in which your photon was absorbed. The outcome by considering both
>> branches is four possible worlds, one for each combination of 'pass' and
>> 'absorb' results. Two of these worlds violate angular momentum
>> conservation. How do you rule out these worlds with only local interactions?
>>
>>
> The photon pair was created at one point in space time, it traveled only
> at light speed to two locations, where its superpositional state became
> entangled with the local environment at its point(s) of measurement.
>
> To say there are 4 possible worlds here, I think is to assume measuring
> the same photon twice using the same polarization angle, can produce
> inconsistent results.
>
>
> You are confusing measurements on the entangled pair with repeated
> measurement of the same single photon. The entangled state is a unity, but
> it is not the same as a single photon.
>
>
>
They are analogous, and by rotating the picture of space-time when looking
at the electron-positron pair in the original EPR thought experiment, you
can view the electron-positron pair as the same particle.  In the
conventional view we see it as a pi meson decaying into e- and e+, with
opposite spins.  But rotate things about 90-degrees and you see it as an
electron interacting with a Pi meson and changing directions.


> Look at it this way. The two measurements are made at space-like
>> separation. If everything is local, the measurements must be independent.
>>
>
> There is where I disagree.  The actions are independent, but the results
> are not.
>
>
> Then there must be a non-local effect! If the measurements are made
> independently at a space-like separation, there can be no correlation
> without either a common cause or non-locality. Common cause is ruled out by
> the statistics of repeated measurements of such entangled pairs at
> different angles.
>

Common cause isn't ruled out by Bell for measurements that have more than
one outcome.


>
>
>
> If the measurements are independent they cannot be correlated -- that is
>> one possible operational definition of independence.
>>
>
> But when measuring an entangled photon pair, they must be correlated.
>
>
> Exactly. So how did this correlation arise?
>


>From the time of the pair's creation, each element of the the pair has
already measured the other. Each element of the pair (while in this
superposition) proceeds at <= light speed to a location where it will be
measured.  Since each element of the pair has already measured the other,

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 10:37 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 6/21/2018 6:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 7:26 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 6/21/2018 3:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6/21/2018 7:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker 
 wrote:

>
>
> On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
 On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,   wrote:

>
> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>   why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional
>>> Interpretation?
>>> I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just
>>> epistemic, and/or
>>> that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved.
>>> AG
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>
>>
>> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger
>> equation,
>> nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies
>> sometimes,
>> or only at certain scales)
>>
>> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the
>> appearance of
>> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by
>> Occam's razor)
>>
>> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear,
>> reversible
>> (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require
>> faster than
>> light influences nor retrocausalities
>>
>> 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is
>> real" with
>> MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of
>> quantum
>> computers (now up to 51 qubits)
>>
>> 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special
>> physical
>> abilities to observers or measurement devices
>>
>> 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality
>> containing
>> all possible observers and observations lead directly to
>> laws/postulates of
>> quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing,
>> Chapter 7 and
>> Appendix D).
>>
>> Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that
>> should
>> convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many
>> worlds (an
>> infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and
>> explains all the
>> weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of
>> MWI-type
>> everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of
>> quantum
>> mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of
>> explanation.
>> With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and
>> understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite
>> reality.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
> You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an
> observer,
> replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple
> quantum
> experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the
> disease,
> CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG
>
 It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and
 common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the
 latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that
 this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just
 present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable
 fact.

>>>
>>> I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:
>>>
>>> https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326
>>>
>>>
>> As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000
>> of his own money on the future construction of large scale quantum
>> computers), I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about 
>> running
>> a conscious AI on such a quantum computer.  That trivially leads to "many
>> worlds" at least as 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Jason Resch* 


On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:56 AM, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:



There are only two photons, but each has two possible
polarizations. When you measure the polarization, you split into
two branches, one for each possible result.  The partner photon
reaches the other person on each of your branches, but if
everything is purely local, the photon that is remotely measured
cannot know which result you obtained (it cannot know which of
your branches it is actually on), so it has indeterminate
polarization, and when measured, there is necessarily equal
probability for either result.



I think this is the heart of our disagreement. You are seeing the 
entangled photons are still distinct objects without a correlation.


The entangled photons are a non-separable unity. But if everything is 
local, the measurements by Alice and Bob, being space-like separated, 
must be equivalent. If Alice splits into two branches, so must Bob. The 
correlation arises because the entangled pair is not a local object -- 
it has no purely local description.


There are two events where some human experimenter gets entangled with 
a photon (you could saw under MWI that two splits occur).  Now I think 
you ask why does the second measurement know to "split the right way", 
but it doesn't, and doesn't need to. Both experimenters contagiously 
contract the superposition of the photon they measure (entangle 
themselves with).


What on earth does that mean? "contagiously contract the superposition". 
It can only mean that the superposition is non-local, and that you are 
actually making use of this non-locality without being aware of it.




This means that the photon that is on the branch in which your
photon passed the polarizer can either pass the remote polarizer,
or be absorbed, with 50% probability for each. Similarly for the
photon that is on the branch in which your photon was absorbed.
The outcome by considering both branches is four possible worlds,
one for each combination of 'pass' and 'absorb' results. Two of
these worlds violate angular momentum conservation. How do you
rule out these worlds with only local interactions?


The photon pair was created at one point in space time, it traveled 
only at light speed to two locations, where its superpositional state 
became entangled with the local environment at its point(s) of 
measurement.


To say there are 4 possible worlds here, I think is to assume 
measuring the same photon twice using the same polarization angle, can 
produce inconsistent results.


You are confusing measurements on the entangled pair with repeated 
measurement of the same single photon. The entangled state is a unity, 
but it is not the same as a single photon.




Look at it this way. The two measurements are made at space-like
separation. If everything is local, the measurements must be
independent.


There is where I disagree.  The actions are independent, but the 
results are not.


Then there must be a non-local effect! If the measurements are made 
independently at a space-like separation, there can be no correlation 
without either a common cause or non-locality. Common cause is ruled out 
by the statistics of repeated measurements of such entangled pairs at 
different angles.




If the measurements are independent they cannot be correlated --
that is one possible operational definition of independence.


But when measuring an entangled photon pair, they must be correlated.


Exactly. So how did this correlation arise?


Since the measurement results are known to be correlated, they
cannot be independent. Since there can be no sub-luminal
interaction between the two measurements, this correlation can
only be a non-local effect. In the case that I have been
discussing, quantum mechanics predicts 100% correlation. There is
no way this can be achieved locally because the singlet you are
measuring is rotationally symmetric and has no intrinsic
polarization state that can be carried subluminally between the
experimenters.

In other words, the structure of the singlet state rules out a
common cause explanation for the 100% correlation. Bell's theorem
then rules out any /local/ hidden variable explanation.

Look, the singlet state is:

   |psi> = (|+>|-> + |->|+>).

When Alice makes her measurement she effectively splits this state
into the |+>|-> state on one branch, and the |->|+> state on the
other branch.


I would not say she splits the state, I would say she splits herself, 
by now becoming part of the state.  The super position never goes away 
so you get two Alices:   (Alice * |+>|->)  +   (Alice |->|+>)


The "(Alice * |+>|->)" knows that Bob she will hear from who performs 
the same measurement of the photon of the entangled pair will be the 
Bob that sees the - photon, and "(Alice |->|+>)" knows the that the 
Bob she 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/21/2018 6:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 7:26 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/21/2018 3:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/21/2018 7:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On 17 June 2018 at 13:26, 
mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at
10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12
AM, mailto:agrays...@gmail.com>>
wrote:



  why do you prefer the
MWI compared to the
Transactional Interpretation?
I see both as absurd. so
I prefer to assume the wf
is just epistemic, and/or
that we have some holes
in the CI which have yet
to be resolved. AG

--



1. It's the simplest theory:
"MWI" is just the Schrodinger
equation,
nothing else. (it doesn't say
Schrodinger's equation only
applies sometimes,
or only at certain scales)

2. It explains more while
assuming less (it explains
the appearance of
collapse, without having to
assume it, thus is preferred
by Occam's razor)

3. Like every other
successful physical theory,
it is linear, reversible
(time-symmetric), continuous,
deterministic and does not
require faster than
light influences nor
retrocausalities

4. Unlike single-universe or
epistemic interpretations,
"WF is real" with
MWI is the only way we know
how to explain the
functioning of quantum
computers (now up to 51 qubits)

5. Unlike copenhagen-type
theories, it attributes no
special physical
abilities to observers or
measurement devices

6. Most of all, theories of
everything that assume a
reality containing
all possible observers and
observations lead directly to
laws/postulates of
quantum mechanics (see
Russell Standish's Theory of
Nothing, Chapter 7 and
Appendix D).

Given #6, we should revise
our view. It is not MWI and
QM that should
convince us of many worlds,
but rather the assumption of

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Jason Resch]

Correction: I meant to say if we *ignore* Boltzmann brain type
computations.  (And only focus on larger computations that contain
self-aware sub-processes).

On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 8:42 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

>
>
> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 7:26 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 6/21/2018 3:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6/21/2018 7:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker 
 wrote:

>
>
> On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
 On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,   wrote:

>
> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>   why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional
>>> Interpretation?
>>> I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just
>>> epistemic, and/or
>>> that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved.
>>> AG
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>
>>
>> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger
>> equation,
>> nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies
>> sometimes,
>> or only at certain scales)
>>
>> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the
>> appearance of
>> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by
>> Occam's razor)
>>
>> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear,
>> reversible
>> (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require
>> faster than
>> light influences nor retrocausalities
>>
>> 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is
>> real" with
>> MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of
>> quantum
>> computers (now up to 51 qubits)
>>
>> 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special
>> physical
>> abilities to observers or measurement devices
>>
>> 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality
>> containing
>> all possible observers and observations lead directly to
>> laws/postulates of
>> quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing,
>> Chapter 7 and
>> Appendix D).
>>
>> Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that
>> should
>> convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many
>> worlds (an
>> infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and
>> explains all the
>> weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of
>> MWI-type
>> everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of
>> quantum
>> mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of
>> explanation.
>> With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and
>> understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite
>> reality.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
> You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an
> observer,
> replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple
> quantum
> experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the
> disease,
> CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG
>
 It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and
 common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the
 latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that
 this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just
 present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable
 fact.

>>>
>>> I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:
>>>
>>> https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326
>>>
>>>
>> As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000
>> of his own money on the future construction of large scale quantum
>> computers), I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about 
>> running

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 7:26 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 6/21/2018 3:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 6/21/2018 7:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker 
 wrote:

>
>
> On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>>> On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,   wrote:
>>>

 On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:

>
>
> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>   why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional
>> Interpretation?
>> I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just
>> epistemic, and/or
>> that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved.
>> AG
>>
>> --
>>
>
>
> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger
> equation,
> nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies
> sometimes,
> or only at certain scales)
>
> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the
> appearance of
> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by
> Occam's razor)
>
> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear,
> reversible
> (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require
> faster than
> light influences nor retrocausalities
>
> 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is
> real" with
> MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of
> quantum
> computers (now up to 51 qubits)
>
> 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special
> physical
> abilities to observers or measurement devices
>
> 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality
> containing
> all possible observers and observations lead directly to
> laws/postulates of
> quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing,
> Chapter 7 and
> Appendix D).
>
> Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that
> should
> convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many
> worlds (an
> infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and
> explains all the
> weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type
> everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of
> quantum
> mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of
> explanation.
> With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and
> understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite
> reality.
>
> Jason
>

 You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an
 observer,
 replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple
 quantum
 experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the
 disease,
 CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG

>>> It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and
>>> common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the
>>> latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that
>>> this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just
>>> present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable
>>> fact.
>>>
>>
>> I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:
>>
>> https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326
>>
>>
> As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000
> of his own money on the future construction of large scale quantum
> computers), I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about 
> running
> a conscious AI on such a quantum computer.  That trivially leads to "many
> worlds" at least as seen by that AI.
>
>
> If it's so trivial maybe you can explain it.
>

 1. A quantum computer is isolated from the environment so as to remain
 in a super position of many possible states.
 2. Quantum computers are Turing universal, anything 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/21/2018 3:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/21/2018 7:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On 17 June 2018 at 13:26, 
mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05
AM UTC, Jason wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,
mailto:agrays...@gmail.com>> wrote:



  why do you prefer the MWI
compared to the Transactional
Interpretation?
I see both as absurd. so I
prefer to assume the wf is
just epistemic, and/or
that we have some holes in the
CI which have yet to be
resolved. AG

--



1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI"
is just the Schrodinger equation,
nothing else. (it doesn't say
Schrodinger's equation only
applies sometimes,
or only at certain scales)

2. It explains more while assuming
less (it explains the appearance of
collapse, without having to assume
it, thus is preferred by Occam's
razor)

3. Like every other successful
physical theory, it is linear,
reversible
(time-symmetric), continuous,
deterministic and does not require
faster than
light influences nor retrocausalities

4. Unlike single-universe or
epistemic interpretations, "WF is
real" with
MWI is the only way we know how to
explain the functioning of quantum
computers (now up to 51 qubits)

5. Unlike copenhagen-type
theories, it attributes no special
physical
abilities to observers or
measurement devices

6. Most of all, theories of
everything that assume a reality
containing
all possible observers and
observations lead directly to
laws/postulates of
quantum mechanics (see Russell
Standish's Theory of Nothing,
Chapter 7 and
Appendix D).

Given #6, we should revise our
view. It is not MWI and QM that should
convince us of many worlds, but
rather the assumption of many
worlds (an
infinite and infinitely varied
reality) that gives us, and
explains all the
weirdness of QM. This should
overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type
everything theories over any
single-universe interpretation of
quantum
mechanics, which is not only
absurd, but completely devoid of
 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le ven. 22 juin 2018 à 01:33,  a écrit :

>
>
> On Thursday, June 21, 2018 at 11:07:16 PM UTC, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le ven. 22 juin 2018 à 00:54,  a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, June 21, 2018 at 5:35:52 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:

 On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 9:04 PM,  wrote:

 *​>​Send a check for $5000 payable to Brent Meeker. When it clears, I
> will send my check for the same amount*


>>>
 Wow, I just figured out what your real name is! You are Abacha
 Tunde, the rich Nigerian Prince of scam fame.

 ​John K Clark​


>>> *You're a confirmed coward and liar. If you were half as smart as you
>>> think you are, you would have figured it out long ago. Not sending check?
>>> AG *
>>>
>>
>>
>> You are just polluting this list with such things... If what you say is
>> true, state your name and give a clear reference to what you claim for
>> free, if you're unwilling to do so, you're clearly not what you claim... So
>> either do that, it's simple and will take you far less time than to
>> continue polluting the list with sterile wager.
>>
>
> *You need not read my posts. I guess you don't get it. I don't like being
> accused of being a liar. AG*
>


I don't care, either prove it (that would have taken you the same amount of
time as your answer) or stop it.

>
>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>>
>> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, June 21, 2018 at 11:07:16 PM UTC, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> Le ven. 22 juin 2018 à 00:54, > a 
> écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, June 21, 2018 at 5:35:52 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 9:04 PM,  wrote:
>>>
>>> *​>​Send a check for $5000 payable to Brent Meeker. When it clears, I 
 will send my check for the same amount*
>>>
>>>  
>>
>>> Wow, I just figured out what your real name is! You are Abacha 
>>> Tunde, the rich Nigerian Prince of scam fame.
>>>
>>> ​John K Clark​
>>>
>>>
>> *You're a confirmed coward and liar. If you were half as smart as you 
>> think you are, you would have figured it out long ago. Not sending check? 
>> AG *
>>
>
>
> You are just polluting this list with such things... If what you say is 
> true, state your name and give a clear reference to what you claim for 
> free, if you're unwilling to do so, you're clearly not what you claim... So 
> either do that, it's simple and will take you far less time than to 
> continue polluting the list with sterile wager. 
>

*You need not read my posts. I guess you don't get it. I don't like being 
accused of being a liar. AG* 

>
>> -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com .
>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com 
>> .
>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le ven. 22 juin 2018 à 00:54,  a écrit :

>
>
> On Thursday, June 21, 2018 at 5:35:52 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 9:04 PM,  wrote:
>>
>> *​>​Send a check for $5000 payable to Brent Meeker. When it clears, I
>>> will send my check for the same amount*
>>
>>
>
>> Wow, I just figured out what your real name is! You are Abacha Tunde, the
>> rich Nigerian Prince of scam fame.
>>
>> ​John K Clark​
>>
>>
> *You're a confirmed coward and liar. If you were half as smart as you
> think you are, you would have figured it out long ago. Not sending check?
> AG *
>


You are just polluting this list with such things... If what you say is
true, state your name and give a clear reference to what you claim for
free, if you're unwilling to do so, you're clearly not what you claim... So
either do that, it's simple and will take you far less time than to
continue polluting the list with sterile wager.

