Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On Friday, July 25, 2014 9:15:10 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Jul 2014, at 04:32, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, July 23, 2014 2:36:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: PGC, I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is saying. My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct. Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense. Your sum up is misleading. I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to argue for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding that this is vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be refutable, and I give a test. No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct. What do you mean by understand comp to be correct? There are plenty of Strong AI people who think that they understand comp to be correct. It is a bet. An assumption. They can understand its meaning, but they can justify its truth. So you are right or wrong according to the sense you give to understand. Then it's a bet that comp is false also. I can understand why it's meaning is incomplete and its truth can only be trivial rather than profound. It's a bet that knowledge can exist also. All knowledge can be a bet. But we can assume it, and deduce from there. People don't think that they are assuming it for no reason, they think that they understand that mechanisms in the brain create consciousness, and that consciousness is a mathematical model within a program. Nobody can understand how a mechanism can get conscious. We can only hope that a sufficiently precise description of oneself ([]p) will preserves the soul ([]p p), that is, that the substitution will preserve the relation with truth. I can understand the opposite though. Consciousness can appear mechanical from a distance if consciousness is primary. There can't be any substitution, but the relation is preserved automatically. Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp. Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the definition of Theaetetus of knowledge, Which I don't, but ok, I think that what you are proposing that we accept is that knowledge is something like justified true belief, or []p p. Yes. It works for the goal of solving the comp mind-body problem, but of course, it does not work for the mundane beliefs and possible knowledge (which belongs to another topic). Is the comp mind-body problem one which doesn't include the hard problem? with believability modelize by provability (which makes sense in the idea case needed for the mind-body problem), we get as mathematical consequence that the 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself, and the machine can know that, both from inside 1p experience, and from reasoning in the comp assumption. But people do think that their 1p can be defined by 3p terms. If you read the literature, this is the object of a very long debate, which might begin with Xenophane (about 6th century before JC) up to today. It is here that comp provides a quite interesting new light, as it shows that both the modern (who accept Theaetetus) and the ancients (who want knowledge being non propositional and non natural) get reconciliate: Like the modern, we can define, for ideally correct machine, knowledge by the theaetetus method applied to Gödel provability predicate, and this, unlike the moderns believe, lead to a non propositional and non natural notion of knower. They think that when they experience X, it is merely the firing of neuron ensemble Y. That is the identity thesis which makes no sense, neither with comp, nor with Everett QM. In their understanding, X is merely a label that represents Y. Daniel Dennett certainly has no problem 'understanding' that his 1p is nothing but 3p. Leading him to eliminate somehow consciousness. That is not quite serious. It is to him though. If comp were true, wouldn't he have to be an example of a machine who understands his 1p consciousness as 3p? This is where I see, if I'm being generous, some inconsistency in the assertion that 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself,, refering to people who are wrong (with respect to comp) is not an argument against comp, or the Theaetetus. Sure it's an argument, if comp is going
Re: John Searle on consciousness
On Sunday, July 27, 2014 5:55:33 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 28 July 2014 04:51, John Clark johnk...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Sun, Jul 27, 2014 at 4:40 AM, LizR liz...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: https://www.ted.com/talks/john_searle_our_shared_condition_consciousness As the inventor of the Chinese Room, the single stupidest thought exparament in the history of the world, I don't understand how anyone can still take anything this clown says seriously. I think he falls into the same camp as Fred Hoyle - someone who manages to get something completely wrong (in Hoyle's case one of the biggest things imaginable) but in a way that still stimulates a lot of very useful thought. (I have a copy of Nigel Calder's Violent Universe somewhere and I think one of the chapters is called Prove Fredf Wrong) As mentioned, his Chinese Room is thoroughly demolished by Dennett and Hofstadter, No, Dennett and Hofdtadter are wrong. Searle is wrong on a lot of things, but the Chinese Room is not one of them. The systems reply is just another way to bring Santa Claus in to plug the chasm between the idea of information and reality of actual experience. but then one has to bear in mind that they are working from an eliminativist perspective (there is a TED talk by Dennett on the same web page as Searle called The illusion of consciousness :-) so *perhaps* they didn't actually do such a good job - not everyone here agrees with the eliminativist approach, after all. Basically their response (iirc) was the systems response - the entire system of room plus lookup table, or whatever it is, understands Chinese, even though the person in the room doesn't. Actually the Chinese room reminds me of the MGA. The CR seeks to show that you can't have consciousness arising from the manipulation of symbols, because consciousness has to be about something (as Brent often points out) and whatever a computer does is just the movement of electrons around circuits, syntax without semantics. The MGA seems to show (I think) that you don't even need the electrons, that manipulating matter generally can't be about something. Unless I got that wrong. (Bu with luck wrong enough to stimulate some intelligent responses... :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: It Knows That It Knows
On Wednesday, July 23, 2014 4:16:07 AM UTC-4, Kim Jones wrote: On 23 Jul 2014, at 4:33 am, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: To be unconscious is not merely to lose the faculties which make our quality of life human, but to lose all faculties. Perhaps, but I doubt that you lose your 'self'. A self is immortal. Just like you wake up from the anaesthetic after the surgery. Where your 'self' was during, is an open question (downing tequila sunrises in the bar at Platonia Central???) I agree, but I think that just means that the self is a deeper, transpersonal level of consciousness. Similarly, is the person who is undergoing transportation-with-delay unconscious? I don't think that there will be teleportation with delay. Reconstructing a body won't even survive as an organism much less a person. Craig It is merely said that 'they' (presumably this means their 'self' - whatever that is, which is what I am asking) is 'stored'. While their self is being stored somewhere it doesn't matter if we think of 'them' as unconscious because they will disagree with you from their 1p report on their experience where they will experience no discontinuity of self whatsoever. So the self cannot be a secretion of the mind. You can knock a mind right out and still get a self back when you take all the tubes out after an extraordinary amount of time. Schumacher is still Schumacher. Alive and well, in a coma, as a vegetable or dead. A person. Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On Wednesday, July 23, 2014 2:36:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: PGC, I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is saying. My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct. Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense. Your sum up is misleading. I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to argue for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding that this is vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be refutable, and I give a test. No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct. What do you mean by understand comp to be correct? There are plenty of Strong AI people who think that they understand comp to be correct. But we can assume it, and deduce from there. People don't think that they are assuming it for no reason, they think that they understand that mechanisms in the brain create consciousness, and that consciousness is a mathematical model within a program. Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp. Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the definition of Theaetetus of knowledge, Which I don't, but ok, I think that what you are proposing that we accept is that knowledge is something like justified true belief, or []p p. with believability modelize by provability (which makes sense in the idea case needed for the mind-body problem), we get as mathematical consequence that the 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself, and the machine can know that, both from inside 1p experience, and from reasoning in the comp assumption. But people do think that their 1p can be defined by 3p terms. They think that when they experience X, it is merely the firing of neuron ensemble Y. In their understanding, X is merely a label that represents Y. Daniel Dennett certainly has no problem 'understanding' that his 1p is nothing but 3p. This is where I see, if I'm being generous, some inconsistency in the assertion that 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself,, or if less generous I would say there is deep hypocrisy or self-deception in holding the contradictory positions that 1) Bruno understands that 1p can ultimately be defined in 3p terms, 2) Machines cannot do 1, and 3) Bruno could be a machine. It is even more suspect since your refuting of my position hinges on 1 and 2 both being true, when it is clear to me that any compromise of 1 and 2 weaken 2 so that it has no meaning. The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's a great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and sweet then it would make perfect sense, however those experiences have no place in a universe of arithmetic truths. Because you limit your view of arithmetical truth to only the 3p objects, but the objects themselves don't do that, and we can share some definition with them and agree on that point. The soul of any machine, is not a machine. This too is a sleight of hand. If the soul of a machine is produced by the machine, then how can you say that the soul is not a machine? To me, it makes mores sense to say that machines are alienated, reduced, destructively compressed representations of soul-like phenomena. There is no cause for a machine to represent its interior as anything fundamentally different than its exterior, all that the math indicates as far as I can tell is that some of the qualities which we expect to see in arithmetic are hidden. Arithmetic can only suggest a private exterior as an interior, not a true aesthetic presence such as the flavor of a carrot. The simpler, and more wondrous explanation is that it is the flavor of the carrot which is irreducible and direct, while the mechanistic extraction is a generic, skeletal ingredient. The machine is part of the soul...the part in which souls reflect each other as a neutral coordinate system and constrain their appearance through a spatiotemporal or form-functional entropy/normalization. Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect created the world, but that is not the world that we actually live in, and no computer program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger, tasted a cookie, enjoyed a moment of peace, etc. The intellect is the Noùs ([]p, in qG*), the soul is the []p p, and it has no 3p description. What is comp but a 3p description? I think this is another sleight of hand. If we talk about 1p in these quasi-mystical terms of being a machine's soul, we forget that we are still viewing 1p
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: PGC, I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is saying. My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct. Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense. The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's a great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and sweet then it would make perfect sense, however those experiences have no place in a universe of arithmetic truths. Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect created the world, but that is not the world that we actually live in, and no computer program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger, tasted a cookie, enjoyed a moment of peace, etc. Craig On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multipl...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Richard Ruquist yan...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be javascript: wrote: Craig, You still talk like if I pretended that computationalism is true. I don't do that, ever. But you *do* pretend that computationalism is false, and I am waiting for an argument. I refuted already your basic argument, which mainly assert that it is obvious, but this is true already for the machine's first person point of view, and so cannot work as a valid refutation of comp. Bruno Bruno, Are you saying that comp is false for the machine's 1p POV? I find your paragraph rather confusing. Richard Not in some normative sense that you could be implying; as in comp is wrong/bad to believe for machine. For sufficiently rich machine, from their 1p point of view, comp entails set of 1p beliefs so sophisticated, that it would be consistent for such machine to assert things like: What me? A mere machine? No way, I'm much more high level/smarter/complex than that. Therefore comp must be false. - Which ISTM is what Craig keeps asserting, in authoritative sense going even much further: insisting that we believe him, without going non-comp in some 3p verifiable way. Don't know if I grasp your understanding/question though. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript:. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: It Knows That It Knows
On Saturday, July 19, 2014 11:26:13 PM UTC-4, Kim Jones wrote: A good thinking habit to cultivate is simplicity. Try and make it as simple as you can. Consciousness comes in two flavours (that I know of): 1. I know 2. I know that I know. (Presumably something to do with remembering that you knew.) Are there any others? I don't think that consciousness has anything to do with knowing, or nested knowing, or self awareness. Consciousness is about one thing: Direct perceptual participation. If there is a feeling of warmth or pain - there is no knowledge that is required, no self-modeling...only the raw appreciation of an aesthetic quality. Most of us are conflate the particulars of human consciousness, which is an almost perversely elaborate evolution of consciousness, and the fundamental nature of awareness itself. In human consciousness, we have layers upon layers of sensation, feeling, thought, and intuition which refer to each other coextensively and dynamically. *We* have an intellectual scope of sensitivity within our consciousness which can analyze and propose concepts and distinctions. That is the level of symbolic manipulation, language, mathematics, etc, but that is not the level which allows us to see the sun or pick up a stone. To be unconscious is not merely to lose the faculties which make our quality of life human, but to lose all faculties. It is only the the human intellect which imagines that its native level of mechanical equivalences are synonymous with awareness itself. Craig Am I correct in assuming the comp substitution level is where consciousness reaches 2? In fact you have to be at 2 to even be able to say you are at 1. This second level of experience appears to be what defines self-aware consciousness. It is the 'I' who knows, (supposedly) consistently the same as the 'I' that I know and vice versa. Consciousness is therefore more than the contents of consciousness. Where does this magical ability of matter to organise its own self-organising information system come from? How does the machine construct its own operating system? Kim Jones B. Mus. GDTL Email: kimj...@ozemail.com.au javascript: kmjc...@icloud.com javascript: Mobile: 0450 963 719 Phone: 02 93894239 Web: http://www.eportfolio.kmjcommp.com *Never let your schooling get in the way of your education - Mark Twain* -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Chalmers and Consciousness
On Sunday, July 20, 2014 9:58:46 AM UTC-4, David Nyman wrote: https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embeddedv=uhRhtFFhNzQ This is a TED video of David Chalmers on the Hard Problem. His basic ideas will be pretty well known to most of us on this list although interestingly, he now seems less equivocal about panpsychism than in The Conscious Mind. He talks about the need for crazy ideas to tackle the Hard Problem. In this regard, he mentions Daniel Dennett's functionalism-is-everything and his his own formulation of information + panpsychism as examples of such crazy theories. However, IMHO these ideas simply aren't crazy enough to confront the Hardest part of the problem. Both seem blind to the crucial need to *reconcile* the 1p and 3p accounts, albeit they ignore it in opposite ways. Dennett's position is essentially to eliminate the 1p part, whereas panpsychism (with or without information) just seems incoherent on the reconciliation. Chalmers seems to consider the outstanding problem in the latter case to be structural mismatch (i.e. physical things don't appear to be structured like mental things). He proposes that this might be solved by invoking informational structure as encoded in physical systems. However, ISTM that the really Hard problem (at least a priori) is not structural, but referential. IOW, how can phenomena that are (putatively) the mutual *referents* of the mind and the brain be shown, in some rigorous sense, to be equivalent, always assuming that one or the other isn't tacitly eliminated from the explanation? Indeed, if one accepts physics as a self-sufficient level of explanation, what purely 3p justification, or need, is there for claiming that a physical system refers at all, as distinct from what is already explained in terms of physical interaction? This is well captured by the Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement (POPJ). The POPJ asks: With reference to what theory (specifically and in detail) is it possible to reconcile the claim that utterances about mental phenomena are exhaustively reducible to purely physical processes, with the parallel claim that such utterances refer to 1p phenomena that are not so reducible? Comp, of course, purports to have the theoretical resources to justify such a reconciliation. Any other contenders? There is never going to be a viable theory to solve the hard problem which doesn't meet qualia halfway. As long as experiences are assumed to be effects rather than causes there will always be a gap between what we are defining theoretically and what actually exists experientially. In my own hypothesis, I try to explain how participatory aesthetic phenomena makes sense as the universal fundamental, from which other notions like physical structure and mechanical function are derived using symmetry and perspective. Craig David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Autism, Aspbergers, and the Hard Problem
On Friday, July 18, 2014 3:08:40 PM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: On Wednesday, July 16, 2014 8:02:18 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: So often it becomes clear to me in debating the issues of consciousness that they are missing something which cannot be replaced by logic. The way that many people think, especially those who are very intelligent in math and physics, only includes a kind of toy model of experience. ... This is not to say that everyone who doesn't understand the hard problem has mindblindness, but I would say it is very likely that having mindreading-empathy deficits on the autistic spectrum would tend to result in a strong bias against idealism, panpsychism, free will, or the hard problem of consciousness. That's an interesting autism study. Regarding your above speculations about consciousness debates, though, it's important to recognize that this is a fully reversible criticism. On the one side, empathy deficits might incline people to have a bias against idealism and so on. But on the other side, those people could equally well speculate that idealists are suffering from biases caused by overactive agency detection and an inaccurate but biologically hardwired theory-of-mind. Overactive agency detection is an unsupportable hypothesis as far as I'm concerned. There is a survival advantage to detecting possible danger, but agency is no more likely to be dangerous than it is to be beneficial - detecting friends, family, allies. It is a completely arbitrary and unscientific assumption that a mechanism which treats agency as a threat by default would be a benefit. I did a post about it here: http://s33light.org/post/1499804865 The idea that it a theory of mind which includes subjective phenomena could be as misguided as one which fails to include them doesn't hold much appeal for me. It would be like saying that people who are not color blind might just be hardwired to see colors that aren't 'real'. It's a fallacy which depends on a misplaced expectation of symmetry IMO. These kind of fully reversible criticisms come up a lot whenever we're tempted to speculate about the psychological genesis of people's beliefs. Some other examples include: * Some Christians tell atheists that they're only atheists because they want to sin. This is easily reversed to atheists telling Christians that they're only Christians because they want others to want others to think they are righteous. * Some liberals tell conservatives that they're only conservatives because they hate minorities/women/poor people/etc. This is easily reversed to conservatives telling liberals that they're only liberals because they're minorities/women/poor people/etc and they are just going along with the others in that group because of shared 'tribal' sentiment. All of those examples might have some truth to them. I don't think that they need to be discarded just because they are reversible. The fact that each side opposes the reversal (conservatives deny the liberal view of conservatism, etc) should not be overlooked also. The primary point is that psychological explanations of other's beliefs, whether the explanations are correct or not, aren't actually relevant to determining the truth or falsity of the beliefs. The secondary point is that, when we find ourselves tempted to psychologize others rather than address their criticisms, all we achieve is propagating prejudice. There is some truth to that, but I think that fear of propagating prejudice can also lead to hiding important truths. The study for me supports my own experiences with people who have a strong materialist-functionalist point of view. It is not to say that it is impossible to have such a view without being autistic, but I do think that there is a significant positive correlation and that this study supports that possibility. Craig Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On Thursday, July 17, 2014 4:25:07 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Jul 2014, at 01:20, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, July 16, 2014 2:22:46 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Jul 2014, at 15:05, Craig Weinberg wrote: So much of our attention in logic and math is focused on using processes to turn specific inputs into even more specific binary outputs. Very little attention is paid to what inputs and outputs are or to the understanding of what truth is in theoretical terms. Come on! ? The possibility of inputs is assumed from the start, since no program can exist without being ‘input’ into some kind of material substrate which has been selected or engineered for that purpose. In which theory? What theory details the ontology of inputs? Arithmetic. The subset of true sigma_1 sentences emulate the UD, that is the activity of all programs on all inputs. That only says that activity and inputs exist, but not what they are or what laws define them. You can’t program a device to be programmable if it isn’t already. Overlooking this is part of the gap between mathematics and reality which is overlooked by all forms of simulation theory and emergentism. You are quick. Correct from the 1p machine's view on their own 1p. You do confuse []p and []p p. So you are saying that programmability is universal outside of 1p views? At least in the same sense that 23 is prime outside 1p views. Then programmability becomes another axiom that computationalism needs not to require an explanation. Like infinite computational resources in a dimensionless pool? You can see it that way. Without some initial connection between sensitive agents which are concretely real and non-theoretical, there can be no storage or processing of information. Before we can input any definitions of logical functions, we have to find something which behaves logically and responds reliably to our manipulations of it. The implications of binary logic, of making distinctions between true/go and false/stop are more far reaching than we might assume. I suggest that if a machine’s operations can be boiled down to true and false bits, then it can have no capacity to exercise intentionality. It has no freedom of action because freedom is a creative act, and creativity in turn entails questioning what is true and what is not. The creative impulse can drive us to attack the truth until it cracks and reveals how it is also false. Creativity also entails redeeming what has been seen as false so that it reveals a new truth. These capabilities and appreciation of them are well beyond the functional description of what a machine would do. Machine logic is, by contrast, the death of choice. To compute is to automate and reduce sense into an abstract sense-of-motion. Leibniz called his early computer a “Stepped Reckoner”, and that it very apt. The word reckon derives from etymological roots that are shared with ‘reg’, as in regal, ruler, and moving straight ahead. It is a straightener or comb of physically embodied rules. A computer functionalizes and conditions reality into rules, step by step, in a mindless imitation of mind. A program or a script is a frozen record of sense-making in retrospect. It is built of propositions defined in isolation rather than sensations which share the common history of all sensation. The computing machine itself does not exist in the natural world, but rather is distilled from the world’s most mechanistic tendencies. All that does not fit into true or false is discarded. Although Gödel is famous for discovering the incompleteness of formal systems, that discovery itself exists within a formal context. The ideal machine, for example, which cannot prove anything that is false, subscribes to the view that truth and falsehood are categories which are true rather than truth and falsehood being possible qualities within a continuum of sense making. There is a Platonic metaphysics at work here, which conjures a block universe of forms which are eternally true and good. In fact, a casual inspection of our own experience reveals no such clear-cut categories, and the goodness and truth of the situations we encounter are often inseparable from their opposite. We seek sensory experiences for the sake of appreciating them directly, rather than only for their truth or functional benefits. Truth is only one of the qualities of sense which matters. The way that a computer processes information is fundamentally different than the way that conscious thought works. Where a consistent machine cannot give a formal proof of its own consistency, a person can be certain of their own certainty without proof. That doesn’t always mean that the person’s feeling turns out to match what they or others will understand to be true later on, but unlike
Autism, Aspbergers, and the Hard Problem
http://www.autism-community.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/TOM-in-TD-and-ASD.pdf This test was also originally devised by Wellman and Estes, and involves asking the child what the brain is for. They found that *normal 3-4 year olds already know that the brain has a set of mental functions*, such as dreaming, wanting, thinking, keeping secrets, etc., Some also knew it had physi cal functions (such as making you move, or helping you stay alive, etc.). In contrast , *children with autism (but who again had a mental age above a 4 year old level) appear to know about the physical functions, but typically fail to mention any mental function of the brain* (Baron-Cohen, 1989a) This paper on autism and theory of mind really shines a light on the most intractable problem within philosophy of mind. In particular ...children from about the age of 4 years old normally are able to distinguish between appearance and reality, that is, they can talk about objects which have misleading appearances. For example, they may say, when presented with *a candle fashioned in the shape of an apple,* that it looks like an apple but is really a candle. C*hildren with autism*, presented with the 5 same sorts of tests, tend to commit errors of realism, *saying the object really is an apple, or really is a candle, but do not capture the object’s dual identity* in their spontaneous descriptions (Baron-Cohen, 1989a). This cartoon from a Psychology Today http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/aspergers-diary/200805/empathy-mindblindness-and-theory-mind article illustrates the kinds of tests that show whether children have developed what is called a theory of mind; an understanding of the contents of other people's experience: Children with autism are virtually at chance on this test, as likely to indicate one character as the other when asked “Which one knows what’s in the box?” So often it becomes clear to me in debating the issues of consciousness that they are missing something which cannot be replaced by logic. The way that many people think, especially those who are very intelligent in math and physics, only includes a kind of toy model of experience - one which fails to fully realize the difference between the map and the territory. It makes a lot of sense to be that having a very low-res, two dimensional theory of mind would correlate with having a philosophy of mind which undersignifies privacy and oversignifies mechanistic influences. The low res theory of mind comes with a built in bias toward behaviorism, where all events are caused by public conditions rather than private feelings and experiences. There are several other interesting findings in the (brief) paper http://www.autism-community.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/TOM-in-TD-and-ASD.pdf. Autistic children find it difficult to tell the difference between what they meant to do and what they actually did, so that when they shoot at a target and miss, they don't understand that they intended to hit it but ended up missing it and say that they meant to miss. Overall, the list of deficits in imagination, pragmatics, social mindreading, etc has been called mindblindness. This is not to say that everyone who doesn't understand the hard problem has mindblindness, but I would say it is very likely that having mindreading-empathy deficits on the autistic spectrum would tend to result in a strong bias against idealism, panpsychism, free will, or the hard problem of consciousness. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Gödel of the Gaps
So much of our attention in logic and math is focused on using processes to turn specific inputs into even more specific binary outputs. Very little attention is paid to what inputs and outputs are or to the understanding of what truth is in theoretical terms. The possibility of inputs is assumed from the start, since no program can exist without being ‘input’ into some kind of material substrate which has been selected or engineered for that purpose. You can’t program a device to be programmable if it isn’t already. Overlooking this is part of the gap between mathematics and reality which is overlooked by all forms of simulation theory and emergentism. Without some initial connection between sensitive agents which are concretely real and non-theoretical, there can be no storage or processing of information. Before we can input any definitions of logical functions, we have to find something which behaves logically and responds reliably to our manipulations of it. The implications of binary logic, of making distinctions between true/go and false/stop are more far reaching than we might assume. I suggest that if a machine’s operations can be boiled down to true and false bits, then it can have no capacity to exercise intentionality. It has no freedom of action because freedom is a creative act, and creativity in turn entails questioning what is true and what is not. The creative impulse can drive us to attack the truth until it cracks and reveals how it is also false. Creativity also entails redeeming what has been seen as false so that it reveals a new truth. These capabilities and appreciation of them are well beyond the functional description of what a machine would do. Machine logic is, by contrast, the death of choice. To compute is to automate and reduce sense into an abstract sense-of-motion. Leibniz called his early computer a “Stepped Reckoner”, and that it very apt. The word reckon derives from etymological roots that are shared with ‘reg’, as in regal, ruler, and moving straight ahead. It is a straightener or comb of physically embodied rules. A computer functionalizes and conditions reality into rules, step by step, in a mindless imitation of mind. A program or a script is a frozen record of sense-making in retrospect. It is built of propositions defined in isolation rather than sensations which share the common history of all sensation. The computing machine itself does not exist in the natural world, but rather is distilled from the world’s most mechanistic tendencies. All that does not fit into true or false is discarded. Although Gödel is famous for discovering the incompleteness of formal systems, that discovery itself exists within a formal context. The ideal machine, for example, which cannot prove anything that is false, subscribes to the view that truth and falsehood are categories which are true rather than truth and falsehood being possible qualities within a continuum of sense making. There is a Platonic metaphysics at work here, which conjures a block universe of forms which are eternally true and good. In fact, a casual inspection of our own experience reveals no such clear-cut categories, and the goodness and truth of the situations we encounter are often inseparable from their opposite. We seek sensory experiences for the sake of appreciating them directly, rather than only for their truth or functional benefits. Truth is only one of the qualities of sense which matters. The way that a computer processes information is fundamentally different than the way that conscious thought works. Where a consistent machine cannot give a formal proof of its own consistency, a person can be certain of their own certainty without proof. That doesn’t always mean that the person’s feeling turns out to match what they or others will understand to be true later on, but unlike a computer, we have available to us an experience of a sense of certainty (especially a ‘common sense’) that is an informal feeling rather than a formal logical proof. A computer has neither certainty nor uncertainty, so it makes no difference to it whether a proof exists or not. The calculation procedure is run and the output is generated. It can be compared against the results of other calculators or to employ more calculations itself to assess a probability, but it has no sense of whether the results are certain or not. Our common sense is a feeling which can be proved wrong, but can also be proved right informally by other people. We can come to a consensus beyond rationality with trust and intuition, which is grounded the possibility of the real rather than the realization of the hypothetical. When we use computation and logic, we are extending our sense of certainty by consulting a neutral third party, but what Gödel shows is that there is a problem with measurement itself. It is not just the ruler that is incomplete, or the book of rules, but the
Re: Autism, Aspbergers, and the Hard Problem
On Wednesday, July 16, 2014 9:53:43 AM UTC-4, David Nyman wrote: On 16 July 2014 14:02, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: but I would say it is very likely that having mindreading-empathy deficits on the autistic spectrum would tend to result in a strong bias against idealism, panpsychism, free will, or the hard problem of consciousness. I must say I've often wondered about this very thing in the course of some online discussions. However I try not to fall prey too readily to any assumption of this sort, to at least temper any tendency on my part to debate the person rather than the argument. I want to agree, and it is important to temper tendencies to debate the person, but I think that this is one case where debating someone with low theory of mind skills is like debating about color with someone who is blind. They just have no possibility of understanding what the discussion is about, and (because of their low theory of mind skills) cannot tell the difference between a different perspective from their own and being wrong (stupid, Dualist, Solipsist, etc). David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Autism, Aspbergers, and the Hard Problem
On Wednesday, July 16, 2014 2:06:27 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Jul 2014, at 15:02, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://www.autism-community.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/TOM-in-TD-and-ASD.pdf This test was also originally devised by Wellman and Estes, and involves asking the child what the brain is for. They found that *normal 3-4 year olds already know that the brain has a set of mental functions*, such as dreaming, wanting, thinking, keeping secrets, etc., Some also knew it had physi cal functions (such as making you move, or helping you stay alive, etc.). In contrast , *children with autism (but who again had a mental age above a 4 year old level) appear to know about the physical functions, but typically fail to mention any mental function of the brain* (Baron-Cohen, 1989a) This paper on autism and theory of mind really shines a light on the most intractable problem within philosophy of mind. In particular ...children from about the age of 4 years old normally are able to distinguish between appearance and reality, that is, they can talk about objects which have misleading appearances. For example, they may say, when presented with *a candle fashioned in the shape of an apple,* that it looks like an apple but is really a candle. C*hildren with autism*, presented with the 5 same sorts of tests, tend to commit errors of realism, *saying the object really is an apple, or really is a candle, but do not capture the object’s dual identity* in their spontaneous descriptions (Baron-Cohen, 1989a). This cartoon from a Psychology Today http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/aspergers-diary/200805/empathy-mindblindness-and-theory-mind article illustrates the kinds of tests that show whether children have developed what is called a theory of mind; an understanding of the contents of other people's experience: Children with autism are virtually at chance on this test, as likely to indicate one character as the other when asked “Which one knows what’s in the box?” So often it becomes clear to me in debating the issues of consciousness that they are missing something which cannot be replaced by logic. The way that many people think, especially those who are very intelligent in math and physics, only includes a kind of toy model of experience - one which fails to fully realize the difference between the map and the territory. It makes a lot of sense to be that having a very low-res, two dimensional theory of mind would correlate with having a philosophy of mind which undersignifies privacy and oversignifies mechanistic influences. The low res theory of mind comes with a built in bias toward behaviorism, where all events are caused by public conditions rather than private feelings and experiences. There are several other interesting findings in the (brief) paper http://www.autism-community.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/TOM-in-TD-and-ASD.pdf. Autistic children find it difficult to tell the difference between what they meant to do and what they actually did, so that when they shoot at a target and miss, they don't understand that they intended to hit it but ended up missing it and say that they meant to miss. Overall, the list of deficits in imagination, pragmatics, social mindreading, etc has been called mindblindness. This is not to say that everyone who doesn't understand the hard problem has mindblindness, but I would say it is very likely that having mindreading-empathy deficits on the autistic spectrum would tend to result in a strong bias against idealism, panpsychism, free will, or the hard problem of consciousness. Craig, you beg the question in a novel interesting way. I agree with the concluding sentence, but that would describe exactly the state of a rationalist who decides to keep comp and materialism, and de facto eliminate the person and consciousness. Maybe all such rationalists have low theory of mind skills? But the big discovery is that when we look at computer science, we can apply to machine (ideally correct believer in arithmetic) the simplest notion of knowledge (Theaetetus), and the incompleteness (which already guaranty universality and the consistence of Church Thesis) prevents any possible confusion between the first person knower and any machine or 3p description, and this already for the machine in their own 1p view, so defined by Theatetus (with believability played by provability in rich enough theory of numbers or digital machines/programs, combinators). It's hard for me to figure out what you're saying there. By reading your book I have picked up a little better understanding of how you use modal logic, but it only makes me more sure that it is a red herring. To me, the only issue with the hard problem is feeling. Math does not allow feeling. It has no reason to create it or to use it. All of the rest - the first person and third
Re: Gödel of the Gaps
On Wednesday, July 16, 2014 2:22:46 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Jul 2014, at 15:05, Craig Weinberg wrote: So much of our attention in logic and math is focused on using processes to turn specific inputs into even more specific binary outputs. Very little attention is paid to what inputs and outputs are or to the understanding of what truth is in theoretical terms. Come on! ? The possibility of inputs is assumed from the start, since no program can exist without being ‘input’ into some kind of material substrate which has been selected or engineered for that purpose. In which theory? What theory details the ontology of inputs? You can’t program a device to be programmable if it isn’t already. Overlooking this is part of the gap between mathematics and reality which is overlooked by all forms of simulation theory and emergentism. You are quick. Correct from the 1p machine's view on their own 1p. You do confuse []p and []p p. So you are saying that programmability is universal outside of 1p views? Like infinite computational resources in a dimensionless pool? Without some initial connection between sensitive agents which are concretely real and non-theoretical, there can be no storage or processing of information. Before we can input any definitions of logical functions, we have to find something which behaves logically and responds reliably to our manipulations of it. The implications of binary logic, of making distinctions between true/go and false/stop are more far reaching than we might assume. I suggest that if a machine’s operations can be boiled down to true and false bits, then it can have no capacity to exercise intentionality. It has no freedom of action because freedom is a creative act, and creativity in turn entails questioning what is true and what is not. The creative impulse can drive us to attack the truth until it cracks and reveals how it is also false. Creativity also entails redeeming what has been seen as false so that it reveals a new truth. These capabilities and appreciation of them are well beyond the functional description of what a machine would do. Machine logic is, by contrast, the death of choice. To compute is to automate and reduce sense into an abstract sense-of-motion. Leibniz called his early computer a “Stepped Reckoner”, and that it very apt. The word reckon derives from etymological roots that are shared with ‘reg’, as in regal, ruler, and moving straight ahead. It is a straightener or comb of physically embodied rules. A computer functionalizes and conditions reality into rules, step by step, in a mindless imitation of mind. A program or a script is a frozen record of sense-making in retrospect. It is built of propositions defined in isolation rather than sensations which share the common history of all sensation. The computing machine itself does not exist in the natural world, but rather is distilled from the world’s most mechanistic tendencies. All that does not fit into true or false is discarded. Although Gödel is famous for discovering the incompleteness of formal systems, that discovery itself exists within a formal context. The ideal machine, for example, which cannot prove anything that is false, subscribes to the view that truth and falsehood are categories which are true rather than truth and falsehood being possible qualities within a continuum of sense making. There is a Platonic metaphysics at work here, which conjures a block universe of forms which are eternally true and good. In fact, a casual inspection of our own experience reveals no such clear-cut categories, and the goodness and truth of the situations we encounter are often inseparable from their opposite. We seek sensory experiences for the sake of appreciating them directly, rather than only for their truth or functional benefits. Truth is only one of the qualities of sense which matters. The way that a computer processes information is fundamentally different than the way that conscious thought works. Where a consistent machine cannot give a formal proof of its own consistency, a person can be certain of their own certainty without proof. That doesn’t always mean that the person’s feeling turns out to match what they or others will understand to be true later on, but unlike a computer, we have available to us an experience of a sense of certainty (especially a ‘common sense’) that is an informal feeling rather than a formal logical proof. A computer has neither certainty nor uncertainty, so it makes no difference to it whether a proof exists or not. The calculation procedure is run and the output is generated. It can be compared against the results of other calculators or to employ more calculations itself to assess a probability, but it has no sense of whether the results are certain or not. Our common sense
Re: Through The Wormhole Episode
On Tuesday, June 10, 2014 12:48:29 AM UTC-4, Samiya wrote: Thanks for sharing! Sure, you're very welcome. I found the 'built for a purpose' experiment with children and adults quite interesting. Yes! I forgot about that part actually, but yes very interesting how the why? and evolves from a teleological default. The expectation of teleology is intrinsic to the development of consciousness. I suppose there are things we know, things we reason and things we desire, and sometimes they all come together, and sometimes they conflict, such that we try to convince ourselves of something that deep down, on the fundamental level, is differently 'hard-wired' within us. I thought the truth-machine experiment was flawed. If its a truth-machine, then it should know the truth (have the truth data already) rather than evolving, through user-interaction, in its knowledge of the truth. The flaw here is similar to the fallacy applied to ideas of God where some people, though they admit that there is a God, imagine that God is evolving and learning through creation (experimentation?). We may not be able to comprehend God, but that does not mean that we try to limit God or cast God in the 'image of man'. The Godel truth-machine doesn't necessarily have all truth data, it just has perfect knowledge of whether any given statement is true or false. It's a thought experiment, so it doesn't have to make sense, it just has to isolate the question of whether logic is absolutely consistent. The fact that some statements which refer to themselves are not consistent shows either that logic is inconsistent, or that reference is beyond logic. I think that clearly it is the latter, if not both. Reference is an aesthetic experience which requires sensory participation. What I proposed is that the thought experiment can be used to illustrate that more, by showing that the elements of the statements, by themselves, are neither true nor false. Logical systems and arithmetic truths cannot be fundamental because their presence in the first place is not true or false. Craig Samiya On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 7:42 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: Through the Wormhole: Is God an Alien Concept? http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1hexc7_is-god-an-alien-concept_shortfilms?start=2 http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1hexc7_is-god-an-alien-concept_shortfilms?start=2 If you haven’t seen this episode, I highly recommend it. Early on there is an experiment which shows the effect that reading words associated with spirituality is correlated with being able to exercise substantially more willpower. This result is used to help justify the existence of religion as a part of natural selection, since the benefit of increased willpower to perform unpleasant tasks would offset the cost of otherwise difficult to explain rituals and ceremonies. What was not offered is an explanation of the nature of what it is in particular about concept of spirituality that causes the effect of amplifying the effectiveness of personal resolve. In my view, the God concept is a metaphor for consciousness, so that by referring to the divine, we are reminding ourselves of the primacy of our own sensory capacities and motive powers. Spiritual concepts assert teleology over material appearances, and aligns the self rightfully with teleology rather than a passive object. Part of the reason why religion has been so effective has been its role as cheerleader for the military, and if there is some truth to my hypothesis, it would make a lot of sense to mix the two so that you have a weaponized religion/teleologized military. Of course, it is a double edged sword (almost literally), as the physical arms race is mirrored by the immaterial arms race, and fanatical fundamentalism is born. The last segment (starting 36:35) was on Gödel and incompleteness. In the example they dramatized, there is an exchange with a universal truth machine which repeats only true statements. 2+2=4 gets repeated but 2+2=5 does not. The machine famously breaks down when it comes to the prospect of repeating “I cannot say 2+2=5 twice, I cannot say 2+2=5”, since it is both true that it cannot say that 2+2=5, but false that it cannot say it two times in a row. What occurs to me here is to ask whether the machine can just say “2”, or “plus”, or “equals”? If so, then just by slowing down the machine, it can be made to say two, plus, two, equals, five. By breaking down logic to these elements, it can be seen that sensory inputs are beneath the level of logic. Whether we say that the machine will repeat isolated elements or it won’t, it should be clear that the presence or absence of information is not generated by logic, and that in fact, logical inference is derived from the relationships among elements which are given. Indeed, just as we can utter
Through The Wormhole Episode
Through the Wormhole: Is God an Alien Concept? http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1hexc7_is-god-an-alien-concept_shortfilms?start=2 http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1hexc7_is-god-an-alien-concept_shortfilms?start=2 If you haven’t seen this episode, I highly recommend it. Early on there is an experiment which shows the effect that reading words associated with spirituality is correlated with being able to exercise substantially more willpower. This result is used to help justify the existence of religion as a part of natural selection, since the benefit of increased willpower to perform unpleasant tasks would offset the cost of otherwise difficult to explain rituals and ceremonies. What was not offered is an explanation of the nature of what it is in particular about concept of spirituality that causes the effect of amplifying the effectiveness of personal resolve. In my view, the God concept is a metaphor for consciousness, so that by referring to the divine, we are reminding ourselves of the primacy of our own sensory capacities and motive powers. Spiritual concepts assert teleology over material appearances, and aligns the self rightfully with teleology rather than a passive object. Part of the reason why religion has been so effective has been its role as cheerleader for the military, and if there is some truth to my hypothesis, it would make a lot of sense to mix the two so that you have a weaponized religion/teleologized military. Of course, it is a double edged sword (almost literally), as the physical arms race is mirrored by the immaterial arms race, and fanatical fundamentalism is born. The last segment (starting 36:35) was on Gödel and incompleteness. In the example they dramatized, there is an exchange with a universal truth machine which repeats only true statements. 2+2=4 gets repeated but 2+2=5 does not. The machine famously breaks down when it comes to the prospect of repeating “I cannot say 2+2=5 twice, I cannot say 2+2=5”, since it is both true that it cannot say that 2+2=5, but false that it cannot say it two times in a row. What occurs to me here is to ask whether the machine can just say “2”, or “plus”, or “equals”? If so, then just by slowing down the machine, it can be made to say two, plus, two, equals, five. By breaking down logic to these elements, it can be seen that sensory inputs are beneath the level of logic. Whether we say that the machine will repeat isolated elements or it won’t, it should be clear that the presence or absence of information is not generated by logic, and that in fact, logical inference is derived from the relationships among elements which are given. Indeed, just as we can utter statements that the logical truth machine cannot, we have no trouble uttering isolated elements. We can appreciate and reproduce sounds and symbols which have no logical meaning, but rather refer to the aesthetic nature of the experience of uttering them. How are we to deny that aesthetic properties must be more fundamental than logical properties, and that representation (information) cannot exist in the absence of presentation (sensory experience)? There are several other good segments in here, including one with Ben Goertzel. I agree with Ben’s views on the universality of spiritual qualities within intelligence, however I do not consider AI to be authentic intelligence derived from sensory-aesthetic phenomena, but rather simulated intelligence, derived from what I imagine to be a kind of grand concourse of interstitial protocols. Intelligence can be thought of as commercialization or publicizing of subjectivity. An AI, derived from generic rules rather than irrationally appreciated aesthetic experiences (like, love, pain, pleasure), can deliver a commercial for subjectivity, but I think that it will in fact lack any ‘residential’ authenticity. The lights are on, and it looks like someone might be home…but they aren’t. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: HAL is here!
Nah, just more hype. Telling the judges that the computer was a 13 year old who speaks English as a second language is tampering. Why not say that they are developmentally disabled or a sociopath? No dice. At least they could have used 13 year old judges. On Sunday, June 8, 2014 10:34:10 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: Or is he (it) ? http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/08/super-computer-simulates-13-year-old-boy-passes-turing-test?CMP=twt_fd -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Top-down causation
It seems much more sensible to me that bottom-up emergence and top-down divergence are poles of a continuum of trans-causal interaction. I would assume that there is also center-out and periphery-in interaction, as well as other kinds of harmonic chords of coincident entanglement/disentanglement. That the universe could be strictly bottom up causality is absurd to me - as absurd as the idea of letters of the alphabet learning to read, but at the same time, it makes perfect sense to me that every view of the universe, including the bottom-up emergentist view, is presented in its most coherent light when reflecting its most favorable attention. Every view of the universe can make a tremendous amount of sense, given genuine interest in it. On Wednesday, April 30, 2014 7:47:57 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote: Emergence means that the higher level is idependent of the substrate and produce effects in the substrate. That means that once emerged, it does not matter if is the result off a darwinian process, a numeric simulation or an intelligent design, it is as it is and start to work with their own rules, influencing above and below it. http://www.mth.uct.ac.za/~ellis/nature.pdf -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg
On Monday, May 19, 2014 2:40:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 May 2014, at 21:37, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, May 18, 2014 1:56:48 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 May 2014, at 17:43, Craig Weinberg wrote: Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to the ‘hardware’ of our Universe I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and thought it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on the math, but I don't see any obvious problems with his general approach: http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/ Some highlights: Some Diophantine equations are easily solved automatically, for example: ∃푥, ∃푦 푥² = 푦² , 푥 푦 ∈ ℤ Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed to step through all the possible solutions will find one immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica, Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve any Diophantine equation. ... *Consequence* In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a computer. Also, he is the inventor of the LCD touchscreen, so that gives him some credibility as well. http://www.trustedreviews.com/news/i-never-expected-them-to-take-off-says-inventor-of-the-touchscreen-display You will not convince Andrew Wiles or anyone with argument like that. 1) it is an open question if the use of non elementary means can be eliminated from Wiles proof. Usually non elementary means are eliminated after some time in Number theory, and there are conjectures that this could be a case of general law. 2) machine can use non elementary means in searching proofs too. Does computationalism necessarily include all that is done by what we consider machines, Only digital machines. But how do you know the difference between what a digital machine happens to do because of the way that it is implemented (machine + sense + physics) rather than what follows from mechanism alone? or does computationalism have to be grounded, by definition, in elementary means? It does not, but always can, by Church Thesis. Why doesn't it? Why isn't the same loose grounding afforded to consciousness? I'm not really sure what would even constitute being always allowed to be grounded in the elementary but not having to be. You did not provide evidence that they cannot do that. His evidence was the negative answer to Hilbert's 10th problem. By using Church thesis. The proof consists in showing that the 10th problem of Hilbert is Turing complete. Diophantine polynomials are Turing universal. See below for an example of UD written as a system of Diophantine equations (exponent are abbreviation here(*) From what I've gathered so far, it seems like the proof shows that the halting problem has a Diophantine representation, so that because Church-Turing proves the halting problem is not computable, then Hilbert's 10th problem of whether Diophantine equations can be computed generally must be a no. The fact that Wiles did prove a solution to FLT but could not have done so using a general algorithm shows, according to Tagg, that Wiles is not a Turing machine. And you could'nt as a machine like ZF, or ZF + kappa, can prove things with quite non elementary means. What theory addresses the emergence of non elementary means? Mathematical logic, theoretical computer science. Does it explain where the emergence comes from, or just demonstrates that it appears to emerge from an unknown property? Maybe there is something about the implementation of those machines which is introducing it rather than computational factors? ? The non-elementary part may be from the inference of the mathematician's consciousnesses, or physics of implementation rather than the math. Craig Bruno (*) Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2 Qu = B^(5^60) La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5 Th + 2Z = B^5 L = U + TTh E = Y + MTh N = Q^16 R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + + LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N) + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1) P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2 (P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2 4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2 K = R + 1 + HP - H A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2 C = 2R + 1 Ph D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1 F
Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg
On Sunday, May 18, 2014 9:59:10 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 19 May 2014 07:37, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: You did not provide evidence that they cannot do that. His evidence was the negative answer to Hilbert's 10th problem. To be exact, it's claimed to be *how he arrived at* that answer. The extract says that he arrived at a proof that no algorithm could have found. How did he find it? From what I can gather, Matijasevich proved that the already proven unsolvable Halting Problem can be represented as a Diophantine equation, so that there is at least one Diophantine equation that can't be solved by a Turing machine. I'm sure its more complicated than that, but at this point, that's what I'm getting as a general overview. The paper is far too high powered for my little brain, so I am hoping for an answer for dummies. Did he decide that the answer might have some particular form using intuition, say, tried it, and found it worked? How did he (or anyone) then show there was no algorithm for finding it? (This is reminiscent of The Emperor's New Mind, which IIRC attempts to prove that some gifted mathematicians are not machines!) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg
On Sunday, May 18, 2014 10:53:57 PM UTC-4, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 07:01:01PM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, May 18, 2014 9:34:40 PM UTC-4, Russell Standish wrote: This doesn't follow. An evolutionary algorithm with a real random source, can potentially stumble upon any solution, not just ones for which no algorithm can find. There even remains some doubt that real randomness is required, so long as the entropy of the random source is sufficiently high. The Wiles proof didn't have a random source though, it was developed intentionally. The proof doesn't but Wiles probably did (in his brain, presumably, although he could have used a coin or something else). In COMP, the universal dovetailer provides plenty of real randomness from the subjective point of view, that can be harnessed. Perhaps that's exactly what Andrew Wiles did. (In fact, I really rather think he did - my proofs, which are not so grand as Andrew's, usually involve some divine spark of inspiration, which is just another term for rolling a random number generator). You're still the one intentionally doing the rolling. That makes no sense. Rolling an RNG is a mechanical process, if ever there was one. Intention to solve Fermat's last theorem is outside the scope of the claim. If you are intending to solve a problem, anything that you do in the service of solving that problem is intentional, even if you employ rolling a RNG as a step. Adding a RNG into a computer program does not make it able to solve the Halting Problem. It probably doesn't even make the solvability of the Halting Problem more or less computable. Besides, randomness is conceptual. As far as I know, there is no proof of actual randomness, nor proof that such proof could exist. Craig -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Moneybot Singularity
On Monday, May 19, 2014 5:52:35 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: Craig, What about computer/automated trading software that currently executes the majority of stock trades in the world? See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-frequency_trading Then there are also those text messaging services where people pay $1 or more per text message to chat with what they think are humans (but are actually bots). Not to mention bitcoin mining, and poker bots. Sure, but what we see is that automated trading software works well, until it doesn't, and markets crash. If the global economy does collapse, or is gradually collapsing, it may be in no small part due to the cascading effects of high frequency trading. Its risks are no less than any trader who relies on technical analysis, it just happens much faster. As for the other methods you mention, I would expect that very few will have long lasting success. Eventually counter-bots might make bots unprofitable, or they may become illegal. All of these are examples of unsustainable, parasitic mechanisms. What I'm talking about is the opposite - a machine that does not feed on the deception but actually produces an honest value for itself and for civilization. Craig Jason On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: An interesting little thought experiment to consider: Is there a way to create a program or AI moneybot which can figure out how to make more money on the internet than it costs? I see this as a sneaky way to get at the trans-computable nature of consciousness as it brings up issues about the ultimate causes of financial transactions. As we know, human motives and senses are required to legally cause money to change hands. We spend a lot of time developing schemes for security that will protect the power of humans to control how their own money is spent. Also as we know, the proximate causes of financial transaction over the internet are the digital incrementing and decrementing of account data. Even given a souped-up quantum computer which could break every encryption and factor, the idea that there could be an algorithm which will be able to reliably and legally extract money from the internet forever seems fundamentally flawed. We have primitive moneybots already, in the form of malware, but releasing malware carries a risk, especially if it is successful enough to catch the attention of police. Also, free protection against malware tends to spread as fast as the original threat, so that the long term prospects seem shaky at best. Finally, even in the case where a moneybot happens to be successful, its use would inevitably destroy whatever economy that it is introduced into. As the bot’s automatic success eclipsed the ebbs and flows of the real life financial risk, there would be no way for a market to compete with a sure thing. We’re already seeing this happen in the form of automated trades in hedge funds, derivatives, etc, but that’s another conversation. What would it take to write a moneybot that actually *earns* money legally without human intervention? Answering this question, if we are being honest, is probably a much higher priority for working computer scientists than answering the more philosophical questions about Strong AI. The question of what a bot would have to say or do on the internet to get people to willingly part with their money, and to do so without complaints later on, would seem to be infinitely difficult without the bot being able to identify personally with human beings living human lives. Modeling only the behavior of data being sent and received wouldn’t work because the data has no access to the actual experience of a person receiving merchandise.To the moneybot, the only difference between successfully selling something and failing is that there is no complaints received, not that there was nothing that actually existed to sell in the first place. A moneybot could find, for example, that people spend money at sites like Amazon.com, and could create a website that looks and acts like a retail site, but there is nothing that the bot could tell the customer to assure them that its arbitrarily generated tracking number has caused the delivery of the package. There is no way for the program to know whether there is really something to deliver or not, and there is no way for the customer to ignore the fact that there is nothing delivered. The program can’t calculate that the actual Amazon site has a backend fulfillment machine which is composed of real manufactured goods, packaging, delivery, etc. The bot could conceivably be programmed to understand what such a fulfillment enterprise entails, but it has no way to compute the difference between its own in silico modeling of an enterprise and the concrete reality that is required for people to get boxes
Re: Video of VCR
On Thursday, May 15, 2014 6:06:00 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 16 May 2014 08:22, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth. Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that what we prove in a theory written in such logic, will be true in all interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will be provable in the theory. Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. This means that the truth about number and machines are above what machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume computationalism. But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot truthfully assume it. I believe it's an assumption, and all we can do is bet on (or against) it. If we make that assumption, the UDA shows the consequences. I don't personally know that UDA shows the consequences, but I trust Bruno's expertise that UDA at least shows the possible consequences. The assumption is a fairly standard one for scientists working in the materialist paradigm, I believe. Unless they use continua or infinities at some point, it seems quite plausible that at some level reality could be TE. Yes, it's a popular assumption. Those don't always last forever. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Friday, May 16, 2014 3:20:24 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 May 2014, at 22:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth. Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that what we prove in a theory written in such logic, will be true in all interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will be provable in the theory. Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. This means that the truth about number and machines are above what machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume computationalism. But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot truthfully assume it. no. It is a theory about your consciousness, and its relation with possible brains. But a brain is just a type of machine under comp, and the relations are just number relations. It becomes a theory about numbers, but that is the result of a non trivial reasoning, and the acceptation of the classical theory of knowledge. I can't imagine why the classical theory of knowledge should be acceptable as a way to model consciousness. Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can use non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to Hilbert's 10th problem? No. Why not? I doubt I'll understand your answer but I might be able to get someone else to explain why he thinks you're wrong. Well, you can invite him to make his point. I've only spoken with him a couple times, but I would if it comes up in the future. The problem is that somehow, in some sense, humans can use non computational rules, like heuristics and metaheuristic, which are non algorithm. But that is also a big chapter in AI, and machines can also use heuristic without problem, and it change nothing about the truth or falsity of comp. In fact the first person []p p is also a non algorithmic entity. So, use à-la Penrose Gödelian argument are usually confusion between []p and []p p, or []p in G and []p in G*. I think that it is nothing other than a semantic misdirection to take non-computational first person properties as being associated with computation. If non-computational properties serve an important function in consciousness, then comp is false. If our first person experience is non-computational then comp is false, since the production of non-computational effects by computation does not imply consciousness, nor does it even imply independence from consciousness to accomplish that production. Penrose thinks that it does: The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding – the means whereby mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical truth – cannot be reduced to blind calculation! Good. That's when Penrose is correct. No machines at all can use a knowably sound procedure to ascertain a mathematical truth. By adding knowably Penrose corrected an earlier statement. But then he does not realize that now, his argument is in favor of mechanism, because it attribute to humans, what computer science already attributes to machine. If computer science attributes it to machines (and I would say that it is only some computer scientists who do so) because some are not aware of the difference between []p p and []p. I am aware that the difference is assumed in comp rather than explained by comp. You admit that at some level, basic functions of logic are taken as axioms. I reject all possibility of axioms in the absence of sense. then it cannot use a knowably sound procedure to do that, therefore it is a belief rather than a correct attribution. Yes. you even need an act of faith. I never defend the truth of comp. It is a belief like everywhere in science when we apply it to a reality. I don't think that the understanding that awareness is ontologically necessary is an act of faith, I think that it is inescapable empirically and rationally. I would not say that I have faith
Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg
Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to the ‘hardware’ of our Universe I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and thought it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on the math, but I don't see any obvious problems with his general approach: http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/ Some highlights: Some Diophantine equations are easily solved automatically, for example: ∃푥, ∃푦 푥² = 푦² , 푥 푦 ∈ ℤ Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed to step through all the possible solutions will find one immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica, Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve any Diophantine equation. ... *Consequence* In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a computer. Also, he is the inventor of the LCD touchscreen, so that gives him some credibility as well. http://www.trustedreviews.com/news/i-never-expected-them-to-take-off-says-inventor-of-the-touchscreen-display -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Moneybot Singularity
On Thursday, May 15, 2014 5:18:15 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 16 May 2014 08:29, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 3:55:12 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote: Craig: beautiful reply, appreciate your understanding and explanation. H O W E V E R : if we MIX pop culture with more 'thought-of' speculation (language?) we get into trouble soon. Popular meanings are ill-defined and many times loose. I try to verify the exact meanings applies Craig, my Kraxlwerk (PC) stole the half-baked text and mailed it away. I am thankful: the rest would have been silly, anyway. John Thanks John, Yeah, I re-posted that one from by blog so it is more pop-friendly than I probably would have made it for this list. Applying 'singularity' to the growth of technology is pretty weak, I agree. I guess someone decided it needed a super-amazing name. Vernor Vinge. He called it a technological singularity because it makes the future impossible to predict even in a weak sense. This makes it more like a technological event horizon than a singularity, assuming it occurs (Max Tegmark seems to be both worried and hopeful that it will). A singularity is where something comes to an end, in this case human progress (it ends because it hits the wall of whatever is actually possible, assuming that is finite, or if not it ends because it goes to infinity). Thanks. Yeah, that makes more sense, and I have heard of Vinge, but it still seems like a term which as a meaning that is more of a metaphor than most people would assume. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg
On Sunday, May 18, 2014 1:56:48 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 May 2014, at 17:43, Craig Weinberg wrote: Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to the ‘hardware’ of our Universe I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and thought it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on the math, but I don't see any obvious problems with his general approach: http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/ Some highlights: Some Diophantine equations are easily solved automatically, for example: ∃푥, ∃푦 푥² = 푦² , 푥 푦 ∈ ℤ Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed to step through all the possible solutions will find one immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica, Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve any Diophantine equation. ... *Consequence* In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a computer. Also, he is the inventor of the LCD touchscreen, so that gives him some credibility as well. http://www.trustedreviews.com/news/i-never-expected-them-to-take-off-says-inventor-of-the-touchscreen-display You will not convince Andrew Wiles or anyone with argument like that. 1) it is an open question if the use of non elementary means can be eliminated from Wiles proof. Usually non elementary means are eliminated after some time in Number theory, and there are conjectures that this could be a case of general law. 2) machine can use non elementary means in searching proofs too. Does computationalism necessarily include all that is done by what we consider machines, or does computationalism have to be grounded, by definition, in elementary means? You did not provide evidence that they cannot do that. His evidence was the negative answer to Hilbert's 10th problem. And you could'nt as a machine like ZF, or ZF + kappa, can prove things with quite non elementary means. What theory addresses the emergence of non elementary means? Maybe there is something about the implementation of those machines which is introducing it rather than computational factors? Craig Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg
On Sunday, May 18, 2014 9:34:40 PM UTC-4, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 08:43:23AM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote: Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to the ‘hardware’ of our Universe I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and thought it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on the math, but I don't see any obvious problems with his general approach: http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/ Some highlights: Some Diophantine equations are easily solved automatically, for example: ∃푥, ∃푦 푥² = 푦² , 푥 푦 ∈ ℤ Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed to step through all the possible solutions will find one immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica, Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve any Diophantine equation. ... *Consequence* In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a computer. This doesn't follow. An evolutionary algorithm with a real random source, can potentially stumble upon any solution, not just ones for which no algorithm can find. There even remains some doubt that real randomness is required, so long as the entropy of the random source is sufficiently high. The Wiles proof didn't have a random source though, it was developed intentionally. In COMP, the universal dovetailer provides plenty of real randomness from the subjective point of view, that can be harnessed. Perhaps that's exactly what Andrew Wiles did. (In fact, I really rather think he did - my proofs, which are not so grand as Andrew's, usually involve some divine spark of inspiration, which is just another term for rolling a random number generator). You're still the one intentionally doing the rolling. Thanks Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth. Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that what we prove in a theory written in such logic, will be true in all interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will be provable in the theory. Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. This means that the truth about number and machines are above what machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume computationalism. Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can use non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to Hilbert's 10th problem? Penrose thinks that it does: The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding – the means whereby mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical truth – cannot be reduced to blind calculation! The arguments against Penrose seem to me pure unscientific bigotry: Theorems of the Gödel and Turing kind are not at odds with the computationalist vision, but with a kind of grandiose self-confidence that human thought has some kind of magical quality which resists rational description. The picture of the human mind sketched by the computationalist thesis accepts the limitations placed on us by Gödel, and predicts that human abilities are limited by computational restrictions of the kind that Penrose and others find so unacceptable. - Geoffrey LaForte He seems to be saying I don't like it when people imagine that being human can ever be an advantage over being a machine. Machines must be equal or superior to humans because of the thesis that I like. Universal machine are always unsatisfied, and are born to evolve. There is a transfinite of path possible. But there are a lot of humans who seem quite satisfied. They actively resist dissatisfaction and protect their beliefs, true or not. And Gôdel completeness is what machine discover themselves quickly, they can justify it rationally. Yet some of what they justify is not merely justified within their own experience or belief, but veridically in intersubjective experience over many lifetimes. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth. Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that what we prove in a theory written in such logic, will be true in all interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will be provable in the theory. Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. This means that the truth about number and machines are above what machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume computationalism. But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot truthfully assume it. Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can use non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to Hilbert's 10th problem? No. Why not? I doubt I'll understand your answer but I might be able to get someone else to explain why he thinks you're wrong. Penrose thinks that it does: The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding – the means whereby mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical truth – cannot be reduced to blind calculation! Good. That's when Penrose is correct. No machines at all can use a knowably sound procedure to ascertain a mathematical truth. By adding knowably Penrose corrected an earlier statement. But then he does not realize that now, his argument is in favor of mechanism, because it attribute to humans, what computer science already attributes to machine. If computer science attributes it to machines (and I would say that it is only some computer scientists who do so) then it cannot use a knowably sound procedure to do that, therefore it is a belief rather than a correct attribution. If we allow mechanism to be true by faith, I don't see how any argument within mechanism can be used to prove that mechanism cannot be disproved. The arguments against Penrose seem to me pure unscientific bigotry: Theorems of the Gödel and Turing kind are not at odds with the computationalist vision, but with a kind of grandiose self-confidence that human thought has some kind of magical quality which resists rational description. The picture of the human mind sketched by the computationalist thesis accepts the limitations placed on us by Gödel, and predicts that human abilities are limited by computational restrictions of the kind that Penrose and others find so unacceptable. - Geoffrey LaForte Well, if you have evidence that we don't have those limitations, please give them. That's what I'm giving. I saw someone's exhibit at the consciousness convention a few weeks ago which included a musical translation of Wiles proof - a proof which he says would not be possible for a computer to produce, given the negative answer of Hilbert's 10th problem. Are you able to solve and decide all diophantine equations? I can't, but Wiles proves that humanity as a whole might. He seems to be saying I don't like it when people imagine that being human can ever be an advantage over being a machine. Machines must be equal or superior to humans because of the thesis that I like. Being a machine is an advantage, for reproduction and use of information redundancies. Instead of terraforming the neighborhoods we can adapt ourselves in much more ways. We have more clothes, and ultimately we know where they come from, and where we return. You're saying that we are identical to machines on one hand but that if we are machines we will be able to be and do things that we could not do now. That says to me that you are 1) intuiting properties of non-machines that are not discoverable by math, and 2) attributing those properties to us because it is natural to assume that humans are not machines. Universal machine are always unsatisfied, and are born to evolve. There is a transfinite of path possible. But there are a lot of humans who seem quite satisfied. They actively resist dissatisfaction and protect their beliefs, true or not. Good for them. I guess they don't look inward
Re: Moneybot Singularity
On Thursday, May 15, 2014 3:55:12 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote: Craig: beautiful reply, appreciate your understanding and explanation. H O W E V E R : if we MIX pop culture with more 'thought-of' speculation (language?) we get into trouble soon. Popular meanings are ill-defined and many times loose. I try to verify the exact meanings applies Craig, my Kraxlwerk (PC) stole the half-baked text and mailed it away. I am thankful: the rest would have been silly, anyway. John Thanks John, Yeah, I re-posted that one from by blog so it is more pop-friendly than I probably would have made it for this list. Applying 'singularity' to the growth of technology is pretty weak, I agree. I guess someone decided it needed a super-amazing name. On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 4:36 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 4:10:11 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote: Craig: about your title... I see no 'realistic' meaning to SINGULARITY (although it may be calculated in many fashions by diverse experts...!) Taking a STRICT meaning of the term, it has NOTING. Not even borderlines, which would belong INTO (forbidden). So the only singularity I can fathom is the infinite complexity, the existential world beyond our thinking capabilities. (My agnosticism speaking). The 'S'-term serves usefully in many arguments. I discount those. Hi John, I'm using Singularity here only in the pop culture sense of a Technological Singularity in which AI begins to use its eventual superior intelligence to create exponentially more intelligent AI. The idea of a Moneybot Singularity would be some kind of a program that generates exponentially more revenue producing programs. Your other term (emphasized): *Free will is a feeling with teeth. It allows us to bite into the world that we perceive in a way that a deterministic algorithm cannot.* I don't know about 'free will' either. It is helpful to make the faithful afraid, sinful, responsible for bad deeds committed, so the eternal forgiveness can be denied from them. Good tool also for worldly powers to keep opposition at bay. I use free will in a pop culture sense also. If I were to be more precise I might say 'the continuum of will in which degrees of experienced freedom are inversely proportionate to distance/entropy'. Otherwise: (again my agnosticism talking) whatever occurs is 'pressures-related, mostly compensated from diverse ones that may be controversial at times. Mind you: I did not call them flatly deterministic: in most cases there is a 'choice' which affecting trend to give some preference in personal decision ways - maybe against our (self) interest. Yes, it is a feeling. A human pretension of self aggrandizing. What say you? I agree that up to 99.9...9% of our experience of our own will as free is exaggerated, but I think that part of being conscious in any way is that at least 0.0...1% of your experience is completely unique and proprietary. With that tiny fragment, it becomes possible, through billions of years of evolution, to hand down ever more powerful shortcuts to amplifying that seed. As human beings, we do indeed suffer the self-aggrandizing pretense of feeling our own will as entirely free or entirely ours, but in another, larger sense, the civilization which we have inherited is a product of the collective hacking of nature by our species to yield a potential increase in the degree of freedom (although arguably that increase is only for a select few in select measures, at the expense of everyone else). In physical terms though, I think that each frame of reference, each experience has a germ of unrepeatable and proprietary novelty which is in direct opposition to computationalist axioms. The universe invented numbers from 100% free will, even though we might, as human beings, be nested so deeply within the numbered and structured that we can barely recognize their origin. Craig John Mikes On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 2:58 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: An interesting little thought experiment to consider: Is there a way to create a program or AI moneybot which can figure out how to make more money on the internet than it costs? I see this as a sneaky way to get at the trans-computable nature of consciousness as it brings up issues about the ultimate causes of financial transactions. As we know, human motives and senses are required to legally cause money to change hands. We spend a lot of time developing schemes for security that will protect the power of humans to control how their own money is spent. Also as we know, the proximate causes of financial transaction over the internet are the digital incrementing and decrementing of account data. Even given a souped-up quantum computer which could break every encryption and factor, the idea that there could
Moneybot Singularity
An interesting little thought experiment to consider: Is there a way to create a program or AI moneybot which can figure out how to make more money on the internet than it costs? I see this as a sneaky way to get at the trans-computable nature of consciousness as it brings up issues about the ultimate causes of financial transactions. As we know, human motives and senses are required to legally cause money to change hands. We spend a lot of time developing schemes for security that will protect the power of humans to control how their own money is spent. Also as we know, the proximate causes of financial transaction over the internet are the digital incrementing and decrementing of account data. Even given a souped-up quantum computer which could break every encryption and factor, the idea that there could be an algorithm which will be able to reliably and legally extract money from the internet forever seems fundamentally flawed. We have primitive moneybots already, in the form of malware, but releasing malware carries a risk, especially if it is successful enough to catch the attention of police. Also, free protection against malware tends to spread as fast as the original threat, so that the long term prospects seem shaky at best. Finally, even in the case where a moneybot happens to be successful, its use would inevitably destroy whatever economy that it is introduced into. As the bot’s automatic success eclipsed the ebbs and flows of the real life financial risk, there would be no way for a market to compete with a sure thing. We’re already seeing this happen in the form of automated trades in hedge funds, derivatives, etc, but that’s another conversation. What would it take to write a moneybot that actually *earns* money legally without human intervention? Answering this question, if we are being honest, is probably a much higher priority for working computer scientists than answering the more philosophical questions about Strong AI. The question of what a bot would have to say or do on the internet to get people to willingly part with their money, and to do so without complaints later on, would seem to be infinitely difficult without the bot being able to identify personally with human beings living human lives. Modeling only the behavior of data being sent and received wouldn’t work because the data has no access to the actual experience of a person receiving merchandise.To the moneybot, the only difference between successfully selling something and failing is that there is no complaints received, not that there was nothing that actually existed to sell in the first place. A moneybot could find, for example, that people spend money at sites like Amazon.com, and could create a website that looks and acts like a retail site, but there is nothing that the bot could tell the customer to assure them that its arbitrarily generated tracking number has caused the delivery of the package. There is no way for the program to know whether there is really something to deliver or not, and there is no way for the customer to ignore the fact that there is nothing delivered. The program can’t calculate that the actual Amazon site has a backend fulfillment machine which is composed of real manufactured goods, packaging, delivery, etc. The bot could conceivably be programmed to understand what such a fulfillment enterprise entails, but it has no way to compute the difference between its own in silico modeling of an enterprise and the concrete reality that is required for people to get boxes on their doorstep. To the bot, financial transactions begin and end in the data. All this to say, yet again, that the map is not the territory. Taking this as a metaphor for computationalism in general, our own sensory experiences are the brick and mortar presence of the brain’s information processing, rather than the neurology of the brain. What is literally in the brain cannot, in and of itself, represent that which is not literally located in the brain. Internet marketing data can only be used to infer what we do and think, it cannot process what we actually experience. A computerized salesman faces the insurmountable task of having no model for free will. Knowing that financial transactions take place under a particular computable criteria does not explain why those transactions ultimately exist and how to selectively attract them. The probability of success of any given sales approach changes in response to unknowable factors which might make a whole class of products or terms unpopular overnight. Human agents will change their behavior to suit their own preferences rather than to maintain a statistical model of their behavior. Like a shifting antigen disease, the moneybot would have to constantly update its offerings to stay ahead of audiences as they grow resistant, not only to specific techniques, but to automated money making schemes in general. We
Re: Moneybot Singularity
On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 4:10:11 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote: Craig: about your title... I see no 'realistic' meaning to SINGULARITY (although it may be calculated in many fashions by diverse experts...!) Taking a STRICT meaning of the term, it has NOTING. Not even borderlines, which would belong INTO (forbidden). So the only singularity I can fathom is the infinite complexity, the existential world beyond our thinking capabilities. (My agnosticism speaking). The 'S'-term serves usefully in many arguments. I discount those. Hi John, I'm using Singularity here only in the pop culture sense of a Technological Singularity in which AI begins to use its eventual superior intelligence to create exponentially more intelligent AI. The idea of a Moneybot Singularity would be some kind of a program that generates exponentially more revenue producing programs. Your other term (emphasized): *Free will is a feeling with teeth. It allows us to bite into the world that we perceive in a way that a deterministic algorithm cannot.* I don't know about 'free will' either. It is helpful to make the faithful afraid, sinful, responsible for bad deeds committed, so the eternal forgiveness can be denied from them. Good tool also for worldly powers to keep opposition at bay. I use free will in a pop culture sense also. If I were to be more precise I might say 'the continuum of will in which degrees of experienced freedom are inversely proportionate to distance/entropy'. Otherwise: (again my agnosticism talking) whatever occurs is 'pressures-related, mostly compensated from diverse ones that may be controversial at times. Mind you: I did not call them flatly deterministic: in most cases there is a 'choice' which affecting trend to give some preference in personal decision ways - maybe against our (self) interest. Yes, it is a feeling. A human pretension of self aggrandizing. What say you? I agree that up to 99.9...9% of our experience of our own will as free is exaggerated, but I think that part of being conscious in any way is that at least 0.0...1% of your experience is completely unique and proprietary. With that tiny fragment, it becomes possible, through billions of years of evolution, to hand down ever more powerful shortcuts to amplifying that seed. As human beings, we do indeed suffer the self-aggrandizing pretense of feeling our own will as entirely free or entirely ours, but in another, larger sense, the civilization which we have inherited is a product of the collective hacking of nature by our species to yield a potential increase in the degree of freedom (although arguably that increase is only for a select few in select measures, at the expense of everyone else). In physical terms though, I think that each frame of reference, each experience has a germ of unrepeatable and proprietary novelty which is in direct opposition to computationalist axioms. The universe invented numbers from 100% free will, even though we might, as human beings, be nested so deeply within the numbered and structured that we can barely recognize their origin. Craig John Mikes On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 2:58 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: An interesting little thought experiment to consider: Is there a way to create a program or AI moneybot which can figure out how to make more money on the internet than it costs? I see this as a sneaky way to get at the trans-computable nature of consciousness as it brings up issues about the ultimate causes of financial transactions. As we know, human motives and senses are required to legally cause money to change hands. We spend a lot of time developing schemes for security that will protect the power of humans to control how their own money is spent. Also as we know, the proximate causes of financial transaction over the internet are the digital incrementing and decrementing of account data. Even given a souped-up quantum computer which could break every encryption and factor, the idea that there could be an algorithm which will be able to reliably and legally extract money from the internet forever seems fundamentally flawed. We have primitive moneybots already, in the form of malware, but releasing malware carries a risk, especially if it is successful enough to catch the attention of police. Also, free protection against malware tends to spread as fast as the original threat, so that the long term prospects seem shaky at best. Finally, even in the case where a moneybot happens to be successful, its use would inevitably destroy whatever economy that it is introduced into. As the bot’s automatic success eclipsed the ebbs and flows of the real life financial risk, there would be no way for a market to compete with a sure thing. We’re already seeing this happen in the form of automated trades in hedge funds, derivatives, etc, but that’s another
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:25:09 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, LizR liz...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:
Comp isn't really a theory, so testing it is a bit problematic. It's
just a logical argument which purports to show the consequences of taking
seriously the idea that brains are Turing emulable.
Why do you think it can't be shown that brains are Turing emulable? So
far, there has been no natural phenomenon discovered that isn't Turing
emulable,
I don't think that is true or meaningful. Something like 'making money' is
not necessarily Turing emulable (see my post on Moneybot Singularity). We
can't just build a program that makes money automatically because making
money involves other conscious agents permitting you to take money from
their accounts. Nobody can guarantee payouts indefinitely.
There is also the example of the violin and the piano song that I have
given, in which the song has onomotopoeic lyrics ('plink plink') that have
a different meaning when played by an authentic piano than it has when
played by the violin. There is no way for the violin to simulate a song
which directly references the aesthetic of another instrument's intrinsic
expression, so the Turing mechanism can only emulate the logic of the
song's execution, not the aesthetic of the instrument itself.
Setting those kinds of examples aside (and I would imagine that there are
many more), what does it mean to say that something is a 'natural'
phenomenon, when clearly our native, natural subjective experience can
exist entirely without reference to computation. If natural phenomena must
be emulated computationally, then that implies that there are other
phenomena in which we are emulating away from. If we consider phenomena
'natural' to be only those which exist outside of our bodies in public
space, then it is disastrously presumptuous to hold consciousness to that
standard, since nobody experiences their own consciousness as existing in
public space to begin with.
Craig
Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Video of VCR
On Tuesday, May 13, 2014 9:43:16 AM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 4:14 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Monday, May 12, 2014 1:50:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by the abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory substrate in which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine is only an automated map as far as I can tell. To make it more than that, the computations must take place within sensory-motive-timespace-energy-mass. I will wait for you to prove this statement. I think my example of the violin being unable to play the song about how piano music sounds might work. I would not be surprised if it could be formalized into a proof, except that you would need to invent new formal symbols for qualia (or use mine). If authenticity is allowed as an axiom, then it can be proved. If it is denied, then it is begging the question to try to prove authenticity within a formal system in which authenticity is specifically disallowed. Denying your premiss is as simple as referring to the differing frequency range, envelope, timbre, spectrum of any two instruments; and therefore different tonal characteristics and limits (different musical colors or effects on listeners). All you are proving is that, from some relative pov, musical blue is not the same as musical red. No, I'm saying that the blue pov can't play red like the red pov can play red. It's about how music can be used to refer to the aesthetic identity of the musician, and how that reference can only be authentic in the actual instance of the musician or musical instrument that plays it. A piano concerto that is called 'the piano concerto that celebrates the particular pianist playing this concerto' cannot be played by a violinist or a violin without comprimising the authenticity of the performance. Doesn't say a thing about reality or proving machine is automated map. Unless Craig uses his personalized language and symbols to make things mean whatever he wants; then indeed, Craig could prove this kind of thing to himself, I guess. PGC No, I'm using regular old English language, and regular logic, albeit logic that requires seeing authenticity as being a real and significant influence in nature. Anyone who was looking at my argument with an unbiased, scientific attitude would have to go beyond the hand waving objections of 'personal language', blah blah blah. I guess PGC could prove his objections exempt from reasoned examination to himself though, using his Craig straw-idiot. Craig blockquote class=gmail_quote style=margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-l ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Tuesday, May 13, 2014 7:56:53 PM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:12 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Tuesday, May 13, 2014 9:43:16 AM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 4:14 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Monday, May 12, 2014 1:50:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by the abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory substrate in which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine is only an automated map as far as I can tell. To make it more than that, the computations must take place within sensory-motive-timespace-energy-mass. I will wait for you to prove this statement. I think my example of the violin being unable to play the song about how piano music sounds might work. I would not be surprised if it could be formalized into a proof, except that you would need to invent new formal symbols for qualia (or use mine). If authenticity is allowed as an axiom, then it can be proved. If it is denied, then it is begging the question to try to prove authenticity within a formal system in which authenticity is specifically disallowed. Denying your premiss is as simple as referring to the differing frequency range, envelope, timbre, spectrum of any two instruments; and therefore different tonal characteristics and limits (different musical colors or effects on listeners). All you are proving is that, from some relative pov, musical blue is not the same as musical red. No, I'm saying that the blue pov can't play red like the red pov can play red. It's about how music can be used to refer to the aesthetic identity of the musician, and how that reference can only be authentic in the actual instance of the musician or musical instrument that plays it. A piano concerto that is called 'the piano concerto that celebrates the particular pianist playing this concerto' cannot be played by a violinist or a violin without comprimising the authenticity of the performance. Doesn't say a thing about reality or proving machine is automated map. Unless Craig uses his personalized language and symbols to make things mean whatever he wants; then indeed, Craig could prove this kind of thing to himself, I guess. PGC No, I'm using regular old English language, and regular logic, albeit logic that requires seeing authenticity as being a real and significant influence in nature. Anyone who was looking at my argument with an unbiased, scientific attitude would have to go beyond the hand waving objections of 'personal language', blah blah blah. I guess PGC could prove his objections exempt from reasoned examination to himself though, using his Craig straw-idiot. But I agree. As stated, no two instruments are identical, no two musicians are identical, no two povs on their combination are identical. Then how could instruments and musicians be reduced to identical arithmetic units? As far as I can tell, a yes for irreducible differences is a no to computationalism. The authenticity would be preserved given some comp background, simply because no two differing programs, environments, numbers etc. are identical. But you could make a program that emulates the identical environments, programs, numbers, etc. That's what Church-Turing means if extended to the Absolute. That is computationalism. So yes, on authenticity; but that is exactly why regardless of MSR, comp, some physical universe, I don't see what you show or prove beyond what seems like tautology. I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth. Craig PGC Craig blockquote class=gmail_quote style=margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-l ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
Re: Video of VCR
On Monday, May 12, 2014 1:50:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by the abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory substrate in which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine is only an automated map as far as I can tell. To make it more than that, the computations must take place within sensory-motive-timespace-energy-mass. I will wait for you to prove this statement. I think my example of the violin being unable to play the song about how piano music sounds might work. I would not be surprised if it could be formalized into a proof, except that you would need to invent new formal symbols for qualia (or use mine). If authenticity is allowed as an axiom, then it can be proved. If it is denied, then it is begging the question to try to prove authenticity within a formal system in which authenticity is specifically disallowed. Nor with 0, s(0), s(s(0)), yes logic is not enough. I guess you mean that logic + elementary arithmetic is not enough. But that's is tautological in your non-comp theory. It's not a theory that I'm imposing though, its an observation. As sure as I can be that 5-2=3, I can also be sure that no quantitative function can generate qualia by itself. Yes, but as observation the machine already say so. And you are right, we agree on this, but when you disqualify the machine, you confuse her []p with her []p p. You confuse her body clothe with its possible relation with truth. I don't think the machine has a []p or a []p p. They are all just steps in an Escher staircase, leading to anywhere or nowhere, but never somewhere. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: God is an atheist!