>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, June 21, 2018 at 5:35:52 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 9:04 PM, > 
> wrote:
>
> *​>​Send a check for $5000 payable to Brent Meeker. When it clears, I will 
>> send my check for the same amount*
>
>  

> Wow, I just figured out what your real name is! You are Abacha Tunde, the 
> rich Nigerian Prince of scam fame.
>
> ​John K Clark​
>
>
*You're a confirmed coward and liar. If you were half as smart as you think 
you are, you would have figured it out long ago. Not sending check? AG *

-- 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 6/21/2018 7:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker 
 wrote:

>
>
> On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,   wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>


 On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,  wrote:

>
>
>   why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional
> Interpretation?
> I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just
> epistemic, and/or
> that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG
>
> --
>


 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation,
 nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies
 sometimes,
 or only at certain scales)

 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance
 of
 collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's
 razor)

 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear,
 reversible
 (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require
 faster than
 light influences nor retrocausalities

 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is
 real" with
 MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of
 quantum
 computers (now up to 51 qubits)

 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special
 physical
 abilities to observers or measurement devices

 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality
 containing
 all possible observers and observations lead directly to
 laws/postulates of
 quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing,
 Chapter 7 and
 Appendix D).

 Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that
 should
 convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many
 worlds (an
 infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains
 all the
 weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type
 everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of
 quantum
 mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of
 explanation.
 With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and
 understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite
 reality.

 Jason

>>>
>>> You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an
>>> observer,
>>> replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple
>>> quantum
>>> experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the
>>> disease,
>>> CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG
>>>
>> It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and
>> common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the
>> latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that
>> this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just
>> present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable
>> fact.
>>
>
> I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:
>
> https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326
>
>
 As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000 of
 his own money on the future construction of large scale quantum computers),
 I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about running a conscious
 AI on such a quantum computer.  That trivially leads to "many worlds" at
 least as seen by that AI.


 If it's so trivial maybe you can explain it.

>>>
>>> 1. A quantum computer is isolated from the environment so as to remain
>>> in a super position of many possible states.
>>> 2. Quantum computers are Turing universal, anything that can be
>>> programmed on a classical computer can be programmed on a quantum computer
>>> 3. Assuming Computational Theory of mind, a quantum computer can execute
>>> the same conscious program as "Brent Meeker's Brain"
>>> 4. The quantum computer can be arranged to entangle an 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/21/2018 7:48 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 1:02 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/20/2018 9:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:47 PM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Most of these objections to CI are answered by
decoherence theory.


I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a
collapse theory.


You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced
density matrix that is diagonal FAPP (or for all conscious
purposes) and then you declare it is exactly diagonal and cut
the other "worlds" loose.



What's the point of that last step, when decoherence explains why
we don't see those other branches?


But decoherence didn't quite explain it.  You have to take the
trace over the environment in order to justify making the reduced
density matrix exactly diagonal (instead of FAPP diagonal) and
that step is not unitary evolution per the SE, it's using a
projection operator.


Wouldn't this imply that Everett failed in his relative state 
formulation and that the collapse postulate is still necessary to 
explain observations?


Dunno.  Everett assumes that FAPP is good enough, but I don't know how 
that squares with a theory of mind.


Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/21/2018 7:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On 17 June 2018 at 13:26, 
mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM
UTC, Jason wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,
mailto:agrays...@gmail.com>> wrote:



  why do you prefer the MWI
compared to the Transactional
Interpretation?
I see both as absurd. so I prefer
to assume the wf is just epistemic,
and/or
that we have some holes in the CI
which have yet to be resolved. AG

--



1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is
just the Schrodinger equation,
nothing else. (it doesn't say
Schrodinger's equation only applies
sometimes,
or only at certain scales)

2. It explains more while assuming less
(it explains the appearance of
collapse, without having to assume it,
thus is preferred by Occam's razor)

3. Like every other successful physical
theory, it is linear, reversible
(time-symmetric), continuous,
deterministic and does not require
faster than
light influences nor retrocausalities

4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic
interpretations, "WF is real" with
MWI is the only way we know how to
explain the functioning of quantum
computers (now up to 51 qubits)

5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it
attributes no special physical
abilities to observers or measurement
devices

6. Most of all, theories of everything
that assume a reality containing
all possible observers and observations
lead directly to laws/postulates of
quantum mechanics (see Russell
Standish's Theory of Nothing, Chapter 7 and
Appendix D).

Given #6, we should revise our view. It
is not MWI and QM that should
convince us of many worlds, but rather
the assumption of many worlds (an
infinite and infinitely varied reality)
that gives us, and explains all the
weirdness of QM. This should
overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type
everything theories over any
single-universe interpretation of quantum
mechanics, which is not only absurd,
but completely devoid of explanation.
With the assumption of a large reality,
QM is made explainable and
understandable: as a theory of
observation within an infinite reality.

Jason


You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even
infinite copies of an observer,
replete with memories, are created when an
observer does a simple quantum
experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is
immensely worse than the disease,
CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG

It is important to make the distinction 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/21/2018 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:47, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence theory.

I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse theory.

You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density matrix that is diagonal 
FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and then you declare it is exactly diagonal and cut 
the other "worlds" loose.

But why adding that last steps? Why to make the diagonal exact if not to cut 
the other worlds?


Because if you don't, a further evolution may undo the 
measurement/perception.


Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/21/2018 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:28, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/19/2018 7:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Jun 2018, at 22:41, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/16/2018 10:16 AM, John Clark wrote:


​> ​
/Another universe comes into existence when Joe the Plumber
performs, say, a spin measurement./


But a measurement (whatever in the world that means) does not need 
to be made and there is nothing special about Joe, if Everett 
is right the same thing happens every time an electron in Joe's 
skin encounters a photon, or for that matter whenever an electron 
anywhere encounters anything.


That's where MWI gets fuzzy.


Not more than QM itself. We can define a world by a branch of the 
universe wave. But such world will be “world” only as part of a 
personal history. Everett disagrees, but his “relative state” is a 
better wording than “many-worlds” which is often confusing.




Do all the submicroscopic events that make to macroscopic 
difference create different worlds? That can't be right because 
"worlds" are classical things.  So the Heisenberg but problem seems 
to reappear in different form.


Heisenberg cut disappear, it is just that worlds differentiate from 
our perspective when they make difference for us, like when they can 
no more interfere. There is no cut, only the quantum wave (in the 
Schroedinger picture) and relative state related to macroscopic 
irreversibility, which needs only the classical chaos to be 
irreversible FAPP. Histories are internal things, already a form of 
first person plural notion.


Right.  But how FAPP does it have to be, how irreversible, in order 
that it constitutes a conscious distinct state? That's how the 
Heisenberg cut problem reappears at a different level.


Very quickly, like when you mix milk in the coffee. Pure statistics 
theory provides the numbers, like when we can use Gauss e^(-x^2) 
instead of Pascal triangle. You don’t need 0 on the diagonal, only 
tiny numbers.


I think you mean OFF the diagonal.  But how do you know you only need 
tiny numbers, and how tiny?  I have thought that perhaps there should be 
a smallest non-zero unit of probability; but it has been pointed out 
that even tiny numbers may add up when the density matrix is transformed 
to some other basis.


You don’t need purely orthogonal state, the big numbers and classical 
chaos will lead to the right quasi classical phenomenology,


So you say.  But that requires a theory of "phenomenology", i.e. a 
theory of how perception is realized.


Brent

for most relative observers. We don’t need to kill all white rabbits, 
just to make them relatively rare.


Bruno






Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[John Clark]

On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 9:04 PM,  wrote:

*​>​Send a check for $5000 payable to Brent Meeker. When it clears, I will
> send my check for the same amount*

Wow, I just figured out what your real name is! You are Abacha Tunde, the
rich Nigerian Prince of scam fame.

​John K Clark​

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/21/2018 1:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Jun 2018, at 16:10, Jason Resch > wrote:




On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,  mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason
wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,
mailto:agrays...@gmail.com>> wrote:



  why do you prefer the MWI compared to the
Transactional Interpretation?
I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume
the wf is just epistemic, and/or
that we have some holes in the CI which have
yet to be resolved. AG

--



1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the
Schrodinger equation,
nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's
equation only applies sometimes,
or only at certain scales)

2. It explains more while assuming less (it
explains the appearance of
collapse, without having to assume it, thus is
preferred by Occam's razor)

3. Like every other successful physical theory,
it is linear, reversible
(time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and
does not require faster than
light influences nor retrocausalities

4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic
interpretations, "WF is real" with
MWI is the only way we know how to explain the
functioning of quantum
computers (now up to 51 qubits)

5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it
attributes no special physical
abilities to observers or measurement devices

6. Most of all, theories of everything that
assume a reality containing
all possible observers and observations lead
directly to laws/postulates of
quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory
of Nothing, Chapter 7 and
Appendix D).

Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not
MWI and QM that should
convince us of many worlds, but rather the
assumption of many worlds (an
infinite and infinitely varied reality) that
gives us, and explains all the
weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly
convince us of MWI-type
everything theories over any single-universe
interpretation of quantum
mechanics, which is not only absurd, but
completely devoid of explanation.
With the assumption of a large reality, QM is
made explainable and
understandable: as a theory of observation
within an infinite reality.

Jason


You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite
copies of an observer,
replete with memories, are created when an observer
does a simple quantum
experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely
worse than the disease,
CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG

It is important to make the distinction between our
intuition and
common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can
guide the
latter very successfully, but the history of science
teaches us that
this is not always the case. You don't provide an
argument, you just
present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as
irrefutable
fact.


I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:

https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326



As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked
$100,000 of his own money on the future construction of large
scale quantum computers), I would love to ask Scott Aaronson
what he thinks about running a conscious AI on such a quantum
computer.  That trivially leads to "many worlds" at least as
seen by that 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/21/2018 1:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Jun 2018, at 07:24, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/18/2018 4:33 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 12:01 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/17/2018 2:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sunday, June 17, 2018, mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:



On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 12:29:35 PM UTC, Jason wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 6:26 AM, 
wrote:



On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason
wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,
 wrote:



* why do you prefer the MWI compared to the
Transactional Interpretation? I see both as
absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is
just epistemic, and/or that we have some
holes in the CI which have yet to be
resolved. AG *
-- 




1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the
Schrodinger equation, nothing else. (it doesn't
say Schrodinger's equation only applies
sometimes, or only at certain scales)

2. It explains more while assuming less (it
explains the appearance of collapse, without
having to assume it, thus is preferred by
Occam's razor)

3. Like every other successful physical theory,
it is linear, reversible (time-symmetric),
continuous, deterministic and does not require
faster than light influences nor retrocausalities

4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic
interpretations, "WF is real" with MWI is the
only way we know how to explain the functioning
of quantum computers (now up to 51 qubits)

5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it
attributes no special physical abilities to
observers or measurement devices

6. Most of all, theories of everything that
assume a reality containing all possible
observers and observations lead directly to
laws/postulates of quantum mechanics (see
Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing
,
Chapter 7 and Appendix D).

Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not
MWI and QM that should convince us of many
worlds, but rather the assumption of many
worlds (an infinite and infinitely varied
reality) that gives us, and */explains /*all
the weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly
convince us of MWI-type everything theories
over any single-universe interpretation of
quantum mechanics, which is not only absurd,
but completely devoid of explanation. With the
assumption of a large reality, QM is made
explainable and understandable: as a theory of
observation within an infinite reality.

Jason

*
You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite
copies of an observer, replete with memories, are
created when an observer does a simple quantum
experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely
worse than the disease, CI, that is, just plain
idiotic. AG *


There are many atoms, many planets, many solar systems,
many galaxies, many Hubble volumes, and it is believed
many universes.  On what basis are you so certain there
aren't many histories? (That is, other states in the
wave function that are predicted to be there by our
well established scientific theories, but which the
theory explains we cannot see or interact with except
in very limited controlled manners)?
If you find MWI distasteful you might prefer to think
of it as the many-minds interpretation as described by
Heinz-Dieter Zeh, or the "zero-universe interpretation"
as explained by Ron Garrett:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc


I think you are hung up on the "creation", I think it
is conceptually easier to grasp under the understanding
that it is all already there.  If you 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 1:02 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 6/20/2018 9:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:47 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence theory.

>>>
>>> I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse theory.
>>>
>>
>> You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density matrix
>> that is diagonal FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and then you declare
>> it is exactly diagonal and cut the other "worlds" loose.
>
>
>
> What's the point of that last step, when decoherence explains why we don't
> see those other branches?
>
>
> But decoherence didn't quite explain it.  You have to take the trace over
> the environment in order to justify making the reduced density matrix
> exactly diagonal (instead of FAPP diagonal) and that step is not unitary
> evolution per the SE, it's using a projection operator.
>

Wouldn't this imply that Everett failed in his relative state formulation
and that the collapse postulate is still necessary to explain observations?

Jason

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

> On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,   wrote:
>
>>
>> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,  wrote:
>>>


   why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional
 Interpretation?
 I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just
 epistemic, and/or
 that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG

 --

>>>
>>>
>>> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation,
>>> nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies
>>> sometimes,
>>> or only at certain scales)
>>>
>>> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance
>>> of
>>> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's
>>> razor)
>>>
>>> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear,
>>> reversible
>>> (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require
>>> faster than
>>> light influences nor retrocausalities
>>>
>>> 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is real"
>>> with
>>> MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of quantum
>>> computers (now up to 51 qubits)
>>>
>>> 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special physical
>>> abilities to observers or measurement devices
>>>
>>> 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality
>>> containing
>>> all possible observers and observations lead directly to
>>> laws/postulates of
>>> quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing, Chapter
>>> 7 and
>>> Appendix D).
>>>
>>> Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that should
>>> convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many worlds
>>> (an
>>> infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains
>>> all the
>>> weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type
>>> everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of
>>> quantum
>>> mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of
>>> explanation.
>>> With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and
>>> understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite
>>> reality.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>
>> You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an
>> observer,
>> replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple
>> quantum
>> experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the
>> disease,
>> CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG
>>
> It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and
> common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the
> latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that
> this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just
> present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable
> fact.
>

 I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:

 https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326


>>> As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000 of
>>> his own money on the future construction of large scale quantum computers),
>>> I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about running a conscious
>>> AI on such a quantum computer.  That trivially leads to "many worlds" at
>>> least as seen by that AI.
>>>
>>>
>>> If it's so trivial maybe you can explain it.
>>>
>>
>> 1. A quantum computer is isolated from the environment so as to remain in
>> a super position of many possible states.
>> 2. Quantum computers are Turing universal, anything that can be
>> programmed on a classical computer can be programmed on a quantum computer
>> 3. Assuming Computational Theory of mind, a quantum computer can execute
>> the same conscious program as "Brent Meeker's Brain"
>> 4. The quantum computer can be arranged to entangle an unmeasured
>> particle with Brent Meeker's quantum brain emulation,
>> a) by feeding in spin up as an auditory tone in Brent Meeker's left
>> auditory nerve
>> b) by feeding in spin down as an auditory tone in Brent Meeker's right
>> auditory nerve
>> 5. The quantum brain simulation, 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:56 AM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> From: Jason Resch < jasonre...@gmail.com>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:03 AM, Bruce Kellett <
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
>>
>> I find Baylock's exposition of counterfactual indefiniteness as applied
>> in MWI quite opaque. He makes the argument needlessly complicated by
>> considering a sequence of experiments with non-aligned filters. Then
>> analyses these by comparing to an arbitrary 0º and 90º pair of
>> orientations. When he does his general analysis he gets four possible
>> worlds as he should, but he does not calculate the probabilities for these
>> individually. Rather, he relates the results back to the 0º and 90º
>> orientations. And then says that because no measurements were actually made
>> at these angles the lack of counterfactual definiteness rules out the
>> worlds in which the results do not agree with the quantum predictions. This
>> is quite confused. There is no need to consider sequences of measurements
>> at different angles, one need consider only one set of such measurments and
>> calculate the resulting probabilities for each of the four possible sets of
>> results. By doing something quite peculiar, Baylock does nothing more than
>> confuse himself into error.
>>
>
> What specifically, is the error?
>
>
> Opacity. There is no need for reference to violations of counterfactual
> definiteness, because no comparison with measurements that were possible,
> but not made, is ever necessary. The account that I have given only ever
> refers to measurements that are actually made.
>
>
> We should concentrate on the simple case that I have presented, where the
>> polarizers are aligned by construction, and no reference is made to
>> measurements that are not made, but are assumed to have definite outcomes
>> (no violation of counterfactual defininteness need be assumed). You have to
>> be able to give a local account of why certain combinations of results are
>> not observed. You have been unable to do this.
>>
>>
> You agreed both photons are entangled to each other.
>
> When you measure either of the photons, you too become entangled not only
> with that photon, but also with its pair.
>
>
> Entanglement with the partner photon is the non-local effect. The pair is
> at a spacelike separation.
>


But entanglement can spread locally?  E.g. from the measurement device, to
your eyes, to your brain, to the notebook, etc.