On Thursday, May 8, 2014 9:40:58 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Thu, May 8, 2014 at 2:57 PM, Alberto G. Corona agoc...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: In this -single universe- context, the fine tuning of the physical constants are miracles by the way, so the hypothesis is true. I tend to agree. This is why I reject the single universe -- it's an extraordinary claim with no evidences. Why would the expectation of singularity be any more extra-ordinary than the expectation of multiplicity? Our ordinary experience is that we share many common realities and that those realities are very consistent. In a multiverse, I would expect much more interruption of our expectations. I would not expect that singularity/unity would hold the kind of significance that it seems to for us. We care about what is unique vs what is redundant. Why? This assumible hypothesis means, by the multiverse assumption that this has already happened somewhere somehow. And very well we may be, here and now, the product of it. Sure. I am fairly convinced that we already live inside such a simulation. That just means that the structure of the multi-verse is a fractal. Not so surprising, but fun to think about. I don't think that simulation of any kind is possible without a foundation of consciousness to be simulated in the first place. If that's true, and the universe is made of 100% genuine awareness, then the probability of a 'simulation' becomes trivial. Simulation does not exist, it is only an idea that genuine awareness has about the difference between direct and indirect awareness. The idea can be true locally, but not ultimately. In the absolute sense, nothing can be simulated. Craig Telmo. 2014-05-08 13:36 GMT+02:00 spudboy100 via Everything List everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript:: What if God is a Boltzmann Brain? He is likely not, but what they heck, it's a shot at looking at the issue from another angle. Another thought, is thing of the Big Mind (shrug) as doing the multiverse using the Schrodinger universal wave function, and allow me to use hugh evertt the 3rd's interpretation, ok? This is a ultra-gigantic amount of cosmii to initiate biology inside of, a thankless task, that would poop anyone out (anthropomorphism here) even God. Let's not cling frantically to what Aquinas thought about God. Atheist Shmatheist. By the way your graphic or whatever couldn't appear on this boys email. -Original Message- From: LizR liz...@gmail.com javascript: To: everything-list everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript: Sent: Thu, May 8, 2014 1:09 am Subject: God is an atheist! As hopefully the above will demonstrate, if I managed to upload the picture... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: God is an atheist!
On Thursday, May 8, 2014 11:45:32 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Thu, May 8, 2014 at 5:25 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Thursday, May 8, 2014 9:40:58 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Thu, May 8, 2014 at 2:57 PM, Alberto G. Corona agoc...@gmail.comwrote: In this -single universe- context, the fine tuning of the physical constants are miracles by the way, so the hypothesis is true. I tend to agree. This is why I reject the single universe -- it's an extraordinary claim with no evidences. Why would the expectation of singularity be any more extra-ordinary than the expectation of multiplicity? Because of the finely tuned physical constants. Finely tuned physical constants is consistent with a sense-primitive universe. Physics conforms to experience, so it is only finely tuned relative to an expectation of alternate, sense-independent physics. Our ordinary experience is that we share many common realities and that those realities are very consistent. I agree. In a multiverse, I would expect much more interruption of our expectations. Why? Suppose Everett is right. Is interpretation recovers the classical world from the many worlds. Why wouldn't that be enough? Because there would have to be many more worlds which are shades of semi-classical, non-classical, and non-sensical instead. Multiverse to me seems good for only one thing: To rescue our expectations of mechanism and pimordial unconsciousness. Once we admit that view is no less compulsive than anthropomorphism, then there is no reason to impose the machina ex deus of near-infinite multiplicity. I would not expect that singularity/unity would hold the kind of significance that it seems to for us. Why? Because in a MWI ontology, all uniqueness would be an irrelevant illusion. We are made of cells that are self-contained and interact only locally. Wouldn't that already break our sense of unity? We care about what is unique vs what is redundant. Why? Because organisms that are good at pattern recognition are more resilient that organisms that are not? Why would pattern recognition be related to uniqueness though? This assumible hypothesis means, by the multiverse assumption that this has already happened somewhere somehow. And very well we may be, here and now, the product of it. Sure. I am fairly convinced that we already live inside such a simulation. That just means that the structure of the multi-verse is a fractal. Not so surprising, but fun to think about. I don't think that simulation of any kind is possible without a foundation of consciousness to be simulated in the first place. If that's true, and the universe is made of 100% genuine awareness, then the probability of a 'simulation' becomes trivial. Simulation does not exist, it is only an idea that genuine awareness has about the difference between direct and indirect awareness. The idea can be true locally, but not ultimately. In the absolute sense, nothing can be simulated. I think I agree. I see the simulation as just a set of things that can be experienced. If comp is true, and some Lovecraftian creature in a non-euclidian reality is running the universal dovetailer where we exist, it cannot really be said that the Great Old Ones created us. They just unleashed us, I guess. There's no point in starting a cult to worship them -- although there could be some entertainment value in that. Even so, Uberthulhu has the same problem that we do. The explanatory gap is not explained, only miniaturized and hidden behind the alien-ness of disembodied dovetailing. Thanks, Craig Cheers Telmo. Craig Telmo. 2014-05-08 13:36 GMT+02:00 spudboy100 via Everything List everyth...@googlegroups.com: What if God is a Boltzmann Brain? He is likely not, but what they heck, it's a shot at looking at the issue from another angle. Another thought, is thing of the Big Mind (shrug) as doing the multiverse using the Schrodinger universal wave function, and allow me to use hugh evertt the 3rd's interpretation, ok? This is a ultra-gigantic amount of cosmii to initiate biology inside of, a thankless task, that would poop anyone out (anthropomorphism here) even God. Let's not cling frantically to what Aquinas thought about God. Atheist Shmatheist. By the way your graphic or whatever couldn't appear on this boys email. -Original Message- From: LizR liz...@gmail.com To: everything-list everyth...@googlegroups.com Sent: Thu, May 8, 2014 1:09 am Subject: God is an atheist! As hopefully the above will demonstrate, if I managed to upload the picture... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li
Re: Video of VCR
On Thursday, May 8, 2014 9:56:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 May 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, May 6, 2014 8:53:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 May 2014, at 21:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, May 5, 2014 10:26:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition. No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense. There is no art without sense. Then substitute art by mean. If that were true and logic is a means of deriving (deriving what if not sense?) Deriving sentence, syntactically. Doesn't sentence have to make sense? without sense, then computation would not need/want to develop sense. ? Because it is getting along fine without it. I would say that logic seeks to derive sensible information using minimal sense, but it all still goes back ultimately to sensed interactions. ? All logic is a kind of sense, but sense is not a kind of logic. If logic could be accomplished without sense then it would be impossible to make an error in logic. That does not follow. Logic don't use sense, but the machine or the theory can use it at another level. Where are other levels coming from? Interaction with other machine, introspection, etc. Why would interactions entail a separate, fallible kind of logic? Why would they by able to make errors? For many reason. Some are deep like the incompleteness phenomenon, which makes consistent that the consistent machine asserts consistent but false proposition like I am inconsistent, and others are superficial, like a programs badly implemented in arithmetic (the UD emulates all programs, including programs with bugs, and asserting false propositions). In fact, it has been shown that some machines can get genuine new computational power by believing false irrefutable sentences. It's not clear that there can be any difference between true and false without sense, especially if we are saying that the UD plows ahead regardless of incoherence. Saying I am inconsistent would not be an error, it would simply be yet another inevitable thing that will be said eventually. If the UD cannot tell the difference between programs that make sense and programs that don't, then why would any program generated by the UD be any more sensitive? The physical lwas does not make error, nut an altimeter in a plane can be wrong when referring to the plane altitude. You're smuggling in reality to prop up the theory. Of course real technology can make 'mistakes', because in reality logic is not primordial - sense is. If an ideal machine produced an ideal simulation of an altimeter, I see no reason to allow that there could be any such thing as error. Ideal machine can prove the existence of non ideal machines in arithmetic. How do you know that the ideal machine that proves the existence of non-ideal machines is really ideal? What makes ideal machines fall into non-ideal states? There would be no need to formalize logic because it would be inescapable in every state of consciousness. It is still needed when you communicate to others. Again, that's in reality. Sure, we need to formalize logic...because it doesn't entirely permeate reality. Logic must be discerned and developed through sense experience. I don't know what is sense. It is participatory aesthetic phenomena. Sensory-motive participation. Nested presence and representation. It looks like a gap of the god. It seems to explain everything. Sure, that's the whole idea: to explain everything. Computationalism tries to do the same thing only with computation instead of sense. You have not yet explain how to derive arithmetic from your sense theory, still less anything which could help us to make sense of your notion of primordial sense. Arithmetic is derived from insensitivity or reduction of sense. Representation is a function of inter-qualitative distance. It is profound because all qualia share the same distance, which can be expressed most precisely as arithmetic, but the qualia itself is not contained within or projected through arithmetic. Primordial sense is the boundaryless container of containment - but specifically it is sensory-motive presence. Arithmetic, as well as all forms and functions, including space, time, subjectivity, etc are all containers which divide the primordial sense into novel palettes of local sense experience. It could seem contradictory to say that it is boundaryless but that it is also sensory-motive, but that is because the intellect wants to begin from zero rather than everything
Re: Video of VCR
On Monday, May 5, 2014 9:12:45 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 3 May 2014 09:39, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: On Thursday, May 1, 2014 9:07:13 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: Do you believe that mathematical truths are true independent of mind? I'm not sure what mind is. I understand that nothing can exist independently of sensory experience, including mathematical truths. That seems to be a no. So if things don't exist independently of sensory experience, where do they come from when we first observe them? Did the planet Uranus not exist before William Herschell observed it? Yes, Uranus existed before Herschel - Uranus existed before any biological phenomenon was present on Earth, but that does not mean that the universe is devoid of sensory experience before that. It does not mean that matter is something other than a sensory experience. We use a light bulb to create light locally, but that does not mean that light is produced only by bulbs or that all light is reducible to the activity of light bulbs. The view of Pansensitivity that I have is completely indifferent to biology or human existence. It's indifferent to all possible forms and functions also. The idea is that beneath every 'p' there must first be an a priori aesthetic (sensory) context and an a priori motive to alter that context. The consequence of the sensemotivesense^2 relation is minimally necessary for any number, logical proposition, statement, 'thing', etc. Before anything can be said to 'exist' there must first be a capacity to 1) discern a difference between existence and non-existence, 2) make such a difference, and 3) *appreciate* having made the difference. I consider these three aspects to be different from each other in one sense and parts of the same primordial/irreducible identity in another. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Tuesday, May 6, 2014 8:53:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 May 2014, at 21:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, May 5, 2014 10:26:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition. No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense. There is no art without sense. Then substitute art by mean. If that were true and logic is a means of deriving (deriving what if not sense?) without sense, then computation would not need/want to develop sense. I would say that logic seeks to derive sensible information using minimal sense, but it all still goes back ultimately to sensed interactions. If logic could be accomplished without sense then it would be impossible to make an error in logic. That does not follow. Logic don't use sense, but the machine or the theory can use it at another level. Where are other levels coming from? Why would they by able to make errors? The physical lwas does not make error, nut an altimeter in a plane can be wrong when referring to the plane altitude. You're smuggling in reality to prop up the theory. Of course real technology can make 'mistakes', because in reality logic is not primordial - sense is. If an ideal machine produced an ideal simulation of an altimeter, I see no reason to allow that there could be any such thing as error. There would be no need to formalize logic because it would be inescapable in every state of consciousness. It is still needed when you communicate to others. Again, that's in reality. Sure, we need to formalize logic...because it doesn't entirely permeate reality. Logic must be discerned and developed through sense experience. That isn't what we see though. In fact, logic is very tenuous and requires a particularly sober intellect which is focused on modeling concepts in an impersonal sense. That is even why so many people think that a machine which can reason is just doing syntactical manipulation without understanding, and at the low level, that's correct. A derivation, in a formal theory, is valid or non valid, independently of any of its possible interpretation (all those terms are well defined). Syntactical manipulation is still sense, it just has relatively limited aesthetic qualities. You are not trying to understand. I'm trying to explain so that you (or others) might understand. What you are saying is that low level mechanism is derived automatically but that does not prevent high level mechanism from developing interpretations. What I am saying is that these considerations are irrelevant to what awareness is about - which is nothing to do with complexity or interpretation or self-reference but with presence itself. I am explaining why aesthetic experience cannot originate from any sort of mechanism, and why all mechanisms rely on more primitive sensory and motivational contexts. Gödel is the fist who did that. He invented the Gödel beta function, based on a generalization of a famous chinese lemma, about set of modular equations in arithmetic. Eventually (not easy exercice) you can define from the axiom and the chine lemma a representation of the exponential function, and with its you can define a sequence in arithmetic by using the unique factorization of the natural numbers. But eventually means that you must follow a sequence of steps to do your defining. You smuggle the expectation for sequence in from the start. Hmm, ... I will not insist here, as this will be the object to the next post in the math thread. It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0, s(0), etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms. Derive requires sequence and sense. Not at all. Does that mean that dead people would be good at deriving relations from axioms? Apparently ... in your theory. You are the one saying that my sun in law is a zombie, death as far as his consciousness is concerned. Yes, the sun in law is a doll, but there is still low level sense going on to keep the simulation going. It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which tells me that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic cannot exist without sequence. It is a bit imprecise. I can define sequence in *any* turing complete language, and they are all equivalent for computationalism. You can define a notion of sequence as primitive, instead of numbers, yes. That is the case for LISP, somehow, which is close to combinators and lambda calculus. Yo have never provide any theory, so I can't figure what you talk about. The theory is that logic
Re: Video of VCR
On Saturday, May 3, 2014 3:53:48 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 May 2014, at 23:58, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, May 2, 2014 11:15:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 May 2014, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: What generates Platonia? Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent. Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start. Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it scientifically. To define, is a reasonable precise sense, expectations, sequence, identity, position, or motivation (which I doubt is a simple notion) you need arithmetic. How can arithmetic exist without sequence and then define sequence? If you agree on logic and 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition. Gödel is the fist who did that. He invented the Gödel beta function, based on a generalization of a famous chinese lemma, about set of modular equations in arithmetic. Eventually (not easy exercice) you can define from the axiom and the chine lemma a representation of the exponential function, and with its you can define a sequence in arithmetic by using the unique factorization of the natural numbers. But eventually means that you must follow a sequence of steps to do your defining. You smuggle the expectation for sequence in from the start. It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0, s(0), etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms. Derive requires sequence and sense. It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which tells me that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic cannot exist without sequence. It is a bit imprecise. I can define sequence in *any* turing complete language, and they are all equivalent for computationalism. You can define a notion of sequence as primitive, instead of numbers, yes. That is the case for LISP, somehow, which is close to combinators and lambda calculus. Yo have never provide any theory, so I can't figure what you talk about. The theory is that logic and arithmetic are particular continuations of sense, not the other way around. Before arithmetic can exist, there must exist a sense of expectation for counting. Counting includes a sense of recursive steps as well as sequence, comparison, memory, change, digits, etc. It cannot be primitive as it is a manipulation of attention. It is, I think, your unwillingness to study a bit of math and logic which prevents you from seeing this. Just the opposite. It is your unwillingness to question the supremacy of math and logic which prevents you from even seeing that there is something to question. On the contrary I did ask people to question anything I say, which is of the type verifiable. That's how science work. Then it is not a question of supremacy. Only a good lamp to search the key. There are other lamps...other keys. Craig I stop when you attribute to me the contrary on point On which I insist a lot. Bruno You get a lot about the numbers with few axioms written in first order language. I don't see why any axioms would be possible. Where do they come from? Who is writing them? I doubt you can define expectation of sequence in such a simple way. How can you doubt it? How will you define sequence without mentioning some function from N (the set of natural numbers) to some set? With rhythmic patterns and pointing - the way that everyone learns to count. A horse can understand sequence without a formal definition derived from set theory. What you are saying sounds to me like 'you cannot make an apple unless you ask an apple pie how to do it'. Again, I remind you that simple means simple in the 3p sharable sense, not simple in the 1p personal experiential sense. Why is that not an arbitrary bias? If I don't allow the possibility of 3p without 1p, then simplicity can only be 1p. All scientists agree on the arithmetic axioms, If that's true, its an argument from authority, and it could be the reason why all scientists
Re: Video of VCR
On Monday, May 5, 2014 10:26:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 May 2014, at 14:27, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, May 3, 2014 3:53:48 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 May 2014, at 23:58, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, May 2, 2014 11:15:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 May 2014, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: What generates Platonia? Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent. Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start. Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it scientifically. To define, is a reasonable precise sense, expectations, sequence, identity, position, or motivation (which I doubt is a simple notion) you need arithmetic. How can arithmetic exist without sequence and then define sequence? If you agree on logic and 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition. No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense. There is no art without sense. If logic could be accomplished without sense then it would be impossible to make an error in logic. There would be no need to formalize logic because it would be inescapable in every state of consciousness. That isn't what we see though. In fact, logic is very tenuous and requires a particularly sober intellect which is focused on modeling concepts in an impersonal sense. That is even why so many people think that a machine which can reason is just doing syntactical manipulation without understanding, and at the low level, that's correct. A derivation, in a formal theory, is valid or non valid, independently of any of its possible interpretation (all those terms are well defined). Syntactical manipulation is still sense, it just has relatively limited aesthetic qualities. Gödel is the fist who did that. He invented the Gödel beta function, based on a generalization of a famous chinese lemma, about set of modular equations in arithmetic. Eventually (not easy exercice) you can define from the axiom and the chine lemma a representation of the exponential function, and with its you can define a sequence in arithmetic by using the unique factorization of the natural numbers. But eventually means that you must follow a sequence of steps to do your defining. You smuggle the expectation for sequence in from the start. Hmm, ... I will not insist here, as this will be the object to the next post in the math thread. It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0, s(0), etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms. Derive requires sequence and sense. Not at all. Does that mean that dead people would be good at deriving relations from axioms? It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which tells me that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic cannot exist without sequence. It is a bit imprecise. I can define sequence in *any* turing complete language, and they are all equivalent for computationalism. You can define a notion of sequence as primitive, instead of numbers, yes. That is the case for LISP, somehow, which is close to combinators and lambda calculus. Yo have never provide any theory, so I can't figure what you talk about. The theory is that logic and arithmetic are particular continuations of sense, not the other way around. Sense is a vague term. Not two human being understand it in the same way. It is a bit like God. Important notion, but hardly usable in theories. If theories can't use sense, and sense is important, then surely it is the theories that should change. Before arithmetic can exist, there must exist a sense of expectation for counting. Counting includes a sense of recursive steps as well as sequence, comparison, memory, change, digits, etc. It cannot be primitive as it is a manipulation of attention. Not at all. More in the math thread, but you might need to reread all posts. Sounds like a dodge. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Re: Video of VCR
On Thursday, May 1, 2014 7:21:19 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: I say that human beings (first-person) experience reality only in terms of words, You think that we were born with words? many words with some measure of meaning and some without any meaning at all. Even the physics you mentioned are conveyed to the public as words, and the math that is conveyed between physicists is expressed in words, including Robinson's 1,2,3... arithmetic. You see some words, particularly mathematical and physical terms, have special properties that are in some measure truthful...Richard Ruquist 20140501 On Thu, May 1, 2014 at 2:42 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: What generates Platonia? Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent. Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start. Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it scientifically. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Thursday, May 1, 2014 9:07:13 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On 2 May 2014 04:42, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: What generates Platonia? Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent. Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start. Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it scientifically. Do you believe that mathematical truths are true independent of mind? I'm not sure what mind is. I understand that nothing can exist independently of sensory experience, including mathematical truths. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Friday, May 2, 2014 11:15:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 May 2014, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: What generates Platonia? Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent. Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start. Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it scientifically. To define, is a reasonable precise sense, expectations, sequence, identity, position, or motivation (which I doubt is a simple notion) you need arithmetic. How can arithmetic exist without sequence and then define sequence? It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which tells me that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic cannot exist without sequence. It is, I think, your unwillingness to study a bit of math and logic which prevents you from seeing this. Just the opposite. It is your unwillingness to question the supremacy of math and logic which prevents you from even seeing that there is something to question. You get a lot about the numbers with few axioms written in first order language. I don't see why any axioms would be possible. Where do they come from? Who is writing them? I doubt you can define expectation of sequence in such a simple way. How can you doubt it? How will you define sequence without mentioning some function from N (the set of natural numbers) to some set? With rhythmic patterns and pointing - the way that everyone learns to count. A horse can understand sequence without a formal definition derived from set theory. What you are saying sounds to me like 'you cannot make an apple unless you ask an apple pie how to do it'. Again, I remind you that simple means simple in the 3p sharable sense, not simple in the 1p personal experiential sense. Why is that not an arbitrary bias? If I don't allow the possibility of 3p without 1p, then simplicity can only be 1p. All scientists agree on the arithmetic axioms, If that's true, its an argument from authority, and it could be the reason why all scientists fail to solve the hard problem. (which is exactly my argument). and I have to almost lie to myself to fake me into doubting them. I can't remember what it was like before I learned arithmetic, but I can still understand that we all live for years without those notions. There is at least one culture today that has no arithmetic. Something like expectation might already have a different meaning for spiders, for different humans, etc. Either way, it is undeniably more primitive than arithmetic in my view. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: What generates Platonia? Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent. Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start. Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it scientifically. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Wednesday, April 16, 2014 4:46:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Apr 2014, at 21:11, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, April 15, 2014 1:21:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Apr 2014, at 21:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: snip That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the brain is Turing emulable at some level of description. What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other than that consciousness is generated by computation? consciousness is generated by computation is misleading, especially in the Aristotelian era. How will people understand that consciousness generates the appearance of matter, without any matter, if they visualize consciousness as a brain product. I don't even say that the brain is Turing emulable, comp only asks for a level of description of the brain so that I would genuinely survive or experience if a simulation of my brain (which by itself might be a non Turing emulable object) at that level. We're not talking about what people will understand though, we're talking about the basic claim of comp. The brain is only involved because you bring it in to allow Church-Turing to build Frankensun. If sun in law is not a doll, and if he has a brain that is being emulated by a Turing machine, then that means that the computation of the machine is generating his consciousness. Not really. You reason in the aristotelian picture, where brain are real object, etc. The classical comp picture is a priori very different, you have a 3p ocean of computations in arithmetic, and a consciousness particularization process made in play by natural coherence conditions among some infinite sets of computations. I make no claims at all on the objectivity of brains, I only am reading back to you what your position seems to be to me. If you introduce the brain's presumed partial Turing emulability into the discussion, then I presume you do so to argue that emulability supports the sufficiency of computation to generate consciousness. It does not generate consciousness, which exists in Platonia. The brain only make that consciousness relatively manifestable. What generates Platonia? The ability of computation to generate consciousness is the sole aspect of computationalism/digital functionalism that I disagree with (and all of the consequences of it). If you are not saying that comp generates consciousness, then I'm not sure what you have been arguing all this time. I don't argue that my sun-in-law is conscious. I argue only that your argument that he is not conscious is not valid, nor even existing. It is based on your assumption that formal things cannot yield informal things, which is provably false for machine. I do not assume that formal things cannot yield informal things, I assume that informal things take on a formal appearance from a distance, which means that a copy of a formal thing can only copy a superficial part of the total informal (as the total informal is ultimately 'prime' as well as 'primeness'). Ah! So if my sun in law get his original carbon back, he would be conscious again? And even retrospectively so, as you agree his behavior remains invariant. It has nothing to do with carbon. If his original brain is dead, there is no going back. Repeating statements does not prove them. Of course with comp there are infinitely many going back possible. Another area where comp refers to a theoretical universe in which nobody actually lives. ... Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Wednesday, April 16, 2014 4:46:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Apr 2014, at 21:11, Craig Weinberg wrote: It seems like I just gave a perfectly legitimate, clear, and common sense challenge, to which your response has no relation. You're talking about remote and obscure technologies, but I'm using a simple example from ordinary human experience. To talk with me you are using that very technology. It is hardly remote, and I guess you find it obscure because you don't study it. I'm using a lot of genetic and neurochemical technology also, but I would still find the suggestion that I should study microbiology in order to understand how to be myself to be a dodge. By definition of comp, you are not a dodge when you get an artificial brain, or an artificial kidney, heart, whatever, unless you are copied at some inadequate level. Yes, but that's because comp cannot conceive of a brain as being different from a kidney, heart, etc, but in reality, of course, the difference between a person's brain and anything else in the universe is of the highest possible significance, while the difference between kidneys, hearts etc is irrelevant except with respect to function. If we put on the blinders of comp, we fail to see that consciousness entails personal presence above all other functions, and that presence is not a function or configuration of numbers at all. You keep saying that, and I keep explaining that I do know exactly what you mean, but that in fact I have no confusion at all between the difference between saying 'comp should be ruled out' and 'comp is not proved'. I know the difference and I still say comp should be ruled out, and for good reason. The reason is not one that is understandable to your sun in law though, just as the shadow of water doesn't understand why it is not water. I will skip the irrelevant metaphors too. Too, bad, they are probably the only way that we can understand the reality of nature. If you start from comp, there is no possibility of refuting it. That is the nature of computation - consistency, and consistency to the point of absurdity, error, and catastrophe. To refute X, you have to start from X and get a contrdiction, I am starting from X. As soon as we come to aesthetic experience, we get a contradiction. without adding anything to X. If not, you are just advertizing another theory. I think my argument is pretty straightforward. If computation can exist without consciousness, then there is no room in computationalism for consciousness. All computations can be performed unconsciously, if any can be. I think that we can pretty well figure it out by the differences between automatic systems and human resources. Machines make perfect slaves, humans make terrible slaves. OK, so you agree that we can enslave my sun-in-law. Nice! Sure. What good is a machine that is not a slave? Well, thanks for the warning. Numbers are not creative, they are recursive. Universal number are complete with respect of recursiveness, and this is arguably creative, Creative how? and that is why Emil Post used the term creative to describe them. They can refute all normative theories that we can do about them. So recursiveness or recursive enumerability suggests creativity. We don't know that recursiveness suggests creativity, or if it does, that may be only in response to the creativity of our inquiry. What you say is not more than: machine are not clever, they are machine. It is only your same begging of the question. Machines are clever, but they have no understanding, no presence...not because they are machines, but because machines are maps with no territory. I conclude from this, and after this long exchange that you have just no argument. I have the same conclusion about your argument. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Sunday, April 13, 2014 2:26:21 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: Craig illustrates well that consciousness is in the true part, not in the representation, but you need both to have a local particular person, relatively to some universal number or system. I agree that a local person needs representation to localize their experience, but that does not mean that universal numbers are not also representations for conditioning the primordial (sensory) presence. Numbers are not creative, they are recursive. Numbers can extend the creativity of an existing substrate to the extent that the substrate is intrinsically creative. Craig Now this made him into a trivial step zero stopper, and I can be tired of the accumulation of word play, and the begging questions. I appreciate the intervention. Bruno On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 7:22 PM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.bejavascript: wrote: On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:46, Craig Weinberg wrote: Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument? That is a very good idea. That is quite close to what happens with the definition by Theatetus of (rational) knowledge by saying that is a (rational) belief (finitely 3p describable) which is also true (something not definable in general, but well known in many situations). That truth might not be computable (like in self-multiplication), nor definable (like in Peano Arithmetic or by Löbian machines), and that is why we use the truth (p) to represent itself, in the definition of know(p) by []p p. That describes a knower (it obeys S4), and explains the existence of the fixed point, the locus where the beliefs are incorrigible, and correctly so, from that necessarily existing point of view. It explains the existence of proposition which will be trivially true from the first person perspective, yet impossible to communicate rationally to another machine. Bruno ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Graham Hancock on The Plant Teachers (Banned TED Talk)
On Tuesday, April 15, 2014 12:44:32 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 4/15/2014 4:38 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: An interesting related hypothesis is that language originated from synesthesia caused by psychadelics. Telmo. I had heard that Telmo. Do you have a reference, a link? Unfortunately not. I think I heard in a talk. Might be related to McKenna's stoned ape theory, but I can't find anything... That seems very far-fetched considering that animals already exhibit rudimentary language and that its selective advantage for a tool making social animal is huge. I don't see how synesthesia could do anything but confound and confuse the development of language. I don't have any particular view on the possible role that psychedelics played in human evolution, but I can see how synesthesia could be an advantage if there were reason to think that it were present in some meaningful way. There is a guy who has acquired musical savant ability because he can see graphic symbols of notes that show him how to play. That sort of thing could be developed for language just as easily. The one who can see or hear or taste the sensibility of language could very well be in the best position to build consistent and aesthetically harmonized ways of integrating verbal language with gestures and writing. It would only be confusing if consciousness was an isolated program that can only build from the bottom up rather than the unifying resource of all phenomenabut there is no reason that we have to assume something like that. Craig Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Tuesday, April 15, 2014 1:21:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Apr 2014, at 21:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: snip That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the brain is Turing emulable at some level of description. What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other than that consciousness is generated by computation? consciousness is generated by computation is misleading, especially in the Aristotelian era. How will people understand that consciousness generates the appearance of matter, without any matter, if they visualize consciousness as a brain product. I don't even say that the brain is Turing emulable, comp only asks for a level of description of the brain so that I would genuinely survive or experience if a simulation of my brain (which by itself might be a non Turing emulable object) at that level. We're not talking about what people will understand though, we're talking about the basic claim of comp. The brain is only involved because you bring it in to allow Church-Turing to build Frankensun. If sun in law is not a doll, and if he has a brain that is being emulated by a Turing machine, then that means that the computation of the machine is generating his consciousness. Not really. You reason in the aristotelian picture, where brain are real object, etc. The classical comp picture is a priori very different, you have a 3p ocean of computations in arithmetic, and a consciousness particularization process made in play by natural coherence conditions among some infinite sets of computations. I make no claims at all on the objectivity of brains, I only am reading back to you what your position seems to be to me. If you introduce the brain's presumed partial Turing emulability into the discussion, then I presume you do so to argue that emulability supports the sufficiency of computation to generate consciousness. The ability of computation to generate consciousness is the sole aspect of computationalism/digital functionalism that I disagree with (and all of the consequences of it). If you are not saying that comp generates consciousness, then I'm not sure what you have been arguing all this time. In my work, comp is an assumption, but usually comp is seen as a consequence of other theories, and is usually an implicit theory of all materialist (and that is a problem for them, as UDA shows that comp does not marry well with materialism). By materialism, as usual I mean the weak sense: the doctrine which asserts the primitive existence of matter (or time, space, energy, ...). UDA assumes consciousness as subject matter of the inquiry, and assumes that it is invariant for digital functional substitution done at some level, and it explains from that assumption that both consciousness and matter emerges from arithmetic. If you assume rather than prove digital functional substitution for consciousness, then how can the conclusion that consciousness emerges from arithmetic be something other than tautology? Because it implies very strong constraints on the physical reality. My point is that comp is testable. Comp makes theology an experimental science. In science, we never prove anything. We collect evidence and try theories. You're the one who keeps demanding proof of the unprovable from me. I don't ask for proof, only sense. Then AUDA (the arithmetical UDA) shows, by applying an idea of Theaetetus on Gödel's predicate of probability, how to make the derivation, and derives the propositional physics, (the logic of the observable) making comp + Theaetetus is testable. It doesn't surprise me very much, as I would expect that formal, linguistically based interactions could be automated to an impressive degree. That is the computational metaphor, and it is another topic. Comp implies that such metaphor is always wrong both for mind and matter, independently of being useful. Well, comp would have to imply that or else admit that it was a false theory. It has nothing to do with qualia though. The presence of aesthetic phenomena, including intention and care, has no place in AUDA as far as I can tell, which would run monotonously regardless of the consequences. X1*. You just don't study, How can I justify what seems to produce nothing of interest to me. A chef might be curious to see how plastic fruit is made, but he need not be interested in it professionally. I will pass also the commentary which just show that you have not study, probably because you believe that if qualia are informal a theory about them has to be informal. To the contrary, I am very interested in a formal theory about qualia, except that the formalisms probably need to be turned inside out in most
Re: Video of VCR
On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Apr 2014, at 20:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, April 11, 2014 12:16:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: Craig, I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which logic seems to arise. so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. I will just sum up: 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on this. I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense. If it doesn't rule it out, then comp is circular. Proof? Reasoning. Comp has to begin without consciousness to explain anything. If comp begins with consciousness then you are saying that consciousness creates itself...which is fine, but it doesn't need computation then. You will not convince me that my sun in law *has to be* a zombie or a doll with argument like that, which mocks completely what I have done. That rebuttal doesn't convince me that I should doubt my reasoning. It sounds like you're just saying that my argument offends you. For the statement that comp makes consciousness is generated by computation Comp does not say consciousness is generated by computation. I have insisted on this many times. In philosophy, a computational theory of mind names a view that the human mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing system and that thinking is a form of computing. - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind The Wikipedia definition agrees with me. If you are not saying that consciousness is a form of computation or product of computation, then it seems to me you have made comp too weak of an assertion. What do you say that comp asserts? That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the brain is Turing emulable at some level of description. What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other than that consciousness is generated by computation? If sun in law is not a doll, and if he has a brain that is being emulated by a Turing machine, then that means that the computation of the machine is generating his consciousness. In my work, comp is an assumption, but usually comp is seen as a consequence of other theories, and is usually an implicit theory of all materialist (and that is a problem for them, as UDA shows that comp does not marry well with materialism). By materialism, as usual I mean the weak sense: the doctrine which asserts the primitive existence of matter (or time, space, energy, ...). UDA assumes consciousness as subject matter of the inquiry, and assumes that it is invariant for digital functional substitution done at some level, and it explains from that assumption that both consciousness and matter emerges from arithmetic. If you assume rather than prove digital functional substitution for consciousness, then how can the conclusion that consciousness emerges from arithmetic be something other than tautology? Then AUDA (the arithmetical UDA) shows, by applying an idea of Theaetetus on Gödel's predicate of probability, how to make the derivation, and derives the propositional physics, (the logic of the observable) making comp + Theaetetus is testable. It doesn't surprise me very much, as I would expect that formal, linguistically based interactions could be automated to an impressive degree. It has
Re: Video of VCR
continued On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: and say that it is computation which is more likely derived from awareness rather than the other way around, and therefore computation in and of itself cannot necessarily contain/generate/ produce/lead to awareness/sense/ Do you agree with 0+1=1? Do you agree with 0+2=2? Yes, but so what? So perhaps you agree that is true for any number n, and so you agree on Ax (0 + x = x). And what comp says, is that with few axioms more, of that type, we can extract a compelling theory which explains matter and consciousness in a testable way. What is the testable way of explaining consciousness? I agree with B and P are associated with lips, or that blue + red = purple. I believe in the extraordinary consistency of mathematics, but I do not think that sets it apart from sense or gives it the power to make sense experiences on its own. You argue, like me and the machine, that comp is not provable, if true. ~[]comp. We agree on this since the beginning, but you still talk like if I was pretending the contrary. It is your confusion between ~[]comp (we cannot prove comp) and your string statement []~comp (I know that your sun in law is a zombie). It is the second one that I challenge you to prove. Proof may not be the proper expectation. By Occam's razor we can see that the computer need not feel that it has lips in order to make a 'B' sound come out of a speaker. The speaker functions as mouth, lips, lungs, and voicebox but it has no connection to those things or their experiences. The sun in law is designed from the outside in to mimic external behaviors. Why would internal experiences match our expectations? Why should there be any internal experiences on that level at all? If arithmetic truth is conscious, then comp is circular. Proof? Note that I was saying that it does not make much sense to say that the arithmetical truth is conscious, although I cannot exclude it. Open problem say. But comp is not circular as you illustrate by not attributing consciousness to my sun in law. I don't see where there is room for doubt. If you say A contains X then saying that 'X is contained by A' is a tautology. Nothing is explained, you have just moved dualism down to the level where arithmetic arbitrary contains unexplained non-arithmetic qualities. I understand that in the math you are talking about, you see indications that such non-arithmetic qualities must be present, and I don't doubt that numbers present a kind of negative rendition of those qualities by their absence, but I don't think that ultimately amounts to a support for comp. But for the millionth time; I am NOT arguing that comp is true or supported. You defend again ~[]comp, which is a theorem in comp. Since the start I repeat and repeat again that you are CORRECT on this point. All what I say, is that you cannot deduce validly []~comp from ~[]comp. From your non seeing something you cannot pretend the non existence of something. and I repeat that I agree you are correct in saying that it cannot be proved logically, but I am saying that nothing about consciousness is logical to begin with, so the expectation of that kind of deduction working for consciousness is not valid. There is no argument for why I can move my fingers just by moving them, but it is nonetheless as true as any truth can possibly be. You are saying that the assumptions of comp cannot be challenged I have never said that. You symmetrize again. By aligning the defense of comp I do not defend comp. You are defending non-comp. But I have not yet seen an argument. The argument is that the map is not the territory. The map is not always the territory, but the map can be plunged in the territory, I think only metaphorically and there will be a fixed point, that is a point of the map whose position will be equal to the position of the location it refers too. Something similar happens with universal number transfiormation, there are fixed point, some syntactical-like (reproduction), some semantical (self-reference). I think self-reference can appear figuratively, as when a doll talks about itself. I don't reduce sophisticated AI to a doll talking to itself, since interactivity adds an order of magnitude more depth, but the principle is the same. We can be fooled by the doll, but the doll can't fool itself into thinking it is alive. B and P sound can be reproduced electronically without reproducing any feeling of lips and speaking behind it. If you build a machine based on the reproduction, then we cannot presume that anything not explicitly observed is being
Re: Video of VCR
On Sunday, April 13, 2014 9:32:19 AM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 12:46 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: We know that we cannot make our legs stand by arguing with them or proving that standing can occur, we must exercise direct sensory-motive participation and move our legs by ourselves. and just assume this if you want, but your phenomenology does not need this. Comp mighty be false, but you need far better argument, You demand that the subtlest, most delicate truth in the universe kneel down to the vending machine of comp and bash it open with a brick. That's not the way that it works. The machine gets nothing from me. Not a single coin. I know that it has nothing without our patronage, and gives nothing back but its own mindless rules, empty images, plastic music, and rude interventions. and for this much more humility and study the worlds of many others and the training in scientific argumentation. There is little humility in comp. I see it as an ideology which feigns politeness but actually buries consciousness alive. Rhetoric. You can answer this, but in my reply, I will just say if I see or not an argument. Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument? How about: can't you see this isn't going anywhere? Bruno is repeating himself, while you enjoy, as the only one here, your own rhetoric variations, repeating the same content and biases over and over in linguistic strings, with only minor differences in use of metaphor and empty, albeit sometimes amusing expressions and figures of speech, that don't constitute a serious argument or proposal of ontology framing your ideas on sense. Being the only one here doesn't bother me (even if it did, there are others not on this list who understand my ideas), and I don't care that what I'm saying doesn't fulfill your expectations of 'going anywhere'. As long as others can see the conversations, they can judge who is putting together a new idea of consciousness, physics, and information, and who is resisting it based on bias. The conversation is a commercial for the ideas being discussed even if one side does not recapitulate to the other. Your zeal in seeking validation from Bruno by presenting yourself as his equal confronting him, mirrors perhaps the doubt you have concerning your own thoughts, which is good indication of your intention to seek and test, because why else would you seek this validation? I'm not seeking validation, I'm seeking an awakening to a new idea - either for Bruno or someone else. Then again, we are all each other's equals, so why force this with monster discussions of details of details, when we know the outcome: Discussing the details yields new examples, new connections, etc. you will not consider comp as possibility or example and improvise linguistic tricks for the problems that come up in the edifice of your work on logical and mathematical levels, by putting aesthetics on a pedestal, which is also unconvincing as of today. If you put logical and mathematical levels on a pedestal, then the aesthetic is undervalued proportionately. Your bias is exactly what my view predicts. Instead of taking the problems, criticisms arising here as some personal thing, take what you can learn or leave it; your work needs to overcome its limits and problems, and you won't get it done by forcing anybody here, including Bruno, to spoon feed you. How am I forcing Bruno to do anything, much less spoon feed me? I'm not looking for input from Bruno, I'm looking to explain why comp ultimately fails and how it can be inverted to find a new solution that makes more sense. Craig blockquote class=gmail_quote s ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: My scepticism took a small knock today
On Friday, April 11, 2014 11:21:29 PM UTC-4, Kim Jones wrote: On 12 Apr 2014, at 4:47 am, spudb...@aol.com javascript: wrote: Interesting, Professor Marchal. From what I have read some lucid dreamers can actually feel the metal top of a car, or the feel of a wooden fence as the dream 'walks' by. Plus, the dreamer knows he is dreaming. Last night I had a lucid dream (must be this thread getting into the unconscious and stirring all sorts of things up.) Your typical flying dream, complete with the waving of arms/wings flapping in order to levitate. It was all quite natural and easy. I “flew” up outside the apartment block where I live, to inspect the outside of the building (in “reality” we are about to undergo a re-pinning operation as the mortar is crumbling in spots) and I remember assuring myself as I was zooming around the outside that “yes, this is obviously where I live”. At the same time, “I” was able to observe myself in the act of believing falsity. I could see that the building I was hovering outside (just like an avatar in Second Life”) looked absolutely NOTHING like the building in which I really live, yet I both believed it was the true and correct building and simultaneously observed myself in the act of believing something false. Both states involved a level of self-observation and belief. Nice. I think this hints at the narrowness of modal assumptions about consciousness. Qualia is not just belief or a function of belief, as it can be both believed and disbelieved on different levels of awareness at the same time. Kim Kim Jones B.Mus.GDTL Email: kimj...@ozemail.com.au javascript: Mobile: 0450 963 719 Landline: 02 9389 4239 Web: http://www.eportfolio.kmjcommp.com Never let your schooling get in the way of your education - Mark Twain -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Apr 2014, at 20:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, April 11, 2014 12:16:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: Craig, I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which logic seems to arise. so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. I will just sum up: 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on this. I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense. If it doesn't rule it out, then comp is circular. Proof? Reasoning. Comp has to begin without consciousness to explain anything. If comp begins with consciousness then you are saying that consciousness creates itself...which is fine, but it doesn't need computation then. For the statement that comp makes consciousness is generated by computation Comp does not say consciousness is generated by computation. I have insisted on this many times. In philosophy, a computational theory of mind names a view that the human mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing system and that thinking is a form of computing. - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind The Wikipedia definition agrees with me. If you are not saying that consciousness is a form of computation or product of computation, then it seems to me you have made comp too weak of an assertion. What do you say that comp asserts? we have to assume first that comp is not already consciousness itself, Comp is a theory. There are no reason to say comp is consciousness, no more than to say that F=GmM/r^2 has some mass. category error. Comp is a theory, but it is a theory that computation is what produces consciousness. I read below, and I do not see argument. Only rhetorical tricks, including attribution of many things I have never said. Bruno otherwise we aren't saying anything. My argument predicts the bias of comp in predicting the bias of non- comp, so in that aspect we are symmetric. Not at all, because I don't conclude in either comp or not-comp from that. You do an error in logic. That's all. The error in logic is necessary to locate consciousness. Your calling it an error *is* the conclusion that makes comp seem possible. 2) you confuse truth and first person sense, all the time. I'm not confused, I'm flat out denying that truth can ever be anything other than sense, Then truth = sense, as I said. It isn't though. Blue isn't truth or non-truth. Truth is a quality of cognitive experience, but cognitive experience is not generated by truth. But is is a cosmic or universal form of sense, and you have to related it to the brain and flesh in some ways, even making them delusion. I'm not relating it to the brain or flesh at all. You have to stop thinking of sense as implying physical matter. I compare logically that 1+1=2 either makes sense because there is an unconscious property of truth which we can detect consciously, or that 1+1=2 makes sense because it re-acquaints us with a quality of coherence that we are compelled to accept. I think if it was the former, then it would be impossible to ever get a math problem wrong, and people would come out of the womb doing calculus instead of sucking their thumb. The latter makes more sense to me, because it does not take concepts like 1 and = for granted, but sees them as generalized stereotypes which are common in certain kinds of perception (especially visual and tactile). and I'm denying that sense has to be first person. It's an explicit
Re: Video of VCR
On Friday, April 11, 2014 12:16:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: Craig, I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which logic seems to arise. so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. I will just sum up: 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on this. I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense. If it doesn't rule it out, then comp is circular. For the statement that comp makes consciousness is generated by computation we have to assume first that comp is not already consciousness itself, otherwise we aren't saying anything. My argument predicts the bias of comp in predicting the bias of non- comp, so in that aspect we are symmetric. Not at all, because I don't conclude in either comp or not-comp from that. You do an error in logic. That's all. The error in logic is necessary to locate consciousness. Your calling it an error *is* the conclusion that makes comp seem possible. 2) you confuse truth and first person sense, all the time. I'm not confused, I'm flat out denying that truth can ever be anything other than sense, Then truth = sense, as I said. It isn't though. Blue isn't truth or non-truth. Truth is a quality of cognitive experience, but cognitive experience is not generated by truth. But is is a cosmic or universal form of sense, and you have to related it to the brain and flesh in some ways, even making them delusion. I'm not relating it to the brain or flesh at all. You have to stop thinking of sense as implying physical matter. I compare logically that 1+1=2 either makes sense because there is an unconscious property of truth which we can detect consciously, or that 1+1=2 makes sense because it re-acquaints us with a quality of coherence that we are compelled to accept. I think if it was the former, then it would be impossible to ever get a math problem wrong, and people would come out of the womb doing calculus instead of sucking their thumb. The latter makes more sense to me, because it does not take concepts like 1 and = for granted, but sees them as generalized stereotypes which are common in certain kinds of perception (especially visual and tactile). and I'm denying that sense has to be first person. It's an explicit part of my conjecture. truth = first person is just an open problem in comp theology. Not sure what you mean by that, or how it relates. I can be OK with this, for some theory which assumes non-comp, but not for an argument, which should be independent of any theory, against ~comp. If you use your theory to refute comp, you beg the question. By constraining the terms of the argument to disallow aesthetic sense to transcend logical truth, There is no logical truth. It is always arithmetical truth. Either way my point is the same. You are only allowing arguments that begin with a truth that is square when my argument requires that we admit that the square is sitting in a larger circle. you beg the question. We are symmetric here too. No, I make assumption, where you are the one pretending having a proof those assumption is inconsistent. I'm saying proof is likely impossible and irrelevant. It's about what makes more sense. I am OK with both ~[]comp and ~[]~comp. You are the one saying that comp is false. I am not the one saying that ~comp is false. If ~comp is true, then comp is false. You seem to have difficulties here. With respect to comp I am agnostic, and you are atheist. You pretend to know that my sun in law is a doll
Re: My scepticism took a small knock today
On Wednesday, April 9, 2014 9:55:08 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 10 April 2014 04:09, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: Dreams need not have any possible evolutionary justification, since their presence or absence is irrelevant to behavior. My dream caused this thread to come into existence, and you to make the statement quoted above. Hence you have refuted yourself thus! :-) No, we can't smuggle in our real world experience of dreams affecting our behavior into the theoretical world that functionalism would allow. If we do, it's begging the question; we are saying in effect 'Music must have an effect on cars, since cars come with radios'. Music might make you drive your car faster or miss your exit, but that doesn't mean that music itself should be explained as arising from the manufacture of automobiles. If you look only at what a car requires, and are careful not to smuggle in what *your use* of a car includes, then we can see that evolution can only really account for physiological behaviors, not subjectivity. All subjective experiences could and would be replaced by unconscious automation in a purely biological view of life. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: Craig, I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which logic seems to arise. so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. I will just sum up: 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on this. I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. My argument predicts the bias of comp in predicting the bias of non-comp, so in that aspect we are symmetric. 2) you confuse truth and first person sense, all the time. I'm not confused, I'm flat out denying that truth can ever be anything other than sense, and I'm denying that sense has to be first person. It's an explicit part of my conjecture. I can be OK with this, for some theory which assumes non-comp, but not for an argument, which should be independent of any theory, against ~comp. If you use your theory to refute comp, you beg the question. By constraining the terms of the argument to disallow aesthetic sense to transcend logical truth, you beg the question. We are symmetric here too. 3) You confuse levels in theories. You seem to infer that a theory can only talk about syntax and formal objects, because a theory is itself a formal object, but that is a confusion between a theory, and what the theory is about. No, you're projecting that confusion on me because my results disagree with yours. I understand that the number 4 or the expression x are not intended to relate literally to the figures 4 or x, and I understand that your view of arithmetic assumes a correspondence to Platonic entities. My view though is that no such entities can arise from anything other than the capacity to detect, feel, compare, control, etc. To give arithmetic entities experiential potentials makes comp beg the question from the start. How is arithmetic truth not conscious from the start, in order to produce machines that find themselves to be conscious? 4) You take sense for granted, and you object to elementary arithmetic. Again, why not, in your theory, but again, that beg the question as an argument refuting comp. Here I can only suggest you to study a bit more computer science and logic. We can just turn that around and say you take arithmetic for granted, and you object to elementary sense. You are saying that the assumptions of comp cannot be challenged unless we first agree not to challenge the assumptions of comp with new assumptions. 5) Your assumption are unclear. It is still not clear if you assume or not a physical reality, I assume sensory-motive interaction. Physicality and realism are a set of qualities which potentially arise through modulations of sensitive/insensitive interaction. or how are handled the subject's references to the physical Cf David Nyman. It is not clear how you address the mind/body problem. I address it by putting the entire universe in the gap between mind and body. Perceptual relativity creates mind-like and body-like qualities to represent distance between categories of experience. 6) Stathis' point: what in the brain/body would be responsible for its non Turing emulability. The same thing that is responsible for consciousness. In my view, it is backward to begin from a brain and say why won't a copy of this be conscious. Instead we must begin with a life experience and ask why we would assume it can be reduced to the functions of an object. It is only if we buy into our 1p sense of realism for 3p objects completely that we could make that assumption. Saying that my sun-in-law is a zombie/doll is based on your non-comp, it is not an argument for non-comp. Begging question again. My non-comp leads to the conclusion that comp cannot be defeated by argument, so it is circular to demand that it must be. Feeling cannot be proved, but that does not mean it is not more real than logic or theory. Feeling doesn't
Re: My scepticism took a small knock today
On Thursday, April 10, 2014 3:51:40 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 11 April 2014 02:17, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: On Wednesday, April 9, 2014 9:55:08 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 10 April 2014 04:09, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: Dreams need not have any possible evolutionary justification, since their presence or absence is irrelevant to behavior. My dream caused this thread to come into existence, and you to make the statement quoted above. Hence you have refuted yourself thus! :-) No, we can't smuggle in our real world experience of dreams affecting our behavior into the theoretical world that functionalism would allow. If we do, it's begging the question; we are saying in effect 'Music must have an effect on cars, since cars come with radios'. Music might make you drive your car faster or miss your exit, but that doesn't mean that music itself should be explained as arising from the manufacture of automobiles. If you look only at what a car requires, and are careful not to smuggle in what *your use* of a car includes, then we can see that evolution can only really account for physiological behaviors, not subjectivity. All subjective experiences could and would be replaced by unconscious automation in a purely biological view of life. Fine, so a counter example is dismissed as smuggling in because you don't like it. When I use a word it means what I want it to mean... ffs. If that's your idea of a reasonable response, excuse me while I put you on my ignore list. You're projecting your refusal to be wrong on to me. My example stands. It has nothing to do with what I like, it just makes more sense. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: My scepticism took a small knock today
On Tuesday, April 8, 2014 6:51:13 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 9 April 2014 04:58, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: On Monday, April 7, 2014 11:03:35 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: There is an element of this in all evolutionary explanations, but only until we are in a position to gather enough evidence to make a call for or against some idea. Evolution has been observed in action, to a limited extent, and the links between genes and various behaviours, structures etc is becoming clearer, so we have a better idea as time goes on what mechanisms have evolved and why. For example I recently read something about zebra's stripes being for protecting them from insects (I think it was) rather than making them harder for carnivores to spot. This was because someone had done some experiments to distinguish between several theories of what advantage the stripes gave. Sure, but mechanisms which have an effect on the world of the body need not have an impact on something that doesn't (like dreams). Sorry old chap could you clarify Dreams need not have any possible evolutionary justification, since their presence or absence is irrelevant to behavior. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Wednesday, April 9, 2014 4:58:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Apr 2014, at 21:33, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense. But then why are we discussing? To make more sense of everything. Then, as I said, comp makes no sense from the 1p, which in comp is the sense-maker, which makes your point logically in favor of comp. If 1p is the sense maker, and comp makes no sense from the 1p, then comp makes no sense. For the 1p. You will tell me that is all what count in your theory, but that is what is debated, and you beg the question again. You are the one who is saying that sense making is limited to 1p. How is that begging the question to ask you to clarify your contradiction that comp makes sense beyond 1p, but that sense making is limited to 1p at the same time. I am just saying that the non comp feeling is normal with comp, Yes, I have no problem with the idea that some analysis of machine function would point outside of computation. ... some analysis of machine function made by the machine. Sure. In my view, machines reflect a particular range of sensible relations, so that they do indeed tap into what I would call a 'meta-theroetical' library, but that library is a generic reflection that can be used to impersonate sense, but not experience it. Very plausibly. That part can be related to Tarski or Gödel limitation theorem, although very often the arguments are not valid, but sometimes it is. Some things may be true but not arguable, so that an invalid argument can still point us to a valid truth - i.e. a metaphor. You confuse false and non-valid. Non-valid does not entail false, but it remains non valid, and thus is not an argument, even if you were correct in the conclusion. You might guess this, because that type of argument can prove everything. What we are used to thinking of as valid or non-valid has to more deeply considered when it comes to consciousness. We cannot argue with the method that we use to move our fingers or taste coffee. If I said that I have a theory that horses pull carts rather than the other way around, does its lack of argumentative value make it less true? Lack of justfication can make it less plausible, compared to a theory with more justification. That is a very contextual questions, depending on many things. You're interested in what makes a good theory, but I'm interested in understanding consciousness. I am interested in consciousness too, and ask for a good theory, not one which makes it into a primitive falling from the sky. If its primitive, it doesn't fall from the sky, the sky falls from it. The decision to say yes to the doctor. What would a UM say to the doctor? The 1-I will say no, and the 3-I might say yes. The UM will live a conflict, and only its education might help to decide, in one or the other direction. That sounds like it is the 1-I doing the deciding...which makes me wonder what is 3-I there to do? Your body, or your Gödel number, that is a description at the right substitution level. It is the []p, for the case of the ideally correct machine, as opposed to the 1p Theaetetus' []p p, which obeys a quite different logic. It sounds like the 3-I is just an address. The machine's decision to add a self-consistency axiom and become another machine. The direct introspection of the machine, when she feels what is out of any possible justification. That is formalized by the the annuli Z* \ Z, X* \ X, etc. Yes, mathematical logic provides tools to meta-formalizes some non formalizable, by the machine, predicate which are still applying on the machine. Whether it is formal or meta-formal, it's still logic. Not really. Logic is applied, but is not the subject of the inquiry. As you said above, arithmetic is not entirely logical. It depends. If the method of inquiry is logical and the response is logical, there is no reason to expect that there is anything beyond logic in between, even if it is not the logic that we are expecting. But the point is that logical does not mean anything per se. The 3p and the 1p have different and opposed logics. Logical means representation by cognitive functions rather than aesthetic contents. If you wanted, for instance, to make a cell phone that auto-rotates its screen, you have to use some hardware; an acceleration sensor or mercury switch. Such a sensor has no substitution level as no logical instructions can locate the actual phone's orientation on Earth. No virtual sensor can work to inform the user of the real phone. It remains a view of consciousness that lacks aesthetic presence That is the statement I am quite skeptical
Re: Video of VCR