All I am saying is that in the EPR case, the "measurement" (entanglement)
already occurred, at the time of the photon pair's creation.  The result
(though not a single definite value) of this "measurement" spread at
sublight speeds, to two different locations, where the entanglements spread
from there.


>
>
> If someone measures it's partner photon, now you, the left photon, the
> right photon, and that other person are now all entangled with each other.
>
>
> There are only two photons, but each has two possible polarizations. When
> you measure the polarization, you split into two branches, one for each
> possible result.  The partner photon reaches the other person on each of
> your branches, but if everything is purely local, the photon that is
> remotely measured cannot know which result you obtained (it cannot know
> which of your branches it is actually on), so it has indeterminate
> polarization, and when measured, there is necessarily equal probability for
> either result.
>

I think this is the heart of our disagreement. You are seeing the entangled
photons are still distinct objects without a correlation.

There are two events where some human experimenter gets entangled with a
photon (you could saw under MWI that two splits occur).  Now I think you
ask why does the second measurement know to "split the right way", but it
doesn't, and doesn't need to. Both experimenters contagiously contract the
superposition of the photon they measure (entangle themselves with).


>
> This means that the photon that is on the branch in which your photon
> passed the polarizer can either pass the remote polarizer, or be absorbed,
> with 50% probability for each. Similarly for the photon that is on the
> branch in which your photon was absorbed. The outcome by considering both
> branches is four possible worlds, one for each combination of 'pass' and
> 'absorb' results. Two of these worlds violate angular momentum
> conservation. How do you rule out these worlds with only local interactions?
>
>
The photon pair was created at one point in space time, it traveled only at
light speed to two locations, where its superpositional state became
entangled with the local environment at its point(s) of measurement.

To say there are 4 possible worlds here, I think is to assume measuring the
same photon twice using the same polarization angle, can produce
inconsistent results.


> (entanglement is nothing mysterious, it is equivalent to measurement).
>
>
> Yes, but entanglement, being a local effect, can only spread 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:47, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence theory.
>> 
>> I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse theory.
> 
> You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density matrix that 
> is diagonal FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and then you declare it is 
> exactly diagonal and cut the other "worlds" loose.

But why adding that last steps? Why to make the diagonal exact if not to cut 
the other worlds?

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:28, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/19/2018 7:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 16 Jun 2018, at 22:41, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/16/2018 10:16 AM, John Clark wrote:
 ​> ​ Another universe comes into existence when Joe the Plumber performs, 
 say, a spin measurement.
 
 But a measurement (whatever in the world that means) does not need to be 
 made and there is nothing special about Joe, if Everett is right the same 
 thing happens every time an electron in Joe's skin encounters a photon, or 
 for that matter whenever an electron anywhere encounters anything.
>>> 
>>> That's where MWI gets fuzzy. 
>> 
>> Not more than QM itself. We can define a world by a branch of the universe 
>> wave. But such world will be “world” only as part of a personal history. 
>> Everett disagrees, but his “relative state” is a better wording than 
>> “many-worlds” which is often confusing.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Do all the submicroscopic events that make to macroscopic difference create 
>>> different worlds?  That can't be right because "worlds" are classical 
>>> things.  So the Heisenberg but problem seems to reappear in different form.
>> 
>> Heisenberg cut disappear, it is just that worlds differentiate from our 
>> perspective when they make difference for us, like when they can no more 
>> interfere. There is no cut, only the quantum wave (in the Schroedinger 
>> picture) and relative state related to macroscopic irreversibility, which 
>> needs only the classical chaos to be irreversible FAPP. Histories are 
>> internal things, already a form of first person plural notion. 
> 
> Right.  But how FAPP does it have to be, how irreversible, in order that it 
> constitutes a conscious distinct state?  That's how the Heisenberg cut 
> problem reappears at a different level.

Very quickly, like when you mix milk in the coffee. Pure statistics theory 
provides the numbers, like when we can use Gauss e^(-x^2) instead of Pascal 
triangle. You don’t need 0 on the diagonal, only tiny numbers. You don’t need 
purely orthogonal state, the big numbers and classical chaos will lead to the 
right quasi classical phenomenology, for most relative observers. We don’t need 
to kill all white rabbits, just to make them relatively rare. 

Bruno




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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:14, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/19/2018 6:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:01 AM, Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/18/2018 3:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> Block time plus MWI means universes aren't created, they're all already 
>>> there.
>>> 
>>> Seems like super-determinism to me. You're making a distinction with no 
>>> difference. AG
>>> 
>>> Superdeterminism says you and a remote partner could decide to use the 
>>> digits of Pi to pseudorandomly select angles of measurement in a Bell 
>>> experiment, then decide to use the digits of Euler's number. Yet somehow, 
>>> the universe knew you and your friend had this agreement to use these 
>>> digits of these constants,
>> 
>> You keep anthropomorphizing the universe to make super-determinism sound 
>> ridiculous.  It's nothing more that taking determinism completely seriously, 
>> no free will by experimenters.  The choice of you and your friend was 
>> determined by the past.  That's all determinism means.  
>> 
>> 
>> It's not just me.  The first person who proposed this loophole around Bell 
>> also immediately discarded it as ridiculous.  If super-determinism means the 
>> same thing as determinism, why add the "super-" qualifier?
>> 
>> Here is a write up 
>> 
>>  in scientific american about t'Hooft's idea:
>> 
>> The dramatic version is that free will 
>> 
>>  is an illusion. Worse, actually. Even regular determinism–without the 
>> “super”–subverts our sense of free will. Through the laws of physics, you 
>> can trace every choice you make to the arrangement of matter at the dawn of 
>> time. Superdeterminism adds a twist of the knife. Not only is everything you 
>> do preordained, the universe reaches into your brain and stops you from 
>> doing an experiment that would reveal its true nature. The universe is not 
>> just set up in advance. It is set up in advance to fool you. As a conspiracy 
>> theory, this leaves Roswell and the Priory of Sion in the dust.
> 
> Yes, they explain that the "super" means Alice and Bob cannot make 
> independent spacelike decisions because their decisions are the product of 
> common events in the (distant) past and that product is determined.
>> 
>> I've taken it one step further.  By using the digits of Pi or Euler's 
>> number, it's not just reaching into your brain, since our brain did not 
>> determine those digits. It requires a universe setup in advance to know the 
>> digits of Pi,
> 
> Why is that a problem? The digits are determined and the choice to use them 
> is determined.  Bruno's theory requires "the universe to know" the solutions 
> to sets of Diophantine equations.

?

There is no “universe”. What is requires is only the excluded middle on the 
existence or not of solution to Diophantine equations, or equivalently that a 
machine stops or does not stop, or that phi_i(j) gives a number or is 
undefined. That is presuppose in analysis and physics.




> 
>> and to take into account the knowledge that you are using the digits of Pi 
>> to pseudorandomly set the angles of the measurement devices, and produce 
>> statistics (that were super determined at the time of the big bang) to fool 
>> you by reproducing the quantum statistics with super-determined hidden 
>> variables. 
> 
> Again with the anthropomorphizing.  The universe is just following its 
> deterministic laws; it's not fooling anybody.

It fools us in making us believe in FTL. 
The MWI is deterministic, but not in that super-conspiratorial way. 

Bruno




> 
>> If you see super-determinism as nothing more than determinism I think you 
>> are missing something.  This is a pre-established harmony of the highest 
>> order, requiring a massive information content per particle interaction
> 
> No, it certainly requires no more information than required to define a block 
> universe and potentially much less since all results flow from the past, and 
> being deterministic means it's reversible, so the information content is 
> fixed (as it is for SWE).
> 
>> (each particle has to contain knowledge, presumably up to and including all 
>> other knowledge about the entire universe up to that point).  For example:
>> 
>> 1. Take the deep-field image from Nasa, or the CMB data from all 360 degrees.
>> 2. Use that as a seed to the Hash-DRBG (NIST defined deterministic random 
>> bit generator)
>> 3. Use the output of the Hash DRBG to select the angles for each iteration 
>> of a Bell experiment
>> 
>> Now each particle has to be aware of the entire arrangement of remote 
>> galaxies in a particular direction looked at by the Hubble Telescope, in 
>> order to properly establish a hidden variable at the 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Jun 2018, at 16:10, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>> On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,  > > wrote:
>> 
>> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM, > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>>   why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional Interpretation?
>> I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just epistemic, and/or
>> that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG
>> 
>> --
>> 
>> 
>> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation,
>> nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies sometimes,
>> or only at certain scales)
>> 
>> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance of
>> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's razor)
>> 
>> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear, reversible
>> (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require faster than
>> light influences nor retrocausalities
>> 
>> 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is real" with
>> MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of quantum
>> computers (now up to 51 qubits)
>> 
>> 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special physical
>> abilities to observers or measurement devices
>> 
>> 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality containing
>> all possible observers and observations lead directly to laws/postulates of
>> quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing, Chapter 7 and
>> Appendix D).
>> 
>> Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that should
>> convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many worlds (an
>> infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains all the
>> weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type
>> everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of quantum
>> mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of explanation.
>> With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and
>> understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite reality.
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an observer,
>> replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple quantum
>> experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the disease,
>> CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG
>> It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and
>> common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the
>> latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that
>> this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just
>> present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable
>> fact.
>> 
>> I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:
>> 
>> https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000 of his 
>> own money on the future construction of large scale quantum computers), I 
>> would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about running a conscious AI 
>> on such a quantum computer.  That trivially leads to "many worlds" at least 
>> as seen by that AI.
> 
> If it's so trivial maybe you can explain it. 
> 
> 1. A quantum computer is isolated from the environment so as to remain in a 
> super position of many possible states.
> 2. Quantum computers are Turing universal, anything that can be programmed on 
> a classical computer can be programmed on a quantum computer
> 3. Assuming Computational Theory of mind, a quantum computer can execute the 
> same conscious program as "Brent Meeker's Brain"
> 4. The quantum computer can be arranged to entangle an unmeasured particle 
> with Brent Meeker's quantum brain emulation,
> a) by feeding in spin up as an auditory tone in Brent Meeker's left auditory 
> nerve
> b) by feeding in spin down as an auditory tone in Brent Meeker's right 
> auditory nerve
> 5. The quantum brain simulation, being isolated from the environment, remains 
> in a super position of the Brent Meeker brain emulation hearing an auditory 
> tone in his left and right ears.
> 
> You can repeat this process 30 times, with 30 different measurements of 
> different electrons, and end up with over 1 billion Brent Meeker brain 
> emulations, each remembering a different pattern of auditory tones.
> 
> For the Brent Meeker quantum brain emulation, many worlds is definitely true. 
> The only question is, why isn't it true for us?
> 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Jun 2018, at 07:24, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/18/2018 4:33 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 12:01 AM, Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/17/2018 2:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, June 17, 2018, >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 12:29:35 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 6:26 AM, > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM, > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>>  why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional Interpretation? I 
>>> see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just epistemic, and/or 
>>> that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG 
>>> -- 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation, 
>>> nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies 
>>> sometimes, or only at certain scales)
>>> 
>>> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance of 
>>> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's razor)
>>> 
>>> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear, reversible 
>>> (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require faster 
>>> than light influences nor retrocausalities
>>> 
>>> 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is real" with 
>>> MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of quantum 
>>> computers (now up to 51 qubits)
>>> 
>>> 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special physical 
>>> abilities to observers or 
>>> measurement devices
>>> 
>>> 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality containing all 
>>> possible observers and observations lead directly to laws/postulates of 
>>> quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing 
>>> , Chapter 7 and Appendix 
>>> D).
>>> 
>>> Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that should 
>>> convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many worlds (an 
>>> infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains all the 
>>> weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type 
>>> everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of quantum 
>>> mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of explanation. 
>>> With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and 
>>> understandable: as a theory 
>>> of observation within an infinite reality.
>>> 
>>> Jason
>>> 
>>> You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an observer, 
>>> replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple quantum 
>>> experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the disease, 
>>> CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> There are many atoms, many planets, many solar systems, many galaxies, many 
>>> Hubble volumes, and it is believed many universes.  On what basis are you 
>>> so certain there aren't many histories? (That is, other states in the wave 
>>> function that are predicted to be there by our well established scientific 
>>> theories, but which the theory explains we cannot see or interact with 
>>> except in very limited controlled manners)?
>>>  
>>> If you find MWI distasteful you might prefer to think of it as the 
>>> many-minds interpretation as described by Heinz-Dieter Zeh, or the 
>>> "zero-universe interpretation" as explained by Ron Garrett: 
>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I think you are hung up on the "creation", I think it is conceptually 
>>> easier to grasp under the understanding that it is all already there.  If 
>>> you look at the homepage of Wei Dai (who founded this e-mailing list 
>>>  20 years ago) he outlines what he 
>>> calls "a very simple interpretation of quantum mechanics 
>>> " which is basically this: all 
>>> the states are already there.
>>> 
>>> Sounds like Super-Determinism proposed by t'Hooft, and referenced yesterday 
>>> by Brent, which proposes the universe knows beforehand what kind of 
>>> experiment Joe the Plumber will perform. Too ridiculous for my tastes, and 
>>> of course untestable. IMO, one of the "achievements" of quantum theory is 
>>> to make otherwise intelligent persons totally gullible in what they believe 
>>> as plausible.  AG
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I agree with you about super derterminism being too ridiculous to believe. 
>>> But super derterminism is a different animal from "block time".  Super 
>>> derterminism is the idea that the universe conspires against all 
>>> experimenters 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Jun 2018, at 07:16, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/18/2018 4:09 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> It will take a lot of work under his approach, but I am not aware of any 
>> other system proposed by anyone, which even has a chance at this.
> 
> Penrose's gravity induced collapse has as good a chance as Bruno's, and a 
> better chance of predicting some surprising but true physics. Some version of 
> transactional QM also has a chance.  And Omnes' view, summed up as, "It's a 
> probabilistic theory, so it predicts probabilities.”

Elementary arithmetic + mechanism predicts probabilities too, note. 

Unlike Penrose, mechanism assumes only what we learn in high school + Diderot’s 
definition of Rationalism (localism, Descartes mechanism, …).

A gravity collapse looks more prestidigitation to me. It mix what we don’t 
understand (consciousness, collapse, gravity, without putting any light an any 
of them). Then its motivation from Gödel are simply invalid. 