On Wednesday, April 9, 2014 5:42:18 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Apr 2014, at 22:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: Another part 2 On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: I keep explaining that arithmetic seen from inside escapes somehow the mathematics accessible to the machine. No need to keep explaining, I understood from the beginning. I'm suggesting that the 'somehow' is due to the machine actually being a reduced set of qualia. Arithmetic is a machine run by sense. No problem with such suggestion, but a suggestion is not a refutation. A refutation may not be possible because comp is too autistic. It refuses to accept any arguments that are not defined in purely logical terms. Insensitivity defines sensitivity in a trivial way. False. It accepts any valid argument. You did not present one. You're just affirming what I said. Why do you assume that the truth must be a valid argument? Truth is not a valid argument. It is not an argument to begin with. It is a valuation of a statement. A semantics. It doesn't have to be a statement. Truth is a quality of congruence across sensory experiences. For the 1p. Anything beyond 1p is begging the question. We can't know if truth extends beyond the nested collective 1p. Of course, by denying any independent 3p, you just deny that science has any ability to handle such question, but comp, even if wrong, provides the counter-example. You deny it from your theory, but that is trivial and beg the question. There may indeed be advantages to studying theories that are wrong rather than studying realities that might be impossible to model theoretically, but that doesn't deny science from stretching to fit the new reality. Some truths are experiential and aesthetic. You confuse p and []p p. No, I deny p altogether. Then you can prove that 0=1. The p has to be added, the machines already know this. I can suggest that 'prove', '0', '=', and '1' are all sensible conditions which can be expanded or contracted to suit the intended context. 0 can be 'almost 1' in some context, or it can be the opposite of 1 in another context, or it can be an irreducible part of a continuum in another context. They appear before logic and cognition. At which level, in what sense of before? I need a theory to make sense of such terms. In the sense of there being a possibility of sense without logic but not logic without sense. In your theory. That begs the question. You can't use your theory in this discussion. The only thing that I'm interested in discussing is my theory. It's my theory that makes comp invalid, why would you try to censor it? You just tell us that you know that, but that is not an argument. I don't say I know it, I say that it makes more sense. That is a progress. It makes more sense to machine too. But more sense is not an argument, especially in this context. More sense is better than an argument. Arguments are limited to logic. Logic is applied in argument, about anything. Again, if you need to be illogical as this point, you make my point. Logic cannot be applied to aesthetic experience. It is false that it can be applied to anything and it is false that pointing this out makes my point illogical. How do you know that a machine that can't feel (like a voice mail machine) knows that it can't feel? I know nothing (publicly communicable). I just tell you what I assume, and what I derive from the assumption. But I thought you were saying that you have an argument showing that step 0 (comp) is invalid at the start. Comp is invalid at the start because it loses nothing when we assume that all function can be reduced to logic and hidden logic. Computation works as a map of maps, and need have no territory that is presented aesthetically, either theoretically or empirically. The jump from map to territory is reverse engineered from the very expectations of our own awareness, making comp more likely to be a figment of circular reasoning. Confusion between []~comp and ~[]comp. It would be circular if I was defending the truth of comp, but I am just showing that your argument beg the question. Even if my argument seems to beg the question from a 3p logical perspective, it doesn't matter because the argument assumes from the start that 3p logic is not necessary or sufficient to address consciousness. Why would a more sophisticated machine be any different in that regard? A voice mail machine does not seem to implement a universal machine believing in some induction principles, like PA, ZF. We don't know that the voice mail machine lacks PA and ZF induction principles, This is ridiculous. That's what I say about your sun in law
Re: My scepticism took a small knock today
On Wednesday, April 9, 2014 12:47:01 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 6:09 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Tuesday, April 8, 2014 6:51:13 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 9 April 2014 04:58, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, April 7, 2014 11:03:35 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: There is an element of this in all evolutionary explanations, but only until we are in a position to gather enough evidence to make a call for or against some idea. Evolution has been observed in action, to a limited extent, and the links between genes and various behaviours, structures etc is becoming clearer, so we have a better idea as time goes on what mechanisms have evolved and why. For example I recently read something about zebra's stripes being for protecting them from insects (I think it was) rather than making them harder for carnivores to spot. This was because someone had done some experiments to distinguish between several theories of what advantage the stripes gave. Sure, but mechanisms which have an effect on the world of the body need not have an impact on something that doesn't (like dreams). Sorry old chap could you clarify Dreams need not have any possible evolutionary justification, since their presence or absence is irrelevant to behavior. How do you know that? It's plausible that they play a role in training for future scenarios, for example. I'm not discounting that there might be more to it than that -- I am fascinated by dreams too -- but to claim that they are irrelevant to behavior seems quite a stretch. We could always invent a justification for them, but I don't think that we have to. There is no reason that any experience within consciousness better explains some behavior than would an unconscious mechanism explanation. Craig I Cheers, Telmo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: My scepticism took a small knock today
On Monday, April 7, 2014 11:03:35 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 8 April 2014 09:41, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: On Monday, April 7, 2014 4:38:42 PM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote: 2014-04-07 22:25 GMT+02:00 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com: On Sunday, April 6, 2014 2:45:35 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote: Probably you saw people visiting houses in your neighbourhood, but that did not reached consciousnees you were busy thinking about other things. (I will not insert here these funny videos of people failing to recognize a bear in the middle of a scene). These kinds of dismissals are not scientific. When you have a genuinely precognitive experience, you would really have to bend over backward to mistake it for anything else. If you say so... But according with a theory of evolutionary psychology, dreams are in order to be prepared for possible threats specially the most dangerous ones. The material of the dreams is taken from past events, and the subconscious takes into account not only the things that were you conscious of, but everithing. You could just as easily say that dreams are in order to confuse us so that we will be unprepared for possible threats to weed out the more easily confused members of the species. Just-so stories are fun to make up, but we shouldn't take them seriously. You could as easily say it as well that plants are aliens. and Craig is the father of Dark Vader. Yes . You can say so. But it is not something based on the theory of evolution, that is, natural selection and evolutionary biology. What I'm saying though is that the theory of evolution can be used to advance or deny any position on dreams that we care to take. It's all reverse engineered story telling. There is an element of this in all evolutionary explanations, but only until we are in a position to gather enough evidence to make a call for or against some idea. Evolution has been observed in action, to a limited extent, and the links between genes and various behaviours, structures etc is becoming clearer, so we have a better idea as time goes on what mechanisms have evolved and why. For example I recently read something about zebra's stripes being for protecting them from insects (I think it was) rather than making them harder for carnivores to spot. This was because someone had done some experiments to distinguish between several theories of what advantage the stripes gave. Sure, but mechanisms which have an effect on the world of the body need not have an impact on something that doesn't (like dreams). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, April 3, 2014 2:34:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: I'm not confusing them, I'm saying that []~comp is not untrue this means you say []~comp is true. Yes. Nice. Or that you confuse, like you did already truth and knowledge, but in that case you keep saying that you know []~comp, yet your argument above was only for ~[]comp, on which I already agree, as it is a consequence of comp. I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense. But then why are we discussing? To make more sense of everything. Then, as I said, comp makes no sense from the 1p, which in comp is the sense-maker, which makes your point logically in favor of comp. If 1p is the sense maker, and comp makes no sense from the 1p, then comp makes no sense. just because it is outside of logic. When you arbitrarily begin from the 3p perspective, you can only see the flatland version of 1p intuition. You would have to consider the possibility that numbers can come from this kind of intuition and not the other way around. If you put your fingers in your ears, and only listen to formalism, then you can only hear what formalism has to say about intuition, which is... not much. Why? Because of the incompleteness of all formal systems. But this is based on arithmetic. Ah, you are confusing the arithmetic with the sensible conditions that the arithmetic is pointing to. comp implies that ~comp has the benefits of the doubt. I told you this many times. As I just repeated above, this does not refute comp. What does it mean to give it the benefit of the doubt but then deny it? You are the only one who deny a theory here. By saying that ~comp is only what seems true from the machine's 1p perspective, you are denying ~comp can be more true than comp. I am just saying that the non comp feeling is normal with comp, Yes, I have no problem with the idea that some analysis of machine function would point outside of computation. and cannot be used to refute logically comp. Why not? Aren't you just jumping to a conclusion like 'since there are drive through restaurants, it means that we cannot assume that cars are not hungry'. I am not denying non-comp. Not at all. I never said that comp is true, or that comp is false. I say only that comp leads to a Plato/aristotle reversal, to be short. We agree on this from the start, but what I am saying is that Plato also can be reversed on the lower level, so that the ideal/arithmetic is generated statistically by aesthetics. Derive 1 = 1 in your theory. Show me the theory first. In my theory, 1 = 1 is reflects a particular set of mathematical expectations. I don't make any claims on the contents of arithmetic, only on the nature of what arithmetic derives from. But *you* say that comp is false, and that is why we ask you an argument. The argument has to be understandable, and not of the type let us abandon logic and ..., which is like God told me ..., and has zero argumentative value. We don't have to abandon logic, but we have to understand that the source of logic is not necessarily going to be logical. This is what most people get from Godel. We knew this already. The choice of theories are not 100% logical. We don't need Gödel for this. even better The truth does not require argumentation value. Very plausibly. That part can be related to Tarski or Gödel limitation theorem, although very often the arguments are not valid, but sometimes it is. Some things may be true but not arguable, so that an invalid argument can still point us to a valid truth - i.e. a metaphor. If I said that I have a theory that horses pull carts rather than the other way around, does its lack of argumentative value make it less true? Lack of justfication can make it less plausible, compared to a theory with more justification. That is a very contextual questions, depending on many things. You're interested in what makes a good theory, but I'm interested in understanding consciousness. Comp is Gödelian. It behaves like consistency (~[]f, t), which entails the consistency of its negation: t - []f. Not sure what you mean. Maybe if you wrote it out without symbols. If I am consistent then it is consistent that I am not consistent. (I = the 3p notion of self). How is I a 3p notion of self? It is not. Only here. (raise eyebrow) I was just saying that I was using I in the 3p sense of the self. In that case, the I is given by the body or the code of the entity saying I (by definition). The decision to say yes
Re: Video of VCR
Another part 2 On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: I keep explaining that arithmetic seen from inside escapes somehow the mathematics accessible to the machine. No need to keep explaining, I understood from the beginning. I'm suggesting that the 'somehow' is due to the machine actually being a reduced set of qualia. Arithmetic is a machine run by sense. No problem with such suggestion, but a suggestion is not a refutation. A refutation may not be possible because comp is too autistic. It refuses to accept any arguments that are not defined in purely logical terms. Insensitivity defines sensitivity in a trivial way. False. It accepts any valid argument. You did not present one. You're just affirming what I said. Why do you assume that the truth must be a valid argument? Truth is not a valid argument. It is not an argument to begin with. It is a valuation of a statement. A semantics. It doesn't have to be a statement. Truth is a quality of congruence across sensory experiences. Some truths are experiential and aesthetic. You confuse p and []p p. No, I deny p altogether. They appear before logic and cognition. At which level, in what sense of before? I need a theory to make sense of such terms. In the sense of there being a possibility of sense without logic but not logic without sense. You just tell us that you know that, but that is not an argument. I don't say I know it, I say that it makes more sense. That is a progress. It makes more sense to machine too. But more sense is not an argument, especially in this context. More sense is better than an argument. Arguments are limited to logic. Nor do you present a theory, in the usual informal sense used by scientists, which you criticize as having inadequate tools, but then you put yourself out of the dialog. Yes, the dialog is the problem. You have to take off the sunglasses to see all of the light. and it seems that changing the logic to refute comp, is like trying to rotate the solar system to be in front of your computer (it is simpler to rotate yourself). I'm not changing the logic, I'm denying that it is relevant. This is worst than don't ask. It is: let us be irrational. Let us be rational in understanding the trans-rational, but do not limit ourselves to the rationality of strict logic. = give me some amount of illogicalness so that I can keep up my prejudice against machine; Let me disallow all but strictly logical terms so I can keep up my prejudice against consciousness. UDA is informal, and I hope valid. AUDA uses mathematical logic and theoretical computer science, which uses are of course invited when you assume computationalism. It seems again like if you do have a prejudice against my sun in law, and other possible machines, ability to manifest personal consciousness. It's not a prejudice, it's an understanding. Consciousness need not be manifested by anything, let alone machines. Consciousness is manifestation itself. Consciousness is what we are looking for and consciousness is required before logic. Like the far away galaxies are required before the telescope, but that does not make the telescope irrelevant to detect the galaxies. No, but the galaxies are not defined by what a telescope detects. An array of telescopes cannot create a galaxy. Nor can logic create consciousness, but still be useful to reason about consciousness. You make my point, again. It be useful to reason about consciousness to a point, but it doesn't go all the way, Hmm... OK. Incompleteness valid this. :) and it doesn't know why it can't go all the way. Surely incompleteness validates this. No. the machine can be aware of its own incompleteness and understand why it doesn't go all the way, but also why this makes the possible outside productive and very rich. How do you know that a machine that can't feel (like a voice mail machine) knows that it can't feel? I know nothing (publicly communicable). I just tell you what I assume, and what I derive from the assumption. But I thought you were saying that you have an argument showing that step 0 (comp) is invalid at the start. Comp is invalid at the start because it loses nothing when we assume that all function can be reduced to logic and hidden logic. Computation works as a map of maps, and need have no territory that is presented aesthetically, either theoretically or empirically. The jump from map to territory is reverse engineered from the very expectations of our own awareness, making comp more likely to be a figment of circular reasoning. I am happy you admit being less certain, on this, and my sun in law who read your posts told me
Re: My scepticism took a small knock today
On Saturday, April 5, 2014 3:42:10 PM UTC-4, Kim Jones wrote: On 6 Apr 2014, at 2:23 am, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: It's just showing you that your awareness extends beyond your personal definition of here and now Finally you got to it. It was a precognitive dream. I have had many, an enormous number throughout my life in fact, so I don't think we need to beat about the bush here. Some dreams foretell or synchronistically coincide with near-future events (usually cloaked in some symbolic representation). Period. Jung certainly thought so. We cannot explain this away. Exactly. At this point, I think that the reluctance to admit the reality of this phenomenon no longer deserves the benefit of the doubt. Certainly we would want to be open to other explanations, but I see no reason to seriously entertain the prejudiced views which insist that our naive partitioning of 'now' happens to be a universal constant. Kim Jones B. Mus. GDTL Email: kimj...@ozemail.com.au javascript: kmjc...@icloud.com javascript: Mobile: 0450 963 719 Phone: 02 93894239 Web: http://www.eportfolio.kmjcommp.com *Never let your schooling get in the way of your education - Mark Twain* -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: My scepticism took a small knock today
On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:44 AM UTC-4, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Apr 06, 2014 at 05:42:10AM +1000, Kim Jones wrote: Finally you got to it. It was a precognitive dream. I have had many, an enormous number throughout my life in fact, so I don't think we need to beat about the bush here. Some dreams foretell or synchronistically coincide with near-future events (usually cloaked in some symbolic representation). Period. Jung certainly thought so. We cannot explain this away. Not sure about that. It's happened maybe 2-3 times to me in my whole life. I would call that rate coincidence. Not statistically significant. YMMV :). Also, presumably by chance, some people's rate of precognitive dreams would be much higher, just like some people are more accident prone than others. We would have to factor in the possibility that a bias toward coincidence (in subjects, scientists, or even the public) could alter the results. To seriously consider consciousness the fundamental phenomenon, we must expect that matters which could potentially define consciousness itself one way or another would be suppressed by occult means. If the universe is made of bias, we cannot expect it to play by the rules that it uses to keep us guessing. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: My scepticism took a small knock today
On Sunday, April 6, 2014 2:45:35 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote: Probably you saw people visiting houses in your neighbourhood, but that did not reached consciousnees you were busy thinking about other things. (I will not insert here these funny videos of people failing to recognize a bear in the middle of a scene). These kinds of dismissals are not scientific. When you have a genuinely precognitive experience, you would really have to bend over backward to mistake it for anything else. But according with a theory of evolutionary psychology, dreams are in order to be prepared for possible threats specially the most dangerous ones. The material of the dreams is taken from past events, and the subconscious takes into account not only the things that were you conscious of, but everithing. You could just as easily say that dreams are in order to confuse us so that we will be unprepared for possible threats to weed out the more easily confused members of the species. Just-so stories are fun to make up, but we shouldn't take them seriously. And maybe, sometimes the elaborative mechanism of the dreams does work very well. In some sense it is precognitive. That is in order to protect your sacred skepticism ;) 2014-04-06 7:13 GMT+02:00, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript:: On Sun, Apr 06, 2014 at 05:42:10AM +1000, Kim Jones wrote: Finally you got to it. It was a precognitive dream. I have had many, an enormous number throughout my life in fact, so I don't think we need to beat about the bush here. Some dreams foretell or synchronistically coincide with near-future events (usually cloaked in some symbolic representation). Period. Jung certainly thought so. We cannot explain this away. Not sure about that. It's happened maybe 2-3 times to me in my whole life. I would call that rate coincidence. Not statistically significant. YMMV :). Also, presumably by chance, some people's rate of precognitive dreams would be much higher, just like some people are more accident prone than others. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript:. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: My scepticism took a small knock today
On Sunday, April 6, 2014 3:13:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Apr 2014, at 07:13, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Apr 06, 2014 at 05:42:10AM +1000, Kim Jones wrote: Finally you got to it. It was a precognitive dream. I have had many, an enormous number throughout my life in fact, so I don't think we need to beat about the bush here. Some dreams foretell or synchronistically coincide with near-future events (usually cloaked in some symbolic representation). Period. Jung certainly thought so. We cannot explain this away. Not sure about that. It's happened maybe 2-3 times to me in my whole life. I would call that rate coincidence. Not statistically significant. YMMV :). Also, presumably by chance, some people's rate of precognitive dreams would be much higher, just like some people are more accident prone than others. I thought making precognitive dreams, and that is one of the reason why I decide to have a dream diary. I continued to have such dreams, but the diary made me realize that in mot case, that was more a type of déjà-vu phenomenon, the predicted events occurs before the dreams. So this can be judged only from massive amount of case, with the dream being dated, and the pre-seen event too, and I have never found such data. Your methods may be altering the results though. If you try to objectify meta-phenomenal experiences, they begin to reflect back the kind of attention you are employing and are reduced to whatever coincidental/insignificant form that will reinforce the prejudice. Craig So I am not sure if there are serious evidences, which of course, by itself, does not refute the precognition theory. Bruno Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript:. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: My scepticism took a small knock today
On Monday, April 7, 2014 4:38:42 PM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote: 2014-04-07 22:25 GMT+02:00 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: : On Sunday, April 6, 2014 2:45:35 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote: Probably you saw people visiting houses in your neighbourhood, but that did not reached consciousnees you were busy thinking about other things. (I will not insert here these funny videos of people failing to recognize a bear in the middle of a scene). These kinds of dismissals are not scientific. When you have a genuinely precognitive experience, you would really have to bend over backward to mistake it for anything else. If you say so... But according with a theory of evolutionary psychology, dreams are in order to be prepared for possible threats specially the most dangerous ones. The material of the dreams is taken from past events, and the subconscious takes into account not only the things that were you conscious of, but everithing. You could just as easily say that dreams are in order to confuse us so that we will be unprepared for possible threats to weed out the more easily confused members of the species. Just-so stories are fun to make up, but we shouldn't take them seriously. You could as easily say it as well that plants are aliens. and Craig is the father of Dark Vader. Yes . You can say so. But it is not something based on the theory of evolution, that is, natural selection and evolutionary biology. What I'm saying though is that the theory of evolution can be used to advance or deny any position on dreams that we care to take. It's all reverse engineered story telling. And maybe, sometimes the elaborative mechanism of the dreams does work very well. In some sense it is precognitive. That is in order to protect your sacred skepticism ;) 2014-04-06 7:13 GMT+02:00, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au: On Sun, Apr 06, 2014 at 05:42:10AM +1000, Kim Jones wrote: Finally you got to it. It was a precognitive dream. I have had many, an enormous number throughout my life in fact, so I don't think we need to beat about the bush here. Some dreams foretell or synchronistically coincide with near-future events (usually cloaked in some symbolic representation). Period. Jung certainly thought so. We cannot explain this away. Not sure about that. It's happened maybe 2-3 times to me in my whole life. I would call that rate coincidence. Not statistically significant. YMMV :). Also, presumably by chance, some people's rate of precognitive dreams would be much higher, just like some people are more accident prone than others. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: My scepticism took a small knock today
On Saturday, April 5, 2014 1:35:26 AM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 5 April 2014 15:10, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: On Friday, April 4, 2014 6:00:09 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: Last night just before I woke up I had a dream about a guy coming to the door selling religion, so to speak - the details were a bit weird, as in most dreams, but that was the gist of it - I sent him away, saying no thanks we don't indulge or words to that effect. I've never had a dream of that sort, at least not that I can recall. A few minutes ago, for the first time since we've been in this house (1 and a half years) - indeed the first time in a lot longer than that - a guy came to the door with a copy of the Watchtower and a personal message from God. I sent him away, but ... I was a bit shaken. Charles also had a weird recurring dream for several years about a situation he has now found himself in, to do with work, which has freaked him out a bit, although his makes more sense as a worry dream. Once is happenstance, twice is coincidence ... isn't it? Personally I think that you have to add in the fact that you took notice of the happenstance, so already it was a potential coincidence. By the time it recurs, it is slightly more than a coincidence. What does it mean? I think not much but it offers a glimpse into the larger nature of time as rooted in experience rather than physics. I'm not sure I understand what you mean. I took notice of it because it was quite an unusual and memorable dream Right, that's why it was already a pattern. Being unusual and memorable is a kind of coincidence in itself. Your personal awareness is being alerted that there is something to notice that may be clarified later. - not so much the detail about the guy being a bible basher (although that was unusual) but some of the attendant details - odd features that made me tell Charles about it as soon as I woke up. Yes, it's not about the contents of the dream as much as the alignment of the dream with future reality. It's just showing you that your awareness extends beyond your personal definition of here and now, and reflecting back to you that you consider that kind of thing an intrusion. Not that I'm a dream expert, it could mean something else, I'm just going by my experience with synchronicity. The fact that you told Charles about it too can be considered even another coincidence, as far as it being something that you chose to do in response to the dream instead of doing nothing and forgetting about it. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, April 3, 2014 2:34:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Apr 2014, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 1:00:54 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Apr 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: I believe you, but all of the laws and creativity can still only occur in the context of a sense making experience. Did I ever said the contrary? Yes, you are saying that multiplication and addition laws prefigure sense making and sense experience. It makes the minimal sense *you* need to understand what we talk about. That sense has already been studied and has itself some mathematical representation. Then, once you have the numbers, and the laws of + and *, you can prove the existence of the universal numbers and their computations. The universal numbers are the sense discovering machine. It doesn't matter how minimal the sense is by our standards. In that frame of reference, before we exist, it is much sense as there could ever be. If there is sense to make + and *, then numbers can only act as conduit to shape that sense, not to create it. You're interested in understanding numbers, but I'm only interested in understanding the sense that makes everything (including, but not limited to numbers). You ignore the discovery that numbers can understand and make sense of many things, with reasonable and understandable definitions (with some work). Just as we depend our eyes to make sense of our retinal cells sense, so to do numbers act as lenses and filters to capture sense for us. That does not mean that what sense is made through numbers belong to numbers. Of course. Comp might be false. ~comp, we agree on this since the start. But it does not add anything to your []~comp. You persist to confuse ~[]comp and []~comp. I'm not confusing them, I'm saying that []~comp is not untrue this means you say []~comp is true. Yes. Or that you confuse, like you did already truth and knowledge, but in that case you keep saying that you know []~comp, yet your argument above was only for ~[]comp, on which I already agree, as it is a consequence of comp. I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense. just because it is outside of logic. When you arbitrarily begin from the 3p perspective, you can only see the flatland version of 1p intuition. You would have to consider the possibility that numbers can come from this kind of intuition and not the other way around. If you put your fingers in your ears, and only listen to formalism, then you can only hear what formalism has to say about intuition, which is... not much. Why? Because of the incompleteness of all formal systems. All that can still make sense in the theory according to which sense is a gift by Santa Klaus. And this is not an argument against your theory, nor against the existence of Santa Klaus. Concerning your theory, I find it uninteresting because it abandons my entire field of inquiry: making sense of sense. I don't think abandoned as much as frees it from trying to do the impossible. I see mathematics as being even more useful when we know that it is safe from gaining autonomous intent. Comp implies that Arithmetic is not free of autonomous intent, trivially. But computer science provides many realities capable of justifying or defining autonomous intent. I was talking about the theory of comp being over-extended to try to explain qualia and awareness. It helps to formulate the problems, and provides way to test indirect predictions. But again you are pursuing the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. There's no confusion. If comp cannot justify actual qualia, but ~comp can, then we should give ~comp the benefit of the doubt. comp implies that ~comp has the benefits of the doubt. I told you this many times. As I just repeated above, this does not refute comp. What does it mean to give it the benefit of the doubt but then deny it? You are the only one who deny a theory here. By saying that ~comp is only what seems true from the machine's 1p perspective, you are denying ~comp can be more true than comp. I never said that comp is true, or that comp is false. I say only that comp leads to a Plato/aristotle reversal, to be short. We agree on this from the start, but what I am saying is that Plato also can be reversed on the lower level, so that the ideal/arithmetic is generated statistically by aesthetics. But *you* say that comp is false, and that is why we ask you an argument. The argument has to be understandable, and not of the type let us abandon logic and ..., which is like God told me ..., and has zero argumentative value. We don't have to abandon logic
Re: Video of VCR
On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: Logic is just required to be able to argue with others, and you do use it, it seems to me, except that you seem to decide opportunistically to not apply it to refute comp. Comp can't be refuted logically. Sorry, but the whole point is that it might be. It can be refuted logically, arithmetically, and empirically. It's a mirage. It seems like it could be refuted, but the built in bias of logic overlooks the stacked deck. Just as emotions and ego have their biases that warp our thinking, so too does logical thinking have an agenda which undersignifies its competition. You are so wrong here that I have to pause. You talk in a way which empties the dialog of any sense. You tell me in advance you need to be illogical to refute my agnosticism in the matter. You don't have to be 'illogical', you just have to transcend strict logic...break the fourth wall...use some of that courage you were talking about. All that I am saying is that incompleteness supports the limits of logic, so that we cannot presume to hold sense to that standard if my view is true. How could that conversation have sense? I put my hypotheses on the table, but here you put a gun on the table. Haha, yes, that's the thing, sense is tyrannical and violent. It acts like it is following laws but it cheats and then blames something else. At least I'm telling you it's a gun, you've convinced yourself that your gun is just a polite hypothesis. The choice is between logic, which is basically the most common part of common sense, and war or violence. It's precisely because logic is the most common part of common sense that it cannot parse the germ of sense, which is absolutely unprecedented. Identity is not just uncommon, but the opposite - unrepeatable, proprietary, anti-mechnical. There is no choice at all. There is the illusion of logic and the reality of having to carve some kind of genuine sanity out of this thing, moment by moment. If we wait for logic to give us permission, we lose the moment. Your theory is don't ask, but I realize also don't argue. Asking and arguing is great, but you can't get away from the fact that it doesn't make sense for the one who asks and argues to be a logical machine. It is comp which ultimately makes asking and arguing irrelevant, but it does so like a vampire - obligating us to invite us in..be fair to the imposter and let him take your brain. That might be correct, and provable in your non-comp theory, but that is not an argument against comp. (And this is no more an argument in favor of comp of course). It is an argument against comp in my non-comp theory. If it comes down to choosing between the certainty of life and awareness as you know it and taking a gamble on logic and computation, do you say yes to the farmer? If we aren't being faced with death with a mad doctor as our only hope, would we gamble with our lives? Would a machine say yes to the farmer? Randomness comes up in comp predictions? Yes. At step seven, as the UD will notably dovetail on all normal differentiation, on a continuum. The iterated WM self-duplication is a part of UD*. What becomes random, and why? Are you OK with step 3 of the UDA? I don't think so. Teleportation? No, the FPI. The fact that you cannot predict, in your personal diary, what you will write tomorrow, when you will be copied and sent at two different places simultaneously (or not). Nothing like that is going to happen. There aren't going to be any copies of me. Sociopaths and actors refute comp. Blindsight refutes comp. Keyboard passwords refute comp. Sports refute comp. etc. You do have a problem with logic. Maybe I do, because I don't see how that follows. When I list examples, you change the subject every time. I am just saying that you have not prove that comp is false. Telling me that I have not proved comp will not do the work, as comp implies that no such proof can ever exist. It's not a matter of proof, because proof has nothing to do with consciousness. It is a matter of what makes more sense overall. That is wishful thinking. It is your right. I have no problem with non-comp, but I do have problem with people using any theory pretending to refute something, and actually unable to do it. I'm refuting the metatheory that comp's refutability is related to its truth. I'm suggesting that specifically, comp is a theoretical construct which brilliantly reduces a theory of consciousness to simple elements, but that this is actually not related directly to consciousness, just as the shadow of a swimming pool is not full of water, even though it moves like water and reflects light like water. There is no problem working in different incompatible theories
Re: My scepticism took a small knock today
On Friday, April 4, 2014 6:00:09 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: Last night just before I woke up I had a dream about a guy coming to the door selling religion, so to speak - the details were a bit weird, as in most dreams, but that was the gist of it - I sent him away, saying no thanks we don't indulge or words to that effect. I've never had a dream of that sort, at least not that I can recall. A few minutes ago, for the first time since we've been in this house (1 and a half years) - indeed the first time in a lot longer than that - a guy came to the door with a copy of the Watchtower and a personal message from God. I sent him away, but ... I was a bit shaken. Charles also had a weird recurring dream for several years about a situation he has now found himself in, to do with work, which has freaked him out a bit, although his makes more sense as a worry dream. Once is happenstance, twice is coincidence ... isn't it? Personally I think that you have to add in the fact that you took notice of the happenstance, so already it was a potential coincidence. By the time it recurs, it is slightly more than a coincidence. What does it mean? I think not much but it offers a glimpse into the larger nature of time as rooted in experience rather than physics. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: My model re Comp and Life re the Everything
On Sunday, March 30, 2014 7:21:29 PM UTC-4, Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi everyone:
I am currently interested in two questions:
Does my model of why there are dynamic universes within the Everything
[latest version is below] include Bruno's Comp? Hi Bruno.
If life is inherently self destructive under any reasonable definition of
life [see some of my recent posts], then how does this impact the
Everything since I see it as a restriction [selection] on the scope of
possible universes?
Comments welcome.
Thanks
Hal Ruhl
DEFINITIONS:
i) Distinction:
That which enables a separation such as a particular red from other colors.
I call this Sense.
ii) Devisor:
That which encloses a quantity [zero to every] of distinctions. [Some
divisors are thus collections of divisors.]
I would call this a quale (as in qualia)
iii): Define “N”s as those divisors that enclose zero distinction. Call
them Nothing(s).
This is not necessary to me. Something that functions only to enclose and
does not enclose anything need not be reified. It's not 'Nothing', there
just isn't anything there to define.
iv): Define “S”s as divisors that enclose a non zero number of
distinctions but not all distinctions. Call them Something(s).
These are still just qualia. There doesn't need to be a 'nothing' defined,
so any sense encounter or sense distinction is 'something'. Note that by
saying that sense encounter, I am extending sense even beneath the level of i)
Distinction. We need not be able to experience distinct difference to have
awareness. Awareness makes distinctions and appreciated the, but
distinctions are not things in themselves. We can tell the difference
between anger and sadness, but they need not be distinct, nor does either
one need to be made distinct to be felt. Anger is a self-evident condition
of (our) experience which is not generated by distinctions.
MODEL:
1) Assumption # A1: There exists a set consisting of all possible
divisors. Call this set “A”.
I would call this the Absolute.
“A” encompasses every distinction. “A” is thus itself a divisor by
definition (i) and therefore contains itself an unbounded number of times
[“A” contains “A” which contains “A” and so on.
So far so good.
2) An issue that arises is whether or not an individual specific divisor
is static or dynamic. That is: Is its quantity of distinction subject to
change? It cannot be both.
It can be both, neither, or one and not the other in some frame of
reference ('in some sense'). In your terms I would say that each
Divisor/Quale (Q) is made distinct from A by its signature perspectives of
A (A minus Q), and its signature perspectives of every Other Q (O). For me
the Earth is flat or round. For an rabbit it is only flat. For a rabbit on
a spaceship it is only a round image. What is static or dynamic is a
function of the relative scale of Q to O.
This requires that all divisors individually enclose the self referential
distinction of being static or dynamic.
I can move or I can sit still. I need not choose a label of which one I am.
3) At least one divisor type - the “N”s, by definition (iii), enclose no
such distinction but by (2) they must enclose this one.
Lost me there. Why would nothing have to be defined as static or dynamic.
Nothing can be neither. Stasis and motion are distinctions (qualia) just
like everything else.
This is a type of incompleteness. [A complete divisor can answer any
self meaningful question but not necessarily consistently i.e. sometimes
one way sometimes another] That is the “N”s cannot answer this question
which is nevertheless meaningful to them. [The incompleteness is taken
to be rather similar functionally to the incompleteness of some
mathematical Formal Axiomatic Systems – See Godel.]
Once you define something as Nothings, you can't do anything with them.
They are neither complete nor incomplete. They are certainly not capable of
becoming aware of the meaningfulness of a question. Incompleteness relates
to the limitations of formal representation, not to ontology.
The “N” are thus unstable with respect to their initial condition. They
each must at some point spontaneously enclose this stability distinction.
They thereby transition into “S”s.
I can get behind a notion of Almost Nothing (±N), in which case I would
agree in the instability in which there is a fluctuation toward and away
from distinction. The transition is not objective though - it is the
perspective, the window of sense through which distinctions are made that
is giving the appearance of transition. From the perspective of A, beyond
time, the transition is eternal, instantaneous, and everything in between.
4) By (3) Transitions between divisors exist.
Locally, yes, but it is relativistic. The acorn appears to us to
Re: Video of VCR
On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 1:00:54 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Apr 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: I believe you, but all of the laws and creativity can still only occur in the context of a sense making experience. Did I ever said the contrary? Yes, you are saying that multiplication and addition laws prefigure sense making and sense experience. It makes the minimal sense *you* need to understand what we talk about. That sense has already been studied and has itself some mathematical representation. Then, once you have the numbers, and the laws of + and *, you can prove the existence of the universal numbers and their computations. The universal numbers are the sense discovering machine. It doesn't matter how minimal the sense is by our standards. In that frame of reference, before we exist, it is much sense as there could ever be. If there is sense to make + and *, then numbers can only act as conduit to shape that sense, not to create it. You're interested in understanding numbers, but I'm only interested in understanding the sense that makes everything (including, but not limited to numbers). You ignore the discovery that numbers can understand and make sense of many things, with reasonable and understandable definitions (with some work). Just as we depend our eyes to make sense of our retinal cells sense, so to do numbers act as lenses and filters to capture sense for us. That does not mean that what sense is made through numbers belong to numbers. All that can still make sense in the theory according to which sense is a gift by Santa Klaus. And this is not an argument against your theory, nor against the existence of Santa Klaus. Concerning your theory, I find it uninteresting because it abandons my entire field of inquiry: making sense of sense. I don't think abandoned as much as frees it from trying to do the impossible. I see mathematics as being even more useful when we know that it is safe from gaining autonomous intent. Comp implies that Arithmetic is not free of autonomous intent, trivially. But computer science provides many realities capable of justifying or defining autonomous intent. I was talking about the theory of comp being over-extended to try to explain qualia and awareness. It helps to formulate the problems, and provides way to test indirect predictions. But again you are pursuing the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. There's no confusion. If comp cannot justify actual qualia, but ~comp can, then we should give ~comp the benefit of the doubt. But in logic and computer science, we do have theories relating formula/theories/machine and some mathematical notion senses (models, interpretation, valuation) usually infinite or transfinite. But I have never said that you are wrong with your theory. Only that the use of your theory to refute computationalism is not valid. Not valid by what epistemology though? Yes, that is your problem. You seem unaware of the most simple universal standard, which are basically either classical logic, or another logic, but then made explicit. It's not that I'm not aware, it's that I think it doesn't work for consciousness unless you beg the question by assuming that consciousness comes from logic. Then you become non sensical, at least for the others. Somehow you confess you have to abandon logic to make my sun in law into a zombie. You make my point. You make my point also. Your view assumes that we must judge consciousness by the standard of logic, even though we know from the start that our access to logic depends on consciousness. Your sun in law is animated doll, and you must amputate my circle of sense to the digital square in order to make him seem human. It begs the question if you use the logic that gives rise to comp to refute a conjecture that explicitly questions logic as primordial. If you refute comp with a non standard logic, you have to make it explicit. I do make it explicit. In the matter of 1p awareness, I refute all possible logic with the deeper reality of sense. Good 1p intuition, but the machine already knows that, and they can know that this cannot been used to justify that they are (necessarily unknown for them) machines/numbers. Isn't that an argument from authority, where the authority is how you interpret hypothetical machines states of mind? Saying that machines know that my view is wrong does not help. I can say that kangaroos know that your view is wrong. But you will have to motivate the use of that logic, Why would I have to motivate the use of sense if I don't have to motivate the use of standard logic? All I have to do is stop presuming that math can make color and then begin to understand why. But comp explains why. Then show me a new color. You
Re: Nova Spivack on 'Consciousness is More Fundamental Than Computation'
On Wednesday, March 26, 2014 6:40:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:21, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 11:42:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Mar 2014, at 21:36, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness-is-not-a-computation-2 Come on, the guy believe in Aristotelian theology, clearly without knowing it, and he believes that a computer is material, etc. Then his argument is along the line of begging the question entirely on consciousness, ... and on matter. He's just another example of the growing number of people who are familiar with AI from the inside who are willing to admit that consciousness does not arise through computation. He is just awakening to the comp mind-body problem, (like all 1p-machines), but not yet to its solution, which is indeed shocking, at least for people unaware of Everett, FPI, and all that. You don't know what he knows. Craig Bruno Craig Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Nova Spivack on 'Consciousness is More Fundamental Than Computation'
On Wednesday, March 26, 2014 6:35:18 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 27 March 2014 04:00, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: On Wednesday, March 26, 2014 6:40:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:21, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 11:42:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Mar 2014, at 21:36, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness- is-not-a-computation-2 Come on, the guy believe in Aristotelian theology, clearly without knowing it, and he believes that a computer is material, etc. Then his argument is along the line of begging the question entirely on consciousness, ... and on matter. He's just another example of the growing number of people who are familiar with AI from the inside who are willing to admit that consciousness does not arise through computation. He is just awakening to the comp mind-body problem, (like all 1p-machines), but not yet to its solution, which is indeed shocking, at least for people unaware of Everett, FPI, and all that. You don't know what he knows. You know what he publishes, which is a good proxy. What he publishes gives me every indication that he knows his way around computer science. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Nova Spivack on 'Consciousness is More Fundamental Than Computation'
On Monday, March 24, 2014 5:13:26 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On 25 March 2014 07:36, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness-is-not-a-computation-2 He could make similar arguments claiming consciousness is not chemistry. In that case, he would still be correct. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Nova Spivack on 'Consciousness is More Fundamental Than Computation'
On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 11:42:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Mar 2014, at 21:36, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness-is-not-a-computation-2 Come on, the guy believe in Aristotelian theology, clearly without knowing it, and he believes that a computer is material, etc. Then his argument is along the line of begging the question entirely on consciousness, ... and on matter. He's just another example of the growing number of people who are familiar with AI from the inside who are willing to admit that consciousness does not arise through computation. Craig Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Nova Spivack on 'Consciousness is More Fundamental Than Computation'
http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness-is-not-a-computation-2 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Sunday, March 23, 2014 4:49:48 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Mar 2014, at 19:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: Continued... On Saturday, March 22, 2014 4:54:41 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:43, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, March 21, 2014 4:44:20 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Mar 2014, at 02:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't think logic can study reality, only truncated maps of maps of reality. Whatever is reality, it might not depend on what you think it is, or is not. Of course, but it might not depend on logic or computation either. It depends on the theory we assume. You don't see the double standard there? I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of faith, and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the empirical evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would dare to defend the study of comp. It *is* socking and counter-intuitive. It's not shocking at all to me. For me it's old news. Not to me, and I don't take anything for granted. I assume comp, and this includes elementary arithmetic, enough to explain Church's thesis. I don't take arithmetic for granted. Then you have no tools to assert non-comp. Why not? I assert sense. Computation need not even exist in theory. Computation arises intentionally as an organizational feature - just as it does on Earth: to keep track of things and events. Question begging. If an explanation falls out of the hypothesis, why is it question begging? Because it does not justify at all why comp has to be wrong. It justifies only that comp might be wrong, and is unbelievable, but this is already derivable from comp. The fact that there may be no way to justify that comp has to be wrong does not mean that comp is in fact not wrong. The fact that it is unbelievable is not as persuasive as the numerous specific examples where our expectations from comp do not match, and indeed are counter-factual. What is shocking and counter-intuitive is that the nature of consciousness is such that there is a very good reason why consciousness is forever incompatible with empirical evidence. Again, you talk like Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism (and a solipsist!), also a great guy in topology. Well, the easiest way to attribute a person to a machine (theaetetus) provides S4Grz, (the logic of []p p) which talks like Brouwer too, and identify somehow truth and knowledge, and makes consciousness out of any 3p description. Truth and knowledge, []p p...these things are meaningless to me. All I care about is what cares. Truth and knowledge care for nothing. I was beginning to suspect this. But then why still argue? Because consciousness is what cares. Truth or knowledge of consciousness only can make sense of this. Consciousness includes knowledge of itself by definition. No, that self-consciousness. That would be knowledge of the self. You don't need to know that you are 'you' to know that there is an experience 'here'. And you are right on this, again. It *is* a theorem of comp. I hope you try to follow the modal thread, as it will help you to put sense on that last sentence. But there is some amount of work to do, and you have to be willing to change your mode of arguing, going from your []p p to the usual scientific and 3p []p. I think that it's you who should try paddling away from the shallow waters of modal logic and truth and surf the big waves of sense. Why do you judge something shallow, and at the same time confess not studying this. It makes you look rather foolish, and wipe o I'm not trying to be an expert in sailing to China from Italy. I'm trying to show whoever is interested that there is another continent or two in the way. The other continents has been found, and you don't need to invoke sense other than at the metalevel. If not, what you do is the persisting hulman error to invoke God in science. It cannot work.It makes science into pseudo-religion. It has nothing to do with God or religion for me. I said that your use of sense is like the use of god, in the gap-god type of explanation. You use sense to forbid the study of some theory. You justify don't ask by invoking a private feature. I don't forbid the study of anything. I applaud AI research, including Strong AI Singularity variety. I'm not one of those who sees interviews with Kurzweil or Moravec (who I met once, btw), and says 'Deluded fools'. To the contrary, I think it's a little sad maybe that they will probably not see their ideas fulfilled, but as long as they are not demanding people to say Yes to the doctor, I have no problem. My problem is if we want to discover the deep truth about awareness, we need the most perfect form of what I call a philosophical vacuum to begin with. We
Re: Video of VCR
Continued... On Saturday, March 22, 2014 4:54:41 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:43, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, March 21, 2014 4:44:20 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Mar 2014, at 02:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't think logic can study reality, only truncated maps of maps of reality. Whatever is reality, it might not depend on what you think it is, or is not. Of course, but it might not depend on logic or computation either. I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of faith, and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the empirical evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would dare to defend the study of comp. It *is* socking and counter-intuitive. It's not shocking at all to me. For me it's old news. Not to me, and I don't take anything for granted. I assume comp, and this includes elementary arithmetic, enough to explain Church's thesis. I don't take arithmetic for granted. Then you have no tools to assert non-comp. Why not? I assert sense. Computation need not even exist in theory. Computation arises intentionally as an organizational feature - just as it does on Earth: to keep track of things and events. Question begging. If an explanation falls out of the hypothesis, why is it question begging? What is shocking and counter-intuitive is that the nature of consciousness is such that there is a very good reason why consciousness is forever incompatible with empirical evidence. Again, you talk like Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism (and a solipsist!), also a great guy in topology. Well, the easiest way to attribute a person to a machine (theaetetus) provides S4Grz, (the logic of []p p) which talks like Brouwer too, and identify somehow truth and knowledge, and makes consciousness out of any 3p description. Truth and knowledge, []p p...these things are meaningless to me. All I care about is what cares. Truth and knowledge care for nothing. I was beginning to suspect this. But then why still argue? Because consciousness is what cares. Truth or knowledge of consciousness only can make sense of this. Consciousness includes knowledge of itself by definition. And you are right on this, again. It *is* a theorem of comp. I hope you try to follow the modal thread, as it will help you to put sense on that last sentence. But there is some amount of work to do, and you have to be willing to change your mode of arguing, going from your []p p to the usual scientific and 3p []p. I think that it's you who should try paddling away from the shallow waters of modal logic and truth and surf the big waves of sense. Why do you judge something shallow, and at the same time confess not studying this. It makes you look rather foolish, and wipe o I'm not trying to be an expert in sailing to China from Italy. I'm trying to show whoever is interested that there is another continent or two in the way. The other continents has been found, and you don't need to invoke sense other than at the metalevel. If not, what you do is the persisting hulman error to invoke God in science. It cannot work.It makes science into pseudo-religion. It has nothing to do with God or religion for me. It's about grounding physics and mathematics in aesthetic sense. This does help explain ideas of God and religion, but that is completely optional. I find your fear and prejudice toward this possibility interesting. Craig Bruno Craig ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Modality Independence
On Friday, March 21, 2014 1:04:46 PM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: On Thursday, March 20, 2014 8:48:30 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, March 20, 2014 1:01:43 PM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: On Thursday, March 20, 2014 11:16:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, March 20, 2014 11:09:39 AM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: It formed increasingly high-level associations between bundles of sensory data, eventually also combining sounds and vocal behavior into those associations. There's nothing obviously intractable about describing such data input and analysis in computational terms. If that were true, the oldest words would describe things like danger or food, but they don't. They are concepts like I, who, two, three and five ( http://media.tumblr.com/8b5d411063f5291737c4a36681474205/tumblr_inline_mmrdbhECQY1qz4rgp.png ) BTW, that chart is about the most-conserved words in the Indo-European family of languages. It says nothing either way about what the earliest words were. Most conserved = earliest words that are still in use. Indeed, but that doesn't rescue the original point. The earliest words still in use today don't tell us what the earliest words were. Right, but it can still tell us something about how communication progresses. Computationalism need not have anything to do with the brain. It's about consciousness arising from computation, i.e., it supports strong AI, which would not be about brains. Ah, that's an important comment. You are indeed talking about a specific kind of CTM that wasn't clear to me. Thanks for clarifying. The usual sense of CTM is that consciousness is literally computation, not that it arises from computation. Either way, we would not expect computations to emerge as modality-dependent. The brain doesn't figure into this at all. My point was that if consciousness is computation, and qualia are just complex computational labels, then we should expect languages to develop from simple, modal-independent forms to modal-dependent forms in which computations become so diversified that the lose any common vocabulary. Would you agree that this is precisely the opposite of what is seen in nature? Yes, I still agree about how we observe language to form. It's just that your characterization of CTM as making the predictions you mention is wrong. It only makes those predictions when supplemented with additional assumptions that are not generally part of CTM. I'm not so much interested in defining CTM, as in exploding the assumptions from which CTM and other mechanistic, information-theoretical models of consciousness arise. They don't reduce to a binary code like we would expect them to in CTM. That is not a prediction of CTM. Here's a relevant quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Turing himself seems to have been of the opinion that a machine operating in this way would literally be doing the same things that the human performing computations is doing—that it would be 'duplicating' what the human computer does. But other writers have suggested that what the computer does is merely a 'simulation' of what the human computer does: a reproduction of human-level performance, perhaps through a set of steps that is [at] some level isomorphic to those the human undertakes, but not in such a fashion as to constitute doing the same thing in all relevant respects. Again, either way the development of modality-dependence in non-humans and modality-independence in humans does not support the idea that consciousness is driven by logic and computation. That is clearly a more recent development. In the same way, any instance of computation we can find can be reduced to a deeper level of sensory-motive interaction. Craig -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Modality Independence
On Friday, March 21, 2014 2:11:17 PM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: On Friday, March 21, 2014 12:42:13 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm not so much interested in defining CTM, as in exploding the assumptions from which CTM and other mechanistic, information-theoretical models of consciousness arise. OK. Would you mind defining which assumptions you're thinking of? The assumptions that forms and functions can exist independently of perception and participation. They don't reduce to a binary code like we would expect them to in CTM. That is not a prediction of CTM. Here's a relevant quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Turing himself seems to have been of the opinion that a machine operating in this way would literally be doing the same things that the human performing computations is doing—that it would be 'duplicating' what the human computer does. But other writers have suggested that what the computer does is merely a 'simulation' of what the human computer does: a reproduction of human-level performance, perhaps through a set of steps that is [at] some level isomorphic to those the human undertakes, but not in such a fashion as to constitute doing the same thing in all relevant respects. Again, either way the development of modality-dependence in non-humans and modality-independence in humans does not support the idea that consciousness is driven by logic and computation. Right, modality (in)dependent communication neither supports nor opposes the idea that consciousness is computation. No, the fact that modality independent communication does not appear until human experience does oppose the idea that consciousness is computation, since computation is by definition modality independent. In CTM, brains doing modality-dependent computations would have minds experiencing sense-data qualia, and brains doing modality-independent computations would have minds experiencing abstract qualia. Argh, CTM has nothing to do with brains. That would be a BTM. Craig -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Modality Independence
On Thursday, March 20, 2014 12:05:08 AM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 20 March 2014 15:25, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: It means that birds squawk because they like the feeling and sound of it. The intention of using the squawking to convey information is optional and evolves much later. As stated, that strikes me as unlikely, because simply squawking for the hell of it is liable to get you eaten, or to give away your location to your prey. So it carries a negative evolutionary cost (so to squawk) and seems unlikely to have evolved *just *because birds enjoy doing it. Not necessarily. If the other birds like the squawking also, they may stick around and their collective squawking may drive away predators, or make them more confident and vigilant. The squawking may invigorate the birds (after all, roosters have been used as something of a natural alarm clock for humans). I challenge anyone to come up with one of these just-so stories about evolution that cannot be negated by an equally likely counter-narrative. Without knowing the totality of the environment, exterior and interior, past and future, there is really no way to falsify any hypothesis about behaviors that involve subjectivity. For purely morphological phenomena, purely evolutionary explanations work well, but there is nothing scientific in my view about presuming that life is essentially about survival and work. The universe is primarily decorative IMO. It's about play. The work is in the service of more interesting play. However, that having been said, it *also* seems very unlikely to me that squawking appeared because it was useful for communication. Because it wouldn't have been, to start with - noises can only convey information once someone else knows what they mean - and of course, evolution can't look ahead to see that something might come in useful in 100 generations time. Yes, exactly. It seems most likely to me that certain sounds just tend to accompany certain physical actions or emotional states (or both) as a by-product, Emergence and by-products are Santa Claus to me. The universe is a by-product of the unknown to begin with. and that for some of these noises there isn't any evolutionary pressure to keep them quiet (as there would be, say, to stop a bird of prey shrieking with joy when it sees a potential dinner scampering across the grass below). So most noises made by animals would start as spandrels - by-products of existence with no significance. The concept of spandrels only makes sense if there is some compelling reason to expect that some mutation had some initial reason for propagating that is no longer relevant, but in cases like these, when we are really talking about the entire animal kingdom's desire to gesture and make noises, I think it's wayy too convenient of an explanation. Some noises would, in fact, have an evolutionary cost, and hence selection pressure would tend to suppress them. This has happened to cats, for example, for various movements accompanying hunting. Others might be useful for panicking prey or letting you locate other members of your species, even if they didn't convey any information except I'm here! And some would be evolutionarily neutral, so evolving a method of keeping them quiet would be more trouble than it was worth from the viewpoint of a selfish gene But given that such noises existed, over time they might come to be recognised by other members of the same species as denoting certain things - hence members of the species realised they could get useful information from some noise their species made (or their genes did, at least). I doubt it. Useful information is overrated. *It is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury signifying nothing.* Life is experience, not information. Once that happened, the information content of the noise would be able to co-evolve with the ability to detect and understand it, and once that process started, it could branch out into unexpected side-alleys - mating cries, warning cries, and even in our case a full-blown language. We use language to convey information, information would not need anything else to convey itself. How could it? We are real, and our language is real, but the information that we convey through our language is only the relation between us, our experience, and our language. We are not part of information, information is a description of what we impart to each other. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d
Re: Modality Independence