Then Mechanism predicts new physics too, even f today that aspect is not 
tractable. Mechanism in metaphysics already explain why we observe anything, 
which is simply an assumption without explanation in the physicalist theology.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Jun 2018, at 01:54, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, June 18, 2018 at 2:40:20 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> > On 15 Jun 2018, at 12:33, Telmo Menezes  > > wrote: 
> > 
> > On 15 June 2018 at 02:55,  > wrote: 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> On Thursday, June 14, 2018 at 8:15:59 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
> >> wrote: 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> On Wednesday, June 13, 2018 at 11:30:27 PM UTC, Jason wrote: 
>  
>  
>  Physical Theories, Eternal Inflation, and Quantum Universe, Yasunori 
>  Nomura 
>  
>  We conclude that the eternally inflating multiverse and many worlds in 
>  quantum mechanics are the same. Other important implications include: 
>  global spacetime 
>  can be viewed as a derived concept; the multiverse is a transient 
>  phenomenon during the 
>  world relaxing into a supersymmetric Minkowski state. We also present a 
>  theory of “initial 
>  conditions” for the multiverse. By extrapolating our framework to the 
>  extreme, we arrive at a 
>  picture that the entire multiverse is a fluctuation in the stationary, 
>  fractal “mega-multiverse,” 
>  in which an infinite sequence of multiverse productions occurs. 
>  
>  "Therefore, we conclude that the multiverse is the same as (or a 
>  specific 
>  manifestation 
>  of ) many worlds in quantum mechanics." 
>  
>  "In eternal inflation, however, one first picks a causal patch; then one 
>  looks for observers in it.” Our framework does not follow this approach. 
>  We 
>  instead pick an observer first, and then construct the relevant 
>  spacetime 
>  regions associated with it. 
>  
>  Instead of admitting the existence of the “beginning,” we may require 
>  that the quantum observer principle is respected for the whole history 
>  of 
>  spacetime. In this case, the beginning of our multiverse is a 
>  fluctuation of 
>  a larger structure, whose beginning is also a fluctuation of an even 
>  larger 
>  structure, and this series goes on forever. This leads to the picture 
>  that 
>  our multiverse arises as a fluctuation in a huge, stationary 
>  “megamultiverse,” which has a fractal structure." 
>  
>  
>  The Multiverse Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Raphael Bousso and 
>  Leonard Susskind 
>  
>  In both the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics and the 
>  multiverse 
>  of eternal inflation the world is viewed as an unbounded collection of 
>  parallel universes. 
>  A view that has been expressed in the past by both of us is that there 
>  is 
>  no need to 
>  add an additional layer of parallelism to the multiverse in order to 
>  interpret quantum 
>  mechanics. To put it succinctly, the many-worlds and the multiverse are 
>  the same 
>  thing [1]. 
>  
>  
>  Jason 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> Not right. Not even wrong. AG. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> Eternal inflation and string theory imply universes created by natural 
> >> processes. The jury is out on those. OTOH, the MWI has human beings 
> >> creating 
> >> universes by going into a lab and doing trivial quantum experiments. Of 
> >> course they're they same (for idiots). AG 
> > 
> > The MWI does not propose that new universes are created specifically 
> > by certain experiences in the lab. It proposes that this universe 
> > branching is a fundamental natural mechanism -- that it happens for 
> > every quantum-level event that we perceive as random from our branch. 
> > It's an attempt to describe nature by making sense of experimental 
> > results, the same way as string theory and other theories. 
> > 
> > It is perhaps the size of the multiverse implied by MWI that makes it 
> > hard to believe. It is good to be skeptical of our own "common sense" 
> > on these topics, because human common sense has been wrong many times 
> > before in the history of science. Consider the size of the visible 
> > universe, something that is uncontroversial nowadays, but that would 
> > sound like complete lunacy not so long ago. 
> 
> 
> My feeling is that here mechanist gives comfort, as there is only 0, 1, 2, 3, 
> …, or only K, S, KK, … 
> 
> A notion of physical world can still make sense, as the least set of 
> proposition true in all the description of realities consistent with our 
> (indexical) memories”. But its multiplicity is no more astonishing than the 
> infinity of universal number relations, or of the prime numbers. 
> 
> If QM is correct, and well married with GR, the bubble mutilverse should be 
> given by an Everett quantum mechanical description of the vacuum, which 
> itself should be a quantum universal dovetailing extractable from the logic 
> of the observable of the universal machine. 
> 
> What we see is only a tiny part of the physical reality which is itself only 
> the border of something 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Jun 2018, at 19:21, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 12:55 AM, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> >JKC has mis-stated CI.  CI didn't say QM as embodied in the SWE was the 
> >theory of the world.  Bohr and Heisenberg both held that theclassical 
> >world was logically prior to the quantum
> 
> If so then forget string theory, Newton discovered the theory that fully 
> describes the fundamental underlying nature of reality way back in 1687. And 
> nobody knows what Copenhagen is saying. Bohr, Heisenberg, Wigner and Wheeler 
> all said they are ardent believers in the Copenhagen interpretation but 
> Wigner, a Nobel Prize winner, thought consciousness collapsed the quantum 
> wave function while Heisenberg, another Nobel prize winner, insisted it did 
> not; and that's a pretty big difference in my opinion. And John Wheeler was 
> Hugh Everett's thesis adviser and even wrote a letter to Bohr that still 
> exists saying that Many Worlds is fully consistent with the Copenhagen 
> Interpretation! As for Niels Bohr, he said "Never express yourself more 
> clearly than you are able to think” and as a result of that to this day 
> people are still arguing about what the man was trying to say.
> 
> So before we start debating its pros and cons we should figure out what the 
> hell the Copenhagen Interpretation is.


There are many interpretations, of both “SWE"  (Everett) and "SWE +collapse” 
(Copenhagen), which are two different theories. Bohm gives one more  different 
theory SWE + a particle guiding potential.

Everett says so explicitly: he provides a new formulation of QM, not a new 
interpretation.

Bruno





> 
> John K Clark
> 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Jun 2018, at 17:23, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:54 PM,  > wrote:
> 
> >> What about it, what is your theory of decoherence and how does it make the 
> >> CI less dumb?  
>  
> > Not that I'm a great fan of decoherence theory, but it doest includes the 
> > apparatus, observer, and the rest of the environment in the measuring 
> > process.
> 
> I know what quantum decoherence is but I've never heard of the term 
> "decoherence theory" before and I don't see how anyone can talk about 
> decoherence without referring to the rest of the environment. If X is the 
> only thing in the universe or the only thing that’s important then there is 
> nothing X can become cohered or de-cohered from. 
> 
> >>>  I have always regarded Bell results as paradoxical, or if you prefer 
> >>> unintelligible,
>  
> >>It's not paradoxical because its not self contradictory and its not 
> >>unintelligible because the results are clear as a Bell (pun intended), they 
> >>are just very very odd.  
> 
> > Do us all a favor and stop playing word games.
> 
> Now you sound like Bruno. Do you really thing you can give words vague 
> ephemeral meanings and still do science?


Ask question, or avoid ad hominem remark.

Bruno



> 
> >What you call "odd", can easily been seen as paradoxical or unintelligible
> 
> I don’t think we’re ever going to be able to figure out anything if the 
> meanings of words change at our whim from day to day. The reductio ad 
> absurdum proof is actually poorly named because it is not good enough to show 
> that a proposition will lead to something odd or even very odd to prove that 
> the proposition must be untrue, you’ve got to show it is paradoxical, that is 
> to say self contradictory. If Many World’s or the Transactional 
> Interpretation was true it would means some very odd things were going on 
> behind the scenes, but that doesn’t prove either of them is untrue. In fact 
> now that the Bell experiments have been performed one thing we know for sure 
> is that some very odd things ARE going on behind the scenes, we’re just not 
> sure exactly what they are. So if your explanation is not very very odd it 
> can’t be right.
> 
> I don’t know what it would mean if Copenhagen turned out to be true because 
> even those who say they believe in it can’t agree among themselves what 
> exactly the Copenhagen Interpretation is saying other than “shut up and 
> calculate”.
> 
> > insofar as it can't be understood in terms of how we perceive space, or 
> > spatial extent, and of course causality
> 
> So to have any hope of understanding what’s going on we’re going to have to 
> abandon comfortable concepts like causality and the normal way we perceive 
> space and embrace something much stranger. 
> 
> >> Are you confusing plane waves with advanced waves?
> 
> >Definitely not. Plane waves don't exist except possibly in your imagination. 
> > AG
> 
> To a good approximation a Laser produces plane waves, the electromagnetic 
> wave fronts form parallel planes, that’s why a Laser beam spreads out very 
> little with distance unlike a light bulb which produces a spherical wave. But 
> I don’t see what this has to do with quantum interpretation and I don’t know 
> of any physicists who thinks plane waves are more controversial than 
> spherical waves.
> 
> John K Clark 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Jun 2018, at 14:38, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Jason Resch < jasonre...@gmail.com 
> >
>> 
>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 6:24 PM, Bruce Kellett < 
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
>> > wrote:
>> 
>> Maybe it just means that we don't yet fully understand the collapse. There 
>> are plenty of possibilities that don't resort to magic.
>> 
>> 
>> I agree.
>> 
>> But what facts about our observations of collapse are not already fully 
>> explained by Decoherence?
> 
> Decoherence does not explain the transition from FAPP orthogonality to full 
> orthogonality of the branch states. In other words, decoherence is unitary, 
> so cannot explain the non-unitary trace over unobserved environmental 
> entanglements inherent in the projection of actual experimental results.
> 
>> In other words, what is left to solve about it? I thought Decoherence solved 
>> this (back in 1952 with Bohm).
> 
> Decoherence was not introduced by Bohm. The idea originated with Dieter Zeh 
> in around 1974, if I remember correctly.

It seems to me that decoherence is already in Everett (1957). But the word is 
used in different sense by different people. 

Bruno




> 
>>> When you say non-local what type of non-locality do you mean?  It is a 
>>> local theory in the sense that physical objects interact only with other 
>>> physical objects in their proximity, and carry information only at luminal 
>>> or subluminal speeds.  See Q12 on  
>>> http://www.anthropic 
>>> -principle.com/preprints/ 
>>> manyworlds.html
>> 
>> Price's argument here has been shown to be invalid -- he surreptitiously 
>> relies on non-locality.
>> 
>> 
>> Care to explain this non-locality and where it appears in a MWI explanation 
>> of the EPR paradox, for example?  I've provided explanations on this list 
>> before of how EPR/Bell operates under MWI without FTL influences.  So if you 
>> think they are required I would be interested to know where you think they 
>> appear and are necessary.
> 
> I have pointed out the flaw in Price's account previously on the list. Tipler 
> makes the same mistake, as do several others. But rather that going through 
> the argument here, I will postpone it to my discussion of your attempted 
> local account. You make essentially the same mistake, so we can look at it 
> then.
> 
>> John Clark often says MWI is non local because the branches are not local to 
>> each other, but I think this is a redefinition of the common sense use of 
>> the term locality in physics. Is this what you mean by MWI being non local?
> 
> Not really, but John does have a point.
> 
>>  How do you explain the finite computational resources of a table-top 
>> quantum computer factoring a prime number in seconds when it would take a 
>> classical computer the size of the solar system 10^100 years to do the same 
>> calculation?
>> 
>> David Deutsch notes that quantum computers present a strong challenge to 
>> defenders of single-universe interpretations, saying “When a quantum 
>> computer delivers the output of such a computation, we shall know that those 
>> intermediate results must have been computed somewhere, because they were 
>> needed to produce the right answer. So I issue this challenge to those who 
>> still cling to a single-universe world view: if the universe we see around 
>> us is all there is, where are quantum computations performed? I have yet to 
>> receive a plausible reply.”
>> 
>> That might be Deutsch's opinion, but plenty of others think differently. 
>> Quantum computers can easily be understood in a single world account.
>> 
>> 
>> But it can't be explained in non-realist views of the wave function. For 
>> example, those that say it is nothing but a convenient tool for computing 
>> probabilities.
> 
> Why can't that account for quantum computing?
> 
>> The reason is, here this "convenient tool" is computing results for us that 
>> we have no hope of ever computing ourselves.  How is something which isn't 
>> real, and isn't really there, yielding results of computations?
> 
> Quantum mechanics is weird!
> 
>> You say others think differently, but don't allude to who those other 
>> thinkers are or what their thoughts are.  Do you have an explanation for 
>> quantum computers that works with the assumption the wave function is not 
>> real?
> 
> Yes. The particular person I was thinking of here is Scott Aaronson. He is no 
> fan of Deutsh's approach to quantum computing and many worlds. He points out 
> that quantum computers rely on interference between the components, and that 
> is possible only in a single world.
> 
>> What would you say about a conscious AI implemented on a quantum computer? 
>> Would it or would it not be capable of existing in and experiencing "many 
>> simulations"?
> 
> A quantum computer 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/20/2018 9:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:47 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence
theory.


I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse
theory.


You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density
matrix that is diagonal FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and
then you declare it is exactly diagonal and cut the other "worlds"
loose.



What's the point of that last step, when decoherence explains why we 
don't see those other branches?


But decoherence didn't quite explain it.  You have to take the trace 
over the environment in order to justify making the reduced density 
matrix exactly diagonal (instead of FAPP diagonal) and that step is not 
unitary evolution per the SE, it's using a projection operator.


Brent



Jason
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,  mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC,
Jason wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,
mailto:agrays...@gmail.com>> wrote:



  why do you prefer the MWI compared to
the Transactional Interpretation?
I see both as absurd. so I prefer to
assume the wf is just epistemic, and/or
that we have some holes in the CI which
have yet to be resolved. AG

--



1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just
the Schrodinger equation,
nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's
equation only applies sometimes,
or only at certain scales)

2. It explains more while assuming less (it
explains the appearance of
collapse, without having to assume it, thus
is preferred by Occam's razor)

3. Like every other successful physical
theory, it is linear, reversible
(time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic
and does not require faster than
light influences nor retrocausalities

4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic
interpretations, "WF is real" with
MWI is the only way we know how to explain
the functioning of quantum
computers (now up to 51 qubits)

5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it
attributes no special physical
abilities to observers or measurement devices

6. Most of all, theories of everything that
assume a reality containing
all possible observers and observations lead
directly to laws/postulates of
quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's
Theory of Nothing, Chapter 7 and
Appendix D).

Given #6, we should revise our view. It is
not MWI and QM that should
convince us of many worlds, but rather the
assumption of many worlds (an
infinite and infinitely varied reality) that
gives us, and explains all the
weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly
convince us of MWI-type
everything theories over any single-universe
interpretation of quantum
mechanics, which is not only absurd, but
completely devoid of explanation.
With the assumption of a large reality, QM
is made explainable and
understandable: as a theory of observation
within an infinite reality.

Jason


You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even
infinite copies of an observer,
replete with memories, are created when an
observer does a simple quantum
experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is
immensely worse than the disease,
CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG

It is important to make the distinction between our
intuition and
common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former
can guide the
latter very successfully, but the history of science
teaches us that
this is not always the case. You don't provide an
argument, you just
present your gut feeling as if it were the same
thing as irrefutable
fact.


I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:

https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326
 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Jason Resch* mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>>


On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:03 AM, Bruce Kellett 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:



I find Baylock's exposition of counterfactual indefiniteness as
applied in MWI quite opaque. He makes the argument needlessly
complicated by considering a sequence of experiments with
non-aligned filters. Then analyses these by comparing to an
arbitrary 0º and 90º pair of orientations. When he does his
general analysis he gets four possible worlds as he should, but he
does not calculate the probabilities for these individually.
Rather, he relates the results back to the 0º and 90º
orientations. And then says that because no measurements were
actually made at these angles the lack of counterfactual
definiteness rules out the worlds in which the results do not
agree with the quantum predictions. This is quite confused. There
is no need to consider sequences of measurements at different
angles, one need consider only one set of such measurments and
calculate the resulting probabilities for each of the four
possible sets of results. By doing something quite peculiar,
Baylock does nothing more than confuse himself into error.


What specifically, is the error?


Opacity. There is no need for reference to violations of counterfactual 
definiteness, because no comparison with measurements that were 
possible, but not made, is ever necessary. The account that I have given 
only ever refers to measurements that are actually made.




We should concentrate on the simple case that I have presented,
where the polarizers are aligned by construction, and no reference
is made to measurements that are not made, but are assumed to have
definite outcomes (no violation of counterfactual defininteness
need be assumed). You have to be able to give a local account of
why certain combinations of results are not observed. You have
been unable to do this.


You agreed both photons are entangled to each other.

When you measure either of the photons, you too become entangled not 
only with that photon, but also with its pair.


Entanglement with the partner photon is the non-local effect. The pair 
is at a spacelike separation.


If someone measures it's partner photon, now you, the left photon, the 
right photon, and that other person are now all entangled with each other.


There are only two photons, but each has two possible polarizations. 
When you measure the polarization, you split into two branches, one for 
each possible result.  The partner photon reaches the other person on 
each of your branches, but if everything is purely local, the photon 
that is remotely measured cannot know which result you obtained (it 
cannot know which of your branches it is actually on), so it has 
indeterminate polarization, and when measured, there is necessarily 
equal probability for either result.


This means that the photon that is on the branch in which your photon 
passed the polarizer can either pass the remote polarizer, or be 
absorbed, with 50% probability for each. Similarly for the photon that 
is on the branch in which your photon was absorbed. The outcome by 
considering both branches is four possible worlds, one for each 
combination of 'pass' and 'absorb' results. Two of these worlds violate 
angular momentum conservation. How do you rule out these worlds with 
only local interactions?



(entanglement is nothing mysterious, it is equivalent to measurement).


Yes, but entanglement, being a local effect, can only spread at, or less 
than, the velocity of light. You cannot be entangled with your remote 
partner when he does his measurement, because you are space-like separated.


When nothing collapses, all you get are local effects, of information 
(in the form of particles or fields) moving through space time at 
light or sublight speeds.


That is the conclusion that you have not been able to establish. The 
Bell-like correlations actually have nothing to do with collapse or 
non-collapse. The entanglement is intrinsically non-local in either case.


You never observe the person who got the inconsistent measurement, nor 
ever hear their radio signal because you are entangled with the person 
who got the result consistent with your measurement.


But that entanglement is the non-local effect.

Look at it this way. The two measurements are made at space-like 
separation. If everything is local, the measurements must be 
independent. If the measurements are independent they cannot be 
correlated -- that is one possible operational definition of 
independence. Since the measurement results are known to be correlated, 
they cannot be independent. Since there can be no sub-luminal 
interaction between the two measurements, this correlation can only be a 
non-local effect. In the case that I have been discussing, quantum 
mechanics predicts 100% correlation. There is no way this can be 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/20/2018 9:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:17 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/19/2018 6:55 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:16 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/18/2018 4:09 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

It will take a lot of work under his approach, but I am
not aware of any other system proposed by anyone, which
even has a chance at this.


Penrose's gravity induced collapse has as good a chance as
Bruno's, 



At least Penrose has drawn a line in the sand, which can be
experimentally refuted. Though I don't see any motivation for any
collapse base theory since Everett provided an account of
collapse without having to assume it.  (Again this is like adding
appending motive demon theory, which is entirely superfluous and
adds whose sole motivation is to preserve the notion of collapse
as physically real rather than apparent)

and a better chance of predicting some surprising but true
physics. Some version of transactional QM also has a chance. 



Transactional QM is another complication of the theory, proposing
things we have no evidence for to explain things which have
already been explained from a much simpler theory.


You only think it's simpler because you close your eyes to the
last step in going from a FAPP diagonal reduced density matrix to
an actually diagonal reduced density matrix.  A step that is
perfectly equivalent to Bohr and Heisenberg's collapse postulate,
except it tells you where to hide the collapse.



Is the appearance of collapse not describable from the other postulates?


"Appearance" is a psychological concept.  So to decide what that means 
requires a theory of mind.  Most advocates of MWI want to say that 
getting the off-diagonal terms of the reduced density matrix "small 
enough" is enough to make it "appear" that the wf has collapsed.  But 
aside from this fuzziness there is the problem that in some other basis 
the cross-terms may not be small at all; hence the preferred basis 
problem?  Do our minds impose a preferred basis?  and why should 
different minds agree on it?


Brent



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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/20/2018 9:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:14 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/19/2018 6:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:01 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/18/2018 3:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


Block time plus MWI means universes aren't created,
they're all already there.


*Seems like super-determinism to me. You're making a
distinction with no difference. AG
*


Superdeterminism says you and a remote partner could decide
to use the digits of Pi to pseudorandomly select angles of
measurement in a Bell experiment, then decide to use the
digits of Euler's number. Yet somehow, the universe knew you
and your friend had this agreement to use these digits of
these constants,


You keep anthropomorphizing the universe to make
super-determinism sound ridiculous.  It's nothing more that
taking determinism completely seriously, no free will by
experimenters.  The choice of you and your friend was
determined by the past.  That's all determinism means.


It's not just me.  The first person who proposed this loophole
around Bell also immediately discarded it as ridiculous.  If
super-determinism means the same thing as determinism, why add
the "super-" qualifier?

Here is a write up


in scientific american about t'Hooft's idea:

*The dramatic version is that free will

 is
an illusion. Worse, actually. Even regular
determinism–without the “super”–subverts our sense of free
will. Through the laws of physics, you can trace every choice
you make to the arrangement of matter at the dawn of time.
Superdeterminism adds a twist of the knife. Not only is
everything you do preordained, the universe reaches into your
brain and stops you from doing an experiment that would
reveal its true nature. The universe is not just set up in
advance. It is set up in advance to fool you. As a conspiracy
theory, this leaves Roswell and the Priory of Sion in the dust.*



Yes, they explain that the "super" means Alice and Bob cannot make
independent spacelike decisions because their decisions are the
product of common events in the (distant) past and that product is
/*determined*/.



I sometimes can't tell if you're playing devil's advocate or not.




I've taken it one step further.  By using the digits of Pi or
Euler's number, it's not just reaching into your brain, since our
brain did not determine those digits. It requires a universe
setup in advance to know the digits of Pi,


Why is that a problem? The digits are determined and the choice to
use them is determined.  Bruno's theory requires "the universe to
know" the solutions to sets of Diophantine equations.



It requires only an independent existence of arithmetical truth.




and to take into account the knowledge that you are using the
digits of Pi to pseudorandomly set the angles of the measurement
devices, and produce statistics (that were super determined at
the time of the big bang) to fool you by reproducing the quantum
statistics with super-determined hidden variables.


Again with the anthropomorphizing.  The universe is just following
its deterministic laws; it's not fooling anybody.


It's fooling us into believing in non-locality QM when QM isn't really 
true.


In that sense super-determinism is self-defeating, to believe it means 
one is forced to discard the very theory it is meant to explain.  It 
is a bit like epiphenominalism that way.


You are so invested in MWI you think the purpose of theories is to 
explain it.







If you see super-determinism as nothing more than determinism I
think you are missing something.  This is a pre-established
harmony of the highest order, requiring a massive information
content per particle interaction


No, it certainly requires no more information than required to
define a block universe and potentially much less since all
results flow from the past, and being deterministic means it's
reversible, so the information content is fixed (as it is for SWE).


super-determinism is so ill-defined of a theory it is hardly worth 
debating.





(each particle has to contain knowledge, presumably up to and
including all other knowledge about the entire universe up to
that point).  For example:

1. Take the deep-field image from Nasa, or the CMB data from all
360 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:47 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence theory.
>>>
>>
>> I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse theory.
>>
>
> You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density matrix
> that is diagonal FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and then you declare
> it is exactly diagonal and cut the other "worlds" loose.



What's the point of that last step, when decoherence explains why we don't
see those other branches?

Jason

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
 On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,   wrote:

>
> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>   why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional
>>> Interpretation?
>>> I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just
>>> epistemic, and/or
>>> that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>
>>
>> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation,
>> nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies
>> sometimes,
>> or only at certain scales)
>>
>> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance of
>> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's
>> razor)
>>
>> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear,
>> reversible
>> (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require
>> faster than
>> light influences nor retrocausalities
>>
>> 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is real"
>> with
>> MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of quantum
>> computers (now up to 51 qubits)
>>
>> 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special physical
>> abilities to observers or measurement devices
>>
>> 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality
>> containing
>> all possible observers and observations lead directly to
>> laws/postulates of
>> quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing, Chapter
>> 7 and
>> Appendix D).
>>
>> Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that should
>> convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many worlds
>> (an
>> infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains
>> all the
>> weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type
>> everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of quantum
>> mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of
>> explanation.
>> With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and
>> understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite reality.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
> You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an
> observer,
> replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple
> quantum
> experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the
> disease,
> CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG
>
 It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and
 common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the
 latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that
 this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just
 present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable
 fact.

>>>
>>> I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:
>>>
>>> https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326
>>>
>>>
>> As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000 of
>> his own money on the future construction of large scale quantum computers),
>> I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about running a conscious
>> AI on such a quantum computer.  That trivially leads to "many worlds" at
>> least as seen by that AI.
>>
>>
>> If it's so trivial maybe you can explain it.
>>
>
> 1. A quantum computer is isolated from the environment so as to remain in
> a super position of many possible states.
> 2. Quantum computers are Turing universal, anything that can be programmed
> on a classical computer can be programmed on a quantum computer
> 3. Assuming Computational Theory of mind, a quantum computer can execute
> the same conscious program as "Brent Meeker's Brain"
> 4. The quantum computer can be arranged to entangle an unmeasured particle
> with Brent Meeker's quantum brain emulation,
> a) by feeding in spin up as an auditory tone in Brent Meeker's left
> auditory nerve
> b) by feeding in spin down as an auditory tone in Brent Meeker's right
> auditory nerve
> 5. The quantum brain simulation, being isolated from the environment,
> remains in a super position of the Brent Meeker brain emulation hearing an
> auditory tone in his left and right ears.
>
> You can repeat this process 30 times, with 30 different measurements of
> different electrons, and end up 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:17 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 6/19/2018 6:55 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:16 AM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 6/18/2018 4:09 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>> It will take a lot of work under his approach, but I am not aware of any
>>> other system proposed by anyone, which even has a chance at this.
>>>
>>
>> Penrose's gravity induced collapse has as good a chance as Bruno's,
>
>
> At least Penrose has drawn a line in the sand, which can be experimentally
> refuted.  Though I don't see any motivation for any collapse base theory
> since Everett provided an account of collapse without having to assume it.
>  (Again this is like adding appending motive demon theory, which is
> entirely superfluous and adds whose sole motivation is to preserve the
> notion of collapse as physically real rather than apparent)
>
>
>> and a better chance of predicting some surprising but true physics. Some
>> version of transactional QM also has a chance.
>
>
> Transactional QM is another complication of the theory, proposing things
> we have no evidence for to explain things which have already been explained
> from a much simpler theory.
>
>
> You only think it's simpler because you close your eyes to the last step
> in going from a FAPP diagonal reduced density matrix to an actually
> diagonal reduced density matrix.  A step that is perfectly equivalent to
> Bohr and Heisenberg's collapse postulate, except it tells you where to hide
> the collapse.
>


Is the appearance of collapse not describable from the other postulates?

Jason

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:14 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 6/19/2018 6:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:01 AM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 6/18/2018 3:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> Block time plus MWI means universes aren't created, they're all already
 there.

>>>
>>>
>>> *Seems like super-determinism to me. You're making a distinction with no
>>> difference. AG *
>>>
>>
>> Superdeterminism says you and a remote partner could decide to use the
>> digits of Pi to pseudorandomly select angles of measurement in a Bell
>> experiment, then decide to use the digits of Euler's number. Yet somehow,
>> the universe knew you and your friend had this agreement to use these
>> digits of these constants,
>>
>>
>> You keep anthropomorphizing the universe to make super-determinism sound
>> ridiculous.  It's nothing more that taking determinism completely
>> seriously, no free will by experimenters.  The choice of you and your
>> friend was determined by the past.  That's all determinism means.
>>
>>
> It's not just me.  The first person who proposed this loophole around Bell
> also immediately discarded it as ridiculous.  If super-determinism means
> the same thing as determinism, why add the "super-" qualifier?
>
> Here is a write up
> 
> in scientific american about t'Hooft's idea:
>
> *The dramatic version is that free will
>  
> is
> an illusion. Worse, actually. Even regular determinism–without the
> “super”–subverts our sense of free will. Through the laws of physics, you
> can trace every choice you make to the arrangement of matter at the dawn of
> time. Superdeterminism adds a twist of the knife. Not only is everything
> you do preordained, the universe reaches into your brain and stops you from
> doing an experiment that would reveal its true nature. The universe is not
> just set up in advance. It is set up in advance to fool you. As a
> conspiracy theory, this leaves Roswell and the Priory of Sion in the dust.*
>
>
> Yes, they explain that the "super" means Alice and Bob cannot make
> independent spacelike decisions because their decisions are the product of
> common events in the (distant) past and that product is *determined*.
>


I sometimes can't tell if you're playing devil's advocate or not.


>
>
> I've taken it one step further.  By using the digits of Pi or Euler's
> number, it's not just reaching into your brain, since our brain did not
> determine those digits. It requires a universe setup in advance to know the
> digits of Pi,
>
>
> Why is that a problem? The digits are determined and the choice to use
> them is determined.  Bruno's theory requires "the universe to know" the
> solutions to sets of Diophantine equations.
>


It requires only an independent existence of arithmetical truth.


>
>
> and to take into account the knowledge that you are using the digits of Pi
> to pseudorandomly set the angles of the measurement devices, and produce
> statistics (that were super determined at the time of the big bang) to fool
> you by reproducing the quantum statistics with super-determined hidden
> variables.
>
>
> Again with the anthropomorphizing.  The universe is just following its
> deterministic laws; it's not fooling anybody.
>

It's fooling us into believing in non-locality QM when QM isn't really true.

In that sense super-determinism is self-defeating, to believe it means one
is forced to discard the very theory it is meant to explain.  It is a bit
like epiphenominalism that way.



>
>
> If you see super-determinism as nothing more than determinism I think you
> are missing something.  This is a pre-established harmony of the highest
> order, requiring a massive information content per particle interaction
>
>
> No, it certainly requires no more information than required to define a
> block universe and potentially much less since all results flow from the
> past, and being deterministic means it's reversible, so the information
> content is fixed (as it is for SWE).
>

super-determinism is so ill-defined of a theory it is hardly worth debating.


>
>
> (each particle has to contain knowledge, presumably up to and including
> all other knowledge about the entire universe up to that point).  For
> example:
>
> 1. Take the deep-field image from Nasa, or the CMB data from all 360
> degrees.
> 2. Use that as a seed to the Hash-DRBG (NIST defined deterministic random
> bit generator)
> 3. Use the output of the Hash DRBG to select the angles for each iteration
> of a Bell experiment
>
> Now each particle has to be aware of the entire arrangement of remote
> galaxies in a particular direction looked at by the Hubble Telescope, in
> order to properly establish a hidden variable at the time of its creation.