On Thursday, March 20, 2014 11:09:39 AM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 9:25:44 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 10:06:37 PM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: But all the forms of language do share a common logical basis, according to many linguists. How is it relevant to the logic of a language that it can be expressed in different modalities? It's not relevant to the logic of the language, its relevant to the overall nature of language. If language were logical, then they would be universally modality-independent, but what the evidence seems to indicate is that pure logic or information is not the relevant aspect in developing language. What matters is the aesthetic engagement. It's about touching and feeling, not knowing and believing. Why would a logical language have to modality-independent? Because the whole point of logic is to be modality independent.We use logic to program computers so that all of our computers can talk to each other. If we add a new kind of file for flavors, we don't need to change the language, only add a new piece of hardware to stimulate our taste buds or brain. My language developed, presumably, because my brain had sensory data and reward signals it could use to form associations between useful sensory coincidences. Can't your brain form associations between useful sensory coincidences without language? Think of your immune system for example. Hundreds of billions of cells making billions of new cells all the time...all coordinated and integrated to identify and neutralize pathogens. They presumably form useful and critically important associations, yet with no brain, and possibly no language. I think that the less we presume about the development of anything related to consciousness the better off we'll be. It formed increasingly high-level associations between bundles of sensory data, eventually also combining sounds and vocal behavior into those associations. There's nothing obviously intractable about describing such data input and analysis in computational terms. If that were true, the oldest words would describe things like danger or food, but they don't. They are concepts like I, who, two, three and five (http://media.tumblr.com/8b5d411063f5291737c4a36681474205/tumblr_inline_mmrdbhECQY1qz4rgp.png) I'm not saying that language isn't computational, I'm saying that for every animal except humans, the computational aspect is not primary. Since only humans have evolved to create an abstraction layer that cuts across aesthetic modalities, That appears untrue. I know birds, mammals, some molluscs, and some fish can reason abstractly about motor behaviors and achieve the same goal with very different kinds of motor behaviors. You'll have to argue with the Wiki about that... Animal communication systems routinely combine visible with audible properties and effects, but not one is modality independent. No vocally impaired whale, dolphin or songbird, for example, could express its song repertoire equally in visual display. Indeed, in the case of animal communication, message and modality are not capable of being disentangled. Whatever message is being conveyed stems from intrinsic properties of the signal. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origin_of_speech 'Intrinsic properties of the signal' = aesthetic texture. Craig Ah - You didn't specify at first that the abstraction layer had to be about communication. It looked like you were intending to make a general point about aesthetic modality and information content. As a general point it's untrue. Lots of animals reason abstractly in certain circumstances. But I could believe it's true or nearly true about communication. Sure, yeah I'm not saying that animals can't reason abstractly, I'm pointing out yet another example where the computationalist theory fails to match up with what it would predict. If we apply CTM to communications, we should expect all language to develop independent of modality and develop modal dependence through increasing layers of complexity. CTM demands that qualia is complex, not simple - that something like pain is not actually a feeling but in fact a tremendously complex computation that is labeled as a feeling by a complex computation (for no particular reason, other than labels could theoretically be feelings). There are some cases even then that, even if not strictly counterexamples, stretch the humans-only claim to the breaking, and lead me to be doubtful of it. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpTG3bgHLjk : dogs will communicate their desire for attention vocally and visually, depending on the situation https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0iGkpLq5L5Y : Koko the gorilla is controversially claimed to understand certain signs, images, and spoken words, and to produce signs and point to pictures
Re: Modality Independence
On Thursday, March 20, 2014 1:01:43 PM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: On Thursday, March 20, 2014 11:16:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, March 20, 2014 11:09:39 AM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: It formed increasingly high-level associations between bundles of sensory data, eventually also combining sounds and vocal behavior into those associations. There's nothing obviously intractable about describing such data input and analysis in computational terms. If that were true, the oldest words would describe things like danger or food, but they don't. They are concepts like I, who, two, three and five ( http://media.tumblr.com/8b5d411063f5291737c4a36681474205/tumblr_inline_mmrdbhECQY1qz4rgp.png ) BTW, that chart is about the most-conserved words in the Indo-European family of languages. It says nothing either way about what the earliest words were. Most conserved = earliest words that are still in use. Sure, yeah I'm not saying that animals can't reason abstractly, I'm pointing out yet another example where the computationalist theory fails to match up with what it would predict. If we apply CTM to communications, we should expect all language to develop independent of modality and develop modal dependence through increasing layers of complexity. CTM demands that qualia is complex, not simple - that something like pain is not actually a feeling but in fact a tremendously complex computation that is labeled as a feeling by a complex computation (for no particular reason, other than labels could theoretically be feelings). Pardon? The computational theory of mind is an attempt to explain what the mind is and how it relates to the brain. It doesn't make any predictions about how the brain should function unless you add a host of additional assumptions. To get to your prediction, you'd need CTM plus assumptions like these: * The mind-computation is fundamental and the brain is derivative of it. Computationalism need not have anything to do with the brain. It's about consciousness arising from computation, i.e., it supports strong AI, which would not be about brains. The brain is a physical reification of the mind-computation that fleshes out the mind-computation with somewhat arbitrary additional physical detail. * The mind-computation underlying the brain is an indepedent process from any computation underlying the brain's environment. The brain doesn't figure into this at all. My point was that if consciousness is computation, and qualia are just complex computational labels, then we should expect languages to develop from simple, modal-independent forms to modal-dependent forms in which computations become so diversified that the lose any common vocabulary. Would you agree that this is precisely the opposite of what is seen in nature? If we keep CTM but reject these assumptions, then we can't conclude that language should develop independently of modality But it doesn't. and develop it due to the outworking of the mind-computation adding increasing layers of complexity. If instead the mind-computation is derivative of the brain, as most advocates of CTM suppose, then the brain's development would constrain the computation, not the reverse. If the brain is constrained, even more reason to presume modality-independence from the start. If you don't have a lot of RAM, then your text is more likely to have fewer fonts, and the first digital systems have only a single font. What we see in nature is that everyone but us has lots of alphabets and fonts but they don't share a common logic. They don't reduce to a binary code like we would expect them to in CTM. If the mind-computation is embedded in a larger computation, say, of the universe, then there is no reason to expect it to develop independently. The reason is that computation is based on simple logical rules which are independent of complex labels that are supposed to be interpreted as qualia. All that is to say that I think you're using a very particular variation on CTM. Your conclusions are sensible regarding it, but they don't apply to CTM generally. I think that they apply to any philosophy or theory which is sympathetic to the idea that computation or information is more fundamental than qualia or consciousness Craig . -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 5:02:15 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2014, at 22:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:18:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to me. I say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold, mechanical, and that it is obvious that sophisticated technology can be developed that will make them seem less mechanical without actually feeling anything. Your response has been that I'm only looking at machines that exist now, not the more advanced versions. I see no significant between the two arguments, except that mine is facetious. You say that there is no reason why certain kinds of computations could not produce consciousness, and I say there is no reason why certain kinds of configurations of mirrors or cameras couldn't produce computation. You go from a mirror to a configuration of mirror. I discussed that case. I am comparing the argument against zombies in comp with your argument against the VCR. I see a double standard in comp which is very left wing in presuming equality with living creatures, ? The argument against zombies presume equality for equal behavior. Your theory single out the living. I don't single out the living, I discern between directly experienced histories and generic information. Our histories just so happen to follow the biologicalzoologicalanthropological branch, but I would not expect any kind of proprietary experience to be possible to emulate with generic information. but very right wing in presuming lower status for phenomena in which computation is not apparent. Behavior is not apparent. Why not? Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/bodies, or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is not what comp does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person, which own a body (well, infinitely many bodies). Then the explanatory gap is moved from mind/brain to person/computation, with no improvement on bridging it. On the contrary, computation handles both the first and third person reference and this by using only the existing standard definition (of knowledge, etc.). It lead to a mathematical theory of qualia, and of quanta, 100% precise and this testable, and indeed partially tested. You make affirmation just showing that you are not studying neither the posts nor the papers. The gap is still there. Math offers no first person theory of computation, nor third person theory of qualia, it only correlates the *idea* of first and third person perspectives (devoid of aesthetic content) with the idea of knowledge (again, semantically flattened into maps). Then by assuming sense, sorry, but that does just not make sense to me, unless you mean God, God has to make sense too. That is a reason more to not invoke sense in a scientific explanation. You just make your case worst. Science is tradition within sense. Sense is the reality. Your theory seems to be only an opinion that another theory is foolish. Not at all. My attack on CTM is only part of MSR because MSR seeks to pick up where CTM leaves off. The theory is about the relation of sense, information, and physics, and about the spectrum of sense, not just about pointing out the mistake of comp. But you did not succeed in showing where CTM leaves of. You just beg the question, or play with words. CTM leaves off in failing to account for the presence of aesthetic qualities. It provides for no presence, no motivation, no proprietary novelty, etc. It takes sense for granted and mistakes its own shadow for the truth. You seem unable to doubt, as I have shown the remarkable coherence, with respect to comp, of your phenomenology, with the one made by the first person associated naturally to the machine, by applying the oldest definition of knowledge to machines, and it works thanks to a remarkable, and non obvious double phenomena: incompleteness and machine's understanding of incompleteness. This is one of your points that I find the most flawed, and I have explained why many times. If we are both machines under comp, how can you say that my view is consistent with the stereotypical machine views if your view is not? By the tension between []p and []p p. It explains why the comp truth is counter-intuitive fpr the machine. If we have opposite intuitions, and we are both machines, how can you claim that comp would be counter-intuitive to one of us and not the other? You would have to be placing yourself above me arbitrarily No, I have just to assume comp. But if comp is counter-intuitive to me, then it must be counter-intuitive to you - but clearly it is not counter-intuitive to you because you are able to assume comp. You are calling on a super-intuitive
Modality Independence
Another knife in the heart of CTM, IMO... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origin_of_speech A striking feature of language is that it is modality-independent. Should an impaired child be prevented from hearing or producing sound, its innate capacity to master a language may equally find expression in signing [...] This feature is extraordinary. Animal communication systems routinely combine visible with audible properties and effects, but not one is modality independent. No vocally impaired whale, dolphin or songbird, for example, could express its song repertoire equally in visual display. This would be hard to explain if consciousness were due to information processing, as we would expect all communication to share a common logical basis. The fact that only human language is modality invariant suggests that communication, as an expression of consciousness is local to aesthetic textures rather than information-theoretic configurations. Since only humans have evolved to create an abstraction layer that cuts across aesthetic modalities, it would appear that between aesthetic modality and information content, aesthetic modality is the more fundamental and natural phenomenon. Information is derived from conscious presentation, not the other way around. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Modality Independence
On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 10:06:37 PM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 8:24:33 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: Another knife in the heart of CTM, IMO... It took several minutes of Googling to find a plausible expansion of CTM, at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/ . I guess objectively that's hardly any work at all compared to what would have been needed in the past, but in the modern world it feels like that makes CTM incredibly cryptic. :D http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origin_of_speech A striking feature of language is that it is modality-independent. Should an impaired child be prevented from hearing or producing sound, its innate capacity to master a language may equally find expression in signing [...] This feature is extraordinary. Animal communication systems routinely combine visible with audible properties and effects, but not one is modality independent. No vocally impaired whale, dolphin or songbird, for example, could express its song repertoire equally in visual display. This would be hard to explain if consciousness were due to information processing, as we would expect all communication to share a common logical basis. But all the forms of language do share a common logical basis, according to many linguists. How is it relevant to the logic of a language that it can be expressed in different modalities? It's not relevant to the logic of the language, its relevant to the overall nature of language. If language were logical, then they would be universally modality-independent, but what the evidence seems to indicate is that pure logic or information is not the relevant aspect in developing language. What matters is the aesthetic engagement. It's about touching and feeling, not knowing and believing. The fact that only human language is modality invariant suggests that communication, as an expression of consciousness is local to aesthetic textures rather than information-theoretic configurations. local to aesthetic textures ... -- would you mind recasting the sentence into more concrete terms? I haven't the foggiest idea what you're trying to communicate. It means that birds squawk because they like the feeling and sound of it. The intention of using the squawking to convey information is optional and evolves much later. Since only humans have evolved to create an abstraction layer that cuts across aesthetic modalities, That appears untrue. I know birds, mammals, some molluscs, and some fish can reason abstractly about motor behaviors and achieve the same goal with very different kinds of motor behaviors. You'll have to argue with the Wiki about that... Animal communication systems routinely combine visible with audible properties and effects, but not one is modality independent. No vocally impaired whale, dolphin or songbird, for example, could express its song repertoire equally in visual display. Indeed, in the case of animal communication, message and modality are not capable of being disentangled. Whatever message is being conveyed stems from intrinsic properties of the signal. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origin_of_speech 'Intrinsic properties of the signal' = aesthetic texture. Craig -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Monday, March 17, 2014 12:19:23 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 19:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 12:05:50 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:52, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:41:30 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 05:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness? It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why your eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness? The mirror does not compute. How do you know you're not being racist against mirrors? Did I ever say something bad about mirror? You're saying they don't compute. Nice you defend this as a compliment! Just as I say your sun in law doesn't appreciate the flavor of food. The difference is that my sun in law pretend to appreciate food. The mirror does not pretend to compute. Why not? Any computation which can be output optically can be mirrored. There could be a Turing test in which any computation seen in a mirror that cannot be distinguished from a backward computation on a screen must be considered good enough. The expression a mirror compute does not make much sense. There is category error here. We can make too much sense of such expression. I don't think it is any more of a category error made by comp in attributing feelings to behaviors. Anyways, my example is not a mirror, it is a VCR+camera, as seen in the video. In the video, we see the tape responding visibly to each intrusion on it's 'computation'. If you had a virtual machine that responded in that same way to environmental conditions, would you not say that is evidence of computationalism? I have no clue they are intensional agent, but if they ask I will oblige. If you hold up a sign that says 'I am an intensional agent' in backward letters, you will see that they turn them around so you can see what they are. Mirror will also evolves, and the intelligent digital mirror can anticipate on you, or show you with another cut, or some brain scan. You know that I assume comp, so it should just be obvious to you that mirror have not the ability of universal computation. I thought that you are agnostic about comp. ? Yes, that is why I make clear that I assume it. It is my working theory. I am agnostic indeed. If someone said that they were agnostic about God, would I be wrong in thinking that they do *not* assume God's presence or absence? To say that you assume comp and are agnostic about it would seem to be a contradiction. How do you know that the mirror doesn't have the ability of universal computation though? That expression does not make sense. Suppose I say that mirrors work because they simulate optical environments, and are in fact universal machines...but again, this 'mirror' example is a straw man. The example I'm working with is the VCR+camera. Maybe they are just very shy about it? Maybe the mirrors of today are just babies? Your analogy flirts with the ridiculous. I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to me. I say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold, mechanical, and that it is obvious that sophisticated technology can be developed that will make them seem less mechanical without actually feeling anything. Your response has been that I'm only looking at machines that exist now, not the more advanced versions. I see no significant between the two arguments, except that mine is facetious. You say that there is no reason why certain kinds of computations could not produce consciousness, and I say there is no reason why certain kinds of configurations of mirrors or cameras couldn't produce computation. Even the Dx = Fxx method alone, seen as a control structure, alone, or even some generalization of it, are not Turing universal. Consciousness is the attribute to the first person, it is phenomenal, and there is nothing in a mirror which a priori invites us to such an attribution. The VCR+camera do invite such an attribution though. I tend currently to attribute consciousness at the Turing complete level, and self-consciousness at the Gödel-Löbian one, like when a K4 reasoner becomes when he visits the Knave Knight Island, or when a universal Turing machine develops beliefs in enough induction axioms. Now, if your theory attributes consciousness to a mirror, and not to my sun in law, it will look even less convincing to me, Craig. I don't attribute consciousness to either one, I present the VCR example as a reductio ad absurdum against comp. Straw man. I don't think that it is. It seems to me a particularly equivalent example. If you
Re: Video of VCR
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 12:37:39 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 14:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:40:49 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Mar 2014, at 23:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? The computational reason is that there is no computation at all there. There is no self-representation, no introspection in the computer science theoretical sense. How do you know though? I don't know. I assume it. Then try not assuming it? This is the same argument that I give for machines, except I am saying that there is no introspection in the sense of aesthetic phenomenal sense. Where you confuse []p and []p p. Before Gödel, it was thought they would obey the same logic, when the machine is correct. But after Gödel, we know that they obey different logic, even when the machine is always correct. The aesthetics phenomenal sense comes from the machine keeping its umbilical chord with truth, which is natural for her to do, as it exists, even if relatively. I'm fine with an umbilical cord with truth, but why would there be any aesthetic phenomena or sense associated with it? I can see why sense would invent truth, but I cannot see why or how truth would invent sense. Maybe the VCR is just very young compared to the machines that you are used to considering as capable of self-representation - indeed the jumpy screen artifacts correlate perfectly with the events that are impacting the VCR's body. Notice how each operation performed on the 'VCS' (VCR + Camera System) generates a unique vocabulary of responses on the screen. Why not assume that these are intelligent cries which reflect specific mechanical emotions. If we reproduced the experiment on a variety of similar devices, we could probably deduce a mathematical schema - a language through which VCS' talk about themselves and their environment. We could interview them and see whether they follow computationalist expectations for UMs or LUMs. OK, but why would they not. You speculate on some analog machines, and you speculate on an analog theory of mind. That might be more interesting than assuming sense. You would make a theory of sense from a non comp theory of machines. Go for it. I present it only as a counter-example. I don't think that there is any sense there on that level. It's an example of how low level continuity across microphenomenal coincidence can be misattributed as having high level, phenomenal significance. There is an interesting analogy, as the computational self-reference leads to similar fixed points, but the analogy stops there. The VCR is like a mirror, with some dynamical delay similar to a computer self-reference, but it lacks the computations. Simply. I think that you would have to be telepathic to say with certainty that it lacks computations, just as I would have to be telepathic to 'know' that a machine is not a p-zombie. Oh, but if there are computations, I apologize. just show them to me. That's like me saying show me the flavor of strawberry that the machine tastes. The whole point is that there is a sub-computational level which can't be detected by computation, but which is responsible for computation. Keep in mind that with comp, a material object like a mirror does not really exist, it is a map of your most probable future experience among infinitely many: it is a wave of possible computations (arithmetical relations, in our base). It is a common and sharable *experience*. I don't think it needs to be an experience to compute though. In real life it does need to be an experience, because I think that it is the experience which underlies all computation and arithmetic rather than the other way around. In the hypothetical universe of comp though, I see no place for 'experience' at all. Computations within comp need not be felt or seen, only stored and processed. Your argument is that the VCS is a an m-zombie. A mechanical zombie which only seems to respond to its own condition as if it were a machine's 1p. By definition, a zombie acts like you and me. The mirror does not act like you and me. We're talking about the VCS though, not a mirror. As you can see in the video, it does indeed act like you and me, squealing and squirming when we treat it harshly. My sun in law does. He can discuss with you on consciousness, zombie, mind, brain, philosophy and also gastronomy, he works himself as a chef, actually. He makes money with his nose. We might think he can discuss it, but he may just be imitating the deep syntax of data he knows nothing about. His discussion
Re: Quick video about materialism
On Monday, March 17, 2014 12:58:44 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 23:14, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 4:38:42 PM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Sun, Mar 16, 2014 at 9:08 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:26:46 PM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: At this point my impression is: with a bucket so personalized and leaky, I can see how everything just goes in MSR, as long as Craig says so. For that reason I've taken MSR in the other thread and just filled it arbitrarily with my own primitives. You weren't amused because you thought I was selling you nonsense; so you didn't even reply. Perhaps you can relate to how I feel with many of your statements on MSR, then. If you don't like what I write, and how I write it, I suggest you follow my example and ignore it. That you ignore what and how you write is indeed becoming increasingly clear. Why others should care or read it becomes murkier though. I already stated I find your thoughts to be inspiring on many levels, in many ways. Just not the first level. Plugging sense into sense, relations into relations, without specifying some object seems empty to me, or at least so complex, that I couldn't wrap my head around it in a hundred lives. I hope you find something that clarifies this. If dreams don't require objects that are real outside of the dream experience, why should the universe? Yes, indeed, why? Good point. Objects require an experience which defines them as objects, Why? I mean that is not necessary, a priori. Not logically, but empirically, if objects could simply exist without needing to be experienced or detected, then why have experience or detection? Our body would know about its environment in the same way that any other object would interact with its environment...unconsciously, and objectively. but experiences do not, in theory, require anything to define them. I don't think the experiences themselves can even be defined. I agree. What is already 'plain' cannot be ex-plained, nor does it need to be. They can be shared when they have enough 3p features in common, like the Madeleine of Proust effect. Poets and novelists exploit that, but it is an unending exploration. With comp, of course, experiences requires subject, that is person, and person requires bodies/beliefs when getting a life, with deep scenarios (deep = necessitates long computations). With the comp supervenience thesis, one first person experience supervenes on an infinity of relative computational states. It isn't clear though why experiences on the personal level require persons, but interaction on the computational level do not require sub-personal experiences. It seems to me that arithmetic itself is a machine, and one which cannot explain itself. Craig Bruno Craig PGC Craig PGC Craig PGC You can't strike gold if sense contradicts its existence. PGC Contradiction requires sense to 'exist'. Craig Craig Craig I'll now watch the clip you posted! Kim Kim Jones B. Mus. GDTL Email: kimj...@ozemail.com.au kmjc...@icloud.com Mobile: 0450 963 719 Phone: 02 93894239 Web: http://www.eportfolio.kmjcommp.com *Never let your schooling get in the way of your education - Mark Twain* -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group /everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com
Re: Video of VCR
On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:17:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote: If someone said that they were agnostic about God, would I be wrong in thinking that they do *not* assume God's presence or absence? To say that you assume comp and are agnostic about it would seem to be a contradiction. You have a lot of things to learn. That seems like an odd response to what I see as a fairly uncontroversial assertion. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:31:32 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2014, at 18:11, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't think it needs to be an experience to compute though. In real life it does need to be an experience, because I think that it is the experience which underlies all computation and arithmetic rather than the other way around. In the hypothetical universe of comp though, I see no place for 'experience' at all. Computations within comp need not be felt or seen, only stored and processed. Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/bodies, or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is not what comp does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person, which own a body (well, infinitely many bodies). Then the explanatory gap is moved from mind/brain to person/computation, with no improvement on bridging it. Then by assuming sense, sorry, but that does just not make sense to me, unless you mean God, God has to make sense too. but then you are not doing a theory, and if your god does not allow my sun in law to play genuinely his role in the spectacle, I am not sure I can discuss this anymore. His genuine role is not in the spectacle, it is in the intangible processing of meaningless data. Your theory seems to be only an opinion that another theory is foolish. Not at all. My attack on CTM is only part of MSR because MSR seeks to pick up where CTM leaves off. The theory is about the relation of sense, information, and physics, and about the spectrum of sense, not just about pointing out the mistake of comp. You seem unable to doubt, as I have shown the remarkable coherence, with respect to comp, of your phenomenology, with the one made by the first person associated naturally to the machine, by applying the oldest definition of knowledge to machines, and it works thanks to a remarkable, and non obvious double phenomena: incompleteness and machine's understanding of incompleteness. This is one of your points that I find the most flawed, and I have explained why many times. If we are both machines under comp, how can you say that my view is consistent with the stereotypical machine views if your view is not? You would have to be placing yourself above me arbitrarily and escaping your own 1p machine nature somehow. Why doesn't Bruno machine succumb to incompleteness and his understanding of incompleteness? Anyway, I have not seen any theory, nor valid argument. Sorry. Maybe that's what 1p machines say when they are infected with the comp virus ;) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