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:03 AM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> From: Jason Resch < jasonre...@gmail.com>
>
>
> On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 7:26 PM, Bruce Kellett <
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
>> From: Jason Resch >
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 7:38 AM, Bruce Kellett <
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>> From: Jason Resch < jasonre...@gmail.com>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In the EPR experiment, a pair of photons is created.  Each photon is in
>>> a super position of every possible polarization, and because it is created
>>> as a pair, it's dual in the superposed state always has exactly the
>>> opposite polarization (rotated 180 degrees).
>>>
>>>
>>> OK.
>>>
>>> When you perform a measurement of your left-traveling photon on Earth,
>>> you become entangled (correlated) with it, and all the possible states of
>>> that photon, when measured, leak into the room, starting with the measuring
>>> device, then your eyes, then your brain, then your notebook, etc. until now
>>> everything is in the room, and soon Earth is now in many states which
>>> contagiously spread from that photon.
>>>
>>>
>>> OK. Your result (and you) become entangled with your environment.
>>>
>>> Also, because the photon you measured was entangled (correlated) with
>>> its pair in the superposition, whatever result you measure for the photon's
>>> polarization tells you immediately what the polarization of its pair is (in
>>> your branch at least).  So any future communication you get from me on
>>> Pluto will necessarily align with the result you measured.
>>>
>>>
>>> This is where the mistake creeps in. My measurement tells me the
>>> polarization of the entangled photon in the branch in which my measurement
>>> was made. When you come to measure your entangled photon on Pluto, how do
>>> you know what branch my measurement was made in? You are at a spacelike
>>> separation from me, and completely independent. So I ask again, how come
>>> you assume that your measurement will be in the same branch as mine was?
>>>
>>
>> Let's make it more concrete and say there are only 360 possible
>> polarizations, each having an equal probability.
>>
>>
>> That is not a very good way to look at it. The photon is not in a
>> superposition of all possible polarization states. You cannot write the
>> photon wave function as such a superposition:
>>
>>  |psi> = Sum_i a_i |i> for i running over all 360 possibilities in
>> the case you outline.
>>
>> The most you can ever do is write the state as a superposition of the two
>> possible polarizations in any particular direction. Thus:
>>
>>|psi> = (|+> + |->), ignoring normalization factors.
>>
>> This can be written for |+> and |-> being the polarization eigenstates in
>> any chosen direction. But not all directions at once.
>>
>
>
> I see.
>
> Could you explain the point of error in the following paper?  I've
> excerpted the relevant sections if it helps your search.
>
> From: https://arxiv.org/pdf/0902.3827.pdf
>
> *According to quantum mechanics, whichever measurement is performed first
> collapses the entangled twin state superposition to a single polarization
> state that is identical for both photons.*
>
> *[...]*
>
>
> *If we wish to know what the probability is of getting the same
> measurement for photon 1, we need only figure out what the probability is
> for a photon with polarization along θ2 to pass through a filter oriented
> along θ1. This probability is easily calculated according to simple
> trigonometry. Any arbitrary linear polarization can be thought of as a
> superposition of polarization along the θ1 direction (which will pass
> through the filter) and perpendicular to the θ1 direction (which will be
> absorbed by the filter). For a wave polarized along the θ2 direction, the
> amplitude component along the θ1 direction is given by cos(θ2 − θ1), and
> the probability for transmission, given by the wave amplitude squared, is
> cos2 (θ2 − θ1). That is the prediction of quantum mechanics *
>
> *[...]*
>
>
> *The key is to allow more than one possibility for the potential result of
> a measurement. Orthodox quantum mechanics embraces this notion of multiple
> possibilities whenever a quantum state is in a superposition. In the
> absence of measurement (and collapse), there is no single definite
> potential result. Instead, there are many potential results represented by
> many components of the superposition. *
>
> *[...]*
>
>
> * It is possible to violate Bell’s inequality using either nonlocality or
> counterfactual indefiniteness alone, and there are examples of each
> approach. To better understand the role of counterfactual indefiniteness,
> it is instructive to examine an interpretation of quantum mechanics that
> relies solely on counterfactual indefiniteness to violate the inequality.
> One of the most popular of these is the “many worlds” interpretation. *
>
>
> I find Baylock's exposition of counterfactual indefiniteness as applied in
> MWI quite opaque. He makes the 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, June 20, 2018 at 11:04:20 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 2:22 PM, > 
> wrote:
>
> *>I found an old version of my resume and gave you the exact references, 
>> which you found without my help.*
>
>
> I have no idea what you're talking about. I looked and I could not find 2 
> scientific papers written by Alan Grayson or even one, and if they existed 
> I would have found them. But if you have an exact reference then lets hear 
> it.
>
>  > *The papers were published in reputable journals,*
>
>
> What was the name of those "reputable journals"? An even better question 
> is what the hell is your name? 
>
> *> The papers were written over 50 years ago, so when the subject first 
>> came up my memory was a little vague.*
>
>
> That's OK,  things have changed in the last 51 years and we now have a 
> thing called "Goodle", so if you tell me your name Mr. Google can find the 
> two papers you wrote with Carl Sagan in 3 seconds flat, if of course they 
> exist.
>
> >* So make the bet, or apologize​ and​ STFU. AG*
>
>
> I have absolutely nothing to apologize for, in the very unlikely event I 
> was wrong about you writing those papers it would be because you were lying 
> about who you were and the initials "AG" that you put in at the end of 
> every line does not stand for "Alan Grayson. I don't like it when people 
> lie to me, that's why I don't like Donald Trump and that's why I don't like 
> you.
>
> John K Clark
>

*Big talker; no guts. Won't put your money where your mouth is. Do us all a 
favor and cease your arrogant misinformed BS. Send a check for $5000 
payable to Brent Meeker. When it clears, I will send my check for the same 
amount, which will prove I wrote at least two papers with CS. There was a 
third paper which Carl might not have been a co-author. AG* 

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/20/2018 2:37 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 03:09:37AM -0700, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:


On Wednesday, June 20, 2018 at 2:22:53 AM UTC, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 9:58 PM, >
wrote:
  


*​> ​I think you should admit that bringing up the energy change of a
photon in a quantum experiment being caused by the expansion of the
universe is just plain dumb.*


OK I admit it, saying a measured energy change found in a quantum
experiment was caused by the expansion of the universe would be dumb. So
its a good think I didn't say it.
  


*And Yes, I did write two scientific papers with Carl Sagan.*


​Bullshit​.
  

  
*Let's settle the question this way: we'll each send a check to Brent

Meeker, payable for $5000. Brent will then decide who is telling the truth
about my papers with Carl Sagan. Brent will then send $9000 to the winner
and keep $1000 for himself. If you don't agree, apologize and STFU. AG*


This situation is getting quite Kafka-esque.


HEY!  Butt out Russell.  I'm gonna make some money on this.

Brent
:-)

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[John Clark]

On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 2:22 PM,  wrote:

*>I found an old version of my resume and gave you the exact references,
> which you found without my help.*


I have no idea what you're talking about. I looked and I could not find 2
scientific papers written by Alan Grayson or even one, and if they existed
I would have found them. But if you have an exact reference then lets hear
it.

 > *The papers were published in reputable journals,*


What was the name of those "reputable journals"? An even better question is
what the hell is your name?

*> The papers were written over 50 years ago, so when the subject first
> came up my memory was a little vague.*


That's OK,  things have changed in the last 51 years and we now have a
thing called "Goodle", so if you tell me your name Mr. Google can find the
two papers you wrote with Carl Sagan in 3 seconds flat, if of course they
exist.

>* So make the bet, or apologize​ and​ STFU. AG*


I have absolutely nothing to apologize for, in the very unlikely event I
was wrong about you writing those papers it would be because you were lying
about who you were and the initials "AG" that you put in at the end of
every line does not stand for "Alan Grayson. I don't like it when people
lie to me, that's why I don't like Donald Trump and that's why I don't like
you.

John K Clark

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Russell Standish]

On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 03:09:37AM -0700, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, June 20, 2018 at 2:22:53 AM UTC, John Clark wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 9:58 PM, > 
> > wrote:
> >  
> >
> >> *​> ​I think you should admit that bringing up the energy change of a 
> >> photon in a quantum experiment being caused by the expansion of the 
> >> universe is just plain dumb.*
> >
> >
> > OK I admit it, saying a measured energy change found in a quantum 
> > experiment was caused by the expansion of the universe would be dumb. So 
> > its a good think I didn't say it. 
> >  
> >
> >> *And Yes, I did write two scientific papers with Carl Sagan.*
> >
> >
> > ​Bullshit​.
> >  
> >
>  
> *Let's settle the question this way: we'll each send a check to Brent 
> Meeker, payable for $5000. Brent will then decide who is telling the truth 
> about my papers with Carl Sagan. Brent will then send $9000 to the winner 
> and keep $1000 for himself. If you don't agree, apologize and STFU. AG*
> 

This situation is getting quite Kafka-esque. 

-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, June 20, 2018 at 1:28:16 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 10:46 PM, > 
> wrote:
>
> *​> ​And Yes, I did write two scientific papers with Carl Sagan.*
>>>
>>>
>>> ​
>>> ​>>​
>>> Bullshit​.
>>>  
>>>
>>  
>
> >* How much money are you willing to wager? Put your money where your 
>> mouth is. It must be placed in an escrow account. AG*
>>
>  
> I can't do that because if I lose the bet I wouldn't know who to send the 
> money to, and if I win the bet I wouldn't know who to demand payment 
> from. I don't know who I'm talking to, I don't know you're real name. If 
> your claim is true then your other claim to be somebody named "Alan 
> Grayson" can not be true because nobody named Alan Grayson ever wrote a 
> paper with Carl Sagan. And you won't tell us what journal the papers were 
> published in, or their titles, or even what they were about. Why is that? I 
> can think of only 3 possibilities:
>
> 1) The papers were so bad you're embarrassed by them. But that seems 
> unlikely as Sagan was not in the habit of writing bad papers. By the way, 
> I'm not ashamed of my views so I always use my real name.
>
> 2) You’re so old dementia has kicked in and you’ve forgotten all details 
> about the papers and have even forgotten what your name is.
>
> 3) The papers do not exist.   
>
>  John K Clark
>

*You're a coward and a liar. In my last post I explained how we can deal 
with payment issues. Very simple. The papers were written over 50 years 
ago, so when the subject first came up my memory was a little vague. But I 
found an old version of my resume and gave you the exact references, which 
you found without my help. The papers were published in reputable journals, 
which attests to their quality. So make the bet, or apologize and STFU. AG *

>
>  
>

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[John Clark]

On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 10:46 PM,  wrote:

*​> ​And Yes, I did write two scientific papers with Carl Sagan.*
>>
>>
>> ​
>> ​>>​
>> Bullshit​.
>>
>>
>

>* How much money are you willing to wager? Put your money where your mouth
> is. It must be placed in an escrow account. AG*
>

I can't do that because if I lose the bet I wouldn't know who to send the
money to, and if I win the bet I wouldn't know who to demand payment
from. I don't know who I'm talking to, I don't know you're real name. If
your claim is true then your other claim to be somebody named "Alan
Grayson" can not be true because nobody named Alan Grayson ever wrote a
paper with Carl Sagan. And you won't tell us what journal the papers were
published in, or their titles, or even what they were about. Why is that? I
can think of only 3 possibilities:

1) The papers were so bad you're embarrassed by them. But that seems
unlikely as Sagan was not in the habit of writing bad papers. By the way,
I'm not ashamed of my views so I always use my real name.

2) You’re so old dementia has kicked in and you’ve forgotten all details
about the papers and have even forgotten what your name is.

3) The papers do not exist.

 John K Clark

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, June 20, 2018 at 2:22:53 AM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 9:58 PM, > 
> wrote:
>  
>
>> *​> ​I think you should admit that bringing up the energy change of a 
>> photon in a quantum experiment being caused by the expansion of the 
>> universe is just plain dumb.*
>
>
> OK I admit it, saying a measured energy change found in a quantum 
> experiment was caused by the expansion of the universe would be dumb. So 
> its a good think I didn't say it. 
>  
>
>> *And Yes, I did write two scientific papers with Carl Sagan.*
>
>
> ​Bullshit​.
>  
>
 
*Let's settle the question this way: we'll each send a check to Brent 
Meeker, payable for $5000. Brent will then decide who is telling the truth 
about my papers with Carl Sagan. Brent will then send $9000 to the winner 
and keep $1000 for himself. If you don't agree, apologize and STFU. AG*

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, June 20, 2018 at 2:22:53 AM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 9:58 PM, > 
> wrote:
>  
>
>> *​> ​I think you should admit that bringing up the energy change of a 
>> photon in a quantum experiment being caused by the expansion of the 
>> universe is just plain dumb.*
>
>
> OK I admit it, saying a measured energy change found in a quantum 
> experiment was caused by the expansion of the universe would be dumb. So 
> its a good think I didn't say it. 
>

*Now you're distorting history. That was your comment when I asked Jason 
where the energy came from, or lost, in the quantum photon experiment with 
a half-silver deflector. AG *

>
>  
>
>> *And Yes, I did write two scientific papers with Carl Sagan.*
>
>
> ​Bullshit​.
>  
>

*How much money are you willing to wager? Put your money where your mouth 
is. It must be placed in an escrow account. AG *

>
> ​>
>> *you're a bully*
>
>
> For god's sake, stop whining!
>  
>
>> ​> ​
>> Oh, hardly a boy; now collecting SS.
>
>  
> Then stop acting like a child and grow up.
>

*So now it's immature to point out your misleading comment about loss of 
photon energy in a quantum experiment? Pathetic. AG *

>  
> John K Clark​
>  
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>> -- 
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>> .
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>>
>
>

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[John Clark]

On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 9:58 PM,  wrote:


> *​> ​I think you should admit that bringing up the energy change of a
> photon in a quantum experiment being caused by the expansion of the
> universe is just plain dumb.*


OK I admit it, saying a measured energy change found in a quantum
experiment was caused by the expansion of the universe would be dumb. So
its a good think I didn't say it.


> *And Yes, I did write two scientific papers with Carl Sagan.*


​Bullshit​.


​>
> *you're a bully*


For god's sake, stop whining!


> ​> ​
> Oh, hardly a boy; now collecting SS.


Then stop acting like a child and grow up.

John K Clark​







>
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, June 20, 2018 at 1:58:32 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, June 19, 2018 at 11:04:34 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 9:29 PM,  wrote:
>>
>> *​> **> I meant coming apart NOW. Bringing up the expansion rate of the 
>>> universe when the discussion is about the behavior of a photon in quantum 
>>> experiment is just plain dumb. AG*
>>>
>> ​
>> ​
>> So says the man (or more likely boy) who claimed who claimed to have 
>> written 2 scientific papers with Carl Sagan 51 years ago and expected us to 
>> believe him.
>>
>> John K Clark​
>>
>
> *More evidence that Bruno was right-on; you're a bully, and not as bright 
> as you see yourself. I think you should admit that bringing up the energy 
> change of a photon in a quantum experiment being caused by the expansion of 
> the universe is just plain dumb. And Yes, I did write two scientific papers 
> with Carl Sagan. You found them but couldn't connect the obvious dots. Oh, 
> hardly a boy; now collecting SS. LOL. AG *
>

*On the quantum issue, there's really no issue about the foolishness of 
your reply. The Milky Way won't rip apart, if it ever does, until many many 
billions, maybe trillions of years elapse. So to question of whether I can 
believed or not, depends on knowing the basic parameters of the expansion 
of the universe. AG *

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[agrayson2000]

On Tuesday, June 19, 2018 at 11:04:34 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 9:29 PM, > 
> wrote:
>
> *​> **> I meant coming apart NOW. Bringing up the expansion rate of the 
>> universe when the discussion is about the behavior of a photon in quantum 
>> experiment is just plain dumb. AG*
>>
> ​
> ​
> So says the man (or more likely boy) who claimed who claimed to have 
> written 2 scientific papers with Carl Sagan 51 years ago and expected us to 
> believe him.
>
> John K Clark​
>

*More evidence that Bruno was right-on; you're a bully, and not as bright 
as you see yourself. I think you should admit that bringing up the energy 
change of a photon in a quantum experiment being caused by the expansion of 
the universe is just plain dumb. And Yes, I did write two scientific papers 
with Carl Sagan. You found them but couldn't connect the obvious dots. Oh, 
hardly a boy; now collecting SS. LOL. AG *

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[John Clark]

On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 1:55 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:


> ​> ​
> practically "The Copenhagen Interpretation" is just "The Not MWI"
> interpretation.
>


I agree, and that means there is no such thing as *THE* Copenhagen
Interpretation. It means "all the problems have been ironed out so just
shut up and calculate", but they don't agree on how the problems have been
ironed out, ten Copenhagen fans will have 12 different opinions on what's
going on at the quantum level, or even agree with Bohr's enigmatic
statement "there is no quantum level".
​

John K Clark​

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[John Clark]

On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 9:29 PM,  wrote:

*​> **> I meant coming apart NOW. Bringing up the expansion rate of the
> universe when the discussion is about the behavior of a photon in quantum
> experiment is just plain dumb. AG*
>
​
​
So says the man (or more likely boy) who claimed who claimed to have
written 2 scientific papers with Carl Sagan 51 years ago and expected us to
believe him.

John K Clark​

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence theory.


I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse theory.


You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density matrix 
that is diagonal FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and then you 
declare it is exactly diagonal and cut the other "worlds" loose.


Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/19/2018 8:08 AM, smitra wrote:

On 19-06-2018 07:21, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker 
wrote:

On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,  wrote:

On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:

On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,  wrote:

why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional
Interpretation?
I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just
epistemic, and/or
that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG

--

1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger
equation,
nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies
sometimes,
or only at certain scales)

2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance
of
collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's
razor)

3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear,
reversible
(time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require
faster than
light influences nor retrocausalities

4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is
real" with
MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of
quantum
computers (now up to 51 qubits)

5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special
physical
abilities to observers or measurement devices

6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality
containing
all possible observers and observations lead directly to
laws/postulates of
quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing,
Chapter 7 and
Appendix D).

Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that
should
convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many
worlds (an
infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains
all the
weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type
everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of
quantum
mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of
explanation.
With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and
understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite
reality.

Jason


 You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an
observer,
 replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple
quantum
 experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the
disease,
 CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG
 It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and
 common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the
 latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that
 this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just
 present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable
 fact.

 I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:

 https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326 [3]

As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000
of his own money on the future construction of large scale quantum
computers), I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about
running a conscious AI on such a quantum computer.  That trivially
leads to "many worlds" at least as seen by that AI.
 If it's so trivial maybe you can explain it.  And you don't have
wonder about Aaronson thinks, go check his blog.  I'm pretty sure he's
posted about it.


QM also tells us that Wigner's friend, is no different from that "AI
running on a quantum computer".


 I get kind of tire do being told that QM tells us this or that.  QM
is just another theory.  Ptolemy's theory told us the Sun went around
the Earth.  You do realize that QM is inconsistent with GR?

 Brent


QM is not inconsistent with GR. The issue with quantum gravity is that 
it is not renormalizable, 


That's just a problem in QFT perturbation theory approximation. There's 
the deeper problem that QM assumes the spacetime background independent 
of the matter distribution.  There is no operator for the stress-energy 
tensor.


Brent

just like the old Fermi theory of the Weak interaction was not 
renormalizable either. If we imagine that quantum gravity or Fermi 
theory is obtained from a fundamental theory under coarse graining and 
rescaling (a so-called RG-flow), then what is going on is that there 
are a wide range of different theories that flow to the same effective 
field theory, and that this makes the predictions of higher order 
effects dependent on the details of the microscopic theory that flows 
to the effective field theory. That's obviously not a convenient 
feature for a theory, but it's not unphysical and it doesn't make it 
an inconsistent theory.


E.g. many QFT textbooks make the rather stupid remark that Fermi 
theory violates unitarity. That's obviously wrong because it's 
ultimately just quantum mechanics and that can't possibly be in 
violation of unitarity. What is going on here is that because you 
can't get unique predictions 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/19/2018 7:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Jun 2018, at 22:41, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/16/2018 10:16 AM, John Clark wrote:


​> ​
/Another universe comes into existence when Joe the Plumber
performs, say, a spin measurement./


But a measurement (whatever in the world that means) does not need 
to be made and there is nothing special about Joe, if Everett 
is right the same thing happens every time an electron in Joe's skin 
encounters a photon, or for that matter whenever an electron 
anywhere encounters anything.


That's where MWI gets fuzzy.


Not more than QM itself. We can define a world by a branch of the 
universe wave. But such world will be “world” only as part of a 
personal history. Everett disagrees, but his “relative state” is a 
better wording than “many-worlds” which is often confusing.




Do all the submicroscopic events that make to macroscopic difference 
create different worlds?  That can't be right because "worlds" are 
classical things.  So the Heisenberg but problem seems to reappear in 
different form.


Heisenberg cut disappear, it is just that worlds differentiate from 
our perspective when they make difference for us, like when they can 
no more interfere. There is no cut, only the quantum wave (in the 
Schroedinger picture) and relative state related to macroscopic 
irreversibility, which needs only the classical chaos to be 
irreversible FAPP. Histories are internal things, already a form of 
first person plural notion.


Right.  But how FAPP does it have to be, how irreversible, in order that 
it constitutes a conscious distinct state?  That's how the Heisenberg 
cut problem reappears at a different level.


Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,  mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,
mailto:agrays...@gmail.com>> wrote:



  why do you prefer the MWI compared to the
Transactional Interpretation?
I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume
the wf is just epistemic, and/or
that we have some holes in the CI which have
yet to be resolved. AG

--



1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the
Schrodinger equation,
nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's
equation only applies sometimes,
or only at certain scales)

2. It explains more while assuming less (it
explains the appearance of
collapse, without having to assume it, thus is
preferred by Occam's razor)

3. Like every other successful physical theory,
it is linear, reversible
(time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and
does not require faster than
light influences nor retrocausalities

4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic
interpretations, "WF is real" with
MWI is the only way we know how to explain the
functioning of quantum
computers (now up to 51 qubits)

5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes
no special physical
abilities to observers or measurement devices

6. Most of all, theories of everything that
assume a reality containing
all possible observers and observations lead
directly to laws/postulates of
quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory
of Nothing, Chapter 7 and
Appendix D).

Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not
MWI and QM that should
convince us of many worlds, but rather the
assumption of many worlds (an
infinite and infinitely varied reality) that
gives us, and explains all the
weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly
convince us of MWI-type
everything theories over any single-universe
interpretation of quantum
mechanics, which is not only absurd, but
completely devoid of explanation.
With the assumption of a large reality, QM is
made explainable and
understandable: as a theory of observation within
an infinite reality.

Jason


You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite
copies of an observer,
replete with memories, are created when an observer
does a simple quantum
experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely
worse than the disease,
CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG

It is important to make the distinction between our
intuition and
common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can
guide the
latter very successfully, but the history of science
teaches us that
this is not always the case. You don't provide an
argument, you just
present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as
irrefutable
fact.


I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:

https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326



As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked
$100,000 of his own money on the future construction of large
scale quantum computers), I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what
he thinks about running a conscious AI on such a quantum
computer.  That trivially leads to "many worlds" at least as seen
by that AI.


If it's so trivial maybe you can explain it.


1. A quantum computer is isolated from 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/19/2018 6:55 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:16 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/18/2018 4:09 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

It will take a lot of work under his approach, but I am not
aware of any other system proposed by anyone, which even has a
chance at this.


Penrose's gravity induced collapse has as good a chance as Bruno's, 



At least Penrose has drawn a line in the sand, which can be 
experimentally refuted.  Though I don't see any motivation for any 
collapse base theory since Everett provided an account of collapse 
without having to assume it.  (Again this is like adding appending 
motive demon theory, which is entirely superfluous and adds whose sole 
motivation is to preserve the notion of collapse as physically real 
rather than apparent)


and a better chance of predicting some surprising but true
physics. Some version of transactional QM also has a chance. 



Transactional QM is another complication of the theory, proposing 
things we have no evidence for to explain things which have already 
been explained from a much simpler theory.


You only think it's simpler because you close your eyes to the last step 
in going from a FAPP diagonal reduced density matrix to an actually 
diagonal reduced density matrix.  A step that is perfectly equivalent to 
Bohr and Heisenberg's collapse postulate, except it tells you where to 
hide the collapse.


Brent



And Omnes' view, summed up as, "It's a probabilistic theory, so it
predicts probabilities."


This will be ruled out when we reach quantum supremacy 
.


Jason

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/19/2018 6:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:01 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/18/2018 3:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


Block time plus MWI means universes aren't created,
they're all already there.


*Seems like super-determinism to me. You're making a
distinction with no difference. AG
*


Superdeterminism says you and a remote partner could decide to
use the digits of Pi to pseudorandomly select angles of
measurement in a Bell experiment, then decide to use the digits
of Euler's number. Yet somehow, the universe knew you and your
friend had this agreement to use these digits of these constants,


You keep anthropomorphizing the universe to make super-determinism
sound ridiculous.  It's nothing more that taking determinism
completely seriously, no free will by experimenters.  The choice
of you and your friend was determined by the past.  That's all
determinism means.


It's not just me.  The first person who proposed this loophole around 
Bell also immediately discarded it as ridiculous.  If 
super-determinism means the same thing as determinism, why add the 
"super-" qualifier?


Here is a write up 
 
in scientific american about t'Hooft's idea:


*The dramatic version is that free will

 is
an illusion. Worse, actually. Even regular determinism–without the
“super”–subverts our sense of free will. Through the laws of
physics, you can trace every choice you make to the arrangement of
matter at the dawn of time. Superdeterminism adds a twist of the
knife. Not only is everything you do preordained, the universe
reaches into your brain and stops you from doing an experiment
that would reveal its true nature. The universe is not just set up
in advance. It is set up in advance to fool you. As a conspiracy
theory, this leaves Roswell and the Priory of Sion in the dust.*



Yes, they explain that the "super" means Alice and Bob cannot make 
independent spacelike decisions because their decisions are the product 
of common events in the (distant) past and that product is /*determined*/.


I've taken it one step further.  By using the digits of Pi or Euler's 
number, it's not just reaching into your brain, since our brain did 
not determine those digits. It requires a universe setup in advance to 
know the digits of Pi,


Why is that a problem? The digits are determined and the choice to use 
them is determined.  Bruno's theory requires "the universe to know" the 
solutions to sets of Diophantine equations.


and to take into account the knowledge that you are using the digits 
of Pi to pseudorandomly set the angles of the measurement devices, and 
produce statistics (that were super determined at the time of the big 
bang) to fool you by reproducing the quantum statistics with 
super-determined hidden variables.


Again with the anthropomorphizing.  The universe is just following its 
deterministic laws; it's not fooling anybody.


If you see super-determinism as nothing more than determinism I think 
you are missing something.  This is a pre-established harmony of the 
highest order, requiring a massive information content per particle 
interaction


No, it certainly requires no more information than required to define a 
block universe and potentially much less since all results flow from the 
past, and being deterministic means it's reversible, so the information 
content is fixed (as it is for SWE).


(each particle has to contain knowledge, presumably up to and 
including all other knowledge about the entire universe up to that 
point).  For example:


1. Take the deep-field image from Nasa, or the CMB data from all 360 
degrees.
2. Use that as a seed to the Hash-DRBG (NIST defined deterministic 
random bit generator)
3. Use the output of the Hash DRBG to select the angles for each 
iteration of a Bell experiment


Now each particle has to be aware of the entire arrangement of remote 
galaxies in a particular direction looked at by the Hubble Telescope, 
in order to properly establish a hidden variable at the time of its 
creation.


Nonsense.  To use your form, the universe knew that's what you were 
going to do and so only had to provide the seed, and it knew the random 
bit generator and it's state, so it knew the angles that would be selected.




The article I linked says only 3 people take the idea seriously.  I 
don't imagine this number to grow because it means giving up on any 
hope of scientific progress (the same excuse can be used to avoid 
having to take seriously the result of any experiment).  At its best 
it is saying "God made it that way", at its worst it 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/18/2018 10:21 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 12:55 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:


>JKC has mis-stated CI.  CI didn't say QM as embodied in the SWE
was the theory of the world.  Bohr and Heisenberg both held that
the    classical world was logically prior to the quantum


If so then forget string theory, Newton discovered the theory that 
fully describes the fundamental underlying nature of reality way back 
in 1687. And nobody knows what Copenhagen is saying. Bohr, Heisenberg, 
Wigner and Wheeler all said they are ardent believers in the 
Copenhagen interpretation but Wigner, a Nobel Prize winner, thought 
consciousness collapsed the quantum wave function while Heisenberg, 
another Nobel prize winner, insisted it did not; and that's a pretty 
big difference in my opinion. And John Wheeler was Hugh Everett's 
thesis adviser and even wrote a letter to Bohr that still exists 
saying that Many Worlds is fully consistent with the Copenhagen 
Interpretation! As for Niels Bohr, he said "Never express yourself 
more clearly than you are able to think” and as a result of that to 
this day people are still arguing about what the man was trying to say.


So before we start debating its pros and cons we should figure out 
what the hell the Copenhagen Interpretation is.


I  don't think anybody tried to mush Heisenberg, Bohr, von Neumann, 
Wigner all into one "Copenhagen Interpretation" until Everett's relative 
state was recognized as an alternative.  So practically "The Copenhagen 
Interpretation" is just "The Not MWI" interpretation.  That makes it 
seem that the CI is inconsistent and incoherent and ill-defined.  But 
this is unfair to the founders who each had certain coherent ideas.


Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[John Clark]

Somebody wrote:
​

> > *That's what determinism means.  It means EVERYTHING IS DETERMINED BY
> THE PAST.  *


Yes, deterministic means the laws of physics are deterministic, but Super
Determinism claims much much more than that. Even if you knew all the
deterministic laws of physics perfectly that would not be nearly enough to
uniquely determine the present because it also depends on initial
conditions and the ultimate initial condition was the one at the Big Bang.
Super Determinism says that although the number of initial conditions the
universe could have started out in is an astronomical number to an
astronomical power we just happen to be living in the one and only
configuration where after 13.8 billion years of deterministic cosmic
evolution events unfolded in the one and only way that humans would always
be fooled and cause them to draw incorrect conclusions whenever they
performed Bell type experiments. Well, I can't prove the idea is wrong
obviously, the universe has seen to that, but to turn to Super Determinism
because Many Worlds is too strange seems a bit nuts to me. And if
scientists really believed it they should just give up because experimental
science would be impossible.

Hmm... but now that I think of it maybe Many Worlds and Super Determinism
are BOTH true. Many Worlds says everything that could happen did happen,
and although ridiculously unlikely Super Determinism *could* happen if
deterministic laws of physics could happen. I don’t know if they could or
not but even if such deterministic laws do exist in some universe the
probability that we just happen to be living in the one that had such a
super mega ultra rare initial condition is not exactly large.

> ​> ​
> *You've anthropomorphized the universe.*


​
You almost make that sound like a bad thing.


> ​> ​
> The universe doesn't conspire or do anything, it just is.
>

​I can't prove it but if Super Determinism is true that would sure smell
like a conspiracy to me!

John K Clark ​

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Jun 2018, at 06:55, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/17/2018 2:13 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com  
> wrote:
>> I think Jason answered that question very well. But who knows ​,​ the 
>> Transactional Interpretation could turn out to be right, it certainly makes 
>> far more sense than Copenhagen which isn’t even wrong. Copenhagen isn’t 
>> weird its self contradictory, it says quantum mechanics is the theory of the 
>> world and everything must follow it, but when a measurement is made (which 
>> is so important to Copenhagen) it insists that the measuring device and the 
>> observer that looks at the measuring device be classical.
>> 
>> Well, any evidence that the device and observer are *not* classical? But if 
>> you want to treat them quantum mechanically, apply decoherence theory. Did 
>> it ever occur to you that the CI is a work in progress?  AG
> 
> JKC has mis-stated CI.  CI didn't say QM as embodied in the SWE was the 
> theory of the world.  Bohr and Heisenberg both held that the classical world 
> was logically prior to the quantum and that QM applied to microscopic systems 
> and systems composed of them but there must a scale in any particular problem 
> above which the system is treated classically.  Heisenberg thought there 
> should be some cut off.  Bohr thought you could put the quantum-classical 
> transition where ever was convenient so long as it was prior to recorded 
> results.  This was perfectly reasonable since otherwise there would be no 
> results on which scientists could agree.

Yes, but then you get the debate if the “last cut” is made by consciousness 
(Wigner, von Neumann), or is it in the device instruments and macro-world 
(Prigogine), plus the problem of the FTL if you want one and only one world, 
etc.

With mechanism, things get far clearer: all you have is very elementary 
arithmetic, and the physical is given by the observable mode of the universal 
machine (which exists as a consequence of the laws of addition and 
multiplication). The observable are determined by the “probability 1”, which 
can be translated in arithmetic by []p & <>t. We lost transitivity which is 
nice for the immediate apprehension, and we get a quantum logic with a sharable 
part (quanta) and a non sharable part (qualia). It is motivated by the UDA that 
we can get observation only through

1) The Sigma_1 sentences p (the arithmetical description of the leaves of the 
universal dovetailer, or what you can access through very elementary arithmetic 
(cf sigma_1 completeness = Turing universal).

2) which are true (or false in some sense) in all accessible world, in 
arithmetic: []p,  and 

3) repeatable, avoiding the cul-de-sac world condition, in arithmetic <>p.

Three arithmetical and quasi-arithmetic modes satisfies this requirement: []p & 
p (not arithmetical, non definable by the machine concerned, but “bettable”), 
[]p & <>t, and []p & <>t & p. To be sure there is an infinity of them, 
conferring to them a graded structure, which is also welcome here.

They all, at the G* (true) level provides a quantum logic, and the tree of them 
are different, and richer than most quantum logics isolated by physicist and 
logicians. The richness comes from the Löb’s formula, which encapsulate the 
self-reference implicit in all observation (the fingers, with the sign minus 
points on the observer). It would already be interesting to see which of the 
quantum logics is closer to the empirical one.

If empirical-physics is closer to []p & p, then Plotinus is more right than my 
own intuition or taste, and the physical is more psychological than material in 
the phenomenology. If empirical-physics is closer to []p & <>t, then the 
separation between subjective and objective is less subjective, and the sigma_1 
sentences looks like “primary matter”, and that is what I expect. If 
empirical-physics is closer to []p & <>t & p, then we get a curious mix of 
both, the physical would rely On an epistemic intuitionist quantum logic.

The incompleteness divides those modes on the true and assertable part of the 
self-discovery.
Theology contains many true but not assertable propositions. There is a notion 
of blasphemy, and it does not send the machine into hell, but it can transform 
its location paradise into local hell.

It is all in the head of the universal numbers. Necessarily so once we assume 
mechanism explicitly, which is made possible by the Church-Turing Thesis. 

Bruno






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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Jun 2018, at 05:02, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/17/2018 5:20 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> How do you explain the finite computational resources of a table-top quantum 
>> computer factoring a prime number in seconds when it would take a classical 
>> computer the size of the solar system 10^100 years to do the same 
>> calculation?
>> 
>> David Deutsch notes that quantum computers present a strong challenge to 
>> defenders of single-universe interpretations, saying “When a quantum 
>> computer delivers the output of such a computation, we shall know that those 
>> intermediate results must have been computed somewhere, because they were 
>> needed to produce the right answer. So I issue this challenge to those who 
>> still cling to a single-universe world view: if the universe we see around 
>> us is all there is, where are quantum computations performed? I have yet to 
>> receive a plausible reply.”
> 
> As Scott Aaronson pointed out the computation relies on interference effects 
> which means it all happens in one world -  in spite of Deutsch's wishful 
> thinking.

It all happen in one multiverse. Worlds are just superposition of state, and 
those get into different branches, from the perspective of the observer. By 
looking at the S cat, I put myself in the superposition seing the cat dead + 
seeing the cat alive, in one world, if you want, but my consciousness still 
split on two different histories (assuming there is not cut or collapse).

In any case, both Deutsch and Feynman got the quantum computation idea by 
taking the superposition of states has physically real and important, and both 
disbelieve in the collapse, which is not an interpretation, but an hardly 
intelligible physical axiom.


Bruno





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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Jun 2018, at 01:24, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Jason Resch < jasonre...@gmail.com 
> >
>> 
>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 6:42 AM, Bruce Kellett < 
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
>> > wrote:
>> From: Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>>
>>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM, < 
>>> agrayson2...@gmail.com 
>>> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>>  why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional Interpretation? I 
>>> see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just epistemic, and/or 
>>> that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation, 
>>> nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies 
>>> sometimes, or only at certain scales)
>> 
>> Well no, it is an interpretation of the SE, involving the reification of the 
>> wave function. So it is not 'just' the Schrödinger equation.
>> 
>> It is a theory, in that it is fully mathematical and makes predictions.  
>> Other so called interpretations CI etc. are not mathematical theories 
>> because they don't say when or why or under what circumstances Schrodinger's 
>> equation stops working.  As Max Tegmark said:
>> 
>> “I disagree that the distinction between Everett and Copenhagen is ‘just 
>> interpretation’. The former is a mathematical theory, the latter is not. The 
>> former says simply that the Schrödinger equation always applies. The latter 
>> says that it only applies sometimes, but doesn't given an equation 
>> specifying when it doesn't apply (when the so-called collapse is supposed to 
>> happen). If someone were to come up with such an equation, then the two 
>> theories would be mathematically different and you might hope to make an 
>> experiment to test which one is right.”
>> 
> 
> Decoherence theory effectively answers such objections.
> 
> 
>> 
>> You speak of reification of the wave function as if it is something special. 
>>  In what other physical theory is something postulated one theory, and a 
>> different theory is when that same thing is postulated, but is also "really 
>> real"?  Is the theory of quarks distinct from another theory of quarks that 
>> holds them to be really real?
>> 
>> David Deutsch comments on the absurdity of this:
>> 
>> “Schrödinger also”, David Deutsch notes, “had the basic idea of parallel 
>> universes shortly before Everett, but he didn't publish it. He mentioned it 
>> in a lecture in Dublin, in which he predicted that the audience would think 
>> he was crazy. Isn't that a strange assertion coming from a Nobel Prize 
>> winner—that he feared being considered crazy for claiming that his equation, 
>> the one that he won the Nobel Prize for, might be true.”
> 
> Schrödinger was also the originator of the idea of a collapse of the wave 
> function. He saw that his wave function necessitated a collapse of his wave 
> to a point particle interaction in the majority of measurements.
> 
> 
>>> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance of 
>>> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's razor)
>> 
>> Maybe the collapse is real.
>> 
>> 
>> But to assume this is like assuming there are invisible and undetectable 
>> "motive demons" operating within a car engine that are necessary to make the 
>> car engine work, when we have another perfectly valid way of explaining 
>> everything the car engine does without having to assume these motive demons. 
>>  I don't see the point when we have a theory that explains all the facts 
>> before us.
> 
> Maybe it just means that we don't yet fully understand the collapse. There 
> are plenty of possibilities that don't resort to magic.
> 
> 
>>> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear, reversible 
>>> (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require faster 
>>> than light influences nor retrocausalities
>> 
>> MWI is still a non-local theory. FTL influences or not, QM is intrinsically 
>> non-local.
>> 
>> 
>> When you say non-local what type of non-locality do you mean?  It is a local 
>> theory in the sense that physical objects interact only with other physical 
>> objects in their proximity, and carry information only at luminal or 
>> subluminal speeds.  See Q12 on  http://www.anthropic 
>> -principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html
> 
> Price's argument here has been shown to be invalid -- he surreptitiously 
> relies on non-locality.


Easily? I am skeptical on this, especially for Deutsch original problem, 
revised so as to make the outcome correct in all cases. In fact, even the two 
slits cannot be explained, or Einstein’s Solvay one slit. The collapse itself 
has to be non-local, I mean, with FTL transmission, if it 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[smitra]

On 19-06-2018 07:21, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker 
wrote:

On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,  wrote:

On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:

On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,  wrote:

why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional
Interpretation?
I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just
epistemic, and/or
that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG

--

1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger
equation,
nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies
sometimes,
or only at certain scales)

2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance
of
collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's
razor)

3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear,
reversible
(time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require
faster than
light influences nor retrocausalities

4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is
real" with
MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of
quantum
computers (now up to 51 qubits)

5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special
physical
abilities to observers or measurement devices

6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality
containing
all possible observers and observations lead directly to
laws/postulates of
quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing,
Chapter 7 and
Appendix D).

Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that
should
convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many
worlds (an
infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains
all the
weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type
everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of
quantum
mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of
explanation.
With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and
understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite
reality.

Jason


 You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an
observer,
 replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple
quantum
 experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the
disease,
 CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG
 It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and
 common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the
 latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that
 this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just
 present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable
 fact.

 I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:

 https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326 [3]

As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000
of his own money on the future construction of large scale quantum
computers), I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about
running a conscious AI on such a quantum computer.  That trivially
leads to "many worlds" at least as seen by that AI.
 If it's so trivial maybe you can explain it.  And you don't have
wonder about Aaronson thinks, go check his blog.  I'm pretty sure he's
posted about it.


QM also tells us that Wigner's friend, is no different from that "AI
running on a quantum computer".


 I get kind of tire do being told that QM tells us this or that.  QM
is just another theory.  Ptolemy's theory told us the Sun went around
the Earth.  You do realize that QM is inconsistent with GR?

 Brent


QM is not inconsistent with GR. The issue with quantum gravity is that 
it is not renormalizable, just like the old Fermi theory of the Weak 
interaction was not renormalizable either. If we imagine that quantum 
gravity or Fermi theory is obtained from a fundamental theory under 
coarse graining and rescaling (a so-called RG-flow), then what is going 
on is that there are a wide range of different theories that flow to the 
same effective field theory, and that this makes the predictions of 
higher order effects dependent on the details of the microscopic theory 
that flows to the effective field theory. That's obviously not a 
convenient feature for a theory, but it's not unphysical and it doesn't 
make it an inconsistent theory.


E.g. many QFT textbooks make the rather stupid remark that Fermi theory 
violates unitarity. That's obviously wrong because it's ultimately just 
quantum mechanics and that can't possibly be in violation of unitarity. 
What is going on here is that because you can't get unique predictions 
beyond tree level, you could omit higher order corrections. But 
pretending that these higher order corrections don't exist is wrong, and 
that leads to a violation of unitarity. Fermi theory is perfectly 
unitary, you just have too much choice about the counterterms at one 
loop 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 17 Jun 2018, at 13:42, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Jason Resch < jasonre...@gmail.com 
> >
>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM, < 
>> agrayson2...@gmail.com 
>> > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>>  why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional Interpretation? I 
>> see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just epistemic, and/or 
>> that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG 
>> 
>> 
>> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation, nothing 
>> else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies sometimes, or only 
>> at certain scales)
> 
> Well no, it is an interpretation of the SE, involving the reification of the 
> wave function. So it is not 'just' the Schrödinger equation.

It is of course the meaning of the SWE, or a solution of it (but here the 
solutions makes a Hilbert space, and that plays some role). You need a 
reification only if you believe in an ontological universe, but that is true 
with Newton too, and indeed, with Mechanism, that cannot work. 




> 
>> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance of 
>> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's razor)
> 
> Maybe the collapse is real.

Then the SWE is false. Unitarity is false.



> 
>> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear, reversible 
>> (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require faster than 
>> light influences nor retrocausalities
> 
> MWI is still a non-local theory. FTL influences or not, QM is intrinsically 
> non-local.

If there is no FTL, there is still d’Espagnat inseparability. OK. Usually, non 
locality assumes FTL influences, even if they cannot be used to transfer 
information. But this is mere vocabulary. With the MW, there is no FTL, and I 
think this is what Jason was pointing to.




> 
>> 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is real" with 
>> MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of quantum 
>> computers (now up to 51 qubits)
> 
> Rubbish. The functioning of quantum computers is not dependent on MWI. Many 
> worlds is, after all, only an interpretation. Not the reality of anything at 
> all.

0 world, 1 world, 2 worlds, … omega worlds, 2ômega worlds, … once you mention a 
world, a god or a reality, that is interpretation.But that can be tested most 
of the times, albeit more indirectly. 




> 
>> 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special physical 
>> abilities to observers or measurement devices
> 
> Which version of the CI are you referring to? There are as many "Copenhagen 
> Interpretations" as there are citizens of Copenhagen. Bohr's original theory 
> did not refer to observers or make experiments central. He merely thought 
> that quantum phenomena were understandable only in the context of a classical 
> world.

Everett leads to a (materialist monism, which fails to address the 
computationalist measure problem, but do address the quantum measure problem).

Copenhagen leads to the unintelligible dualism between the observer and the 
observed.



> 
>> 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality containing all 
>> possible observers and observations lead directly to laws/postulates of 
>> quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing 
>> , Chapter 7 and Appendix 
>> D).
> 
> Unfortunately, Russell's attempt to derive quantum mechanics from the plenum 
> of all possible bit strings failed at the first step. So you don't have much 
> support from this.
> 
>> Given #6, we should revise our view
> 
> But we don't have #6. See the discussion I had with Russell on this list some 
> time ago. He had to admit that his derivation of QM failed.
> 
>> It is not MWI and QM that should convince us of many worlds, but rather the 
>> assumption of many worlds (an infinite and infinitely varied reality) that 
>> gives us, and explains all the weirdness of QM.
> 
> No, the weirdness of the violation of the Bell inequalities and non-locality 
> remains, even in MWI.

Once there is no FTL, I don’t see any problem here. The non-locality is made 
explainable, even if this requires the many-worlds, which is the only remaining 
weirdness , but that is not more weird than when Giordano Bruno suggested the 
existence of other planets.





> 
>> This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type everything theories over 
>> any single-universe interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is not only 
>> absurd, but completely devoid of explanation. With the assumption of a large 
>> reality, QM is made explainable and understandable: as a theory of 
>> observation within an infinite reality.
> 
> I think other possibilities are still available, and generally more 
> acceptable.
> 
> MWI has problems of its own. 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 17 Jun 2018, at 13:26, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM, > wrote:
> 
> 
>  why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional Interpretation? I 
> see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just epistemic, and/or 
> that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG 
> 
> -- 
> 
> 
> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation, nothing 
> else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies sometimes, or only 
> at certain scales)
> 
> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance of 
> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's razor)
> 
> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear, reversible 
> (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require faster than 
> light influences nor retrocausalities
> 
> 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is real" with MWI 
> is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of quantum computers 
> (now up to 51 qubits)
> 
> 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special physical 
> abilities to observers or measurement devices
> 
> 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality containing all 
> possible observers and observations lead directly to laws/postulates of 
> quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing 
> , Chapter 7 and Appendix D).
> 
> Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that should 
> convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many worlds (an 
> infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains all the 
> weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type 
> everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of quantum 
> mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of explanation. 
> With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and 
> understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite reality.
> 
> Jason
> 
> You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an observer, 
> replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple quantum 
> experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the disease, 
> CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG 

They are not created. It is only personal consciousness which select 
endemically which computations support them. In QM, it comes from the fact that 
a(b+c+d+e+f+s+t+u+ …) = ab +ac +ae + ….
a is not multiplied in that identity, but its disposition to differentiate is 
made bigger. It is alway a local phenomenon. Mechanism is an abstract form of 
locality principle.

And yes, reality is huge, but that is common in nature, which like to multiply 
many things, particles, atoms, molecules and waves. It is shocking, perhaps, 
but that is very subjective, and can be expected, because our brain have not 
evolved to make us find metaphysics easy, only to facilitate the eat of be 
eaten game, which is a macro-game.

Bruno




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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 17 Jun 2018, at 12:15, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,  > wrote:
> 
> 
>  why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional Interpretation? I 
> see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just epistemic, and/or 
> that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG 
> 
> -- 
> 
> 
> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation, nothing 
> else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies sometimes, or only 
> at certain scales)
> 
> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance of 
> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's razor)
> 
> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear, reversible 
> (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require faster than 
> light influences nor retrocausalities
> 
> 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is real" with MWI 
> is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of quantum computers 
> (now up to 51 qubits)
> 
> 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special physical 
> abilities to observers or measurement devices
> 
> 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality containing all 
> possible observers and observations lead directly to laws/postulates of 
> quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing 
> , Chapter 7 and Appendix D).
> 
> Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that should 
> convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many worlds (an 
> infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains all the 
> weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type 
> everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of quantum 
> mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of explanation. 
> With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and 
> understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite reality.

I agree. The fact that independent approach leads to the same conclusion put 
much weigh on the MWI. Computationalism implies it, and without assuming 
anything more than elementary arithmetic. 
The problem here is that most people continue to work in the Aristotelian 
paradigm, with mechanism in the background, but that is logically inconsistent.

Bruno



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